TB: Ch. 29
(See Problem 28:1) Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 1. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 8 and Little Pig gets 2. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 5 and Little Pig gets 1. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 5. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 2 and Big Pig will get a payo of 8. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:1) Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 3. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 7 and Little Pig gets 3. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 5 and Little Pig gets 1. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 5. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 3 and Big Pig will get a payo of 7. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:1) Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 3. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 8 and Little Pig gets 2. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 2 and Little Pig gets 1. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 2. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 2 and Big Pig will get a payo of 8. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:1) Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 3. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 9 and Little Pig gets 1. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 7 and Little Pig gets 1. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 7. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 9. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:6) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken". There are two pos- sible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 192 if the other player swerves and a payo of 48 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.20 and drives straight with probability 0.80. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.20 and the other swerves with probability 0.80. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.10 and drives straight with probability 0.90. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:6) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken". There are two pos- sible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 3 if the other player swerves and a payo of 12 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.80 and drives straight with probability 0.20. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.80 and the other swerves with probability 0.20. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.40 and drives straight with probability 0.60. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:6) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken". There are two possible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 12 if the other player swerves and a payo of 12 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.50 and drives straight with probability 0.50. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.50 and the other swerves with probability 0.50. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.25 and drives straight with probability 0.75. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:6) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken". There are two possible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 18 if the other player swerves and a payo of 12 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.40 and drives straight with probability 0.60. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.40 and the other swerves with probability 0.60. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.20 and drives straight with probability 0.80. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
(See Problem 28:6) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken". There are two possible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 56 if the other player swerves and a payo of 24 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.30 and drives straight with probability 0.70. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.30 and the other swerves with probability 0.70. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.15 and drives straight with probability 0.85. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
In the town of Torrelodones, each of the N > 2 inhabitants has $100. They are told that they can all voluntarily contribute to a fund that will be evenly divided among all residents. If $F are contributed to the fund, the local K-Mart will match the private contributions so that the total amount to be divided is $2F. That is, each resident will get back a payment of $2F=N when the fund is divided. If people in town care only about their own net incomes, in Nash equilibrium, how much will each person contribute to the fund? (a) 0 (b) $10 (c) $20 (d) $50 (e) $100
A
Suppose that in a Hawk-Dove game similar to the one discussed in your workbook, the payo to each player is 4 if both play hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 1 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 4 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays hawk is: (a) 0.43. (b) 0.21. (c) 0.11. (d) 0.71. (e) 1.
A
Suppose that in a Hawk-Dove game similar to the one discussed in your workbook, the payo to each player is 9 if both play hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 5 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 7 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays hawk is: (a) 0.18. (b) 0.09. (c) 0.05. (d) 0.59. (e) 1.
A
Suppose that in the Hawk-Dove game discussed in Problem 28.3, the payo to each player is 10 if both play Hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 5 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 8 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays Hawk is (a) 0.23. (b) 0.12. (c) 0.06. (d) 0.62. (e) 1.
A
Suppose that in the Hawk-Dove game discussed in Problem 28.3, the payo to each player is 4 if both play Hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 2 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 5 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays Hawk is (a) 0.43. (b) 0.21. (c) 0.11. (d) 0.71. (e) 1.
A
Suppose that in the Hawk-Dove game discussed in Problem 28.3, the payo to each player is 7 if both play Hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 3 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 8 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays Hawk is (a) 0.42. (b) 0.21. (c) 0.10. (d) 0.71. (e) 1.
A
Suppose that in the Hawk-Dove game discussed in Problem 28.3, the payo to each player is 7 if both play Hawk. If both play dove, the payo to each player is 4 and if one plays hawk and the other plays dove, the one that plays hawk gets a payo of 7 and the one that plays dove gets 0. In equilibrium, we would expect hawks and doves to do equally well. This happens when the fraction of the total population that plays Hawk is (a) 0.30. (b) 0.15. (c) 0.08. (d) 0.65. (e) 1.
A
Two players are engaged in a game of "Chicken". There are two possible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 12 if the other player swerves and a payo of 12 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and: (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.50 and drives straight with probability 0.50. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.50 and the other swerves with probability 0.50. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.25 and drives straight with probability 0.75. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
Two players are engaged in a game of "Chicken". There are two possible strategies. Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "Chicken" and gets a payo of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payo of 9 if the other player swerves and a payo of 36 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and: (a) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.80 and drives straight with probability 0.20. (b) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight. (c) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.80 and the other swerves with probability 0.20. (d) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.40 and drives straight with probability 0.60. (e) no mixed strategies.
A
A famous Big Ten football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate forces on the left side or the right side. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, his o ense is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and the o ense ran left, it gain only 1 yard. If the opponent defended the right side when the o ense ran right, the o ense would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.30. It is the last play of the game and the famous coach's team is on o ense. If it makes 5 yards or more it wins, if not it loses. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In equilibrium the o ense: (a) is sure to run to the right side. (b) will run to the right side with probability 0.59. (c) will run to the right side with probability 0.74. (d) will run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) will run to the right side with probability 0.70.
