Political Science 14 FINAL
realist explanation for democratic peace
Realists strongly discount the idea that domestic variables matter Instead, dem peace is caused by 20th century coincidence of democracies having common enemies But the evidence is against them Common enemy was fascists and then it was communists Democratic peace is because of the common enemy Finds that there is democratic peace, but from 1816-1900 there is not a statistically significant democracy effect Only find a statistically significant result from 1950-1990 No evidence after the cold war
how is private information and bargaining related to civil wars?
Rebels and government suffer from the same difficulties as official states with respect to revealing private information about: Battle plans and war strategies Resolve about the conflict Sources of External Support
why do small groups have such a large influence?
Specific Benefits ---Economic actors might bribe corrupt leaders &/or make campaign contributions to "honest" ones ---Ethnic lobbies can "turn out the vote" The Logic of Collective Action ---If the outcome of interest is a public good, each group member has an incentive to "free ride" ---In small groups, free riding can be observed and prevented
bargaining failure due to incomplete information
States A and B have private information about their resolve in the crisis, their war-fighting strategy, the quality of their armies, etc. This private info can lead them to have inconsistent views of the bargaining space. Why don't A & B tell each other their private info so as to harmonize expectations and avoid war?
Non-State wars
- also a COW dataset and occur when: neither participant is an official state at least 1000 fatalities occur generates a list of 62 wars since 1816 and most are fought between non-state entities in non-state territories
conclusions about democratic peace
The democratic peace is a very robust empirical relationship But, until we figure out a good critical test we cannot really differentiate between the competing theories My favorites are the strategic arguments
how are bargaining and alliances related?
The formation of an alliance can deter war if it convinces a would-be attacker it will lose any war it starts against an alliance member. See Figure in powerpoint How can the allies make their alliance credible? Why would State B believe C will risk all the costs of war to help A?
conclusion about peacekeeping
The international community seems to have decided that Peacekeeping Operations are a good thing The evidence suggests that is true Expect to see more and more, perhaps increasingly from regional IGOs as well as from the UN and NATO. Peacekeeping is a fine example of institutional constraints inhibiting return to war (liberalism)
bargaining range
bar is all of the possible outcomes that we could have how to divide the territory between them? A's benefit from war is offset by the war costs
asymmetric alliances
between a strong and weak power weak power gets security and strong power gets concessions
symmetric alliance
between two major powers and can bring greater security
why is commitment hard to communicate?
carrying through on threats is costly shared interest in avoiding war coincides with private interest to get a better bargain
casualty-level definition of war
correlates of War (COW) project defines war as: between 2 states features governmentally-sanctioned, sustained combat at least 1000 battle fatalities (not civilian) at least 100 per states, or 1000 troops in area generates a list of 95 wars since 1816-2010
types of alliances
defense pacts: B promises to aid C if there is a war neutrality/nonaggression pacts: B promises to remain neutral if C is attacked/or promises to not attack C ententes: B promises to consult with C if there is war
traditional peacekeeping
deployment of military units, usually to establish a buffer zone and disarm combatants
dilemma about alliance credibility
dilemma is to achieve a credible alliance but don't want to create a moral hazard, so alliances are rarely unconditional
joint decision making problems
how will all the CS org members agree which state is the aggressor? (credibility problem) how will all the CS org members agree what is the right punishment for the aggressor?
multidimensional peacekeeping
implement a comprehensive negotiated settlement involving reconstruction of society, economy, and political system
why do rally effects work?
in group/out group and muting of domestic opposition divert attention from domestic woes scapegoating
what makes alliances not credible?
increasing costs of NOT fighting reputational costs: honor, prestige formerly royal weddings
alliances
institutions that help their members cooperate militarily in the event of war
what is needed for the power transition theory?
international hierarchy with one dominant power international status quo: political, military, economic institutions governing, and the general orientation of, the international system conditional anarchy demography + political capacity = power parity and war rather than preponderance and war -- contrary to balance of power theory
collective security dilemmas
joint decision making problems and collective action problems
what indicators make alliances more likely?
