Pols 200 Exam #2 Review
Duverger's Law
*"SMD plurality elections tend to produce 2-party competition"* - because people don't want to "waste" their vote - generalized by Cox to cases where DM > 1 - "the logic of wasted votes applies to any candidates whose expectations of success fall too far beyond the threshold of success" - as we figure out which parties are viable unsuccessful parties will drop out as they're not successful
ways to systematically measure regime type
*1) polity scores* - range from -10 to 10 (higher score is better) - focus on institutions and competitive elections - score of 6-7 or higher usually means it's a democracy *2) Freedom House scores* - scores on political rights and civil liberties range from 1 to 7 - low scores are "free" *3) V-Dem* - focus on measuring different conceptions of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian) - goes back to 1800
types of deterrence
*1) prosecutorial* - legal punishment *2) social* - informal calculation of how much someone will have to pay if they continue to maintain a bad reputation
what prevents states from locating a bargain both sides would prefer to a fight?
*1) strategic incentives to misrepresent information about their willingness to fight:* - states don't tell the truth - have incentive to avoid unfavorable resolution of an issue - want to act now because costs might be higher in the future - because it wants to get the other side to make concessions *2) credible commitment problem* - try to arrange a settlement but they don't trust each other to follow through - negotiations are going on to avoid paying costs of war but it falls apart *3) issue indivisibilities* - when you can't divide up what the two opposing sides want (land with valuable resources) - may not be possible to come to an agreement
institution definitions
*1)* rules that govern social interactions, constraining the behavior of and the options open to actors *2)* equilibrium behavior among participants in social interactions - not necessarily a political institution, just institutions in general - open up options to actors - can act strategically with another actor - actors understand how other actors will behave
types of federalism
*Congruent* - all of territorial units are very similar in their populations (in terms of interests) - shouldn't be that difficult to come up with single national policy *Incongruent* - important social and cultural differences across the units - different groups are geographically concentrated
in the event of writing a new constitution for a new regime:
*H1:* if forces are uneven and known --> institutions will be stable as long as the balance of force continues - have a weak actor and strong actor; if strong actor maintains its strength, constitution will favor them *H2:* if forces are balanced and known --> any outcomes is possible (e.g., civil war, a dysfunctional agreement, institutions that last) - neither side has any incentive to give in - not likely to last *H3:* if balance of forces is unknown --> institutions will contain a lot of checks to protect losers - this is the US - as the balance of power bounces back and forth, winners may become losers and vice versa, but losers are okay with that because they know they're protected
after a civil war ends, does it often start again?
*No* - 44% chance of returning to conflict within 5 years - the original reason for the conflict still exists - due to the 1st civil war's impact (level of economic development decreased) - the 1st civil war created a diaspora community that may help finance continued war - many people acquired weapons and learned how to fight - hatreds built up across the competing groups from the prior war
does a constitution have to be a single document?
*No* - can be verbal (Iroquois) - verbal presentation very carefully maintained by the society
does a constitution have to be written?
*No* - there are some dangers to not having a written document - if there isn't a constitution, you can't have a high court rule on whether some act is constitutional or not because there is no constitution to refer to - results in legislature being supreme - Britain and Israel don't have written constitutions but are both still democracies - BUT if a constitution is not written that makes it completely flexible and there is no judicial review
where can rebel groups get funding?
*a wealthy leader* - Osama bin Laden came from a very wealthy family and helped fund the Taliban on his own *donations* - people may leave due to civil war but still care about the war in their country and may send money back to the side they support *a commercial enterprise - often built on violence* - extortion - sell protection or punish people who don't buy protection
why are coalitions often larger than "minimum winning"?
