Politics of the Middle East Final

Identify and discuss (#?) of the Chapter 11 recommendations that Jones et al., present as steps to weaken and ultimately defeat the Islamic State?

***1. INTENSIFY MILITARY EFFORTS IN SYRIA (SEIZE RAQQA) -Use SDF as a partner (Kurdish & Sunni Arab forces) -Need to give them the heavy weapons they need to assault Raqqa -Need to add more American troops than the special operations that are already there. -Go ahead and ignore Turkey's wishes not to arm the SDF. -Need an interim government already at ready before the operation begins that Turkey, Russia, and locals will listen to. -Raqqa should be under international administration. ***2. DELEGATE AUTHORITY DOWNWARD -Need to review/change policy for authorization of lethal force overseas. -Loosen constraints for counterterrorism operations. -Allow the use of lethal force outside of designated areas of active hostilities. -Expand the ares they consider to be actively hostile. -Establish streamlined approval process in active war zones. -Relax restrictions on military on US military forces accompanying local forces into combat environments. -Need to rely less on military partner forces because they are less reliable. -Different interests than the US -Push authority down to US local commanders. ***3. EXPAND BASING ACCESS IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA -Current threat is high in these areas, their collapse in Iraq & Syria may lead to them trying to grow in North Africa. -There are many US military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq (due to post 9/11 war on terrorism) -Almost no US presence in Africa so there can be no quick response by the US in this region. -Should begin negotiating with other countries in the region to make US military forces present. ***4. TIGHTEN RESTRICTIONS ON ISLAMIC STATE INTERNET ACCESSS ***5. STRENGTHEN PARTNER CAPACITY TO SECURE AND GOVERN TERRITORY ***6. AID TO STATE BUILDING

What specific steps should be taken to defeat and prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State in at least three of the countries where it controls territory?

***IRAQ: -Sunni dissatisfaction is a major part of the emergence, these grievances must be addressed, they suggest the US remain engaged diplomatically, economically, and militarily. -Continue to professionalize the Iraqi security forces and broker an enduring accommodation among the country's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations. ***SYRIA: -Liberate Raqqa from ISIS before the end of the civil war if necessary, work with Moscow to clear dier ez zur. -Washington should reengage diplomatically and support the emergence o a decentralized state based upon agreed zones of control recognized by major outside parties. ***LIBYA: -Bolster international support for an effective government, help train and equip security forces, and keep pressure on remaining Islamic State networks. -Perhaps establish an international peacekeeping force to disband militia groups. -More effective governance is basically the only answer. ***EGYPT: -Control movement of ISIS in the Sinai. -The US should direct substantial military assistance to train and equip Egyptian military forces to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency missions. -Should prioritize civilian security, the provision of development assistance, and securing local tribe support. -Gulf states and Israel should contribute. ***NIGERIA: -Boko Haram, new leadership, and the use of a multinational task force. -Need to address corruption. ***AFGHANISTAN: -Work with Afghanistan and Pakistan to target local IS leadership, counter ideology, and improve local leadership. -An enduring American commitment is needed to prevent the country from becoming a breeding ground.

Characterize each of the 5 Jewish aliyot or waves of immigration to Palestine. How did the immigrants differ in each of these aliyot?

*Aliyah #1 (1882-1905): Most immigrants were from Russian Bilu Zionist Movement. About 10,000 by 1905. *Aliyah #2 (1905-1919): About 30,000 Jews from Russia and Poland came because of the failed 1905 Russian Revolution. Most left for the West eventually. This group emphasized SOCIALISM. *Aliyah #3 (1919-1923): About 35,000 came from Poland and elsewhere in East & Central Europe. Economic pressures and increased anti-Semitism (Pogroms (rape, plunge, pillage)) major reasons. This group was labor oriented. *Aliyah #4 (1925-1929): Larger than the third Aliyah; half from Poland, prompted by official economic discrimination, poverty, and 1925 US closed door policy to large scale immigration. Many small businessmen. *Aliyah #5 (1933-1936): Largest Aliyah (164,000); precipitated by Hitler's rise to power. Many middle class German Jews. ***By 1948: 650,000 Jews in Palestine

According to Jones et al.,'s Chapter 10, as part of a strategy designed to roll back gains of Islamic State, what options do US and its allies have to counter the efforts of ISIS's message, promotion, strategies?

*SHAPING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: -IS's use of social media is both a strength and a weakness. By posting messages publicly available online, states can identify extremists and potential terrorist attacks, tracking or undermining their efforts form an early stage. The US should exploit this and help weaker states build up their cyber-forensic abilities. -The US should plant disinformation highlighting the presence of moles and spies in order to sow distrust and paranoia within the group. Attributing intelligence to human efforts rather than signals intelligence is one way of doing this. The US should also participate in cyber warfare in order to increase the difficulty of reaching and staying in touch with recruits. -Counter messaging is important, but exceptionally difficult for cumbersome government operating against quick opponents. However, using and promoting disenchanted IS members is a powerful way to do this. -Finally, the US should pressure allied states like Saudi Arabia to clamp down on radical messaging stemming from within their borders. *HELPING REFUGEES AND TARGETING PROPAGANDISTS: -Refugee populations, when handled improperly, can become a breeding ground for radicals. Ensuring that they gain employment and that their children get an education will help prevent refugees from becoming disenchanted with and resentful of Western governments. This task is easier in the US, giving the smaller number of refugees, but is hampered by Islamophobia and anti-refugee sentiment. In Europe, the size of the refugee population could make this a multi-billion dollar effort. -IS recruiters have a disproportionate effect and are difficult to replace, so targeting and stopping them can help prevent radicalization of refugees. Additionally, encouraging allies like Turkey to crack down on facilitation networks will make it much more difficult for IS members to travel back and forth and get recruits to the battlefield. *GIVE EXTREMISTS OFF RAMPS: -Family members and friends will be less likely to turn in their friends and relatives if they will get a long prison sentence. Providing alternatives like counseling, employment, and maybe light prison sentences will help stop radicalized individuals before it's too late while potentially reforming them. *DEFEAT THE CORE ORGANIZATION: -Defeating IS massively harms its propaganda efforts, which rely a great deal on its image as a winner.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - ISLAMIC JIHAD

