War Weapons and Arms Control Final
Carol Cohn: the consequences of entering into the language of national security discourse
Strategic terminology Drained of human implications Doesn't include vocabulary that allows for certain thoughts - humanitarian ideas Not taken seriously unless you use this language Specific language - has social implications Gendered language - male sexuality This language also removes people from the actual horrors of these weapon systems and make 'rational' decisions possible- disconnect
Problems of arms control treaties (trust, error factors, monitoring, verification, enforcement)
international anarchy Establishing intent Establishing trust is problematic No set organization already Perpetrators - could be non-state actors Hard to find out where attack originates Dual use - hard to separate military and civil who will be monitor? how will it be enforced? - How to build trust between states Goal articulation Communication - information about cyber security Dispute resolution/investigation Define legitimate and illegitimate targets States take responsibility for attacks originated in their state set up agencies for this purpose arms trade bureaucracy like with arms trade restrictions Economic incentives
What are Schelling's views on the relationship of diplomacy and violence?
"coercive diplomacy,": which is the threat of the use of force or the actual use of limited force applied in order to coerce an actor to change their objectionable behavior. At its best it rests at the threat of punishment without carrying it out-a threat is most successful when its not carried out Contrast between brute force with coercion the capacity to punish before defeating an adversary is widening, it use to be that you had to defeat the adversary before coercion. Compellence - getting someone to do something in your interest Deterrence - make sure someone doesn't do something against your interest
Arms sales motivations (Feinstein)
- Arms Dealers - Corrupt, profit seeking, ruthless - War profiteers lead to more war - Defense department imperatives Protect money as early as possible Maximize ten-year-planning horizon threat Turn threats into hardware responses: Modify needs marginally rather than declare a system non-performing Promote competition to increase performance and reduce cost, but prevent elimination of any competitors - Intelligence imperatives The worst case scenario Problem of prognosticating - the threat that will exist at the time that the weapons now under consideration will actually be available. Tell the leadership what it wants to hear Dominate information flow in areas dearest to the bureaucratic core of your agency Defense industry imperatives: Generate needs Support the most pessimistic view of the threat Spread research and development across as many variants of a system as possible Create slush funds of money to support slowed projects Develop as many permutations of a known technology as possible Get cozy with the Pentagon officials you deal with Congressional imperatives Target of Political engineering >> Home-state procurement Service loyalties RLow return on procurement cuts because of multi-year expenditure pattern - Contractors always (falsely) claim that costs will decrease as we invest more in a concept/weapon creation - Military Objectives second to personal/political objectives - Defense industry help congressmen bring jobs to their districts - Over prepare or under prepare? -Always want to do worst-case analysis, over prepare
Toxic Weapons Treaty, land mines, cluster munitions (Docherty), Arms Trade Treaty.
- Cluster Munitions developed during cold war era large weapons that spread dozens/hundreds of smaller munitions Antipersonnel devices - designed to attack infantry formations that are not heavily armored Negatives: Failure to explode rate is quite high → a lot of them lying around unexploded Inherently indiscriminate - doesn't just attack combatants - Cluster munitions and land-mines treaty requires states not to develop, produce or otherwise acquire or transfer cluster munitions stockpile reduction, clearance and risk education, victim assistance, international cooperation and assistance, transparency, compliance, national implementation measures expands weapons treaties to also deal with weapons when they don't work expands coverage of weapons treaties to govern munitions both as active instruments and remnants of war includes relations with states not party to treaty - encourage them to adopt it Arms trade treaty (from Wikipedia) is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. Toxic Weapons Treaty (from Wikipedia) was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons The Geneva Protocol prohibits use but not possession or development of chemical and biological weapons. March 1975 - commits the 173 states which are party to it as of December 2014 to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention. includes all microbial and other biological agents or toxins and their means of delivery
Weapons procurement: rational versus actual (political engineering, front-loading, gold plating, long lead-times, distant planning horizon) (Spinney)
- In rational world, defense planning would be formulated as a long-term plan i.e. in worst possible world how many conflicts must we pursue? - Front Loading - practice of planting seed money for new programs while downplaying their future obligations makes it easier to sell high cost programs to skeptics in Pentagon and congress starts money flowing complex hardware easier to front load - more uncertain we are about its ultimate performance and cost tendency to overstate performance during testing - Political engineering - strategy of separating dollars, jobs and profits to as many important congressional districts as possible lock the spigot open - Both about flow of money bias choice of technologies by creating powerful political motives to buy complex high-cost weapons - implications sacrifice real military needs for politics patterns of decisions that guarantees costs will grow faster than budgets encourage immoral behavior corrupt relationship between congress and defense department -gold plating: Manufacturers tend to go for the best technology that is available, regardless of cost. It is rationalized by the idea that if the technology is available, it should be provided to the military. Distant planning horizon-- 10+ year conflict planning time,the more complex weapon system is, the more expensive and harder it is to put into action, things may change in the world before you get to use it
What kinds of explanations are there at different levels of analysis for the sources of war?