*concern about policy - ideologically compatible parties* - if the parties that you agree with collectively make too big a number then that's okay because you get along and agree ideologically *pivotal party - contains the median member of parliament* - pivotal party: party in the center of ideological contiuum - can draw in opposition parties when bills come up *a party may want to be out of government for a while* - if things aren't going well or don't want to be blamed for things going wrong some parties may choose to be out of power for a period of time
gerrymandering
*drawing electoral district lines to advantage a specific party* - this is a big issue in the US - state legislatures draw lines every 10 years (seats are reapportioned after every census) - 2 strategies: 1) packing - the process of drawing district lines and packing in your opponents into as few districts as possible - if more districts = more votes, the fewer the districts there are the fewer votes the opposition party will get - decrease opponents strength and influence 2) cracking - taking one district and cracking it into several pieces - opposite of packing - usually done in districts where your opponent has many supporters - cracking spreads these supporters out among many districts, denying the opposition a lot of votes and breaking the opponents voting bloc
political institution definition
*establish guidelines for deliberation, the aggregation of preferences into collective decisions, and the implementation of those decisions* - agree on how to make a decision - voting is a way we aggregate preferences
can arms control treaties prevent arms races?
*findings: YES, even after accounting for strategic selection into the treaty* - arms control treaties have been in use since Ancient Greece - nuclear weapons are expensive to build and true that most countries can't build nuclear weapons - some believe countries that have capacity to build sign the treaty and just violate it later - methodological challenge: countries select into the treaty themselves; not a requirement (violation of random assignment) - found that some people do violate treaty (not a perfect system), but that country can then be sanctioned and just having signed the NPT reduces likelihood that they will pursue nuclear weapons - substantive impact of NPT ratification is important for countries that "might be considered reasonable candidates for proliferation"
can international organizations deter human rights abuses?
*findings: YES, the ICC has a deterrent effect for both governments and rebel groups* - the court has jurisdiction in a domain where military and strategic logic generally prevails, though it does not have its own police force (has no enforcement mechanism) - rebel groups don't ratify ICC but can still be subject to it - when ICC takes action, reduces intentional civilian killings - if countries pass laws in keeping with ICC standards, deterrence occurs - for rebel groups: doesn't matter if your government signs the treaty; certain types of rebel groups care a great deal about their reputation and social deterrence has an effect here
parchment institution
*formal, written down (e.g., constitution, treaties, laws)* - writing down the rules allows actors to strategize to get where they want to be - ex: rules of elections let us know how the candidates will run their campaigns - BUT, it is not required that an institution be formal or written down (ex: societal norms are informal institutions that are not written down, yet they are followed)
key characteristics of a consociational democracy
*grand coalition:* - an arrangement in a multi-party system in which the two largest political parties of opposing political ideologies unite in a coalition government *mutual veto* - a lot of groups in society have the ability to say "no" to a policy - makes it hard to get things done *proportionality* - giving seats in the legislature or other parts of government to groups in proportion to their size *segmental autonomy* - could be federalism or granting rights to certain groups - to allow local groups to make their own policy - prevent government from doing hurtful things to their group
semi-presidentialism (a hybrid system)
*has both a president and a PM* - both have real power - people vote for parliament which selects PM and people vote for president who has real power - if PM and president are from the same party then the president is "real" head - need to explore which one is the "real" head of government with policy making power, and note that this can change over time *cohabitation* - when the president and PM are from different parties - so look at which one most recently won an election - ex: in France the president is elected and during their term there is a parliamentary election; the one who is elected most recently in this situation is the individual who has the most power; doesn't happen that often
types of veto players:
*institutional* - including the legislature, committees, parties, the president - rules of legislative interaction inside a particular chamber or among different institutions *partisan* - is there a stable and cohesive majority or not - if one party has a huge voting block then they have a lot more power
decentralization (Escobar-Lemmon) why would policy makers in the national government make a policy that decreases their power?