jointly democratic same religion same language common enemy
what do domestic actors want when it comes to bargainin?
leaders: retention of office bureaucracy/interest groups -- share of budget/impact general public -- good governance
peace enforcement
military intervention sanctioned by UN, designed to impose public order by force with or without consent of hosts
war as coercive bargaining
- war is a conflict over things states value such as territory, policies, and regime type - threats to use force to resolve crises are efforts by states to convince each other that the reversion point (non-agreement) is costly - there always exist bargains that could prevent wars. why states fail to perceive these bargains is the main cause of war according to the bargaining approach - the bargains would have higher utility than war, so we assume that states are rational actors and will respond to incentives but something stops them from agreeing on a bargain
monitoring or observer mission
monitor a truce or help negotiate a peace treaty
types of peacekeeping missions
monitoring or observer mission, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement
is power transition theory a realist theory?
no because the status quo evaluations create "conditional anarchy"
collective action problem
peace/stability is a collective good all members of the CS org have incentives to free-ride and let others pay to punish the aggressor (credibility problem again)
defense
policies to make attack likely to fail
deterrence
policies to make attack to costly to occur, mutually assured destruction, based on the secure 2nd strike, is the ultimate deterrence policy
arms control
policies to reduce arsenals and to stop proliferation
what indicators make alliances less likely?
polity differences past conflict distance between
three mechanisms that explain why bargaining fail
private information + incentives to misrepresent commitment problems indivisibility (rarely happens)
what is the problem with legal definitions of war?
since the creation of the UN, no states declare war against each other anymore
proliferation
spread of weapons to additional states
bargaining over sources of future bargaining power
strategically important pieces of territory (Golan Heights) development of weapons systems (Iranian nuclear weapons program) in both of these instances, concessions A gave to B to get the territory/weapons system could be demanded back by a now-more-powerful A so B can't give in the first place
bargaining range with status quo
study powerpoint
Correlates of War definition of alliances:
there must be a formal, ratified treaty between two or more system members about war behavior 332 alliances in last COW update
why would great powers like collective security?
they are generally able to defend themselves, so they do not enjoy special benefits, yet since they are usually the aggressors, they are constrained by a collective security system
why do small states like collective security?
they tend not to have aggressive intentions but suffer from attacks by more powerful states
goal of alliances
to prevent war and a secondary goal is to win war in the event that the primary goal is not achieved
legal defintion of war
war is observed when states make legal declarations of war against each other
three categories of commitment problems
when the bargain is over a source of future bargaining power war in response to changing power war in response to 1st strike advantages
are wars rare?
yes, extremely
what does the definition of war not include?
-Rules out spontaneous, disorganized violence -Distinguishes war from one-sided mass killing -Excludes cases of low level military force
diversionary evidence
Anecdotes: Falklands War, Russo-Japanese War, Clinton's Missile Strikes on Iraq (1998) Cross-National Studies: No consistent findings Diversions by Americans: When US Presidents suffer decline in support of partisans, p(MID) increases substantially. Anecdotes not wrong, but the evidence is clearly not systematic. Why?
democratic peace
Arises from a claim that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other. Is the generally accepted finding that war, and lower-level violence too, is particularly rare among democracies Even though democracies are just as war-prone as are non-democracies
moral hazard and alliances
B reverse credibility problem arises if A thinks C will help it regardless of how reckless its foreign policies become. Moral Hazard arises when guarantees of assistance produce reckless behavior by the guaranteed state. The guarantor ally faces a dilemma because it wants to help A but does not want A to become reckless.
how are there commitment problems when it comes to civil war bargaining?