- Individual human nature causes propensity towards violence People responsible for the visions that lead to war - State some types of states have a propensity to start wars - not human nature that - System (structuralist theory) the system of states - international relations - anarchy - state of competition without regulatory mechanism Assumption: states make rational decisions - Interrelated
Nuclear non-proliferation. Uranium enrichment, Plutonium separation, heavy water reactor, light water reactor, Baruch Plan, International Atomic Energy Agency,
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Only US, UK, Soviet Union, France and China can have nuclear weapons IAEA has monitoring abilities Easy to fool in the sense that facilities have to be declared - if they aren't the IAEA can't go around looking for them allowed to opt if they want checks - Russia and China don't Informations supposed to be secret - contained by IAEA 3 branches: non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy → International Atomic Energy Agency promote peaceful uses of atomic energy prevent their diversion to military use only way it can do this is to have control the material that passes through it very little in the way of control functions Baruch Plan -1946 give country's nuclear technology for peaceful ends - way to regulate the non-peaceful ends - Uranium enrichment - Enriched uranium is a type of uranium in which the percent composition of uranium-235 has been increased through the process of isotope separation. Natural uranium is 99.284% 238U isotope, with 235U only constituting about 0.711% of its weight. Enriched uranium is a critical component for both civil nuclear power generation and military nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency attempts to monitor and control enriched uranium supplies and processes in its efforts to ensure nuclear power generation safety and curb nuclear weapons proliferation. - heavy-water reactor (PHWR) is a nuclear power reactor, commonly using unenriched natural uranium as its fuel, that uses heavy water(deuterium oxide D2O) as its coolant and moderator. The heavy water coolant is kept under pressure, allowing it to be heated to higher temperatures without boiling. While heavy water is significantly more expensive than ordinary light water, it creates greatly enhanced neutron economy, allowing the reactor to operate without fuel-enrichment facilities (offsetting the additional expense of the heavy water) and enhancing the ability of the reactor to make use of alternate fuel cycles. - light water reactor (LWR) is a type of thermal-neutron reactor that uses normal water, as opposed to heavy water, as both its coolant and neutron moderator - furthermore a solid form of fissile elements is used as fuel. Thermal-neutron reactors are the most common type of nuclear reactor, and light water reactors are the most common type of thermal-neutron reactor.
Historic revolutionary technological innovations; what are the characteristics of a revolutionary technology? (Gabriel and Metz, McKitrick)
- criteria fundamentally changes the way people fight Change the scope of the conflict - Spacial - where battlefield is located or how large or small it is Size of effects - examples The wheel Gunpowder Nuclear Weapons - efficiency - Evolutionary - do the sae thing but higher intensity and efficiency machine guns evolutionary vs. guns are revolutionary
Strategy (especially but not exclusively nuclear): first strike/second strike, deterrence, punishment/retaliation, and war-fighting
- deterrence: MAD, once a nuke is used deterrence is useless because the ultimate punishment has already been used retaliation: early on made sense b/c of inaccurate weapons what's the point of retaliation when your country is destroyed? Rise of precision Compellence: getting other guy to do what you want or don't want them to do through threat or use of force war-fighting or first-strike Deterrence: threat to punish someone for doing what they want to do, punishment based on second-strike, retaliation war fighting -using your capabilities as strategy - demonstrate power to adversary to build credibility -dont mess with me look at all the stuff i have
Logic and objectives of arms control (Schelling and Halperin)
-Arms Control has the objective of increasing state security. Limit weapons to improve the security of the state Interest in mutual survival in the age of the nuclear missile crisis -Objectives: Make war less individually destructive. reduce likelihood of war. Cost Containment. -Concerns about non state actors acquiring WMDs harder to control small arms (AK-47s) but they're a bigger threat than WMDs -Confidence building - prevent damage in general war - Crisis management techniques establish better communication in the event of crisis → increase confidence. increase trust between adversaries -Reducing Uncertainty again, monitoring and verification - reduce incentive to preempt (which makes suspicion of war a cause of war) -so need to increase trust - decrease likelihood of accidental war - reduce urgency of quick action -reduce capability for destruction What kinds of weapons motivate arms control responses? more controllable or more desirable to control long lasting effects if only a few states have them, easier to control Indiscriminate or civilian targeted anyone can make them unpopular with major combatants
Weapons power to weight ratio, maneuverability
-certain weapons are better for certain conditions -tradeoff between power and maneuverability In the case of Henry fighting the French at the battle of Agincourt, the cavalry (less able to maneuver in conditions they were fighting in) vs. the pike-men (who were less powerful but lighter and had small swords, too) are an example of the power to weight ratio in regards to maneuverability. Certain technologies are better for certain circumstances.
