PSCI 252 Final Key Terms

Shared interests

(limited political goals) → what one party does depends on what the other side does/threatens to do

Missile Technology Control Regime

*REVISE* A multilateral export control regime. It is an informal and voluntary partnership among 35 countries to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology capable of carrying above 500 kg payload for more than 300 km.

John A. Lejeune

13th Commandant of the Marine Corps. And Was the First Marine Officer to Command an Army Division in 1918. His service with the Marine Corps after he retired was as the 5th Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute.Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina was named in his honor during World War II. Lejeune is often referred to in the present day as being the "greatest of all Leathernecks" and the "Marine's Marine." In September 1939, when Hitler's legions invaded Poland he wrote to Thomas Holcomb, then the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, and volunteered to serve once more given his alarm over the crisis in Europe. The offer was gently declined given his age. In February 1942, he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant general on the Marine Corps retired list.

al-Qaeda

A militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and several other Arab volunteers during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Following the death of bin Laden in 2011, the group has been led by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. VC group for terrorists; spend a lot of time funding other organizations to act in early to mid 1990s; changes w/ East African embassy bombings in 1998 → follow that up w/ USS cole attack and 9/11. Was organized with an executive committee, not particularly big, same size as other leadership kabals; sells in particular countries, becomes more pronounced after US invasion of Afghanistan which ejects them from territory in masse Effective b/c the Taliban, a radical jihadist group, has taken over Afghanistan and offered space as safe haven to train; resolves dilemmas for terrorist groups → don't usually hold territory so difficult for them to train; relation to military training and logistics; if train better, be better → AQ has ability which is why they build expertise. From size perspective, maximal/broadest was in the thousands; smaller than mass rebel armies → goal, one hint in 1998 was declaration of jihad by bin Laden → every Muslim has a duty to do jihad to liberate Mecca and eliminate US, liberate Islam → essentially goal that AQ lays out (has beef with a bunch of different actors, primarily w/ Saudi royal family and other govt's in Muslim world that they view as apostates, take over communities and impose sharia law and rule them according to what they view as authentic principles; also beef w/ US because we deployed armies and supported these govt's; third beef w/ Israel, this is smaller part of AQ ideology and tossed in because they thought it would build support in arab world rather than being core thing) → after Bin Laden, AQ struggled a lot; following death, massive power vacuum in AQ and end up w/ a bunch of constituent parts that continue to operate in less centralized way than previously

Primary group

A soldier's squad or section. Company = community; on an individual basis, soldiers are preoccupied less with political values and more with individual survival → this was the case for the German, but not all, armies. Bound by expectations and demands of other members.

Threat credibility

A threat has to be credible to be efficacious, and its credibility depends on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making a threat. The rationality of the adversary is pertinent to the credibility of the threat.

"The decision"/decisiveness

But that the only means is the combat, and that consequently everything is subject to a supreme law: which is the decision by arms; that where this is really demanded by one, it is a redress which cannot be refused by the other. The decision by arms is, for all operations in war, great and small, what cash payment is in bill transactions. Will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires, but take political object as standard only if think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move. *REVISE*.

David Galula

Classic of this is Galula → deals w/ communist and insurgent regimes and how to respond to them; Galula dealing w/ nationalist insurgents that want control of the state; generally, support of civilian pop is considered an open contest → civil pop becomes center of gravity; want to fight insurgents in a way that wins hearts and minds of relevant civilian population Col in French army, served in Algeria, died in 1967 at 48 years old → key principles of COIN and how to distinguish insurgents from civilians; seeing through subterfuge becomes essential for success of counterinsurgent Act of participation in pop is necessary for success → make use of such an asset; job of counterinsurgent to defeat that, go through a few cases that do this Role of population → pop = center of gravity, grounds of contest between insurgent and counterinsurgent; critical is politically intelligible victories → Galula emphasizes that victory in insurgency warfare is about defeating enemies in a way that is politically viable and that increases your support in the civilian population Captain in the Algerian War on the French side. He developed the COIN theory of Counter-Insurgency Warfare. In his theory, he draws on his experience in Algeria where he was able to reduce the insurgency in the sector assigned to him (earned him a promotion) but also from his previous experience in Communist controlled China where he was captured by Mao's followers. Insurgency and strength rapport to the local government it is fighting Sees Insurgency as a protracted war where insurgents can inflict high costs on gov bc they are hard to find and eliminate and also bc the government is not as fluid as an insurgent group. Galula was more concerned with rendering the insurgents politically useless and unable to gain the support of the population rather than military victories. Importance: COIN Theory centered around 8 steps: 1. Concentrate enough forces to expel the insurgents 2. Leave enough soldiers to prevent insurgents from coming back 3. Establish Contact with and control population (cut them off from guerrilla) 4. Destroy local insurgent political org. 5. Set up new authorities via elections 6. Test new leaders and replace the soft while enabling the strong ones 7. Educate leaders into a national political movement 8. Suppress remnants of guerrilla Theory: Sun Tzu's focus on winning over the population but also the public become the COG in this case. Example: British new strategy in Malaya under Marshall Templar. They were able to control the population by registering them with ID cards and housing them in "New Villages". In this case they were able to isolate the population from the insurgents (Chinese Malays) by stopping population movements. Also there was a reliance on the local government and police as the first line of defense. Since the British were willing to offer independence, therefore was able to offer political power in the new institution as bribe/incentive for the insurgents to stop fighting

Challe Plan

Implemented by the French commander who gave this plan its name. The Challe plan was a surprise offensive in two waves, going from east to west. There was a shift to small rapidly deployed units to destroy FLN insurgents. These units were highly trained individuals who were inserted via helicopters after the target areas had been bombed thoroughly. The Challe Plan also attempted to destroy the administrative and political organizations of the insurgency in that region. The result was an effective tactical regime. His offensive, begun in March 1959, succeeded in substantially weakening the FLN. Through the use of speed and concentration of force, Challe kept the FLN insurgents in constant retreat and disorder. His innovative tactics would be studied and emulated by others - notably Syrian government forces in the Syrian Civil War seeking to keep insurgency at bay and off balance. The Challe Plan was only partially completed before he was reassigned to France. The French relegated reserve and conscript units to static defense roles, e.g., protecting roads, quadrillage, etc, in order to free up regular units to conduct mobile 'search and destroy' missions in the mountains where guerrilla bands had taken refuge. Employing helicopters, the French inserted special mobile units composed of elite troops such as Foreign Legionnaires, paratroopers, marines, special commandos units, and air mobile regulars. These elite forces never exceeded 20,000 troopers. Operationally, the Plan Challe comprised a series of sweeps against known insurgent spots. Releasing troops from static quadrillage duties, Challe broke down large formations into small units, many of which were mixed Franco-Algerian in make-up, that could move quickly and bring the guerrillas to battle in rough country. The highly sophisticated operational and tactical scenario was virtually the same. Utilizing primarily air-gathered intelligence and without warning, the elite units and the air force move at tremendous speed on enemy territory. The strike usually takes place at dawn. First, the target area is bombed out of existence and showered with cluster bombs from fighter jets and bombers. Within few minutes, the paratroopers land in the heart of the insurgent territory, close air support provided by armed helicopters. The elite force engages immediately the insurgents while fighters, bombers, armed helicopters patrolled the battle space and strafe or bomb any insurgents leaving the area. Additional troops are brought in by helicopters to close the immediate net around the insurgents. A larger contingent of regular troops and Commandos de chasse [hunter class troops] are convoyed to several spots around the battle space to ambush and pursue the survivors. The aircraft are relieved when the area is under control by the elite troops and when the regular contingent is in place. The command and control post (Joint Operations Command) is always shared by Air Force and Army commanders. The operation is dismantled at sundown and the elite troops are withdrawn leaving the local (secteur) regular troop to finish the job and keep the area clean. It was devastating to the F.L.N., in terms of lives and morale. Importance: Sun Tzu: Importance of speed and force, also regular and extraordinary forces. Modern system, COIN strategy

KM Panikkar

Indian Ambassador who served as an intermediary between the United States and China. He relayed messages to the US that the Chinese would intervene if the fighting passed the 38th Parallel. The United States did not find this threat credible and continues past the 38th Parallel all the way to the Yalu river. Indicates issues surrounding credible signals in conflict (Schelling).

Centralized command

Promotes coordinated operations and economy of force and aids in integrating all assets into a cohesive capability.

Tactical propaganda

Refer to propaganda which seeks to promise immediate results in the tactical situation.

Pericles

Ruler of Athens who zealously sought to spread Athenian democracy through imperial force; constructed the Parthenon.

Battle of Midway

Six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States defeated Japan in one of the most decisive naval battles of World War II. Thanks in part to major advances in code breaking, the United States was able to preempt and counter Japan's planned ambush of its few remaining aircraft carriers, inflicting permanent damage on the Japanese Navy. An important turning point in the Pacific campaign, the victory allowed the United States and its allies to move into an offensive position. This fleet engagement between U.S. and Japanese navies in the north-central Pacific Ocean resulted from Japan's desire to sink the American aircraft carriers that had escaped destruction at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Japanese fleet commander, chose to invade a target relatively close to Pearl Harbor to draw out the American fleet, calculating that when the United States began its counterattack, the Japanese would be prepared to crush them. Instead, an American intelligence breakthrough-the solving of the Japanese fleet codes-enabled Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to understand the exact Japanese plans. Nimitz placed available U.S. carriers in position to surprise the Japanese moving up for their preparatory air strikes on Midway Island itself. One of the most decisive naval battles of WW2 that combined the forces of two new innovations: Intelligence Decryption and Carrier Warfare While the US had decoded messages that let Nimitz know that a massive Japanese strike was coming with a rough date and that it was targeting "AF". Sent out Midway is out of water message to confirm "AF" was Midway. Nimitz had to decide between battleships and carriers: picked the Carriers to surprise the Japanese. The aircrafts were sent on scout missions and the Japanese were found on June 4 and bombers were sent out. Torpedo bombers diverted attention for long enough (took heavy losses) for dive bombers to take out Japanese forces. The Japanese carriers were caught in the middle of refuelling and rearming their planes and was extra vulnerable. Doolittle raid forces extension of Japanese perimeter → Japanese try to project power towards Alaska; where are the Japanese heading? Aleutians v. Midway → go into alaska or midway? HUGE intelligence coup → Op 20 G, Edwin Laten is Nimitz's fleet intelligence officer, sees references and intercepted Japanese transmissions of "AF" → design an experiment; sends out message on a frequency that they know Japanese have cracked, saying Midway is short on water → then see AF short on water, so now they know Midway is AF and that's where Japanese are planning their attack Japan brings more to the fight; Critical thing is that from a loss of forces perspective, the battle is more or less a draw → but US has superior industrial capacity; Japan losing 3 aircraft carriers and pilots devastated Japanese war effort, Japanese navy never recovers → didn't necessarily know this at the time; shows the limits of intelligence, looks like Japan extremely capable; Japan after the war was actually limited severely.

Soft core

Source of infection which was by no means as effective as hard core; lack of organized opposition.

Operation Barbarossa

The Axis powers' invasion of the Soviet Union. The attacked area = 75% of Soviet economy Goal: Capture Caucasus Oil fields, expand aryan living space into west Soviet Union, capture Slavs as labour force. German POV: German High Command (Halder) in favor of going all out on Moscow bc significance as capital + majority of the Red Army was stationed outside. Hitler refuses and commands his armies to go north and south to capture the Caucasus/Ukrainian oil fields first (S) and Leningrad (N). Halder warns that by not attacking M first would give the Soviets times to strengthen up defenses = true. Soviet POV: Lacked leadership bc 90% of Soviet High Command was executed by Stalin. The Red Army = ultimate version of Centralized Command. Advantages: Number of people and space/territory. The Soviets traded space for time to figure out a counter-offensive /response. They used the sheer number of people to overwhelm their enemy. need Ukraine, breadbasket of Europe, think it will give them food supplies to control all of Europe → problem is USSR is a lot bigger than France, most fertile agricultural land of Ukraine is South so Halder notices that they will be splitting forces a bit more than they should → if we get into a war of attrition, may not have enough forces to carry it out and win (exactly what happens); Ukraine so important that they send Guderian toward Ukraine, get to Moscow where they get stumped Soviet response → not Blitzkrieg but trade land for time; bring forces over from Siberia, but have small problem of Soviets killing 90% of own division commanders in 1930s in Stalin's purchase; all of operational strategic leaders of Soviets are dead at outset of WW2, leaves Soviets ill-equipped to fight → using against Japanese Blitzkrieg, but in 1941-42 start innovating using what they have; technique where division fighting with unit behind them with a bunch of machine guns, if anyone retreats they get shot by the Soviets → blocking formations to discourage retreat and surrender on part of Soviet forces; horrific but leverages comparative advantage of brutal autocracy and mass of people Germans end up doing what they feared; outrun supply, don't have enough forces, winter sets in, and now they're stuck Success on every front for Germans until Battle of Moscow. Showed contrasting military objectives between German HC and Hitler. Hitler focused on the destruction of soviet field armies and capturing economic/industrial regions, rather than capturing militarily strategic assets. He wanted to take Crimea , and prevent Soviets from getting oil from the Caucasus and in the north take Leningrad rather than listen to his commanders and strike heavy on Moscow which is the more strategically sound choice since it is the psychological/physical capital + transportation hub+ comms/control center of the Centralised Command Red Army Calls into question once again the idea of Civ-Mil Relations between Hitler and the German Military High Command. Halder and HC saw Moscow as the capital and center of gravity while Hitler saw the industrial and economic regions of Russia as COG. On June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler launched his armies eastward in a massive invasion of the Soviet Union: three great army groups with over three million German soldiers, 150 divisions, and three thousand tanks smashed across the frontier into Soviet territory. The invasion covered a front from the North Cape to the Black Sea, a distance of two thousand miles. By this point German combat effectiveness had reached its apogee; in training, doctrine, and fighting ability, the forces invading Russia represented the finest army to fight in the twentieth century. Barbarossa was the crucial turning point in World War II, for its failure forced Nazi Germany to fight a two-front war against a coalition possessing immensely superior resources. The Germans had serious deficiencies. They severely underestimated their opponent; their logistical preparations were grossly inadequate for the campaign; and German industrial preparations for a sustained war had yet to begin. But the greatest mistake that the Germans made was to come as conquerors, not as liberators-they were determined to enslave the Slavic population and exterminate the Jews. Thus, from the beginning, the war in the East became an ideological struggle, waged with a ruthlessness and mercilessness not seen in Europe since the Mongols. In Barbarossa's opening month, German armies bit deep into Soviet territory; panzer armies encircled large Soviet forces at Minsk and Smolensk, while armored spearheads reached two-thirds of the distance to Moscow and Leningrad. But already German logistics were unraveling, while a series of Soviet counterattacks stalled the advance. In September the Germans got enough supplies forward to renew their drives; the results were the encirclement battles of Kiev in September and Bryansk-Vyazma in October, each netting 600,000 prisoners. Moscow seemingly lay open to a German advance, but at this point Russian weather intervened with heavy rains that turned the roads into morasses. The frosts of November solidified the mud, so that the drive could resume. Despite the lateness of the season and the fact that further advances would leave their troops with no winter clothes or supply dumps for the winter, the generals urged Hitler to continue. The Germans struggled to the gates of Moscow where Soviet counterattacks stopped them in early December. In desperate conditions, they conducted a slow retreat as Soviet attacks threatened to envelop much of their forces in a defeat as disastrous as that which befell Napoleon's Grand Army in 1812. In the end the Soviets overreached, and the Germans restored a semblance of order to the front; the spring thaw in March 1942 brought operations to a halt. But Barbarossa had failed, and Nazi Germany confronted a two-front war that it could not win.

Viet Cong

The insurgent groups against which the United States fought in the Vietnam War. They lived off the land and local population eliminating the need for vulnerable supply routes (something the US didn't get). A mass political organization in South Vietnam and Cambodia with its own army - the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (PLAF) - that fought against the United States and South Vietnamese governments during the Vietnam War, eventually emerging on the winning side. It had both guerrilla and regular army units, as well as a network of cadres who organized peasants in the territory it controlled. Many soldiers were recruited in South Vietnam, but others were attached to the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the regular North Vietnamese army. During the war, communists and anti-war activists insisted the Viet Cong was an insurgency indigenous to the South, while the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments portrayed the group as a tool of Hanoi. Although the terminology distinguishes northerners from the southerners, communist forces were under a single command structure set up in 1958. The headquarters of the Viet Cong based at Memot came to be known as Central Office for South Vietnam or COSVN by its MACV and South Vietnamese counterparts, a near-mythical "bamboo Pentagon" from which the Viet Cong's entire war effort was being directed. For nearly a decade the fabled COSVN headquarters, which directed the entire war effort of the Viet Cong was the target of the RVN/US war effort, and which would have collapsed the insurgency war effort. US and South Vietnamese Special Forces sent to capture them usually were killed very quickly or returned with heavy casualties to the point that teams refused to go. Daily B-52 bombings had failed to kill any of the leadership during Operation Menu despite flattening the entire area, as Soviet trawlers were able to forewarn COSVN, whom used the data on speed, altitude and direction to move perpendicular and to move underground. North Vietnam established the National Liberation Front on December 20, 1960, to foment insurgency in the South. Many of the Viet Cong's core members were volunteer "regroupees", southern Việt Minh who had resettled in the North after the Geneva Accord (1954). Hanoi gave the regroupees military training and sent them back to the South along the Ho Chi Minh trail in the early 1960s. The NLF called for southern Vietnamese to "overthrow the camouflaged colonial regime of the American imperialists" and to make "efforts toward the peaceful unification". The PLAF's best-known action was the Tết Offensive, a gigantic assault on more than 100 South Vietnamese urban centers in 1968, including an attack on the U.S. embassy in Saigon. The offensive riveted the attention of the world's media for weeks, but also overextended the Viet Cong. Two further offensives were conducted in its wake, the mini-Tet and August Offensive. In 1969 the Viet Cong would establish the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, a shadow-country in South Vietnam intended to represent the organization on the world stage and was immediately recognized by the communist bloc and maintained diplomatic links with many nations in the Non-Aligned Movement. Later communist offensives were conducted predominantly by newly mechanized PAVN forces, as the ability of the Viet Cong to recruit among the South Vietnamese became much more limited. The Viet Cong remained an active military and political front. The organization was dissolved in 1976 when North and South Vietnam were officially unified under a communist government. Importance: Sun Tzu: No noticeable shape (ie infrastructure to defend) Galula: Ability to attack when you want to; advantage

Unit cohesion

The military term for a unit's ability to work well together.

Strategic management

The strategic management problem in our national security establishment has been the peacetime competition to preserve and enhance the future of our ability to deter USSR from actions adverse to our interests; needs serious amendment as we move into a multipolar world.

New Villages

The villages created under the Briggs plan, they included amenities such as power and running water. They were guarded continually to prevent civilian contact with insurgents and to thus starve the insurgents of support amongst the population Importance: Effectively isolated the population from the insurgents -- lost public support → lost center of gravity

Battle of the Coral Sea

This four-day World War II skirmish in May 1942 marked the first air-sea battle in history. The Japanese were seeking to control the Coral Sea with an invasion of Port Moresby in southeast New Guinea, but their plans were intercepted by Allied forces. When the Japanese landed in the area, they came under attack from the aircraft carrier planes of the American task force commanded by Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher. Although both sides suffered damages to their carriers, the battle left the Japanese without enough planes to cover the ground attack of Port Moresby, resulting in a strategic Allied victory. The first air-sea battle in history and an engagement in which the lead role was played by aircraft launched from ships at sea, this battle resulted from Japanese efforts to make an amphibious landing at Port Moresby in southeast New Guinea. Unknown to the Japanese, Allied codebreakers had learned enough about enemy communications to discern Japanese plans in time for Allied fleets to assemble in the Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher commanded American task forces, including two large aircraft carriers and other ships, and a British-led cruiser force mounted surface opposition. The Japanese used many more ships but divided them into a number of widely separated groups, one of which contained a light carrier. The Japanese covering force (led by Vice Admiral Takagi Takao) also contained two large carriers.There were a number of missed opportunities as carrier airmen learned their trade. Air strikes from both sides either missed their targets or found them only after using up their ordnance. Americans connected first, sinking the light carrier Shoho. When the main forces traded air strikes, the Americans lost the carrier Lexington (Yorktown was also damaged), and the Japanese suffered damage to the carrier Shokaku. Without air cover, however, the Japanese invasion force turned back, leaving the strategic victory to the Allies. The results had an important impact upon the Battle of Midway a month later, reducing Japanese forces available at that key battle. May 4th-May 8th 1942 (Northeastern coast of Australia) Australian and American forces against Japanese Navy 5 month after the Surprise Attack of Pearl Harbor. Turning point in the Pacific campaign: First aircraft carrier battle fought and was the first to see no direct ship versus ship action. All attacks during the battle were conducted by aircraft. Become the largest naval battle fought near the coast of Australia. Stop Japanese plan for the invasion of the Australian Port Moresby First Japanese failure during WWII. Later analysis: tactical defeat for the Allied forces but strategic victory since Japanese lost and their ships were not able to be used for the battle of Midway Considered by the press at the time as the battle that saved Australia today it is still considered important but historians agreed that it wasn't the only factor that helped protect Australia. Both belligerents called for victory after the battle (technically the Japanese sank a greater amount of tonnage). Strategically Allied forces are considered as winners because the invasion of Port Moresby was avoided. Because both sides over-stated the damages inflicted the press decided to be more careful with the results when the Battle of Midway happened. Consequences on Japanese forces: thought they'll easily win against the US on later operations => they entered Midway with smaller forces than planned + They thought they sank 2 American carriers they entered the battle of Midway realizing they will be facing 3 carriers instead of 2.