*internal pressure* - international lending agents put pressure on federal governments to give power to local governments because it's more efficient (local government may know a better way to run things) *domestic political motives* - future electoral prospects of a party - realize your party may not always be in power and want to make sure that if someone else wins they won't have too much power - elected officials from districts with great capacity
turnout buying
*monitoring whether people who received rewards actually showed up to vote (not monitoring how you vote, but if you vote)* - what you're actually trying to buy is turnout - strategy: to reward unmobilized supporters of the party - use the grim trigger strategy - argues parties do need to mobilize supporters - parties are appealing to their supporters so they show up - but parties monitor who turns out and continues to give benefits as long as people keep showing up
vote buying
*offering cash or minor consumption goods to voters in exchange for their vote* - what it takes to get a voter depends on their needs - people in middle class don't have needs that are extensive enough to buy votes so candidates may campaign on policy instead in middle-class districts
paths to transformation of structures of political participation and legitimation (plural democracy and mass-party autocracy)
*plural democracy:* - we the people have influence in government - we are selecting the government and giving the right to govern *mass-party autocracy:* - not a democracy, but have a mass base political party backing the government - more people involved than in an absolute monarchy - people now have the right to political expression - governments started granting more influence to a greater chunk of people because there was too much to get done (didn't want to share power but needed to)
sources of presidential power
*powers defined in the constitution (parchment powers)* - explicit powers given to president in the constitution - ex: what kind of veto the president has; rights to initiate legislation *strength and cohesion of the president's party in the legislature (partisan powers)* - strength has to do with that % of seats the party holds - whether or not the party sticks together - problem for president in US (low cost for legislators not to side with US president) *direct population election --> though this power varies with how big a % of votes the president actually won* - president campaigns all over the country when no one else does - a lot stronger with a higher % of popular vote
waves of democratization
*second wave* - began after WW2, but many of the new democracies fell (not all though) *third wave* - began in 1974 in southern Europe - spread to Latin America, then Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia - good news: there hasn't been a "reserve wave" where many democratic regimes fall and authoritarian regimes are installed - BUT many installed democracies are not making rapid progress toward consolidation
presidential systems - key characteristics
*separate selection of president and congress* - people cast votes for chief executive and votes for congress *separate survival* - constitution says what the term is for a congressperson and what the term is for president and neither can shorten the term of the other
how to design an effective gender quota
*size of the quota* - can play around with percentage required to see what the threshold is to increase women's representation to an appropriate level *placement mandate* - if you have a 30% quota, but the women go to the bottom of the list in a PR system then no women will be elected and quota is useless *strong enforcement mechanism* - just a suggestion if there isn't an enforcement mechanism - need effective sanctions - if the sanction of noncompliance means that party won't be able to run at all, more likely than not they'll comply
rebel organization characteristics
*typical size* - 500-5000 members - typically pretty small *hierarchical, often with a charismatic leader and punishment for dissent* - power often in the hands of one person - high degree of discipline and punishment for dissent from the organization *a political organization* - it has to have structure - have to recruit members *a military organization* - has to recruit, train, command troops - need military equipment - has to survive militarily *a business organization* - costs money to run an organization - have to pay their troops because they're working full time
parliamentary systems - key characteristics
*voters elect the parliament* *parliament selects the executive (cabinet)* - don't have separate selection (only select parliament) *parliament can dismiss the cabinet and prime minister* - using vote of no confidence - *if a single party wins in an election by a majority, there will not be a vote of no confidence because the majority party picked the executive* - *if there is not a single party that has a majority or it is not cohesive then executive could still be brought down*
competitive authoritarian regimes
