Property Law Final

Movie star Mina is a tenant in Oliver's apartment building. Seeking to sell the building, Oliver places an advertisement in the local newspaper which reads: "$2,500,000. Luxury 3-unit apartment complex. Home of famous movie star Mina. Call 333-3333." Has Oliver violated Mina's right of publicity?

Yes, because Oliver used Mina's name in order to gain a commercial advantage. As you saw in White, the common law right of publicity is violated when a person appropriates a celebrity's name or likeness to his advantage, unless the celebrity consents. Here, O seems to be using Mina's name in order to help sell his building, almost as if Mina were endorsing a product

Willie owned a small house on a quarter acre of land (Greenacre). In 2000, Sean entered Greenacre and began to meet all the elements for adverse possession. Willie was born in 1995. The statutory period in this jurisdiction is ten years. A state statute also suspends the running of the statutory period during the disability and for five years after the disability ends. The age of majority is 18. What is the earliest date that Sean could perfect title by adverse possession?

2015 Incorrect. The five year period is added to the date the disability ends (2013), not to the end of the normal statutory period (2010). 2018 Correct. Willie's disability ended in 2013 (he was five when Sean entered and became 18 in 2013). Adding the additional five year period that the statute grants an owner to protect his interest, the earliest Sean could gain title is 2018 (2013 + 5).

Obe conveyed Greenacre to "Ben so long as it is used as a school, and if such use ever ceases, then to Carl, if living." At the time of the grant, Ben is 90 years old and Carl is five years old. In a jurisdiction that applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, what does Carl have?

Carl has an executory interest. Carl has an executory interest because it is an interest in a third party that follows a fee simple defeasible. A remainder cannot follow a vested fee simple. The Rule Against Perpetuities is not violated because the interest must vest, if at all, during Carl's life; the conveyance reads "...to Carl, if living".

Which of the following statements is incorrect about time limits on possibility of reverter?

Following a breach of condition, the holder of a possibility of reverter must exercise that interest within a reasonable time. This statement is incorrect. A possibility of reverter always follows a fee simple determinable - an estate that automatically ends when a certain event or condition occurs. The possibility of reverter automatically becomes possessory. The holder does not need to do anything. By contrast, a right of entry always follows a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. When the condition occurs, the transferor can elect to renter the property, as long as the holder does so within a reasonable time.

Tex owned a 200-acre tract of unimproved land in a remote corner of County, which he used for cattle ranching. All the other properties in the areas were also used for cattle ranching. Tex's land was zoned A-10, which permitted general agricultural use and also allowed the owner to build one home per every 100 acres. Tex applied to County to have his land rezoned into the R-4 zone, which permits 4 homes per acre. County's general plan mentions the need to "create more housing opportunities in our county." County rezoned the land. Later, a local environmental group filed a lawsuit to challenge the decision as spot zoning. What is their best reasoning for spot zoning?

The nature of the benefits from the decision cut in favor of finding spot zoning. The rezoning primarily benefits Tex, not the public in general; this project is a form of "leap frog" development

Leroy owned a four-story apartment building, painted light blue. He leased the units on the lower three floors to tenants, but retained the fourth floor penthouse as his personal residence. Leroy extended the penthouse balcony outward for 20 feet in order to install a new hot tub; the extension was painted light blue to match the rest of the building. Although Leroy did not realize it, 10 feet of the new balcony extension protruded into airspace over a vacant lot owned by Bill. Leroy used the hot tub once, did not like it, and never used his balcony again for the next four years. Leroy then sold the building to Abby, who immediately occupied the penthouse apartment and used the hot tub daily for the next two years; Abby did not notice that any part of the balcony extended into Bill's airspace. Bill never visited his lot after the balcony extension was built. The period for adverse possession in the jurisdiction is five years. Who owns the airspace occupied by the outermost 10 feet of the balcony extension in most jurisdictions?

Abby, because the adverse possession elements are satisfied. The best answer is that the adverse possession elements are satisfied. The balcony extension owned by Leroy/Abby physically occupied the airspace; this occupancy was exclusive; it was open and notorious because the extension could have been seen from the ground surface; it was adverse and hostile under the good faith test because neither Leroy or Abby knew the balcony extended into Bill's airspace, and under the objective test their conduct satisfies the other adverse possession requirements; the balcony extension continually occupied the airspace; and Abby can tack her two years of possession onto Leroy's four years of possession to meet the six year period because Leroy's conveyance to Abby created privity between them

Lance owned Greenacre in fee simple absolute. In 1998, Lance conveyed Greenacre to Julian by a valid deed which read "to Julian for life." In 2000, Kobe entered Greenacre and began to adversely possess it. Kobe occupied Greenacre for the next 13 years. In 2013, Julian died. Julian's will provided that his son, Rick, receive all his assets. In 2014, Kobe married Ada and made the following oral declaration: "I give Greenacre to my beloved wife Ada." The statutory period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is ten years. In 2014, who owns Greenacre?

Lance Lance regained fee simple title to Greenacre upon Julian's death in 2013. Remember, Lance only conveyed a life estate to Julian, retaining a reversion in himself. Kobe merely adversely possessed the life estate held by Julian. When Julian died, Kobe's title ended and Lance regained the fee simple

Will owned a mountain cabin that he used during his summer vacations. He borrowed $50,000 from Bank, secured by a mortgage on the cabin. He then leased the cabin to Tina for a ten-year term pursuant to a written lease. Tina planned to use the cabin during her summer vacations, but she became so busy at work that she was unable to visit it. Abe noticed that the cabin was vacant, took possession, and lived there on a full-time basis for six years. Neither Will nor Tina ever visited the cabin during this period. The adverse possession period in the jurisdiction is five years. Assuming that Abe satisfied all adverse possession elements, what is the state of title to the property?

Abe has a term of years tenancy, Will has a reversion, and the property is encumbered by Bank's mortgage. Abe's adverse possession had no effect on Will's reversion or the Bank's mortgage because neither of them was entitled to present possession of the cabin. Abe received only Tina's term of years tenancy.

Abe owned a residential condominium unit on the 12th floor of a highrise tower in a large city. But Abe never used the unit because he lived in Switzerland. Abe's daughter Beth bribed the building superintendent to give her a key to the unit; over the next 7 years, she spent 12 hours each day practicing the cello there. When Beth decided to move to Japan, her cousin Connie asked if she could use the unit to compose songs; Beth replied "Of course. Here's the key." Connie visited the unit every Tuesday for 10 hours to write songs. When Abe returned 4 years later, Connie claimed title by adverse possession. Assume that the period for adverse possession in the state is 5 years. Connie sued Abe for a declaratory judgment that she owned the unit. Who will win the lawsuit?

Abe, because Connie cannot tack on Beth's period of possession. The privity required for tacking usually arises from a deed; here, the only arrangement between Beth and Connie was a brief conversation. Even under the liberal standard that you saw in Howard, privity is not present. There is no "reasonable connection" between Beth and Connie which raises Connie's claim "above the status of the wrongdoer or the trespasser."

Sienna owned two contiguous parcels. One year ago, she built a house on the eastern most parcel (Eastacre), but failed to develop the western most parcel (Westacre). Given the topography of Eastacre, it would have been extremely difficult and very costly to construct an access road to connect her house with the county road to the east. Consequently, Sienna built a dirt roadway over Westacre to connect her house with a county road to the west and used the roadway almost daily. A few months later, Sienna sold Westacre to Josie. Shortly thereafter, a new state highway was built bordering Eastacre on the north. It then became very convenient for Sienna to access her home directly from the highway rather than driving across Westacre. Recently when Sienna attempted to drive her car across Westacre, she found her access barred by a new gate Josie had erected. Josie was standing by the gate and shouted, "Access your home by means of the state highway. I no longer want you on my land." Traditionally, which easement to cross Westacre, if any, would Sienna have?

An implied easement by prior existing use. Sienna has met the three elements required for an implied easement by prior existing use: severance of land held in common ownership (Sienna sold Westacre to Josie), an existing, apparent, and continuous use of one parcel for the benefit of the other (access over the dirt road), and reasonable necessity for that use (no other reasonable means of accessing Eastacre). Once an implied easement by prior existing use is established, it is not terminated if the necessity ends. Therefore, the implied easement by prior existing use (using the dirt road to access Eastacre) would not end when better access (the state highway) became available.

Bob holds title to Redacre, a 100-year-old mansion. Over the objection of his family and his neighbors, Bob plans to demolish Redacre in a week. A group of Bob's neighbors file suit, seeking a court order to prevent the demolition. What is the most likely basis for obtaining such an order?

As a general rule, a landowner has a broad right to destroy property during his lifetime, absent direct harm to others. But here the demolition will be done in a manner that releases dangerous asbestos particles into the air, so the court would probably enjoin it as a nuisance.

Charlotte owned Greenacre, a large parcel that included a butterfly habitat. As a birthday present to her only daughter Julia, Charlotte made the following valid inter vivos gift: "Greenacre to Julia for life." A few years later, Julia made the following conveyance to Naomi: "I, Julia, grant Naomi any and all interest I have in Greenacre." Naomi moved onto Greenacre, hoping to cultivate her hobby of butterfly watching. Regrettably, shortly thereafter Naomi fell on the handle of a butterfly net and died. Her valid will left everything she owned to her best friend, Avery. Who has the best right to present possession of Greenacre?

Avery, because she inherited Naomi's estate. Naomi received a life estate pur autre vie (measured by the life of Julia). Unlike a life estate which is neither devisable nor descendible, a life estate pur autre vie continues for the length of the measuring life (here, Julia's). Therefore, when Naomi died, the life estate pur autre vie continued because Julia was still alive. It passed to Avery, Naomi's devisee.