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Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - HEZBOLLAH

- "Party of God" - Emerged during Lebanon's 15 year long civil war (1975-1990) in the aftermath of Israel's invasion in 1982 and subsequent occupation. - Shiite Muslim political party and militant group that the US and EU consider a terrorist organization. - With significant support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah maintains an extensive security apparatus, political organization, and social services network in Lebanon, where the group is often described as a "state within the state." - Hezbollah's raison d'etre, resistance to Israel and Western involvement in the Middle East, has made it an EFFECTIVE PROXY FOR IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY while earning the group some support from beyond its Shiite base. But as it has become increasingly embroiled in the Syrian civil war, where its fighters have fought for the Assad regime, it has alienated some of its Lebanese constituents and reportedly prompted deadly reprisals in Beirut from partisans of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Syrian rebels.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - PESHMERGA

- "one who confronts death" - Military forces of the autonomous region of IRAQI KURDISTAN. The overall formal head of Peshmerga is the president of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Peshmerga force itself is LARGELY DIVIDED AND CONTROLLED SEPARATELY BY THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN AND PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN, although both pledge allegiance to the Kurdistan Regional Government. - Peshmerga forces are responsible for DEFENDING THE LAND, PEOPLE, AND INSTITUTIONS of the Kurdistan region. - Because the Iraqi army is forbidden by law from entering Iraqi Kurdistan, the Peshmerga are primarily responsible for the SECURITY OF THE KURDISH REGION, along with INTELLIGENCE and MP SUBSIDIARIES. - Oct. 2015 - Peshmerga and US forces LIBERATE 70 ISIS HOSTAGES.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - AL-QUDS BRIGADE

- (Jerusalem Brigades) - ARMED WING of Islamic Jihad. Especially active in the West Bank & Gaza, the al-Quds Brigades were founded in 1982 by FATHI SHAQAQI and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA in Gaza, and is reportedly receiving orders from the PIJ leadership in Damascus, Syria. - The al-Quds Brigades were very active in the West Bank, especially Jenin, but extensive operations against its infrastructures carried out by the IDF resulted in severe losses to the group, and it appeared significantly weakened by 2004. - From the Gaza Stript, the al-Quds Brigades promote the military destruction of Israel, e.g., indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire or suicide bombings. The international community considers their use of indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations and the use of human shields as illegal. - They seek the ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE and to settle Palestinians to "their rightful homeland" within pre-1948 British mandated Palestine. It refuses to participate in political processes or negotiations about a swap of Israeli and Palestinian settlements.

The period between 1994-2004 saw the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, and other Arab states, take some sharp twists and turns. Using your understanding of Bickerton & Klausner, trace the peace process during this time by describing the individual leaders who influenced the peace process. How have these leaders influenced the peace process and why?

- 1994: Yitzhak Rabin signs a peace treaty with Jordan that requires Jordan to transfer control over the West Bank to the Palestinian National Authority. - 1995: Yitzhak assassinated by extremist Yigal Amir and halts peace negotiations. - 1996: Benjamin Netanyahu elected PM and continues hardened negotiations with the PA. - 1998: Wye Agreement signed (Netanyahu & Arafat) - 1999: Ehud Barak elected to replace Netanyahu, initially just as stubborn as Netanyahu. - 2000: Second Intifada begins, terror attacks occur in Israel; Barak & Arafat meet at Camp David but a peace agreement was not signed. - 2001: Ariel Sharon elected to PM, encourages settlements. - 2004: Yassir Arafat dies, Israel assassinates two Palestinian leaders.

The time immediately surrounding the birth of the state of Israel deeply impacted the politics of the Middle East. According to Bickerton & Klausner, there were many leaders (international, Arab, and Jewish) who directly influenced Middle East politics during this time. Identify (#?) leaders who shaped the politics of the region, choosing at least one from each of those groups. Finally, describe what position they held, what impact they had, and why. - KING ABDULLAH (ARAB)

- Abdullah was the HASHEMITE KING of Transjordan after it was granted independence by the UK in 1946. - Like the Zionists, he feared the creation of a Palestinian Arab state under the leadership of the mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. - He sought to annex the Palestinian Arab lands and made a secret arrangement with the Jews that he would not attack them if they did not interfere with his annexation plans. - HOWEVER, he REVERSED this decision after coming under Arab political pressure to fight the creation of any Jewish State. - Jordanian troops joined the Arab coalition to fight the Zionists before and after the establishment of Israel. - Jordan was the second to last Arab state to sign an armistice, before Syria in April 1949. - After the war ended, Jordan annexed the West Bank & Jerusalem much to the anger of the Palestinian population. - He was assassinated in 1951 by a Palestinian who feared that he was going to make peace with Israel.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - TALIBAN

- Afghan-Nationalist, jihadist movement - Fight for Islam - Prioritize following the principles of Islam movement. - Nationalism: very patriotic to your origins/state

4 Contemporary Middle East Leadership Styles - TRADITIONAL

- Base their claim to leadership on the assertion that they are the CLEAR and LOGICAL successors to a line of leaders that stretches back in time and is legitimized by practice. - Often imply that their leadership is necessary to maintain the social order on the right course. - Legitimacy often bound up in the intersection of political and religious tradition. - Strong ECONOMIC BASE often REDUCES pressure for CHANGE. - Examples: Bahrain, Egypt under King Farouk, Iran under Pahlevis, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE

4 Contemporary Middle East Leadership Styles - KEMALIST MODERN BUREAUCRATIC

- Begins with the same premises as modern bureaucratic leadership. - Kemalist refers to the MODERNIZING authoritarian rule of KEMAL ATATURK in Turkey. - Aimed ultimately at the creation of a DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. - Reject the regular view of their right to rule, arguing that NO ONE HAS THE ABILITY TO JUDGE THEIR LEADERSHIP or its performance. - Often MILITARY in nature. - Often conceive of their rule as a period of POLITICAL TRUST and tutelage during which the society learns and practices the skills and procedures that will lead to genuine ACCOUNTABLE or DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. Examples: Egypt under Sadat; Iraq in Saddam's early years; Syria before current troubles; Yemen before current warfare.

