Comps Review

"Nukes with Numbers" (Gartzke and Kroenig)

2 Important reasons for nuclear security: I. Changes in world affairs. II. Perceived interests in the importance of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction for foreign policy. --> deterrence theory: proliferation can promote stability and prevent the use of force. Nuclear weapons matter for deterrence and crisis outcomes. -- Nuclear states can impact the propensity for other nations to proliferate, upsetting the balance of power. Opponents point to hubris (excessive pride/confidence), accident or anger that heightens the risk of war; Nuclear weapons matter for deterrence and crisis outcomes. Nuclear actors in asymmetric dyads are more likely to prevail than states in symmetric nuclear dyads. Nuclear states can impact the propensity for other nations to proliferate upsetting the balance power. Nuclear nations are likely to vary in how they use nuclear arsenals for deterrence, conflict, or influence, depending on factors like satisfaction with the status quo, institutionalization and integration within the international community.

Hegemony

A dominant state or group of states. Or: The political, economic, or military predominance or control of one state over others.

"Securitization and Desecuritization" (Weaver)

A form of speech act made by the elites (government) of a country to establish what is an immediate threat to the state. There are 4 components to securitization: I. A securitizing actor/agent: an entity that makes the securitizing move/statement. II. An existential threat: an object (or ideal) that has been identified as potentially harmful. III. A referent object: an object (or idea) that is being threatened and needs to be protected. IV. An audience: the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and accept the issue as a security threat.

"Terrorist Decision Making" (McCormick)

A terrorist group's life cycle is shaped by its changing environmental constraints and by the degree to which it is able to continue to operate within those fluctuating constraints --Their strategic space defines the limits of the possible strategies -- Principal decision problem: identify its available room for maneuver, consider how to make it greater, and design and execute an operational plan that offers the highest expected return.

"Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" (Paris)

Any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could constitute a threat to one's human security. Economic, food, health, environmental, personal, security and political. Human security definition can provide a handy label for research category that deals with particular conditions that affect the survival of individuals groups and societies. (Some say that the definition for this makes the term ambiguous and meaningless - but is it really? there are new threats arising every single day.)

"The US and the Rise of China" (Art)

US and China reflect hegemonic war theory friction between relatively dominant power (US) and rising power (China.) Mutual second strike capability nuclear deterrent helps to stave off conflict by mitigating threats.

"Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building" (Ikenberry)

America needs a new Grand Strategy (Liberal Order Building; a milieu-based grand strategy) --It needs to restore its role as the recognized and legitimate leader of the system. --Rebuilding the institutions and partnerships upon which this leadership position is based. Strategy of Liberal Order Building --US leads the way in the creation and operation of a loose rule-based international order. Milieu-based type of grand strategy. --Where a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. --Objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from uncertain, diffuse, shifting threats. US is used to liberal order building. --After WW2, the US didn't just fight the Cold War, it also created a liberal international order with multilayered pacts and partnerships that served to open markets, bind democracies together and create trans-regional security community. US will not be able to depend on unipolar power or air-tight borders. --US will need authority and respect as a global leader (it has lost this in the recent years.) Globalization will make it necessary to develop a complex protective infrastructure that will support global efforts at intelligence, monitoring, inspections and enforcement. Pursuing milieu-based grand strategy, building international frameworks of cooperation to deal with multiple and evolving contingencies.

"The Origins of Alliances" (Walt)

American's alliances are at the heart of the maintenance of peace, and if it should be discovered that the pledge of America was worthless, the structure of peace would crumble and we would be well on our way to a terrible catastrophe. States ally against threats rather than against power alone. --> Level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived threats. Alliances are more a balance of threat than a balance of power. Since threats are being balanced, not power, the US has been able to sustain alliances comprising three times more people and GNP than those of the USSR.

Kenneth Waltz

An American Political Scientist. An original founder of neorealism, or structural realism. Later, he became associated with defensive neorealism.

John Joseph Mearsheimer

An American Political Scientist. Best known for developing the theory of offensive realism.

Multipolarity

An international system in which three or more great powers have the capability to threaten the security and sovereignty of one another.

Bipolarity

An international system where two powers dominate. An example would be during the Cold War -- The US, and the Soviet Union.

Unipolarity

An international system with a single power dominating.

Waltz's Argument

Argues on defensive realism. States need power to survive, and for security. Anarchy forces states to compete for power because power equals security. Considering states seek power and security, they view other states as potential threats. Therefore, states seek to arm themselves as a means of protection. In reaction, other states begin to strengthen themselves. (States aim to survive) In ultimate situations, when wars are threatening, states choose security over power. Waltz prefers a bipolar world.