Lessons of Agincourt
-what appears to be a weaker force defeats what appears to be a stronger force -problems w command, communication and control (C3I), -weapons technology: sharp steaks and longbows, maneuverability (weight of heavy cavalry armor -command: English: single commander, clear hierarchy, archer autonomy French: confused chain of command, bigger organization -usually uphill position helps (French), but not in this case because of the steaks -english won b/c of destruction of French morale -taboo against killing the prisoners, did it anyway -they could attack from behind or escape and rearm themselves
Export Control Act
1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the authority to control the export of defense articles and services, and charges the President to exercise this authority. The Act of Congress requires international governments receiving weapons from the United States to use the armaments for legitimate self-defense. Consideration is given as to whether the exports "would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements." [2] The Act also places certain restrictions on American arms traders and manufacturers, prohibiting them from the sale of certain sensitive technologies to certain parties and requiring thorough documentation of such trades to trusted parties.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Feinstein)
1978, US legislation passed in reaction to scandals where American corporations were passing large amounts of money to foreign leaders in hopes of securing a contract intended to force companies to police themselves into a cleaner capitalism, to compel them to avoid bribery for fear of shame of getting caught. anti bribery and record keeping and accounting provisions → paper trail to prevent concealment of bribery privately owned companies do not have to comply with record-keeping provisions only applies to public officials left holes - US companies pay bribes to Saudi Arabia through majority-controlled joint ventures overseas
Israeli attack against OSIRAK (1981), Syrian reactor (2007)
1981: Iraqi, OSIRAQ, French-supplied heavily enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor under construction Israelis considered OSIRAQ a long term threat Fuel → remanufacture, exhaust HEU Irradiate U238 → Pu239 Israelis use F-16s and F-15s to bomb. Claim it is a "Preventive Strike" While Iraq and France maintained that the reactor, named Osirak by the French, was intended for peaceful scientific research, the Israelis viewed the reactor with suspicion, and said that it was designed to make nuclear weapons. On 7 June 1981, a flight of Israeli Air Force F-16A fighter aircraft, with an escort of F-15As, bombed and heavily damaged the Osirak reactor internationally condemned 2007: North Koreans and Syrians start talking about production Illegal reactor site; North Koreans and Syrians tried to keep it secret, not a moderated facility. Cyber warfare used to make Syrian air defense systems look normal as facility was being bombed
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): adversary varieties, information war, precision strike, space war, dominating maneuver (McKitrick)
Adversary Varieties Type A: Peer competitors - other major powers able to compete with US Tybe B: Regional competitors - able to compete regionally and only across a limited set of military capabilities Type C: Terrorists - low-intensity conflict countries, drug lords, etc. must keep in mind what a nation or region is to accurately reflect what it may become - cultural/social beliefs, demographics, geography, economic development, political system, access to trade and technology, military structure, nature of alliances Information war struggle between two or more opponents for control of the information battlespace at military operation level - contributes to major changes in conduct of warfare - key issue is vulnerability of C3I and how to attack enemies system while protecting yours issue - when does war begin?, hard to signal intentions creates problems at national level rather than just for the Department of Defense precision strike most developed conceptually dramatically increased capability to strike strategic targets intercontinental distances by 2020 similar effects of nukes but without attendant risk of escalation or intolerable levels of destruction ability to sense the enemy at operations and strategic depth, recognize his operational concept and strategic plan, and select and prioritize attacks on enemy target sof value space war exploitation of space environment to conduct full-spectrum, near-real-time, global military operations possibility of conducting worldwide military operations in a greatly reduced time frame currently provide support essential for successful operations of terrestrial forces dominant battlefield awareness and coordination of global precision strike improved surveillance - altitude dominating maneuver by 2020 our competitors could well challenge our national interests in regions where they enjoy the advantages of close proximity, and we may have neither a lengthy buildup period to marshal our forces no access a continental infrastructure to support our forces in the theater → we will have to fight using the continental US as our principal base of operations dominating maneuver could allow ground forces to operate successfully in situations where they cannot dominate the entire battlespace requires new operations concepts - take into account decisive importance of time new means for movement of ground forces - forms of mobility not possessed by the enemy need strong logistics → smaller forces and new transportation
Iran's nuclear program (Zetter), nuclear diplomacy, U.N. sanctions, P5+1 negotiations
Biggest concern is enrichment capacity → with a reduction of enrichment capacity and inventory of material the likelihood that Iranians could move rapidly to gain a significant amount of fissionable material is contained can never reduce threat to zero P5+1 negotiations (the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) has been engaged in serious and substantive negotiations with Iran with the goal of reaching a verifiable diplomatic resolution that would prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. general parameters of a comprehensive solution that would constrain Iran's nuclear program over the long term, provide verifiable assurances to the international community that Iran's nuclear activities will be exclusively peaceful, and ensure that any attempt by Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon would be promptly detected If Iran fails to meet its commitments, we will revoke the limited relief and impose additional sanctions on Iran. Negotiations benefit US because its important to show that we are willing to deal and come to a placid compromise with iran instead of casting them to the dogs and alienating them as enemies.