The time immediately surrounding the birth of the state of Israel deeply impacted the politics of the Middle East. According to Bickerton & Klausner, there were many leaders (international, Arab, and Jewish) who directly influenced Middle East politics during this time. Identify (#?) leaders who shaped the politics of the region, choosing at least one from each of those groups. Finally, describe what position they held, what impact they had, and why. - COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE (INTERNATIONAL)

- Bernadotte was chosen as MEDIATOR for the Truce Commission by the UN General Assembly. He was to work with this commission, established by the Security Council, in order to PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. - He succeeded in arranging a month-long truce on June 11 even after the war had commenced. However, the truce failed to bring peace and fighting resumed after its expiration. - In September, responding to the importance of control of Jerusalem to both sides, Bernadotte recommended to the UN that the Old City become an INTERNATIONAL CITY under UN CONTROL. - He also recommended that the Negev be allocated to the Arabs and Galilee to Israel, and that Arab refugees be allowed to return home. - He was assassinated the next day by the Stern-Gang, a Jewish terrorist group, for this position.

Discuss some of the salient biographical features of x number of the following 4 Middle East leaders. How have the leaders' backgrounds had an impact on their actions as leaders and on the Middle East? - BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (Israel)

- Born in 1949 in Tel Aviv and spent his early years in Jerusalem. - In 1964 his family moved to Philadelphia, where his father, historian Benzion Netanyahu, took an academic post. - In 1967, after graduating from high school in the US, he went back to Israel, served in Sayeret Matkal, AN ELITE COMMANDO UNIT. - RETURNED TO THE US and attended MIT: BA in architecture in 1974 and an MBA in 1976. - In 1976: Netanyahu's brother Yonatan was KILLED in Entebbe, Uganda, during the rescue of Israeli hostages being held by plane hijackers. - In 1978: returned to Israel to help establish the JONATHAN INSTITUTE in J'lem to RESEARCH TERRORISM. - In 1982: Moshe Arens, Israeli ambassador to the US, appointed Netanyahu as his deputy. Netanyahu became Israel's delegate to the UN in 1984. - In 1988: he returned to Israel as DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER and was elected to the KNESSET. - During the Persian Gulf War (1991) he acted as ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL SPOKESPERSON. In 1993 Netanyahu was elected LEADER OF LIKUD. - As leader of Likud, Netanyahu OPPOSED THE PEACE AGREEMENTS negotiated by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO in 1993 & 1995. - After Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995, by a JEWISH EXTREMIST, Netanyahu was criticized for his ADVOCACY OF MILITARY POLICIES and ACCUSED OF HAVING ENCOURAGED RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS. - In 1996: suicide bombings by Palestinian militants in Israel made SECURITY one of the CENTRAL ISSUES in Israeli politics. - Later in 1996: he won the election by fewer than 30,000 votes, becoming the YOUNGEST PRIME MINISTER ever elected in Israel. - Served as Prime Minster until 1999. During his term, he signed the HEBRON and WYE ACCORDS, advancing the PEACE PROCESS WITH THE PALESTINIANS. - Was beat out of the race by his former military commander... - In 2002: returned to politics, serving as minister of foreign affairs before becoming MINISTER OF FINANCE. - On March 31, 2009: he was sworn in as Prime Minister for the SECOND TIME, ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT and calling for a DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE that recognized a Jewish state. - Won re-election in March, 2015 with the minimum coalition of 61 of the 120 Knesset seats in his coalition. Coalition predominantly right wing.

Discuss some of the salient biographical features of x number of the following 4 Middle East leaders. How have the leaders' backgrounds had an impact on their actions as leaders and on the Middle East? - AYATOLLAH ALI KHAMEINI (Iran)

- Born in the Northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad in 1939. - Father was a religious scholar and Khamenei, the second of eight children, followed his father's path to seminary. - Studied in Qom from 1958-1964, where he joined the religious opposition movement led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. - Played important role in '79 Revolution. - President of Iran from 1981-89. - Iran's SUPREME LEADER since 1989. - Has always been in contact with the world of Iranian INTELLECTUALS. - Basic outlines of his thinking were laid down in his youth and young adulthood, during the 1950 and 1960s. - Sees a tension between West and third world, and views hardened during his dealings with the US after the Iranian Revolution. - Believes the US is bent on REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN, whether through internal collapse, democratic revolution, economic pressure, or military invasion. - Has always been CRITICAL OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY and thinks that CAPITALISM and the West are in inevitable long-term decline. - Very PRAGMATIC; realized that being overtly AUTHORITARIAN IS PROBLEMATIC in today's Iran. - Working hard in November 2015 to irradicate as much Western influence within Iran as possible. - Tension with much of Iran's urban, educated population is the core of Iranian politics today.

Discuss some of the salient biographical features of x number of the following 4 Middle East leaders. How have the leaders' backgrounds had an impact on their actions as leaders and on the Middle East? - BASHAR AL-ASSAD (Syria)