B
A famous Big Ten football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate forces on the left side or the right side. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, his o ense is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and the o ense ran left, it gain only 1 yard. If the opponent defended the right side when the o ense ran right, the o ense would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.70. It is the last play of the game and the famous coach's team is on o ense. If it makes 5 yards or more it wins, if not it loses. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In equilibrium the o ense: (a) is sure to run to the right side. (b) will run to the right side with probability 0.77. (c) will run to the right side with probability 0.87. (d) will run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) will run to the right side with probability 0.70.
B
The old Michigan football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate either on the left side or the right side of Michigan's line. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, Michigan is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and Michigan ran left, Michigan would be stopped for no gain. But if the opponent defended the right side when Michigan ran right, Michigan would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.30. It is the last play of the game and Michigan needs to gain 5 yards to win. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In Nash equilibrium, Michigan would (a) be sure to run to the right side. (b) run to the right side with probability 0.59. (c) run to the right side with probability 0.74. (d) run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) run to the right side with probability 0.70.
B
The old Michigan football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate either on the left side or the right side of Michigan's line. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, Michigan is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and Michigan ran left, Michigan would be stopped for no gain. But if the opponent defended the right side when Michigan ran right, Michigan would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.40. It is the last play of the game and Michigan needs to gain 5 yards to win. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In Nash equilibrium, Michigan would (a) be sure to run to the right side. (b) run to the right side with probability 0.63. (c) run to the right side with probability 0.77. (d) run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) run to the right side with probability 0.60.
B
The old Michigan football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate either on the left side or the right side of Michigan's line. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, Michigan is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and Michigan ran left, Michigan would be stopped for no gain. But if the opponent defended the right side when Michigan ran right, Michigan would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.50. It is the last play of the game and Michigan needs to gain 5 yards to win. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In Nash equilibrium, Michigan would (a) be sure to run to the right side. (b) run to the right side with probability 0.67. (c) run to the right side with probability 0.80. (d) run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) run to the right side with probability 0.50.
B
The old Michigan football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate either on the left side or the right side of Michigan's line. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, Michigan is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and Michigan ran left, Michigan would be stopped for no gain. But if the opponent defended the right side when Michigan ran right, Michigan would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.60. It is the last play of the game and Michigan needs to gain 5 yards to win. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In Nash equilibrium, Michigan would (a) be sure to run to the right side. (b) run to the right side with probability 0.71. (c) run to the right side with probability 0.83. (d) run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) run to the right side with probability 0.60.
B
The old Michigan football coach had only two strategies. Run the ball to the left side of the line. Run the ball to the right side. The defense can concentrate either on the left side or the right side of Michigan's line. If the opponent concentrates on the wrong side, Michigan is sure to gain at least 5 yards. If the defense defended the left side and Michigan ran left, Michigan would be stopped for no gain. But if the opponent defended the right side when Michigan ran right, Michigan would still gain at least 5 yards with probability 0.70. It is the last play of the game and Michigan needs to gain 5 yards to win. Both sides choose Nash equilibrium strategies. In Nash equilibrium, Michigan would (a) be sure to run to the right side. (b) run to the right side with probability 0.77. (c) run to the right side with probability 0.87. (d) run to the two sides with equal probability. (e) run to the right side with probability 0.70.
B
(See Problem 28:11) If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 56 + 0:30X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club. (a) 56 (b) 186.67 (c) 112 (d) 80 (e) 24
D
A game has two players. Each player has two possible strategies. One strategy is called \cooperate", the other is called \defect". Each player writes on a piece of paper either a C for cooperate or a D for defect. If both players write C; they both get a payo of $100. If both players defect they each get a payo of 0. If one player cooperates and the other player defects, the cooperating player gets a payo of S and the defecting player gets a payo of T. To defect will be a dominant strategy for both players if: (a) S +T > 100 (b) T > 2S (c) S < 0 and T >100. (d) S < T and T >100. (e) S amd T are any positive numbers.
C
Frank and Nancy met at a sorority sock-hop. They agreed to meet for a date at a local bar the next week. Regrettably, they were so fraught with passion that they forgot to agree on which bar would be the site of their rendezvous. Luckily, the town has only two bars, Rizotti's and the Oasis. Having discussed their tastes in bars at the sock-hop, both are aware that Frank prefers Rizotti's to the Oasis and Nancy prefer the Oasis to Rizottis. In fact, the payo s are as follows. If both go to the Oasis, Nancy's utility is 3 and Frank's utility is 2. If both go to Rizotti's, Frank's utility is 3 and Nancy's utility is 2. If they don't both go to the same bar, both have a utility of 0. (a) This game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies and a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where the probability that Frank and Nancy go to the same bar is 12=25. (d) This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies and a Nash equilbrium in mixed strategies where each person has a probability of 1=2 of going to each bar. (e) This game has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
C
George and Sam have taken their fathers' cars out on a lonely road and are engaged in a game of "Chicken". George has his father's Mercedes and Sam has his father's rattly little Yugoslavian- built subcompact car. Each of the players can choose either to Swerve or to Not Swerve. If both choose Swerve, both get a payo of zero. If one chooses Swerve and the other chooses Not Swerve, the one who chooses Not Swerve gets a payo of 10 and the one who chooses Swerve gets zero. If both choose Not Swerve, the damage to George's car is fairly minor and he gets a payo of 5; while for Sam the results are disastrous and he gets a payo of 100. (a) This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which George does not swerve and Sam swerves. (b) This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria and no mixed-strategy equilibrium. (c) This game has three di erent Nash equilibria, two of which are pure strategy equilibria and one of which is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which George is more likely to swerve than Sam is. (d) The one and only Nash equilibrium in this game is where George does not swerve and Sam swerves. (e) This game has two pure strategy equilibria and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which Sam randomizes his strategy and George chooses Not Swerve with certainty.