"The Banality of Ethnic War" (Mueller)

Argument: Ethnic war is waged by small groups of combatants and is usually a neighbor against another neighbor. Because these small bands are responsible, policing the situation may not be hard through intervention. --Ethnic war doesn't really exist, but instead is just thuggery organized around ethnic lines. All-on-all ethnic war doesn't occur - instead ethnic violence is driven by bands of opportunistic/sadistic non-ideological thugs recruited and given free rein by political elites. Ethnicity serves as an ordering mechanism to set the sides. Ethnic conflict can emerge wherever elites provoke it. Nationalism and ethnicity are not causes or motivators of ethnic war, rather they are organizing principles in leader's struggles for power. Mechanisms of violence are remarkable banal - there was nothing inevitable about the violence. With different people in charge and different policing procedures, the violence could have been avoided.

"Tragedy of Great Power Politics" (Mearsheimer) (Realism)

Argument: Focuses on offensive realism. The world is anarchy-driven, and states are looking for opportunities to gain power at the expense of other states. The ultimate goal is hegemony. Great powers look to shift the international system in their favor. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, the world is condemned to great-power competition. Three core Realist tenants: I. States are principal actors, namely great powers II. Behavior of powers influenced by external factors (not internal factors) III. Calculations about power dominate states' thinking, and states compete for power among themselves.

"The Theory of Hegemonic War" (Gilpin)

Argument: Hegemonic war occurs in a relatively stable system. The power of the subordinate state grows disproportionately. (The uneven growth of power among states is the driving force of international relations) The struggle for dominance results in bipolarization and the system becomes zero-sum game (what one side gains, the other loses it completely.) Three Propositions (or core Hegemonic War Tenets) I. Hegemonic war is distinct; caused by broad change in political, economic and strategic affairs. II. Behavior of states determined by strategic interaction. II. Hegemonic War threatens and transforms the structure of the international system. Assumptions: Humans are driven by pride, interest and fear, not reason. Passion generates great conflicts.

"The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identifying Civil Wars" (Kalyvas)

Argument: There are 2 levels of civil war: local and supralocal (the elites.) Each level has its own reasons for going into conflict. People can fight for their own personal reasons not for the intention of going to war. Civil war is based on two different levels of cleavages: I. Master (ethnic, religious, etc...) II. Local private ones Each level manipulates the other to serve its own ends. Civil wars, in practice, play out "on the ground" as settling local scores, while grafting onto political divisions of a war at the national level. i.e., at the local level people are taking sides in the national civil war, but the divisions and violence reflect local grudges and personal vendettas. Cleavages: different among local groups exploited by elites to foment conflict. Lessons for insurgency and recruitment of terrorists and fighters in any situation. Increasing economic opportunity through conflict; this leaves people no choice.

"Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo" (Tannenwald)

Argument: Traditionally, once a weapon is introduced it inevitably comes to be widely accepted as legitimate. Nuclear weapons have instead been defined as abhorrent and unacceptable weapons with a taboo on their use. This taboo has developed such that uses of nuclear weapons that were once considered acceptable by US are now unacceptable by decision makers. The way people talk about nukes has changed since 1945 including public opinion, diplomatic statements of governments/their leaders, and private moral concerns of decision makers.

"The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest" (Brooks)

Argument: the benefits of conquest have declined significantly in recent years. Conquest does not pay due to mobility of surplus, challenging of financing innovations, level of innovation post-conquest. Trade makes imperialism unnecessary Actors place a high priority on wealth and that trade is a better way to obtain it than conquest. Thus, states will increase their trade, leading to interdependence and prosperity, and decreasing tensions and war. Assumption: we all want wealth and well-being Significance: globalization, trade and free markets have changed conquest. It's cheaper to trade with a country than to kill them.

"Why Democratic Peace" (Russett)

By cooperating, all can gain even if it's not equal; winners are restrained from crushing the losers. I. Trans- & International institutions: states bound by common ties and share common institutions. II. Alliances Make Peace: allies can have common interests concerning security and enemies. III. Political Stability Makes Peace: states with stable/durable political systems lack incentives to externalize domestic discontent with other countries.

"The False Promise of International Institutions" (Mearsheimer)

Central conclusion: institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-CW world Mearsheimer defines institutions as a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. -- Are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. --Rules are negotiated by states. Institutions are based on self-interested calculations of the great powers and have no independent effect on state behavior. Realists recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions; they believe that those roles reflect calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. --The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power or even increase it (institutions are arenas for acting out power relationships.) Example: NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was the balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the USSR threat.