Erik and Drake were brothers and owned a two-bedroom house as tenants in common. The house was located on a large lot containing a number of mature trees (excellent commercial timber). For the past 15 years, Erik occupied the house and paid all of the operating and maintenance expenses during that period. He built a greenhouse in the backyard at a cost of $20,000 (although it only increased the market value of the property by $15,000). Erik also cut down approximately one third of the trees on the property and sold the timber to a paper mill. Erik and Drake recently sold the house and now are arguing about how to divide the proceeds of the sale. This jurisdiction applies all existent majority rules when dealing with the rights and obligations of concurrent tenants What is Drake entitle to, as a cotenant?

Drake is entitled to a proportionate share of the proceed from the cut timber. A cotenant may remove natural resources on the property without the consent of the other cotenants, but must account to his cotenants for a proportionate share of any profits derived from the extraction.

What kind of provisions of a zoning ordinance is most likely to be held unconstitutional under the standard in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty?

Each house must be painted red, white, or blue. It is unlikely that there is any relationship between the color of a house and the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. A weak argument can be made that this requirement enhances patriotism by providing a constant reminder of the American flag, which would relate to public welfare, but the argument is ultimately unconvincing.

Today Tristan made the following inter vivos conveyance of his residence: "to Elizabeth and her heirs in two weeks." What interests are created by this conveyance?

Elizabeth receives an executory interest and Tristan retains a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Tristan retains the present possessory interest, labeled a fee simple subject to an executory interest since it is followed by a future interest in a transferee. Elizabeth has an executory interest because she will cut short Tristan's fee simple after two weeks (it is a springing executory interest because her possession will follow the transferor's, Tristan's).

Pedro was a successful professional baseball pitcher due to his unusually-shaped right hand. During a game, Pedro's right hand was struck by a hard-hit baseball, which almost severed it from his arm, leaving it hanging by only a bit of skin. Pedro was taken to the hospital unconscious, where doctor Darla removed the hand. One hour later, Darla transplanted the hand onto the arm of another patient. Pedro sued Darla for conversion. Under Moore v. Regents of the University of California, who will win the lawsuit?

Pedro, if the hand could have been successfully reattached to his arm. This is the best answer because of the key factual differences—and thus policy differences—between this situation and Moore. Notice that Pedro was unconscious after being struck by the ball, so he had no idea that he was even having an operation, unlike Moore who knew his spleen was to be removed. Most importantly, imposing conversion liability here does not impair medical research (there is no indication that Darla is doing such research), so the key policy concern that underpins Moore is absent.

Austin owned a five acre parcel of desert land. Last week, Austin made the following conveyance of the parcel: "to Stella for life, then to Maya for life, then to the heirs of Stella." This jurisdiction applies the Rule in Shelley's Case. What does Stella have?

Stella received a life estate and a vested remainder. An initial parsing of the conveyance would identify the following interests: Stella - a life estate, Maya - a vested remainder in life estate, the heirs of Stella - a contingent remainder, and Austin - a reversion. Here the Rule in Shelley's Case would apply (one instrument; a life estate in a transferee; a remainder in that transferee's heirs; both interests are legal interests). The remainder in Stella's heirs becomes a remainder in fee simple in Stella. In effect, the words of purchase ("heirs of Stella") become words of limitation ("Stella and heirs"). Therefore, Stella received a life estate and a vested (Stella is ascertainable and there is no condition precedent) remainder.

Odis conveys Redacre to "Sam for life, then to Ted for life, then to Sam's children for life, then to Uria and her heirs." Sam has a five-year-old son, Yao. This jurisdiction applies the Rule in Shelley's Case. Which of the following statements is not correct?

Ted has a contingent remainder. This statement is not correct. Ted has a remainder because the interest is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of Sam's life estate, and Ted cannot divest Sam of Sam's interest. However, Ted's remainder is vested because Ted is ascertainable and there is no condition precedent (other than the natural termination of Sam's life estate). The Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply because the grant is to "Sam's children" rather than "Sam's heirs."

Cal owned a 100-acre tract that was located in the "Heavy Industry Zone" on the outer edge of a small town. The town's zoning ordinance provided that all types of industrial uses were permitted in this zone, while the town's general plan encouraged "all efforts to develop new jobs in our community." Cal constructed a facility on his land to reprocess radioactive fuel rods used in nuclear reactors. The facility created 20 new jobs when it began operation. Concerned about potential radiation leaks, local residents petitioned the town council to take action. The town attorney concluded that the facility was not a nuisance. The town council then adopted the following amendment to the zoning ordinance: "Uses that involve radioactive fuel rods from nuclear reactors will not be permitted in the Heavy Industry Zone." What is the most likely reason that the amendment will not affect Cal's facility?

The amendment was adopted after the facility opened. The facility is a prior nonconforming use because it was an existing use before the amendment was adopted. Prior nonconforming uses are generally exempt from newly-adopted zoning ordinances or amendments.

Bill owned and operated a successful bakery in a large city for many years. Ten years ago, facing a housing shortage, the city rezoned Bill's bakery and other nearby properties into the R-20 zone; the only permitted use in this zone is a high-density residential project with at least 20 units per acre. Thereafter, the entire neighborhood was converted to condominiums and apartments, except for the bakery. Two years ago, a serious fire damaged the bakery, and Bill had to cease bakery operations until he could develop a plan to rebuild. Bill's contractor has just informed him that the bakery building will have to be replaced. The city opposes Bill's plan. What is the best argument in support of the city's position?

The bakery use requires a new building. The right to operate a prior nonconforming use is terminated when the structure is destroyed. Here the bakery building was damaged so extensively that it must be replaced by a new structure; it has effectively been destroyed

Accession Doctrine

Acting under the good faith belief that he owned something , Cal used his labor and equipment to transform someone else's property into something new - something qualitatively different from the raw materials

In 1995, Mason and Adam moved in together and are still very much in love. They have one child, Bruno, who is in his last semester of law school. Mason is writing his will and wants to leave a large nature preserve that he owns (Greenacre) to his partner and son. He is very insistent that Greenacre be preserved in its current state and not be developed. He would like Adam to become the owner when he dies, but wants Bruno to automatically gain the property if the land is developed. This jurisdiction applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Which of the following provisions, if placed in his will, will best forward Mason's intentions?

"Greenacre to Adam until it ceases to be used as a nature preserve, then to Bruno if living." Adam has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation (the future interest is held by a transferee, rather than the transferor), and Bruno has a shifting executory interest. Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to the executory interest, it is valid. The executory interest will only vest if Bruno (a life in being at creation) is alive and, therefore, there is no possibility of remote vesting. The words of limitation ("until....") denote that Adam's defeasible fee will automatically end if and when Greenacre ceases to be used as a nature preserve. At that moment, Bruno's executory interest will vest in possession.

Pip has always been close to his two nephews, Dan and Eric. Dan and Eric are the sons of Pip's sister, Sara. Pip and Sara rarely get along and have been estranged from each other for some time. If Sara dies at this time, Dan and Eric would be her only heirs. Sara becomes sick and has little hope of surviving. Believing Sara will live only a few days, Pip conveys Greenacre to "Sara and her heirs." Sara miraculously recovers. Who owns Greenacre?

Sara in fee simple. The words "and her heirs" are words of limitation that signify Sara receives a fee simple. Dan and Eric receive nothing from this grant.

Vivian and Jesse were mother and daughter. They held title to Greenacre as joint tenants. Last year, Vivian secretly mortgaged her interest in Greenacre to Mila. A few months later, Vivian married Piper, Jesse's father. Recently, while on a trip to Brazil, Jesse died. Jesse's valid will left all of her assets to her father What is the state of Vivian and Piper's tenancy?

Under the title theory, Vivian and Piper are tenants in common in Greenacre. Under the title theory of mortgages, the mortgage is viewed as a conveyance of title to the mortgagee. Consequently, the joint tenancy is severed because the unities of time and title are destroyed. As a result, Vivian and Jesse became tenants in common. Tenancies in common are alienable, devisable, and descendible. Piper succeeded to Jesse's interest.

Which of the following statements is not correct about adverse possession?

Adverse possession applies exclusively to real property. This is an incorrect statement. Adverse possession applies equally to both real and personal property. While traditionally real property was the more important category, title to personal property may be equally gained by adverse possession

When considering the effect of disabilities on the statutory period for adverse possession, which of the following is not correct?

Disabilities may be tacked. This is an incorrect statement. Disabilities cannot be tacked. Only disabilities of the owner that exist when the adverse possessor enters the property can be taken into account. If a "disabled" owner conveys her property to a "disabled" successor during the statutory period, the disability of the successor is not considered

Eli and Xi are married and still deeply in love. They have one child, Lucas, who is 25. Eli wants to convey his most prized possession, a 100 acre nature preserve (Meadowacre), to Xi and Lucas. Eli wants to maintain his dominion and control while he is alive, but upon his death he wants Xi to have a life estate in Meadowacre followed by a possessory fee simple in Lucas. This jurisdiction applies the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities. What provisions, if placed in his deed, will best forward Eli's intentions?