Eighth Army

Under Ridgeway's command this unit was pushed back by a Chinese counter-attack while North of the 38th Parallel. The unit suffered from a lack of planning and poor logistical support, as well as a loss of unit cohesion due to replacement of lost members by ROK army which led to an unmotivated, hollowed-out force. The peace of occupied Japan was shattered in June 1950 when 75,000 North Korean troops with Russian made tanks invaded South Korea, igniting the Korean War. U.S. naval and air forces quickly became involved in combat operations, and it was soon clear that U.S. ground forces would have to be committed. To stem the North Korean advance, the occupation forces in Japan were thus shipped off to South Korea as quickly as possible, but their lack of training and equipment was telling, as some of the initial U.S. units were destroyed by the North Koreans. However, the stage was eventually reached as enough units of Eighth Army arrived in Korea to make a firm front. The stalemate was broken by the Inchon landings of the X Corps (tenth corps, consisting of soldiers and Marines). The North Korean forces, when confronted with this threat to their rear areas, combined with a breakout operation at Pusan, broke away and hastily retired north. Both South and North Korea were almost entirely occupied by United Nations forces. However, once U.S. units neared the Yalu River and the frontier between North Korea and China, the Chinese intervened and drastically changed the character of the war. Eighth Army was decisively defeated at the Battle of the Chongchon River and forced to retreat all the way back to South Korea. U.S. historian Clay Blair noted that the Eighth Army was left completely unprotected on its right flank due to the Turkish Brigade's retreat despite myths that arose about the Turks killing 200 enemies by bayonet. The defeat of the U.S. Eighth Army resulted in the longest retreat of any U.S. military unit in history. General Walker was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December 1950, and replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway. The overstretched Eighth Army suffered heavily with the Chinese offensive, who were able to benefit from shorter lines of communication and with rather casually deployed enemy forces. The Chinese broke through the U.S. defenses despite U.S. air supremacy and the Eighth Army and U.N. forces retreated hastily to avoid encirclement. The Chinese offensive continued pressing U.S. forces, which lost Seoul, the South Korean capital. Eighth Army's morale and esprit de corps hit rock bottom, to where it was widely regarded as a broken, defeated rabble. General Ridgway forcefully restored Eighth Army to combat effectiveness over several months. Eighth Army slowed and finally halted the Chinese advance at the battles of Chipyong-ni and Wonju. It then counter-attacked the Chinese, re-took Seoul, and drove to the 38th parallel, where the front stabilized. When General Ridgway replaced General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as the overall U.N. commander, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet assumed command of Eighth Army.

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — drones. The complexity and expense of long-range armed UAVs are quite different from short-range systems, which make them difficult to develop and even to operate. How UAVs will be employed is also important; UAVs that are expendable, like cruise missiles, are easier to use than those intended to be used again. Many countries are developing and acquiring UAVs. Shortrange UAVs are going to spread, because they have attractive civilian uses. Only a few rich and technologically advanced countries will be in a position to develop the higher-technology and longer-range systems. Most of these are U.S. allies. Others, including U.S. adversaries, will likely find other weapons, such as aircraft, more militarily and cost-effective. Armed UAV systems are not truly transformative weapons, though they offer the United States some significant advantages today (and our more militarily proficient allies and adversaries in the future), particularly against enemies that lack air defenses. It is also plausible, though not necessarily likely, that a substate group might employ armed UAVs to create a significant psychological effect. Armed UAVs do not create the dangers and instabilities that have traditionally led to nonproliferation efforts, although the risks of proliferation cannot be dismissed entirely, as with any conventional weapon. The United States has an interest in how others use armed UAVs as they spread, and will need to address how its own use of these systems can be fit into a broader set of international norms to discourage their misuse by others. A UAV has these characteristics: It is a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator; It uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift; It can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely; It is designed to be recoverable; It can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload; It includes those components (necessary equipment, network, and personnel) to control the vehicle. The development of inexpensive GPS receivers makes it possible for aircraft to gauge their position with considerable accuracy, eschewing the need for line-of-sight radio contact with a ground controller or expensive onboard navigation systems. Also widely available, this technology makes it possible to control UAVs and receive data from them over long distances. Users requiring only low-bandwidth communication (i.e., those who wish to know the UAV's location and how it is functioning) can meet that requirement with a simple satellite phone. One great advantage of UAVs is their size. They can be very small, in part because they are not required to transport a human being. This results directly in relatively small costs. Reusable armed UAVs such as the Predator are effective in a role often referred to as "hunter-killer," in which they fly and search for targets. When targets are found, they can engage them directly or pass cues to other systems that can then continue the surveillance or engage. Searching for targets can require flying for extended periods of time. Systems like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper operate at medium-to-high altitudes to maximize survivability and minimize the chance of being detected.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

Was a Jordanian jihadist who ran a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan. He became known after going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of bombings, beheadings, and attacks during the Iraq War, reportedly "turning an insurgency against US troops" in Iraq "into a Shia-Sunni civil war". In late 2004 he joined al-Qaeda, and pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. After this al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and al-Zarqawi was given the al-Qaeda title "Emir of Al Qaeda in the Country of Two Rivers". In September 2005, he declared "all-out war" on Shi'ites in Iraq, after the Iraqi government offensive on insurgents in the Sunni town of Tal Afar. He dispatched numerous suicide bombers throughout Iraq to attack American soldiers and areas with large concentrations of Shia militias. He is also thought to be responsible for the 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan. Zarqawi was killed in a targeted killing by a joint U.S. force on June 7, 2006, while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse in Hibhib, a small village approximately 8 km (5.0 mi) west-northwest of Baqubah. One United States Air Force F-16C jet dropped two 500-pound (230 kg) guided bombs on the safehouse. Zarqawi's intent in using women may partially have been to shame Muslim men into participating in attacks, since women are generally seen as less suited to this sort of attack, and using them in this way expresses a lack of options. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was renowned for his particularly savage tactics as well as for pursuing the controversial strategy of inciting sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shiite factions in Iraq. His influence and legacy is underscored by the fact that all of the documented cases of al-Qaeda's use of women suicide bombers to date either have taken place in Iraq or have been carried out by an Iraqi. Beheadings, hostage takings, and suicide car bombings became part of daily life during al-Zarqawi's leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Over time, these types of attacks became synonymous with al-Zarqawi himself; eventually the use of these tactics became tantamount to a declaration of responsibility, so that no official announcement was required. Female suicide bombers embody the very characteristics that allowed al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq to mount such a successful campaign against coalition forces and to destabilize the nascent Iraqi government. Among other attributes, female bombers are largely unexpected, generate a great deal of media attention, demonstrate the power and reach of al-Qaeda in Iraq by challenging cultural norms, and successfully employ asymmetric means. By incorporating women into its arsenal of suicide bombers, al-Qaeda gained a number of tactical and strategic advantages

Battle network

Work, all talking about 3 components, censors, commandcontrolcomm, computers infrastructure/effectives *REVISE*

Collective Punishment

A form of retaliation whereby a suspected perpetrator's family members, friends, acquaintances, sect, neighbors or entire ethnic group is targeted. The punished group may often have no direct association with the other individuals or groups, or direct control over their actions.

Curtis LeMay

A general in the United States Air Force and the vice presidential running mate of American Independent Party candidate George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. LeMay is credited with designing and implementing an effective, but also controversial, systematic strategic bombing campaign in the Pacific theater of World War II. He served as Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force from 1961 to 1965. He commanded the 305th Operations Group from October 1942 until September 1943, and the 3d Air Division in the European theatre of World War II until August 1944, when he was transferred to the China Burma India Theater. He was then placed in command of strategic bombing operations against Japan, planning and executing a massive fire bombing campaign against Japanese cities and Operation Starvation, a crippling minelaying campaign in Japan's internal waterways. After the war, he was assigned to command USAF Europe and coordinated the Berlin airlift. He served as commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 to 1957, where he presided over the transition to an all-jet aircraft force that focused on the deployment of nuclear weapons.

"The Surge"

"Surge strategy," because its most controversial provision involved sending five new brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Iraq, a commitment that grew to a total of nearly 30,000 additional troops—this at a time when public support for the Iraq War was strained to the breaking point in opting for the surge, President Bush overruled some of his most important military advisers, most notably, the two senior combatant commanders: Gen. George Casey, who was responsible for running the Iraq War, and Gen. John Abizaid, who was responsible for the overall theater of operations. My thesis is that the surge case poses problems for both the professional supremacist and civilian supremacist camps and is an unabashed vindication of neither. Ultimately, the Bush administration did not follow the prescriptions of either camp exactly and, in the process, arrived at a better result than if it had hewed rigidly to one or the other. If the administration had followed the professional supremacist school precepts to the letter, at least from 2005 on, then the surge never would have happened. Conversely, if the administration had followed the precepts of the civilian supremacists to the letter, the surge might have been stillborn; the decision might even have provoked another "revolt of the generals" that would have strengthened the hands of congressional partisan opponents seeking to block implementation of the new strategy. First, the surge strategy worked better than opponents expected and at least as well as any of the alternatives available at the time. In other words, President Bush's decision was not, in hindsight, a strategic blunder and it did not result in a fiasco. It was the right decision, or at the very least a right decision. Second, the additional U.S. forces, which were the most controversial part of the strategy and the focal point for mobilizing domestic opposition, were a necessary component; without the surge in troops, the other contributing factors would not have yielded an equivalent positive result. Noteworthy in 3 ways: First, although the various departments began with sharply opposing views that amounted to very different strategic alternatives, the full-blown alternate strategies were not presented to President Bush for an up or down decision on each one. Most of the other elements of the strategy, however, were worked out at lower levels until a blended, hybrid proposal that enjoyed something like a consensus could be brought forward. At no time did advocates of sharply differing approaches—say the NSC pro-surge, the State Department pro-hunker down, and the MNF-I pro-transition—debate fully articulated versions of the strategy in front of the president so that he could decisively pick the one he most preferred while rejecting the other two The second noteworthy aspect was President Bush's decision to shake up his leadership team in Iraq, replacing General Casey with General Petraeus and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad with Ambassador Crocker—but then to promote both Casey and Khalilzad to higher office. In this regard, the involvement of Chairman Pace was critical. He had to fill three roles that stood in tension with one another: principal military adviser to the president, principal military adviser and confidant to the secretary of defense, and principal advocate for the views of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders. The third noteworthy aspect of the surge decision involves the extent to which the new strategy was conceived in Washington as opposed to in theater. As with any decision that events later seem to vindicate, there are plenty of candidates willing to claim paternity. Many of those claims have some warrant, because several different factions had been advocating for something like the surge for a number of years. The strategic-level decisions, however, were pushed and made in the White House. And importantly for civil-military relations theory, they were pushed by the vice president, the civilian national security adviser, and other senior civilian staff, and made by the president over and against the initial preferences of the military commanders in the field

Phase IV

*Look at Schadlow reading* Events in Iraq since March 2003 highlight the importance and complexity of operations during Phase IV of a campaign—activities conducted after decisive combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations (AO). Phase IV is often described as postconflict operations, but that is a misleading term. Phase IV usually begins soon after the advent of combat during Phase III, and the two overlap. In addition, as in Iraq, significant fighting can still occur during Phase IV. A better descriptive term would be "transition operations," because military forces try to position the AO to move back to peace and civilian government control. In the past, U.S. commanders often conducted detailed planning for Phase IV while Phase III was ongoing, such as during World War II. But, with modern war fighting concepts like Rapid Decisive Operations and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries, such an approach is no longer wise or feasible.

"Overmatch"

*REVISE* Be stronger or more skillful than an adversary; The application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent to prevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics.

2005 Amman Bombings

*REVISE* The 2005 Amman bombings were a series of coordinated bomb attacks on three hotel lobbies in Amman, Jordan, on 9 November 2005. The explosions at the Grand Hyatt Hotel, the Radisson SAS Hotel, and the Days Inn started at around 20:50 local time (18:50 UTC) at the Grand Hyatt. The three hotels are frequented by foreign diplomats. The bomb at the Radisson SAS exploded in the Philadelphia Ballroom, where a Jordanian wedding hosting hundreds of guests was taking place. The attacks killed 60 people and injured 115 others. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was quick to claim the attack. The bombings, a rare terror attack in Jordan, then spurred a wave of new anti-terror measures by the Jordanian government.

Regime maturation

*REVISE* When everyone has something; nuclear weapons regimes have matured because other countries match US nuclear capacity.

Ratio of fire

75% of the troops won't fight when they first engage the enemy → majority in group seek lives of minimum risk and expenditure of effort; 1 in 4 will not finish the job, "close the circuit", as they are expected to.

Carl von Clausewitz

A 19th century Prussian general and military theorist who stressed the "moral" and political aspects of war. His most notable work, On War, was unfinished at his death. Believed war is an extension of politics by other means, and that all war is an act of policy. His work heavily drew on lessons learned from Napoleon.

Sun Tzu

A Chinese general, military strategist, writer, and philosopher who lived in the Eastern Zhou period of ancient China. Wrote the Art of War.

Dominant indicator approach

A general, organizational model that focuses on sudden and dramatic changes in the quantitative indicators on which decision-makers rely to predict how organizations evaluate the performances of such indicated policies as strategy (focus on direction and rate of change). Implications show that (1) organizations hold on to assessment criteria better than policy preferences, and (2) explains why changes in strategy are widely seen as successful; (3) organizations can have dramatic fluctuations in assessment; (4) explains conditions under which organizations become internally conflicted and torn; (5) explains the timing of decisions. Represents systematic factors in info relied upon by decision-makers; capture dramatic movements by looking at rates of change (derivative) of these indicators.

Force employment

A powerful and explicable determinant of capability. Central problem of modern warfare: how to conduct meaningful military operations in the face of radical firepower → by 1918, a process of convergent evolution under harsh wartime selection procedures produced stable and transnational body of ideas on the methods needed to operate effectively in the face of lethal modern weapons → focused on reducing exposure to firepower and slowing the movement of the enemy → led to modern system of force employment.

al-Qaeda in Iraq

Also referred to as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, AQI, or Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia was an Iraqi Sunni Islamic Jihadist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda, for part of the first two decades of the 21st century. The group was founded by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999 under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. The group is believed to have started bomb attacks in Iraq as of August 2003, five months after the coalition invasion and occupation of Iraq, targeting UN representatives, Iraqi Shiite institutions, the Jordanian embassy, provisional Iraqi government institutions. After it pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in October 2004, its official name became Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. On 7 June 2006, the leader of AQI, al-Zarqawi, and his spiritual adviser Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman, were both killed by a U.S. airstrike with two 500 lb (230 kg) bombs on a safe house near Baqubah. The group's leadership was then assumed by the Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. In a letter to al-Zarqawi in July 2005, Al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined a four-stage plan beginning with taking control of Iraq. Step 1: expulsion of US forces from Iraq. Step 2: establishing in Iraq an Islamic authority—a caliphate. Step 3: "the jihad wave" should be extended to "the secular countries neighboring Iraq". Step 4: "the clash with Israel".

Threat that leaves something to chance

As Schelling (1960) first emphasized, nuclear deterrence is based on a "threat that leaves something to chance." It is this possibility of probabilistic escalation that allows the static models of deterrence to be translated into a dynamic story. In a conventional war between the superpowers, as long as each side holds firm there is a risk of escalation. The risk is both from accidents and from the unintended consequences of fighting a conventional war. This risk continues until the conflict is resolved: either one side backs down or the probability of unintentional nuclear war turns into a reality. This nuclear game of "chicken" is called brinkmanship

Narrow AI

As used here, autonomous systems have the capability to independently compose and select among diff courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation → narrow AI systems can compose courses of action and choose among them Narrow AI Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Aimed: specific target is designated and engaged by the weapon Semi-autonomous (target is illuminated in some fashion) Fire-and-forget Directed: weapon has an authorized target list to engage, with priorities Line-of-sight Non-line-of-sight Kill box Loitering Can be network enabled (human in the loop), or not Weak artificial intelligence (weak AI), also known as narrow AI, is artificial intelligence that is focused on one narrow task. Weak AI is defined in contrast to either strong AI (a machine with consciousness, sentience and mind) or artificial general intelligence (a machine with the ability to apply intelligence to any problem, rather than just one specific problem). Many currently existing systems that claim to use "artificial intelligence" are likely operating as a weak AI focused on a narrowly defined specific problem. Siri is a good example of narrow intelligence.

Tacit bargaining

Bargaining when communication is nearly impossible or incomplete → it may be to the advantage of one to be unable to communicate; there's room for a motive to destroy communication or to collaborate in advance on a method of meeting if one is aware of his advantage and confident in the solution he foresees. key takeaways: (1) tacit agreements require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the alternatives and cannot be a matter of degree; (2) when agreement must be reached with incomplete communication, participants must be ready to allow the situation itself to exercise substantial constraint over the outcome Problem of limited warfare is a discrete world that is better able to recognize the qualitative and quantitative differences Steps to be taken before tacit bargaining occurs: (1) keep communication open; (2) give thought to usefulness of mediators

Principle of polarity

By thinking interests of two commanders are opposed in equal measure, we assume general principle of polarity → valid only in relation to one and the same object, in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another. Attack and defense being things different in kind and unequal in strength, polarity cannot be applied to them → polarity lies in the object both sides seek to achieve, namely the decision. The superiority of defense over attack often destroys the effect of polarity which explains the suspension of military action → defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack; the impulse created by the polarity of interests may be exhausted in the difference between the strength of attack and defense, and may become inoperative.

Deep battle

Called for the use of longer-range offensive elements to disrupt defenders' ability to move resources in the rear, both by striking moving forces themselves and by disrupting the command functions needed to direct their movement

Absolute war

Characterized by very high levels of energy and professional competence, and it aims at the destruction of the opposing force and the attainment of a political decision by force of arms. It contrasts to a weaker, less competent "war of observation," based on the carefully circumscribed use of force in the century or so prior to the French Revolution. in order to make the enemy comply with one's will, a state must place its adversary in a position that is more oppressive to it than compliance. Furthermore, that position cannot be temporary, or appear to be temporary.

SLA Marshall

Chief US Army combat historian during WW2 and Korean War. Served in WW1 in France. In 1940, Marshall began a career as an author with the publication of Blitzkrieg: Armies on Wheels, an analysis of the tactics the Wehrmacht developed in the years leading up to the start of World War II. Marshall's work on infantry combat effectiveness in World War II, titled Men Against Fire, is his best-known and most controversial work. In the book, Marshall claimed that of the World War II U.S. troops in actual combat, 75% never fired at the enemy for the purpose of killing, even though they were engaged in combat and under direct threat. Marshall argued that the Army should devote significant training resources to increasing the percentage of soldiers willing to engage the enemy with direct fire. These findings were later challenged as mistaken or even fabricated; Marshall himself reported far more men fired weapons during the Vietnam War.

Civilian supremacists

Civilian supremacists discourage civilian leaders from reflexively deferring to military expertise on important decisions where the civilians' strategic judgment differs from the military. Eliot Cohen put it succinctly, "Both [civilians and the military] must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not dictate, it must dominate; that that conversation will include not only ends and policies, but ways and means." Contrary to McMasterism, once military advisers have given senior civilian leaders their candid views, the military obligation to speak up has been satisfied; there is no corresponding duty to speak out if civilian leaders decide on a course of action contrary to what the military advised. Instead, once a policy has been decided, the military is obligated to salute, obey, and implement. To civilian supremacists, it is not a matter of professional expertise so much as a matter of political competence. Military professional expertise is still only one (albeit very important) factor that belongs in the strategic calculus.

Grammar of war

Clausewitz's observation that 'war has its own grammar, but not its own logic' as normative. On War, though, is a blend of descriptive and normative observations, which Clausewitz referred to as objective and subjective, respectively. *REVISE*

Combined arms

Combined arms integration reduces net vulnerability by teaming together weapon types with contrasting strengths and weaknesses (in 1918, key combo was between infantry and artillery). Commanders must know respective pros, cons, conditions for effective employment, maintenance needs, training procedures, and resupply requirements of a whole range of unique weapons Defensive: as important to defenders as attackers; direct fire systems suppress offensive movement, giving slower indirect-fire systems time to destroy the attack in detail.

ISIS

Comes in some ways as a more or less splinter of AQ; Zarqawi, radicalized while in prison for drug possession → adopts salafi ideology, helps form AQ in Iraq, which was originally defined to be an offshoot of main AQ org to deal with the aftermath of US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; they split w/ AQ → one reason is a generational gap; Islamic state rose in the early 2000s and in context of arab spring, period of instability → AQ is old person who remembers the stable 1990s and reacts in some ways to that and views world in a relatively stable way whereas Islamic State is more Gen Z, viewing the world as extremely unstable and in reaction to the arab spring, everything falling apart so even compared to AQ dials up rhetoric of jihad and an emphasis on a coming apocalypse, violent resistance now, sharia law now, to avoid outcome Very different strategies → AQ strategy is to win and beat the west, have them leave and then declare caliphate; ISIS strat is to declare caliphate and then win, use declaration of caliphate as basis to expand territory → AQ strategy looked a lot more traditional (rebel groups) where idea is to achieve victory and then you create new order, whereas ISIS reverses it, expand new order as they win and use it for recruiting; want to create caliphate How are they organized → ISIS leader Baghdadi → centralized committee, member of ISIS killed in drone strike; some sort of leadership broader than originally envisioned, organized in a way that is much broader than AQ; in groups as broad as Boko Haram in Nigeria affiliated with ISIS, part of idea of caliphate is build this broad coalition of similar salafi groups that would go along w/ ideology Role of religion → debate about how important this is to who is included in Islamic State; accidental guerilla hypothesis → most people that join ISIS are not especially religious, very parochial material grievances against governments and desire for resources and safety end up in ISIS; alternatively people argue ISIS is religious in ways that influence strategy; ranks infused w/ religious vigor, even foot soldiers spout stuff constantly Key here is about religiosity of leadership than foot soldiers → Shils/Janowitz, how patriotism plays a smaller role than image of everything else, in fact reasons are more local, brothers/sisters in arms → key is what leadership believes; ISIS leaders especially religious, plays key role in driving strategy Influences tactics as well, why ISIS engaged in violence against muslims and non-muslims; because they view those muslims who disagree as illegitimate and need to be purified, legitimizes extreme violence against civilians; ISIS extremely successful, initial attacks by Islamic state take bracca and declare it capital, role into mosul, few if any would believe would happen; US originally stands aside but then ISIS threatens the curds, US-led coalition engages islamic state beginning in August 2014 After military successes, local military superiority, but in long run don't have resources to hold things → question is how are they going to sustain themselves; gains and losses in Islamic State in 2015, Islamic State at max has extensive territory in Syria and Iran, advantage of Syrian civil war to expand → Syrian gov't retakes territory, US has something to do with some of these, over time local superiority of Islamic State fades as US and curds deploy more, and Russia/Turkey all converge on threat imposed by Islamic State US strategy → goal is to decrease number of boots on the ground, but do it gradually; even though the big reversal of Islamic State occurs in Trump admin, Trump is following Obama playbook → have big differences in how Trump and Obama talk about middle east, but came to idea of low footprint max reliance on alliances and air power, follow similar strategy; over time grinds down Islamic state, by November 2017 ISIS further reduced → ISIS illustrates the max potential of what a group can do without taking control of the resources of a government Remarkable that they take territories and then act like regular gov't; taxing, selling oil, building logistical apparatus of governance to fuel continued expansion and defense

William Westmoreland

Commander of US forces in Vietnam. He dislikes the Marines Combined Action Platoons. While he recognizes the issues around promoting ARVN advisors and fixes them, the fix does not get publicized so it never really worked. US military attempted to hide the ARVN failures→ this often involved withholding data that would make the military look good to protect the image presented by the administration. For example, photos taken during Operation Rolling Thunder showed that the US Air Force was hitting its desired targets during their bombing campaigns with minimal civilian damage. The US military refused to release these photos, however, because the administration didn't want to admit that there had been some civilian casualties in Vietnam. He begins a technically successful war of attrition against the VC but it loses popular support back home. Importance: Wheeler and Westmoreland's special data analysis group ties to Gartner's dominant indicator theory because they tried to choose indicators that would make it look as though the US was winning the war.