- *regimes that combine democratic rules with authoritarian practices* - do not meet minimalist standards for a democracy but also fall short of complete authoritarianism - government can't avoid holding elections and can't get away with banning opposition - government frequently and seriously violates the rules so the playing field is not level between government and opposition - government abuses state resources, does not allow a free media, and harasses the opposition - BUT opposition can speak out in the legislature
conditional theory
- 1st state ratifies the ICC - 2nd ICC jurisdiction increases the chances of being punished for violations (deterrent to committing crimes) - BUT punishment is uncertain, SO: --> deterrent should work better for actors that are sensitive to maintaining their legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic public or the international community --> depends on the likelihood of getting caught and how serious the punishment is - public display of the ICC's power will strengthen deterrence - state implementation of ICC-consistent laws will aid deterrence - propensity to commit a crime = function of 1) likelihood of being caught and 2) cost of punishment
single member districts (SMD)
- DM = 1 - SMD-plurality: just have to have the highest number of votes (not necessarily more than 50%) - SMD-majority: have to get at least 50% of vote - underrepresent small parties
proportional representation (PR)
- DM = >1 *closed and blocked list:* - you vote for the party that you like - can see who's running on the ballot but can't change the order of the list (can't pick your own candidate) - creates strong incentive for elected officials to work towards their party (campaign for their party rather than for themselves) *open list* - party still presents a list of names, but you can either vote for entire party or vote for a particular person on that list - campaign for themselves, not just for the party because you're also competing against other candidates in your own party
polyarchy (Dahl 1971)
- Dahl argues that the world has never seen a complete democracy - freedom to form and join organizations - freedom of expression - right to vote by (nearly) everyone in regular elections - eligibility for public office - right of political leaders to compete for support and votes - alternative sources of information - free and fair elections - institutions for making policies depend on voters and other expressions of preferences - a shield to protect individual rights against government excess - Dahl is interested in exploring when you have enough of these items to be considered a democracy
Mohawk preeminence
- Mohawk was "1st among equals" - the Confederation granted sufficient protection to the other nations to make it worth staying in the Confederation - Mohawks were only ones who could call a meeting and could frame debate - impossible for any other nation to frame an alternative solution
what attributes of electoral systems can make small parties more electorally viable?
- PR with large DM - having a larger number of seats up for grabs - if a lot of the party's supporters are in one particular area - when president has to win outright majority, and if not then a runoff is held - no (or very low) electoral threshold - when small parties are allowed to run their own list but can formally link their list to another list
cabinets in presidential and parliamentary systems
- Presidential: cabinet ministers are advisors who work for the president - Parliamentary: (especially with a coalition) more like co-equal participants, a collegial executive
mixed member
- a system in which some representatives from a district are elected via single member elections and others are from proportional representation
authoritarianism
- a very broad category - *all types of regimes that are not democracies, and not totalitarian (spectrum with totalitarian on one end and democracy on the other)* - includes military regimes, single party regimes, single-party dominant regimes (has other parties but they can't win), monarchy, and personalist dictators
consociational democracy
- advocate of more consensual systems of government - Lijphart proposed this as a way to govern via democracy in a highly divided society - proposed as a possibility for Colombia and South Africa - difficult to make work
common rationalist arguments made in the literature for causes of war
- anarchy - expected benefits exceed expected costs - rational preventive war - rational miscalculation due to lack of information - rational miscalculation or disagreement about relative power
power of monarchs
- at the time of the US and French revolutions, monarchs dominated the political world, and they claimed to have absolute power (in reality "most social and economic life was autonomous from state control and extraction") - governments have gotten broader powers: broadened rights of population participation; developed high capacity bureaucracies that enabled the state to do more; granted more policy making power; not democratization but more decision making by the people
how does vote buying work when the ballot is secret?
