SEP - Foundationalist theories of epistemic justification

While the externalist defends radically different views than those of classical foundationalists, the structure of knowledge and justification that emerges from such theories is still often a foundationalist structure. Give examples of such externalist theories and how are they foundationalist in structure ?

The reliabilist actually accepts the first clause of PIJ (to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be (1) justified in believing E) and avoids the epistemic regress by embracing a kind of justified belief that does not owe its justification to the having of other justified beliefs. Any undefeated belief resulting from a reliable belief-independent process is justified. No other beliefs are involved in the justification. So, such beliefs are foundational.

Difference between propositional and doxastic justification?

Very roughly, one has propositional justification when one has justification for belief in a proposition—i.e., when one possesses good reasons, evidence, or justification to believe a proposition. One has doxastic justification when one not only has justification to believe a proposition but also believes the proposition and believes it at least partly on the basis of good reasons, evidence, or justification one has

What is Bonjour's (1985) objection to the thesis: To be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be (1) justified in believing E, and (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.

(2) requires that the believer would also need access to the fact that E makes probable P. Bonjour says that you can't accept both: STRONG ACCESS REQUIREMENT on justification AND accept foundationalism. The reason is that if you accept both, we get a regress because you always need to have access for what justifies your belief that p, and then what justifies your belief that you're justified in believing that p, and so on. Thus we should reject foundationalism.

What is Ayer's argument that it is difficult to produce contingent infallible beliefs that are not self-referential ?

Ayer is raising a problem for our ability to give examples of contingent infallible beliefs (besides, for instance, these self-referential propositions). The reason is that there will always be a possible gap between P being the case and my belief that P. - And this is because we can believe falsehoods. - The mere fact that I believe that P doesn't guarantee that P. For example: Imagine one state of affairs where snow is white, and another where I believe that snow is not white.

Why are externalist versions of foundationalism attractive ?

Externalist versions of foundationalism are probably attractive to many because they seem to allow at least the possibility of a much expanded foundational base of justified beliefs. Moreover, many epistemologists hold that justifiers must in some way be truth-conducive or probable, and the requirement of reliability (or some other such external condition) makes the connection to the truth explicit. In contrast, non-classical internalist foundationalist views like phenomenal conservatism threaten to sever the connection between justification and truth or probability, for it is possible that propositions that seem true are mostly false.

What are the objections to acquaintance theory of classical foundationalism ?

For example, I may be acquainted with a very specific color or shape in my visual field, and also believe (correctly) that I am experiencing such-and-such a color or shape, but I might actually be really bad at identifying such specific features and my belief might be little more than a lucky guess. Alleged cases of fallible acquaintance (e.g. color ex): either show that (a) some foundational beliefs by acquaintance can be fallible OR (b) that cases of fallible acquaintance can't be the foundations for justification -- so we should restrict the basis for foundational beliefs to infallible acquaintances (e.g. pain, on Salman's view) Worry about (b): too thin a foundation

How does Goldman define noninferentially justified beliefs in his process reliablism?

Goldman initially distinguished two importantly different sorts of justified beliefs—those that result from belief-independent processes and those that result from belief-dependent processes. The former are processes that take as their "input" stimuli other than beliefs; the latter are beliefs produced by processes that take as their input at least some other beliefs. So, for example, it is possible that we have evolved in such a way that when prompted with certain sensory input we immediately and unreflectively reach conclusions about external objects. And we may live in a world in which beliefs about the external world produced in this way are usually true (or would usually be true if enough of them were generated). Such beliefs will be justified by virtue of being the product of reliable belief-independent processes. This is basically the "base clause" of the reliabilist's analysis, a principle of foundational or noninferential justification: if a belief is the product of a reliable belief-independent process, then it is justified. Reliabilists generally add to this a condition requiring, in effect, that there be no defeaters available to the subject—e.g., no good reason or justification to think that the belief is false, unreliable or untrustworthy. (Specifying the needed "no defeater" condition in the base clause without using epistemic terms like 'justification' and 'reason' is a nontrivial matter. Goldman (1979) proposes adding the condition that there be no reliable belief-withholding process available to the subject.)

What does the following mean: Some foundationalists want to locate the noninferential justification in the truth-maker for the proposition believed. Give an example.

I'm in pain entails I believe that I'm in pain. What makes it true that I'm in pain is the same exact thing that justifies me in believing that I am in pain. It is the fact that I have a kind of access to my pain that no one else has that makes my belief noninferentially justified while others must rely on inference in order to discover that I am in this state. This takes us to another classical version of foundationalism, the acquaintance theory. Perhaps the best known proponent of an acquaintance theory is Bertrand Russell.