C
In the game matrix below, the rst payo in each pair goes to Player A who chooses the row, and the second payo goes to Player B; who chooses the column. Let a, b; c; and d be positive constants. If Player A chooses bottom and Player B chooses right in a Nash equilibrium then we know that: !ta game1.tab! (a) b > 1 and d < 1. (b) c < 1 and b < 1. (c) b < 1 and c < d. (d) b < c and d < 1. (e) a < 1 and b < d.
C
(See Problem 28:11) If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 77 + 0:30X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club. (a) 77 (b) 256.67 (c) 154 (d) 110 (e) 33
D
(See Problem 28:11) If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 112 + 0:20X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club. (a) 112 (b) 560 (c) 224 (d) 140 (e) 28
D
(See Problem 28:11) If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 120 + 0:20X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club. (a) 120 (b) 600 (c) 240 (d) 150 (e) 30
D
(See Problem 28:11) If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 45 + 0:70X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club. (a) 45 (b) 64.29 (c) 90 (d) 150 (e) 105
D
If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 21+0:70X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club? (a) 21 (b) 30 (c) 42 (d) 70 (e) 49
D
If the number of persons who attend the club meeting this week is X; then the number of people who will attend next week is 77+0:30X. What is a long run equilibrium attendance for this club? (a) 77 (b) 256.67 (c) 154 (d) 110 (e) 33
D
Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 1. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 8 and Little Pig gets 2. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 4 and Little Pig gets 3. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 3 and Big Pig will get a payo of 4. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 2 and Big Pig will get a payo of 8. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
E
Big Pig and Little Pig have two possible strategies, Press the Button, and Wait at the trough. If both pigs choose Wait, both get 2. If both pigs press the button then Big Pig gets 7 and Little Pig gets 3. If Little Pig presses the button and Big Pig waits at the trough, then Big Pig gets 10 and Little Pig gets 0. Finally, if Big Pig presses the button and Little Pig waits, then Big Pig gets 6 and Little Pig gets 1. In Nash equilibrium, (a) Little Pig will get a payo of 1 and Big Pig will get a payo of 6. (b) Little Pig will get a payo of 3 and Big Pig will get a payo of 7. (c) Both pigs will wait at the trough. (d) Little pig will get a payo of zero. (e) The pigs must be using mixed strategies.
E
Professor Binmore has a monopoly in the market for undergraduate game theory textbooks. The time discounted value of Professor Binmore's future earnings is $1,000. Professor Ditt is considering writing a book to compete with Professor Binmore's book. With two books amicably splitting the market, the time discounted value of each professor's future earnings would be $100. If there is full information (each professor knows the pro ts of the other), under what conditions could Professor Binmore deter the entry of Professor Ditt into his market? (More than one answer may be correct. Full credit will be given only if all correct choices are selected.) (a) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price so that Professor Ditt would loose $200. In so doing, Professor Binmore would loose $20 over time. (b) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price so that Professor Ditt would loose $20. In so doing, Professor Binmore would just break even over time. (c) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Ditt's book so that Professor Ditt would loose $2. In so doing, Professor Binmore would still make $90 over time. (d) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Ditt's book so that Professor Ditt would only make $2. In so doing, Professor Binmore would still make $50 over time. (e) None of the above.
E
Professor Binmore has a monopoly in the market for undergraduate game theory textbooks. The time discounted value of Professor Binmore's future earnings is $2,000. Professor Ditt is considering writing a book to compete with Professor Binmore's book. With two books amicably splitting the market, the time discounted value of each professor's future earnings would be $200. If there is full information (each professor knows the pro ts of the other), under what conditions could Professor Binmore deter the entry of Professor Ditt into his market? (More than one answer may be correct. Full credit will be given only if all correct choices are selected.) (a) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price so that Professor Ditt would loose $200. In so doing, Professor Binmore would loose $20 over time. (b) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price so that Professor Ditt would loose $20. In so doing, Professor Binmore would just break even over time. (c) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Ditt's book so that Professor Ditt would loose $2. In so doing, Professor Binmore would still make $190 over time. (d) Professor Binmore threatens to cut his price and attack the credibility of Professor Ditt's book so that Professor Ditt would only make $2. In so doing, Professor Binmore would still make $100 over time. (e) None of the above.
E