Defeat Phobia

Concept that US is willing to accept casualties but so long as there is an achievable goal but as soon as the war turns south then we start to see resistance.

Deterrence

Concerned with the exploitation of potential force → persuading the enemy that it is in his own interest to avoid potential action; a theory of deterrence would be a theory of NONUSE of military force. Concerned with influencing other people's decisions by giving them expectations of how we will behave.

Limited aims

Conditions for defeating an enemy presuppose great physical or moral superiority; when neither is present, military objective can be (1) seizing a piece of enemy territory, or (2) holding one's own until things take a better turn (defensive war)

Strategic interaction

Deciding how much force to bring to bear on an enemy depends on analyzing the interaction of an entire nation with the entirety of its enemy and with the rest of the international community → need to consider enemy vulnerabilities in relation to the strengths of its adversary

Defensive war

Defense is a stronger form of warfare than offense, because it is easier to hold ground than take it. It follows that defense is easier than attack, assuming both sides have equal means. In other words, defense has a passive purpose: Preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest. The latter increases one's own capacity to wage war; the former does not. So...we must say that the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive. Consists of two parts: the first, waiting for the attack, and the second, parrying it, the counterattack.

Convoy system

Definition: when naval escorts accompany merchant ships in order to protect them from enemy attack; speed is governed by top speed of the slowest ship, go as a pack with armed trollers, cruiser/destroyer in front, fast ship with lookout to spot U-boat, destroyers zigzagging on side Opposed convoy system b/c can't keep track of all the ships in GB, can't possible escort all of them → George goes around military, turns out they don't have to keep track of all, only 140/week doing transatlantic voyages Critical task of the Royal Navy → natural tension of military reform, naval admirals against convoy system, thought critical task was sinking u-boats, thought if that stopped they wouldn't be successful Argued convoy system was risky, that when merchant ships independent, diversification, not a big deal; protecting ships left becomes critical however → gets back to tank from last lecture, reason they couldn't build tank army was because need of steel → all this takes steel so not enough steel for tanks, need to be properly supplied with commercial shipping is more important than need to build tanks Implementation → Convoy system works VERY well; better at sinking u-boats than sea-control, interesting b/c shows differences in military and civilian thoughts of how to win, civilian leaders focused on sustaining the nation instead of destroying German navy

Breakthrough and exploitation

Designed to induce systemic collapse of a defense while fighting through only a fraction of it directly → objective is to gain access to the rear areas over which supporting infrastructure is distributed, destroy it, and render the great mass of the defender's forward forces incapable of fighting at full efficiency → do this by concentrating the invader's forces disproportionately against a small portion of the defender's lines Enables invaders simultaneously to take an entire theater's terrain, to do it quickly, and to limit casualties

Compellence

Deterrence is preventing the enemy from doing something by making a threat and convince that the threat is credible; compellence is how to make the enemy do something by making a threat Which is harder? → Compelling is harder because it makes someone actively back down.

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell"

Don't Ask, Don't Tell → 1992, Clinton said was going to allow LGBT to serve; backlash in public and military was enormous, compromise was Don't Ask, Don't Tell, can serve in military if LGBT and no one is allowed to ask you. Congress enacted the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy: gays and lesbians can now serve in the military, but they must keep their sexual orientation private. Legal discrimination, no ability to find out; argument for exclusion about unit cohesion → interesting is that like broader societal conversations about LGBT, public opinion changed SO fast compared to gender integration. Obama Administration policy change (2011) → military is mirror of society in many ways, willingness of society to let LGBT people serve increases dramatically; one of the interesting things is the way LGBT debate is essentially considered to be over even by Trump admin, whereas you still have some debate about gender; lesson again is argument for exclusion is social cohesion argument.

Cover and concealment

Earth's surface is very irregular, denies defenders a visible target. Each commander in a mass army must fashion own unique plans for movement and disposition based on the vagaries of local conditions.

Wassenaar Arrangement

Established to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Formally established in July 1996, is a voluntary export control regime whose 42 members exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through such exchanges, Wassenaar aims to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of weapons and dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations." Unlike its predecessor, the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was created to restrict exports to the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, Wassenaar is not targeted at any region or group of states, but rather at "states of concern" to members. Wassenaar members also lack veto authority over other member's proposed exports, a power that COCOM members exercised.

Friction

Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult. In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. Nearby they do not appear as they did from a distance. Every fault and exaggeration of a theory is instantly exposed in war. Friction the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. Caused mainly by the danger of war, by war's demanding physical efforts, and by the presence of unclear information or the fog of war.

Defensive depth

Exploits the inherent drawbacks of modern-system offensive attacks; increases the distance attackers must travel and break through, reduces the density of the defenses they must penetrate; increases reserves' effectiveness once they arrive Entropic effect: increases defensive reserves' ability to halt the attack once it arrives since the longer the attack has to travel, the less effective its attack actually is since the distance erodes the attackers' coordination.

Fire superiority

Fire wins wars; in the heat of battle, forceful individuals gravitate towards each other; need to find the moral leaders of men in combat (not necessarily leading the commander assigned) → leads to issues about encroachment on authority; need a senior commander who learns to function through his staff. "Fundamentally, fire must always be beaten with fire. Fundamentally, movement is the means of increasing the efficiency of one's own fire until at last the strength of the enemy's fire is reduced to the vanishing point." → people are reluctant to recognize that war = killing. Without superior firepower, mass and velocity can never win a war

Modern system

Focused on reducing exposure to firepower and slowing the movement of the enemy → led to modern system of force employment. Modern system gave West unprecedented offensive successes → Not due to tanks, since they were subject to vulnerability, mechanical unreliability, and crew exhaustion → rather, modern system force employment. Key elements are (1) cover, (2) concealment, (3) dispersion, (4) small-unit independent maneuver, (5) suppression, and (6) combined arms integration. Modern system operations employ 2 broad approaches to defeat an opposing state and conquer its territory: (1) limited aims bite-and-hold offensives, (2) breakthrough and exploitation attempts.

Andrew Marshall

Former director of the US DOD's office of net assessment. RAND scholar. One of the most important figures changing Chinese defense strategy. Foreign policy expert. Trained many young leaders who came to be very powerful. A lion of American defense strategy, office of net assessment from Nixon to Obama, had to be appointed in each administration → did not talk or write much.

Strategic propaganda

Four themes in this type of propaganda: (I) Ideological attacks on the Nazi Party and Germany's war aims, (2) the strategical hopelessness of Germany's military and economic position, (3) the justness of the United Nations war aims and their unity and determination to carry them out (unconditional surrender, although made known to the troops, was never stressed), (4) promises of good treatment to prisoners of war, with appeals to self-preservation through surrender. Largely unsuccessful.

"Fragging"

Fragging is an extreme example. Dubbed "fragging" during the Vietnam War because of the frequent use of fragmentation grenades, these violent assaults on U.S. military officers were occasionally carried out by individual soldiers pursuing a personal vendetta, but over 80 percent of the fraggings in Vietnam were part of a carefully planned group activity. Individuals talked to one another, providing support and encouragement, and collected bounties of cash donations. A chilling ritual often accompanied this group activity: the target would be warned what to expect if he did not change his behavior.

Outbidding strategies

Groups engaged in outbidding use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support. Outbidding arises when two key conditions hold: two or more domestic parties are competing for leadership of their side, and the general population is uncertain about which of the groups best represents their interests. If citizens had full information about the preferences of the competing groups, an outbidding strategy would be unnecessary and ineffective; citizens would simply support the group that best aligned with their own interests. In reality, however, citizens cannot be sure if the group competing for power truly represents their preferences. Three reasons help to explain why groups are likely to be rewarded for being more militant rather than less. First, in bargaining contexts, it is often useful to be represented by an agent who is more hard-line than oneself. Second, uncertainty may also exist about the type of adversary the population and its competing groups are facing. A third factor that may favor outbidding is that office-holding itself may produce incentives to sell out. An interesting aspect of the outbidding strategy is that the enemy is only tangentially related to the strategic interaction. In fact, an attack motivated by outbidding may not even be designed to achieve any goal related to the enemy, such as inducing a concession or scuttling a peace treaty. The process is almost entirely concerned with the signal it sends to domestic audiences uncertain about their own leadership and its commitment to a cause. As such, outbidding provides a potential explanation for terrorist attacks that continue even when they seem unable to produce any real results. Outbidding will be favored when multiple groups are competing for the allegiance of a similar demographic base of support. When organizations encounter less competition for the support of their main constituents, outbidding will be less appealing. One solution to the problem of outbidding would be to eliminate the struggle for power by encouraging competing groups to consolidate into a united opposition. If competition among resistance groups is eliminated, the incentive for outbidding also disappears. The downside of this counter-strategy is that a united opposition may be stronger than a divided one. United oppositions, however, can make peace and deliver, whereas divided ones may face greater structural disincentives to do so.

Secret agent

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Native - Local spies; (2) Internal - inward spies; (3) Double - converted spies; (4) Expendable - doomed spies; (5) Living - surviving spies. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called the Divine Skein - or "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the treasure of the sovereign and their most precious faculty.

Battlefield Isolation

Isolated parts of companies tended to surrender in groups, reinforced fear of self-destruction. "The battlefield is cold. It is the loneliest place which men may share together"; quiet is ominous; you find yourself alone in the greatest moment of danger → difficult to engage with an enemy who does not seem to be present Goal is to shed light on things that are unknown to soldiers before entering the battlefield

Factors decreasing primary group solidarity

Isolation → isolated parts of companies tended to surrender in groups, reinforced fear of self-destruction Familial ties and primary group disintegration → discussing family reinforced a feeling of dependence on familial support and correspondingly weakened the hold of the military group Demand for physical survival → individual fears of destruction weakened primary group cohesion, especially concerns about food and health; hence, Nazis told them they and their families would be severely punished upon deserting

Terrain and ground

Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total. 9 varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive, (2) Frontier, (3) Key, (4) Communicating, (5) Focal, (6) Serious, (7) Difficult, (8) Encircled, (9) Death.

Indirect approach

Liddell Hart → 20th century British military theorist, served in WW1, arguably first modern European theorist to embrace indirectness Indirect approach → battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy; true aim is to seek strategic situation that is advantageous → psychological dislocation in adversary Idea that you should do anything but direct assaults against an adversary Role of intelligence → need to know what enemy plans/expects Implementation issues: Same limitations as Sun Tzu: idea of using intelligence/strategy to generate psych dislocation through complex attack strategy, but in reality it's anything that works except for direct assaults Same problem as Clausewitz: assumes one side is following his advice and the other is not

Dispersion

Made cover usable by breaking up large formations and allowing small subunits to find their way forward by sprinting between terrain features; also reduces vulnerability by putting fewer targets in the blast radius of any given shell. More difficult for leaders to see and communicate with their troops even as they increase the demands on those officers to exercise independent leadership functions

Systems Analysis

McNamara; looked at the use of nuclear forces without any consideration of how those forces might have interacted with non-nuclear forces. Was a crude net assessment, but with the dominant elements of the possible interactions systematically excluded.

Lethal autonomous weapon system

Narrow AI Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Aimed: specific target is designated and engaged by the weapon Semi-autonomous (target is illuminated in some fashion) Fire-and-forget Directed: weapon has an authorized target list to engage, with priorities Line-of-sight Non-line-of-sight Kill box Loitering Can be network enabled (human in the loop), or not General AI Lethal Autonomous Weapons Independent hunter: can compose its own goals...and change them Hard to imagine the Department of Defense pursuing this type of weapon

NSFO

National Socialistiche Führungsofiziere (Guidance, or Indoctrination Officer); initially regarded as a joke. Became political indoctrination officers; messing with chain of command became military crime → made sure senior officers didn't have faltering faith. The NSFO "organization" came to publish or directly supervise most of the publications and radio stations for the troops, and to prepare the leaflets which were distributed to or dropped on the German troops. Their job also included periodic indoctrination meetings.

Intelligence

Natural tendencies of government have made it impossible to collect the data necessary to conduct accurate net assessments; it's important for defense management purposes to know how many organized military units exist. Utilizing net assessments data → net assessments emphasizes military interactions, so it emphasizes the understanding of potential military behavior; asymmetries in military operations of both sides are very important and it's difficult to measure our military power without understanding them. Good analysis includes quantitative comparison of firepower of both sides and quantitative modeling; considerable effort has been put in to war games and war crisis simulations, but they are very simplified; problems arise when models are used without regard to their limitations.

Hard core

Nazi nucleus of the primary group, 10-15% of enlisted men, were responsible for military effectiveness and stability of primary group. Gemeinschaft: community solidarity, the mentality of the Nazi hard core, enthusiasts of military life, toughness, and group solidarity. SS was super effective because of this; Volksgrenadier was not effective because of a lack of this. A function of this segment was to minimize divisive political discussions. Preoccupation with weakness is most acute in the Nazi hard core; in all-male military environment, men regress into state of adolescence and focus on discipline to hide and overcome insecurities about weakness.

NCOs

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) serve alongside their staff officer counterparts in all staff sections. They execute similar duties as those of their staff officer. NCOs often provide the experience and continuity in their particular staff section. Highly technical qualifications were necessary for officership, especially for junior officers → value of the NCO as a cohesive factor of the military group.

"Stand down/stand up"

Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists. And that is why we are on the offense. And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. First, we are partnering coalition units with Iraqi units. These coalition-Iraqi teams are conducting operations together in the field. These combined operations are giving Iraqis a chance to experience how the most professional armed forces in the world operate in combat. The second approach has coalition transition teams living, working and fighting together with their Iraqi comrades. Under U.S. command, they're providing battlefield advice and assistance to Iraqi forces during combat operations. Between battles, they are assisting the Iraqis with important skills, such as urban combat and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques. The third approach involves working with the Iraqi ministries of interior and defense to improve their capabilities to coordinate anti-terrorist operations. We're helping them develop command-and-control structures. We're also providing them with civilian and military leadership training, so Iraq's new leaders can effectively manage their forces in the fight against terror. He acknowledged that his old strategy—dubbed by the media the "stand-up/stand-down" strategy—had failed even after being tweaked over the preceding year. In addition, he outlined the new strategy, including key features such as prioritizing the population security mission over the train-and-transition mission, focusing on bottom-up accommodation rather than top-down reconciliation, and complementing the military surge with a civilian surge of additional political and development resources.

Sea control

Protects merchant ships by keeping sea-lanes open, do that by focusing on destroying enemy ships → originally wanted to find/sink U-boats, not protecting merchant ships; Lloyd George overrides objections to implement convoy system

Pure strategy

Provides a complete definition of how a player will play a game. In particular, it determines the move a player will make for any situation he or she could face. Player makes a specific choice or takes a specific action.

Secondary symbol

Remoter agents and symbols of state authority. Strategic aspects of the war → poverty of information about the actual course of war, extremely ignorant of state affairs; fear of Russians built resistance The ethics of war and patriotism → ethical aspects of the war didn't trouble the German soldier Political ideals → pronounced in hard core who desired discipline; not the case for general soldiers Devotion to Hitler → personal devotion to Hitler maintained throughout the German Army for the duration of the war Weakening of the Hitler symbol → danger to physical survival deteriorated devotion to Hitler

Defense-in-depth

Requires tanks to be supported by infantry → British envision a force of 15,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery to make enemy collapse by destroying command networks → British figure out Blitzkrieg, but never actually implement it Put in the field over 7 month period, based on rather than line up forces in thin line where if enemy breaks through they could flank you, creating staggered and layered defenses, so even if adversaries break through, ability to defend and defeat offensive → 1) positioning of forces in layered fashion, 2) need for local initiative for counter attacks to defeat offensive

McMasterism

Some professional supremacists take the logic a step further: not only should civilians defer to the military; the military should insist that they do so—and take dramatic action to ensure that the military voice is heard and heeded. This extreme variant warrants a label all of its own: "McMasterism," denoting its origin as a caricature drawn from the influential Dereliction of Duty book by H.R. McMaster. McMasterism lays the blame for wartime failures at the feet of generals, but in a curious way: he blames them for going along with civilian preferences rather than blocking those preferences. reduces to a debate over two options—resign in protest or go over the heads of the president to the American people, the Congress, or both—because even hard-bitten professional supremacists would agree that the military should not use physical coercion to resist civilian authorities.

Spoiler strategies

Spoilers attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. The goal of a spoiling strategy is to ensure that peace overtures between moderate leaders on the terrorists' side and the target government do not succeed. Terrorists resort to a spoiling strategy when relations between two enemies are improving and a peace agreement threatens the terrorists' more far-reaching goals. Peace agreements alarm terrorists because they understand that moderate citizens are less likely to support ongoing violence once a compromise agreement between more moderate groups has been reached. Terrorists pursuing a spoiling strategy are likely to be more successful when the enemy perceives moderates on their side to be strong and therefore more capable of halting terrorism. When an attack occurs, the target cannot be sure whether moderates on the other side can suppress their own extremists but choose not to, or are weak and lack the ability to stop them. When mutual trust is high, a peace settlement can be implemented despite ongoing terrorist acts and the potential vulnerabilities the agreement can create. Trust, however, is rarely high after long conflicts, which is why spoilers can strike with a reasonable chance that their attack will be successful. Strategies that build trust and reduce vulnerability are, therefore, the best response to spoiling.

Task cohesion

Task cohesion is shared commitment among members to achieving goal that requires collective effort of the group; members motivated to coordinate; from performance perspective, want task cohesion; social cohesion is good to the extent that it leads to task cohesion. Instrumental bonding, refers to a "shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group". Unlike the inconclusive results from studies of the relationship between cohesion and performance, researchers are finding consistently positive relationships between task cohesion and performance, but not between social cohesion and performance; soldiers understand the distinction. Researchers have discovered that social cohesion has a negative, or no, relationship to performance, whereas task cohesion is correlated with performance. This finding means that the type of cohesion that may be related to performance (task cohesion) is also the type of cohesion that the introduction of individuals with different values and attitudes would not disrupt.

Normal/Extraordinary force

That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces → force which confronts the enemy is normal; that which goes to his flanks the extraordinary; use normal force to engage, use extraordinary to win.

Iwo Jima

The Battle of Iwo Jima was an epic military campaign between U.S. Marines and the Imperial Army of Japan in early 1945. Located 750 miles off the coast of Japan, the island of Iwo Jima had three airfields that could serve as a staging facility for a potential invasion of mainland Japan. American forces invaded the island on February 19, 1945, and the ensuing Battle of Iwo Jima lasted for five weeks. In some of the bloodiest fighting of World War II, it's believed that all but 200 or so of the 21,000 Japanese forces on the island were killed, as were almost 7,000 Marines. But once the fighting was over, the strategic value of Iwo Jima was called into question. Japan's air force had lost many of its warplanes, and those it had were unable to protect an inner line of defenses set up by the empire's military leaders. This line of defenses included islands like Iwo Jima. Given this information, American military leaders planned an attack on the island that they believed would last no more than a few days. However, the Japanese had secretly embarked on a new defensive tactic, taking advantage of Iwo Jima's mountainous landscape and jungles to set up camouflaged artillery positions. Although Allied forces led by the Americans bombarded Iwo Jima with bombs dropped from the sky and heavy gunfire from ships positioned off the coast of the island, the strategy developed by Japanese General Tadamichi Kuribayashi meant that the forces controlling it suffered little damage and were thus ready to repel the initial attack by the U.S. Marines, under the command of Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith. On February 19, 1945, U.S. Marines made an amphibious landing on Iwo Jima, and were met immediately with unforeseen challenges. First and foremost, the beaches of the island were made up steep dunes of soft, gray volcanic ash, which made getting sturdy footing and passage for vehicles difficult. As the Marines struggled forward, the Japanese lied in wait. The Americans assumed the pre-attack bombardment had been effective, and had crippled the enemy's defenses on the island. However, the lack of immediate response was simply part of Kuribayashi's plan. With the Americans struggling to get a foothold on the beaches of Iwo Jima - literally and figuratively - Kuribayashi's artillery positions in the mountains above opened fire, stalling the advancing Marines and inflicting significant casualties. Despite a banzai charge by dozens of Japanese soldiers as dusk fell, however, the Marines were eventually able to move in past the beach and seize part of one Iwo Jima's airfields - the stated mission of the invasion. Within days, some 70,000 U.S. Marines landed on Iwo Jima. Although they significantly outnumbered their Japanese enemies on the island (by a more than three-to-one margin), many Americans were wounded or killed over the five weeks of fighting, with some estimates suggesting more than 25,000 casualties, including nearly 7,000 deaths. The Japanese, meanwhile, were also suffering major losses, and were running low on supplies - namely, weapons and food. Under Kuribayashi's leadership, they mounted most of their defenses via attacks under the cover of darkness. While effective, the success of the Japanese forces seemed to merely forestall the inevitable. Battles raged on in the northern part of Iwo Jima for four weeks, with Kuribayashi essentially setting up a garrison in the mountains in that part of the island. On March 25, 1945, 300 of Kuribayashi's men mounted a final banzai attack. The American forces sustained a number of casualties, but ultimately quelled the attack. Although the American military declared that Iwo Jima had been captured the next day, American forces spent weeks on end trudging through the island's jungles, finding and killing or capturing Japanese "holdouts" who refused to surrender and opted to continue fighting. Dozens of Americans were killed during this process. Two Japanese holdouts continued to hide in the island's caves, scavenging food and supplies until they finally surrendered in 1949, almost four years after the end of World War II. In the end, neither the U.S. Army nor the U.S. Navy was able to use Iwo Jima as a World War II staging area. Navy Seabees, or construction battalions, did rebuild the airfields for Air Force pilots to use in case of emergency landings. US Amphibious invasion of the island in the Bonin Chain (less than 600 miles from Japanese coast) Goal: To establish a base close enough to the Japanese coast for B-29 bombers damaged over Japan to land without going all the way to the Marianas. The island was defended by 23K Japanese army and navy troops from caves, dugouts, underground installations, and tunnels. Even though the Japanese were difficult to find and destroy, the 3 Marine divisions deployed completely wiped out the garrison except for around 1000 prisoners. Significance: The Marines had made appropriate changes that allowed them to make successful amphibious landings. But the Battle of Iwo Jima marked changes in Japanese counter tactics for US amphibious warfare. The Japanese stopped defending the beach line and moved to concentrate inland. They fought from complex networks of caves, tunnels and underground spaces and avoided the US pre-landing preparatory air and naval bombardments. This caused the Marines to have success taking the beach but became stuck further inland in attritional warfare. Despite difficult conditions, except for the 1083 prisoners, the Marines obliterated the whole garrison.