Two ends of a gun barrel
Breech - where bullet goes in Muzzle - where bullet comes out
International arms trade - major systems versus small arms and light weapons (Feinstein)
Conventional Arms Trade Treaty (CAT) - attempt to stop pumping arms into 3rd world countries Pattern in late 20th century: chemical weapons = inhumane, small arms production is also routine production activity, hard to find, legally sold at first but then with civil war or other conflict those stockpiles are up for grabs. More people are killed by assault rifles than nuclear weapons More incentive for arms control when it comes to bigger weapons, less so with smaller arms, which are harder to control Need a government to control trade Reducing Demand requires: Education financial compensation incentives to limit use financial restrictions What is so attractive about WMDs instead of weapons that actually do the most killing (salw)? attempt to humanize war - increased distance from killers and killzone Attempt to reduce conflict, stabilize WMDs are targets of control for these reasons, more emphasis on stabilization agreement Internal conflicts in foreign nations don't concern us
What are the objectives of war and the use of military force?
Demonstration of force Expansion (physical, ideological) Coercive diplomacy & politics by other means Credibility - following through on threats Testing new technologies Warning to other states
Leakage of weapons to rebel groups from state stockpiles (Jackson)
Despite the attention given to the international arms trade, in reality it is by theft, ambush, and corruption that most rebel groups source weapons and ammunition. Arming preferences are dependent on the stage of the conflict, the size and strength of the armed groups, and the state armed forces. easiest, yields high returns for relatively little effort or cost, and does not require any external supporter or the development of a war economy. new warfare: non state actors, muddying of warfare and criminal activities economization of motivates, privatization of war, deliberate targeting of civilians, national interest has been substituted by the micro-level causes of groups representing divergent interests (often labeled ''greed and grievance'') → weapons use: high number of participants that lack similar ideological motivations, more likely to occur within weak or failing states, little open confrontation between opposing sides, main victims are civilians government control over weapons is a crucial factor in limiting the rebel group capacity, and that ''new war'' literature has misconceived the dynamics of arms acquisition in order to meld it with broader theories of globalization and ideas about contemporary nonstate actors.
Powell Doctrine
For deployment of major military force, all of these questions should be answered in the affirmative: Is a vital national security interest threatened? S Do we have a clear, attainable objective? O Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? C Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? N Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? E Have the consequences of our actions been fully considered? C Is the action supported by the American people? S Do we have genuine international support? S SSCCONES Powell also thought that if military force is to be committed, it should be committed wholeheartedly - that is, not piecemeal or minimally, but preferably overwhelmingly to assure victory.
Four Generations of War, characteristics and examples (Hammes)
First generation - Napoleonic warfare - Mass manpower - Large armies - massed manpower, Linear battle - relatively static, shallow battlefront, Second generation - arises with US Civil War - high point WWI - massed firepower - attrition, Artillery has come a long way → deeper battlefield, Linear battle - relatively static, wars of production - need to sustain level of supply to continue war, trench warfare Third Generation warfare - WWII - Blitzkrieg - maneuver warfare - War of maneuver - deepening of battlefield vastly expanded, destruction of the enemy's command and control and logistics as the faster way to destroy his will to fight (C3I) , society as a whole starts to be target of warfare - new form of attrition, Production - Wartime economy, Airpower, Very heavy firepower Fourth Generation Warfare - Schwerpunkt - assymetrical warfare - regular military guerillas, insurgencies, non-state actors - In post WWII environment, smart combatants understand that there are states that are good at third generation warfare - if you want to effectively fight them, need to find a new type of warfare or you'll lose, Ex) Vietnam War, uses all available networks - political, economic, social, and military - to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. Evolved form of insurgency. Schwerpunkt (hardpoint) - targeting center of power
Dual-use technology problem
Hard to distinguish between military and civilian use High in: Chemical weapons Cyber warfare nuclear power
System structure and armed conflict (balances of power) (Ken Waltz)
Human nature doesn't tell us very much about the onset of war State level - doesn't help to say that a particular form of state or ideology leads to international conflict - all states cause wars war is due to structure of international system System of anarchy - no higher authority constraining states' behavior Security dilemma - way to avoid war is to convince combatants that there are consequences - creating a balance - mutual threat 2 kinds of change in the world - change within the system, and change of the system Anarchy does not necessarily imply disorder - primary organizing component of it is balance of power nuclear weapons are the ultimate power balancer
NPT, IAEA, Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW, Mustard Gas, Sarin, Biological and