- Born on September 11, 1965, the second son of former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and his wife, Anisa. - Hafez had risen to power through the Syrian MILITARY and the MINORITY ALAWITE POLITICAL PARTY to take control of Syria in 1970. With much of the military composed of fellow Alawite associates, he was able to integrate the military into his political regime, and ruled Syria with an IRON FIST for three decades. - Grew up QUIET and RESERVED, in the shadow of his more dynamic and outgoing brother, Bassel. Educated at the Arab-French Al Hurriya School in Damascus, Bashar learned to speak fluent French and English. - Educated in Damascus and London as an opthalmologist. - His father had been grooming Bassel as the future president. But in 1994: Bassel was killed in an automobile accident, and Bashar was recalled to Damascus. - 1994: Bashar entered the military academy at Homs, Syria, and was quickly pushed through the ranks to become a Colonel in just 5 years. - He served as an ADVISOR to his father, hearing complaints and appeals from citizens, and led a CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION. As a result, he was able to remove many potential rivals. - Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000. Syria's parliament quickly voted to lower the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 34, so that Bashar could be eligible for the office. - Ten days after Hafez's death, Bashar al-Assad was chosen for a seven-year term as President of Syria: running unopposed, he received 97% of the vote. He was also selected leader of the Ba'ath party and commander in chief of the military. - Bashar was considered a younger-generation Arab leader, who would bring change to Syria, a region long filled with aging dictators. - Influenced by WESTERN EDUCATION & URBAN UPBRINGING, he initially seemed eager to IMPLEMENT A CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN SYRIA. He states early on the democracy was "a tool to a better life." - After his first year as president, many of his promised economic reforms had not materialized. The grossly overstaffed and largely corrupt government bureaucracy made it difficult for a private sector... - 2006: Syria expanded its use of TRAVEL BANS against DISSIDENTS, preventing many from entering or leaving the country. - 2007: The Syrian Parliament passed a law requiring ALL COMMENTS ON CHAT FORUMS TO BE POSTED PUBLICLY. - In 2008, and against in 2011, social media sites such as YouTube and Facebook were BLOCKED. Human rights groups have reported the political opponents of Bashar al-Assad are ROUTINELY TORTURED, IMPRISONED, AND KILLED. - Following successful regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, protests began in Syria on January 26, 2011, DEMANDING POLITICAL REFORMS, A REINSTATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, AND AN END TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY (in place since 1963). - Outraged by government inaction, protests spread and became larger. In May 2011, the Syrian military responded with VIOLENT CRACKDOWNS in the town of Homs and the suburbs of Damascus. In June, Bashar promised a national dialogue and new parliamentary elections, but no change came, and the protests continued. - In June 2012, a UN official stated that the uprisings had transitioned into a FULL-SCALE CIVIL WAR. The conflict continues, with daily reports of the killing of scores of civilians by government forces, and counter-claims by the al-Assad regime of the killings being staged or the result of outside agitators. - Assad has continued to demonstrate tremendous DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE in his efforts to hold onto power. In August 2013: he has come under fire from leaders around the world for using CHEMICAL WEAPONS against civilians. - Chemical weapons and barrel bombs have resulted in deaths of women and children, and some Western countries are debating what steps should be taken against al-Assad and his regime. - Assad himself has become a major issue, with the Russians and Iranians working to KEEP HIM IN POWER, and virtually ALL OTHERS saying that an end to the civil war in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis demands an end to the rule of this once promising "younger generation leader."

According to class discussion, in what ways have the history books had an impact on the actions of recent Middle East leaders? Give examples.

- For Middle East leaders who stay in office for many years, one distinct factor in their calculation is their identity in history and in their people's memory. - The late Yitzchak Rabin of Israel and King Hussein of Jordan each wanted to leave a LEGACY as a PEACEMAKER. - Rabin: military commander-1948-said enough of the killing when he got elected; wanted non-military peace. Was assassinated. - Hussein: died of cancer. - Hafez El-Assad (Syria): would have preferred to be remembered as the Syrian leader who REGAINED THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, not the leader who LOST THEM. - Yassir Arafat: would have preferred to be remembered as the CREATOR OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, but certainly not as the PALESTINIAN LEADER WHO GAVE LEGITIMACY TO A JEWISH STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (similar to Abbas).

In his chapter on the War on Terrorism, what does Goldschmidt see as some of the primary impacts of that war on relations between the US and the states in the Middle East?

- Goldschmidt argues that the 9/11 attacks and the response to them led to a widening distrust between Americans and Middle Easterners. - The attacks left many Americans perplexed as to why they had been attacked. In general, fear and paranoia about the region and Islam set in. -The main issue for Middle Easterners was the US invasion of Iraq. Invading Iraq destroyed one of the more modern states in the Middle East and one respected by much of the region's population. *Iran has increased its influence in Iraq with its longtime enemy (Saddam Hussein) gone and a Shia government in power. It's possible that Iran's aim to produce nuclear weapons stems in part from its fear of US attack, which seemed reasonable after the Iraq War. *Most Gulf states have largely continued to work with the US, although they have also been the birthing ground of many terrorists and a great number of people in these countries express anger at deference to the US and its large regional presence. *In Egypt, anti-US sentiment grew a great deal during the Iraq War despite America's financial support. *In general, most in the Middle East oppose the War on Terror, which many in the region call the "War on Militant Muslims." Counter-terror efforts have generally posed a greater threat to civilians than terrorists themselves and have been counterproductive anyway. Wars like the Iraq War weren't seen as liberating wars, but as wars by imperialist foreign powers against the Muslims in the occupied countries. The instability in invaded countries and the hostility sparked by the wars there led many across the region to go to these places to support burgeoning insurgencies. - Since the War on Terror, America has largely forfeited its role as an honest broker between the Israelis and Palestinians. Israel was a heavily, but secretly, involved participant in the Iraq War. And the US has offered massive support to Israel and its efforts against "terrorism." Arab states have largely condemned this, although little material action has been taken.

The time immediately surrounding the birth of the state of Israel deeply impacted the politics of the Middle East. According to Bickerton & Klausner, there were many leaders (international, Arab, and Jewish) who directly influenced Middle East politics during this time. Identify (#?) leaders who shaped the politics of the region, choosing at least one from each of those groups. Finally, describe what position they held, what impact they had, and why. - DAVID BEN-GURION (JEWISH)

- Head of the executive of the Jewish Agency from 1935 until Israel's founding, & was the first Prime Minister of Israel. - An immigrant to Palestine from the Russian Empire and a Zionist from a very early age. -He held SOCIALIST VIEWS and was a man of decisive action. - Before partition, he feared a Palestinian Arab state led by the mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. - He accepted the 1947 UN partition plan, despite the fears of many Jews that it would leave Israel in far too vulnerable a position against its Arab neighbors. - When the British Mandate ended on May 15, 1948, Ben-Gurion immediately declared the state of Israel. - He united the various Jewish militias into the IDF, although they continued to operate separately for some time. - He was often at odds with Begin, the head of the Irgun (a Jewish terrorist militia), and at times used force to control the Irgun. - He was Israel's first defense minister and led the successful war effort with his cabinet.

Why are non-state actors so significant at this point in the Middle East?