Khe Sanh

The Battle of Khe Sanh began on January 21, 1968, when forces from the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) carried out a massive artillery bombardment on the U.S. Marine garrison at Khe Sanh, located in South Vietnam near the border with Laos. For the next 77 days, U.S. Marines and their South Vietnamese allies fought off an intense siege of the garrison, one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War. The U.S. military presence at Khe Sanh began in 1962, when Army Special Forces built a small camp near the village, located some 14 miles south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Vietnam and 6 miles from the Laotian border on Route 9, the principal road from South Vietnam into Laos. U.S. Marines built a garrison adjacent to the Army camp in 1966. In the fall of 1967, the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) began to build up its strength in the region, and U.S. officials began to suspect that Khe Sanh would be the target of an attack. General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), believed that Vietnamese Communist forces had targeted Khe Sanh as part of a general effort to seize South Vietnam's northernmost regions and put themselves in a stronger position prior to any future peace negotiations. They had done this successfully against French colonial troops at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, prior to obtaining independence at the Geneva peace conference. As part of a program codenamed Operation Scotland, Westmoreland reinforced the Marine garrison at Khe Sanh—bringing the total number of troops to around 6,000—stockpiled ammunition and refurbished the airstrip at the base, all in preparation for a possible attack. The attack finally came on January 21, 1968, when PAVN forces began a massive artillery bombardment of Khe Sanh, hitting the base's main store of ammunition and destroying 90 percent of its artillery and mortar rounds. President Lyndon B. Johnson agreed with Westmoreland's argument that the base should be held at all costs, and U.S. and South Vietnamese forces launched Operation Niagara, a major artillery bombardment of suspected locations of North Vietnamese artillery in the hills surrounding Khe Sanh. As Johnson, Westmoreland and other officials considered Khe Sanh to be the primary target of the North Vietnamese, they largely ignored signs of a Communist buildup in more urban areas of South Vietnam. This proved to be a mistake, as on January 31, 1968—a date celebrated as the lunar new year, or Tet—some 70,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched a coordinated series of fierce attacks on more than 100 cities and towns in South Vietnam. News reports of the Battle of Khe Sanh consistently referred to the struggle as another Dien Bien Phu, but in reality the U.S. and South Vietnamese enjoyed a much stronger position than had the French. In addition to a fleet of helicopters and cargo planes that could resupply and reinforce the besieged Marines, they could rely on the heavy bombing capacity of the B-52 fighter planes, which dropped close to 100,000 explosives on the hills surrounding Khe Sanh over the course of the battle. Though U.S. officials expected a full-scale attack by North Vietnamese forces on the base, it never came, and in March Westmoreland ordered Operation Pegasus, a joint Army, Marine and ARVN ground advance that relieved the base and ended the siege by mid-April, after some 77 days. In the face of criticism that he had fallen victim to the North Vietnamese diversionary tactic, Westmoreland defended his decision to defend Khe Sanh, and claimed the battle as a victory in that it prevented the enemy from gaining control over the northwest corner of South Vietnam and inflicted heavy losses on PAVN forces. As antiwar sentiment mounted on the home front in the wake of the Tet Offensive, the Johnson administration lost confidence in the general's strategy of attrition and his claims of progress in the war effort. On March 31, Johnson announced he was halting most of the bombing attacks in North Vietnam and opening peace negotiations; he also withdrew his candidacy for reelection. General Creighton W. Abrams replaced Westmoreland as MACV head in June 1968, and on July 5 he closed the U.S. Marine base at Khe Sanh.

1957 Crittenden Report

The Crittenden Report was the outcome of a 1957 investigation on the part of a United States Navy Board of Inquiry, officially known as the Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures and Directives Dealing With Homosexuals. The Board evaluated Navy policies dealing with homosexual personnel that were based in part on the assertions made in the December 1950 final report of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditure in Executive Departments, which said that all of the government's intelligence agencies "are in complete agreement that sex perverts in Government constitute security risks." The Crittenden Report, by contrast, concluded that there was "no sound basis for the belief that homosexuals posed a security risk" and criticized the Hoey Report: "No intelligence agency, as far as can be learned, adduced any factual data before that committee with which to support these opinions" and said that "the concept that homosexuals necessarily pose a security risk is unsupported by adequate factual data." Completed on March 15, 1957, the report entails three main areas of consideration, namely: available knowledge and facts concerning homosexual behavior and treatment; standards and methods used in implementation of military policies and instructions; and recommendations with respect to treatment, investigative procedures, discharges and policies. Noting that only homosexuality is covered by specific directives related to sexual perversion, the Crittenden Board stated at the outset of their report that there may be "an unwarranted emphasis" on homosexuality by military authorities. Further, the board stressed: "Many common misconceptions pertaining to homosexuality have become exaggerated and perpetuated over the years. As additional facts have been gathered in recent years, the fallacies inherent in these concepts are being demonstrated with increasing frequency."

ORHA

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), created before the start of hostilities in February 2003, was charged with administering the country, providing humanitarian aid, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. ORHA's relationship to CENTCOM seemed to create dual authorities, with ORHA technically under CENTCOM's operational control, but with CENTCOM controlling critical resources (such as security), and ORHA itself charged with creating the conditions for Iraqi self-rule. This early organization illustrated the ambivalence of civilian leaders about ceding too much control to the military. Furthermore, the original appointment of a retired Army general, Jay Garner, to head ORHA exemplified the sort of uncertainty plaguing US leaders over who should control governance tasks. A retired general officer offered the benefits of previous Army experience, but without the perceived political ramifications of appointing an active-duty officer to head such a political task.

Casualty Counts

The US Army decided to use this metric as the dominant indicator for success in the Vietnam war, unfortunately the US (McNamara) came to the conclusion that the United States was not killing enough VC as they could always just replace them with more. Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive were both seen as tremendous victories for the United States. However, these "victories" contrasted with political indicators → these victories showed the public that the situation was not as under control as the Johnson administration made it out to be Military Indicators vs Political Indicators Importance: Gartner's Dominant Indicator

Political object

The aim upon which the whole war is to be directed. "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" → force is the means of war, to impose our will on the enemy is its object, and to secure object we must render the enemy powerless. If war is an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfill our will, then in every case all depends on our overthrowing the enemy, that is, disarming him, and on that alone. This object, developed from abstract conceptions, but which is also the one aimed at in a great many cases in reality, we shall, in the first place, examine in this reality.

Net assessment

The analysis of the interaction of national security establishments in peacetime and war; interaction of opposed establishments is the central concept, and the "net" in net assessments is the focus on the resultant of the interaction of these establishments, how weapons will interact and act in combat. Concern with 2-sided nature of military relationships, and the importance of comprehensiveness, even-handedness, and attention to detail.

Officer-enlistee relations

The basis of the officer's status → submission to an overriding authority, strictly hierarchical; leader must be a man who possesses military skill and look after his men; role of the officer is fatherly (kinder = children).

Revolution in Military Affairs

The development in the USA in particular of new military strategies, based on 'high-tech' technology and 'smart' weapons, aimed at achieving swift and decisive outcomes. Warfare settles into a certain pattern; Blitzkrieg was discontinuity in how wars were fought → discontinuities, changes, linked to broader political and societal means Effects: (1) increasing lethality of operations; (2) cost of personnel (31 percent jump to keep the average person; by 2030, ave cost per person is $215,000), people are extremely expensive → thus you need to go to unmanned/robotic systems Tech advances are being pushed by commercial sector Hypothesis: the next Military Tech Revolution will be by combat ops featuring ubiquitous autonomous unmanned systems and machines Autonomy results from delegation of a decision to take action to an authorized entity within specific boundaries An important distinction is that systems governed by prescriptive rules that permit no deviations are automated, but they are not autonomous As used here, autonomous systems have the capability to independently compose and select among diff courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation → narrow AI systems can compose courses of action and choose among them

Social cohesion

The extent to which group members like each other; affective bonding, refers to interpersonal attraction or "the nature and quality of emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members." Groups are socially cohesive to the extent that members enjoy one another's company and share an emotional closeness.

Abu Bark al-Baghdadi

The leader of the Salafi jihadist militant terrorist organization ISIS. ISIS has been designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, European Union and many individual states, while al-Baghdadi is considered a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In June 2014, he was elected by the majlis al-shura (consultative council or Shura council), representing the ahl al-hall wal-aqd of the Islamic State as their caliph. Al-Baghdadi remained leader of ISIS until its formal expansion into Syria in 2013 when, in a statement on 8 April 2013, he announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - alternatively translated from the Arabic as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). When announcing the formation of ISIS, al-Baghdadi stated that the Syrian Civil War jihadist faction, Jabhat al-Nusra - also known as al-Nusra Front - had been an extension of the ISI in Syria and was now to be merged with ISIS.

Shape

The shape of an army resembles water: take advantage of enemy's unpreparedness; attack him when he does not expect it; avoid his strength and strike his emptiness, and like water, none can oppose you. Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes weaknesses → and as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy → and as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.

Social disintegration

The tendency for society (in this case, primary groups) to break down due to the lapse and destruction of traditional support systems. Modes are: desertion, active surrender, passive surrender, routine resistance, and "last-ditch resistance."

Fog of war

The war's ambiguities; once a battle begins, information that is tactically relevant can become confusing and even distorted. Because of the difficulty of seeing patterns in the midst of the fog—separating the signal from the noise, for example—tactical leaders must be allowed to act independently of operational plans.

Paul Bremer

These concerns seemed to only increase with the replacement of Garner by a stronger civilian leader, L. Paul Bremer, to oversee the newly created Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). While the appointment of Bremer seemed to reflect an effort to improve unity of command in the theater, with Bremer reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the CPA remains dependent on CENTCOM for many of the resources needed by the CPA to accomplish its mission. The specific sets of activities that fall under CENTCOM's purview and the CPA's purview are being worked out in the theater, and although the situation seems to be improving, there are still disconnects between the two organizations. One example: the CPA lacks the capability to secure areas, and without security, reconstruction in unstable pockets of the country cannot begin. Joint Task Force 7, under CENTCOM's command, retains responsibility for security, creating a bureaucratic separation between two inextricably linked tasks. The hundreds of CPA administrators control very few resources on the ground. The CENTCOM theater commander almost literally holds all the keys (Army convoys accompany top officials), and CPA personnel remain dependent upon the Army for accomplishing many of their day-to-day activities. CENTCOM has a great deal of control on the ground, without the necessary authorities, while CPA has more control on paper than it does in reality.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Way Johnson constructs the war: options NOT taken by Johnson Declaring war → Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Fulbright discusses giving president authority to give whatever action he may deem necessary to use force as to lead to war (NOT Congress declaring war) Stirring up war fever → No effort to create a war psychology in US; no military parades, concern by Democrats that as Republican primaries start, Nixon is coming back and could be Republican nominee given his anti-communist credentials, fear that playing up getting commies in the war will actually help the Republicans (tougher on communism) Domestic politics strategy doesn't work: deny they are escalating the war while escalating the war, in hopes that by denying it they will avoid criticism → US soldiers in Vietnam, allowed to protect themselves, shift from protection to going on offensive attacks (beginning of search and destroy operations) → State department press officer screws up; NYT reaction is scathing, American people were told that they were in a land war on continent of Asia (not informed by correct authority) Overall approach shapes the way American public ends up losing the war; when being lied to that consistently, not clear imagery as to what is going on → civilian approach to distribution of info; if SV ask Westmoreland for help, can use US forces for help → civilians see that the US is conducting offensive operations Plays out in Rolling Thunder in 1966 → US air strikes within 10 mile radius of Hanoi authorized, argues that very careful and not civilian damage; but of course civilian damage in residential areas, US gov't denies this, but when it is clear they are doing this, actually NV fault (not true) → super complicated, US gov't loathe to admit bombs went off target and damaged civilian areas Salzburg (journalist) exploiting trust gap between Johnson admin and newspapers; who does LBJ think he is fooling, cannot bomb a city and kill no civilians, lose so much credibility; NV exploit this by passing info to NYT editor, propaganda about how bad the US is → cost of losing credibility and accurately describing what's going on is NV use American media outlets as propaganda to get their message out at times → causes public to not believe in war McNamara testifies against expanded bombing → statistically argues against this, NYT reports this (leaks), testimony shows that American escalation has been matched by communists, stalemate = higher casualties and destruction → McNamara reports cannot give SV will to survive as independent people; proves war isn't going very well → key issue facing 3rd party COIN, by definition means governance problem, types of governance w/ insurgencies are less capable; ineffective partner to build up. The 36th President of the United States. He was responsible for entering the US into the Vietnam war. Concerned about the expansion of communism via the domino theory he felt that pushing against the SU in Vietnam was making a statement w/o escalating too much. The administration lies about the nature and scale of American involvement, shaking trust in government and support for the war. Importance: Issues with waging a limited war against a totally bought in adversary. LBJ's strategy for managing public opinion during the Vietnam War shows the importance of correctly handling the relay of information from the government to the people. The Pericles Funeral Oration explains how the strength of a democratic system stems from the fact that it is representative of the public; however, the representation of the public also brings challenges. In the triangle between the public, government, and military, the public is often emotional about the costs of war. This puts pressure on the political arm of the triangle to take actions that aren't militarily smart. The information gap between the people and the American administration thus undermined trust in the US military's claims, which proved disastrous for later public support of the Vietnam War.

Tacit coordination

What is necessary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations of each other converge on People can concert their intentions or expectations with each other if each knows that the other is trying to do the same → focal points have some kind of prominence or conspicuousness and uniqueness → dealing as much with imagination as with logic

Signals intelligence

What is the importance of intelligence for strategy? → WW2 really lays out the critical importance of intelligence; different types of intelligence information that modern forces start using; signals intelligence becomes super important Intercept between radio, telephone, other sorts of information → encryption perspective. Intelligence taken from electronic signals and systems used by opponents: comms systems, radars, weapons systems etc. During WW2, this type of intelligence interception was made possible by the use and invention of the radio. 2 types of analysis of Signals Intelligence: Traffic Analysis is the monitoring of amount and flow of signals. By analyzing where signals were coming from and the traffic flow, analysts could locate the signal senders and heavy traffic = comms center of attack Decryption is reading messages being sent by opponents. Essential to intercept, decode, translate into information usable in military operations.

Center of gravity

always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity. The same holds true in war. The fighting forces of each belligerent—whether a single state or an alliance of states—have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity can be applied. Thus, these forces will possess certain centers of gravity, which, by their movement and direction, govern the rest; and those centers of gravity will be found wherever the forces are most concentrated. But in war as in the world of inanimate matter the effect produced on a center of gravity is determined and limited by the cohesion of the parts. (1) Destruction of army if significant, (2) Seizure of enemy's capital if it is not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity; (3) Delivery of an effective blow against enemy's principal ally if that ally is more powerful.

Plan Orange

"Color Plans" → each country has a color; in WW1, Japanese take control of Mariana, Carolines, and Marshall Islands → if Japan takes these Islands at WW2, would give them ability to attack the US in the Philippines → Plan Orange developed in 1919, if Japan attacks the US, US will use naval power ot est. sea-control, and go on offensive in island-hopping campaign In 1919, American defense planners outline what WW2 Pacific will look like Naval War College → War games designed to predict trajectory of US-Japanese war, INCREDIBLE SUCCESS → influences American strategy, all leading admirals went to Naval War College and participated in Naval war games → nothing was a surprise EXCEPT kamikaze tactics Plan Orange has NO WAY to defend the Philippines → Japanese can get there much faster and can take other territories to give it control; Plan Orange skips over Philippines, assumes US will have to get back to Philippines at end of island hopping; what happens is predicted in Plan Orange even if not laid out specifically A war plan by the US Army and Navy that anticipates war with Japan on the Pacific theatre. The original plan failed to account for several things: 1. Japanese obliteration of the US Battleship force in Pearl Harbor 2. Advances in Submarine warfare and naval aviation tech Plan Orange was altered after Pearl Harbor to accommodate the new advances and loss of battleships. The US adopted the "island-hopping" advance method which favors land based air cover and also heavy blockades implemented by the US sub force. Importance: It was originally formally adapted by the joint army and navy board in 1924. It anticipated a blockade of Philippines and US bases in West Pacific. The strategy was to have them hold out on their own, wait for the Pacific Fleet to be mobilized in California and come to their aid, and then finally sail North for a decisive battle against Imperial Japanese Navy and then blockade the Japanese main islands. The original plan that included a decisive battle near the Japanese main islands was in line with the Naval theory doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Theory and Doctrine: Mahan saw the factors that supported and secured sea power as having the largest and most powerful navy AND commercial shipping fleet. Used the British naval dominance as an example of his theory. He also states that any army would succumb to a strong and effective naval blockade. He focused heavily on blockades, decisive battles with opposing surface fleets that were large numbers of low caliber destroyers/cruiser.

Blitzkrieg

"Lightning war", not known to German army before 1939 (coined by Western newspapermen) → used to convey to readers something of the speed and destructiveness of German ground-air operations in 3-week campaign against Poland → Hitler wanted spectacle to persuade France and Britain to accept Polish victory, but their rejection persuaded him that Germany must make war again. Ambitions required at least the defeat of France, which might persuade Britain to sue for separate terms and inaugurate that accommodation of her maritime with his continental empire. Was a result of refining the tactics used in WWI. In WW1, the Germans learnt how to breakthrough the front lines but didn't have the ability/strategic training to maintain the gains. How did they sustain and develop extended mobility needed to sustain their gains? **TRUCKS, NOT TANKS** Trucks allowed deeper penetration and high level of mobility; broke limitations of railroad and shitty mobility of tanks. discover that big problem that German forces were only effective 1 day's march from end of nearest rail head b/c needed to resupply; how do you supply forces for mobility → not about tanks but about trucks Von Seeckt takes over, Germany prohibited by Versailles treaty to do military exercises, so focus on strategic planning, doing military exercises in secret, start planning for how to break through the trenches → comes into famed German tank commander Guderian, who believes in power of tank and truck combined with air-dropped supplies to enable rapid projection of forces over land → has insight that if this happens fast enough, disrupt adversary command/control, prevent them from actually responding; paralyze decision making, challenge is that needs tanks and trucks Idea of this is that trucks need to carry people (challenge for protecting tank is clearing out opposition to tank, so need trucks for people/supplies and tanks for fire power, but need more supplies than you can get in truck); airdropping supplies, implemented in invasion of France Von Seeckt: Development of German Airpower (Luftwaffe) Guderian: Developed the Panzerwaffe (Panzer corp) and formed the strategy of the New Military Unit where Airpower was used to bomb/strike all hostile formations near ground troops (close air support). Relate back to modern system — combined arms formation, having both tanks, mechanized and motorized infantry, along with artillery, anti-aircraft and other integrated support elements. Radio + New Force Structure: Radio allowed coordination of decentralized command and ability of trucks+planes to scout ahead of main panzer troops

Six Specific Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan

(1) The use of initiative, flexibility, and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations (2) Coordination with regular warfare (3) Establishment of base areas (4) The strategic defensive and strategic offensive (5) The development of guerilla warfare into mobile warfare (6) Correct relationship of demand

Jungle Warfare School

*REVISE to include Malaya* For the first 3 years of the Vietnam War, the US relied on pre-war COIN training, which focused more on fighting conventional wars than counterinsurgencies. In the early 1960s, President Kennedy ordered the US Army to train for counterinsurgency operations; however, the US military identified fighting a counterinsurgency as a lesser form of fighting a conventional war → assumed that they will be good at this too bc they excelled in WW2 Marine Corps: the local population was identified as COG and so they focused on patrols and local security, which produced lower casualty rates and gathered intelligence from the local people. Unfortunately, overwhelming bureaucratic resistance prevented this approach from being more widely implemented Importance: Failure of the "search and destroy" strategy Failure to follow Galula's COIN Lack of institutional learning in the US Army Jungle Warfare School remained irrelevant. This resulted in US failure at fighting a guerrilla war in Vietnam.

Lend-Lease Act

A program by which the United States supplied Free France, UK, China, and Soviet union. The act of Congress allowed the president to transfer arms or any other defense materials such as food, oil to the Allies and for Congress to allocate funds to "the gov't of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the US." The act was the principle means for providing US military aid to foreign nations: it allowed the US to support its war interests and allies without being overextended in battle. It brought US one step closer to war and was opposed by Isolationists. By allowing the president to transfer war matériel to a beleaguered Britain-and without payment as required by the Neutrality Act of 1939-the act enabled the British to keep fighting until events led America into the conflict. It also skirted the thorny problems of war debts that had followed World War I.