"Meadowacre to Eli for life, then to Xi for life, then to my first son when he reaches 30." The conveyance grants Eli a life estate, Xi a vested remainder in life estate, and Lucas a contingent remainder in fee simple. Lucas's contingent remainder is valid under the Rule Against Perpetuities because it will vest, if at all, during Lucas's life. Lucas can only reach 30 while he is alive; he cannot reach 30 after he has died. Consequently, there is no possibility of remote vesting and the contingent remainder in Lucas is good. Note the difference between "my first son who reaches 30" and "my first son when he reaches 30." The first phrase defines a single individual who may or may not be Lucas (Lucas could die the following year, never having reached 30, and Eli could have another child who does reach 30). The second phrase only refers to Lucas since no matter what occurs no one other than Lucas can be Eli's first child. Out of the four choices, this grant will best forward Eli's intentions.

Catalina owned Desertacre in 2000 when Mira took possession. Catalina was mentally incompetent at the time Mira began her occupancy. In 2002, Catalina died intestate never having regained mental capacity. Her sole heir was her brother Felipe who was also mentally incompetent. Felipe regained mental competency in 2020. The statutory period in this jurisdiction in ten years. A statute in this jurisdiction also provides: "If a person entitled to bring an action in adverse possession is, at the time the cause of action accrues, within the age of minority or of unsound mind, the person, after the expiration of ten years from the time of the cause of action accrues, may bring the action within five years after the disability is removed." When is the earliest that Mira can perfect title by adverse possession?

2010 The earliest Mira can perfect title is in 2010. At minimum, she must always occupy the property for the standard statutory period, here ten years. While Catalina's disability does not provide her (or her heirs) any additional time beyond the statutory period, it can never shorten the statutory period

Centerville, a large city, has long been known for its residential neighborhoods. The city recently adopted an ordinance which bars particular groups from living in certain neighborhoods. Which of the following definitions of "group" is most likely to render the ordinance unconstitutional? (1) A definition that bars three or more students from living together. (2) A definition that bars a married couple from living together. (3) A definition that bars two or more opera singers from living together.

A definition that bars a married couple from living together. This is the best answer. The constitutionality of this restriction is governed by the "family zoning" standard in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, because the married couple clearly constitutes a "family" under the Moore analysis, which stressed that the family is the method by which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural...." Under Moore, a family zoning ordinance is evaluated based on the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged ordinance. It seems quite unlikely that the city has a strong interest in banning married couples from residing in certain areas.

Alice owned an 11-acre tract of apple trees. The property was located in the "Industrial Agriculture Zone," where the permitted uses included agriculture, fruit stands, and food processing plants. Most of the land in the region was used to grow apples. Alice wanted to build a food processing plant on her land where apples would be made into applesauce. This use was permitted in the zone, but only on parcels which were at least 12 acres in size. Alice applied to the county for a variance to build her proposed plant. The county board of supervisors granted the variance, noting that "it will benefit everyone in the county to have this new plant." Ben, one of Alice's neighbors, filed a lawsuit challenging the county's decision. Who will win the lawsuit?

Ben, because Alice's land can be used to grow apples. In most jurisdictions, the applicant is required to prove, among other things, that strict enforcement of the ordinance would impose a special hardship due to some physical attribute of the land which would prevent her using it in a reasonable manner. Alice cannot prove such hardship here because she can use the land to grow apples. Variance law does not guarantee that a parcel can be used for its highest and best use.

Sara, a pilot, owned a 200-acre tract of undeveloped land. The property was bordered on the west side by a public road, on the east side by a public-owned lake, and on the north and south sides by other parcels of privately-owned land. The west half of Sara's land was covered by forest, and she occasionally visited it to hunt; on most of these occasions, she reached it from the public road. Occasionally, however, she reached the land by helicopter, landing in a meadow on the east half of the land and then walking over to the west half to hunt. In addition, Sara sometimes reached her property by boat; she would launch her boat from the public dock on the northeast side of the lake, and then row across to the east half of her land. Sara recently sold the east half of her land to Bill. Bill has just sued Sara to obtain a declaratory judgment that he has an easement by necessity over Sara's retained land to reach his own land. Assuming that the jurisdiction requires strict necessity, who will win the lawsuit?

Bill because the elements for an easement by necessity are satisfied. The most likely outcome is that the court will hold that Bill has an easement by necessity. Sara severed title when she sold the east half to Bill; and strict necessity existed at that time because Bill had no legal right to access his property via the land surface.

Bill owned a 2,000-acre tract of desert land. In 2005, Cara drove by the land and noticed that rare cactus plants grew there. Cara dug up four cacti, each time leaving a hole that was 18" wide and 12" deep; she sold the cacti for $50. Cara did exactly the same thing on a visit in 2008, another in 2012, and yet another in 2015. Cara also drove past the land without stopping during trips in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Between 2005 and 2015, Bill drove past the land on two occasions without stopping. Assume that the period for adverse possession in the state is 10 years. Cara now sues Bill for a declaratory judgment that she owns the land. Who will win the lawsuit?

Bill, because Cara did not have continuous possession. Cara's possession was not continuous, assuming that Cara had possession at all. Cara entered the land on only four occasions, presumably just long enough to steal cacti—perhaps 30 minutes each time. Over slightly more than 10 years, she spent about two hours on the land, not enough for continuous possession even of desert land.

Allen owned Pearacre, a 500-acre tract of pear trees which included a small house in its southwest corner. When Allen died, his only living relatives were his daughter Betty and his niece Carrie. When Betty and Carrie looked through Allen's records, they discovered a document which appeared to be Allen's will; it provided in part: "I devise Pearacre to Carrie." The document was signed by Allen. Betty and Carrie both assumed that this paper was a valid will, but under state law it was invalid because no one witnessed Allen's signature; indeed, under state law Betty had automatically received title to Pearacre when her father died without a valid will. Carrie moved into the Pearacre house. Because she disliked pears, however, she never visited or used the rest of the Pearacre property. Two days after Carrie occupied the house, Betty drove a small green travel trailer onto the northeast corner of Pearacre and built a foundation around it; she occupied it each weekend as a vacation retreat from her city job. When Carrie drove down the public road in front of Betty's trailer on weekends, Betty shouted at her: "You robbed me of my inheritance!" Carrie and Betty continued the conduct set forth above for 15 years. The period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is 12 years. Which of the following statements is correct in most jurisdictions?

Carrie owns all of Pearacre except for the northeast corner. Carrie owns the Pearacre house because she satisfied the elements for adverse possession by her 15 years of continuous occupancy. In addition, because Carrie had color of title to all of Pearacre pursuant to the invalid will, she obtained title to all of Pearacre except for the northeast corner, which was actually occupied by Betty, the true owner.

Mark conveys his house to "Chuck for life, then to Quinn's widow for life, then to Chuck's children living at the time of Quinn's widow's death." Chuck is 21 years old, unmarried with no children. Quinn is 84 years old, happily married to Reda who is 91 years old, with four adult children. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities applies in this jurisdiction. Who has what interest in the house?

Chuck has a life estate; Quinn's widow has a contingent remainder in life estate; Mark has a reversion. (i) Chuck has a life estate because of the words of limitation "for life." (ii) Quinn's widow has a contingent remainder in a life estate because she is unascertainable (Quinn is alive at the time of the grant; therefore, his widow will only be ascertained at his death). This contingent remainder does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities because it must vest, if at all, immediately upon a life in being's (Quinn's) death. (iii) Chuck's children have a contingent remainder because they are unascertainable since Chuck has no children. This contingent remainder violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and therefore is void ab initio. Quinn could marry Xi, who is not alive at the time of the grant (and therefore is not a life in being). Chuck could have a son, Zin, who is not alive at the time of the grant (and therefore is not a life in being). Thirty years after all lives in being (Mark, Chuck, Quinn, and Reda) die, Xi could die. At that moment, Zin's interest would vest—which is at a point beyond a life in being plus 21 years. This provides one instance of remote vesting; and therefore, the contingent remainder in Chuck's children is stricken from the conveyance. (iv) Mark's reversion follows Quinn's widow's interest (since Quinn's widow's interest is a contingent remainder in life estate, it will end and possession then reverts to Mark).

Oren holds a fee simple absolute. Oren conveys "to City, its successors and assigns, provided that if the land is not used as a park, then to Karl and his heirs." (City is the City of New York.) This jurisdiction applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What does the city have?

City has a fee simple absolute. The words of purchase "to City" denote City as the grantee of the present possessory interest. The words of limitation identify the estate as a fee simple. However, the words of limitation "provided that" create a defeasible fee. Since the defeasible fee is followed by an interest in a third party, City has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. The words of purchase "to Karl" denote Karl as the grantee of a future interest. The words of limitation "and his heirs" identify the estate (that will exist if the future interest becomes possessory) as a fee simple. Since the defeasible fee is followed by an interest in a third party, Karl's interest is an executory interest. It is a shifting interest because Karl, a transferee, will divest City, another transferee, of the estate. Applying the common law Rule Against Perpetuities: (a) Identify the contingent interests: the rule must be tested against Karl's shifting executory interest. City's fee simple subject to an executory limitation is a present possessory interest and therefore is deemed to be vested for purposes of the rule. (b) List the lives in being: Oren and Karl are alive at the time of conveyance. Therefore, they are both lives in being. Remember, a life in being must be a real person. Thus, City, a city, is not considered a life in being. (c) Consider whether anyone can be born who might affect vesting: no children, issue, heirs, or widows are referred to in the conveyance. Karl could have a son, Ben, in 2020. (d) Kill off the lives in being and add 21 years: suppose that in 2021 Oren and Karl both die in a common disaster. The lives in being are now dead. The "RAP line" becomes 2042. (e) Ask: is there any possibility that the executory interest may vest more than 21 years after all lives in being (Oren and Karl) die (past the 2042 "RAP line")? If you said no, think more creatively. Imagine this possibility: 50 years after the deaths of Oren and Karl, City decides the land would make a much nicer parking garage than a park, and converts the land into this different use. According to the terms of the conveyance, the executory interest becomes possessory at that moment. The interest would vest in 2071, far beyond the 2042 "RAP line." RAP is violated. It is important to keep in mind that you are asking whether the future interest itself is capable of violating RAP, not whether the current holder of the interest will be alive when the interest vests. Again, the focus is on the interest and the conditions of its vesting, not on the identity of any current holders of the interest and whether they will vest in possession. The vesting of the executory interest is not dependent on Karl being alive. When a conveyance violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, it does so when it is made, not 21 years later. In the absence of reform tools, the offending interest (Karl's executory interest) is deleted. The conveyance therefore reads: Oren conveys "to City, its successors and assigns." Remember, the phrase "provided that..." is deemed to be part of the executory interest (and therefore is also penned out). City has a fee simple absolute.