- International governmental and non-governmental orgs have played important roles in the Middle East for many years (UN and its agencies, private relief organizations, Amnesty International) - Strength of state actors is often related INVERSELY to the strength of non-state actors. In other words, non-state actors find opportunities when citizens are less supportive of their state leaders. - Failed states are fertile ground for recruiting of many relevant Middle East non-state actors.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - PKK

- Kurdish Nationalist Group - Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - Has Marxist-Leninist roots. Formed in the late 1970s and launched an armed struggle against the TURKISH GOVERNMENT in 1984, calling for an INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE WITHIN TURKEY. - Since then, more than 40,000 people have died. Conflict reached a peak in the mid-1990s, thousands of villages were destroyed in the largely Kurdish Southeast and East of Turkey, and many Kurds FLED TO CITIES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. Efforts are under way to gather the entire force under the ministry of Peshmerga affairs. - In the '90s, PKK rolled back on its demands for an independent Kurdish state, calling instead for MORE AUTONOMY FOR THE KURDS. - In 1999, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested and jailed for treason. Peace talks between '09-'11. - In March 2013: he called a CEASEFIRE and urged PKK forces to WITHDRAW FROM TURKEY, in an announcement seen as "historic." - Ceasefire appeared to be over in July 2015 when Turkey launched air strikes against PKK camps in Northern Iraq. Some say Erdogan needs this threat. *"Needs this threat" meaning the "rally around the flag" effect, in-group out-group psychology

Discuss some of the salient biographical features of x number of the following 4 Middle East leaders. How have the leaders' backgrounds had an impact on their actions as leaders and on the Middle East? - MAHMOUD ABBAS (Palestine)

- Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Maze, born in 1935, Zefat, Palestine (now in Israel). - PRIME MINISTER of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2003. - Elected its PRESIDENT in 2005 following the DEATH OF YASSER ARAFAT. - Fled with his family to SYRIA during the 1948 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. Earned a law degree from the University of Damascus. - In the late 1950s: Abbas was one of the FOUNDERS OF FATAH, which spearheaded the Palestinian armed struggle and came to dominate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). - As head of the PLO's international department in the late 1970s, Abbas was instrumental in FORGING CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI PEACE GROUPS. - In 1982: Abbas was awarded a doctorate in HISTORY from Moscow State University. - In the early 1990s: Abbas shaped Palestinian negotiating strategy at both the peace conference in Madrid (1991) and in SECRET MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS in Norway. Through the resulting Oslo Accords (1993), Israel & the Palestinians extended MUTUAL RECOGNITION to each other, and Israel CEDED SOME GOVERNING FUNCTIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP to a Palestinian Authority. - Abbas was a senior member of the Palestinian Delegation to the Camp David Peace Talks in July 2000. - Abbas adamantly REJECTED ISRAEL'S PEACE OFFER but OPPOSED THE VIOLENT PALESTINIAN UPRISING called the Intifadah (Arabic: "Shaking Off") that followed. - Following Arafat's death in November 2004, Abbas was named head of the PLO. In January 2005: he WON THE ELECTION to succeed Arafat as PRESIDENT OF THE PA. -A short-lived Fatah-Hamas coalition government gave way to VIOLENCE, and in 2007 HAMAS ESTABLISHED EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN THE GAZA STRIP. - May 2011: Hamas, Fatah sign RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT. - February 2012: the 2 groups selected Abbas for the post of INTERIM PRIME MINISTER. - In September 2015: Abbas announced in a speech to the UN General Assembly that Palestinians were no longer bound by the Oslo Accords. - Abbas always in a difficult political balancing situation. - Now 85 years old.

In his chapter on the Gulf War & the peace process, how does Goldschmidt relate the events of the Gulf War to the rise of Islamism in the Middle East?

- Many Middle Eastern regimes constantly faced a crisis of legitimacy. Their highly religious populations had very little control over the autocratic and typically secular governments which rule them. - Adding to this problem was the fact that Saddam Hussein was popular in many of these countries. - His invasion of Kuwait of course couldn't be allowed to stand. If it were, what would other powerful countries be allowed to do to their weaker neighbors? - But at the same time, supporting a Western, non-Muslim power against the man perceived to be most likely to stand up to imperialism and Israel would provide challenges for governments already dealing with support issues. - The lack of legitimacy held by most Middle Eastern states led many in this time and later to seek solutions in Islamism. - The Gulf War exacerbated the economic problems facing many of the Middle East's reeling economies. - Most states joined an embargo against Iraq, but this harmed many of them due to Iraq's size and its power as an oil producer. - Additionally, finding the money to support the coalition's war effort was difficult. - Islamist groups frequently delivered benefits to the increasingly urbanized, and poor, populations of these countries, long undeserved by their autocratic and frequently American backed governments. - Allowing so many American troops into Saudi Arabia helped helped inspire many of the terrorists which would go on to orchestrate 9/11 and support organizations like al-Qaeda. - American troops located in the Gulf have caused similar problems since. - In Jordan, Islamist parties won votes because of economic hardships and disillusionment with the peace process, but also because of anger at the Gulf War, which had harmed Jordan due to the massive influx of refugees and the loss of oil imports from Iraq due to the embargo. -In Egypt, opposition to Mubarak and his American backers manifested after the Gulf War as terrorist attacks against government officials, Copts, foreign tourists, and secular writers. - The highly Islamist Sudanese attempted to have Mubarak assassinated.

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - AL-QAEDA

- Original goal: toppling Western capitalism - First started when they wanted to get rid of Western capitalism - 9/11 defense department/White House, who & when

Compare and contrast 4 of the following 8 militant non-state actors. - HAMAS

- Palestinian; Gaza; spawned by the Muslim Brotherhood; Palestinian social services plus destruction of Israel.

4 Contemporary Middle East Leadership Styles - MODERN BUREAUCRATIC

- Predicated on the promise of adequate SHORT TERM performance in government. - Usually claim TECHNICAL and ORGANIZATIONAL superiority over the older, traditional means of governance. - Often promise to transform society through the application of management skills. - Consistent with either AUTHORITARIAN or DEMOCRATIC systems. - Usually emerge from a POLITICAL PARTY BACKGROUND. - Non-Kemalists usually recognize the right of the public to evaluate periodically their performance and decide whether to keep them in office. Examples: Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Palestinian Authority

What are some of the key characteristics of ISIS discussed in class?