IAEA (1957)- International Atomic Energy Agency. Created outside of U.N. as autonomous organization, reports to UN general assembly + security council, promotes scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the implementation of international safeguards and standards. NPT (1968) completed in 1968, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear technology, Monitored by the IAEA, doesn't have complete control over all nuclear tech in the world, multilateral, creates nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) - NNWs subject to INFCIRC agreements but NWS are not CWC (1997): Arms control treaty which outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors, as well as destroying existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Provision for collective action in case of use of chemical weapons, inspection regime for chemicals with potential for weaponry, cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry OPCW (1997): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- intergovernmental organization which administers/created CWC, Provision for collective action in case of use of chemical weapons, inspection regime for chemicals with potential for weaponry, cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry, Not discriminatory in nature (different from nuclear treaties) - same requirements for state that have and don't have, includes challenge inspections About chemical weapons - three categories: Nerve agents (Sarin), Blister agents, (mustard gas) Choking Agents, Weapons of mass destruction? Not in how numbers they kill at once But in the indiscriminate nature - Civilian use vs. military use: A lot harder to discern difference than with nuclear weapons, Relatively easy to make chemical processes
Principles of international humanitarian law (laws of war): discrimination, proportionality, military objective, right to self defense, problems of asymmetric combatants
International human rights law (declaration not a treaty so not binding) International humanitarian law (The Geneva conventions) → law of armed conflict. Obligations in the form of treaties apply only during armed conflicts (combatants and civilians) Prisoner of War: certain privileges must be released when the war is over Right to surrender Can't indiscriminately kill civilians International criminal law genocide capable of violence on an INDIVIDUAL (war crime) Jurisdiction territorial: crime takes place on territory and therefore the government on that territory has jurisdiction Nationality or active personality government of person's nationality (home country) could claim jurisdiction Protective principle: if citizen of that government was targeted in another country, they can ask the perpetrator (who's from somewhere else) for jurisdiction Universal jurisdiction: some crimes that are so serious, any state can try them (EX: genocide, crimes against humanity) Only if domestic legal structure permits such jurisdiction
The debate over why Japan surrendered (atomic bombing, or not?) (Ward Wilson)
Japanese internal discussion more stimulated by Russian invasion Japanese needed something to "blame their loss" on, interest in building up idea of these weapons
Military Industrial Congressional Complex (Spinney, Feinstein)
MICC - complex network of economic and political interests tied in a multitude of different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities. Long-standing practice of MIC to invest in arms companies (like Lockheed Martin) according to their financial needs rather than the merits of a particular weapons design - symbiotic relationship between Pentagon and top contractors, need each other to survive and prosper bomber gap & missile gap - defense contractors attempts to build more bombers and missiles claiming that USSR was surpassing US in production of them - need to be prepared Earmarking - lawmakers adding federal money to budget of often unrelated pieces of legislation to give no-bid contracts (contracts awarded to companies w/o any competition) to pet projects and companies of their choosing US sells about 40% of world's armaments with a high of 61% in 2008 Military spending in US accounts for 43% of global total In order to keep defence spending high, crucial for US to fulfil the role as the world's policemen, defender of freedom, at home and abroad
Small arms and light weapons (SALW), MANPADS, consequences of proliferation,
Most genocides today are at hands of small weapons (assault rifles) there large gains ($$$) to be made from arming rebels in nations such as Congo or Rwanda (Feinstein, The Shadow World). Arms control proponents argue for greater regulation of the small arms trade ISIS - using weapons we left behind in - Conventional Arms Talks (CAT): during Cold war period, Greater transparency and greater responsibility for international trade in larger arms systems - Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) initiatives Post Cold War Early 1990's - growing number of internal conflicts More people have been killed by small arms than nuclear weapons - restrictions on them will save more lives Large inventories of arms that are no longer in demand with lax control, floating around Eastern Europe → sold off into private sector 1997 - resolution reported in UN General Assembly - endorsed obligation of state after armed conflict to destroy leftover light weapons urges responsibility of state suppliers to buy back weapons call for marking weapons to make them traceable suggest international sales of weapons should only be for governments to governments (preventing weapons being provided to non-state actors) Since 2000- yearly published small arms survey IANSA - 2001 UN conference on small arms and light weapons Producing a non-binding program of action Compliance completely voluntary 2006 whole thing basically comes to a stop because US not in support 2008 election of Obama US attitude shifts → 2013 UN general assembly adopts arms trade treaty (US votes with majority) MANPADS Man-portable air defence systems - threat to low flying aircraft both commercial and military. shoulder launched anti-aircraft missile
Arms Control: Tacit/explicit, unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, confidence building measures, reciprocity and mutual interest, transparency (Smith, Kartchner)
Multilateral goal: to ban particularly dangerous weapons and technologies, creating weapons free zones and buffers and establishing international norms and standards zenith = nuclear nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 - freeze number of nuclear weapons states and share peaceful technology, treaty compliance and verification of central importance, also Biological Weapons Convention (CWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Bilateral US and Soviet Union - nuclear weapons mutual interest: in all states interests to avoid the steep costs of war/security (arms races) Uncertainty reduction - agreement on "where we stand" in coming years Transparency efforts - Production numbers, arms identifications, use restrictions, trade (volume & types of goods) confidence building measure: (CBMs) ex: mutual notifications of arms tests, mutual observation, actions that increase stability without decreasing security tacit agreements: your actions inciting your adversary w/ unilateral measures first -unspoken rule explicit agreements: treaties and written agreements unilateral: one state tacit actions export controls, embargoes, interdiction (stopping exports from certain states w/ physical intervention)