- ballot supposed to be secret in a democracy - works in smaller towns and cities where social relations facilitate monitoring voters - works where party operatives can closely observe the person voting
Aristotle's typology of regime types
- based on: 1) number of people who govern, 2) whether rulers govern in the common interest or their own interest - *Aristocracy* looked upon as governing in the interest of the country vs *Oligarchy* which is ruled by the rich to benefit themselves - in *Democracy* the poor rule in their own self-interest vs *Polity* where everyone gets the right to participate and looking out for the best interest of the country - *Kingship* if the one in charge rules in the best interest of the people vs *Tyranny* if the one in charge rules in their own self-interest
overcoming the cheap talk problem
- building weapons: if Country A has a large arsenal of weapons and threatens an attack then it may seem more believable - mobilizing troops: if troops are already mobilized threat may be more credible - signing alliance treaties: alliances are only as good as their credibility and there is an incentive to follow through with protecting an ally to keep reputation - support troops in a foreign land - create domestic political costs: if a democratic leader states that they will defend an ally and they don't, they will likely pay costs at home in the ballot box
constitution as an institution
- can coordinate expectations among actors about the limits on state authority (have mutual expectations about behavior and this is what allows politicians to work efficiently) - can provide ideas about the likely actions actors will take when a new topic of conflict comes up (we know what Congress can and cannot do in certain situations) - overall, it enables actors to anticipate the actions of other actors, and thus to act strategically to pursue their policy interests - comforting to us because we can strategize how we get what we want in politics --> media distressed because Trump doesn't follow political norms - BUT works differently in an authoritarian regime because they often ignore the constitution (not an indicator of how actors will act as a result)
importance of self-enforcement (institutions)
- can't have the police follow us around all the time - have to have ways to self-enforce our interactions
survival of a rebel group is facilitated by:
- cheap sources of equipment: weapons are available for cheap on the black market - concealing terrain: lots of forested, mountainous terrain - government that lacks capability: if locals aren't willing to pass information to government, makes it easier for rebels to survive; if the fighting has been going on for a while, government may get weaker and won't be able to govern - if the group can make money from its "business": may not want to quit fighting if they're making money
poverty as the cause of civil war
- civil war is heavily concentrated in the poorest countries - war causes poverty, but the more important reason for the concentration is that poverty increases the likelihood of civil war - key root cause: failure of economic development, especially when paired with stagnant and unequal distribution of income and dependence on primary commodities for export - countries that have valuable natural resource are the areas where you see civil wars because the resource can help fund the civil war and because sometimes the source only benefits certain people in the country
consolidation of democracy
- consolidation ≠ persistence (does not equal number of years a particular regime has been governing the country - consolidation of a democratic regime involves: 1) removing perverse (undemocratic) elements 2) habituation to resolving conflicts that arise through democratic processes (if people aren't willing to limit themselves to democratic processes to solve inevitable conflict, there will be a problem) - BUT, a democratic regime can backslide or regress away from consolidation even if a country's government has reached the point where it is a consolidated democracy (ex: Venezuela, Russia)
minority government
- could be one party of multiparty but does not represent majority in congress - if there doesn't have to be an investiture vote you might have a minority government - if there are parties who don't go into the coalition but agree to back the government
decentralization --> comes in different forms
- decentralization is when the national government gives power to lower levels of government *1) political* - when the national government decides it's going to start having elections for things like mayors and governors instead of the federal government appointing them - may not all be cooperative with the federal government, so it's a big change *2) Fiscal* - national government gives local units of government some taxing powers *3) Administrative* - local units of government get specific competencies that they're in charge of - ex: health care
clientelism
- did not stop with the installation of democratic regimes and elections - parties will campaign on policy when that is an efficient way to win votes - (poor) voters still have needs and establishing democracy doesn't make those needs go away
consensus model
- differ over the extent of concentration or diffusion of power - consensus models seek to maximize the size of the majority, to share and disperse power - idea that everybody who's affected by a policy decision should have a chance to give their input - executive power: multi-party coalition (MPC executive is distributing power among more groups) - executive-legislative relations: balance of power (legislature plays a more powerful role in decision making) - number of important political parties: more than 2 - electoral system: proportional representation (can give a quite proportional result) - interest group system: coordinated "corporatist" groups (corporatist groups: power concentrated) - geographic division of power: federal and decentralized - institutional distribution of power: equally strong chambers (bicameral: two chambers, one may be weaker or each has separate and distinct power) - ease of amending the constitution: judicial review (adds another player) - autonomy of central bank: independent (if autonomous, is a distinct actor that can stop policy)
majoritarian model
- differ over the extent of concentration or diffusion of power - majority rule can be a bare majority, or even a plurality - executive power: single party - executive-legislative relations: executive dominance (executive can call the shots) - number of important political parties: 2 - electoral system: majoritarian and disproportional - interest group system: free-for-all competition - geographic division of power: unitary (all power concentrated at one level of government) and centralized - institutional distribution of power: unicameral or asymmetrical legislature (unicameral: one chamber/concentrating power) - ease of amending the constitution: flexible (concentrated power) - who can interpret the constitution: legislature has final say - autonomy of a central bank: dependent on executive (if bank works for president, just concentrating more power with the executive)
does ethnic or religious diversity cause civil war?