- Seeks to build a unitary state or caliphate that eliminates all borders from the Middle East through at least India and central Asia. - Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham - Not seeking martyrdom; rather trying to build a state based on their views: *Want to exacerbate Sunni-Shia rift *Want to eliminate all Shias as Tafkir (unacceptable and liable to be killed) *Also want to eliminate all Sunnis who do not follow ISIS variant of Wahabbism. - An update to the original notion that ISIS is not focused on Israel: on November 1, 2015, ISIS uploaded a video in Hebrew as part of #Behead the Jew: "No Jew will be left alive once our fighters conquer Jordan and arrive at Israel's borders." - Technically sophisticated - Ruthless - Exploit Sunni discontent with "repressive" Shia governments - Small cabinet, led by Baghdadi, who apparently has a PHD in Islamic Studies - Social media savvy

Describe the role of President Jimmy Carter in the Camp David Accords.

- Sought a comprehensive settlement that he believed would only come from sitting down together and him mediating. - Carter endorsed the idea of a Palestinian homeland originally, but backlash from the American Jewish community led to his backtracking and saying that Palestine should be an entity within Jordan. - Sadat & him often spoke on how to normalize relations, and agreed to recognize Israel as a state per a peace treaty. - There were multiple backroom talks between Morocco, Egypt, & Israel before the Geneva Accords even began. - Russia & the US met and called for an end to the dispute, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the 1967 occupied territories, and the guarantee of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. - Israel rejected such a statement, and refused to have the PLO present for any peace talks per request of the banned Sadat. - Sadat then visited Israel to discuss peace measures, demanding more than he would get, demanding Israel withdrawal, & Israeli recognition of Palestine, though this did essentially nothing, it did lead to meetings between Sadat and Begin in which Begin agreed to administrative autonomy for the Palestinian people. - Carter then requested that Begin & Sadat meet with him at Camp David, where two accords were signed in 1978 - not without monetary threat from Carter. - "A framework for peace in the Middle East" contained provisions that formed the basis of subsequent peace negotiations, including Madrid in 1991. It called for negotiations between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian representatives to settle the question of Gaza and the West Bank. A self-governing Palestinian Authority would be set up while negotiations took place to determine the final status of these locations. - The second accord: "A framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt & Israel" was a draft proposal for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed within three months. This called for full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai over three years, and full restoration of the area to Egypt. Israeli ships would have free passage through the Suez Canal. - The Camp David Accords ignored Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. - Egypt saw widening the Suez as a way to break Soviet orbit, and by regaining the Sinai could follow through with "Egypt first." - Jordan & Saudi Arabia rejected the Accords.

What are Islamic State's ideologies, objectives, and global reach? (Jones)

- The Islamic State's behavior is shaped by a combination of religious fervor, strategic calculation, and apocalyptic prophecy. - It perpetuates an extreme Salafist ideology which places special importance on its idea of an Islamic caliphate, a state for true Muslims by true Muslims which provides safe haven for true believers while waging war on those who do not submit. - IS is also one of the most virulently anti-Shia Salafist groups ever, calling for war to be waged on this group. - IS's raison d'etre is the caliphate, which transcends existing borders. It seeks to control populations, rule them with its extreme interpretation of Sharia, and finance itself through local economies. It has detailed hierarchical structure which it uses to govern its territory and its provinces elsewhere. - Controlling this territory is essential to its goal, as most of its financial strategies, producing and selling oil, taxing local populations, seizing bank accounts, and kidnapping for ransom, are useless without it. - Global Reach: *Territorial Control: IS's heartland is Syria & Iraq, where it has at times controlled territory hosting many millions of people in major cities and rural areas alike. However, its territory in these countries has dwindled massively, standing at only a fraction of its 2015 peak. It also possesses provinces in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt, but these territories were smaller and have also seen their size decrease massively. *Public Opinion: Polling, which is limited due to methodological challenges and lack of availability in states like Syria and Libya, shows that IS is overwhelmingly unpopular outside of its territory across the Arab world. Vast majorities in almost every country express an unfavorable opinion of the group, but enough support exists to provide longevity. It has been able to gain support from abroad through propaganda and messaging campaigns. Anecdotal evidence within its territory shows that locals sometimes view it as the least bad option due to bad experience with lawless rebel groups or repressive states, as while as hostile sectarian rivals. However, it appears to have governed poorly. *Expansion of Provinces: IS was able to establish a number of provinces abroad by co-opting existing insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and disenchanted elements of the Taliban. Even in countries without provinces, it has been able to establish terrorist cells and has inspired lone wolf attackers. It has done this by leveraging local grievances, disenchanted youth, doling out wealth to prospective allies, and showing its victory through social media. *Violence: IS's primary means of expansion is VIOLENCE. It relied more on conventional MILITARY TACTICS than other terrorist groups initially, overpowering disorganized foes in Iraq & Syria. However, as its position has weakened in Iraq it has increasingly resorted to traditional insurgent tactics and non-conventional tools of warfare. It has also escalated the number of terrorist attacks carried out outside of Iraq & Syria, making a change from its early years. Attacks have his Nigeria and other African countries as well as many state in the West.

How do Bickerton & Klausner characterize the reasons for the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Palestinian reactions to it?