Arms Control: Tacit/explicit, unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, confidence building measures, reciprocity and mutual interest, transparency (Smith, Kartchner)
Multilateral goal: to ban particularly dangerous weapons and technologies, creating weapons free zones and buffers and establishing international norms and standards zenith = nuclear nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, Biological Weapons Convention (CWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Bilateral - US and Soviet Union - nuclear weapons mutual interest: in all states interests to avoid the steep costs of war/security (arms races) Uncertainty reduction - agreement on "where we stand" in coming years Transparency efforts - Production numbers, arms identifications, use restrictions, trade (volume & types of goods) confidence building measure: (CBMs) ex: mutual notifications of arms tests, mutual observation, actions that increase stability without decreasing security tacit agreements: your actions inciting your adversary w/ unilateral measures first - unspoken rule explicit agreements: treaties and written agreements unilateral: one state tacit actions
Counterinsurgency warfare principles (Hammes, Gentile, Cohen)
Objective: win over support of population for government against insurgents - support governmental legitimacy - population protection Use military means that build support not destroy support among the population military and nonmilitary - Political objective is primary Intelligence leads operations Insurgents can't be killed (in large enough numbers), they must be isolated (ideologically and materially) Time - this is a slow process
Offense and defense for (a) military decision-makers and (b) system stability (Posen)
Offensive Doctrines: aim to disarm an adversary Defensive Doctrine: aim to deny an adversary the objective that he seeks Deterrent doctrines: aim to punish an aggressor - raise their costs without reference to reducing one's own When Defense is preferred When a state is happy with the status quo If state is easy to defend, they are more likely to engage in defensive doctrine military decision makers perception - how you perceive what others are doing around you is going to lead to your doctrine for your state - cycle → system stability war more inevitable when conquest is believed to be easy System Stability: even if only one side hold an offensive doctrine, preemption is encouraged for that side if all side hold offensive doctrines, and all know that the others do, then when war appears possible, all will begin contemplating a first strike and everyone knows that everyone else is thinking that too deterrence doctrines should limit the possibilities of misperception and overreaction offensive systems are less stable because security dilemma and first strike carries more weight
Private Military Security Companies (Feinstein, White)
PMSC activities are regulated by the Montreux Document combination of hard laws + soft laws not a legally binding instrument only applicable to PMSC in armed conflict Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies ('Draft Convention') 2010 Differences from Montreaux: not limited to situations of armed conflict - human rights premise - there are inherently governmental or state functions that should not be delegated or outsourced - reaffirm and strengthen state responsibility states monopoly on use of force cannot be absolute each state party is required to establish jurisdiction over the above offences when the offence is committed within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft registered under its laws, or when the offence is committed by its nationals, and also permits the assertion of jurisdiction when the victim is one of its nationals. - does include limited overview of national prosecutions Needs to be synthesis between international standard setting, supervision and accountability, and robust national systems of licensing and regulation States connected to the PMSC industry are more likely to stick with and entrench the Montreux process, and those opposed to PMSCs as a modern form of mercenarism are more likely to support the Draft Convention process. Ambiguous actor in battlefield - when, where, and to what degree should PMSCs use force? Advantages from the POV of the government: they serve a wide range of functions, lower overhead cost, the military used to be a full service unit which made their overhead too large now have new sources. Lets the military increase and decrease on demand as maintaining a large military all the time is super costly so create system where you hire temp workers. Disadvantages: corruption, many contracts, no control, where does the money go? Grey legal area
International Arms Trade (Feinstein)
Private dealers supply weapons, some governments oversee transactions e.g. French Arm Industry, armed Rwandan genocide, partially government owner involves more than just arms dealers - at every level - militia, governors, kings, US officials
Security Dilemma
Situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it efforts for security produce more insecurity zero sum view of security: another state gaining security takes away from my security so i will build up and it becomes a vicious cycle
Capabilities as signals and indexes (Robert Jervis), capabilities' relationship to intentions
States have 'images' of other states. Whether or not images are unified, whose images count (which decision makers)- this is not clarified. An assumed jump from personal perception on the part of individuals to perceptions of states is made. - In spiral model: state are assumed to seek security, not expansion Signals: are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors. ex. diplomatic notes, arms control proposals. can be viewed as promissory notes b/c they lack inherent credibility Indices: carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct b/c they are believe to be inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities and intentions. ex. intelligence reports, ratified arms control treaties, major adjustments in a state's political and military capabilities -> indices of intentions indices are believed to be beyond the ability of the state to manipulate, thus accurately predicting a state's likely future behavior. logic is indicated through human perception & psychology potential adversaries communicate through capabilities of weapons Figuring out what enemy can do. Measuring capabilities, reducing uncertainty