"The Strategic Implications of Climate Change" (Dupont)

Climate change creates insecurities with food, water, energy, disease, natural disasters, and refugees. Food and water: with the reduction of food supplies some markets will increase the price. Water supplies are running out in various countries. --> · Rising sea levels will inundate and make unusable fertile coastal land, and potential changes in the strength and seasonality of ocean currents will cause fish species to migrate and disrupt breeding grounds. Changes in the variability and distribution of rainfall could also exacerbate fresh-water scarcity in water-deficient states. Energy: climate change forcing a reassessment of the utility of nuke power. Carbon dioxide continues to be projected into the atmosphere due to the increased use of energy. --> A warmer climate may reduce the efficiency of power production for many existing fossil fuel and nuclear power plants because these plants use water for cooling. The colder the water, the more efficient the generator. So, higher air and water temps could reduce the efficiency with which these plants convert fuel into electricity. --> · The submergence of small rocks and low-lying islands due to sea-level rise could have on the EEZ of maritime states and disputed seabed resources, including oil and gas. In Asia, rising oceans could make more difficult the resolution of disputed sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands. Warming seas are making it possible to exploit previously inaccessible energy resources under polar ice caps, threatening a new gold rush, which claimant states jostling for the rights. Disease: temperature is a key factor of disease spreading. The spread of disease is the greatest risk for populations. Natural disasters: will increase due to climate change; this should be considered a security problem. Displaced refugees: climate change, spread of diseases, shortages of food and water supplies can cause displacement of people and mass migration. --> Can destabilize states internally, aggravate trans-border conflicts, and create political tensions between sending/receiving states.

"Anarchy is What States Make of It" (Wendt)

Constructivism is the theory of how norms are created, not why they matter. Anarchy is what states make when they interact, democratic states treat non-democratic states differently. Suggests that states can remake the implications of anarchy identity -> interests -> behavior. International politics is socially constructed. The theory of how norms are created between actors, repeated interactions, and preference formation. Significance: the US would not care if the UK has a nuclear weapon, but it would if the DPRK does.

"Democratization and War" (Mansfield and Snyder)

Dealing with Democratic Peace Theory Here, mature democracies don't fight, but states that are transitioning to democracies are highly unstable due to the competing factions without institutional restraint. Promoting democracy may not promote peace. Why does this matter? Because transitioning countries are very unstable. Rising nationalism goes hand-in-hand with rising democracy.

"Structural Realism" (Mearsheimer)

Dealing with the 5 assumptions of power: I. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and operate in an anarchic system. II. Must have military capabilities and power to inflict harm on another state. Important to also have economic capabilities. III. States can never be certain about other states' intentions. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers, and they are especially difficult to discern. IV. The main objective of states is survival and to remain with their territorial integrity V. States are rational actors that are able to come up with sound strategies to maximize their prospects of survival Dealing with a self-help system (states) (Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified)

"Defense of the West" (Sloan)

Dealing with the transnational bargain" also known as NATO. About unsentimental calculations of self-interest and shared ideas about man, government and society. "Nations have no permanent allies/friends, just permanent interests." What was the original bargain? I. US should support Europe's economic recovery and coordinate efforts to assist effectively. II. US would continue on defense if Europeans organized themselves to help defend against Soviet threat. NATO has shown to adapt throughout the years in the international system.

"Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb" (Sagan)

Dealing with threat perception: Nuclear weapons programs are a solution looking for a problem; nuclear programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to international security problems. Contradictory Policy Implications --> There are various reasons for nuclear weapons and states acquiring them, that no single policy can eliminate all proliferations problems. I. Security Model: --> Nuclear proliferation from states' internal balancing nukes for external (dealing with the nuke umbrella) --> US and positive security guarantees strengthen the NPT. II. Domestic Politics Model: --> Proliferation when coalitions of nuclear programs, military units, and politicians wield direct or informational power. --> Restraint = major internal political changes. --> US influence more limited but could support anti-nuke coalitions NPT effects by entrenching domestic negotiators - there will be compliance with Article VI of the NPT. III. Norms Model: proliferation is not done on cold calculations about the national security or their parochial bureaucratic interest, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate. --> US could promote non-proliferation norms but these conflict with alternate sources of modernity (UNSC members on non-nuke conditionality; sticky norms.) --> Dealing with extended deterrence: US provides security for the security of its allies by threatening a nuclear response in the event of an enemy attack. Proliferation focused on deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate.

"The Four Functions of Force" (Art)

Defense: ward off attack and minimize damage if attacked. Deterrence: prevent an adversary from doing something one doesn't want through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences (the threat intended to keep an adversary from starting something.) --Involves setting the stage and them waiting. Compellence: stop an action already undertaken or do something not yet undertaken. Difficult to achieve due to prestige at risk (don't want to look weak in front of the enemy) (the threat to an adversary to DO something.) -->Involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. -->Involves timing. Swaggering: displaying military might and building prestigious weapons (best example: Trump wanting his military parade)

"The Fact of Democratic Peace" (Russett)

Democratic Peace Theory Democracies don't fight each other because there are institutions that constrain such actions. Feeling of common liberal and democratic values (this helps moderate conflict) Institutions have shared ideologies that build trust. Democracies are more likely to fight autocracies Significance: Democracies have other means of resolving conflict, they do not believe they should fight each other. U.S. and France aren't going to fight each other because we believe it.