Changes in relative power are frequent due to economic downturns. Bad economy lowers tax receipts and increases domestic discontent These make rebellion easier to organize, which makes government eager to offer concession But after the economy improves, the now-stronger government can renege on the agreed concessions Negotiated settlements require rebel disarmament, but if the rebels disarm, the government can renege on agreements
collective security conclusions
Collective Security is: "a generalized notion of all nations banding together in undertaking a vague obligation to perform unspecified actions in response to hypothetical events brought on by some unidentifiable state." (Inis Claude, 1962) And yet, Collective Security is the logical underpinning of the United Nations system.
defining democracy
Conceptually should include: Fair elections, regularly held w/large franchise Guarantees of civil liberties Constraints on executive authority
are alliances credible?
Conventional Wisdom holds that allies often fail to honor their commitments (scraps of paper) In a study of 177 "alliance honoring opportunities", allies: Fought alongside their allies 27% of the time Remained neutral 61% of the time Actively fought their own ally 12% of the time! Better results suggest 75% of time Allies fulfill the specific provisions of their alliances if war comes.
what makes alliances credible?
Decreasing the Costs of Fighting Joint military planning Joint military exercises Stationing troops on each others' soil
bargaining explanation for the democratic peace
Democracies operate very transparently So there is far less uncertainty about them Democratic leaders cannot hide statements So they can "tie their hands" and credibly signal private info kenneth schultz
strategic arguments for the democratic peace
Democracies tend to win the wars they fight So, if two democracies were to fight each other, it'd be nasty Democratic leaders are punished for losing So two democracies could only fight if both expected to win david lake and bruce bueno de mesquita
history of peacekeeping
During the Cold War (1945-1989): 18 Peacekeeping Missions (8 for civil wars) Africa: 3; Asia: 4; Europe: 1; Latin America:2; Middle East:8 After the Cold War (1990-on): 44 Peacekeeping Missions (33 for Civil Wars) Africa: 22; Asia: 6; Europe: 8; Latin America:7; Middle East:1 (but 3 ME missions continue from Cold War) Longest = UN Truce Supervision Org (1948-on) Shortest = UN Observer Group in Lebanon (1958)
ethnic lobbies/groups and war
Ex: The Israel Lobby and US Policy toward all Middle Eastern politics Ex: The Cuban-American lobby in Miami and relations with Cuba These groups often have very strong opinions about the issue(s), while the general population does not
evidence about nuclear deterrence
Fortunately, we cannot directly test MAD logic, b/c there is no war among nuclear states BUT, we can evaluate other implications Jacek Kugler evaluated 9 "extreme crises" pitting a nuclear-armed state against a non-nuclear, or clearly weaker, nuclear-armed state Nuclear-armed state "won" in only 3 of them! 4 states have voluntarily liquidated their nuclear arsenals; another 5 have voluntarily abandoned efforts to develop nuclear weapons
how do rally effect create an incentive to divert and start a war?
Given rally effects, there is an incentive for leaders to start wars in order to improve their domestic standing (not just democracies) ----Gambling for Resurrection Might leaders prefer war to any negotiated settlement?