Aircraft carrier

A ship that could carry planes. The British invented it but didn't perfect it. They gave the technology to America and Japan after WWI (Sempill Mission of Sept. 1921) . America was the one who saw the potential for it. At first seen as inferior since it was under the command of the Navy and seen as "transports" rather than active players in combat. Navy Pilots were considered inferior to Army pilots (USAF). The Americans made a case for naval aviation to become part of the navy → Admiral Moffett Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics finally established equality for carrier pilots with their army counterparts and autocracy of naval aviation, separation of the carriers from AF, revolutionized promotion system within naval aviation. Britain didn't embrace the new technology because of structural inefficiencies. Many in the British navy thought that battleships were still the dominant power and saw the battleships as the first line of defense. Battleships were equipped with 16-18in armour piercing heavy artillery guns with distance and attack advantages. However the US successfully saw the Aircraft carrier as its own class of warship and a "mobile airfield" rather than a supplementary force to the AF and Battleships. There were also significant design differences between the Brit and US carriers due to their different naval aviation doctrines: British believed in armored vessels which mean they were heavier (can carry limited weight → limited crafts) and also less deck space=less crafts. US sacrificed armour for more deck space = more crafts also invented folded plane wings to fit more planes per carrier. Japan: Sempill Mission in Sept. 1921, Early WW2 experiences and Admiral Yamamoto's lessons in US, experimentation in the Sino-Japanese War allowed them to further perfect their use of carriers in the Pacific Theatre and led to successes such as Pearl harbour. Japan vs GB @ the Battle of Singapore: a disaster for the British Naval forces (gross underestimation of Japanese air and naval power). British defeat = death of British superiority at sea, at least in the pacific, also death of the battleship and rise of carrier warfare US: After WW1 it was general assumption that battleships would continue as the principle attack method. Lit. Simms advocated heavily for the movement to naval aviation = not widely accepted bc the army/navy HC were mostly conservative commanders brought up as experts in Battleship warfare saw themselves becoming obsolete in the dawn of aircraft carrier warfare (job security) US was able to breakthrough in naval aviation bc of individuals like Moffet and Sims who pushed for new strategic use of existing resources, and understanding the carrier as a mobile airfield and not as support for battleships.

Protracted war

According to Mao, insurgencies often had to take this strategic approach given that they often begin with little or no power → PW favours insurgents Both sides generally start with advantages and shortcomings, but as the conflict continues, the enemy's strength will decrease as the insurgents grow stronger. Since time is on the insurgents' side, protracted war works to their advantage and to their enemy's detriment. Mao outlines the 3 stages of protracted war: 1. Enemy's strategic offensive and insurgents' strategic defensive; 2. Enemy's consolidation and insurgents' preparation for counter-offensive; 3. Insurgents' strategic counter-offensive and enemy's retreat. Throughout the 3 stages of a protracted war, the insurgents' inferiority would initially be aggravated, but then it would begin to change for the better as enemy suffers casualties and a drain on its resources. Ultimately, the insurgents would achieve success through a protracted war by wearing down the enemy's forces, developing guerrilla forces to reduce enemy's territory, consolidating and expanding a united front etc. Over time the insurgents develop support amongst the population and eventually develop the strength needed to fight alongside regular forces. Importance: Sun Tzu: This ties to Sun Tzu's shape, speed, and flexibility Since the insurgents are relatively weaker in both resources and strength of forces, they must rely on speed and mobility to target the weak points in the enemy's defense. Insurgents must also remain flexible and be willing to adapt to whatever defense the counterinsurgent may present, which gives them a shape like water. Net Assessment: used to decide when and how to fight as a revolutionary force → Intelligence is hypercritical that everything should be done for the retrieval of accurate intel Power of the Masses: mobilizing the workers/peasants and securing the support of oppressed people within the country was a main goal for Mao

Close air support

Air action such as air strikes by fixed or rotary-winged aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of these forces and attacks. Requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires or movement is the determining factor. World War II marked the universal acceptance of the integration of air power into combined arms warfare as close air support. Although the German Luftwaffe was the only force to use CAS at the start of the war, all the major combatants had developed effective air-ground coordination techniques by the war's end. Though the Luftwaffe, like its counterparts, tended to focus on strategic bombing, it was unique in its willingness to commit forces to CAS. Unlike the Allies, the Germans were not able to develop powerful strategic bombing capabilities, which implied industrial developments they were forbidden to take according to the Treaty of Versailles. Experience in the Spanish Civil War lead to the creation of five ground-attack groups in 1938, four of which would be equipped with Stukas. The Luftwaffe matched its material acquisitions with advances in the air-ground coordination. These preparations did not prove fruitful in the invasion of Poland, where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support. But the value of CAS was demonstrated at the crossing of the Meuse River during the Invasion of France in 1940. General Heinz Guderian, one of the creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine commonly known as "blitzkrieg", believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on French defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the French under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Though there were difficulties in coordinating air support with the rapid advance, the Germans demonstrated consistently superior CAS tactics to those of the British and French defenders. Later, on the Eastern front, the Germans would devise visual ground signals to mark friendly units and to indicate direction and distance to enemy emplacements.

Sickle Stroke

Also called Sickle Cut, part of the Manstein Plan. Reversal of Schlieffen plan, which based victory plan on the expectation that the French would push into Germany south of the Ardennes, allowing German armies to outflank them through Belgium. However, this was based on expectation that in 1940 the French, with British allies, would push into Belgium, allowing German armies to outflank them through the Ardennes → double bluff exercise. 3 German army groups: Group B (northernmost, commanded by General Fedor von Bock) was to attack into Holland and Northern Belgium with aim of tempting Franco-British field army as far east as possible and seizing territory from which it could be outflanked from the North; Group C (commanded by General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb), the southernmost, was to engage the garrison of the Maginot Line, penetrating it if possible → ***Group A, in the center, was to advance through the Ardennes, seize crossings over the great water obstacle of the Meuse between Sedan and Dinant, then drive northwest, along the line of the River Somme, to Amiens, Abbeville and the Channel coast. Consequence: France falls in 6 weeks; rest of GB troops escape via Dunkirk Attack through the woods of Ardennes and rapid drive to English Channel, cutting off the French and Allied armies in Belgium and Flanders. Germans: Breakthrough and Exploitation; Bridged the gap between strategy and tactical offenses/technology → Biddle's Modern System of Force Employment (Ex. Use of Trucks and Tanks to reach ranges that the railroad could not). Also Blitzkrieg!!!!

John Foster Dulles

An anti-communist public figure, he served as Secretary of State under Eisenhower. His 'roll back' method was an alternative to Truman's containment and called for a more active routing of communism. He helped to pioneer the Eisenhower policy of 'Massive Retaliation'. In the late 1940s, as a general conceptual framework for contending with world communism, Dulles developed the policy known as rollback to serve as the Republican Party's alternative to the Democrats' containment model. It proposed taking the offensive to push Communism back rather than defensively containing it within its areas of control and influence. As Secretary of State, Dulles concentrated on building up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and forming other alliances (a phenomenon described as his "Pactomania") as part of his strategy of controlling Soviet expansion by threatening massive retaliation in the event of a war. In the 1950s, he worked alongside people in Vietnam, and others, to reduce French influence in Vietnam as well as asking the United States to attempt to cooperate with the French in the aid of strengthening Diem's Army.

Combined Action Platoon

An effective counterinsurgency strategy developed by the Marines. It turned on embedding platoons of mostly SV and some Marines in villages to offer local security. They were effective and reduced VC contact with local population and provided good intel. Super effective COIN strategy that maximized local population security, lowered US casualty rates but due to Westmoreland's opposition of the plan no more troops were dedicated to this strategy. The Marine Approach Focus on patrols/local security → army patrols in large units during the day, Marine Corps does this at night and in smaller numbers → recognize Center of Gravity is the PEOPLE, so travel with the people, provide people w/ security → relied on same roads used by population; key innovation becomes the notion of small units of marines living in the villages → best way to provide for local security, becomes Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) Fear for Westmoreland is more body bags in TV back home; casualty rate for CAPs was lower than that for army units for the same period Limitations → not strategy US uses at large, not enough marines to spread stability; perhaps army should try what the marines are doing → Canard, disgusted, role of military isn't to live in villages but kill the enemy → most marines do border surveillance and interdiction, army never does CAPs despite evidence of success Importance: Galula's COIN strategy: Isolate the insurgents from the population Similar approach to the Briggs Plan and the Morice Line

National Security Council

An office created in 1947 to coordinate the president's foreign and military policy advisers. Its formal members are the president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, and it is managed by the president's national security assistant. The principal forum used by the President of the United States for consideration of national security, military matters, and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and Cabinet officials and is part of the executive office of the president of the United States. Since its inception under Harry S. Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the president on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the president's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. The Council has counterparts in the national security councils of many other nations. It was created because policymakers felt that the diplomacy of the State Department was no longer adequate to contain the USSR in light of the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States.[1] The intent was to ensure coordination and concurrence among the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force and other instruments of national security policy such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also created in the National Security Act.

Dean Acheson

As United States Secretary of State in the administration of President Harry S. Truman from 1949 to 1953, he played a central role in defining American foreign policy during the Cold War. Acheson helped design the Marshall Plan and was a key player in the development of the Truman Doctrine and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Acheson's most famous decision was convincing President Truman to intervene in the Korean War in June 1950. He also persuaded Truman to dispatch aid and advisors to French forces in Indochina, though in 1968 he finally counseled President Lyndon B. Johnson to negotiate for peace with North Vietnam. He gave a speech which did not include South Korea as part of the US's 'Defense Perimeter'. Since the war in Korea broke out on June 25, just a few months later, critics, especially in South Korea, took Acheson's statements to mean that the United States support for the new Syngman Rhee government in South Korea would be limited and that the speech provided Joseph Stalin and Kim Il-sung with a "green light" to believe the U.S. would not intervene if they invaded the South. This illustrative of a signaling failure between the US and NK/USSR → Schelling.

Malaya

Background: Communist uprising in Chinese Malay pop in 1947-48; British colony; British engage in measures to put down the insurgency and key is British are thinking about getting out of this → initial strategy is to defeat insurgents and transfer political authority to friendly local officials; strat focuses too much on big conventional ops, predilection for this is incurable, British are bringing too many forces to fight at one time, takes British a day to go anywhere because so many forces → problem is that 4 Brit units converge on village, no insurgents, declare victory Recognition of problem by British high command → Field Marshal Montgomery; British change course, need intelligence → weakness is lack of early and accurate of info of enemy strength and dispositions Briggs Plan → new villages approach; Chinese malays are forcibly relocated to new villages built for the purposes of holding them; it's the Chinese malay pop that's rebelling; if they can separate them out from rest of pop, then Chinese Malays outside of context of new villages are more likely to be insurgents → severe food rationing, limit ability to aid insurgents → approach was classically called "draining the swamp", notion that you are draining the swamp of the insurgents → British rely heavily on police rather than military for intelligence; recruit Chinese malays; intelligence gathering app does (1) bringing potential insurgents into the fold as police, (2) effort focuses much more on police than the military → military problem is to relieve pressure on villages by splitting up larger insurgent units; harder for insurgents to hide; makes it easier to attack Appointment of Field Marshal Templar as High Commissioner of Malaya → need one person in charge of counterinsurgency case; leave malaya, turn over authority to the local population, but challenges for generalization include (1) insurgency is largely isolated w/ chinese malay population; (2) British are able to offer massive political concessions → leave authority, weapons, gov't with someone → doesn't work unless you are leaving

Economy of forces

Because these operations are spread in time, they can be spread in space. This strategy thus conforms with the principle of economy of forces, a vital one in war where the insurgent needs so little to achieve so much whereas the counterinsurgent needs so much to achieve so little. While a main effort is made in the selected area, necessarily at some risk to the other areas, what results can the counterinsurgent legitimately expect from his operations in these other areas? To prevent the insurgent from developing into a higher form of warfare or from organizing a regular army. This objective is fulfilled when the insurgent is denied safe bases, and it can be achieved by purely conventional raids that do not tie down large counterinsurgency forces. Through this strategy, insurgency can be rolled back with increased strength and momentum, for as soon as an area has been made safe, important forces can be withdrawn and transferred to the neighboring areas, swollen with locally recruited loyal and tested personnel. This transfer of troops can being as soon as the first step is concluded.

Tet Offensive

Begins Jan 31 1968; problem b/c in late 1967, Westmoreland knows enemy is launching larger attacks but number of attacks declining, US issuing statements suggesting war going well and commies ground down; launch countrywide attack; will to fight of SV and US is shaky, if they launch countrywide attack they can break the backs of SV military and US military and force American withdrawal → if US wants to stay, forced to withdraw → intrawar learning, gap between winning battles and winning wars; problems of search and destroy missions and air mobility operations, reason why air mobility doesn't work is you CAN'T FIND THE ENEMY; in Tet Offensive, VC and NV come out of hiding and attack, now US knows where enemy is, generated targets for the American military → from military perspective, is decisive American and SV victory; kill twice as many VC and NV forces, wipes out VC as effective fighting force; from purely military perspective, Tet is a WIN for US and SV Think about Tet as a big failure because gap between battles in wars and need for politically intelligible victories, victories you can sell to the public: (1) US claiming that number of attacks of Vietnamese is declining and US grinding down ability to fight; Tet offensive makes admin look like liars; (2) credibility gap, because Johnson admin generated credibility gap, when US says we won not believed by as many people as they should have been b/c of not being entirely truthful with American public; (3) US soldiers die; (4) afterwards, Westmoreland follows Tet Offensive by asking 220,000 more troops, which makes US public go wait a minute, why do we need more troops → political impact of tet offensive is to further undermine American military credibility w/ American people On the holiday of Tet, Viet Cong attacks the US army. Throughout 1967, the US has been issuing statements saying that the war is getting better, but it really isn't. Search and destroy doesn't work because it's hard to find the target. Bc of the tet offensive, the US find the target and it's a decisive victory. Domestic Political Impact American public did not see this as a victory bc the government had been caught lying so many times, they lost the trust of the public.There was also the question of why were there so many enemies in the first place. After this event, generals ask for more troops to consolidate gains and help governing institutions to succeed → due to massive public opposition, troops ended up being pulled out of Vietnam. Importance: Although this is a military victory, it's a political defeat. This ties into Clausewitz's idea that war is just politics by other means. Even though the US won in battle, they lost politically.

B-29

Boeing B-29 Superfortress was the largest bomber to enter service for WW2. Is a four-engine propeller-driven heavy bomber designed by Boeing, which was flown primarily by the United States during World War II and the Korean War. Used only by the USAAF in the Pacific Theatre. 1) High Altitudes: B29s were able to stay just beyond the range of Japanese fighter crafts and most anti-aircraft weapons of the time 2) Bombing missions: designed for hi-alt bombing but had poor results, transformed into use for night-time low-alt bombing mission. Sighting and defensive equipment were sacrificed so more fuel and bombs could be carried on low-alt missions. Most significant use in Pacific Theatre: two B29s were used to drop the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Erich von Manstein

Born into aristocratic Prussian family, Manstein joined army at a young age and saw service on both the Western and Eastern Front during WW1. Rose to rank of captain by end of war and active in interwar-period helping Germany rebuild forces. During WWII, he devised the "Sickle Stroke", after opposing Case Yellow. Attaining the rank of general, he was active in the invasion of the Soviet Union. After the war ended, he gave a testimony at the main Nuremberg trials of war criminals. He cultivated a myth "clean Wehrmacht" that German armed forces were not culpable for the atrocities of the Holocaust. He wrote a book called "Lost Victories" which was highly critical of Hitler's leadership and only dealt with the military aspects of war.

Bernard Montgomery

British General who cut off Rommel from advancing into Africa. Junior officer for GBR in WWI. During the Second World War he commanded the British Eighth Army from August 1942 in the Western Desert until the final Allied victory in Tunisia in May 1943. This command included the Second Battle of El Alamein, a turning point in the Western Desert Campaign. He subsequently commanded the British Eighth Army during the Allied invasion of Sicily and the Allied invasion of Italy. He was in command of all Allied ground forces during Operation Overlord from the initial landings until after the Battle of Normandy. He then continued in command of the 21st Army Group for the rest of the campaign in North West Europe. The failed airborne attempt to bridge the Rhine at Arnhem in Holland was with 21st Army Group personnel, however was successful with a subsequent Allied Rhine crossing. When the German armoured forces attacked American lines in the Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery was given command of the US First Army and the US Nineth Army. On 4 May 1945 he took the German surrender at Lüneburg Heath in Northern Germany. During WWII, he commanded the British Eighth Army in the Western Desert. Command included Second Battle of El Alamein where he had went against Gen. Rommel. Before Alamein, he didn't counter attack immediately because he thought his troops weren't ready. Once they were ready, he planned out the Second Battle of El Alamein, which was one of the first large scale decisive allied victories of the war. North African Front. able to inspire a defeated force, revive them and inspire them to win the first major land battle against Hitler.

The Strategic Defensive and the Strategic Offensive in Guerilla Warfare

By strategic defensive we mean our strategic situation and policy when our enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; for strategic offensive, vice versa.

Battle of Algiers

Campaign of terrorism in the capital of Algeria in 1957. Belligerents: French Army and the FLN → they were on different sides but also differ in their modes of fighting. The FLN started the Battle with a series of terrorist attacks while the French retaliated by sealing of the Arab Quarters of the city, making a lot of arrests, and even torturing suspects. The French retaliation got that severe because General Massu was called in and given free reign→ torture and illegal methods. While the attacks continued, the French made progress in the eradication of the FLN in each of the zones they operated in, resulting in the end of violence a few months later. The end of violence meant that the French had won the tactical victory but Massu's reprehensible tactics meant they lost strategically → no more local support Importance: French don't provide the incentives for the civilian population to win (pied-noirs = powerful lobbying group that prevented the french from offering concessions) Walter/Kydd: Provocation and Intimidation Galula: Called for destruction of the presence of the insurgency and its political organization (attempted) but the French neglected the fact that the population is COG→ lost popular support

Maxwell Taylor

Chair of the Joint Chiefs under Kennedy who oversaw the first dispatching of troops to Vietnam. US ambassador to South Vietnam during the Johnson administration starting in 1964. Before, he was advising the President on matters in relation to Vietnam. He recommended at the start of the conflict to President Kennedy that 8,000 troops be sent to the county although the Kennedy supported non-intervention. Taylor was of crucial importance during the first weeks and months of the Vietnam War. Whereas initially President Kennedy told Taylor that "the independence of South Vietnam rests with the people and government of that country," Taylor soon recommended that 8,000 American combat troops be sent to the region at once. After making his report to the Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, Taylor reflected on the decision to send troops to South Vietnam: "I don't recall anyone who was strongly against, except one man, and that was the President. The President just didn't want to be convinced that this was the right thing to do... It was really the President's personal conviction that U.S. ground troops shouldn't go in." Taylor opposed the 1963 South Vietnamese coup that overthrew and killed President Ngo Dinh Diem. Taylor received fierce criticism in Major (later Lieutenant General and National Security Advisor) H.R. McMaster's book Dereliction of Duty. Specifically, Gen. Taylor was accused of intentionally misrepresenting the views of the Joint Chiefs to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and cutting the Joint Chiefs out of the decision-making process. Importance: Clausewitz: Political/civilian side should prevail over the military one because war is the continuation of politics. Direct contradiction with Sun-Tzu's idea of civil-military separation

Matthew Ridgway

Commander of the Eighth Army during the Korean war, he was given permission by MacArthur to advance his forces past the 38th Parallel, in defiance of the Truman's administration's desires to use the leveraged gained by the recapture of Seoul to negotiate a ceasefire. He replaced MacArthur once MacArthur was relieved of his command. Civil-Military Tensions. When Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army, the Army was still in a tactical retreat, after its strong foray into North Korea had been met with an unexpected and overwhelming Communist Chinese advance in the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River. Ridgway was successful in turning around the morale of the 8th Army. Upon taking control of the battered Eighth Army, one of Ridgway's first acts was to restore soldiers' confidence in themselves. To accomplish this, he reorganized the command structure. During one of his first briefings in Korea at I Corps, Ridgway sat through an extensive discussion of various defensive plans and contingencies. At the end, he asked the staff about the status of their attack plans; the corps G-3 (operations officer) responded that he had no such plans. Within days, I Corps had a new G-3. He also replaced officers who did not send out patrols to fix enemy locations, and removed "enemy positions" from commanders' planning maps if local units had not been in recent contact to verify that the enemy was still there. Ridgway established a plan to rotate out those division commanders who had been in action for six months and replace them with fresh leaders. He sent out guidance to commanders at all levels that they were to spend more time at the front lines and less in their command posts in the rear. With the entry of China, the complexion of the Korean War had changed. Political leaders, in an attempt to prevent expansion of the war, did not allow UN forces to bomb the supply bases in China, nor the bridges across the Yalu River on the border between China and North Korea. The American Army moved from an aggressive stance to fighting protective, delaying actions. Ridgway's second big tactical change was to make copious use of artillery. When General MacArthur was relieved of command by President Harry Truman in April, Ridgway was promoted to full general, assuming command of all United Nations forces in Korea. He oversaw the desegregation and integration of United States Army units in the Far East Command, which significantly influenced the wider army's subsequent desegregation. Ridgway also assumed from MacArthur the role of military governor of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. During his tenure, Ridgway oversaw the restoration of Japan's independence and sovereignty on April 28, 1952.

Gerd von Rundstedt

Commander-in-chief of the army group A during WWII. He too opposed Case Yellow. Served in WWI as a staff officer. During the interwar years, he continued his military career, reaching the rank of Colonel General before retiring in 1938. He was recalled at the beginning of World War II as commander of Army Group South in the invasion of Poland. He commanded Army Group A during the Battle of France, and requested the Halt Order during the Battle of Dunkirk. He was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal in 1940. In the invasion of the Soviet Union, he commanded Army Group South, responsible for the largest encirclement in history, the Battle of Kiev. He was relieved of command in December 1941, but was recalled in 1942 and appointed Commander-in-Chief in the West. He was dismissed after the German defeat in Normandy in July 1944, but was again recalled as Commander-in-Chief in the West in September, holding this post until his final dismissal by Adolf Hitler in March 1945. Rundstedt was aware of the various plots to depose Hitler, but refused to support them. After the war, he was charged with war crimes, but did not face trial due to his age and poor health. He was released in 1949, and died in 1953. 2 Main achievements in WW2: Commanded the Southern wing of the Eastern front that was in charge of securing Ukrainian oil supplies ; overran Ukraine before winter.