- The stated reason for withdrawing from Gaza was to increase the security of Israel by reliving pressure on the IDF and by reducing friction between the Israelis and Palestinians, but many suspected other motivations. - The Israeli Labor Party as well as many Palestinians suspected that the withdrawal was meant to provide political cover for Israel to maintain and solidify control over the West Bank or, at the very least, major settlement blocks, through its security fence and numerous checkpoints in the territory. - The plan had potentially dire consequences in store for Gaza, leaving it economically weakened and isolated due to Israeli control of the sea, the border with Egypt, and the refusal to allow an airport. All these things would make trade with the outside world even harder. Some also feared that it would increase political instability, allowing organizations like Hamas to gain greater control over Gaza. Building an independent state in this environment would be very difficult. *It is possible that part of the motivation behind Sharon's plan was to provide political cover for continued external security control over Gaza. *After the withdrawal, Israel did gain some moral high ground with the US and the EU, as it had proven that it was capable of demolishing settlements and withdrawing from occupied territory. *The PA viewed the withdrawal with cautious optimism. Abbas called on the people of Gaza to get to work living in peace as regular peoples across the world do. Hamas, however, claimed that its violence had forced Israel to withdraw, and it called for continued resistance in order to liberate "all of Palestine." *As expected by many, the withdrawal did not improve the situation in Gaza. Israel maintained control of land, air, and sea access to the territory. Additionally, the IDF gained increased operational flexibility. Adding on to problems for the Palestinians, the settlement population grew by 13,000 in 2005.

4 Contemporary Middle East Leadership Styles - CHARISMATIC

- UNIQUE leader who possesses particular characteristics that set him or her apart from "normal" leaders. - INTENSE leadership style. - Intense, reciprocal PSYCHOLOGICAL EXCHANGE with his or her followers. - Actions and proposals are legitimized by reference to some TRANSCENDENT SOURCE: religious, historical, natural, or mystical. - Usually emerge during a SOCIAL or POLITICAL CRISIS. - Chemistry of relationship between leader and follower changes according to the particulars of the culture and historical circumstance. - Often promulgates images of a NEW ORDER that will raise the community to new levels of ACTIVITY and ACCOMPLISHMENT. - Rhetorical skill almost always exceptional. Examples: Egypt under Nassar; Iran under Khomeini; Libya under Qaddafi.

In his chapter on changing Middle East environments, what are some of the challenges he (Goldschmidt) anticipates that the Middle East will face?

- Water will be an increasingly scarce resource as states continue to struggle with water management, as climate change progresses, and as populations skyrocket. - Abandoning ancient water management tools like qanats in favor of dams and other modern tools has helped with agricultural production but has increased environmental risks. - Additionally, many rivers, such as the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Nile, cross state boundaries. - Disputes over management of these rivers, including where dams can be built and how water supply can be controlled and diverted, will be a source of geopolitical headaches. - Finally, modern infrastructure for effective water recycling and treatment doesn't exist in most Middle Eastern cities, leading to waste and pollution. *Water has a spiritual significance as the lifeblood of the garden, an important idea in Islam. Islamic cities have traditionally featured homes with gardens at the center and public spaces have included many water heavy structures such as fountains and public baths. *Water scarcity significantly decreases the agricultural labor force and harms the many subsistence economies in the region. *Reliance on foreign farms, as has been the norm in recent times for many Gulf States, makes them more politically vulnerable. *Choosing between water supply for farming or for growing urban centers will be a continuing dilemma. *Deciding which state controls cross-boundary rivers and other water resources has led to war before and could lead to war again. - Safe management of oil in this oil heavy region is always a challenge. - Oil spills have damaged rivers and coastlines across the region, including a major oil tanker collision which cause the Seki oil spill and the damaging of fishing communities and tourist reliant beaches. - Wars which led to the burning of oil wells have also had major environmental impacts, harming Arabian wildlife and polluting soil, water, and air. - Vehicle pollution in extremely crowded cities like Tehran and Cairo has led to an increase in asthma and lung disease and is estimated to kill thousands of people annually.

Discuss the evidence and implications of what can be seen as shifting Middle East alliances today.

- We seem to be entering a period where alliances are shifting, but are unlikely to be the same alliances across all issues. - Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, face difficult choices in these shifting alliances coalitions: *Torn between immediacy and proximity of conflicts such as Yemen and the increasing call from the West that fighting from Syria, Iraq, and Libya requires large commitment from Saudis and other Gulf states. - An effective strategy against ISIS must include Arab participation in military coalition, or else it could look like the West against Islam. - Saudis and other Gulf states with the resources to engage militarily may engage if they see ISIS as posing a threat to their regimes, as ISIS publicly states. - Libya conflict seems to get more complex by the week, ISIS more successful in 2018-19 - Will Iranian Afghans in Syria give Assad more staying power? - ISIS hopes of coalition weariness as casualties in coalition mount is also a crucial issue. - It seems we are entering a period, at least in Middle East politics and perhaps beyond, where particular groups of issues will garner different coalitions-nothing the same, not clear, won't be the same forever. - This may be long-term, or it may be a prelude to a more fundamental realignment. ***These differences may allow for tactical cooperation, but are unlikely to lead to long-term political alliances.

What are possible strategies and instruments of power that the US and its allies should use and employ against the Islamic State?

-DISENGAGEMENT: The US would end most military operations against ISIS while expanding limiting resources to support allies. The US would focus on homeland security and ally capacity building. -CONTAINMENT: The US would prevent further expansion of the Islamic State by utilizing limited US military & civilian resources while building the capacity of America's partners. -ROLLBACK (LIGHT), RECOMMENDED: The US would seek to weaken and ultimately defeaet ISIS through the use of US Spec Ops, air power, and intelligence units; alongside capacity building efforts for allies. -ROLLBACK (HEAVY): The US would seek to weaken and ultimately defeat ISIS through the use of conventional American forces in ground combat supplemented by US Spec Ops and air support. Building capacity of local partners would still be an element of this strategy. *INSTRUMENTS OF POWER: -POLITICAL: It's extremely rare that insurgencies arise without weak governance. When governance becomes weak, it failes to address the needs of its citizens, often suffers from harmful corruption, and loses control over territory, especially remote areas. Insurgent use grievances against the government, combined with religious, nationalist, or other forms of extremist rhetoric, to gain and hold onto followers. For counterinsurgency, it's crucial that governments address legitimate grievances of the people and win them back over. In Iraq, one element of this would be allowing more opportunities for Sunnis in government. -MILITARY: This requires helping local governments, substate actors, and regional partners drive out the Islamic State and secure liberated populations. This means building the capacity of local actors (long run benefits), not just defeating ISIS for them (short run benefits). Assistance would come from spec ops forces, air support, and intelligence operatives. Although conventional forces training would be a key element as well. The US can also transfer weapons and equipment to local forces, ensuring that they have not only the training, but the arms to win fights. Loosening restrictions on air power could accelerate this aspect of war. -FINANCIAL: The US should continue to batter IS's oil revenue by bombing oil fields and supply chains and taking valuable territory. Taking territory also harms IS's financial state as they have fewer people upon whom they can impose heavy taxes. The US has also bombed IS cash storage sites, destroying up to hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cash. Turkey has tightened its border security, cutting back on smuggling of people and materials. Iraq's government has taken steps to make it harder for IS to transfer wealth, making government salaries unretrievable in IS territory and requiring all bank transfers to go through Baghdad. Iraq, the US, and other allies should continue denying IS access to the international financial system. -IDEOLOGICAL: IS has been able to recruit tens of thousands from across the world thanks to its multifaceted message emphasizing its extreme devotion to Islam, its success, and most importantly the core caliphate it holds in Iraq & Syria. Taking away this territory would be the best way to damage IS's brand, but there are other important steps as well. Islamic State media sites should be shut down or filled with disinformation. Recruiters must be targeted everywhere through aggressive warmaking in combat zones and through intelligence work in foreign lands. The US should focus on reforming more than punishing potential and returning IS members through a variety of social programs. It should encourage the Saudis and other allies to crackdown on the spread of sectarianism. And it should male sure it and its allies take care of refugees.