bureaucratic influence on war
Governments deal with very complicated matters (thousands of them) Consequently, they designate experts within each bureau to plan responses in the event of need. Standard Operating Procedures When a need/crisis arises, those experts implement their bureau's plan So Leaders turn to bureaus on purpose
examples of UN peacekeeping
Korean War 1950/53 - Peace enforcement Iraq 1990/1991 - Peace enforcement mission Rwanda 1993/1994 - Monitoring mission Bosnia 1992/1995; 1995/2004 - Peace enforcement, and then Peacekeeping "Quiet Successes": El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, latter Bosnia mission
evidence for a democratic peace
Large cross-national studies with: Varying case selection rules Varying definitions of democracy Varying definitions of conflict Varying statistical estimators Controls for: Contiguity, development, alliances, trade, international organizational memberships, past history, relative power, etc ad nauseam
intriligator and brito's model
Mathematical representation of the logic of Nuclear Deterrence; especially MAD Based on calculations about: Counterforce (destroy enemy missiles) and counter value (destroy enemy cities) capacity; rates of fire; acceptable fatalities; accuracy of targeting Equations calculate "reaction curves", values above/below which behavior differs study powerpoint
the military and war (dovish)
Military leaders personally know the costs of war and should be particularly loathe to put soldiers in harm's way unless absolutely necessary
nuclear history
Nuclear Armed States: USA (1945); USSR/Russia (1949); UK (1952); France (1960); PRC (1964); Israel (1966); India (1974); Pakistan (1998); North Korea (2006) Nuclear Weapons Treaties: SALT I/ABM (1972); Salt II (rejected when USSR invaded Afghanistan); START I (1991); New START (2010)
historical context of collective security
Original idea from Wilson's 14 Points Embodied in League of Nations in 1919 Idealistic effort to prevent something like World War I from ever occurring again War weariness replaces "Cult of the Offensive"
rally effects of war
People tend to become more supportive of their government when dramatic int'l events occur
COW definition of civil war
2 or more groups fighting w/in territory of a single state one belligerent is the government at least 1000 fatalities (military + civilian) generates a list of 334 civil wars, 1816-2010
COW's civil wars
2 or more groups fighting within the territory of a single state one belligerent is the government at least 1000 fatalities (military + civilian) generates a list of 334 civil wars, 1816-2007
commitment problems
A credible threat is a threat the recipient believes will be carried out. A credible commitment is a commitment or promise the recipient believes will be honored states may have complete information here, different from previous bargaining failure
civil war
A war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group.
war
A war is an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reaches a minimum threshold of severity
conclusions about interest groups and war
All these bureaucratic/interest group influences are represented in the bargaining framework by moving expected war outcome or costs around We lack any systematic evidence to suggest that war is regularly caused by interest groups ---Probably it is the case that for every special interest pleading for war, another pleads for peace
why enter into an alliance?
Alliances are the basic source of external power maximization - realist balance of power theories States have a stake in the outcome of the other countries' disputes.
do alliances promote war?
Alliances generate counter-alliances, triggering security dilemmas. Alliances expand wars by entangling allies that otherwise would have remained at peace ("chain gangs"). Example: World War I was strongly influenced by existing alliance arrangements.
collective security theory
An alliance of states promising to enforce peace by combined attack on any state that breaks the peace Organized, coordinated, deterrent/retaliatory military force Somewhat like realism, collective security theory (CS) assumes overwhelming retaliation is needed to deter would-be attackers In event of war, attacker horribly punished
strategic censoring problems with peacekeeping
If PKers only go to "easy" cases, is Fortna's conclusion right? She anticipated this, and has an earlier analysis of "which civil wars get PKers?" Victory↓PKers, Treaty↓PKers, and other variables like war costs, duration, lootable resources do not affect whether peacekeepers are sent So PKers are more likely in aftermath of "hard" wars, and strategic censoring is not happening
Why don't A & B tell each other their private info so as to harmonize expectations and avoid war?
If revealing their private info to the other would weaken their bargaining position, they may be better off fighting. Example: private info about battle plans. State A may lie to B about its resolve, to get B to make larger concessions. ----Incentives to Misrepresent can prevent A & B from telling each other the truth.
bargaining failure due to indivisibilty
If the good in contention cannot be divided in some way between the bargainers, then the bargaining range is empty. Examples: Temple Mount in Jerusalem, policies of genocide Importantly, there are still bargains, they just involve concessions on other issues.
the military and war (hawkish)
If there is war the military gets more $$$, more personnel, more influence, officers get battle experience required for promotion
strategic censoring problem when it comes to alliances and whether or not they are reliable
If you were thinking of attacking state A, would you be more likely to do so if: You thought State A's allies were not really committed to A? Or You thought State A's allies were fully committed to A? It is likely that when a state with allies is attacked, it is because the attacker doubts the commitment of that state's allies. Think NATO during the Cold War. Before we conclude alliances are only scraps of paper, let's remember all the alliances that were never tested b/c they deterred war altogether.
norms and structures explanation for the democratic peace
In democracies conflict is resolved non-violently So democratic leaders open with negotiation In democracies power is shared across parts of government So democracies are slow to get to war
economic interests and war
Industries should be particularly interested in foreign affairs if their profits come from overseas This should be true in democracies and autocracies
does peacekeeping help keep peace?
Is it worth it? 63 (62) missions; $54 billion; ~2600 dead For Interstate War ceasefires, presence of Peacekeepers ↓ p(war recurrence) 85% For Civil War ceasefires, presence of Peacekeepers ↓ p(war recurrence) 60% Peacekeeping is worth it Virginia Page Fortna
factors that make civil war more likely
Previous Civil War: recurrence is common Poverty: the higher a state's GDP per capita the lower the probability of Civil War Regime Type: the more democratic a state, the lower the probability of civil war Natural Resources: both conventional and lootable Insurgency Conditions: mountains, rainforests, split territory make civil war more likely
bargaining and collective security
Prospect of Retaliatory Coalition decreases value of war (expected "p" moves away from ideal point, and/or costs increase) Commitment Problems overcome by 3rd party guarantees (power shift okay if retaliatory coalition will punish aggression) Commitment Problems overcome because Peacekeepers/observers diminish 1st Strike advantage (pre-emptive war prevented
the powerful therefore satisfied problem
Q: If a dissatisfied state is rising in power such that it comes to equal the dominant power, why wouldn't it be satisfied? It got richer! -A: Expectations matter, if you think you could do better under a different SQ, you are likely to be dissatisfied.
prevention problem
Q: Why don't dominant powers wage preventive war against rising challengers? -A: Odd, but historically accurate in that preventive wars almost never happen. Likely b/c states recover from war reasonably quickly (20 yrs), so a series of wars would have to be fought to keep the rising challenger "down"
exceptions to the democratic peace
The War of 1812 The US Civil War World War I The Spanish-American War The Franco-Thai War of 1940 The Turkish-Cypriot War of 1974 The Kargil War
conclusions about alliances
There are a lot of theoretical arguments about alliances and war, and there are very good datasets about alliances. Whether alliances make war more/less likely depends on the type of alliance in question. Alliances probably make states a lot safer from being attacked, but proving that is complicated by strategic calculations of would-be attackers.
do alliances promote peace?
They can indicate what the retaliatory coalition would be, and thereby deter war. Moderate allies can constrain their more aggressive partners. They can mitigate concerns about power shifts if they are alliances of many members. Example: A firmer alliance in 1939 might have deterred Hitler.
league of nations success or failure?
US never joined, so League lacked clout The League Council (which authorized sanctions/force) required unanimity Early successes: post-WWI borders, Chaco War, mandates, treaties/disarmament Big failures: Japanese incursions into China, Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Nazi German rearmament & absorption of neighbors
caveats about democratic peace findings
While states are democratizing, they are more likely to get into disputes than if they just stayed where they were ---Snyder and mansfield Mousseau has done stuff with capitalism and contracts that make conflicts less likely ---Interacting development with democracy ---Reasonably weathy countries are going to be democracies Henderson's findings said that if this is a law, we should find this everywhere
militarized interstate dispute (MID)
also a COW dataset, defined as: incidents between two system members threats, displays, or uses of force sanctioned by governments wars are 3.4% of this list of 2330 MIDs
extra-state Wars
also a cow dataset and occur when: one participant is a state, the other is not nor is it a subset of the state 1000+ battle fatalities for the state generates a list of 163 extra-state wars from 1816-2010, and most of these are ex-colonial or imperial wars, but may be resuming in war on terror
civil war
an armed conflict that occurs between organized actors within a a state and that meets some minimum threshold for severity
peacekeeping
an operation that typically follows conclusion of a war in which combatants have agreed to end the fighting and have invited the neutral party to help them sustain the peace