Operation Typhoon

German strategic offensive for capturing Moscow. Hitler approved it with the support of von Bock, who led the army for this operation. It failed and the German Army Group Center was halted at Moscow and eventually forced to retreat. Reasons why the offensive failed: German troops weren't prepared the winter battle (engines broke, frostbite, lubricants froze), previous diversion of Panzer corp to circle Leningrad (north) and take oil in Caucasus (south) gave time for Soviets to prepare a counter-offensive, Germans destroyed all towns/supplies along the way to Moscow. End: Germans were worn down and weak -- Soviets took advantage and launched a well-hidden counteroffensive that forced the weakened troops to retreat. Russian peasants in the path of Hitler's army employ a "scorched-earth" policy. Russians also remembered Napoleon and began destroying everything as they fled their villages, fields, and farms. Harvested crops were burned, livestock were driven away, and buildings were blown up, leaving nothing of value behind to support exhausted troops. Hitler's army inherited nothing but ruins.

ULTRA

Decryption of Enigma machines; implication for British in mediterranean British Program that is focused on decrypting most difficult German code to break; eventually cracked by British, have to decide what to do with information; speaks to philosophical differences expressed by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz → if intelligence is fleeting/not useful, want to max out ULTRA program in decrypting code, and tell them what happens to counterattack; by doing this, you burn the source → Nazis would've known British decrypted Enigma machines, so try to leverage resources → only time British use info is when they can explain how they got the information in a way that didn't include Enigma/ULTRA program → want to keep this secret, successful in this, but leads to difficult situations especially in Mediterranean → have to let attack happen w/o warning soldiers b/c warning = exposure Sun Tzu-like view of intelligence information: resource that can help them win the war → modern cat and mouse intelligence ops Also see this in U-boat war; extra wheel for U-boats, allies get there eventually, but by the time they have already turned the tide; similar position in WW1 that outset of WW2 no convoy system, U-boats attack merchant systems, get to convoy system faster → takes British a little while to get back to that Allied intelligence project that was able to tap and decrypt highest level of German comms. (Italian and Japanese as well) A small group of allied code breakers decrypted the german Enigma Machine that was used to encrypt german comms messages. The Ultra Program was responsible for speeding up the Allied victory for at least 2 years. The success in decrypting the enigma machine was kept undercover in order to stop the germans from changing their comms method. British intelligence leaked false info that said they developed long range radar to throw germans off the trail. The Allies were forced to pick and choose what decoded information to use when arranging attacks b/c using all their info let the germans know what they accomplished. Importance: Also caused the rise of questions about where the intelligence came from: May 1941 German Gen. Rommell stationed in N. Africa was ordered and supposed to be on the defensive according to ACCURATE INTEL collected by British. Brits∴prepped for offensive strategy but Rommel disobeys orders. Shows that even accurate intel can sometimes be useless. June 1941 Brits decrypts daily comms of U-boats→ allow allied supply ships to avoid contact. July 1941 → decryption allowed allied attacks on axis supply and resource lines Cracking the Enigma let Brits realize that their code was already decrypted by the germans.

Radar

Detection system using radio waves to determine the range, angle, or velocity of objects. Can be used to detect aircraft or ships. UK: Used in Battle of Britain, Range and Direction Finding (RDF) was part of national air defence. Germany: Same concept. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, both Great Britain and Germany had functioning radar systems. By the time of the Battle of Britain in mid-1940, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had fully integrated RDF as part of the national air defense. After the Fall of France, it was realised in Great Britain that the manufacturing capabilities of the United States were vital to success in the war; thus, although America was not yet a belligerent, Prime Minister Winston Churchill directed that the technology secrets of Great Britain be shared in exchange for the needed capabilities. Battle of Britain: The radar allowed Britain to track incoming German warplanes and gave Fighter Command, led by Sir Hugh Dowding, sufficient time to get airborne and attack them. The pilots of Fighter Command needed to be in the air as soon as was possible in an effort to stop the Luftwaffe getting to London. It was radar that gave them this time. It also allowed the pilots to stay in the air longer as the pilots could be given specific bearings as to where they could find incoming enemy planes - as opposed to time spent hunting for them and wasting valuable fuel reserves. Radio transmitters could create an echo from an plane that was over 200 miles away. Such a distance would give the RAF an early warning of an attack. As his work was done during the build-up to World War Two, such an invention was invaluable to the RAF that believed it was significantly weaker than the Luftwaffe. During the Battle of Britain, the Germans lost the element of surprise --> relate to Sun Tzu.

Hawks and Doves

Dove against increasing American involvement in the war, Hawk for it; counsel for Dove is not taken up, position not discussed → opponents of escalating are politically isolated. Importance: Civil-Military Relations: The leaders of the hawk and dove factions, McNamara and Taylor, respectively, represented major positions in both the civilian government and the military. There was continuous struggle between the civilian branch and the military for the main influence over Washington policy-making, both sides citing their expertise in the area

Strategic bombing

During WW2, strategic bombing was sustained aerial attack on strategic locations that included mostly transportation hubs and industrial centers in enemy territory. Different from Close Air Support and Tactical Air Power. Specifically targeting railways, industrial towns/cities, harbors, workers' residential areas etc. for economic reasons, but also residential areas and areas inhabited by civilians in order to disrupt daily activities and terrorize the population. Military HQ on both sides believed that victories would be dependent on Strat Bombing of targets of industrial and political significance rather than military targets. Night Raids (pre B29) bc while less accurate, it was safer for crews Effectiveness? Both Luftwaffe (German AF) and RAF did not deliver a knockout blow/ decisive victory and the war was not ended with Strat Bombing. Could reduce industrial capacity/production but not significant. Also not really worth the high casualties. Goals: Attrition and Fear: Demoralizing civilians Targeting Infrastructure: Inhibit Enemy's Ability to continue to fight Harris Strategy: British RAF deployed 1k for Bombing of Cologne → useless even though it struck down an economic centre bc reconstruction was relatively quick + german factory production rates > rate of destruction caused by bombing Other infamous cases: Dresden, Hamburg (60K UK crew loss).

Yamamoto Isoroku

Marshal Admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy and C-in-C of the Combined Fleet (carried out Pearl Harbor attack) Spent time in the USA and understood the risks and danger of full force war with the US → organized the strategic attack on Pearl Harbor . Admiral Yamamoto → he "gets it", huge skeptic about attacking the US; got that the Japanese vision of attacking the US and US giving up is unlikely, gets assigned to plan Pearl Harbor attack; Japanese become pioneers in effectively using aircraft carriers, carrier most useful as mobile airfield → Japanese realize that put bombs on the plane, aircraft carrier useful as mobile airfield. Strikes against British force Z, sinks Battleship Prince of Wales → battleship dominated naval war from 1700s to WW1; in 20 year period, reign is over because of the aircraft carrier.

Airmobile warfare

Faster form of search and destroy. Extensive use of Helicopter for rapid insertion and strike. It's effective but then Viet Cong adapt and learn to disperse US notion is to use helicopter to enable search and destroy, air mobility to deploy troops faster → once VC and NV realize this, radically disperse in a way they haven't done previously; despite US keeps going (indicators used is how many enemies do we have contact with when we do these sweeps, when numbers go down assume that means they're doing well as opposed to them hiding) → problem of local intelligence for the counterinsurgent How do you provide local security in Vietnam? → Original concept is to let South Vietnamese handle it, this doesn't work → Westmoreland orders treats service = combat command; no one believes or does this → 50% of US advisers sold believes duty as an advisor hurts their career Army approach to COIN → air mobility, dominant indicator; kill enemy w/ firepower, do w/ large US army units to do so → small units at risk of being killed and politically controversial; diff. Than marine core Importance: Sun Tzu: Most advantageous to be the belligerent who decides the conditions in which the battle will be fought. Biddle: Modern system as technological development (the helicopter) goes hand in hand with new operational tactics with the creation of this new type of warfare

"Tentative Manual"

Fleet Marine Force, tentative manual for amphibious operations; everyone else looks at Gallipoli as problem that can't be solved, Marine Corps finds a solution; coordinated artillery, air strikes, heavily armed infantry → get out of range of strong points, go around and come back later Despite planning, very difficult to implement In the 1930s the Fleet Marine Force (Navy + Marine Corp) was developed. They began to modernize amphibious warfare that Marine Corp schools' faculty and students worked to create a manual that set forth a detailed doctrine and techniques to be followed in future training and actual amphibious operations. Hence, the Tentative Landing Operations Manual was officially implemented in 1934. Importance: Air support The manual stated increased military aviation for smoother landings. The Navy carried out most of initial prep air battle. Gunfire support Offshore battleships' guns should provide cover to the landing troops during the most vulnerable phases: before, during and after ship-to-shore movement

Mao Zedong

Focus on accurate assessments of self and enemy → writes about net assessment as basis for revolutionary warfare → relies explicitly on Sun Tzu, know the enemy and know yourself → Maoist warfare is based on notion of accurate assessments, Mao attacks opponents is by arguing that they don't sufficiently appreciate need to understand nationalist forces → use Sun Tzu-like tactics, accurate assessment of enemy is vital Intelligence info is critical → delay campaigns if necessary, wait for enemy mistake, deceive an enemy; at beginning of enemy offensive, don't know which is strongest; strategic retreat is necessary → attacking with a retreat pre-prepared, idea of winning through a bit of fighting to gather information about adversary Guerilla warfare is NOTHING if not DECEPTION → soldiers disguising themselves as peasants, fits well w/ essence of what we imaging rev warfare to be Denying the enemy intelligence by organizing the masses → prerequisite, make enemy blind and deaf, create confusion through masses → necessary for protracted war; if too weak to win now, want to buy time to build support within population Similarities to other theorists → Focus on decentralized ops, work w/ regular troops, integration of political/military decisions → Clausewitz commentaries on partisan warfare to Mao, descriptions not so different Clear that Chinese were going to intervene if US crossed 38th parallel; China's tactics in Korea illustrate consistency w/ Sun Tzu b/c Mao read Sun Tzu → forced and chosen; forced is lack of motorized transportation, travel light and hide in villages; chosen is attack at night, small attacks withdraw attack again; huge war of attrition, but Mao's reading of Sun Tzu does seem to directly influence tactics

Charles de Gaulle

French general and statesman. He was asked to rewrite the Constitution of France and founded the Fifth Republic after approval by referendum. He was elected President of France later that year, a position he was reelected to in 1965 and held until his resignation in 1969. He was the dominant figure of France during the Cold War era, and his memory continues to influence French politics. When the Algerian War was ripping apart the unstable Fourth Republic, the National Assembly brought him back to power during the May 1958 crisis. Upon becoming president, de Gaulle was faced with the urgent task of finding a way to bring to an end the bloody and divisive war in Algeria. His intentions were obscure. He had immediately visited Algeria and declared, Je vous ai compris—'I have understood you', and each competing interest had wished to believe it was them that he had understood. The settlers assumed he supported them, and would be stunned when he did not. In Paris, the left wanted independence for Algeria. Although the military's near-coup had contributed to his return to power, de Gaulle soon ordered all officers to quit the rebellious Committees of Public Safety. Such actions greatly angered the pieds-noirs and their military supporters. He faced uprisings in Algeria by the pied-noirs and the French armed forces. On assuming the prime minister role in June 1958 he immediately went to Algeria, and neutralised the army there, with its 600,000 soldiers. The Algiers Committee of Public Safety was loud in its demands on behalf of the settlers, but de Gaulle made more visits and sidestepped them. For the long term he devised a plan to modernize Algeria's traditional economy, deescalated the war, and offered Algeria self-determination in 1959. A pied-noir revolt in 1960 failed, while another attempted coup failed in April 1961. French voters approved his course in a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination. De Gaulle arranged a cease-fire in Algeria with the March 1962 Evian Accords, legitimated by another referendum a month later. It gave victory to the FLN, which came to power and declared independence. The long crisis was over.

'Case Yellow'

Fuhrer Directive No. 6: announced that nothing less was at stake than 'the destruction of the predominance of the western powers in order to leave room for the expansion of the German people' → Offensive through Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland ASAP; further delay will entail end of Belgian and Dutch neutrality to advantage of the Allies → purpose is to defeat as much as possible of French and forces of Allies fighting on their side, and at the same time win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and Northern France to serve as a base for successful prosecution of air and sea war against England In relation to civil-military relations, Hitler did not share vision with chiefs of staff Brauchitsch and Halder; did not share Hitler's philosophy of domination. Plan was designed to separate the BEF from French army and to win ground in Belgium to provide airfields and North Sea ports for German Navy and air force operations against GB. Frictions between Hitler and top military officers (had no military support to endorse proposals) slowed Case Yellow a bit → General Staff vs. Fuhrer On Jan 10, 2 Luftwaffe officers crash-landed in Belgium with parts of "Yellow" plan in a briefcase (Mechelen Incident) → compromised offensive; Hitler postponed Case Yellow indefinitely and demanded new plan "to be founded particularly on secrecy and surprise" → SUN TZU (deception/surprise attacks)!!!

Battle of the Atlantic

Germany's naval attempt to cut off British supply ships by using u-boats. Caused Britain and the US to officially join the war after their ships were sunk. After this battle, the Allies won control of the seas, allowing them to control supply transfer, which ultimately determined the war. 1939-1945. Allied naval blockade of Germany, announced the day after the declaration of war, and Germany's subsequent counter-blockade. Since Britain is dependent on imports, the battle of the Atlantic was a tonnage war: the Allied struggle to supply Britain and the Axis attempt to stem the flow of merchant shipping that enabled Britain to keep fighting. German strategy: unrestricted U-Boats, warships, Luftwaffe (German AF) combined attack on British commercial shipping/Allied Navies. British/Allied strategy: Countered with the convoy system where the British Navy and AF would protect merchant shipping to and from the UK/Soviet Union. The Battle of the Atlantic pitted U-boats and other warships of the Kriegsmarine (Navy) and aircraft of the Luftwaffe (Air Force) against the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, United States Navy, and Allied merchant shipping. Convoys, coming mainly from North America and predominantly going to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, were protected for the most part by the British and Canadian navies and air forces. These forces were aided by ships and aircraft of the United States beginning September 13, 1941. The Germans were joined by submarines of the Italian Royal Navy (Regia Marina) after their Axis ally Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940. The Allies gradually gained the upper hand, overcoming German surface raiders by the end of 1942 and defeating the U-boats by mid-1943, though losses due to U-boats continued until the war's end.

Joseph Stalin

Head of the Soviet Union. Autocrat and dictator who executed 90% of Soviet high command and directly eliminating the leadership in his army. Very effective for a centralized command system: faced no opposition within the ranks and had ultimate control → also extremely vulnerable bc what if he died? Seen through the Red Army.

Sir Gerald Templer

High Commissioner to Malaya during the emergency between 1952-54. He revamped developed the new British strategy that involved using "New Villages" where the general population was moved to. The villages were made to be more inviting so the locals would be less unhappy and by spraying herbicides over crops in areas with suspected commies, he was able to make people realize the benefits of kicking the insurgents out of their zones → gained population's support Importance: Raised incentives to root out insurgents Amnesty for Insurgents Opportunity to participate in new government → only worked bc Brits were willing to put independence on the table Galula's COIN theory: Templer understood the local population was central to his victory over the insurgents = COG; also Galula's concept to install a new government was used as a negotiating chip

Amphibious warfare

How is it that US military which had never had to fight major wars adapt to becoming leader in biggest war in known human history? Lens of 3 ops: amphibious, submarine, and carrier warfare Lesson of Gallipoli → amphibious ops don't work; problem for US is that possessing the Philippines changes strategic perspective of the navy; how can US advance w/o bases? Seize undefended islands and defend them → US fortifies some undefended islands through advanced base force Marine Corps quandary → why do they exist as an independent service? In WW1, Marine Corps and Army do the same thing; amphibious warfare becomes the mission for marine war; goes back to Plan Orange → recognizes that critical element is island hopping campaign, Plan Orange requires island hopping to get back to Philippines and to get to Japan, need to do that by amphibious assault → both a critical operational requirement for US military is amphibious assault and this will be good for the marine corps Operations Plan 712 → Study becomes basis of future training for amphibious warfare in Marine Corps → b/c of Great Depression, Marine Corps budget is slashed, this w/ difficulty in training turn to plans on doctrine for amphibious warfare → lots of good thinking about future doctrine, Marine Corps spends lots of time on doctrine Fleet Marine Force, tentative manual for amphibious operations; everyone else looks at Gallipoli as problem that can't be solved, Marine Corps finds a solution; coordinated artillery, air strikes, heavily armed infantry → get out of range of strong points, go around and come back later Despite planning, very difficult to implement Battle of Tarawa → tiny spec of land, coordinate strikes in naval artillery, lack of practice by US navy → low-lying Japanese pillboxes were difficult to hit; end up with 1,000 dead and more wounded to capture island of less than 3 square miles → island hopping becomes a vital part of American success in WW2; example of conceptual innovation that really pays off

Briggs Plan

Implemented during the war against the Malayan Communists, this plan forcibly relocated local population into guarded villages, restricted population movement in the country, controlled the food supply all in order to win hearts and minds.The British also conducted a census and proceeded to ID people all while "draining the swamp" (getting rid of insurgents) outside the new villages. Used New Villages, relied on local police force as the first line of defense for their insights that are missed due to the ethnic differences (insurgents = chinese malays) Importance: Galula's COIN Clausewitz's COG Briggs Plan → new villages approach; Chinese malays are forcibly relocated to new villages built for the purposes of holding them; it's the Chinese malay pop that's rebelling; if they can separate them out from rest of pop, then Chinese Malays outside of context of new villages are more likely to be insurgents → severe food rationing, limit ability to aid insurgents → approach was classically called "draining the swamp", notion that you are draining the swamp of the insurgents → British rely heavily on police rather than military for intelligence; recruit Chinese malays; intelligence gathering app does (1) bringing potential insurgents into the fold as police, (2) effort focuses much more on police than the military → military problem is to relieve pressure on villages by splitting up larger insurgent units; harder for insurgents to hide; makes it easier to attack Appointment of Field Marshal Templar as High Commissioner of Malaya → need one person in charge of counterinsurgency case; leave malaya, turn over authority to the local population, but challenges for generalization include (1) insurgency is largely isolated w/ chinese malay population; (2) British are able to offer massive political concessions → leave authority, weapons, gov't with someone → doesn't work unless you are leaving

Wannsee Conference

The purpose of the conference, called by the director of the Reich Main Security Office SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, was to ensure the cooperation of administrative leaders of various government departments in the implementation of the so-called Final solution to the Jewish question, whereby most of the Jews of German-occupied Europe would be deported to occupied Poland and murdered. Soon after the invasion of Poland in September 1939, the persecution of European Jews was raised to unprecedented levels, but systematic killing of men, women, and children only began in June 1941, after the onset of Operation Barbarossa against the Soviets. On 31 July 1941, Hermann Göring gave written authorization to Heydrich to prepare and submit a plan for a "total solution of the Jewish question" in territories under German control and to coordinate the participation of all involved government organizations. At Wannsee, Heydrich emphasized that once the mass deportation was complete, the SS would take complete charge of the exterminations. A secondary goal was to arrive at a definition of who was formally Jewish, and thus determine the scope of the genocide.

Base areas

Important and essential because of the protracted nature and ruthlessness of war → strategic bases on which guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy; guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas In present age of advanced communications and technology, it would be all the more groundless to imagine that one can win victory by fighting in the manner of roving rebels Types of Base Areas: (1) Mountains, (2) Plains, (3) River-lake estuary regions Guerrilla zones and base areas: Areas which are surrounded by the enemy but whose central points are not occupied or have been recovered...are ready-made bases for the convenient use of guerrilla units in developing guerrilla warfare Conditions for establishing base areas: anti-Japanese armed forces, armed forces are employed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they should arouse the people to action → a matter of building an armed force, which should be used in coordination w/ people to defeat an enemy; and the use of all our strength to arouse the masses for struggle against Japan A base area for guerrilla warfare can be truly established only with the gradual fulfillment of these three basic conditions

Search and Destroy

In order to defeat the Vietcong, the US used helicopters to sweep an area and land /deploy troops to take out the viet cong. Mostly ineffective because eventually, the viet cong would all disperse before the US could deploy. The marines tactic of patrolling an area and training the South Vietnam army was shown to be more effective. Bar for victory pretty low, everything we can excludes real escalation, focus on US army is on SEARCH AND DESTROY ops → basically how US fights the war until Westmoreland replaced Operational learning by both sides → air attacks against NV that double from 26,000 to 60,000 in first 9 months from 1965-66 → problem is that operational learning by BOTH sides, i.e. Vietnamese are learning too → US notion is to use helicopter to enable search and destroy, air mobility to deploy troops faster → once VC and NV realize this, radically disperse in a way they haven't done previously; despite US keeps going (indicators used is how many enemies do we have contact with when we do these sweeps, when numbers go down assume that means they're doing well as opposed to them hiding) → problem of local intelligence for the counterinsurgent Problems of search and destroy missions and air mobility operations, reason why air mobility doesn't work is you CAN'T FIND THE ENEMY; in Tet Offensive, VC and NV come out of hiding and attack, now US knows where enemy is, generated targets for the American military. Importance: Bad use of force employment Complete opposite of Galula's COIN strategy: troops are too large and wasted perishable intelligence

Battle of Britain

In the summer and fall of 1940, German and British air forces clashed in the skies over the United Kingdom, locked in the largest sustained bombing campaign to that date. A significant turning point of World War II, the Battle of Britain ended when Germany's Luftwaffe failed to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force despite months of targeting Britain's air bases, military posts and, ultimately, its civilian population. Britain's decisive victory saved the country from a ground invasion and possible occupation by German forces while proving that air power alone could be used to win a major battle. On June 17, 1940, the defeated French signed an armistice and quit World War II. Britain now stood alone against the power of Germany's military forces, which had conquered most of Western Europe in less than two months. But Prime Minister Winston Churchill rallied his stubborn people and outmaneuvered those politicians who wanted to negotiate with Adolf Hitler. But Britain's success in continuing the war would very much depend on the RAF Fighter Command's ability to thwart the Luftwaffe's efforts to gain air superiority. This then would be the first all-air battle in history. In fact, Britain's situation was more favorable than most of the world recognized at the time. Britain possessed an effective air defense system, first-rate fighter pilots, and a great military leader in Air Marshal Hugh Dowding. On the other hand, the Germans had major problems: they had no navy left after the costly conquest of Norway, their army was unprepared for any form of amphibious operations, and the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses in the west (the first two factors made a seaborne attack on the British Isles impossible from the first). Even more serious, the Germans had poor intelligence and little idea of British vulnerabilities. They wasted most of July in waiting for a British surrender and attacked only in August. Although air strikes did substantial damage to radar sites, on August 13-15 the Luftwaffe soon abandoned that avenue and turned to attacks on RAF air bases. A battle of attrition ensued in which both sides suffered heavy losses (an average loss of 21 percent of the RAF's fighter pilots and 16 percent of the Luftwaffe's fighter pilots each month during July, August, and September). For a time the advantage seemed to swing slightly in favor of the Germans, but a combination of bad intelligence and British attacks on Berlin led the Luftwaffe to change its operational approach to massive attacks on London. The first attack on London on September 7 was quite successful; the second, on September 15, failed not only with heavy losses, but also with a collapse of morale among German bomber crews when British fighters appeared in large numbers and shot down many of the Germans. As a result, Hitler permanently postponed a landing on the British Isles and suspended the Battle of Britain. German Forces wanted to compel Britain to agree to a negotiated peace settlement. Churchill anticipated the attack and had recalled RAF fighters from France to prep for this. Fighters inflict heavy losses on German bombers and successfully protected UK and deters Germany from launching a full-fledged invasion on UK (Operation Sea Lion) Development of tactics that used smaller # of crafts to attack larger squadrons. German attempt to use compellence against UK and force them to concede to a settlement → out of the war. Germany understood that UK was the center of gravity for the Allied economy, therefore chose to attack at the COG for highest level of compellence.