"The Nukes We Need" (Lieber and Press)

Deterrence may now be more difficult. High-yield nukes alone are not credible deterrents against limited strikes. -- Credible deterrence: give US leaders a range of retaliatory measures including nukes, conventional counterforce weapons, and low yield warheads --> Arsenal developed by US should be based on deterrence. Many countries have acquired or are pursuing nuclear weapons. Arsenal developed by the US should be based on deterrence.

"The 'R2P' and the Structural Problems of Preventative Humanitarian Intervention" (Paris)

Every state has the responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and responsibility may fall on the international community if the state fails. Multinational military operation in Libya in 2011: first coercive intervention to be justified under 'R2P' --> Libya demonstrated that the R2P was a galvanizing norm in international affairs. There is the issue with altruism (the belief/practice of disinterested and selfless concern for the well being.) --> Issue with how to preserve credibility and legitimacy as altruistic missions if they also reflect self-interest from those intervening Structural problems of the R2P. --> failure in addressing the question of what methods to use. --> overlooks the question of how coercive force may be used to overt mass atrocities (blurred by geostrategic interests and self-interested power pursuits.) The more it is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it is to be discredited. The 3 PILLARS of the R2P I. Responsibility of every state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and from their incitement. --> Adopt human rights monitoring mechanisms. II. Encompasses different forms of international assistance - Technical, financial, and military - to help countries meet these obligations. --> May include international diplomatic efforts to avert a looming crisis. III. Involves coercive measures by outsiders ranging from economic sanctions to direct military action. --> This pillar looms over the others. --> Armed intervention is a last-resort emergency option to prevent mass atrocities if non-military strategies fail. --> Many are still not certain on how to deal with mass atrocity response. R2P still poorly misunderstood; inconsistency with the 3rd pillar; most times military assistance will go unmet. Paradox: no intervention in the face of atrocities, then R2P is criticized as useless and phony. Constructivism: R2P can do something for the people. For example: Rohingya, US intervened in Iraq; Holocaust

Hans Morgenthau

Father of classical realism; wrote Politics Among Nations

"Combined Arms Warfare in the 20th Century" (House)

Forceful explanations for the continual evolution of warfare. Attempts to increase strategic perspective connecting tactical operations and capabilities. Armies must remain equipped and trained to conduct the type of integrated, mobile mechanized warfare that has occurred since 1939.

"The Future of the Liberal World Order" (Ikenberry)

US is losing its position of dominance in the international system as non-Western states rise quickly. -- Rising states seek better placement in the liberal international order; not supplant it. --They benefit from the economic opportunities of trade, investment and innovation that it offers.

Unstable System

System in which economic, technological, and other changes erode the international hierarchy and undermine the hegemonic state.

"The Masks of War" (Builder)

Understanding US Army/Navy/Air Force personalities explains history and much of coming future in US military/national security --> Each branch has its own personality and view on how to approach US security situations; US military pursues its own interest rather than the nation's but insists that reform can only come from within. US military strategies and planning are largely shaped by service branch personalities.

Anarchy

In international relations, its the idea that the world lacks ant supreme authority of sovereign. Or: The absence of a higher authority to adjudicate international disputes.

Polarity

In international relations, its the ways in which power is distributed within the international system.

"The Utility of Force" (Smith)

Military officers and policy makers are stuck on a paradigm of industrial/conventional war where you can win by force alone. -- Reality of war has shifted - success in conflict depends upon the will/intentions of people. --WAR IS POLITICAL. Force has 4 functions: I. Ameliorate: to make (something bad) better/improve. II. Containment: preventing the expansion of a hostile country or influence. III. Deter (discourage from doing something by instilling doubt or fear of the consequences) and Coerce (persuade someone to do something by using force/threats.) IV. Destroy: put an end to the existence of something by damaging or attacking it.

"Transformative Choices: Leaders and Origins of Intervention Strategy" (Saunders)

Leaders choose what intervention strategy to deploy (transformative or non-transformative) or whether to intervene based on their personal beliefs about the threat at hand affecting domestic institutions. Transformative strategy (dealing with peace-enforcement) - Aims to interfere in or actively determine a state's domestic institutions. Non-transformative Strategy (dealing with peacekeeping) - Aims to resolve conflict or crisis without intention to alter domestic institutions. There is a difference between 'peace keeping' and 'peace enforcement.' Example: George HW Bush limited the US intervention in Somalia to humanitarian aid, whereas Bill Clinton at least initially allowed the mission to expand to address underlying internal problems.