City adopts an ordinance providing that no more than eight people may reside in a single-family home. Harry and Wendy, who have seven children, now want to move to City. Harry and Wendy file suit to challenge the ordinance. Who will win the lawsuit?

City, based on the principles in Ames Rental Property Association. Pursuant the police power, the City may adopt an ordinance that restricts the number of people who may reside in a house. Ames reflects the general Euclid approach; under that standard, the restriction is a reasonable measure to control density

Gary operates a successful corner grocery store in a residential area in City. City rezones the entire area, including Gary's property, into the R-1 zone; the only permitted use in this zone is single-family residences. Two weeks later, Gary's store is badly damaged in an earthquake; it will require extensive structural work to make the store usable and will cost almost as much as building an entirely new store. However, this work will extend the useful life of the building by 80 years. Gary cleans up the debris, and then spends over a year deciding whether he should rebuild or retire. He decides to rebuild, only to discover that City refuses to issue a building permit. Gary sues City to obtain the permit. Who will win the lawsuit?

City, because Gary needs to rebuild. When a structure housing a prior nonconforming use is destroyed, the owner loses his right to continue the use.

Pam is running for a seat in the state legislature. Herb, a resident of City who is an avid supporter of Pam's candidacy, erects a neon sign on the lawn in front of his house which reads: "Elect Pam!" Because the sign is quite large (20 feet high and 30 feet wide) and the neon letters blink on and off, it sometimes distracts motorists who are driving down the street. During the five days the sign has been in place, the sign has caused three minor traffic accidents, one of which almost crushed a small child. The City now adopts a zoning ordinance which prohibits any neon sign in a residential zone which is larger than 10 square feet. Herb sues City. Who will win the lawsuit?

City, because the sign is a nuisance. The best answer among the choices given is that the sign is a nuisance. The gravity of the harm (risk of traffic accidents) substantially outweighs the utility of Herb's conduct (the value of having such a large and distracting sign).

Boone County adopts an ordinance that prohibits all billboards within 200 feet of a public highway in order to "preserve the natural beauty of the county." The ordinance provides, however, that "all existing billboards may remain in place for a period of five years, at which point they must be demolished." Al owns seven billboards that would be affected by the ordinance. He routinely rents out space on his billboards to various companies so that they can advertise their products and services. The ordinance would require him to demolish the billboards in five years, which will deprive him of all future revenue from such rentals. Al filed a lawsuit against the county, asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Who will win the lawsuit in most jurisdictions?

County, because the five-year period is reasonable. The best answer is that the county will win the lawsuit because five years is a reasonable period to amortize the use. Most jurisdictions allow a city or county to eliminate a prior nonconforming use without any payment to the property owner if it allows a reasonable period of time for the use to continue before it is terminated. Courts have routinely upheld amortization periods for billboards in the range of two to three years.

Joe started running a junkyard on a 20-acre parcel in County in 1980 next to a large residential subdivision; at the time, his property was in the "General Business" or "GB" zone, where a list of specific business uses were allowed, including "junkyard." Joe eventually had over 500 old cars at his junkyard, where he sold used auto parts cheaply. Beginning in 2000, nearby residents complained that Joe's junkyard and other junkyards in County were "ugly and unsightly." In 2010, County amended its zoning ordinance to delete the word "junkyard" as an allowed use in the GB zone. Finally, in 2015 County amended its ordinance to provide for an amortization period for all junkyards, after which all junkyard uses in the County would be required to end. Joe now sues the County. Who will win the lawsuit?

County, if the 2015 amendment adopted an amortization period of more than ten years. Ten years is probably a reasonable amortization period for a junkyard. The junkyard adjoins a residential subdivision, so it is presumably an undesirable use in that location; the public would benefit by its removal; the junkyard has been a nonconforming use for many years; any improvements on Joe's property would be minimal; and the burden on Joe to move the junkyard would be moderate.

Kelly owned a 10-acre horse ranch. Over the years, the nearby large city slowly expanded until urban development surrounded the ranch. Because of traffic congestion, the city decided to install a light rail train system. The city initially planned to run the tracks across the surface of Kelly's land, but Kelly objected to any use of his property. The city planner then told the city council: "We can elevate the tracks so they run on a bridge 200 feet above Kelly's land; we won't even need to have the bridge towers on his land. Or we can run the tracks in a tunnel 500 feet under Kelly's land." Can they do this or does Kelly own the airspace and subsurface space?

Kelly owns both the airspace 200 feet above his land and the subsurface 500 feet below his land. The best answer is that Kelly owns both the airspace and the subsurface at issue, although some jurisdictions are moving away from this view. (500 ft airspace; Only subsurface space that owner could foreseeably use)

Carla, a biochemist, discovered that certain cells in Dan's body contained a liquid which could cure brain cancer. Carla begged Dan to let her remove some of his cells so that thousands of patients could be cured each year, but Dan refused because Carla was unwilling to pay him what he thought was a fair price. On a dark night, Carla saw Dan walking in a park, stunned him with a punch in the jaw, quickly cut away a small bit of Dan's skin that contained some of the valuable cells, and ran away. Carla then sold the cells to Elsa, a scientist who plans to use them to create a cell line that will generate the life-saving medicine. What are the state of the cells?

Dan owns the cells even though they were excised from his body The best answer is that Dan owns the cells even though they were removed from his body, because the removal was a wrongful act. Moore v. Regents of the University of California might suggest a contrary conclusion. But Carla's conduct here violates a fundamental public policy that was not at issue in Moore: the prohibition of criminal conduct. Carla committed a crime by removing Dan's cells without his consent. Because of this policy difference, Moore can be distinguished

In 1999, Rosa entered Greenacre, a five acre parcel owned by Dana. Rosa met all the elements for adverse possession for the next 15 years. Dana was mentally incapacitated during the first three years of Rosa's occupancy. In 2014, Dana entered Greenacre and told Rosa to leave. Rosa brought suit to quiet title. The statute of limitations for this jurisdiction is 15 years. A state statute also suspends the running of the statutory period until the disability is removed. Who owns the property?

Dana is the owner of Greenacre because Rosa did not meet all the required elements for the requisite statutory period. In this jurisdiction, the statute of limitations is suspended until the disability is removed. Because Dana regained mental capacity in 2002, the 15 year statute of limitations only began at that time. Therefore, Rosa had not gained title in 2014. The earliest she could gain title would be 2017

In 2000, Joe purchased a two bedroom condominium, intending to move into the unit when he retired. The condominium was located in a state far from his current residence. Unbeknownst to Joe, Skyla occupied Joe's condominium unit for three years, beginning in 2001. Skyla knew that someone else owned the unit, and often commented to her friends, "Hey, if the owner isn't going to use it, I might as well use it." When Skyla needed to leave the unit in 2004 because of a job transfer, she conveyed all interest she had in the condominium unit as well as all her furniture to a coworker, Danica, for $175,000. Danica occupied the unit for nine more years, at the end of which Joe appeared, having recently retired. The jurisdiction has a ten year statutory period for adverse possession and applies the modern rule re intent. In a suit to quiet title, how should a court rule?

Danica owns the condominium unit because there was privity between Danica and Skyla. Most jurisdictions allow tacking if the successive possessors are in privity. The privity requirement is met when a prior occupant transfers all her rights in the property to her successor. Here Skyla transferred her rights in the condominium unit to Danica and therefore Danica could tack Skyla's three year occupancy. Three years plus nine years equal twelve years - consequently, the ten year statute of limitations has been met

When Bess retired, she purchased a single room school building ("Readacre") in fee simple absolute. There Bess held free reading classes for illiterate adults. Last month, Bess fell and broke her hip. Unable to continue teaching, Bess conveyed Readacre to Dee. The valid deed read, "...to Dee and heirs provided that Readacre is used for teaching reading to illiterate adults, then to my daughter Lucy." Last month, Dee cancelled all classes and converted Readacre into a commercial winery. This jurisdiction applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What does Dee have?

Dee has a fee simple absolute in Readacre. Dee received a fee simple subject to an executory limitation (a fee simple defeasible whose future interest is held by a transferee, rather than by the transferor) and Lucy a shifting executory interest. Since Readacre could be used for teaching reading to illiterate adults for the next several hundred years (and only then the condition breached), the executory interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities (there is a possibility of remote vesting beyond the lives in being of Bess, Dee, and Lucy). Therefore, it is void ab initio. Because the condition subsequent ("provided that....") is deemed a part of the executory interest - Dee is left with a fee simple absolute.