STUXNET (Zetter)
Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm believed to be a jointly built American-Israeli cyber weapon. sabotage Iran's nuclear program with what would seem like many accidents targets PLCs, which allow the automation of electromechanical processes such as those used to control machinery on factory assembly lines, amusement rides, or centrifuges for separating nuclear material. functions by targeting machines using the Microsoft Windows operating system and networks, then seeking out Siemens Step7 software. causing the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear themselves apart. Stuxnet reportedly ruined almost one-fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges
Clausewitz's description of war, real versus ideal (extreme) war, fog of war, friction in war
The ideal war - war must always tend toward the extremes and there is no reason to expect that they will step back or reduce Friction - doesn't actually work this way because there are all kinds of things that pull it back want to minimize our own friction and maximize friction of others War is a political instrument description of war -make opponent do what you want the to do through force Fog of war: the unknown and uncertainty that defines war
Two routes to an atomic bomb (Schiff)
Uranium Enrichment (Hiroshima) Mine natural uranium (99.7% U238, 0.3% U235) → Convert → Separate → Fabricate core → Manufacture weapon, Electro magnetic separation - particle acceleration system - the Calutron - messy, high energy requirements Irradiate Uranium, chemically separate into Plutonium by adding neutron (Nagasaki) - Mine natural uranium (U238 + neutron = Pu239) →Natural, low enriched, high enriched uranium → Irradiate in reactor → Chemically separate → Fabricate core → Manufacture weapon - compression- harder to make Methods for monitoring Enrichment of uranium - easier to monitor bc above ground, don't use calutrons anymore- first prototype, centrifuges are like calutron (magnets) but via spinning. So certain that they didn't test used for Hiroshima. Enrichment is very difficult plutonium- decays spontaneously so very volatile harder to make, more waste, harder to explode/ technology is compression - very unstable, hard to verify, can be used for other purposes. Technologically very challenging have to separate out all the stuff you don't want- "reprocess" fuel rods become radioactive. Implosion weapon
Keegan's description of war
War predates states so it couldn't possibly be extension of policy Violence and war part of human nature State and war systems explainable from cultural standpoint and manifests same irrationalities as primitive societies exhibited - tendency toward self destruction Forms of violence are culturally determined - in part, non-rational If war is rational continuation of politics, destroying yourself isn't rational, contrasts Clausewitz, Ex) Samurai (swords), Zulu (war end in itself), Easter Island (competition for food→ destruction)
Weapons (and platform) accuracy versus power (damage, "yield", collateral damage)
While weapons have become more accurate and destructive, the casualty ratio of war has decreased. yield - the more accurate it is the less powerful it is and has to be Theory that the more lethal the weapons, the less people are killed.
Asymmetric warfare, non-state actors
You can win every battle but lose the war (Vietnam) Hamas's framework terrorism & insurgency fit into 4th gen structure what is terrorism? attacking civilians to undermine capacity of civil control, undermine will & domestic strength of government Nation building can be solution to this, bring them into status quo if they think their neighbors are stable and there to stay more so than invading forces, they will be happier based on difference in resources and strategies
Gabriel and Metz: characteristics of "Modern War"
ability of technology of target acquisition to literally destroy any target that ventures upon the battlefield disruption of historical nexus between size of combatants and their lethality - now size is far less important than its ability to achieve citrate than the degree of killing technology that it can bring to the battlefield manner in which it is fought - speed, mobility, penetration, encirclement, envelopment and force annihilation linear tactics replaced by 'swirling tactics' combat reach extremely high → must engage in 3 types of battle - deep battle, direct battle and rear battle battlefield highly unstable - war not on fixed lines not offense and defense but all units expected to conduct a continuous offense operational level war in which the scope of command and control moves back from the line divisions to the corps and theater commands total integration of all combat resources
Shortcomings of COIN in application (Gentile)
agrees with principles but not with idea that it was completely new and Petraeus transformed the conflict Counterinsurgency doesn't work when there isn't enough time if not willing to commit long term to armed nation building, won't accomplish it - US has just said that they've won and left "hearts and minds counterinsurgency carried out by an occupying power in a foreign land doesn't work, unless it is a multigenerational effort." 128
Nuclear delivery systems: aircraft, missiles, submarine launched missiles
aircraft: Time to target - slow, Accuracy - medium, Recallability - yes, Vulnerability - yes bombers missiles (ICBMs): Time to target - fast, Accuracy - better, Recallability - no, Vulnerability - yes until launched submarines (SLBMs): Time to target - fast Accuracy - lower than missile, Recallability - no Vulnerability - no
Grand strategy, strategy, tactics
grand - long term, where we at 50 years, idea that states have long term objectives of where they want to be in the order of power and how they want to get there strategy - political objectives of military engagement, territorially defined objectives in conflict, link capabilities to objective- economic and military tactics - specific things to implement strategy, much smaller scale, how conflict is fought on the ground
Logic and objectives of arms control (Schelling and Halperin) What kinds of weapons motivate arms control responses?