"The Delusion of Impartial Intervention" (Betts)

Limited impartial intervention is impossible. Guidelines for intervention: I. Recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules. II. Avoid half-measures. III. Don't confuse peace with justice. IV. Don't confuse balance with peace or justice. V. Make humanitarian interventional military rational. Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation. Argues that in order to take control or to intervene abroad, the US and the UN more than often do more harm than good b/c of the fundamental ideology that you can't intervene in certain wars impartially and expect to end the war. Examples: Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia --> US involvement only prolonged fighting and suffering in the end. However, had they taken the side of the predicted victor, fighting would have ended sooner.

"On War" (Clausewitz)

Looking at the remarkable trinity: passion, reason, chance. War is used to carry out politics. War is not decided upon by soldiers, there is a disconnect; leaders fight strategically and soldiers experience war emotionally --> Friction between actors and decision-makers. Claims that defense is always stronger than offense; the problem is the theory does not hold with the invention on nuclear weapons. War must never be seen as having any purpose in itself, but an instrument of policy and politics (Politik.) The essential unpredictability of war. Fog of war: uncertainty experienced by participants in military operations; uncertain of adversary intent. Center of gravity: source of strength, power, will to act. Only start war if there's an intended objective.

"Let Us Now Praise Great Men" (Byman & Pollack)

Looks at Waltz's first image that the behavior of nations stem from individuals (based on Man, State and War.) The behavior of nations stem from individuals; IR results from individual decisions; individuals shape state strategies and behaviors toward opposing states. Individuals set primary and secondary intentions of a state. Individuals shape state strategies and behaviors toward opposing states. States that are led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to engage in war. States led by delusional leaders are more likely to start wars and prolong them unnecessarily. Leaders with a grand vision are more likely to destabilize the system. States with predictable leaders have stronger and enduring alliances. The more power a leader has the greater influence of the leader's personality and preferences. Example: Hitler pushed the Nazi agenda further than anyone could have; there was the usage of salami tactics; he was charismatic and rallied the German people. Hitler's ambitions far exceeded those he was leading. Hitler's grand vision destabilized the system.

"American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force" (Art)

Military force is a pliable tool of statecraft that cannot be divorced from foreign policy. Force is fungible (replaceable) I. Used for a wide variety of tasks and across different policy domains. II. Can be employed for both military and non-military purposes.

"Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful" (Monteiro)

No matter which grand strategy is used (offensive, defensive or disengagement) a unipole follows, it won't be peaceful because there are different types of conflicts. Bipolarity can cause conflict due to increased tensions between both great powers. Dealing with offensive dominance: likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. An emerging unipole is likely to implement a (defensive or offensive) dominance strategy. ---> temptation to re-engineer the system may lead to the unipole to opt for a strategy of offensive dominance. Unipole can seek offensive, defensive or disengagement strategies. --> Offensive unipole wants to revise the status quo in its favor by acquiring more territory by changing the alignment of other states or by altering the distribution of power in its own benefit. --> Defensive unipole seeks to preserve the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of other states; takes away alliances with other great powers. --> Disengagement requires the unipole to avoid interfering with the balance of power in regions other than its own; a great power vacuum is created by a disengaged unipole; disengagement will yield peace for the uipole only if the following requirements are fulfilled: I. Unipole is disengaged from all regions beyond its own. II. it must disengage completely from these regions (US has not done any of this since the end of the CW.) Requires a lot of restraint to not set off balancing.

"Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" (Finnemore)

Norms provide the strongest explanation for humanitarian intervention. Norms shape interests and interests shape actions. Example: US in Somalia - US intervened in Somalia based on humanitarian norms. Liberalism does not apply here: there is no democratization and no state-building.

"Just and Unjust Wars" (Walzer)

One cannot disconnect ethics from war or conflict, if you deny the role of moral values then you are denying your rules as a society. JUS AD BELLUM (causes of war) --War is a just cause, initiating aggression is illegal, defense is justifiable. --Right intentions: cannot have alternative reasons and selfish interests, prevent further destruction. -- Last resort: all other means have been tried. -- Declared by proper authority. -- Chance of success. -- End proportional to means. JUS IN BELLO (how wars are conducted) -- Discrimination: the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; no punishment for those non-combatants. -- Proportionality: no punishment in excess of the original offense; weapons and tactics used should not be egregious (terrible, abhorrent) and should minimize human suffering. -- Military necessity: must limit military action to only what is required -- Fair treatment: treat prisoners of war fairly. -- No evil means: do not use weapons or methods that are considered evil. JUS POST BELLO

Stable System

One in which changes can take place if they do not threaten the interests of the dominant states.

"Trump Has Officially Ruined Climate Change Diplomacy for Everyone" (Curtin)

Paris Agreement (2016) does not work without the U.S. being a part of it --> The Paris Agreement: an agreement within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impact of climate change. U.S. has halted the rest of the world's efforts. Decision to withdraw has created political and moral cover for further defections from the agreement. A worldwide break to the Paris Agreement - withdrawal fits a Republican ideology that dates back to President Ronald Reagan.

"Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar Order" (Ikenberry)

Persistence of stable cooperative relations amongst advanced industrial democracies is surprising. US engages in strategic restraint to build and maintain political order. - By creating this stable system, states lock-in power by establishing institutions (stickiness of institutions.) - Leading state deals with power management. When the powers commits to the system, it becomes transparent, and establishes strategic restraints - states buy into the institutions. This is also one way to reduce uncertainty and the security dilemma (easier to cooperate in this type of world.) "Constitutional Settlement" conserves hegemonic power. American hegemony is reluctant, transparent, highly institutionalized. The U.S. gains more by creating institutions; it is a strategic way to remain powerful in the long term and prevents others from allying together and ganging up on the U.S. World Bank, Bretton Woods, IMF, NATO (US-Japan alliance post-WWII.)

"Russia's Hybrid Warfare: Waging War Below the Radar of the Traditional Collective Defense" (Reisinger and Golts)

Russia's hybrid warfare has been an effective and sometimes surprising mix of military and non-military, conventional and irregular components and can include a wide variety of instruments: cyber and informational operations. With Ukraine, Russia used "soft power" such as propaganda and technical assistance. Where military capabilities are not sufficient, the Kremlin is ready to bridge the gap with all non-military means available, hand tailored to the vulnerabilities of the target. Ukraine crisis: NATO realized that there is no military option for Ukraine/Crimea. War was undeclared (Ukraine); Russia's actions were deliberately placed beneath the radar. Russian hybrid model outflanked NATOs reaction patterns. Russia's hybrid war cannot be answered by a military alliance alone.

"Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" (Marinov)

Sanctions can work and do destabilize the leaders they target --> must create political pressures, not economic pressures.

"Sanctions Sometimes Smart" (Drezner)

Smart/targeted sanctions: the precision-guided munitions of economic statecraft. --> Designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public. --> Supporters will eventually pressure the targeted government into making concessions. Smart sanctions accepted as an example of "best practices" in both the UN and the US. Useful focal point for policy coordination among the great powers, medium powers and global civil society. Financial sanctions (aid cut-offs, asset freezes, and monetary procedures) more likely to pressure key supporters of the target regime than broad-based trade sanctions. --> comprehensive sanctions created the opportunity for target governments to allocate rent-seeking opportunities to those supporters. Smart sanctions were an idea that created a useful focal point of agreement among key stakeholders in the international system. For recalcitrant members of the UNSC, smart sanctions offered the opportunity to cooperate with the hegemonic actor in the international system. A way to combat financial abuse was the Treasury Department establishing an advisory warning against foreign bankers doing business with terrorist entities. This way the bankers/banks would fear losing access to the American banking services. Smart sanctions are less promising in coercing the target government into making concessions. Solve political problems for sender countries; billed as minimizing humanitarian and human rights concerns. Can be imposed indefinitely with minimal cost. Targeted sanctions: -- More humane -- Less effective in coercing concessions than comprehensive sanctions. (Targeted sanctions: impose embargoes on specific items or restrictions on a person/specific group of people.) (Comprehensive sanctions: full embargoes against the target of sanctions; involve a ban on trade, diplomatic relations and other relationships between target and the sender.)

"The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory" (Hopf)

State behavior comes as a result of identity and perception. States will ally against threats, not power. Identities provide some predictability and order. If states have a reasonably accurate view of the other states, the system is stable. What constitutes a threat is offered by constructivists through an account of the identity of other states.

Classical Realism

States are led by humans who have a "will to power" hardwired in them at birth. (Fundamental lust for power.) This lust for power is the driving force behind every state in the international system.

"The Strategies of Terrorism" (Kydd and Walter)

Terrorists act on costly signaling because they are too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms. But can be strong enough to persuade audience. I. Attrition: terrorists seek to persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK. II. Intimidation: terrorists try to convince the population that the government is too weak to stop them, so that the people behave as the terrorist wish. -- Mostly used when a terrorist organization wants to overthrow a government in power or gain social control over a given population. III. Provocation: an attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorist. -- Mostly seen when wanting a regime change; shifts citizens support away from the incumbent regime. IV. Spoiling: ensure that any type of peace overtures between moderate leaders of the terrorists' side and target government don't succeed. -- When two enemies are improving relations/peace agreements, this threatens the terrorists more far-reaching goals -- Playing on mistrust between the two groups and succeeds when one or both parties fail to sign or implement a settlement. -- Seen with territorial change. V. Outbidding: terrorists use this to convince the public that the terrorists have a greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore, are worthy of support. -- Arises when 2+ domestic parties are competing for leadership of their side, and the general population is uncertain about which of the groups best represents their interests (if population had all the info of the competing sides, there wouldn't be any outbidding.)