When Bess retired, she purchased a single room school building ("Readacre") in fee simple absolute. There Bess held free reading classes for illiterate adults. Last month, Bess fell and broke her hip. Unable to continue teaching, Bess conveyed Readacre to Dee. The valid deed read, "...to Dee and heirs provided that Readacre is used for teaching reading to illiterate adults." The next week Dee cancelled all classes and converted Readacre into a commercial winery. Last month, Bess died. Her will provided that any interest she may have in Readacre passes to Lucy. This jurisdiction applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What does Dee have?

Dee has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent in Readacre. The words of limitation ("provided that...") create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Although the condition was breached, the estate does not automatically terminate (unlike a fee simple determinable). It ends only when Lucy exercises her right of entry by re-entering the property and divesting Dee of possession. Lucy has not done this and therefore Dee's defeasible fee continues despite breach of the condition.

The best explanation for the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. M'Intosh that Native Americans did not have the authority to transfer their ancestral lands to private buyers is that the Native Americans

Did not have the right to transfer under the laws of the United States. Johnson reflects legal positivism. Under the laws of the United States, the Native Americans did not have the right to transfer title to their ancestral lands, as the Court stated: "All of our institutions recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." As the successor to the crown's rights, the United States obtained the right to transfer title. Accordingly, "[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny."

In 2000, Roy conveyed Greenacre and Meadowacre (two five-acre contiguous parcels) to Farrah. Farrah paid $140,000 for both parcels and received a general warranty deed from Roy. Farrah immediately moved onto Greenacre and constructed a two-story house. She cleared most of the rocky terrain immediately surrounding the house and planted a large garden next to the backdoor. Farrah rarely wandered anywhere on Greenacre outside of her house or garden. Farrah also never ventured onto Meadowacre. She was an environmentalist and wanted to preserve the pristine nature of the parcel. In 2012, Jaxen appeared and instructed Farrah that he owned both parcels, having validly purchased Greenacre and Meadowacre in 1990. After some investigation, the following facts were established: (i) Roy never owned either parcel; (ii) the deed from Roy to Farrah was invalid; and (iii) Farrah had no knowledge of Roy's fraud and had always acted in good faith. The statutory period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is ten years. Who owns the property?

Farrah owns Greenacre and Jaxen owns Meadowacre. Regarding Greenacre, Farrah has met the elements of adverse possession for the statutory period. Color of title provides her with title to the entire parcel even though she may not have occupied large portions of it. However, Farrah never occupied Meadowacre, a separate parcel. Color of title will not extend the fiction of constructive possession to a parcel the adverse possessor has not even partially possessed

Oscar owned a 50-acre tract of desert, where the only viable economic use was grazing goats for six weeks each spring. Because Oscar was a committed environmentalist who wanted to preserve the natural vegetation on his land, he built a ten-foot-high fence around the parcel in order to exclude animals. Seven years ago, Fiona broke a large gap through the fence, and brought in her flock of 1,000 goats to feast on the spring vegetation for six weeks. Oscar first noticed the gap in July, and repaired it. This same pattern of fence breaking, grazing use, and fence repair occurred every year thereafter until the present. Assume that the period for adverse possession is five years. Fiona sued Oscar for a declaratory judgment that she had obtained title by adverse possession. Who will win the lawsuit?

Fiona because she meets all by adverse possession requirements. Fiona has met all the elements for adverse possession in most states.

Kim plants a row of young oak trees next to the fence that separates her residential lot from Lana's lot. Two years later, Lana installs a new swimming pool in her backyard. Over time, Kim's trees grow so large that they (a) occasionally cast shadows onto Lana's pool (making the pool water colder to swim in) and (b) drop some leaves into the pool (forcing Lana to clean the pool monthly). Lana sues Kim. Who will win the lawsuit?

Kim, because the trees are not a spite fence or a nuisance. Even assuming that the trees could be viewed as a "fence," here Kim did not plant the trees with malice, so they cannot be a spite fence. Turning to the elements of private nuisance, it seems unlikely that the level of interference with Lana's use is "substantial." Neighborhood trees routinely cast shadows and drop leaves. In any event, Kim's conduct is not "unreasonable." The utility of the trees (summer temperature reduction due to shade; aesthetic pleasure; etc.) is greater than the gravity of harm they cause to Lana.

Frank owned a 50-acre farm in an agricultural region which he used to grow carrots, lettuce, and other crops for many years during the summer growing season. All the properties in the region were used to grow similar crops. Frank decided to retire and give his land to his nephew Ned and Ned's wife Wilma. As a gift, Frank executed and delivered a deed that purported to convey title to the farm to Ned and Wilma as joint tenants. Frank, Ned, and Wilma were not aware that the deed was legally defective, and that Frank accordingly still owned the farm. Ned, Wilma, and their three children visited the land almost every day each summer for six years. They often invited Frank to join them on their trips to the land, and he frequently did. On each visit, they would have a picnic, hike on the land, watch birds, and generally enjoy being outdoors. Seven years after the deed was created, Frank's attorney found it while reviewing records for a lawsuit. When the attorney mentioned to Frank that the deed was a nullity, Frank exclaimed: "Well, I'm going to take my farm back now. Ned and Wilma were never grateful for my gift." The adverse possession period in the jurisdiction is five years. Who owns the land?

Frank, because Ned and Wilma did not have actual possession. The actual possession element requires that the claimant physically use the land in the manner that a reasonable owner would, given its character, location, and nature. The land at issue is a farm, located in a farming region. The reasonable owner of such a farm would use it to grow crops as Frank did. Ned and Wilma could have satisfied the actual possession element if they had used the land as a farm or if they had used it for a more intensive purpose (e.g., operating a factory). But Ned and Wilma used the farm only for recreation, which is a much less intensive use than farming. Most courts would accordingly hold that they did not have actual possession.

Ella owned Swampacre, a wild and undeveloped tract of wetlands spanning 1,500 acres, which she used for hunting wild ducks a few weeks each year with her son Fred. When Ella died, Fred assumed that he had inherited Swampacre, because Ella had always promised to leave it to him. But instead her valid will transferred Swampacre to a local church. Fred never read the will; nor did anyone tell him that the church owned Swampacre. For the next 10 years, no one visited Swampacre except for Fred, who hunted ducks on every part of the land during duck season for two weeks each year. Fred built three small "duck blinds" on the land; each one consisted of a wooden floor surrounded by reed-like camouflage to hide Fred from passing ducks. Fred's hunting on the land was quite successful; each year, he was able to kill the maximum number of ducks allowed by law, though many of his shots missed their intended targets. Last week, a representative of the church visited Swampacre for the first time, saw Fred hunting there, and shouted: "Get off the church's land!" The period for adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. Who owns Swampacre in most jurisdictions?

Fred, because the adverse possession elements are satisfied. The best answer is that all adverse possession elements are satisfied here. Fred had actual possession of Swampacre, in that he used it as an ordinary owner would; his use was exclusive because nobody else used the land; it was open and notorious because the frequent shotgun blasts would be easily heard by an inspecting owner; it was adverse and hostile under both the objective standard and the good faith standard; Fred's use was sufficiently continuous given the nature, character, and location of the land; and the use continued for 10 years, the required statutory period.

Bob's hobby is flying radio-controlled model airplanes in the backyard of his suburban home. Each airplane has a wing span of three feet and is propelled by a battery-powered motor. Every Saturday afternoon, Bob flies one of his airplanes over the homes owned by his neighbors, usually at an altitude of 50-80 feet. Bob's neighbor Gina complains about the model airplanes flying over her house, but Bob continues his conduct. Gina then sues Bob for trespass. Who will win the lawsuit?

Gina, because Bob's airplanes flew through Gina's airspace. In Causby, a taking was found where airplanes flew 83 feet over plaintiffs' farm; the implication of Causby is that a landowner owns at least this portion of the airspace above his property, so this is the best answer.

Glen owned a two-story house which had been built on a ¼ acre lot in 1937; the house was in such bad condition that the city ordered that it be destroyed. The city zoning ordinance, as adopted in 1940, placed the house in the R-1 zone, where the only permitted use was a single-family home. The ordinance also prohibited any house higher than one story and required at least 2,000 square feet of living space in each house. Toby purchased the property from Glen, intending to tear down the old house and build a new one on the lot. But Toby soon discovered that the subsurface of the lot consisted almost entirely of extremely hard rock, where it was impossible to build the foundation required for a modern house?except in one small area where a house with 1,000 square feet of living space could be built. Toby decided to solve this problem by building a two-story house, with each floor containing 1,000 square feet. He applied to the city for a height variance which would allow him to build a two-story home. Vera, who owned a home on the same street, objected to the request on the basis that it would "adversely affect the character of the neighborhood" of single-story homes. How will the city respond to Toby's request for a variance?

Grant the variance because Toby would suffer hardship if it were denied. The unusual rock formation under the surface is a special hardship which arises from the physical condition of the land. As a result, unless the variance is granted, Toby will be unable to use the land for the only permitted use?a single-family home.

Farr inherited Greenacre from his father. The property has been handed down through generations and has great emotional significance to Farr's family members. Farr is in a non-traditional relationship with his partner, Hal. On his deathbed, Farr devises Greenacre to "my loving partner, Hal, and his heirs as long as Hal does not sell Greenacre." What interests are created by this grant?

Hal has a fee simple absolute. An absolute restraint on a fee simple is void. Therefore, the defeasible language is legally inoperative, and Hal is left with a fee simple absolute ("to Hal and his heirs").