Heinz Guderian

Innovator of the New Military Unit that consisted of the use of Air power to strike out all hostile formations near the ground troops. Also a proponent of "Blitzkrieg" doctrine. Noted for success as a leader of Panzer units in Poland and France. An early pioneer and advocate of the "blitzkrieg" (lightning war) doctrine, he successfully led Panzer (armoured) units during the Invasion of Poland, the Battle of France, and Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Guderian had developed motorized tactics in the pre-war army, while keeping himself well-educated about armored formations in other armies. In particular, he implemented the use of radio communication between tank crews and devised shock tactics that proved highly effective. In May 1940, he commanded the Panzer divisions that overwhelmed the French defenses at Sedan, France, leading to the surrender of France a month later. After the German defeat at the Battle of Moscow in December 1941 he was transferred to reserve. After the defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, Hitler appointed him to a new position, rebuilding the Panzer forces, but he bickered with many other generals, who managed to get his duties re-allocated. He was then appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army in July 1944, but this was largely a symbolic role since Hitler had effectively become his own Chief of Staff. Guderian was dismissed in March 1945. Pioneered motorized tactics in the pre-war army, while keeping himself well informed about tank development in other armies. Relate him to the Modern System.

Carrier warfare

Invention → British invented aircraft carrier in 1918, HMS Furious → British leadership decide to house planes within the British air force and not within royal navy, means that within air force planes that launch off carriers compete w/ funding with bombers and other planes, have some financial constraints → British make a choice to (act of hubris) send information exchanges to US and Japan after WW1 to teach them about aircraft carriers and how to operate them; imperial Japanese navy gets access to most modern technology and concepts for how to use aircraft carriers → GB gives US navy production plans for HMS Furious Sempill Mission from UK to Japan Japanese start experimenting w/ Carriers, sino-Japanese war → like Nazis in Spanish-Civil war experimentation w/ air support, Japan's experiences give them a leg up and Mitsubishi 0 fighter is more capable than US planes at outset of the war Admiral Yamamoto → he "gets it", huge skeptic about attacking the US; got that the Japanese vision of attacking the US and US giving up is unlikely, gets assigned to plan Pearl Harbor attack; Japanese become pioneers in effectively using aircraft carriers, carrier most useful as mobile airfield → Japanese realize that put bombs on the plane, aircraft carrier useful as mobile airfield Strikes against British force Z, sinks Battleship Prince of Wales → battleship dominated naval war from 1700s to WW1; in 20 year period, reign is over because of the aircraft carrier US experience with carriers; making the case for naval aviation in the US → theoretical, William Sims becomes prominent advocate; experimentation at Naval War College; Captain Joseph Reeves makes USS Langley operational Naval Bureau of Aeronautics → British take naval aviation and put it bureaucratically, US keeps aviation in the navy so naval aviators don't have to compete with bombers and fighters for prioritization for resources; keeps funding alive, starts promotion process; need is a promotion pipeline, people who understand how tech works gets promoted US mastery of carrier warfare → US understands need for independent carrier ops, designs better careers than everyone else → aircraft carrier is indefensible airfield, want as many possible carriers as possible → folded wing; can bring more planes.

Pearl Harbor

Japan's Strategy: Misreads the US → needs to believe that for econ self-sufficiency, need to take Dutch East Indies → requires war with the US and attack at Pearl Harbor b/c attacking Dutch East Indies, if they do that they need the Philippines, if they take the Philippines then they might as well take the first shot at the US If Japan had just attacked Dutch East Indies, difficult to say whether FDR could have gotten US to fight in the War Develops short-war knockout strategy, theory is American resolve is center of gravity, attack COG by destroying American fleet at Pearl Harbor → make it hard for US to come across the Pacific, US won't want to do that b/c American public won't unify → the attack on Pearl Harbor is interesting b/c Japan skips over destroying oil storage facilities and machine shocks, if had done that would've knocked American fleet to San Francisco, but they didn't Deployment of Pearl Harbor fleet was something FDR imposed Southeast Asia rich in raw materials, by consolidating control Japan will be self-sufficient in a way that would allow it to build and sustain war machine Problem for Japan is psychological → Japan needs to sit back, consolidate control, knockout America's center of gravity Doolittle raid → April 18 1942, US w/ Doolittle strikes back and shows US can hit Japan; B25s modified for carrier launch, mission required going 2400 miles; 5 people per crew as opposed to normal → 15 B25s make it to Chinese coast (bailout location), 1 gets diverted to USSR; attack has HUGE psychological (not material) impact on Japan, demonstrates that the US won't give up and that the US can hit Japan NOW Forces Japan to extend their defensive perimeter → Japanese get upset, result is Japan's landings in Solomon Islands, Battle of Coral sea, etc → Japan responds to this by expanding defensive perimeter, choosing the fight now option over consolidate industry, plays to Japan's weakness b/c Japan is materially inferior; Japan makes similar mistake to Germany in that they send best pilots into battle → when pilots die, nobody to train future Japanese air force, quality of air force declines rapidly, run out of all good trainers Tips scales toward Battle of Midway

Kodo-ha

Japanese political faction in the Imperial Japanese Army that was active in the 1920s and 30s. ("Imperial Way Faction) Supported by junior officers aiming to establish a military government with totalitarian, militaristic and expansionist ideals. Was never an organized political party and had no official standing in the army. Decline: The faction began its decline when a group of Kodo-ha army officers were discovered to be plotting the murders of important politicians. Sun Tzu's separation of Political and Military ideology Can be seen as the opposite to Biddle's theory Spiritual training and Ideological training

Franz Halder

Joined the German Army in WWI and rose through the ranks to become Chief of the General Staff in 1938 and later became C-in-C of German army. Halder lead the invasion of Poland but warned Hitler against the invasion of France. He planned and abandoned Operation Sealion (the original Nazi plan to invade UK) and participated in Operation Barbarossa. He supported the High Command desire to launch a full-blown attack on Moscow and opposed to diverting the panzer corp. Replaced in 1942 after disagreement with Hitler Contributions: Planned the Invasion of Poland (1939) that demonstrated the effectiveness of classic German maneuver warfare. He represented a very different military strategy than Hitler's that is seen particularly in strategies within Operation Barbarossa. Halder warned of underestimation of the Soviets and increasingly became vocal against Hitler's strategies of complete obliteration → dismissal (civil-military relations). Personal opposition to Hitler was based on differences in military strategy.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

Known as the Second battle of the Philippine Sea October 1944: allied landing at the Philippine Island of Leyte. Largest Naval battle of WWII. On 20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in Southeast Asia, and in particular depriving Japanese forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied invasion but was repulsed by the U.S. Navy's Third and Seventh fleets. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered heavy losses, and never sailed to battle in comparable force thereafter. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of fuel, remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War and suffered under heavy sustained aerial attack. The Allies commenced the invasion of Leyte in order to cut off Japan from her South East Asia colonies and hamper the source of crucial oil supplies for the Imperial Japanese navy. Japanese gathered all their remaining forces in a last attempt to repel the Allied troops but failed. The battle was the last major naval engagement of World War II; the Imperial Japanese Navy never again sailed to battle in such large force, being deprived of their fuel, returning to Japan to sit inactive for the remainder of the war until April 1945. Importance: First use of kamikaze Aircraft was during this battle: Oct 21st Kamikaze hit Australian navy cruiser HMAS Australia and these attacks started to be coordinated by the 25. (Battleship Yamato was having that mission). By the time of the battle, Japan had fewer naval ships than the Allied forces had aircraft carriers, underscoring the disparity in force strength at this point in the war. The ferocity of this battle questioned the use of nuclear weapon to put an end to the conflict.

Adolf Hitler

Leader of Germany during WWII. Rose to power because of the deep economic ruin of WW1 and the Great Depression. Hossbach Memorandum -> His plan was to conquer all of Europe, force UK to accept German domination in EU, then attack soviets, them attack Britain, and then US. He didn't want to fight US. lays out plan for what war will look like, imagines starting with Germany's WW1 goals; conquer France, wheel around and take Russia to the mountains, economic pressure to GB and attack them, then attack the US → thinking about this in the 1930s; prior to Munich, Hitler has done a net assessment of these countries and has a plan, problem is that this is horribly biased shaped by racist worldview and his belief in the inherent inferiority of democracies and ability to mobilize and fight → bias skews their plan View of US → US is fundamentally weak, not only are their Nazi sympathizers in US but US is latent power, not ready to fight, imagine that because US isn't mobilized for war, small losses would be enough for US to go home → keep US out of conflict by winning fast enough with France Thinks that Germans are master race and Japanese are inferior, when Hitler violates treaty w/ Stalin and invades Soviets, Japanese are interested at the outset in helping and suck up military resources, and Hitler says no because the Germans can do it themselves and don't need the help of the Japanese → direct military consequence on war, trajectory of fighting in Eastern front is that they get to Moscow and get rolled back → forces that stop the Germans are forces that have to come over the mountains from Siberia, exactly the military units that if the Japanese had engaged, would have been preoccupied (wouldn't have been available if Hitler wasn't so racist) Begins to ramp up the use of the Nazi war machine where the purpose is mass killing/genocide, super inefficient from military strategy perspective if you also have to fight a conventional war; directing resources away from battlefield and towards genocide → growing importance of racial agenda over time; as Nazis start doing poorly, from purely rational military effectiveness perspective, they ramp up the genocide seeking to accomplish master objectives thus super super inefficient.

Blocking formations/blocking units

Most famously used in the Soviet's Red Army. Also called barrier troops, anti-retreat forces is when soldiers would be placed behind regular troops on a battle line to prevent unauthorized retreat/withdrawal. Discourage retreat and surrender on part of Soviet forces; horrific but leverages comparative advantage of brutal autocracy and mass of people. In response to reports of unit disintegration in battle and desertion from the ranks in the Soviet Red Army, the 3rd Department (military counterintelligence of Soviet Army) of the USSR's Narkomat of Defense issued a directive creating mobile barrier forces composed of NKVD personnel to operate on roads, railways, forests, etc. for the purpose of catching 'deserters and suspicious persons'. Their primary goal was to maintain strict military discipline and to prevent disintegration of the front line by any means, including the use of machine guns to indiscriminately shoot any personnel retreating without authorization. Importance: A strategy used by the Soviets in the Battle of Moscow. Although it was unlikely that soldiers actually gunned down their peers, deserters were rounded up and taken back to the front. Primary group cohesion versus social disintegration (relate to Shils/Janowitz).

Inchon Landing

NK pushes down, Inchon landing and US pushes all the way up, Chinese push back down, settle where they started → key moment is when China intervenes; US almost at Yalu river; key question is could the war have been even more limited than it was and keep china out of war A stroke of military genius conceived of by General McArthur, the landing was far from the secure Pusan perimeter which the UN forces controlled making the gamble quite risky but McArthur's intuition about the assault (that it would force a retreat of NKs who were concerned about being surrounded) was correct and UN forces took Seoul two weeks later -> Clausewitz genius!! an amphibious invasion and battle of the Korean War that resulted in a decisive victory and strategic reversal in favor of the United Nations (UN). The operation involved some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels, and led to the recapture of the South Korean capital of Seoul two weeks later. The code name for the operation was Operation Chromite. The battle began on 15 September 1950 and ended on 19 September. Through a surprise amphibious assault far from the Pusan Perimeter that UN and South Korean forces were desperately defending, the largely undefended city of Incheon was secured after being bombed by UN forces. The battle ended a string of victories over the Korean People's Army (KPA). The subsequent UN recapture of Seoul partially severed the KPA's supply lines in South Korea. The UN and South Korean forces were commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of the United States Army. MacArthur was the driving force behind the operation, overcoming the strong misgivings of more cautious generals to a risky assault over extremely unfavorable terrain.

Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island. Pioneered in the use of wargaming as a method of developing contingent war plans. Almost all the war plans developed in the interwar years were created by the NWC Isoroku Yamamoto visited the NWC twice during his training for Sempill. Alfred Thayer Mahan was 2nd President of the NWC. War games designed to predict trajectory of US-Japanese war, INCREDIBLE SUCCESS → influences American strategy, all leading admirals went to Naval War College and participated in Naval war games → nothing was a surprise EXCEPT kamikaze tactics US experience with carriers; making the case for naval aviation in the US → theoretical, William Sims becomes prominent advocate; experimentation at Naval War College; Captain Joseph Reeves makes USS Langley operational Naval Bureau of Aeronautics → British take naval aviation and put it bureaucratically, US keeps aviation in the navy so naval aviators don't have to compete with bombers and fighters for prioritization for resources; keeps funding alive, starts promotion process; need is a promotion pipeline, people who understand how tech works gets promoted US mastery of carrier warfare → US understands need for independent carrier ops, designs better careers than everyone else → aircraft carrier is indefensible airfield, want as many possible carriers as possible → folded wing; can bring more planes.

Chester W. Nimitz

Nimitz experience → originally a submariner, appreciates unique strike capabilities; views unrestricted submarine warfare as a necessity for US to win war; new directive to sink ships, if not you are fired. Commander of the US Pacific Fleet WWII. Brilliant strategist, commanded all land-sea forces in Central Pacific. After Pearl Harbor elevated commander in chief of the Pacific fleet. Battle of the Coral Sea : tactical and strategic victory against Japan. Battle of Midway : 1942 defeated Imperial Japanese navy attack Japan and was hoping for another demoralizing defeat to enhance their dominance in the pacific but American intelligence got the info and prepared in advance for the attack to return the deception situation. US lost only on carrier Yorktown and one destroyer. Single-handedly revolutionized submarine warfare doctrine in the US. Pre-war doctrine: influence of public opinion led to commanders being over cautious and "moral". Enemy commercial shipping was not attacked even tho German U-boats were conducting unrestricted sub-warfare. War-gaming and strategy. Development done in assumption that Japan would open unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific → chose to be on defensive. Nimitz established rule that if a submarine is out on patrol and fails to sink a certain amount of enemy vessels → commander of the sub would be dismissed; a brand new generation of submarine commanders were born by 1941. Post-Nimitz doctrine: More aggressive sub-warfare, convinced president to open up unrestricted submarine warfare on Japan before Japanese could attack them → economic strangulation → successful; almost all Japanese commercial shipping was destroyed (ie Japan was out of gas when US invaded). New US Navy directive → SO MANY sub commanders are fired; wholesale changeover, conservative captains fired; at outset of war percussion caps on torpedos didn't work super well → new torpedos and sub captains, intra-war shift in fighting Results → by 1945 no longer possible to keep track of the number of Japanese merchant ships sunk by US subs and aircrafts w/ capacity over 1000 tons because THERE AREN'T ANY Undermines Japanese navy's ability to function; can't move oil anymore from Southeast Asia to Japan since subs sink ships, have to rely on unrefined crew and crude oil as fews in ships → Battle of Philippine Sea, ships actually blow up.

Douglas McArthur

One of the most brilliant and talented military of the US. After leading West Point and operating in the Philippines he became Chief of staff of the United States Army 1930s. 1935 worked to establish the Philippine's army (personally called by the President of the Philippines). 1937 retired. WWII : 1941 is recalled by Roosevelt as Commander of the US Army Forces in the far East. MacArthur's forces were soon compelled to withdraw to Bataan, where they held out until May 1942. In March 1942, MacArthur, his family and his staff left nearby Corregidor Island in PT boats and escaped to Australia, where MacArthur became Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. Upon his arrival, MacArthur gave a speech in which he famously promised "I shall return" to the Philippines. After more than two years of fighting in the Pacific, he fulfilled that promise. For his defense of the Philippines, MacArthur was awarded the Medal of Honor. He participated and led the democratization and disarmament process of Japan after their surrender that he signed the 2nd of September 1945. Philippines Campaign 41-42, 44-45. The power of MacArthur → future of US is in Asia and not Europe; dismisses industrial importance of Europe, championed by isolationist republicans → leading US forces in Korea, no one will stand up to him; MacArthur didn't follow orders of the President and sends armies to Yalu → infamous meeting in Washington, Joint Chiefs want to control MacArthur, Ridgeway wants to relieve MacArthur b/c he won't obey orders → Joint Chiefs intimidated by MacArthur, theater commander making policy → Truman fires MacArthur b/c wants to fight Korean war in a limited/particular way and MacArthur wanted to escalate conflict and Truman decides that MacArthur can't be trusted, fires him (like LINCOLN) and puts Ridgeway in head of the War, correct general to fight the Korean War Congress intervening and fixing the issue → Senate issues report that says Truman was correct, civil control of military is in the balance, MacArthur is being insubordinate What does all this mean? → Leads military away from politics, retained up to the president.

Operation Dropshot

Operation Dropshot was the United States Department of Defense codename for a contingency plan for a possible nuclear and conventional war with the Soviet Union and its allies in order to counter the anticipated Soviet takeover of Western Europe, the Near East and parts of Eastern Asia expected to start around 1957. The plan was prepared in 1949 during the early stages of the Cold War and declassified in 1977. Although the scenario did make use of nuclear weapons, they were not expected to play a decisive role. An equivalent plan from USSR appeared only in 1979. At the time the US nuclear arsenal was limited in size, based mostly in the United States, and depended on bombers for delivery. Dropshot included mission profiles that would have used 300 nuclear bombs and 29,000 high-explosive bombs on 200 targets in 100 cities and towns to wipe out 85 percent of the Soviet Union's industrial potential at a single stroke. Between 75 and 100 of the 300 nuclear weapons were targeted to destroy Soviet combat aircraft on the ground. The scenario was devised prior to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and even included the note that the entire plan would be invalidated if rocketry became a cheap and effective means of delivering a nuclear weapon. The codename for the DoD early Cold War plan to respond to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe with nuclear and conventional force. That said, Nuclear weapons were not expected to play the decisive role in the original operation/plans.

Winston Churchill

PM of UK from 1940-45 and 1951-1955. Interwar years: warned against the rise of Hitler, campaigned for rearmament WW2: Believed that the UK has a structural advantage over the Germans → if war breaks out, over time UK economic superiority will bring victory Air support/Power: Belief in the ability to beat/stop strategic bombing; Radio used for spotters/Radar-Intelligence and integrated air-defense system. On Bombers and Light Fighters: Churchill decided to pull RAF fighters from FR by May 1940 bc he believed that UK is the economic center of Allies and Fighters were needed to protect it against inevitable German bombing → Battle of Britain. Movement towards using bombers to attack German economic strongholds bc of belief that Empire economy is strong = German weakness is their economy (landlocked nation).

Bougainville

Part of Operation Cartwheel in South Pacific: aim of the intervention was to take back this New Guinean territory to control the Japanese hotspot of Rabaul 1st Phase: allied forces gained the control of a major part of the island (beachhead at Torokina) 2nd phase : Controlling the entire territory wasn't the aim strategically it would use to much forces for a result that would not advance their position. Japanese forces were still present on the territory so the American forces let the Australian army take in charge the control and the patrols of the island. Coordinate command for amphibious warfare Commanders refused to coordinate their tactics and led to failure Strategy in Solomon Islands and Sun Tzu's importance on a integrated tactics and also understanding the terrain you're fighting on Two-prong defensive: Attack didn't have the correct resources for most effective offense (resource allocation) a series of land and naval battles of the Pacific campaign of World War II between Allied forces and the Empire of Japan. It was part of Operation Cartwheel, the Allied grand strategy in the South Pacific. The campaign took place in the Northern Solomons in two phases. The first phase, in which American troops invaded and held the perimeter around the beachhead at Torokina, lasted from November 1943 through November 1944. The second phase, in which primarily Australian troops went on the offensive, mopping up pockets of starving, isolated but still-determined Japanese, lasted from November 1944 until August 1945, when the last Japanese on the island surrendered. Operations during the final phase of the campaign saw the Australian forces advance north towards the Bonis Peninsula and south towards the main Japanese stronghold around Buin, although the war ended before these two enclaves were completely destroyed.

Kamikaze

Pilot member of the Imperial Japanese forces that was in charge of suicide operations during the Pacific war. Called "Jikabu" technique: because of a lack of soldiers and fuel one final solution found was this suicide technique against American carriers, destroyers and allied forces. (term used now to describe suicide attacks). The most significant factor leading to the kamikaze strategy was the fact that Japan could not win against the American juggernaut using conventional forces. The kamikaze attacks inspired terror throughout the American fleet and helped convince American military leaders to deploy nuclear weapons against this nation whose people were so dedicated and so unafraid of death.