According to Jones et al.,'s Chapter 10, what are the components of the Islamic State's messages outside its core areas and how is that message promoted to influence potential adherents?

-The Islamic State mixes several components to attract recruits, shore up morale among existing supporters, and, to a lesser degree, intimidate its enemies. *SUCCESS: IS constantly shows video of its victories to demonstrate that it is a powerful force on the march. *ULTRAVIOLENCE: Showing brutal killings shocks most Muslims, but it appeals to a specific demographic of young men the Islamic State wants to reach. *SECTARIANISM: As the sectarian fault line widens between Shias and Sunnis, as well as other groups, playing up opposition to "apostates" has proven popular. *APOCALYPTICISM: IS plays up quotes from Mohammed and the Quran saying that the end times are near to argue that Muslims should be part of the final victories of the world's great cosmic battles before the Messiah comes. *THE GOOD LIFE IN THE ISLAMIC STATE: IS shows fulfilled women and proud men living prosperous and stable lives in a land safe for Muslims. *ISLAM UNDER ATTACK AND THE DEFENDER OF THE FAITH: IS shows video of coalition attacks, especially those which have killed civilians, to portray it as the defender of the Islamic heartland against foreign crusaders. *SOCIAL MEDIA: IS uses social media to greater effect than most any other Islamist group, recognizing that this tool allows it to bypass media gatekeepers and reach a wider (and younger) audience around the world. It is estimated that in 2015, IS drew on 80,000 total social media accounts to help spread its message. It would use social media to reach and then help identify potential recruits. Once identified, these recruits would be encouraged to enter de facto echo chambers, where only other IS supported would be speaking to them. More direct lines of communication like Skype would eventually be used. This process, and the bottom up nature of it allows IS to have a large propaganda apparatus while expending limited resources. -IS has also taken advantage of a fertile environment created by preachers in Europe who trumpet SECTARIANISM, HOSTILITY TO IRAN, and the PERFIDY OF THE WEST. While those preachers, frequently supported by money from Gulf States, claim to oppose IS, their messaging creates a fertile environment for IS propaganda. -FOREIGN FIGHTERS themselves help spread the message. They often return home and spread the message of their experience, and if they remain in Syria or Iraq they post regularly to social media describing their heroic experience. Additionally, upon returning home they are able to form cells and social networks which can help attract recruits and joining IS easier.

What are the 5 thorny fundamental issues in Israeli-Palestinian relations discussed in class? What are some of the possible solutions to them discussed in class? Why have those solutions not been implemented?

1. Right of Return: Holocaust restitution model: a sum of money is paid for resettlement. 2. Travel between West Bank & Gaza (high tech solutions) 3. Settlements: swap "suburban" (economic and commuting motivation for most settlers) settlements for East Jerusalem; return all others (Israeli public opinion has favored this). 4. Ending economic embargoes, particularly in Gaza. 5. Acknowledging Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state. *Possible Solutions: - Two state solution has always been the stated goal of negotiations: a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel. -Official Arab League peace plan also calls for a two-state solution. -Israel, the US, and the Arab League - and official Palestinian voices until recently - have decried a one-state solution, because there would not be a specific Palestinian state. -Arab League has not always been in line with Palestinians: support Palestinians rhetorically, but not always with practical action. *These cannot be applied or implemented because there is a lack of trust and a willingness to compromise between Israelis and Palestinians. (May have been impacted by past examples of Sadat and Rabin - both were assassinated after both sides agreed to compromise).

What did the June 2015 Herzliya survey of Saudi residents reveal about Saudi opinion? What are some implications of these findings?

Rare survey in SA reveals surprising results (June 2015): - Survey conducted by interdisciplinary center in Herzliya. - Israel & Saudi Arabia are longtime foes with no diplomatic relations. - Poll used proportional sampling of Saudis and was carried out on both mobile and land lines by Arabic speaking Israelis and co-administered by University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. -IMPORTANT FINDINGS: *53% of Saudis named Iran as their main adversary. *22% named ISIS as their main adversary. *18% named Israel as their main adversary. *85% support the Saudi-led Arab Peace initiative, which calls for peace with Israel in return for a full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.

What is meant by the terms "two-state solution" and "one-state solution"? What are the tradeoffs between them, and the problems with each?

When on the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (since they don't have trust and a willingness to compromise): *Two-State Solution: - Always been the stated goal of negotiations: a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel. - Official Arab League peace plan also calls for a two state solution. - Israel, the US, & the Arab League - and official Palestinian voices until recently - have decried a one-state solution, because there would not be a specific Palestinian state. - Arab League has not always been in line with Palestinians: support Palestinians rhetorically, but not always with practical action. *One-State Solution: What might happen with this? - Democratic vote? Minority rights? Shift from Jewish majority to "Palestinian Arab" majority if and when demographics shift? - Non-democratic control? Formally decried by each side! - Continuation of the difficult status quo?