- diversity is associated with reduced risk of civil war - the society will be fragmented, but ethnic and religious groups provide a basis for social networks - social networks can help people get their needs attended to - limited ethnic o differentiation (1 group with about 50% of the population) can be dangerous, particularly if a minority group comes to fear permanent exclusion, even in a democratic regime - if it doesn't look like your group will ever hold any power because one ethnic group is always in power, people might look to overthrow the system - polarization between two equal sized groups is also dangerous (although just because you have people of different ethnic groups doesn't mean they can't get along)
selection of sachems (Confederation Council Members for each Nation)
- each nation had a different number of sachems they could select (each nation gets on vote though) - matrilineal - based on status - women nominated - if men disapproved of the nominee they nominated someone from among themselves - if men and women could not agree, the sitting sachems from that clan made the final decision - NOT democratic - selection by a hereditary oligarchy (set of elite families) - not an inherited position - a sachem could be replaced by the 5 members of the Council of War Chiefs, or clubbed to death by the men of the Great Council of War
what makes a country prone to civil war
- economic inequality - polarization of ideologies - if citizens are triply dissatisfied - ethnic diversity - high levels of corruption - strong disagreements over who should be in power - disagreement over indivisible things
NPT enforcement
- enforcement is handled mostly by individual countries - relies on countries to sanction others who are in violation of the treaty - possible methods of enforcing compliance: 1) economic sanctions 2) preemptive strikes 3) violating country gets a bad reputation
does ethnic fragmentation have to lead to political violence?
- ethnic divisions in society in and of themselves aren't necessarily dangerous - outbidding argument - Chandra: ethnic parties can sustain a democratic system when institutions "foster multiple dimensions of ethnic identity"
characteristics of authoritarian regimes
- everything between totalitarian regime and democratic regime - limited political pluralism (totalitarian = no pluralism and democratic = complete pluralism) - without elaborate and guiding ideology - without intensive or extensive political mobilization (generally like population to stay out of politics but occasionally like people to come out and support leader) - a leader or small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable limits - BUT authoritarian regimes may hold elections (ex: Russia)
institutions and ethnic identity
- fixed ethnic identities do increase the risk of destabilizing political behavior - BUT ethnic identities can be fluid IF the institutional context promotes it - conclusion: some institutional contexts produce benign forms of ethnic politics
disproportionality
- for a party, it refers to the difference between the share of the vote the party received and the share of seats that they win - don't want to just count votes because votes don't necessarily indicate outcome in every election (Hillary won popular vote in 2016 but didn't win election) - big parties count more
"The Great Binding Law" of the Iroquois Confederation
- formed a constitution when most places didn't have constitutions at all - oral --> maintained in society - highly successful for at least 100 years (until Europeans showed up) - 5 nations: Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga - primary purpose to: 1) maintain peace among its members (fighting was wasting resources), 2) ability to organize against common threats - decision-making required unanimity in the Confederation Council (each nation was veto player)
consequences of electoral rules for how government works
- government formation (the more parties, the more options you have to form a coalition and the more parties you may need to form a coalition) - governability - number of veto players (likely to be greater with more parties) - what types of people and groups are represented
group-specific grievances and civil war
- group-specific grievances are more likely to motivate people to participate in a rebel group --> to overcome the collective action problem - if rebellion will improve conditions for everyone, then nobody has an incentive to fight because they will still get the benefit of change if others do the fighting (collective action problem) - group-specific grievances will motivate people to contribute because they need people to be active to have any benefits after the fight
federal systems - key characteristics
- guaranteed division of power between different levels of government (neither one can take away the power of the other) - each level has some areas on which its decisions are final - bicameral legislature (one of the chambers explicitly represents localities) - written constitution (needs to be difficult to amend) - high court can use its power of judicial review to protect the constitution and adjudicate disputes between the levels of government - federal systems intended to guarantee that federal relationship continues
outbidding
- if ethnicities have been politicized, inevitably gives rise to ethnic parties (affects the rest of the party system) - one party outbidding another and pulling people apart - problem with outbidding: assumes that "ethnic identities are fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics" rather than being "fluid, multidimensional and endogenous to competitive politics"