Guy owned Blueacre, a 100-acre forest parcel that adjoined a public road only on its south side; the road was narrow and difficult to use. Guy's friend Harry owned Hillacre, a steep parcel that adjoined the north side of Blueacre. Because Hillacre adjoined a public highway that was in good condition, Guy asked Harry if he could sometimes cross Hillacre to travel between Blueacre and the highway; Harry replied: "Yes, of course." Two months later, Guy sold the south half of Blueacre to Irma. Last week when Guy attempted to cross Hillacre to reach the north half of Blueacre, Harry refused to let him enter. Guy then filed suit against Irma to obtain a declaratory judgment that he had an easement by necessity to cross the south half of Blueacre, so that he could access his land from the narrow public road. Assuming that the jurisdiction follows the traditional approach to easements by necessity, who will win the lawsuit?

Irma because Guy had permission to cross Hillacre. At the time of severance, Guy had a license to cross Hillacre to reach the public highway, so strict necessity did not exist under the traditional view. Harry's later revocation of the license is irrelevant.

Irma, an inventor, purchased a two-acre parcel of country land so that she could it use while developing new inventions. Because many of Irma's inventions could be tested only under conditions that minimized the effect of various types of solar radiation, she decided to have a cave dug on her land so that she could conduct underground testing. Irma hired Cal to dig a cave located 30 feet below the surface of her property, which ran parallel to the surface for 100 feet. Cal inadvertently built the cave in the wrong place, so it extended 40 feet into the soil beneath the house owned by Nancy, Irma's neighbor. When Cal learned about the error, he explained the situation to Nancy, apologized to her, and told her that Irma would be using the tunnel for testing inventions; but Cal never told Irma about his mistake. Irma used the portion of the tunnel beneath Nancy's house once a month for the next six years. There was no visible indication on the surface of Nancy's land that there was a tunnel below it; nor did Irma's testing in the tunnel produce any noise or odors which a person on Nancy's land would have noticed. Irma and Nancy never discussed the tunnel. The period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is five years. Who owns the portion of the tunnel beneath Nancy's land in most jurisdictions?

Irma, because the adverse possession elements are satisfied. The best answer is that all adverse possession elements are satisfied here. Irma use the tunnel area in a more intensive manner than a reasonable owner would do, which meets the actual possession element; her possession was exclusive because Nancy never used the tunnel; her possession was open and notorious because Nancy had actual knowledge of it; her possession was adverse and hostile under the good faith and objective standards; her possession was sufficiently continuous because she used the tunnel every month, more often than a reasonable owner would do; and her use continued for six years, longer than the required five-year period.

Harriet owned Desertacre, an unfenced and unimproved tract of desert land that covered four square miles, located 20 miles from the nearest town; the land was covered with wild cactus plants. The west side of Desertacre adjoined Highway 47 for one mile. Each year, Harriet visited the land once a year to hike for a few hours. When Harriet died, her will devised Desertacre to her son Ivan. Two years after Ivan received title, Julie, a cactus expert driving past Desertacre, noticed that some of the plants growing there were rare and valuable. She stopped and dug up two cactus plants, each about 10 inches high, which she subsequently sold to a collector. Over the next 11 years, Julie visited Desertacre on nine more occasions. Each time she removed between two and four cactus plants from different portions of the property; the plants she took ranged in height from 7 to 15 inches. Julie sold the plants to collectors. Ivan never walked on Desertacre. But once a year for 14 years after receiving title, Ivan drove past the land slowly on the highway, making a visual inspection. During these inspections, he never noticed any evidence of Julie's activities. The period for adverse possession in this jurisdiction is 10 years. Who owns Desertacre?

Ivan, because Julie did not have open and notorious possession. A use must be visible and obvious, such that an owner who made a reasonable inspection of the land would become aware of the adverse claim. Ivan did not make a reasonable inspection because he could only see a small part of the land from the highway. However, even if he had made a careful inspection, it is unlikely that he would have noticed any evidence of Julie's activities. Over 12 years, Julie removed fewer than 40 small cactus plants from four square miles of land. Given the huge size of the tract, a reasonable owner would not have noticed that the plants were missing. Although Julie's actions would have left a small hole when each plant was removed, these holes would not have put an inspecting owner on notice due to size of the tract

Jayce makes the following conveyance: "I convey my fee simple absolute in Greenacre to Omar for life, then to Stella for life, then to the heirs of Omar." Which of the following statements is correct? (1) Stella has a life estate. (2) The heirs of Omar have a vested remainder in fee simple absolute (3) Jayce has retained a reversion

Jayce has retained a reversion. Jayce retains a reversion because he has conveyed estates of lesser quantum than his initial fee. The contingent remainder in the heirs of Omar may never vest (Omar may not leave any heirs); in this event, a reversion is needed. Jayce's reversion could become possessory upon Stella's death (or upon Omar's death, if Stella dies first).

Silas was a wealthy entrepreneur and owned several parcels of land around the country. He was particularly fond of Wateracre, a parcel that encompassed four small lakes and several streams. Silas was divorced but maintained close ties with his adult son, Luke. Luke has a daughter, Cora. Silas also was very close to his lifelong friend, Kaleb. Last month, Silas executed a valid deed. The instrument provided that Silas granted Wateracre "to Luke for life, then to my grandchildren for life, then to Kaleb and heirs." Silas died last week. When he died, Silas was 108, Luke was 91, and Cora was 75. This jurisdiction applies the Rule in Shelley's Case and the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What are the interests created by Silas's will?

Luke received a life estate and Kaleb received a vested remainder in fee simple. The interest in Silas's grandchildren is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. There is a possibility that the vested remainder subject to open in Silas's grandchildren will vest more than 21 years after all lives in being (Silas, Luke, and Cora) die: suppose Silas has another child, Lyla. Then Silas, Luke, and Cora die in a plane disaster. Thirty years later, Lyla (not a life in being for purposes of the Rule) has a child, Amy (a grandchild of Silas and not a life in being for purposes of the Rule). Amy's interest will then vest, at a point more than 21 years after the lives in being have died. Because of this possibility of remote vesting, the Rule Against Perpetuities is violated, and the interest (the grandchildren's vested remainder subject to open) is struck. This leaves Luke with a life estate and Kaleb with a vested remainder in fee simple.

Ten years ago, Harry, Eve, Ronald, and Lela became owners of Greenacre as joint tenants. Greenacre consisted of a four-bedroom house on a two acre lot on a hill overlooking the ocean. Harry and Eve were a married couple, as were Ronald and Lela. Harry and Eve gained their interests in Greenacre with the idea that it would be their retirement residence. They worked and lived in a neighboring state and have not visited Greenacre these past ten years. Ronald and Lela immediately took up exclusive possession of Greenacre and have remained there ever since. Five years ago, Harry conveyed all his interest in Greenacre to his mistress, Matilda. Early last year, Eve died in a car accident and Lela mortgaged her interest to her brother, John. This jurisdiction has a five year statutory period for adverse possession of land and follows the lien theory of mortgages. Who owns Greenacre?

Matilda with an undivided ¼ interest as a tenant in common with Ronald and Lela; and Ronald and Lela with an undivided ¾ interest as tenants in common with Matilda and as joint tenants with themselves. Harry's inter vivos conveyance to Matilda severed his interest in the joint tenancy. Matilda became a tenant in common (of Harry's ¼ interest) with the other concurrent tenants because the unities of time and title were destroyed. Eve, Ronald, and Lela's joint tenancy with each other continued since their unities were not disturbed. When Eve died, her participatory interest in the joint tenancy with Ronald and Eve was removed; Ronald and Eve now hold a joint tenancy with each other. Therefore, Matilda has an undivided ¼ interest as a tenant in common with Ronald and Lela; and Ronald and Lela have an undivided ¾ tenancy in common with Matilda and an undivided a joint tenancy with themselves.

Isabella owned two parcels of land (Greenacre and Forestacre). Isabella's three best friends were Elena, Natalie, and Cora. In celebration of her fiftieth birthday, Isabella made the following two inter vivos conveyances:(1) "Greenacre to Elena for life, then to Natalie and her heirs, but if Amy does not survive Lydia, then to Cora;" and (2) "Forestacre to Elena for life, then to Natalie and her heirs if Amy survives Lydia and if not then to Cora." What does Natalie have?

Natalie has a vested remainder in Greenacre and a contingent remainder in Forestacre Natalie's remainder (in Greenacre) is vested because (i) Natalie is ascertainable and (ii) there is no condition precedent. There is nothing that Natalie needs to do to gain possession following Elena's death. Her right to possession will continue until Amy fails to survive Lydia. Natalie's remainder (in Forestacre) is contingent because it is subject to the condition precedent that Amy survives Lydia. Natalie can only gain possession if, at Elena's death, Amy has not predeceased Lydia.

Amy owned Pearacre, a 100-acre tract of prize-winning pear trees; she lived in the home which was located in the southeast corner of the tract. In 2000, Amy was killed by a falling pear tree. Amy's son Sid quickly found what appeared to be Amy's valid will, which left Pearacre to Amy's niece Nina. Nina immediately moved into the home on Pearacre, and used it as her residence until the present; but Nina has never visited or used any other part of Pearacre. Last week, Sid discovered that the will was invalid due to a technicality and, accordingly, that he should have inherited Pearacre under state law as Amy's closest relative. Assume that the adverse possession period is ten years. Sid sued Amy for a declaratory judgment that he owned Pearacre. How should the court rule?

Nina owns all of Pearacre. By using the home as her residence for more than ten years, Nina has satisfied all adverse possession elements. The invalid will is a form of color of title, so Nina's possession of the Pearacre home gives her constructive possession of all of the property.