"Diminishing Returns? The Future of Economic Coercion" (Feaver and Lorber)

The US dollar is the currency of choice; need for access of the dollar provides the key basis for many US financial sanctions ----> the US can threaten access to US financial markets. Success can be diminishing. I. Target states could withdraw from US markets to escape US reach. II. Potential adversaries are seeing how powerful economic statecraft can be (when combined with other coercive measures) and may seek to apply sanctions of their own to the detriment of US interests. Policymakers should think through what the next wave of sanctions will look like and how the US can leverage its key resources and those of its partners. Future of economic coercion --> Likely to resemble military coercion: advantages in offense beget (bring about) innovations in defense that spur new efforts in offense.

"The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention" (Kuperman)

The emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P) raises expectations of diplomatic and military intervention, thereby unintentionally fostering rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help, but it is usually too late or inadequate to avert state retaliation. Thus, the emerging norm, while well intentioned, actually creates a dangerous moral hazard. --> It encourages excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot protect the backlash.

"Exporting the Bomb" (Kroenig)

The global spread of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances may improve the strategic environment of relatively weak states. Nuclear weapons can deter states from using large-scale conventional military force to pursue their interests. Nuclear-armed allies may enjoy a greater degree of security independence --> Reduce strategic advantages that relatively powerful states can gain. Although some nuclear-capable states repeatedly provide sensitive nuclear assistance, many others refrain from providing sensitive nuclear assistance altogether. --> Looking at where nuclear-armed states place their silos. nuclear-armed states want to make sure that their secret silo locations are not ratted on. Nuclear deterrence theorists argue that state will be reluctant to use military force against nuclear armed states for fear of nuclear retaliation. Nuclear armed allies may enjoy a greater degree of security independence, reducing the strategic advantages that relatively powerful states can gain by offering military protection. DPRK and why they get away with it --> Rules are not binding; violations are not meaningfully punished; words are mostly words; China does little. --> Views nukes as a way/shortcut to be taken seriously. --> DPRK challenges China because the reluctance to move against NK nuclear ambitions, concerns of refugee flood over borders (not an impossible problem to fix - China can handle it.)

"The Meaning of Security Today" in Seeking Security in an Insecure World (Caldwell and Williams Jr.)

The meaning of security has changed and what we used to know as 'security' is outdated. No longer is war the only security threat states face. Today's threat agenda includes: --> Threats posed by environmental degradation. --> Spread of infectious diseases. --> Failed states and their consequences. --> Global warming. --> Oil shortages. --> Cyberspace. Quest for security has become much more complicated. No such thing as absolute security; security is a condition or state of being free from the threat or harm. Security can no longer be defined exclusively in terms of the ability of a state to defend its territory and its principal values against military threats.

"The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" (Posen)

The security dilemma occurs when one group (non-state) within a state gathers power for means of survival, but its actions are perceived by other groups or non-state actors as hostile, which convinces these other groups that they must also build up power. Security dilemma applied to internal conflict. Example: Serbia in the 1990s, Ukraine v USSR before collapse of the USSR

Security

The threat or use of force by state and/or Non-state actors for political or military reasons. -- Security studies is centered around conflict and conflict's far reaching effects. -- Security is linked to questions about policy; security is not studied in a vacuum. --Security is commonly thought to be state centric; However, security is not just on the individual level.

"The Age of Nonpolarity" (Haass)

The world is in nonpolarity with numerous actors exercising various kinds of power. Power and influence less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. The rise of new powers can't be stopped. Looking at globalization: dilutes the influence of major powers and strengthens nonstate actors. Not multipolarity because states have lost their monopoly on power; non-state actors, NGOs and companies are players too.

"The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation" (Lavoy)

There are 3 schools of thought on the idea of nuclear proliferation. They each differ on the beliefs of how to go about managing nuclear proliferation. I. Deterrence Optimist (Waltz) Nuclear deterrence will make wars less likely because nuclear deterrence will hold regardless of the context. --> The possibility that nukes are introduced, states will be more cautious. II. Proliferation Pessimism: nuclear proliferation will create a dangerous world. - There are 3 types of pessimists a. Abolitionist (Tannenwald; looking more at norms fo proliferation) --> Strictest of the pessimists --> Nuclear states should get rid of them; stockpiles should be destroyed or put into the IAEA. b. Absolute Pessimist --> Fine with existing nuclear powers keeping their nuclear arsenal, but are concerned with other states becoming nuclear powers (are not in favor of Iran or the DPRK.) c. Conditional Pessimism (Sagan) --> Don't necessarily believe that all proliferation is bad, but they are usually concerned about developing states becoming nuclear. --> Developing states should not have them; there is a fear that they'll not able to fulfill the operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence. --> Presumes new nuclear states will not have significant civilian control to ensure that the country's military organizations are competent in their role as deterrent force managers as they are in their capacity as war-fighters. 3. Political Relativism - Stress the presumed intentions of a state over the technical characteristics of its military weaponry as the primary determinant of its strategic behavior. --The character of the states matter the most: a state-level argument that focuses on state-intentions, ideology of a state, system of governance, and its strategic culture (these are the surest indicators of its likely conduct as a nuclear power.) -- Believe that new states should not possess nuclear arsenal and would not assist new nuclear states.