agenda setting
- if the agenda setters in congress can keep a bill from coming to a vote they can preserve the status quo (will have total control; we've seen this happen a lot in the last few months in the US) - if the president can force a bill onto the congress schedule they can "pry open the gates" (happens a lot in Latin American countries but doesn't necessarily mean the president will get what they want) - who gets to be on conference committees in bicameral system (because this committee hashes out differences in bills from the two chambers; lots of power) - if an actor can introduce an "amendatory observation" (ex: in France, the president can call a debate to a stop and propose a final amendment to the bill) - rules have huge impact on what kinds of policies a government can come up with - exclusive initiation rights: president can initiate bills
Electoral Integrity Index
- index score from 0 to 100 based on electoral authorities, laws, procedures, district boundaries, voter registration, party/candidate registration, media coverage, campaign finance, voting process and count - elections can be flawed for diverse reasons that vary across countries - US: mean score of 61 (lowest index score of the long-established democracies in affluent societies - reasons for US score: electoral laws, voter registration, district boundary issues - Russia: in the 40-49 range - reasons for Russian score: government actions to prevent the consolidation of a genuine opposition, absence of free press, loyalist security forces, widespread voter intimidation, jailing of political opponents - El Salvador: 54 - Guatemala: 48 - Honduras: 37 - Nicaragua: 36 - Mexico: 61 (same as US) - countries with scores in very high range: Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Scandinavian countries
ethnic party
- makes an appeal to voters as the champion of 1 group to the exclusion of other groups - parties need to market themselves - exclusion is important because it will push parties apart and they have to compete for membership and leave everyone else out
who would not want to use a majoritarian system?
- minority parties would want to avoid a majoritarian system because they won't have a say - if you're always a small group - a society divided on religious, linguistic, ethnic, or cultural lines - if there's one group that's always going to be on the side
district magnitude (DM)
- number of candidates to be elected in a district - ex: elect one person to House per district in our country - impacts how proportional results are going to be (if you get 49% of the vote, you may get nothing depending on DM) - also impacts likely number of parties (if you know you have to come in first to get anything, there will be fewer total parties)
conflict trap
- once you start fighting it's hard to negotiate and stop
examples of institutions
- professor Taylor-Robinson's syllabus - bureaucracies - religion (self-enforced by believers) - US Constitution - Congress: how they make decisions - an electoral institution: rules by which an election will be conducted
context matters for how institutions work
- regimes around the world may look very similar to ours on paper, but operate differently in actuality - ex: open list ballots in Finland and Honduras are very similar even though Finland is much richer and is a much more well established democracy
does inequality cause civil war?
- research finds no effect for either income or land inequality explaining the start of conflict - inequality is ubiquitous - BUT they are related to conflict lasting longer once it starts - problematic to test because there are inequalities everywhere but most countries don't experience civil war
why institutions matter
- the form of institution adopted in a country "has consequences for the distribution of power", and politics is about who has power - different methods of preference aggregation will produce different policy results, even if actors have the same set of preferences - ex: if you have a FPTP electoral system and receive 49% of the vote, you either lose or must do a runoff - BUT, while institutions are sticky, they can be changed (abolition of slavery, women's vote, etc.)
electoral threshold
- the minimum share of the primary vote which a candidate or political party requires to achieve before they become entitled to any representation in a legislature - if more parties are going to be likely to get seats there could be a very large number of parties
veto players and agenda setting
- the rules that structure debate in the legislature shape legislative outcomes - ability to influence the legislative agenda is a valuable resource for affecting and preventing policy change - if you want to prevent legislation then these rules are very important - positional importance: relative ideological positions of all actors - if there is a cohesive party that has a majority, that party will be able to get things done regardless of the formal rules
characteristics of totalitarian regimes
- totalistic ideology (ideology that explains everything) - single, mass party (want to mobilize people, but there can't be competition) - terroristic police force (ex: under Stalin and Hitler) - monopolistic control over communications, economy, and weapons - hard to see whether you actually have total control in this type of society - GOAL: total penetration of society to achieve dreams and attempt to transform the society
why is civil war so hard to end?