Able owned a vacant lot located on a remote mountain lake. Each summer for many years, he pitched a tent on the lot for three months and lived there with his son Bob, enjoying the wilderness. Bob was only eight years old when this pattern began, and he grew to share his father's love of nature as time passed. During one of these trips, Able said to Bob: "I wrote my will two weeks ago. It says that this lot will go to you!" A few days after Bob reached age 21, Able was paralyzed in a car accident. When Bob told Able that he intended to camp on the lot during the coming summer, Able looked sad but said nothing. Bob spent the next six summers camping on the lot, just as he and Able had done in the past. Able then died. Bob discovered that Able's will devising the lot to him (Bob) was legally defective. Instead, under Able's last valid will, the lot was devised to the United Way, a national charity. Bob filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that he had obtained title to the lot by adverse possession. Assume that the adverse possession period in the jurisdiction is five years. Was Bob's possession of the lot adverse and hostile?

No, Bob's possession was not adverse and hostile. Bob was the son of Able, who owned the lot. Given the close family relationship between the two and their history of camping together on the lot, a court would most likely conclude that Able tacitly consented to Bob's use of the lot. Accordingly, Bob's use was not adverse and hostile.

Sara owns a 2,000-acre ranch in a remote, undeveloped part of a western state which she uses for grazing cattle. An oil company now wants to install a pipeline that will run 500 feet underneath Sara's land; this will be one link in a 200-mile pipeline system. Construction and use of the system will not interfere with Sara's cattle grazing. Under the Chance standard, will Sara be able to bar the pipeline?

No, because it will not adversely affect Sara's use of the property. Chance allows the surface owner to prevent a subsurface trespass if it would "actually interfere" with his "reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface." Here Sara has no reasonable and foreseeable use for the subsurface.

Carl owns a 10-acre tract of unfenced, rural land, where he lives in a small cabin. Don walks up to Carl's front door to try to sell him a set of encyclopedias. The next day, while researching an endangered species of frog, Ella walks across Carl's land, believing in good faith that it is public land. Who is liable for trespass?

Only Ella. Good faith is not a defense to trespass liability. Ella intentionally entered land that, in fact, was privately owned; this is enough to subject her to liability

Oren holds a fee simple absolute. Oren conveys "to Gail for life, then to Mel for life, then to Mel's firstborn child for life." Mel has no children. Which of the following is correct? (1) Mel has a contingent remainder in life estate (2) Mel's firstborn has a vested remainder in life estate (3) Gail has a vested remainder in life estate (4) Oren has a reversion

Oren has a reversion The words of purchase "to Gail" denote Gail as the grantee of the present possessory interest. The words of limitation "for life" identify the estate as a life estate. The words of purchase "to Mel" denote Mel as the grantee of a future interest. The words of limitation "for life" identify the estate (that will exist when the future interest becomes possessory) as a life estate. Mel's future interest is a remainder because (i) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding estate and (ii) it cannot divest any other interests. It is vested because (i) Mel is ascertainable at the time of the conveyance and (ii) there is no condition precedent to her receiving the estate. The words of purchase "to Mel's firstborn child" denote Mel's firstborn as the grantee of a future interest. The words of limitation "for life" identify the estate (that will exist when the future interest becomes possessory) as a life estate. Mel's firstborn's future interest is a remainder because (i) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding estate and (ii) it cannot divest any other interest. It is a contingent remainder because, at the time of the conveyance, the firstborn child of Mel is unascertainable; the child is not yet born. Since Oren carved out a smaller estate (three successive life estates) from his larger estate (a fee simple), he retains a future interest known as a reversion, which will become possessory upon the expiration of the last life estate.

Oren holds a fee simple absolute. Oren conveys "to Ted for life, then to Ted's first child to graduate from high school and his heirs." (Ted has a 15-year-old son, Ken, presently in the 11th grade.) This jurisdiction applies the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Which of the following is correct? (1) The first child to graduate from high school has a contingent remainder in fee simple (2) Ted has a fee simple (3) Oren has a reversion

Oren has a reversion. The words of purchase "to Ted" denote Ted as the grantee of the present possessory interest. The words of limitation "for life" identify the estate as a life estate. The words of purchase "to Ted's first child to graduate from high school" denote the child as the grantee of a future interest. The words of limitation "and his heirs" identify the estate (that will exist if the future interest becomes possessory) as a fee simple. The interest is a remainder because (i) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding estate and (ii) it cannot divest any other interest. It is contingent because, at the time of the conveyance, the child is unascertainable. If and when a child of Ted graduates from high school, the remainder will vest. Oren retains a future interest known as a reversion. A reversion will always follow a contingent remainder because someone must hold seisin in the estate at all times. Since a contingent remainder is not certain to vest, the grantor must retain a reversion. Applying the common law Rule Against Perpetuities: (a) Identify the contingent interests: because the conveyance creates a contingent remainder, one must consider whether or not the interest violates RAP. (b) List the lives in being: Ted, Ken, and Oren are alive at the time of the conveyance. Therefore, they are the lives in being. (c) Give birth to any potential afterborns: Ted may have a child, Ned, after the conveyance. Ned is not a life in being for purposes of the rule. (d) Kill off the lives in being and add 21 years: suppose that in 2020, Ted, Ken (who is then 16), and Oren all die. The lives in being are now dead. The "RAP line" becomes 2041. (e) Is there any possibility that the contingent remainder may vest more than 21 years after all lives in being (Ted, Ken and Oren) die (past the 2041 "RAP line")? One possibility: Ted has a child, Ned, who is born in early 2020 (and therefore is not a life in being at creation). Ken, a weak student, never graduated from high school. One day after the birth of Ned, Ted, in his excitement over the news, slips in the snow, falls into Ken and Oren, and the three of them meet an untimely end. The lives in being are now dead. Twenty-two years later (in 2042), Ned, a poor student, graduates from high school, satisfying the condition precedent. His contingent remainder vests more than 21 years after the deaths of the lives in being, and RAP is violated. When a conveyance violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, it does so when it is made, not 21 years later. In the absence of reform tools, the offending interest is deleted. Hence, the contingent remainder in Ted's first child to graduate from high school is deleted. The conveyance now reads: Oren conveys "to Ted for life." Ted has a life estate. Oren retains a reversion (the future interest remaining in the transferor when he grants a vested estate of lesser quantum).

Oren holds a fee simple absolute. Oren conveys "to Gail and her heirs, but if the land is used as a bar, then Oren shall have the right to re-enter and retake the estate." What does Oren have?

Oren has a right of entry. The words of purchase "to Gail" denote Gail as the grantee of the present possessory interest. The words of limitation "and her heirs" create a fee simple. The additional words of limitation "but if" make the fee simple a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, which is a defeasible fee. The estate can be cut short if the express condition is broken. The conveyance also contains words of reentry, which further manifest the grantor's intent to create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Gail (or her grantee, devisee or heir) can lose the estate if the land is used as a bar. Oren, the grantor, retains a right of entry. Upon the happening of the stated event, Oren has the right to re-enter and reclaim the estate. Oren must take affirmative action and exercise this right to regain possession of the estate. Gail's estate continues until Oren exercises his right of entry.

Paul and Ivy are identical twins. Several years ago, they bought a small farm (Farmacre) and took title as joint tenants. Paul and Ivy moved onto Farmacre and slowly remodeled the farm house. Three years ago, Ivy left Farmacre, moving to a large city to begin her professional career as an accountant. Paul continued to live on Farmacre and started medical school. Ivy has recently returned, wanting to spend a six week vacation at Farmacre. Paul refuses to allow Ivy onto Farmacre, stating that he needs to be alone while studying for his medical boards. Paul told Ivy to come at any other time she desired; he would even leave for that period and give her exclusive occupancy. Ivy is insistent upon spending her vacation at Farmacre. The fair market rental value of Farmacre is $1500 per week How much does Paul owe Ivy?

Paul is liable to Ivy for $4500. Paul's refusal to allow Ivy onto Forestacre constitutes an ouster (a cotenant in possession refuses to allow another cotenant to occupy the property). Because Paul ousted Ivy, he is liable to Ivy for Ivy's pro rata share of the rental value of his occupancy. A rental value of $1500 per week for six weeks amounts to $9000. Ivy's pro rata share would be $4500.

Perla, a professional poet, lived in a single-family home which she owned. Paul, another professional poet in the same city, attracted notoriety by loudly reciting some of his verses at midnight on many occasions on the street in front of his single-family home. Homeowners complained to the city council about Paul's conduct. On May 1, the city council adopted the following ordinance: "Because professional poets pose a threat to the health and welfare of our citizens, in that they tend to create noise and other disturbances, thereby impairing tourism, hampering commerce, and harming the public welfare, no professional poet may reside within 500 feet of any single-family residence after next January 1." Perla filed suit attacking the validity of the ordinance. Who will win the lawsuit?

Perla, because the ordinance violates substantive due process. The ordinance has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals, the standard set forth in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. It cannot be seriously be argued that allowing poets to reside in single-family house neighborhoods poses any public concern. Poets as a group are not more likely to threaten the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. Paul created excessive noise, but this problem was unique to him. Poets are no more likely to create excessive noise than any other group.

Oren holds a fee simple absolute. Oren conveys "to Mary for life, then to Pip and his heirs so long as the land is used as a park." Which of the following is correct? (1) Pip has a vested remainder in fee simple determinable. (2) Pip has a contingent remainder in fee simple determinable. (3) Oren has a reversion.