"Give War a Chance" (Luttwak)

War can resolve conflict and lead to peace. Ceasefires prevent war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerent reconstitute forces. Peacekeeping: futile because they refuse to fight, appease the stronger side, prevents emergence of coherent outcome. Refugee camps: they are bad and have terrible living conditions and discourage refugees from leaving. Providing aid to troop: not good; they prolong the war by putting off a decisive victory.

Hegemonic War

War for control of the entire world order; The rules of the international system as a whole. This type of war can occur when a challenger surpasses the reigning hegemon in material capabilities.

"Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria" (Gleick)

Water and climate conditions are also relevant because of the role they have played in the deterioration of Syria's economic conditions. Long history of conflicts occur in many forms. I. Disputes over access of water II. Control of water systems. III. Targeting of water infrastructure and systems during conventional conflicts and terrorist actions. Pressures on Syrian water resources have been growing for nearly a quarter of a century. Syrian experiences a multiseason, multiyear period of extreme drought that contributed to agricultural failures, economic dislocations and population displacement. Drought, including agricultural failure, water shortages and water mismanagement --> have all played an important role in contributing to the deterioration of social structures and spurring violence. Economic deterioration led to very significant dislocation and migration of rural communities to the cities. Most of Syrian irrigated agriculture is in need of modernization, still relying on highly inefficient flood irrigation. Conditions further worsened by water management decisions, poor planing and policy errors. Key environmental factors include both direct and indirect consequences of water shortages, ineffective watershed management, and the impacts of climate vulnerability and change on regional hydrology. Watershed factors are likely to produce even greater risks of local and regional political instability, unless other mechanisms for reducing water insecurity can be identified and implemented.

"Climate Wars?: Assessing the Claim that Drought Breeds Conflict" (Theisen, Holtermann and Buhaug)

What makes wars start?: fights over water due to changing patterns of rain fall. Fights over food production, land use. Climate change can be seen as a "threat multiplier" for instability and conflict that will have repercussions for all. Droughts and crop failure breed hunger and conflict. Water scarcity: key characteristic of the world's poorest and most vulnerable societies. ---> Dependence on rain-fed agriculture for income and food supply. Environment induced migration will have the same security implications as transnational refugee flows due to an outbreak of armed conflict. Drought can't cause an armed conflict by itself, but it can trigger a latent conflict under certain condition. State-based discrimination puts a further strain on a group's resources and might have a detrimental impact on its ability to cope with a climate shock. Example: Africa --> Projected to be hit first and by a less hospitable climate, due to its dependence on rain-fed agriculture, high environmental vulnerability, and weak institutional coping capacity. --> Most African countries are highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture for state income, distribution, employment and food security.

"Arms and Influence" (Schelling)

With nuclear weapons, military power is more often threatened than actually exercised. --> Force diplomacy are not separate, but actually go together. --> The power to hurt is bargaining power in the diplomacy of violence: The diplomacy of violence: it is the art of coercion and intimidation. --> power to hurt is bargaining power and exploit it as diplomacy. Coercion vs brute force: strategies designed to get an adversary to act in a certain way without using brute fore vs. using brute force to change an adversary's behavior. Coercive diplomacy: form of compellence; strategy that demands a change in an adversary's behavior through the threat of force without actually using brute force. Nuclear deterrence rests on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on threat of military defeat. Focuses on the importance of both compellence and deterrence. --> Deterrence is the threat intended to keep an adversary from starting something; involves setting the stage and them waiting. ---> Deterrence tends to be indefinite in its timing; the waiting time, preferably is forever, that is the purpose. --> Compellence is the threat to an adversary to do something; the overt acts, the first step, is up to the side that makes the compellent threat. ---> compellence has to be definite: there has to be a deadline, otherwise, tomorrow never comes. too little time before collision and compliance becomes impossible; too much time and compliance becomes unnecessary. Art of commitment: states need to project intentions and communicate persuasively to make others behave, corner oneself to HAVE to commit. "Last Clear Chance": events leading up to an accident, there is one opportunity for one side to avoid collision. Whoever had the last chance and didn't take it is blamed for the collision. Manipulation of risk: evaluating not whether to go to war, but the levels of risk. Any situation that scares one side will scare both with the danger of war that neither wants. Significance: Military force can be used to hurt, protect value, destroy, cause suffering. Now, threat of military force can be enough to avoid total destruction.