- typically last for around 7 years - government may not want to concede to violence because it sends a signal that violence works (don't want want to make concessions because they don't want to reward violence) - a credible commitment to the agreement is difficult (not that the government is unwilling to make concessions, if other side doesn't believe them can't end violence) - very low income in the country - makes it low cost to sustain the rebellion - distinct ethnic groups can create support for both the rebels and the government, with group hatreds increasing over time - war can become more economic/entrepreneurial (rebel groups can become more of a business)
why adopt a federal system?
- unitary governments are much more common - two situations where it's practical: *1) large territory* - for pragmatic reasons (especially before internet) - China is an exception: very large but have a unitary system *2) plural society --> to give autonomy to distinct minorities who are regionally concentrated* - ex: Belgium is small but extraordinarily diverse
unitary systems - key characteristics
- unitary system meaning: national government in charge (local governments don't have autonomy) - local governments serve at the pleasure of the national government - powers of the local government are not constitutionally guaranteed - local governments are financially dependent on the central government (because money is collected by national government and distributed to local governments)
principal-agent problems
- when a coalition cabinet delegates cabinet portfolios to different parties it creates principal-agent problems - agent: in this case a minister - principal: all the parties in the coalition - agent may feel differently than the principal, so there's an advantage to police the agent to be sure they're playing by the rules - possible means of oversight include: junior minsters from a different party or committees in parliament
cheap talk
- when states say, "now we won't attack you" and other states don't believe them - have to overcome this problem - there are some ways to get around this
{consequences of electoral rules for the likely number of parties} mechanical effect
- with a plurality rule, all but the 2 strongest parties are severely underrepresented unless a minority group is geographically concentrated - SMD elections benefit larger parties, which decreases the number of small parties
various electoral formulas
1) Single member district (SMD) 2) proportional representation (PR) 3) mixed member
how can district lines be drawn to avoid the temptation of gerrymandering?
1) maintaining existing district lines 2) minimizing geographic size of rural districts 3) make it a nonpartisan procedure
prediction about the use of junior ministers
1) more likely when the portfolio is important - because you really care about that department 2) less likely when parties are ideologically close - if you agree on most things, there's no need to monitor 3) less likely when committees in the parliament are strong - don't need oversight because the parliament will do that for you
necessary "minimalist" characteristics to qualify as a democracy (Mainwaring et al. 2001)
1) sponsors free and fair competitive elections 2) allows for inclusive adult citizenship 3) protects civil liberties and political rights 4) one in which elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control - argues that if you don't have all 4 of these you are not a democracy - D = democracy - SD = semi democracy - A = authoritarian
{consequences of electoral rules for the likely number of parties} psychological effect
1) voters learn not to waste their vote 2) political aspirants prefer to run under a party that can win - voters figure out there's no point in voting for the Libertarian party in the US because they'll never win a major election with our current rules
Freedom House trends
1987-1997: things were getting better (more free) 1997-2017: blue bar (not free) getting bigger --> less free
democracy definition
government by and for the people
malapportionment
districts that have substantially unequal voting populations or when legislators represent different numbers of people because people move around in between the censuses
what is the effect when the government attacks insurgent communities?
increased civilian support for the insurgents when government attacks produce civilian casualties
ethnic identity
nominal membership in an ascriptive category, including race, language, caste, or religion
grim trigger strategy
reward a particular individual until he or she fails to cooperate (i.e., show up to vote), after which the party never offers another reward
civil war definition
when an identifiable rebel organization challenges the government military and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 5% on each side