Pip has a vested remainder in fee simple determinable. The words of purchase "to Mary" denote Mary as the grantee of the present possessory interest; thus, she receives the estate. The words of limitation "for life" identify the estate as a life estate. The words of purchase "to Pip" denote Pip as the grantee of a future interest. The words of limitation "and his heirs" identify the estate (that will exist when the future interest becomes possessory) as a fee simple. The interest is a remainder because (i) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding estate and (ii) it cannot divest any other interest. It is vested because Pip is (i) ascertainable at the time of the conveyance and (ii) there is no condition precedent. However, the words "so long as" are words of limitation that create a defeasible fee. Pip has a vested remainder in fee simple determinable.

Sally owned a large lot located on a busy city street. She operated a steak restaurant in a building on the west half of the lot; the east half was undeveloped. Sally decided to sell the east half but wanted to avoid competition with her restaurant. Accordingly, when Sally sold the east half to Boyd, she inserted the following language in the deed with Boyd's consent: "The parties wish to ensure that the property will not be used for a purpose that competes with seller's existing restaurant on adjacent land. Accordingly, buyer covenants that a restaurant will never be operated on the property." Boyd promptly recorded his deed. He then entered into a written lease whereby he leased his new property to the Red Ox Steak Company ("Red Ox"), a national steak restaurant chain, for a 75-year term. Red Ox established a steak restaurant on the land. Sally sued Red Ox for damages on the theory that the restriction was a real covenant. Who will win the lawsuit

Red Ox because vertical privity is absent. The best answer is that the court will find that vertical privity is absent. Because Boyd had a fee simple absolute, but transferred only a term of years tenancy, he did not transfer his entire estate.

Rhonda owned an undeveloped tract of farm land, located 200 feet from a large river. Tim's barren and undeveloped 10-acre parcel was located immediately between Rhonda's land and the river. Three years ago, Rhonda installed a pipeline across the surface of Tim's land which Rhonda uses to bring water to irrigate Rhonda's crops during the summer months. Does Rhonda have rights to the water?

Rhonda has acquired a right to take water from the river under the prior appropriation approach. The best answer is that Rhonda was the first person to put the water to beneficial use, here farming, and thereby obtained a right to the water under the prior appropriation approach. Prior Appropriation Approach: the location of the owner's land is irrelevant; instead, water rights are allocated to the first person to divert the water for beneficial use

Rita notices a rare and valuable butterfly sitting on a leaf in a public park. As Rita moves forward with her hands outstretched to grab the butterfly, it begins to fly away and a brisk wind quickly pushes it 100 feet away from Rita. Susan springs up from behind a bush, nets the butterfly, and refuses to give it to Rita. Under which circumstances below would Rita own the butterfly?

Rita threw a rock that mortally wounded the butterfly before Susan netted it. The Pierson majority holds that property rights in a wild animal are acquired only through capturing or killing the animal, which seems to include mortal wounding. The butterfly is wild; Rita mortally wounded it, thus acquiring title, before Susan captured it

Kara owned 10 vacant lots, each ½ acre in size. The lots were located in the R-4 zone, where the only permitted use was single-family homes; the lots were surrounded by single-family homes that had already been built. The general plan provided that the region where the lots were located "should be devoted to residential uses." Kara applied to the city to have her lots rezoned into the B-6 zone, where business uses were permitted. She intended to construct a small shopping center on the land. Neighbors opposed the rezoning on the basis that the shopping center would increase traffic and noise in the area. The city council adopted an ordinance that rezoned the land as Kara had requested. The council noted that it would be "convenient for neighbors to obtain goods and services at a nearby shopping center rather than having to drive long distances to existing stores." The neighbors then filed suit to block Kara's project. What is their best argument against the zoning?

The ordinance is spot zoning. Kara's parcel is comparatively small, only five acres; in addition, the proposed commercial use is inconsistent with the surrounding residential uses. The proposed use is also inconsistent with the general plan, which calls for the property to be devoted to residential uses. The rezoning appears to be mainly for Kara's benefit, although local residents would benefit to some extent by having convenient access to goods and services.

Mountain Enterprises, Inc. ("Mountain") developed a 250-lot subdivision on wild forest land that it owned. As the final step before lot sales began, Mountain recorded a "Declaration of Restrictions" ("Declaration") in the chain of title of all 250 lots. The Declaration provided, in part: "Because the subdivision is in a remote area, medical care for injuries may not be readily available. Accordingly, the owners of the said lots hereby covenant and agree that at all times each owner shall hold a current certification in first aid proficiency issued by the American Red Cross." The Declaration also established a homeowner's association, which was given the power to enforce the restrictions in the Declaration. Mountain later sold Lot No. 109 to Carla, who built a small vacation cabin on the property. Five years later, Carla died intestate; all of her property passed to her nephew Harry by intestate succession. Harry thereafter used the cabin happily until one day when his neighbor Lisa mentioned the first aid restriction. Harry responded: "I'm going to ignore it." The homeowner's association then sued Harry for damages on the theory that the restriction was a real covenant. What is the most likely reason that Harry will win the lawsuit?

The restriction does not touch and concern. The restriction does not relate closely enough to the use or enjoyment of the land. It concerns the attributes of the people who use the land, rather than the land itself. An argument can be made that the requirement does relate to the use and enjoyment of land in that occupants would be more willing to use the land in an adventurous manner (e.g., climbing trees or rafting rivers) if first aid were readily available. But most courts would find this connection was too remote.

Dan owns the "Galaxy," a movie theater built in 1946 which is located in City. The theater marquee bearing the name "Galaxy" in large glowing letters is 80 feet high. In 1970, City amended its ordinance governing the zone where the theater is located to prohibit any structure which is more than 50 feet high. Because the theater is unprofitable, Dan now plans to demolish it and construct a new five-story, 60-foot high building in its place; the new building will have retail shops on the ground floor and apartments on the upper floors. Dan could build a four-story, 48-foot high building on the site without a variance, but this would eliminate 12 of the planned apartments, and City already has a shortage of rental housing. City approved a height variance for Dan's project. Neighbors then filed suit to challenge the variance. How should the court rule?

The variance is invalid because Dan can build a 48-foot high building. There are no physical circumstances or conditions that prevent Dan from constructing a building which complies with the 50-foot height limit in the zone, so there is no hardship in this situation and no variance is appropriate.

Town has zoned about 50% of its land for single-family residential use only, while 40% is zoned for multi-family residential uses and the remaining 10% is zoned for commercial, industrial, or governmental uses. The citizens of Town recently voted to approve the following amendment to the portion of the zoning ordinance dealing with the single-family zone: "Because having felons reside in a community increases the risk of crime, no person who has ever been convicted of a felony may reside in Town single-family residential zone." Mindy, a convicted felon, files a lawsuit against Town that challenges the legality of this amendment. Who will win the lawsuit?

Town, because the amendment is enforceable. Under the deferential Euclid standard, the no-felon zone is probably valid because it has a substantial relationship to the public safety and welfare, in that convicted felons are statistically more likely than non-felons to commit crimes in the future. An argument might be made that the amendment violates a felon's right to travel under Associated Home Builders, but success on this theory is unlikely because any interference is minimal in scope; convicted felons may reside in 40% of the town.

The theory of property which best explains why the farmworkers in State v. Shack were entitled to receive visitors over the landowner's objection is

Utilitarian theory. The sentiment in Shack that property rights "serve human values" and "are recognized toward that end" reflects classic utilitarian theory

Greenacre, a large farm, has been in Zachary's family for the past four generations. Zachary holds fee simple title to Greenacre. Recently, an extended drought destroyed Zachary's corn crop. Unable to meet his financial obligations, Zachary has consented to sell Greenacre to his cousin Xavier. However, Zachary wants the farm to stay in the family and is very concerned that Xavier may be tempted to sell Greenacre to a large farm conglomerate. Yesterday, Zachary made the following conveyance: "I, Zachary, grant Greenacre to Xavier and heirs on the condition that the land is never sold." What does Xavier have?

Xavier received a fee simple absolute. The phrase "and never to be sold" is a disabling restraint (a restraint that prevents the transferee from transferring her interest). While partial restraints may be valid if reasonable, absolute restraints on a fee simple are void. Any attempt to completely restrict the alienation of a fee simple is inconsistent with the nature of the estate and contrary to public policy. Xavier has an unrestricted fee simple absolute.

Ted works at the county tax assessor's office. One day he notices that no one is paying taxes on a 50-acre parcel of forest land, so he decides to adversely possess the land. He nails four small signs to trees on the land; each sign states: "Property of Ted." Each summer, he camps out on the land for two weeks; and every Christmas he comes to the property to cut Christmas trees for his family and friends. Assume that these activities continue for the 10-year period required for adverse possession and that no one else visits the land during this time. In most states, has Ted acquired title by adverse possession?

Yes, because Ted satisfied the requirements for adverse possession. The best answer is that Ted has acquired title by adverse possession, like the claimants in Gurwit. He had actual possession because he used the land for vacation purposes and harvesting trees. His possession was exclusive because no one else visited the land. The signs (and perhaps tree stumps) made his possession open and notorious, based on Gurwit. Ted's state of mind was irrelevant under the majority view, as long as he did not have the owner's permission to be on the land. Ted's use of the land was sufficiently continuous because owners of similar forest land would use it less frequently. And his possession continued long enough to meet the statutory period.

Zelda owns a 500-acre farm. She installs an extensive network of wells to extract groundwater so that she can sell the water to the residents of an expanding city located 20 miles away. As a result of Zelda's pumping, the wells located on her neighbor Ned's land went dry. Under these circumstances, may Zelda continue pumping groundwater?

Yes, if the state follows the absolute ownership rule. As Sipriano reflects, a landowner may generally withdraw as much groundwater as he wishes under the absolute ownership rule