Syngman Rhee

President of South Korea during the Korean War, he was unprepared for the NK invasion as the United States had not provided him the same level of material support that the USSR had given to NK. Under his leadership the ROK army was incredibly corrupt leading to widespread disaffection.As president, Rhee assumed dictatorial powers, tolerating little domestic opposition to his program. Rhee purged the National Assembly of members who opposed him and outlawed the opposition Progressive Party, whose leader, Cho Bong Am, was executed for treason. He controlled the appointment of mayors, village headmen, and chiefs of police. He even defied the United Nations (UN) during the Korean War (1950-53). Hoping that UN forces would continue to fight and eventually unite North and South Korea under one government, Rhee hindered the truce talks by ordering the release in June 1953 of some 25,000 anticommunist North Korean prisoners. (Under the agreed-upon truce settlement, these men were to have been repatriated to North Korea.) Stunned, the communists broke off the negotiations and renewed their attack, largely ignoring the UN forces and concentrating their fire on Rhee's South Korean troops. Having made their point, the communists then resumed negotiations, and a truce settlement was speedily signed. Importance: Shils and Janowitz

Psywar Section

Psychological warfare (PSYWAR), or the basic aspects of modern psychological operations (PSYOP), have been known by many other names or terms, including MISO, Psy Ops, political warfare, "Hearts and Minds", and propaganda. The term is used "to denote any action which is practiced mainly by psychological methods with the aim of evoking a planned psychological reaction in other people". Various techniques are used, and are aimed at influencing a target audience's value system, belief system, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior. It is used to induce confessions or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives, and are sometimes combined with black operations or false flag tactics. It is also used to destroy the morale of enemies through tactics that aim to depress troops' psychological states. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, and is not just limited to soldiers. Civilians of foreign territories can also be targeted by technology and media so as to cause an effect in the government of their country. The United States ran an extensive program of psychological warfare during the Vietnam War. The Phoenix Program had the dual aim of assassinating National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong) personnel and terrorizing any potential sympathizers or passive supporters. Chieu Hoi program of the South Vietnam government promoted NLF defections. When members of the PRG were assassinated, CIA and Special Forces operatives placed playing cards in the mouth of the deceased as a calling card. During the Phoenix Program, over 19,000 NLF supporters were killed. The United States also used tapes of distorted human sounds and played them during the night making the Vietnamese soldiers think that the dead were back for revenge.

Algeria

Rebellion within French colony of Algeria → De Gaulle's rise, tactically French were right; fail strategically → as w/ Malaya, intelligence and police work are crucial; 3 large scale efforts of French to gather intel: (1) large-scale recruitment of local algerians (more algerians fought w/ French than FLN); (2) Maurice line → FLN getting arms from Tunisia, 200 mile long line defended by 80,000 French colonial troops designed to prevent transfer of weapons into Algeria; (3) Massive civil affairs campaign, try to win hearts and mind of local population → all these things individually go pretty well, problem is that they still lose (1) Approach too reliant on the military; (2) no unified commander (like Templar), connection here is between tactics and strategy; Brit tactics work b/c they are LEAVING, French don't have that → parliament includes French settlers in Algeria, b/c of disfunction, block political concessions that would have appeared to moderate Algerians → have nothing political to offer people to cooperate, but what Algerians want is to control their own country → when De Gaulle rewrites constitution, better, but too late; modern Algerians force French out by FLN; might as well cooperate w/ FLN than French → by time French put serious concessions on table, too late → hence tactics good, strategy bad

Agounennda

The Battle of Agounennda was an engagement of the Algerian War fought from the 23rd-25th May 1957 between the French 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Bigeard and FLN's Commando 41 ('Ali Khodja') under Si Azzedine. Bigeard and his regiment were sent to hunt down the Commando after it had carried out several successful ambushes against French units. They met at Agounennda where the French paratroopers tried to ambush the FLN force, but the FLN discovered the French and instead concentrated their force against an outlying French company. Bigeard managed to redeploy and surround the FLN force; it withdrew successfully albeit with heavy casualties. However, the French were unable to recover large caches of weapons - the FLN having taken them off the field. The battle altered FLN tactics, reminding them that they were unable to meet the French in open battle. Conversely, it gave the French renewed confidence in a military victory. However, skeptics on both sides saw it as evidence that neither faction would ever gain ascendancy in the other's arena. The FLN avoided military combat with the French, relying on guerrilla warfare.

Yalu River

The river which marks the boundary between China and North Korea. MacArthur was vocal in his irritation that Chinese forces were being allowed to muster uncontested North of the river in advance of what would become a counter attack against the United States, these comments and other actions led to MacArthur's eventual dismissal. UN forces rapidly approached the Yalu River—the border with China—but in October 1950, mass Chinese forces crossed the Yalu and entered the war. The surprise Chinese intervention triggered a retreat of UN forces which continued until mid-1951. After Peng Dehuai, at Mao's bidding, made the case that if U.S. troops conquered Korea and reached the Yalu they might cross it and invade China the Politburo agreed to intervene in Korea. After secretly crossing the Yalu River on 19 October, the PVA 13th Army Group launched the First Phase Offensive on 25 October, attacking the advancing UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. This military decision made solely by China changed the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve days after Chinese troops entered the war, Stalin allowed the Soviet Air Force to provide air cover, and supported more aid to China.

Casablanca Conference

The Casablanca Conference was a meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the city of Casablanca, Morocco that took place from January 14-24, 1943. While Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin received an invitation, he was unable to attend because the Red Army was engaged in a major offensive against the German Army at the time. The most notable developments at the Conference were the finalization of Allied strategic plans against the Axis powers in 1943, and the promulgation of the policy of "unconditional surrender." The Casablanca Conference took place just two months after the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa in November 1942. At this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill focused on coordinating Allied military strategy against the Axis powers over the course of the coming year. They resolved to concentrate their efforts against Germany in the hopes of drawing German forces away from the Eastern Front, and to increase shipments of supplies to the Soviet Union. While they would begin concentrating forces in England in preparation for an eventual landing in northern France, they decided that first they would concentrate their efforts in the Mediterranean by launching an invasion of Sicily and the Italian mainland designed to knock Italy out of the war. They also agreed to strengthen their strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Finally, the leaders agreed on a military effort to eject Japan from Papua New Guinea and to open up new supply lines to China through Japanese-occupied Burma. On the final day of the Conference, President Roosevelt announced that he and Churchill had decided that the only way to ensure postwar peace was to adopt a policy of unconditional surrender. The President clearly stated, however, that the policy of unconditional surrender did not entail the destruction of the populations of the Axis powers but rather, "the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people." The policy of demanding unconditional surrender was an outgrowth of Allied war aims, most notably the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, which called for an end to wars of aggression and the promotion of disarmament and collective security. Roosevelt wanted to avoid the situation that had followed the First World War, when large segments of German society supported the position, so deftly exploited by the Nazi party, that Germany had not been defeated militarily, but rather, had been "stabbed in the back" by liberals, pacifists, socialists, communists, and Jews. Roosevelt also wished to make it clear that neither the United States nor Great Britain would seek a separate peace with the Axis powers.

Front de Libération National

The FLN was the Algerian separatist group who fought the French forces in the Algerian War for Independence from 1954-62. Their strategy was that of an insurgency, with terrorism and intimidation to gain the support of the local population, while the idea behind their movement was independence for Algeria. The Algerian separatist group who fought against French force in the Algerian civil war. They employed a strategy of provocation by attacking French government targets to which the French response was heavy handed and cost the French popular support. This group targeted officers whose role was civilian outreach and development at higher rates than military officers. They operated without a distinct chain of command. Importance: Kydd: Provocation (Terrorism) Galula: Heavy-handed French response = lost public support; attacking French gov targets = killed french attempts to gain public support Sun Tzu: Fluid shape without a distinct chain of command

Gilbert Islands

The Gilbert and Marshall Islands Campaign were a series of battles fought from November 1943 through February 1944, in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the United States and the Empire of Japan. They were the first steps of the drive across the central Pacific by the United States Pacific Fleet and Marine Corps. The purpose was to establish airfields and naval bases that would allow air and naval support for upcoming operations across the Central Pacific. Operations Galvanic and Kourbash were the code names for the Gilberts campaign that included the seizures of Tarawa and Makin. Operations Flintlock and Catchpole were aimed at capturing Japanese Bases at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and Majuro in the Marshall Islands. Japanese forces occupied the Gilbert islands on 10 December 1941, landing troops of the South Seas Detachment on Tarawa and Makin islands, a few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in order to protect their south-eastern flank from allied counterattacks, and isolate Australia. The islands were to become a staging post for the planned invasion of the Tuvalu islands by the Japanese, under the codename Operation FS, but their setback at the Battle of the Coral Sea delayed the plans, and their defeat at the Battle of Midway and later in the Solomon Islands put a definitive end to it.

Guadalcanal

The Guadalcanal Campaign, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and codenamed Operation Watchtower by American forces, was a military campaign fought between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 on and around the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific theater of World War II. It was the first major offensive by Allied forces against the Empire of Japan. On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly United States Marines, landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida in the southern Solomon Islands, with the objective of denying their use by the Japanese to threaten Allied supply and communication routes between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand; powerful American and Australian naval forces supported these landings. The Allies also intended to use Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases in supporting a campaign to eventually capture or neutralize the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. The Japanese defenders, who had occupied those islands since May 1942, were outnumbered and overwhelmed by the Allies, who captured Tulagi and Florida, as well as the airfield - later named Henderson Field - that was under construction on Guadalcanal. Surprised by the Allied offensive, the Japanese made several attempts between August and November to retake Henderson Field. Three major land battles, seven large naval battles (five nighttime surface actions and two carrier battles), and almost daily aerial battles culminated in the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November, with the defeat of the last Japanese attempt to bombard Henderson Field from the sea and to land with enough troops to retake it. In December, the Japanese abandoned their efforts to retake Guadalcanal, and evacuated their remaining forces by 7 February 1943, in the face of an offensive by the U.S. Army's XIV Corps. The Guadalcanal campaign was a significant strategic Allied combined-arms victory in the Pacific theater. While the Battle of Midway was a crushing defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy, it did not stop Japanese offensives, which continued both at sea and on the ground.[11] The victories at Milne Bay, Buna-Gona, and Guadalcanal marked the Allied transition from defensive operations to the strategic initiative in the theater, leading to offensive campaigns in the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and the Central Pacific, which resulted in the surrender of Japan, ending World War II.

Morice Line

The Morice Line was a defensive line that went into effect in September 1957 during the Algerian War. It was constructed by the French to prevent the rebel guerrillas of the Algerian National Liberation Front from entering Algeria, then a French colony, from two neighboring countries, Tunisia and Morocco. The Line was named after then French Minister of Defence André Morice. The Morice Line had a significant impact of the reduction of guerrillas activities by forces that originated from Tunisia. Though the Morice Line was not a "fortification" in the traditional sense of the word, it was nonetheless effective in reducing FLN activity during the Algerian War. A long physical barrier consisting of fencing and landmines which the French build along the Moroccan- Tunisian Border to prevent the FLN from receiving out of country support. While it was effective it was incredibly costly to maintain. Importance: Similar to the Briggs plan as a method to isolate the insurgents Galula: Strategy of separating the population from the insurgents and effective isolation

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

The South Vietnamese army. The Marines would train them as a way of counter insurgency. The US military would attempt to mask the fact that they were literally the worst soldiers → added to public distrust of the government. The ARVN begun as a post-colonial army trained and closely affiliated with the United States and had engaged in conflict since its inception. Several dramatic changes occurred throughout its lifetime, initially from a 'blocking-force' to more modern a conventional force using helicopter deployment in combat. During the U.S. intervention, the role of the ARVN was marginalised to a defensive role with an incomplete modernisation, and transformed again most notably following Vietnamization as it was up-geared, expanded and reconstructed to fulfil the role of the departing U.S. forces. By 1974, it had become much more effective with foremost counterinsurgency expert and Nixon adviser Robert Thompson noting that Regular Forces were very well-trained and second only to U.S. and IDF forces in the free world and with General Creighton Abrams remarking that 70% of units were on par with the U.S. Army. However, the withdrawal of American forces through Vietnamization meant the armed forces could not effectively fulfil all the aims of the program and had become completely dependent on U.S. equipment, given it was meant to fulfill the departing role of the United States. At its peak, an estimated 1 in 9 citizen of South Vietnam were enlisted and it had become the fourth-largest army in the world composed of Regular Forces and more voluntary Regional Militias and Village-level militias. Unique in serving a dual military-civilian administrative purpose in direct competition with the Viet Cong political and armed wing, the PLAF. The ARVN had in addition became a component of political power and notably suffered from continual issues of political loyalty appointments, corruption in leadership, factional in-fighting and occasional open conflict between itself. After the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese army (NVA), the ARVN was dissolved. While some high-ranking officers had fled the country to the United States or elsewhere, thousands of former ARVN officers were sent to reeducation camps by the communist government of the new, unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Kokutai

The core ideology of the Japanese state, particularly during the Meiji restoration, stressing the uniqueness of the Japanese system and the supreme authority of the emperor. Concept in the Japanese language and culture that can be summarized as national identity, essence, and character. "Body of the Nation" Propaganda in imperial Japan in the pre-war and WW2 period used the principle of Kokutai to promote the Japanese militarist agenda, to undermine the American Troops' morale, to counteract claims of Japanese atrocities, and to present the war to Japanese public as victorious. Saw the emperor as the head of the empire Promoted by the Imperial army Ability of the Japanese Imperial army to motivate Kamikaze and the civilian population in Okinawa to fight is directly related to the national importance of Kokutai → population rallies around the Emperor General Theory: Shils and Janowitz Group Cohesion = Kokutai and the Emperor as Secondary Symbol ("ideology")

"The political cause"

The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause, particularly in view of the risks involved and in view of the fact that the early supporters and the active supporters — not necessarily the same persons — have to be recruited by persuasion. What is a political problem? It is an "unsolved contradiction," according to Mao. If one accepts this definition, then a political cause is the championing of one side of the contradiction. Where there is no problem, there is no cause, but there are always problems in any country. What makes one country more vulnerable than another to insurgency is the depth and acuity of its existing problems. Problems of all natures are exploitable for an insurgency, provided he causes they lead to meet the above criteria. The problem may be essentially political, related to the national or international situation of the country; could also be social (one class exploited by another) or economic, racial, or artificial, etc. If the problem is merely latent, the first task of the insurgent is to make it acute by "raising the political consciousness of the masses." Terrorism may be a quick means of producing this effect. The insurgent is not restricted to the choice of a single cause; he has much to gain by selecting an assortment of causes especially tailored for the various groups in the society he is seeking to attract.

Rally 'Round the Flag

The idea that civilians will support the conflict at its onset even if there are casualties. Political scientist John Mueller suggested the effect in 1970, in a landmark paper called "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson". He defined it as coming from an event with three qualities: "Is international" "Involves the United States and particularly the President directly" "Specific, dramatic, and sharply focused" In addition, Mueller created five categories of rallies. These categories are considered dated by modern political scientists, as they rely heavily on Cold War events. Mueller's five categories are: "Sudden US military intervention" (e.g., Korean War, Bay of Pigs Invasion) "Major diplomatic actions" (e.g., Truman Doctrine) "Dramatic technological developments" (e.g., Sputnik) "US-Soviet summit meetings" (e.g., Potsdam Conference) "Major military developments in ongoing wars" (e.g., Tet Offensive)

Basic unit of COIN warfare

The problem is how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces will be free to operate elsewhere. This can only be achieved with the support of the population. It is impossible to prevent the return of guerrilla units and the rebuilding of the political cells unless the population cooperates. The population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy. Its tacit support, its submission to law and order, its consensus have been undermined by insurgent activity. And the truth is that the insurgent, which his organization at the grass roots, is tactically the strongest of opponents where it counts, at the population level. In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on the favorably minority in order to rally the neutral majority and neutralize/eliminate the hostile minority. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.

Maginot Line

Unlike fortress of Paris in 1914, was not a place d'armes from which a counterattack force could spring against German flank; its conformation and structure imprisoned its garrison within it, consigning them to a purely frontal defense against frontal attack. Maginot mentality: → French army (101 divisions strong) scarcely differed in character from 1914; worse same boots, manned same artillery, marched to the same tunes as under 'Papa' Joffre ; still a marching army, pace of maneuver very very slow. Impact of WW1 on France → cult of the offensive, fighting spirit; WW1 fundamentally changes the way the French think about warfare in that WW1 shapes French education; to help people understand horrors of trench warfare, send wounded veterans all over the country to different schools to educate French pop about how terrible war is → recoil from the cost of conflict, France reacts to WW1 by losing fighting spirit Social implications → war happens on French territory; shaped attitudes Link between military and political strategy → France adopts massive defensive military posture, idea is that if attack happens like Schlieffen plan, French will be ready because heavily armored defense line (Maginot), thus the French will be able to defeat any German attack that actually happens → France's alliance posture, however, is offensive; alliance w/ Poland obligates France to attack Germany in case of a war, alliance relationship demands they take offensive, military relation demands defensive, generates planning trouble b/c same issues in French society that make it tough for them to do meritocratic promotion still exist after WW1, inhibits ability to plan for mass mobilization at outset of WW2 Strategy of the West was founded on belief in the inviolability of the Maginot Line → consumed big margin of French defense budget since the first funds for its construction were voted in Jan 1930; in event of German offensive, which seemed certain to be based on the exploitation of Belgian weakness, French high command would have to launch its mobile field army with BEF into Belgian territory, w/o having been able to coordinate plans w/ Belgian General Staff beforehand.

Earle Wheeler

Was a United States Army general who served as Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 1962 to 1964 and then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1964-1970), holding the latter position during the Vietnam War. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Wheeler Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1964 to succeed General Maxwell Taylor. Wheeler's tenure as the nation's top military officer spanned the height of America's involvement in the Vietnam War. Wheeler oversaw and supported the expanding U.S. military role in the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s, consistently backing the field commander's requests for additional troops and operating authority. He often urged President Johnson to strike harder at North Vietnam and to expand aerial bombing campaigns. Wheeler was concerned with minimizing costs to U.S. ground troops. At the same time, he preferred what he saw as a realistic assessment of the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military. This earned him a reputation as a "hawk." Wheeler, with General William C. Westmoreland, the field commander, and President Johnson, pushed to raise additional American forces after the February 1968 Tet Offensive. American media at the time widely reported the Tet Offensive as Viet Cong victory. This followed a widely noted news report in 1967 that cited an unnamed American general (later identified as General Frederick C. Weyand) who called the situation in Vietnam a "stalemate." It was a view with which Wheeler agreed in more confidential circles. However, Wheeler was concerned that the American buildup in Vietnam depleted U.S. military capabilities in other parts of the world. He called for 205,000 additional ground troops, to be gained by mobilizing reserves, but intended these remain in the American as an active reserve. The president decided this was not easily accomplished. Together with the Tet Offensive and shifts in American public opinion, this abortive effort contributed to President Johnson's ultimate decision to de-escalate the war. After the election of President Richard M. Nixon, Wheeler oversaw the implementation of the "Vietnamization" program, whereby South Vietnamese forces assumed increasing responsibility for the war as American forces were withdrawn. Wheeler retired from the U.S. Army in July 1970.

Nuclear weapons

Weapons in which the explosive potential is controlled by nuclear fission or fusion. Despite many in the military who believed that these weapons would be used regularly, just as conventional munitions had been in the Second World War, the Korean War did not feature their use. Thus the Korean War provided an example as to how states could wage limited wars in a nuclear age. Importance: Schelling in terms of bargaining and signaling. Deterrence brought on by the existence of Nuclear Weapons.

Initiative

What is initiative in guerilla warfare? → Initiative means freedom of action for an army; if you lose freedom of action, face danger or extermination Japanese imperialism has 2 basic weaknesses: (1) Shortage of troops, (2) Fighting on foreign soil → Japanese militarists are gradually losing the initiative, because of their shortage of troops, because of the fact that they are fighting on foreign soil and because of their stupidities in command It is possible to build up initiative in guerrilla warfare the essential condition being to seize on the enemy's three weaknesses; guerrilla units can use vast areas as their fields of operations, can boldly enlist the support of millions of people, and can give full scope to their resourcefulness Initiative results from making a correct appraisal of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) and from making the correct military and political dispositions → not an innate attribute of genius but is something an intelligent leader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions and through correct military and political dispositions; ability to move is the distinctive feature of the guerrilla unit Flexibility → a concrete expression of the initiative; flexible employment of forces is more essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare → most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative

Plan dog

What should US do? → Plan Dog memorandum in 1940 lays out Germany-first strategy; reaction of Marshall and King in 1942 is to demand of FDR an immediate offensive against Germany → FDR replies "my first impression is this is exactly what Germany hopes the US would do after Pearl harbor" → FDR needs North Africa campaign, good for dealing with internal bureaucratic tensions within US gov't; Germany viewed as more pressing challenge, led to American policy of Europe first. Despite Germany-first policy, US actually has more forces first deployed in Pacific than Europe → Europe is policy, reality is mixed US contingency plan developed by the US navy for the US to work with the UK in an offensive strategy against Germany and Italy while remaining on the defensive against the Japanese (Nov 1940). In 1920s-30s, the US developed contingency plans "Color-coded War Plans" that dealt with the possible outbreak of war with different countries → Plan Orange was most complex but because it was only anticipating for single-front war, it was replaced by Rainbow Plans and Plan Dog Memorandum. Plan Dog was based on the conditions described in the Rainbow war plans and gave 4 possible scenarios for US involvement in WW2: A. Hemispherical Defense B. Offensive in the Pacific against Japan while defensive on the Atlantic C. Equal commitment in both Atlantic and Pacific D. Offensive in the Atlantic against Germany and Italy and Defensive in the Pacific Importance: The memorandum was give to FDR in 1940 with the recommendation that the US should adopt Plan "Dog" or D with the belief that GB will need American support in Europe and Africa. It also recommends that until the actual outbreak of hostilities, the US should adopt Alternative A (hemispherical protection) and build up the Army and Navy in anticipation of Plan Dog. FDR never fully endorsed the Plan but throughout the war, the demands of the European theatre of war received higher priority than the Pacific theatre in allocation of US resources