increasing state security Interest in mutual survival reduce capability for destruction reduce likelihood of war. Cost Containment. Concerns about non state actors acquiring WMDs Confidence building Crisis management techniques: establish better communication in the event of crisis increase trust between adversaries Reducing Uncertainty reduce incentive to preempt (which makes suspicion of war a cause of war) -so need to increase trust decrease likelihood of accidental war - reduce urgency of quick action, What kinds of weapons motivate arms control responses? more controllable or more desirable to control long lasting effects if only a few states have them Indiscriminate or civilian targeted anyone can make them unpopular with major combatants
Is COIN doctrine new? Is it an ideology or a political strategy within the Pentagon? (Gentile)
it's nothing new - we were already doing it those claims are political in nature (that COIN is new - Petraeus saved the day, etc.) "modern counterinsurgency is age-old anti guerilla warfare in new clothes" 13 has moved beyond doctrine and has become gospel goes back to Western military attempts to counter COmmunist revolutionary movements in Third World countries after WWII
"Merchants of doom" theory of war (Feinstein)
money + politics = corruption & war -->War is motivated less by individual conceptions of what is rational, and more motivated by the rational compulsions of money. people who sell arms often prolong and initiate war because it is in their interest → war more likely
Drones and targeted killing (Singer, Solis)
pilotless aircraft that has some autonomous capability "Decapitation strikes" - target the leaders of societies you are fighting with - wiping out adversary's command system "Personality strikes" - Know who you are targeting "Signature strikes" - Things have intelligence signature - characteristics of something on the ground that makes it look suspicious New challenges Where is the target and what is the target with pinpoint accuracy more responsible for less collateral damage - responsibility? decapitation strikes make sense in hierarchical decision making structures, but in insurgency warfare (maybe ISIS) not clear what is the battlefield? what are legitimate targets? - Targeted killing intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot be reasonably apprehended, who is taking direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction of the state, in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict. Five characteristics/requirements of definition of targeted killing 1) an international or non-international armed conflict must be in progress 2) victim must be specific individual 3) targeted individual must be beyond reasonable possibility of arrest (human rights concern) 4) only a senior military official representing the targeting state may authorize a targeted killing 5) targeted individual must be directly participating in the hostilities
End User Agreements (Feinstein)
the selling country/agency as part of the export agreements some stipulation on how material should be used when you sell weapons you stipulate in what context they can be used
Cyberwar (Zetter)
use of internet or electronic connections as part of military activities 5th generation? ubiquitous conflict - battle front not well defined battles don't depend on blowing things up Connection to intelligence gathering sabotage what makes a cyber attack an act of war? civilians targeted, based on objectives (ex: undermine government's legitimacy), amount of damage Offense dominant system (increases likelihood of violence - tends toward instability) - attack happens first, secret defensive methods will probably increase preventive attacks way before threat - Could be interpreted as defensive? Cyber Arms Control - Dual use problem
F35B controversy
very high price - 1.5 billion for program dogged by cost increases and delays computer system vulnerability high false-alarm rates and false target tracks, and poor stability performance, fuel system problems helmet display issues maintenance more frequently than desired What will the future of warfare look like? What enemies will we actually fight in the next 50 years? Would the US, or for that matter any of its customers, ever actually go to war with a country remotely capable of matching its power? A lot of the performance concerns detailed above rest on an assumption that the F-35 will be dogfighting, wheeling through the skies in a dance with enemy craft. But that might never happen: the whole craft seems designed to kill things it's human pilot can't even see, in communication with its squadron and other military assets
Offense, defense, deterrence doctrines and their relationship to war onset (Van Evera)
war is more likely when conquest is easy or war is more likely when states think conquest is easy When offense dominate: empires are easier to conquer self defense is more difficult = states less secure greater insecurity drives states to resist others' expansion more feircly - larger threats to national security = expansion → violent responses First strike advantages are larger → increased dangers of preemptive war windows of opportunity and vulnerability are larger → danger of preventive war states more often adopt fait accompli diplomatic tactics → war states negotiate less readily and cooperatively states more secret about foreign and defense policy → miscalculation and diplomatic blunder arms racing faster and hard to control → preventive war and wars of false optimism Offense dominance is self feeding - as conquest grows easier, states adopt policies that make conquest still easier - magnifies effects 1-9 Types of diplomatic arrangements that strengthen defense Collective security systems - mutual aid against aggression by any system member defense alliances - mutual aid against outside aggressors balancing behavior by neutral states - join weaker of two competing coalitions offensive weapons: aircraft, machine guns, defensive weapons: trenches, land-mines,
Sources and importance of military doctrine (organizational, systemic) (Posen)
what means should be employed? How should they be employed? Military doctrine - subcomponent of grand strategy. preferred mode of a group of services. Reflects judgements of military leaders. connected capacity for defense and destruction to a greater objective. military doctrines affect state perceptions and reactions to one another "Bridge between thought and action," "military doctrine articulate war" - Offensive doctrines imply an offensive advantage (WWII) and entice arms races and wars, as norms of reciprocity regarding. military capabilities occur/security dilemma. They imply a belief that because attacking is more favorable, defense is weak and therefore first strikes/preemptive strikes are advantageous. - Defensive doctrines imply a belief that defense is stronger (WWI). If all countries adopted defensive policies, aggression would decrease because military capabilities being developed are solely for defensive purposes. Reciprocity occurs and conflict due to misperception of capabilities is less likely. - Deterrent doctrines are based on the belief that the nation's military capabilities are great enough to inflict enough damage, even after a first strike, so that attacking the nation is too costly to risk the counterattack. Ex. British nuclear arsenal. Capable of delivering massive casualties to soviet union with small arsenal in case of preemptive attack, therefore matching soviet's arsenal is unnecessary (the costs of attack are too great) balancing behavior - states want to maintain autonomy more about internal stuff