What does epistemic regress argument show ?

It is not yet an argument for foundationalism as much as an argument against what we might call "inferentialism"—the view that all justification is inferential—for it leaves open the skeptical position that we are not, and could not be, justified in believing anything at all, whether by inference or otherwise. This most radical of all skepticisms seems absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it). But, strictly speaking, none of this shows that we have non-inferential justification for any of our beliefs, or even that non-inferential justification is possible. At best, it shows only that, if justification is possible, or if we are or could be justified in believing anything at all, then that justification must take a foundationalist structure. The epistemic regress argument for foundationalism thus needs an additional premise, though one that all but the most radical skeptics would accept: that epistemic justification is in principle possible for beings like us.

Argument for noninferential justification as infallible justification (instead of infallible belief).

It's not that I just believe P, but I should have infallible justification for P for it to be noninferentially justified. - Helps get past the necessary truth objection - more plausible that if I have justification for believing some mathematical truth, then I am infallible with respect to that belief.

Some counterexamples to epistemic conservatism ?

Many worry that the view is vulnerable to counterexamples, for it seems committed to regarding beliefs that clearly have nothing going for them as justified. One of the better counterexamples involves cases in which one forms a belief in a proposition one has no evidence for or against. Suppose that despite lacking any evidence for or against the belief, S somehow comes to believe that there is an even number of grains of sand on a particular beach, or that a particular coin that is tossed and lands out of sight has landed "tails" up. Suppose also that S lacks any defeaters for the belief: S has no evidence against the proposition, and is no longer aware of having formed the belief without evidence or in an unreliable way. Doxastic conservatism yields the counterintuitive result that this belief is rational or justified. (For an attempt to respond to this and related objections, see McCain 2008.)

What is Bergmann's dilemma for the internalists ?

Michael Bergmann (2006: chs. 1 and 2) argues, however, that if to avoid regress we drop the strong access requirements that are so dear to some internalists, we also lose the motivation for the view. As Bergmann sees it, the attraction of internalism is its claim to be able to construe justification in such a way that it gives a subject with a justified belief a certain assurance from the subjective perspective, an assurance that externalist views don't offer. According to Bergmann, even acquaintance with truth bearers, truth makers and a correspondence holding between them doesn't carry with it assurance unless it is accompanied by a justified belief that all these relations obtain. And this will take us again on the road to regress. Thus, Bergmann wants to reject strong access requirement.

What is acquaintance theory of classical foundationalism ?

Roughly the view is that what justifies S in believing that he is in pain is the fact that S is acquainted with his pain in a way in which he is not acquainted with any contingent facts about other people, the physical world, the future, and so on. Russell (1910-11) characterizes acquaintance as a relation of direct or immediate awareness, a relation in which, as he and some others have put it, something is "presented" or simply "given" to the subject

What is "epistemic" or "doxastic" conservatism ?

The doxastic conservative takes the mere fact that you find yourself believing some proposition P to be a prima facie justification for believing the proposition in question. This view does not imply that the mere fact that you believe something renders the belief justified, for it may be that your belief is prima facie justified but not ultima facie justified: if you have good reasons to disbelieve P, or good reasons to think that your belief that P is unreliable or untrustworthy, then your belief is "defeated" and not justified. In other words, according to doxastic conservatism, if S believes that P then, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing that P.

What is the problem of this definition of infallible belief: S's belief that P at t is infallible if S's believing P at t entails that P is true?

The first and most striking problem involves necessary truths. Every necessary truth is entailed by every proposition, and thus if I happen to believe a necessary truth, P, that I believe P will entail that P is true. Thus by the above definition my belief that P will be infallible whenever P is a necessary truth even if P is far too complicated for me to prove and I believe it solely on a whim. Thus, I can't use the infallible belief P can't serve as a foundation for other beliefs because P was not justified for me (was based on lucky guess) Furthermore, a foundation of knowledge and justified belief restricted to infallible beliefs (as defined above) would arguably be far too flimsy to support any sort of substantial epistemic edifice. There are a few contingent propositions that are entailed by the fact that they are believed. My belief that I exist entails that I exist, that I have at least one belief, that someone has beliefs, that experience (broadly construed) exists, etc. But once we get past these sorts of "self-referential" propositions, propositions whose very subject matter is encompassed by the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of contingent infallible beliefs.

What is the main thesis of foundationalism?

The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge or justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief.