Crim Pro

Caldandra Case

"Purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . the ruptured privacy cannot be restored. Instead the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment . . . the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."

Bond

( 2000) - More privacy against physical touch than site. · D puts luggage on bus, at checkpoint agent squeezes bag, feels brick, opens up and finds meth. Was the squeeze a search? o Applying Katz, court says YES: § Use of opaque bag showed subjective expectation of privacy. And, while you may expect bag to be handled/touched by others, not this kind of probing examination § Society prepared to recognize that one's suitcase will not be touched on outside in probing manner, even if it is in public place.

Terry Hypos

(1) Big burly cop with gun while you are waiting for car at car wash. He has hunch you are drug dealer, comes up and starts asking pointed questions. You subjectively feel intimidated - you provide him your ID, give him consent to search your person. · Stop? Argue NO - very similar to Bostick. Nothing he did would objectively make you think not free to leave/end encounter with him. Maybe you don't want to leave car wash, but not because of his actions - because you are waiting for car. (2) Cop approaches you, says "I want to talk" and puts his hand on your shoulder, with intent to keep you in place. · Seizure? MAYBE - depends on circumstances, and whether reasonable person would have thought they were free to leave (cop's subjective intent irrelevant) If you break away at that point, start to run, and toss cocaine you had on you: · That is an abandonment. EVEN IF the initial interaction was a seizure, once you break away, it isn't "continuing" - this is from Hodari D. And no fruit of poisonous tree issue because the causal connection is too attenuated. (3) Same Hypo as 2 - you stay in place, cop asks to search your handbag, you consent. · IF initial interaction is seizure, search is invalid - you cannot voluntarily give consent while you are unlawfully detained. (4) Officer points gun at you, says "stop in the name of law," but you run away · NOT a seizure - even if reasonable person would not feel free to leave, you did not submit to the authority. (5) Cops leave car, and it rolls away. Pins guy against wall. He feels restrained. · NOT a seizure - any use of physical force must be intentional. Brower. Torres v. Madrid Hypo (recent SCOTUS case) · Cop has probable cause to believe you committed grand larceny. Sees you on street, tells you to stop. You run, but he shoots you. You keep running, but toss away stolen goods. Cops eventually track you down. o When he shot you, was an illegal seizure (too much force). So the goods that got tossed were likely suppressible under a fruit of the poisonous tree.

Hypos for Open Field/Curtilage

(1) Cop at blue plus, public street. Uses naked eye tosee weed: NO SEARCH (argue open field, and even if curtilage, ok under Ciraolo) (2) Orange plus, cop sees with binoculars. SAME - even tho Not "naked" eye, generally available and expect people to Be able to see things with minor magnification. Kyllo (3) can only see with satellite in space? YES SEARCH—don't Expect people to have satellites. Kyllo (4) Helicopter at 500 ft - OK Riley (analogize to Ciraolo, public airspace) (5) Helicopter 200 ft - NOT OK (not sure why, but more of a trespass) (6) Helicopter in curtilage, at 400 ft - OK at this point Ciraolo. (7) Officer climbs fence, looks in BBQ. NOT ok - Jones physical intrusion into const. protected area to obtain info; Katz - you have reasonable expectation of privacy of curtilage

Acevado Hypos

(1) Cops have PC to believe guy carrying briefcase with drugs. Sees guy swap with Sally, who has no idea. - can cops arrest sally, and search briefcase incident? NO - because she has no SOM for arrest. (2) Could cops seize briefcase and search under Chadwick? YES seize, but no search (3) Seize, and hear ticking. YES can search as an exigent circumstance.

Johnson Case

(1948) (Pg. 114) · Confidential informant—drug user—tells cops opium being smoked at hotel. Goes in, smells it, tells cops who also smell: o At this point, pretty good argument there is PC to search hotel room for drug paraphernalia - Informant PLUS smell · Cops knock on door smell is coming from, D opens, and lets in (court says nonconsensual because was obtained involuntarily). Cops say "we are placing you under arrest" and then find drugs: o Not lawful arrest because search began once cops entered. From there, only had PC to arrest based on the fact that D was alone in the room. And search cannot be justified as search incident because arrest itself was unlawful (fruit of poisonous tree) Takeaway - even if you have PC that an item subject to seizure (evidence of crime) will be found, CANNOT search without first obtaining a search warrant (except under certain exceptions not applicable here): · WHY? - don't want cops making these decisions. And we don't want to allow evidence to just be invalidated on backend if PC was not right because (1) the initial privacy invasion is the interest at issue; and (2) magistrates may be influenced by hindsight

Terry v. Ohio

(1968) · Cop patrolling downtown. Sees two guys on corner and beings watching. They repeatedly reconnoiter store in pattern. Definitely suspicious activity. Third guy comes to talk and then walks away. Two guys repeat their pattern, then walk same direction third guy went. Cop follows, thinks that the three guys are casing the store to rob it. Cop catches up, approaches three guys, asks for ID and names. They mumble something, cop grabs Terry, spins him, pats down outer clothes, feels gun. Then takes the three into nearby store and does a full search of each ISSUE: At what point was there a search and a seizure? What level of cause was needed? · BOTTOM LINE - If Police have reasonable suspicion someone is engaged in criminal activity, they may be temporarily seized. o This is something less than a full seizure, but still implicates fourth amendment. A "stop" is when a cop "by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen" · If the police has reasonable suspicion that the person subject to temporary seizure is armed and dangerous, the cop may conduct a limited search ("frisk") o Scope is LESS THAN full search - may only search for weapons (guns, knives, clubs, other · Apply here - when cop approached the three guys and started asking questions, not a seizure. BUT once he grabbed Terry, was a seizure o Was ok because the conduct before, and subsequent response to cop's questions gave reasonable suspicion that they were planning a robbery · When he pat down Terry, was a "frisk" - OK because reasonable to believe someone in this circumstance who was casing joint for robbery would be armed. o Justification is officer/public protection - cop wants to investigate the potential crime of which he has reasonable suspicion, but danger if the suspect is armed. NOTE - This is NOT a sliding scale. It's either a full seizure, a Terry seizure, or not a seizure at all. Terry leaves open issue of when interaction w/ suspect is (a) not a stop/seizure at all; or (b) actually a full seizure

Chambers Case

(1970) · Gas station robbed by two men. Two teenagers saw a blue station wagon with 4 men speed out of parking lot, and had seen same car circling gas station earlier. Gas station attendant gives cops description of two men who robbed him · Cops pull over station wagon, see two guys who match description of robbers. Cops arrest all four men, take car back to station and search it, find additional evidence · BOTTOM LINE - Search ok under 4th amendment. o If you have PC to believe evidence subject to seizure is in a car on open highway, can search without warrant § (1) mobility of vehicle and chance that evidence will be lost forever is an exigency § (2) lower expectation of privacy in car than house § (3) Alternative is force officers to seize car, then get warrant, then search - this is just as invasive (maybe more) than just searching it o AND, if you would have PC to search while on highway, you can take back to station and search there (doesn't matter that it is day time, no danger . . .)

Robinson v. United States

(1973) · Cop sees Robinson driving - knew he was without license, so has PC to arrest · Searches Robinson, feels something in jacket pocket. Pulls out cigarette container, opens it up, and finds heroin capsules. · OK UNDER 4th AMENDMENT o Even though there was no possibility of finding evidence of crime (driving without license), the first Chimel justification still authorizes (officer safety) o AND, you do NOT NEED any subjective suspicion/cause to search for weapons - get to do it no matter what. · Takeaway - when you are doing a search incident, you can open any container in immediate reach./control because basically anything can be a weapon (small needle . . . )

United States v. Matlock

(1974) When can third party give consent to cops to search, and fruits of search be used against the D who was not the consent-giver? · NOTE - this doctrine is dependent on idea that 4th amendment consent is NOT a waiver - because 3P can not "waive" someone else's constitutional right. FACTS: · Cops have arrest warrant for Matlock. Go to his house and find him in yard - handcuff him. Then go to door, woman holding baby (Graff) opens. Ask if they can search for money and gun. Graff lets them in, and indicates that a particular bedroom is hers and Matlock's that they share. · Cops go in, find diaper bag in closet, search it and find money. BOTTOM LINE - cops COULD use consent from Graff to search the room and use fruits of search as evidence against Matlock. · If you receive consent from someone with "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected" you may search it, and use fruits against the 3P o Common Authority does NOT depend on property law. Instead, it depends on whether there is "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes so that it is reasonable to recognize that any co-inhabitants has the right to permit inspection in his own right, and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched" · So here, Graff had to have common authority over each area that was ultimately searched - room; closet; diaper bag. Because she (1) was in robe and carrying baby; and (2) told cops she was a joint occupier of the room, strong evidence to establish actual authority. Proper Scope? · Reasonable based on conversation. Cops told her they were looking for guns/money, and she didn't make any qualifying statements. So reasonable to look anywhere in bedroom that might hold gun/money.

Opperman v. South Dakota

(1976) · Car parked illegally on street. Cop writes one ticket at 3 AM. Still there at 10 AM, cop writes second ticket and then tows car to city impound lot · Then search car, including glove boxes, make list of all contents and take them to locker for safe keeping. Find weed in glove box, and D is charged with possession. BOTTOM LINE - no warrant nor probable cause was needed to conduct inventory search, and evidence was usable at trial. · No cause AT ALL is needed for an inventory search. This is NOT a criminal investigation, it is a routine administrative function. Cops have multiple interests in conducting inventory searches of cars: o (1) protect the property from vandals o (2) prevent false claims of stealing by car owners o (3) prevent any dangerous materials from getting into hands of public o (4) maybe car contains explosives · NOTE - some suggestions that inventory searches are not searches at all. But majority does not take that path. Instead, it is a search, but is not subject to the probable cause/warrant requirement. It is purely subject to reasonableness. o That reasonableness test is why a pretextual inventory search is not ok

Dunaway v. New York

(1979) - What is line between Stop and Seizure? · Cops have some info implicating D in murder, but less than probable cause. Go to his friend's house where they find him. They did not tell D he was under arrest, but drove him to station, put him in interrogation room, and questioned him. o This was a full seizure, NOT a Terry stop. And because less than PC, was invalid. · WHY was it full seizure? o Not on the spot; not brief; never informed he could leave; would have been physically restrained if he did try to leave.

Smith Case

(1979)—Third Party Doctrine · V gets robbed, describes robber and car she saw near scene. Cops see car and guy in it matching description, trace license plate to D. Use phone company to put "pen register" on D's phone line—tracks every number that D dials. See D dialed V multiple times, use to get warrant. o Phone company acting as government agent, so this counts as government action o Pen register cannot track contents of calls, only numbers being dialed o No trespass, because pen register gets installed at phone co. HQ · Court says NO SEARCH - society not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in what numbers you dial from your home phone: o Scope is limited to numbers only, NOT contents of call o Phone company always collects info like this (i.e. for billing purposes) · "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties" o NOTE—this may be in cross hairs due to digital age.

Mendenhall Case

(1980) · A Terry seizure occurs (as opposed to nothing, just regular police questioning) when "a reasonable person would have believed they were not free to leave given the totality of the circumstances" o Facts were that D gets approached in airport concourse, officers ask for ticket and ID, and asked her a few questions. Seven justices concluded this was a seizure. o Actual issue in case was that after this initial seizure, cops asked D permission to search her bag, which she granted. SO if initial interaction was (1) no seizure at all; or (2) seizure properly supported by reasonable suspicion, then search of bag = ok - valid consent.

Michigan v. Long

(1983) During a Terry stop in the context of a roadside encounter, IF a police officer has reasonable suspicion that the · Suspect is dangerous, and · May gain immediate control of weapons THEN the police officer may search · The passenger compartment of an automobile · Limited to areas in which a weapon may be hidden (including closed containers) FACTS: · Guy crashed into ditch, walks out of car. Cops notice he is drunk. Guy starts to walk back to car, and cops see a large hunting knife on floor. Immediately grab/stop him, frisk his person. One cop stays with D, the other searches car. · In little bag under arm rest, cop finds weed. They then arrest D. BREAKDOWN: · What justified original stop? o Reasonable suspicion that D was drunk/reckless driving after he crashed in ditch o Could they have arrested? § Probably had PC to arrest. IF THEY HAD arrested, then could have searched car under Gant as long as D was not restrained/was in reaching distance. · So stop was warranted. THEN, in order to "frisk" the car, cops had to have reasonable suspicion that D dangerous and might gain immediate control of weapons. o Could search the car. Will never have a handcuff/out of reach issue here, because you aren't handcuffing someone without probable cause. · What is scope of search in car? o Anywhere in passenger compartment you could find weapons. Includes containers · Why could they seize the weed? o Plain view doctrine - were there lawfully (based on search for weapons) so do not have to ignore it What is Difference Between Long search and a search incident to arrest? · With Long, you MUST HAVE reasonable suspicion there could be weapons in car. · With Gant, you do not need anything. Get to do it as long as unrestrained What if they had reasonable suspicion to believe evidence of drunk driving in car? · Would NOT MATTER - can't "frisk" car for it. That auto exception only applies on PROBABLE CAUSE

United States v. Sharpe

(1985) - Temporal Scope · DEA agent observes a car and a truck hauling tractor trailer driving on road known for narcotics trafficking. Sees truck is heavily weighed down, which makes him suspicious. Follows for 20 min, then decides to stop them. Gets local policeman to effectuate stop. · Once local cop shows up, the two cars start to evade, basically do a car chase. At this point undeniable there is reasonable suspicion of narcotics activity to effectuate stop. Cop goes to pull over car, but truck speeds away. Cop then chases after truck, DEA agent stays with car. · Meanwhile, cop pulled over truck and Savage. Checked license and reg, tells him that DEA agent is coming. DEA agent comes, asks to search, Savage says no, so agent steps on trailer and confirms weight, smells marijuana, arrests Savage. Later search of the truck turned up shit ton of weed · IN TOTAL, from the time Savage stopped to his arrest was 20 minutes BOTTOM LINE - This was a permissible Terry stop · As per Terry, the scop of the resulting stop from the reasonable suspicion must be tied to each other. Here, suspicion was drugs - o Was reasonable for first cop to just hold Savage until DEA agent, expert arrived o Time is a factor, but 20 minutes is not exorbitant § The stop must not be longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop o Fact that Savage himself is the one who caused the delay by his evasive maneuver pulls a lot of weight with court. o Not really any other way to make this shorter - was "diligently pursued" by the police the entire time. Additional Issues · Sharpe was stopped for 40 minutes. Why doesn't that matter? o His stop had zero causal connection to the weed. So even if it was unlawful, does not result in suppression. · Cop physically touched the trailer, and pressed his nose up to it to smell weed - was that a search? o Probably tough argument - could try and point to Jones

Ciraolo v California

(1986) (Pg. 25)—Public Vantage Point Doctrine · Ciraolo growing Marijuana in backyard, which is enclosed by 6 foot outer fence and 10 foot inner fence o Backyard is in the "curtilage"—area "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically" § Here, area was (1) immediately adjacent; (2) protected by fences - because of this "close nexus" it is in curtilage o Curtilage essentially given the same protection as home itself · Police use aircraft to fly over, observe plants, get warrant. Issue = whether Ciarolo had reasonable expectation of privacy: · Court says NO: Even within curtilage, no reasonable expectation of privacy as to: o (1) police observation o (2) from a public vantage point where officer has a right to be o (3) In a physically non-intrusive manner o (4) of what is visible to the naked eye

Arizona v. Hicks

(1987) · Bullet fired through floor of apartment. Cops go to apartment bullet came from, find a bunch of weapons and take them. While searching, cop sees stereo in otherwise "squalid" apartment, gets suspicious. Moves stuff around in order to see serial number, and then writes it down. o Writing down a serial number is not a "seizure" because it did not "meaningfully interfere with the possessory interest in the property. o BUT, moving the stuff around WAS A SEARCH · Bottom line - if officer had probable cause to believe turntable stolen, it would have been subject to seizure under plain view doctrine. Therefore, would have been reasonable to "search" it. BUT, officers only had reasonable suspicion, AND YOU CANNOT SEIZE AN ITEM WITH LESS THAN PROBABLE CAUSE. Incriminating nature must be "immediately apparent" means you must have probable cause that item is subject to seizure.

Maryland v. Garrison

(1987) (Pg. 157) Places to be Searched · Cops get warrant to search McWebb's apartment, which they believe takes up entire floor of building. Warrant describes third floor, and indicates only one apartment on it. · Cops go in, make a right upon entering third floor, and find drug contraband. Turns out this is Garrison's apartment, and there are TWO apartments on third floor. · Creates Two Questions: o (1) was the warrant valid at the time it was issued? § YES - when a warrant turns out to be wrong, you used a reasonableness test. Based on what cops knew at the time warrant was issued, what did they know/should have known, and was eventual warrant and description of place to be searched reasonable based on that? · Here, reasonable mistake to think only 1 apartment on third floor o (2) Was the warrant reasonably executed? § Cops must make a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place to be searched. § HERE, if officers knew or should have known apartment contained two floors, and became aware of error in warrant, search of wrong apartment becomes unreasonable. Depends when/if the overbreadth of warrant becomes apparent. · This was REASONABLY EXECUTED because objective facts available to officers at time gave nothing to suggest the error.

Horton v. California

(1990) · Coin collector robbed by two masked men with guns. Victim heard D's voice, investigation suggests Horton involved. Cops get warrant to search Horton's house. Warrant allows cops to search for "proceeds of the crime" including three rings, but doesn't mention weapons. · While conducting search, cops find multiple guns, as well as a pamphlet for the coin meeting that V had led ALL IN PLAIN VIEW. Evidence used at trial. · Question - was the seizure of that evidence reasonable under the fourth amendment? o Bottom line - YES - they were already lawfully in house, and scope of search did not expand past what the warrant authorized. Therefore, question is if seizure of evidence = ok. o Court says there is NOT an inadvertence requirement for PV seizure - even if cops subjectively know/are hoping to find items not particularly described in warrant, does not matter. § No additional privacy invasion/protection. Cops can only search in scope of warrant regardless. If something is out in PV, the privacy is invaded already. § If cops actually know something subject to seizure is in place to be searched, why wouldn't they just put it in warrant? This is not a real problem. · TEST: Item can be seized without a warrant IF: o (1) Cops are lawfully in the area, and there was no 4th amendment violation in getting to the point from which item could be viewed o (2) Item is in plain view, and its incriminating nature is immediately apparent § i.e. cops have PROBABLE CAUSE to believe item is subject to seizure o (3) Cops had a lawful right of access to the object (fn. 7)

Belton v. New York

1981 · Pre-Gant case, technically still good law. · Facts: Four guys in car. Car gets pulled over for speeding, solo cop smells weed. Takes all four guys out, cannot handcuff because only one pair, so each are separated. Cop then searches, and finds cocaine in zipped jacket pocket in jacket in back seat · Search was okay because: o Belton was recent occupant of car o Under Chimel, was searching area in D's immediate control incident to arrest § BUT, because we need brightline, takeaway is that you can search any containers, opened or closed, within passenger compartment of car

Alabama v. White

(1990) · Cops get an anonymous phone tip. Vanessa White will leave her apartment at a particular time, get into brown Plymouth station wagon with right tail light broken, go to Dobey's motel, and would have an ounce of cocaine in suitcase in car. · Cops go to the apartment, see her walk out with nothing in hands, get into car matching description. They follow her for four miles, and she was going the most direct route to Doby hotel. Stopped her one exit short, tell her they suspect her of carrying cocaine, ask to search car. She says sure. Cops see brown suitcase in car, and she gives them combo. It contains weed. They arrest her, take her to station, and find cocaine in her purse during inventory search at station. BOTTOM LINE - there WAS reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop. When dealing with anonymous tip, you use the Gates standard, but substitute reasonable suspicion for PC: · Based on the totality of the circumstances, is there sufficient indicia of reliability of the informant's tip based on (1) the veracity/reliability of the information; and (2) the basis of the informant's knowledge. VERACITY - Officers verified that woman in fact left building, got into particular vehicle, within somewhat specified time frame predicted by caller, was on the way to Dobeys/taking direct rout. Otherwise, nothing suggests one way or another -fact that caller was completely anonymous weighs against. KNOWLEDGE - PREDICTIVE nature suggests D had some intimate knowledge. Not just going off publicly available/visible info. And fact that some predictions came true show knowledge was real Note · - there was probably no probable cause here, because some of the predictions were wrong, no real veracity component. o Shows difference with Gates.

Florida v. Bostick

(1991) · Defendant is on bus traveling from Atlanta to Miami. Bus is stopped somewhere in Tallahassee. Two cops board bus pursuant to county's drug interdiction program - start asking everyone on bus for ticket, ID, and permission to search bag. One cop has visible gun in holster. · Cops inform D of his right to refuse consent, then tell D they are narcos officers and ask to search his bag. He agrees, they find drugs. · ISSUE - only a valid consent search if D was not seized at the time he gave consent (otherwise unlawful seizure because less than reasonable suspicion, and fruit of the poisonous tree - note, if detention is lawful, then consent valid - Watson). o BOTTOM LINE -per se rule that all encounters on bus are seizures not valid. Use totality of circumstances, and ask whether a reasonable person would have believed they were free to terminate the encounter with police. § He may not have felt free to leave bus - but that was because he was on a bus, not because anything cops did. So question is whether the D would have reasonably felt he could end his encounter with the police, not whether he felt free to physically relocate. o No seizure when cops ask questions, request ID, request to search luggage as long as the cops do not convey message that you must comply.

Minnesota v. Dickerson

(1993) - the "Plain Touch" Doctrine · During Terry stop, cop frisks for weapons. While frisking, feels what he thinks is cocaine. Then uses fingers to manipulate, squeeze . . . and goes in and finds bag of crack BOTTOM LINE: There is NOT a per se rule against searching for contraband while conducting a Terry frisk. BUT, that contraband MUST be immediately apparent from the frisk, in the proper parameters, so search here was violation · When you're frisking, only can look for weapons. So if, while conducting pat-down search that is only as intrusive as would be needed to feel a weapon, you feel an "object whose contour or mass makes its identity Immediately Apparent" you may then go into pocket, bag . . . and seize it without a warrant. o "Immediately apparent" is essentially probable cause · ISSUE HERE was that the squeezing, probing went beyond scope of Terry frisk - would not need to take that kind of action to find weapons. So because officer only could get P.C. that there was contraband by going beyond scope of frisk, was unlawful NOTE - the justification here is plain view doctrine. · So like in Hicks where you (1) only had reasonable suspicion record player was stolen; and (2) needed to physically manipulate—search—to get info you needed, here cop (1) only had reasonable suspicion (or less) the bag he felt was drugs; and (2) had to touch/physically manipulate in a way that exceded lawful scope. ALSO NOTE - when you are feeling for a weapon, you only need reasonable suspicion that you actually felt a weapon to go in pocket, jacket . . . and search it.

Florida v. JL

(2000) · Anonymous tip to police that "young black male standing at particular street corner wearing plaid shirt has a gun." Cops go at some point after (unclear on time), see three young black kids at the corner, no other reason to be suspicious. They stop and frisk them, find a gun. Bottom Line: NO REASONABLE SUSPICION. · Applying same Alabama v. White test and the Gates factors - o Veracity - nothing to really indicated veracity other than the stuff was true - fully anonymous caller o Knowledge - this is key difference - anyone could have seen the kid at corner and described his shirt - no intimation of inside knowledge, no predictive statements that ultimately come true. Zero discussion about the basis for knowing/thinking kid had gun.

Kyllo v. United States

(2001) (Pg. 42)—sense enhancing technology · D growing weed inside house, nothing visible from the outside. Cops use thermal imaging scanner to see a lot of heat emanating from home, and use this as part of warrant application. · Court says YES search— o (1) obtaining by sense-enhancing technology o (2) any information regarding the interior of a home o (3) that otherwise could not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area o (4) when the technology is not in the general public use.

Groh v. Ramirez

(2004) - Things to be Seized · Warrant itself said nothing about the items to be seized, but the affidavit supporting the warrant did have the proper info · Court says DOES NOT MATTER - even if described in application, still must be on warrant itself. You can't just incorporate y inference But How Particular is Particular Enough? · SCOTUS has not given a precise standard but has said "as particular as feasible given the nature and complexity of the case" (thanks) · Anderson v. Missouri - "evidence of a crime at this time unknown" was OK

Plain View Summary

A police officer can seize an item in plain view without warrant IF: · 1. The item can be plainly viewed from a lawful vantage point; o Lawful Vantage Point = the officer did not violate the 4th Amendment in arriving at the location from which the evidence could be plainly viewed · 2. Its incriminating nature is immediately apparent; AND o Immediately Apparent = probable cause to believe the item is subject to seizure · 3. The police officer has a lawful right of access to the item. o Lawful Right of Access = the officer can get to the item's location without violating the 4th Amendment

United States v. Jones

(2012) (Pg. 33) - return to physical intrusion analysis · After Jones, issue is muddier, and we have a sort of two-pronged. · Facts: Cops install GPS device on vehicle without warrant, track movements for 28 days. All 9 justices say YES search, but 5 fashion new test, while 4 rely on Katz—NEW TEST: Did Government Activity: o (1) physically intrude on o (2) a Constitutionally protected area o (3) for the purpose of obtaining information · Here, truck = private property, traditionally protected by 4th amendment. Scalia's point is that Katz didn't remove this private property/textual basis of 4A, just supplemented. Trespass PLUS attempt to find something/Info. o NOTE: Jones explicitly says that Open Fields doctrine still applies, because open fields not protected at common law. o AND, Jones implies that length of survailance matters - two hour GPS tracking was Ok (Knotts), while 28 days was not - still a reasonableness component to what kind of info D believes is out in the public. · IF you fail Jones test, still apply the Katz test.

Jardines v. Florida

(2013) - Building off Jones · Bring drug sniffing dog to porch of home, dog alerts. Cops use to get warrant. · Scalia applies Jones à while you might have an implied license to walk up to porch and knock on door, you do NOT have implied license to do so while searching for evidence/information o Physical intrusion? YES - based on doing activities without license. Social norms considered in 4th amendment analysis see also (case where guy says don't come in but wife says ok). o Constitutionally protected? YES - porch = curtilage o To gain info? YES - dog used to smell inside home.

Navarette v. California

(2014) · Someone calls 911, says "I'm driving, and this pickup truck ran me off road" - gave color, model, license plate, and specific area where this all occurred. · Cops follow truck for 5 minutes, see zero traffic violations or other justifications for stop. They pull truck over (ostensibly for drunk driving), smell marijuana, search truck and find 30 lbs. BOTTOM LINE - There was reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop. But very close call: · Veracity - caller anonymous, BUT she called 9-1-1, which gives ID usually. Also, there was a hearsay-like exception here. She called right as events happened, and described the "startling event" of being run off road - so reason to think more truthfulness. · Knowledge - she witnessed the ongoing crime first hand - reckless driving or potentially drunk driving. Real issue in case is framing this as an "ongoing crime" - to do that, Court had to say that her tip indicated that D might be drunk driving (lane positioning, reckless action, running car off road all indicative of drunk driving [I guess]), and therefore as D continued to drive, there was reasonable suspicion that he was still drunk driving presently · Fact that cops followed and he committed no traffic violation did not really change that - maybe drive more carefully once you see cop. And 5 minutes not enough to fully disprove that he was drunk Why not justify the stop as investigation of a past crime? · Footnote specifically left the issue open. Eventually, Hensley case (Pg. 484) allows Terry stop to investigate a past felony. Mis-demeanor is still unclear.

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez

(Pg. 505) · Cops have reasonable suspicion that woman crossing border into U.S. has narcotics in her stomach. Question her and hold her for 16 hours, and this was reasonable. BUT, very specific reasons: o Border is different than regular o Narcotics are special, airports are special o Her own efforts (refusing X-ray, holding in poop) is what caused delay

United States v Place

(Pg. 509) (1983) "Some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive that strong countervailing government interest will justify seizure based only on specific articulable facts that property contains contraband or evidence of crime" SO . . . due to the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at airports, IF a police officer has reasonable suspicion that · A traveler is carrying luggage that contains contraband or evidence of crime THEN the police officer may · Seize the luggage from the suspect's custody and · Detain it briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused suspicion, Provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope FACTS · Place at airport in Miami (city known for narcotics) flying to LGA. Agents question him right before he gets on plane, he consents to luggage search, but they decline to do it. Before he gets on plane, says "I knew you were cops" · Agents call DEA in NY, tell them about Place. Noticed his check luggage had different addresses, both did not exist, wrong telephone number. Place gets off plane in NY, claims checked bags. DEA agents ID themselves, say we suspect you of narcotics. Place tells them cops in Miami had already searched his bags (a lie) · Cops ID him, then ask for consent to search checked bags, he denies. They say "we are taking your bags to judge to get warrant, you can come with us"—he declines to go with them. Cops take his bags to JFK to get sniffed by drug sniffing dog. Dog alerts to one bag 90 minutes after the initial seizure of the luggage. o Used that info to get warrant. Search turns up 1200 grams of cocaine. BOTTOM LINE: Seizure of the luggage was unreasonable and violation of 4th amendment: · NOTE - if they had probable cause to believe suitcase in public contained evidence of crime, they could have seized it until they got warrant. BUT HERE, there is only reasonable suspicion. · No per se rules on timing - use totality of circumstance test to see if scope was proper · FACTORS: o Time - 90 minutes is super long, that alone is enough to say unreasonable o Reasonable alternatives - cops had entire time flight was in air to get drug dog from JFK to LGA. If they wanted to do this kind of momentary seizure, they should have been more prepared o Never told him how long they would take it, where it would go, where he could get it back · NOTE - O'Connor says you could theoretically momentarily seize suitcase on less than probable cause, but explicitly narrows holding to context of (1) Narcotics; and (2) in airport. o This is what Scalia alluded to in Hicks when discussing when you can seize property on less than PC - only when specific exigency like drugs/airport requires · NOTE - in Dicta, court says drug sniffing dog not a search. SCOTUS eventually holds that in Caballes - no legit privacy interest in narcotics, and dog only "searches" in for those - no other privacy invasion at issue (unlike thermal image in Kyllo which could tell you if someone is showering . . .)

California v. Acevedo

(SCOTUS 1991): · Federal agents seized package in Hawaii - know it contains weed - give it to cop in San Diego, who brings to post office and then sees who comes pick up. · Daza picks it up, brings back to apartment. Two guys go into Daza's. o St. George comes out with backpack, gets into car. Cops stop car, search backpack, and find 1.5 pounds of weed. Unclear what happened, BUT: § If they had arrested him while backpack on back or near him, was search ok? YES under Robinson. § If he had gone into restaurant, and put backpack on coat rack and then sat down 30 feet away: · Could cops arrest him, and then search incident? NO - because 30 ft too far for "immediate control" · Assume cops have PC to believe weed in backpack. Could they have just searched it? NO - based on Chadwick. Could have seized it, taken to station, gotten warrant, then searched, even if they did not arrest St. George. Chadwick did not depend on fact that D was arrested as well. o Acevado comes out with paper bag roughly size of weed brick. Puts it in trunk of car. Cops stop car, open trunk, search brown bag, find weed. o BOTTOM LINE - search was ok. If you have probable cause to search car, can search anywhere in car where there might be objects of the search, and can look in any container. § Overturn Sanders which had said opposite. NOTE - if you only have probable cause to believe a specific container put in a car is subject to seizure, you can only search car to find that container - once you do search is over. AND, if you know it's in particular area of car, can only search that area - so here, cops only could search the trunk because they saw Acevado put the bag in trunk.

Chadwick Case

(SCOTUS 77) · Two amtrack officials see footlocker - based on weight, and fact that it is leaking powder, suspicious that it contains weed. Alert DEA agents in train's destination. · Guy and girl claim footlocker at destination. Drug dog walks by and alerts - gives officers PC to believe drugs inside. o NOTE - drug dog sniff is NOT a search. Only "searching" for whether drugs in suitcase, which D cannot have legitimate interest in keeping private. Otherwise, sniff isn't invading any privacy interest (not like its an xray). · Then, put footlocker in trunk of car. Right then, officers arrest, take footlocker back to station, and search it hour and a half later at station WITHOUT warrant: · Bottom Line - violated 4th amendment: If you have: o (1) PC to believe item subject to seizure located in o (2) movable container o (3) in a public place o (4) It may be seized without a warrant o (5) BUT interior may not be searched without a warrant · Why didn't auto exception apply? Because it was in trunk of car: o Government didn't pursue it - wanted to get very broad ability to search luggage · Why didn't Chimel apply? o Brought back to station. At that point, neither justification is relevant. · Rationales? o More expectation of privacy in sealed/opaque container than in car. Although both can move, fact that cars are licensed, often undergo inspection, often can be taken into police custody. Don't expect your luggage to be searched periodically § NOTE - if get problem, can try and make argument that in post 9-11 world, less likely to think luggage won't be searched o Exigency is less needed here - cars are hard to store, and if you don't search immediately, chance it gets taken. Luggage was secured in police station, no threat it would disappear. · NOTE - leave open possibility that if officers have reason to believe luggage contains some explosive, can search before bringing to police station without warrant. Issue left open in Chadwick - what if they had tried to use vehicle exception? Doctrine moved back and forth, then gets settled in Acevado

Levels of Cause Picture

0% Reasonable Suspicion (31%) Probable Cause (46%) Preponderance (50/50) Clear and Convincing Beyond Reasonable Doubt 100%

Illinois v. Laffeyette

1983 · D arrested for disturbing peace in movie theater, taken to police station (ok under Atwater) · At booking room, cops remove handcuffs from D, ordered him to empty pockets, and then searched his man purse (lol). Found meth pills in cigarette carton. · BOTTOM LINE - search was ok. This was an inventory search. So don't even have to bother with Chimel/Robinson. Key Characteristics: o At station house o LAWFUL arrest (so based on probable cause, and no other issues), and prospectively holding/incarcerating D · Why don't you need a warrant once bag seized based on Chadwick? o Because this is not a probable cause search. Point of inventory search is NOT to gather evidence. It is ADMINISTRATIVE: § Same rationales as car - prevent false claims of theft; prevent cops from stealing. ALSO have a safety rationale. And identification rationale · Police methods do not need to be the least invasive - doesn't matter that they could theoretically lock your stuff in a sealed bag. Extension of Doctrine: · Under same rationale, you can do a strip search of a prisoner. Regardless of whether you have any reason to believe they are trying to smuggle something in. And regardless of level of offense they were charged for. Florence (Pg. 331) · AND, Maryland law collecting DNA swab from all prisoners of "serious offenses" was ok Maryland v. King. o Ok to use DNA as a means of identifying suspect in case like murder, rape . . .

Illinois v. Rodriguez

1990 · Wife calls cops, tells them her husband beat her - says I know he's at this other apartment, I have key, clothes and furniture there · Cops go with wife to arrest husband. She unlocks door with key. Cops see drugs on table, find husband, and arrest him. Find more drugs after. Charge him with possession of controlled substance. · Turns out wide had moved out a month earlier. She was not on lease, did not pay rent, moved out, had taken her clothes and things out, had no permission to invite others, and had stolen the key - did NOT HAVE actual authority BOTTOM LINE - Actual authority is not required. Instead, if considering all the circumstances, a reasonable police officer would conclude that a 3P giving consent did have actual authority to grant it, then search will be permissible.

Illinois v. Wardlow

2000 · Four car caravan going to "investigate" in are known for heavy narcotics trafficking, unknown whether cars marked as cop cars. Cops in back car notices Wardlow standing outside building, holding a white bag. Wardilaw looks cops way, then starts to flee "headlong." Cops chase, corner him in alley, Terry stop him, frisk for weapons. Feel hard object in the white bag, find gun. BOTTOM LINE - there WAS reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and using common sense judgment, did the police have a "minimal level of objective justification" for the stop - more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Less than probable cause, and "considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence" · Factors that court relied on: o Unprovoked, and headlong flight from the police § This was not just refusing to answer questions/ending an encounter, which would not be enough Florida v. Bostick. This was active fleeing · NOTE - if cops have no reasonable suspicion, approach suspect and not a stop at that point, ask Qs, suspect refuses to answer, that alone CAN NOT create reasonable suspicion - Florida v. Royer. o In a high-crime area § Standing ALONE, not enough. Brown v. Texas. But you can consider it in the totality of circumstances analysis. o Where officers anticipated finding/investigating drug customers and lookouts § Not sure how to weigh this one, but court mentions it o When you make argument, make sure to discuss that innocent activities taken by themselves can become suspicious when looked at together. · Also frisked Wardlow during stop. What was required, and what was scope? Reasonable suspicion he was presently armed and dangerous. Because the reasonable suspicion for the stop was based on drug activity, and in a high-crime area, pretty easy call - high correlation between drugs and weapons Scope of Terry frisk is anywhere that might contain the weapons that D has access to. So bag in hand clearly within it.

Atwater v. Lago Vista

2001 - Misdemeanor Arrests Without Warrant · Atwater driving with two kids in front seat, both have no seatbelt, are sticking heads out window to "look at toy". Texas state law says it is a 25-50 dollar fine, but explicitly provides that a cop can arrest anyone committing a seatbelt offense, or give citation instead · Cop pulls Atwater over for seatbelt, and then asks for license and reg, which she doesn't have. He then handcuffed her, took her to station, mug shot . . . · Bottom Line: You Can arrest someone if Cop has: o (1) Probable Cause to Believe o (2) Misdemeanor Committed NO MATTER HOW MINOR o (3) In the officers presence (KEY) o (4) While Defendant is in public o (5) Without a Warrant · Court's reasoning was that (1) Common Law was at the least unsettled on issue, if not conclusive that this was allowed; (2) IF history inconclusive, move to reasonableness balancing test: - Wyoming v. Hovlon o HERE, under balancing test, you should be able to arrest. Too difficult to put in discretionary standard, need bright line to let officers do jobs. If you try and make it so you can only arrest for jailable offenses (like Atwater argued) then issues like drug quantity, repeat offenses . . . become too difficult .

Bringham City v. Stuart

2006 · Officers can enter home to provide assistance to injured occupant or prevent an imminent injury, and doesn't matter if subjective intent was to investigate other stuff · Reasonableness of entry depends on objective weighing of how imminent assistance was needed - does not have to be "ironclad proof of a likely life-threatening injury."

Riley v. United States

2014 · Big question - under Robinson, can you search the contents of someone's cell phone that is seized incident to their arrest? o NO - need a warrant. EVEN IF there is reason to believe the phone contains evidence of crime arrested for · Facts - cops arrest Riley for driving without license - realize he had other outstanding warrants, and arrest him for that as well. Impound his car and find multiple guns. Then arrest Riley, search him, and find phone. · Search phone, find gang-related text messages, videos, pictures of him in front of car associated with an earlier murder · Court says CANNOT search without warrant - how do they get there? o Obviously no CL history, so go to Wyoming v, Houghton balancing test o Court distinguishes Robinson - neither of the justifications fit here. · BUT, you can "search" a phone for weapons (like look behind phone case) NOTE - this is example of how Roberts court starts to look at technology and privacy. Big factor for the balancing test was the idea of how much info a phone actually has, and how big of a privacy invasion revealing that info can be.

Warrant Requirement

4th Amendment - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Searches - generally need warrant Arrests - generally don't need a warrant KATZ: "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth amendment --- subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Bustamonte (1973) (Pg. 347) · Cops pull car over for broken tail light. Six people in car, Bustamonte is in front seat. Cops ask for IDs, drive has none; only one guy in car has, he shows cops, and say car belongs to his brother. Cops ask that guy to search, and he consents. · During search, cops find stolen checks under a rear seat. Pretty extensive search. o Q1 - was scope ok? YES - depends on what an objectively reasonable person would think permissible scope was based on the lead up to the consent. Here, no reason to think search wouldn't include entire car. · Would any other exceptions apply? o Search incident? NO - no one arrested yet o Vehicle exception? NO - no additional evidence of crime of driving with broken tail light. o Inventory search? NO - car not impounded are taken by government · BOTTOM LINE - Consent allowed for search, no 4th amendment violations. Prosecutors do NOT need to prove that you knew about right to refuse request (4th amendment right) in order to have consent be "voluntary." · Rule is: consent is voluntary when: o (1) totality of the circumstances o (2) show that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion o (3) which was express or implied o (4) regardless of whether the Defendant KNEW about the right to refuse consent · Other rights (5th amendment, 6th amendment) require Knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. Why not here? o Those are TRIAL protections. This is pre-trial. o Only way to really show knowledge is to get police to warn people about the rights. But then consent searches will become ineffective tool for cops o 4th amendment is a privacy protector, not an evidentiary protector - the evidence thing is just for deterrence

Carpenter v. United States

Carpenter (Supp) (2018) - Modern Tech and (possible) breakdown of 3P doctrine · CSLT allows location of cellphone to be tracked on minute-by-minute basis, effectively creates a GPS device attached to you at all times · Roberts says you need warrant to access this info - mere "court order" not enough, because accessing it IS A SEARCH o Cell phones integral to modern life (similar to argument made in Katz) § Details a "mosaic" of a person—who they affiliate with, religion, sexuality . . . playing off of privacy expectation prong of Katz · BUT, no trespass here like in Jones, so how do you reconcile? o 5 justices in Jones in dicta suggested that extensive location tracking, regardless of trespass, would be a search · What about 3p Doctrine - cell companies (3rd parties) have all this data, so you are giving it over to the voluntarily: o Argue it is NOT actually voluntary, given that apps do it without knowledge, and fact that you need a cell phone in modern life o Scope of info here is much wider/private in nature that the pen register · What is reach of opinion? Only applies to CSLT. AND, 3P doctrine still in tact, this is just carved out exception.

I. Affiant Seeking Warrant Based on Hearsay

Concern is fact that detective/officer seaking the warrant going off of information told to him by someone else (Hearsay). Could have issues of: · Misremembrance/mistake [Basis of Knowledge] · Lying [Veracity] With the Affiant's statement to magistrate, we have the protections of Oath; Inquiry, Demeanor, but for the statement to the detective, no protections in place.

Consent Search Summary

Consent to search is valid if: · (1) It is voluntarily given o Voluntary = not the result of (governmental) duress or coercion, express or implied, considering the totality of the circumstances, and no requirement that D had knowledge of right - Bustamonte · (2) by someone with actual authority o As defined in Matlock - common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects, based upon mutual use by persons with joint access or control for most purposes · OR (3) someone with apparent authority o Rodriguez - where the available facts warrant a reasonable belief that actual authority is present · (4) and a co-resident present on the scene has not refused o Randolph

Arrest Summary

Cop personally sees you commit crime. Can he arrest: 1. While on street? a. Yes - Watson or Atwater 2. While you are driving? You committed crime, got in car and started to drive away a. YES - that still counts as "in public" for 4th amendment arrest purposes 3. Same, but after you commit crime, go into restaurant a. YES - still counts as public place (Watson) 4. You are on the front steps of your own house a. OK TO ARREST - that counts as public, Even if you are literally in your doorway (Santana) 5. Cop sees you commit crime, then hours later sees you through window of neighbor's home a. Even though PC to arrest, CANNOT enter - Steagald. Would need search warrant 6. Cop sees you through the window of your own home a. Even if PC to arrest, NOT ok unless you get arrest warrant, AND have reasonable belief that you are home - Payton b. Note, could also get search warrant for this 7. `Cop did not see you commit crime, but there is an arrest warrant out for you, and he has reason to believe you are in your home a. OK to enter home under Payton b. BUT, if he then looks in a little box and finds cocaine, NOT ok - because he's supposed to only be looking for YOU, and you can't be in little box i. Scope restricted to where person could be.

Arrest Warrant

Do NOT need a warrant to arrest: · Person Cops have PC to believe committed a felony In PUBLIC · Person Cops have PC to believe committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence in PUBLIC You DO NEED a warrant to: · Arrest someone who is IN THEIR OWN HOME Open Question: · Can officer arrest someone who committed Mis-D not in his presence?

Proper Scope of Terry Stop

Factors to Consider: · Time o 20 minutes ok in Sharpe; 16 hours ok in Montoya de Hernandez; 90 minutes not ok in Place - focus on how long it went vs. how long was necessary to effectuate purpose of stop. § Defendant's role in extending time matters · Whether less intrusive means were available · Nature of the issue - drugs vs. petty traffic violation; airport vs. general public What is at issue? · Stop of person different than seizure of property · Cars have special rules

Robinson Hypos

HYPOs: · Jaywalking and holding a paper bag. Cop writes you a ticket, then searches bag and finds cocaine o Knowles v. Iowa (Pg. 203) - NOT justified under search incident - would have to be a Terry search (reasonable suspicion you were armed and presently dangerous) because once cop writes citation and does NOT arrest, takes way the justification from Chimel · WHAT IF state law prohibited arrest for certain crime, but cop arrested you anyway, did search incident, and found contraband: o NOT a 4th amendment violation - Virginia v. Moore (Pg. 205). Constitutional issue and state law issue are not the same.

Georgia v. Randolph Hypos

Hypo 1 · J and S joint owners of house. J says come in, S says you cannot. Cops find guns. Guns WOULD BE USABLE against J, because he consented, but NOT against S. Hypo 2 · Same, but S is J's 14 year old daughter - OK for use against S. S had no authority to deny search, due to the recognized familial hierarchy Hypo 3 · S is J's 19 year old daughter - Could NOT be used against S. Hypo 4 · J says come in, S says nothing - COULD be used against S. Needs to be an express objection Hypo 5 · J says yes, S says no. Cops then arrest S, and search o OK - Fernandez case. As long as the arrest/removal of S was lawful, and was not specifically designed to remove him and then search.

Consent Search Hypos

Hypo 1 - Cops have detailed description of person subject to arrest. 7'2, blond, scar on face. Go to his house, and see a guy clearly not matching description. Say "can we search your house" · Search would be INVALID - no actual authority for random guy on street; and because he didn't match description, no reasonable belief Hypo 2 - Cops see guy matching description standing outside a house. They don't know which house is his. They say "can we search your house" and he says yea. · Search would be VALID - because even if its wrong house and he has no actual authority, would have apparent authority Hypo 3 - Cops see guy matching description in front of house. They say can we search? He says it's not my house, but go ahead. Turns out he is lying, it IS his house. · Search VALID - even though there is no apparent authority, there was actual authority. And that is enough - Rodriguez. Hypo 4 - Cops ask landlord - know he is leasing house to the guy subject to arrest. Landlord gives permission. · NOT VALID - Chapman case. Landlords, hotel owners . . . cannot give consent. Based on reasonable social expectations.

Plain View Hypos

Hypo 1 - cop knows three valuable paintings stolen from musuem. Walks by house, sees vermeer on wall hanging. Can cop go in and seize? · NO - no lawful right of access into house. Would have to get warrant Hypo 2 - cop sees Vermeer rolled up in back of car parked on street. Could he seize? - YES - auto exception applies (movable vehicle on public thorofair, exigency b/c might leave jurisdiction) - that gives lawful access. Hypo 3 - Same, but car is parked in curtilage of home - NO, Collins v. Virginia Hypo 4 - cop sees Vermeer through window, gets warrant that only describes it with particularity. Walks into house, sees Vermeer on wall and seizes. Can he also seize Da Vinci? - DEPENDS on when he saw it - if he saw it before/contemporaneously with Vermeer, then yes under PV doctrine. But if he saw Vermeer first, search is OVER - once you find what you were looking for. Hypo 5 - Same as above - takes da vinci off the wall, and sees a safe. Can he open it? NO - this is no longer anything in plain view, it is like the record player in Hicks. Even if he has suspicion the other stuff from robbery might be there. Hypo 6 - Cop gets warrant for both Vermeer and Monet. Finds the Vermeer and Da Vanci in room one, then moves to back room. Sees Monet, but also sees the Caesar statue on table in PV. Has PC to believe it was statute stolen from museum - CAN SEIZE. Distinguish Hicks because there is PC here.

Inventory Search Summary

IF police · 1. Follow reasonable, standardized procedures · 2. For the purpose of administrative inventory · 3. And not as a pretext for criminal investigation THEN they may · 4. Conduct a routine inventory search w/o probable cause and w/o a warrant · 5. Of a vehicle that is lawfully impounded (or otherwise in lawful police custody) o including closed containers within the vehicle (scope is anywhere a vandal could get into)

Inventory Search of Person

IF police · 1. Follow reasonable, standardized procedures · 2. For the purpose of administrative inventory · 3. And not as a pretext for criminal investigation THEN they may · 4. Conduct a routine inventory search w/o probable cause and w/o a warrant · 5. of a lawfully arrested person about to be incarcerated o including any container or article in the arrestee's possession · 7. Even if less intrusive means for safeguarding property are available.

Vehicle Search Summary

IF there is · 1. Probable cause to believe an item subject to seizure is located in · 2. A readily mobile vehicle · 3. In a public place · 4. And so situated that an objective observer would conclude the vehicle is not being used as a residence THEN · 5. It may be searched without a warrant on the scene, or · 6. Transported to the police station and searched there (up to 3 days OK, no clear line). · 7. BUT ONLY in those areas (including containers within the vehicle) where there is probable cause to believe an item subject to seizure is located. (Acevado)

Search Incident to Arrest

If there is: · (1) a lawful custodial arrest THEN, without warrant or further justification, police may conduct: · (2) a full search of the person arrested · (3) and of the area within his immediate control · (4) as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest Twin Justifications: · (1) Officer safety (need to find weapons) · (2) Need to find evidence (that could be concealed or destroyed) NOTE - Lawful custodial arrest is one based on probable cause - arrest could be warrantless if in accordance with Watson/Atwater NOTE - do NOT need any suspicion/cause that search will find ANYTHING. Can do it as a matter of course - need for a bright line rule.

Kentucky v. King

Limits on Exigencies · RULE - If the cops created the exigency through threatening to violate the 4th or 14th amendment, then exigent circumstances exception does NOT apply: o HERE, cops knocked on door, yelled "police, open up" and smelled weed/heard very frantic shuffling o Because of the shuffling, believed that drug evidence was being destroyed - exigent circumstance, which allowed them to go in without warrant o No issue because knocking on door is NOT a 4th amendment violation - police have implied license to knock on door without warrant.

Vehicle Exception to Warrant Requirement

Search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle is authorized only when: · 1. The arrestee is unsecured, and · 2. Within reaching distance of the passenger compartment · 3. At the time of the search ---OR--- · 4. When it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. PERMISSIBLE SCOPE - Can search entire passenger compartment (NOT trunk), and any containers within.

Illinois v. Gates Case

NEW DOCTRINE - GATES, Totality of the Circumstances (Pg. 79) (1983) Cops receive anonymous letter that: · Gates' Wife will drive to Florida, and then fly back. Husband will fly down, stay in hotel, drive back next day with tons of drugs · Gives precise day range when next trip will occur Cops investigate - find Gates' address in Illinois, and see that he has a flight booked to Florida in same date range as letter · Use letter and corroboration to get warrant Illinois Supreme Court applies Spinelli, and says no PC (strong argument other way) - SCOTUS overturns, says we need a totality of the circumstances test: · Same two factors as Ag-Spin, BUT they can play off each other - don't both need to be satisfied. So if informant is incredibly reliable and been right in the past all the time, then tip from him can be sufficient even if zero indicia of personal knowledge Court emphasizes that PC should be a fluid test, don't want to impose legal rigidity on law enforcement and magistrates who might not even be lawyers. HERE: Veracity - - A lot of what informant said was corroborated (car would be in FLA, Gates would fly there, he would drive back to IL next day) BUT, anonymity cuts other way Knowledge - - Contained a ton of details like dates, exact means of how they would transport - how else would you know these things other than personal knowledge? Court keys in on FUTURE PREDICTIONS (that came true) - more indicative of knowledge than publicly observable/past details Other Indica - Florida well known narcotics trafficking spot Weird to fly to Florida for one day and drive back next day - suspicious activity

Maryalnd v. Pringle

NOTE -- Probable does NOT mean more likely than not. Cop sees three men walk into house, hears scream, guy dead in middle, other two in separate corners with no blood/indicator, and blame each other - could arrest both · each of three passengers in car where narcotics found could be arrested - PC to believe each might have possessed. BUT, Hypo where car recklessly hits and kills Ped, then cop sees all three in back - maybe no PC to arrest because no "common enterprise" that might link the 3 together via conspiracy, unlike Pringle case.

Open Issue with Arrests

Officer need to be in presence to arrest without warrant? Unsettled, but Strong says pretty clear that there is an in the presence requirement from common law history · BUT, issue might arise with what was a Mis-D vs felony at common law

Spinelli

Old Doctrine = Spinelli - two prong test (Pg. 69) (1969) FBI files an affidavit for search warrant based on: · Drove from Illinois to St. Louis 5 times, went to same apartment building 4/5 times · Two phones in that apartment, ID'd by number · Unelaborated "knowledge of hi being a bookie" among FBI · Tip from an unidentified "reliable informant" that Spinelli using two phones (ID'd by number) to run book Court Rejects Totality of Circumstances Framework, and instead says PC can be established on basis of hearsay informant if: · Tip, standing alone passes a two-prong test; · OR, tip plus additional corroboration substantiates it to the point of PC Aguilar-Spinelli Test · (1) Basis of Knowledge: Does the tip itself contain sufficient statement of underlying circumstances for how informant concluded his inference o Base facts needed for independent judgment of validity of informant's conclusion o EXAMPLES - Claim of personal knowledge, or a detail so specific that only way you would know is intimate involvement · (2) Veracity: Some actual basis—not just conclusory statement—that informant is a credible person o Support for claim that (a) informant is credible or (b) that the information is otherwise reliable o EXAMPLES - Prior dealings with informant; lack of motivation/bias to lie; statement against interest (or other hearsay exception); Corroboration.

oliver and Dunn case

Open Fields Doctrine · No reasonable expectation of privacy in "open fields" - in other words, an open field is NOT part of the curtilage · "one cannot possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields because they do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the amendment is intended to shelter . . . as a practical matter these lands are usually accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home . . . would not be" o REGARDLESS of what precautions you take to protect an "open field" · Dunn (Pg. 32)—FACTORS FOR CURTILAGE vs. Open Field o (1) proximity to home o (2) enclosed area? o (3) use of area o (4) precautions taken to protect privacy?

Katz v. United States

Pg. 5) changes this and gives us modern search doctrine: · Cops put microphone on public phone booth to record Katz's call, and he eventually gets charges with gambling · Under previous doctrine, would not be search: phone booth is public place, so Katz had no private property right. No physical trespass = no search o NEW FRAMEWORK - the 4th amendment protects people not places. o We don't have "protected areas"—instead, we look at the individual person and ask if they reasonably expected privacy. · Harlan's Concurrence Test which is used à Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. Government conducts A SEARCH WHEN It's Activities obtained information/items o (1) Individual exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy o (2) that expectation is one that society recognizes as objectively reasonable · Katz shifted focus of 4th amendment from places/things to people, and from property interests to privacy interests.

Weeks v. United States

Previously, there was 4th amendment right in federal cases, but no exclusionary evidence rule. · Weeks v. U.S. (1914) (Pg. 1064): evidence obtained by federal officers through means violating the 4th amendment must be excluded from federal criminal trial of the person whose rights were violated o BUT, the evidence obtained by state officers that violated 4th amendment WAS admitted à silver platter doctrine. o Primary justification à without exclusion, the amendment itself is toothless

Brinengar v. United States

Probable Cause When: 1. The facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge 2. And of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information 3. Are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that 4. (For ARREST): o An offense has been or is being committed o By the person to be arrested 5. (For SEARCH): o An item subject to seizure o Will be found in the place to be searched

Terry Seizure

Seizure of Person (based upon Terry & Mendenhall, with additions from Florida v. Bostick and Hodari D and Brower v. Inyo) A person is "seized" only when a police officer · 1. By the slightest application of physical force OR · 2. Show of authority to which the person submits · 3. In some way restrains the liberty of a citizen through means intentionally applied Such that, in view of the circumstances · 4. A reasonable innocent person would have believed · 5. He was not free to leave . . .or otherwise terminate the encounter. o Hodari D v. Mendenhall - does the suspect have to submit to show they were not free to leave? · 6. Because of the police's actions, not the general circumstances of the situation

Intro to Terry

Terry Doctrine allows for fourth amendment search/seizure: · On less than probable cause · Without consent of the person subject HOW/WHY? These are cases that come up in context of criminal investigation - on the fly issues. No time to get a warrant, and have special considerations. Court was willing to go to special balancing test due to the tradeoff of law enforcement needs in this special setting. Terry allows a cop to stop (seize) a defendant if they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and "frisk" (search) them if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. BOTH are (1) without warrant, and (2) on less than probable cause. · When is there (a) no seizure at all; (b) Terry seizure; (c) full 4th am. seizure? · What is a "reasonable suspicion" - something based on "specific and articulable facts; not a hunch" · What is permissible scope of Terry search? · Consent issues - was someone "seized" when they gave the consent?

Payton v. United States

To Enter A's Home to Arrest A, the police need: · (1) An arrest warrant, AND · (2) Reason to believe A is within dwelling UNLESS: · (a) exigent circumstances (like hot pursuit); or · (b) consent AGAIN, you need only an ARREST Warrant, you do NOT need a search warrant · Scope of the arrest warrant is that you can search anywhere in the house that the person could be. NOTE - SCOTUS applies to Mis-Ds in Welch v. Wisconsin

Steagald v. United States

To Enter B's Home to Arrest A, the police need: · (1) a SEARCH warrant UNLESS: · Exigent circumstances · Third-parties' consent. Cops have arrest warrant for Lyons, get anonymous tip he will be at certain house for a single day. Go to house, search and find some cocaine, use to get a search warrant, and then find a ton more cocaine, which is used against Steagald. Court says fourth amendment violation - if you have an arrest warrant for A, and you believe he will be in B's home, need a SEARCH WARRANT to enter B's home (unless exigent/consent) WHY? - no clear CL history, so went to balancing test. The arrest warrant protects the privacy interest of person subject to arrest, but if that then gave cops right to enter any of that person's friends/families homes, big invasion of those third parties' privacy Starts to approach type of general warrant/search power founders hated. HYPOS: · (1) you have a warrant to look for drugs at Steagald's home. While there, see Lyons, who you have probable cause (but no warrant) to arrest. Can you? o YES - kind of like Watson at this point - because you are lawfully in the area, no 4th amendment violation to get there, it's like in public, and you can arrest on PC · (2) Steagald and Lyons live together. You have arrest warrant for Lyons, and reason to believe he is at home. You enter house, find 43 lbs of cocaine, charge Steagald OK - because the entry into the house was lawful under 4th amendment

Mapp v. Ohio

Until 1949, 4th amendment not incorporated into state action by 14th amendment. Then, Colorado v. Wolf (1949). However, only applied to things like affirmative state statutes that authorized illegal searches . . . · Mapp v. Ohio (1961) (Pg. 1068): evidence obtained by state governmental action through means violating 4th amendment must be excluded from state criminal trials o Over half states started following Weeks on their own. Plus, states that didn't had big issue of deterrence. § Fact that deterrence = rationale means the scope will continue to be narrow: other ways to deter. o ENDS SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE à previously, federal officials could use evidence obtained through state violation of 4th amendment in federal trials.

Beyond Stop and Frisk

We have seen how Terry has been expanded - you can "stop" someone for 20-plus minutes; you can "frisk" a car. Following cases are additional expansions that rely on underlying Terry rationales - that the warrant requirement is not well-suited for certain situations, and a more "reasonableness" balancing test will have to do.

Whren v. US

Whren v. US (Pg. 95) (1996) · Plain clothes officer patrolling high drug area. Sees car stopped for a while, makes U-Turn, car speeds off without signaling. Cop goes to stop, sees drugs in car upon walking up to the window (1) Cop could seize the car if he had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had been committed · Definitely did under D.C. traffic code BUT, Whren tries to argue there should be a new standard—whether reasonable cop would have stopped in the same circumstances · Scalia REJECTS - basically trying to shoehorn a subjective intent test, and whether a seizure is valid when the officer has P.C. to stop (almost) never depends on subjective intent of officer o EVEN IF affirmatively could show that stop for the traffic violation was pretext to search for drugs, doesn't matter as long as objectively reasonable officer would have had PC for stop in the first place under asserted reason § Or even a non-asserted reason NOTE - the officer's stop actually violated D.C. police code, BUT, violating a state law does not make something a 4th amendment violation.

Watson Case

i. (1976) - Felony Arrests Without Warrant · Government informant alerts postal inspector that Watson using stolen credit cards, and agrees to meet with Watson in restaurant with officers present. If Watson has CCs on him, will signal officers. Informant signals, so officers have PC to arrest. · They arrest Watson without warrant - court says it is OKAY: o (1) Probable Cause to Arrest o (2) For a felony committed o (3) while person subject to arrest is in a public space · Justification: Historically at common law, could arrest people for felonies in public · Leaves two open questions: o Arrest someone in private for felony without warrant? o Arrest someone in public for misdemeanor?

Particularity Requirement of Warrants

no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized HISTORY: · Not just a technicality - goes to the heart of the justification for 4th amendment. Founders were trying to combat general warrants from the British, which basically gave officers of the peace unfettered and unrestricted means to search people's houses for anything. · Also, in response to writs of assistance by British to search ships · Basically, framers hated general searches and ability to introduce with broad authority to look for and take whatever

Michigan v. Chesternut

o Marked police car approaches corner, man runs. Cops follow, but keep lights/siren off, never ordered D to stop, displayed no weapons, and did not use car to block movements - was NOT a seizure.

Florida v. Royer

o Under Mendenhall standard, was NOT seizure when cops asked D for ticket and license, but YES seizure when they then IDd themselves as narcotics agents, told D he was suspected of trafficking, and asked him to accompany them to a interrogation room, while holding on to his license and ticket, and not telling him free to leave.

Vehicle Exception Hypos

· (1) Car parked in car port attached to D's house. Cops have PC to believe it contains contraband. Can they search without warrant? o NO - Jones case. No implied license for cops to go down driveway to car port, so car is not "in public" - it's in curtilage here o ALSO, Collins v. Virginia - cannot enter curtilage even if you believe vehicle itself is the stolen item · (2) Car parked on street - trickier case, but probably ok to search because street = "public" and is not the curtilage.

Exigency Hypos

· (1) Cop sees J mugging woman, chase J and he runs into 3Ps house. Can cops run in? o YES - the hot pursuit/exigency overcomes Steagald · (2) Cops see A litter, chase him into B's house, see cocaine on table. Cops arrest B. Ok? o NO - under Walsh, the minor crime does not create exigency · (3) J mugs someone and flees from cops. Two days later, same cop sees J on his porch of his own home: o Could arrest out on porch - Watson applies · (4) same as 3, but guy starts to run inside. Cop yells "halt, you are under arrest" o Cop CAN enter house - argue exigency is potential to destroy evidence - a suspect may not defeat an arrest set in motion in public place by retreating into private · (5) Cops scoping out house, through window see J bagging up weed and also smoking some joints o Destroying evidence? NO - probably too minor, plus there is still a ton of evidence left if they don't smoke all the weed o So can NOT enter without warrant

Chimel Hypos

· (1) D in front of the desk. Can officer search in closed drawer? o YES - clearly within reach · (2) Locked drawer in same desk? o NO under Chimel - because if locked, not within immediate control to the extent a weapon could be obtained · (3) What if D closer to the door? Can officer search desk drawer? o YES - generally allowed · (4) Can officer search adjoining room? o YES after Buie (Pg. 191) - can look in closets or "immediately adjoining spaces from which an attack could be launched" to search for confederates § So if there was a desk in adjoining room, cannot search that - no attack could be launched from there

Kyllo Hypos

· (1) Radio waves picked up by radio? NO SEARCH - in general public use · (2) cop simply overhears? NO SEARCH · (3) Cop overhears by use of microphone - probably a search.

Katz Hypos

· (1) same facts as Katz, but here, guy on other end of call let cops record - NO SEARCH: assumed risk that person you were talking to cooperating with police · (2) same facts as White, but cops snuck bug into "informant's" pocket without him knowing - YES SEARCH: "uninvited ear" into conversation.

Chimel v. California

· Arrest guy for robbery based on warrant. Then search his entire house for an hour, have his wife open drawers . . . · Court says Arrest was lawful, BUT search exceeded permissible scope of search incident to arrest · Because of twin justifications for search incident, proper scope is to search on D's person, or anything within his "immediate control" o Anywhere D "might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence" o Anywhere D "might reach to grab" Wingspan CLEARLY within. But wingspan + lunge? Wingspan + run? NOTE - If original arrest was invalid, then anything found from search incident MUST be excluded - fruit of the poisonous tree NOTE - Even if arrest warrant was invalid, IF arrest was still valid under Watson/Atwater, OPEN ISSUE whether evidence from search incident must be included

Missouri v. McNeally

· Body metabolizing alcohol is not per se exigency that allows for warrantless blood test when PC for DUI. Depends on circumstances

Exigent Circumstances Summary

· Came up multiple times as means to enter house to arrest/search without warrant when other exceptions don't get you there. But What does it mean? (1) If police have probable cause to search (but no warrant) (2) And, considering the totality of the circumstances, (3) an exigency makes it impracticable to get a warrant (4) Without significantly undermining efficacy of the search (5) THEN warrantless search may be conducted (6) UNLESS the Police Created the exigency themselves through a violation of 4th/14th amendment (7) Scope = as broad as reasonably necessary to meet the exigency

Arizona v. Gant

· Cops get tip Drug dealing at Gant's house. Show up, knock on door, he says owner isn't home. Cups run his name, see warrant out for arrest based on driving without license · Come back later, see Gant drive home and get out of car. 5 Cops then go arrest him for driving without license. · They handcuff him, and put him in cop car. THEN they search his car. Bottom line - NOT OK under 4th amendment. When you arrest someone who was just in car: · You may search the car they were just in incident to the arrest IF AT TIME OF SEARCH: o (1) arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the car [Chimel rationale]; OR o (2) it is reasonable to expect evidence related to the crime of arrest to be found in car. [New rationale, ONLY for vehicles] HERE, Gant was handcuffed, so first one does not apply. And, crime of arrest was driving without license, so would not find any evidence of that. Open Questions? · What is scope of search? o Not specified, but playing off Belton, we can assume it is entire passenger compartment, and any containers open or closed · What is the passenger compartment? · What if container is locked? · What is the temporal limit - how long after guy has left car

Carney Case

· Cops have PC to believe marijuana in mobile home in public parking lot. Go in without warrant, search and find drugs. o If the mobile home is a vehicle, vehicle exception applies. Question is whether objective observer would conclude vehicle not being used solely as a residence: § HERE, vehicle (1) still had wheels; (2) was in public place at the time, insinuating that it had been driven there; (3) not on blocks preventing movement NOTE - Court LEAVES OPEN question of whether warrant required if it was immobile Questions: · What if cops had arrested D first, then searched. Justified under Belton? o YES - they could search the entire passenger compartment of vehicle if probable cause to believe evidence related to crime of arrest in vehicle § What constitutes "passenger compartment" in mobile home is interesting q

Maryland v. Bouie

· Cops have warrant to arrest Bouie and one other accomplice for armed robbery of pizza joint. Bouie described as wearing a red jump suit at time of robbery. Before going to Bouie's house, call to see if home. Woman answers, and then puts Bouie on phone Q1 - could cops go into Bouie's house to arrest him? · YES - with the warrant, plus reason to believe Bouie was in home, plus reasonable belief that house was in fact Bouie's, they could go in under Payton. Cops go into house, start to search. One cop goes to "clear" basement. Opens door, and calls out for anyone to come up. Eventually Bouie comes up, cops handcuff and arrest him. At that point, the arrest warrant expires · Scope of an arrest warrant is you can search anywhere in the house a person could be. But once you make the arrest, that's it. That same cop then walks into basement to make sure "no one else was down there" - while searching basement, saw red running suit in plain view, which he seized. BOTTOM LINE - the seizure of running suit was ok under the plain view doctrine: · Seizure of the track suit was ok if the cop was lawfully in the basement, and his search stayed within scope of what was permitted. · After they arrested Bouie, could search incident under Chimel - search his person, and anything within his immediate control (he was handcuffed, so nothing) · This is where Chimel ended, but Bouie expands: o ZONE 1 -- Incident to an arrest, without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, police may search in closets or other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack may be launched o ZONE 2 -- If the police have reasonable suspicion that there are individuals posing danger to those on arrest scene, they may search the areas which those people might be · Spatial Limit: cursory visual inspection of spaces person might be found · Temporal Limit: no longer than necessary to dispel reasonable suspicion, and in any event, no longer than it takes to complete arrest and depart Application to Present Case: · Basement is outside the area immediately adjoining place of arrest. So needs to be Zone 2 justification. Need Reasonable Suspicion Individuals Posing Danger to those on arrest scene might be in the basement. o HERE - Bouie had an accomplice in the crime, so he might be there. AND, when cops called, woman answered, indicating there was someone else in house shortly before. o TEMPORAL LIMIT - Bouie was upstairs and already handcuffed. So if cops could have departed and were dragging feet, this wouldn't be ok. But no facts about this.

California v. Hodari D

· Cops in unmarked police car, wearing jackets that say police. Approach teens huddled around car who sprint away. Cops chase Hodari on foot, right as he's about to be captured, he throws something away. Cop then tackles him. He had thrown away crack. ISSUE: at what point did "seizure" occur - if after he had thrown away the bag, then there is no fruit of poisonous tree issue, because he had abandoned the crack. BUT, if seizure occurred prior, then evidence must be excluded because State conceded there was no reasonable suspicion. BOTTOM LINE - Seizure only when (a) use of the slightest application of physical force; or (b) a show of authority that the defendant submits to. · Scalia points to common law for this. BUT, problem is that this is the common law arrest requirements, and here we have a seizure that is less than arrest. · Mendenhall test is prerequisite, but not entire standard. Reasonable person must feel they are not free to leave and actually submit to the authority. APPLY HERE: No physical force prior to the tackle. And while sprinting after someone in cop gear could be show of authority, Hodari did not submit:

Additional Cases re Terry Traffic Stop Scope

· Could a five minute stop be unreasonable? o YES - if unnecessarily long based on the suspicion at issue. · What can cops do during routine traffic stop? o Rodriguez v. United States; Illinois v. Caballes (Pg. 507) § Check license and registration, search for outstanding warrants, attend to general road safety concerns § Could do other stuff during that process (drug sniffing dog) as long as the length of the stop is not extended beyond what it otherwise would be o In Rodriguez, the dog extended stop by ten minutes. NOT OK. In Caballes, dog was just brough around car during time guy would have been stopped anyway. OK.

Rule of Exclusion

· Evidence obtained through means that violate the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from the criminal trial of the individual whose rights were violated (NOTE - not actually in the amendment. Judicially created) o Elements: § Evidence obtained by government action § Through means that violate the Fourth Amendment § Must generally be excluded from the criminal trial § Of the individual whose rights were violated · "Government action" - State action only! Private investigation (by a private party) is not subject to the rule · "Generally" - there are important exceptions to the rule · "Criminal trial" - the rule does not apply to civil cases, preliminary hearings, bail & indictment; only the criminal trial itself · "Individual" - must have standing to raise the rule

White Case

· Government informant wears wire that transmits via radio conversations he is having with D to cops: happens in multiple locations (in informant's house, car, in a restaurant) o When convo's in informant's house, cops were physically hiding in closet à OK because informant consented to entry of his home (if other way around and in D's house, would not be ok). · Takeaway: NO SEARCH, because no reasonable expectation of privacy—when committing criminal activity and discussing with another, bear risk that he is informant. Even if you subjectively believed he wasn't, society is not prepared to recognize this privacy.

Warden v. Hayden

· Hayden robs cab co., two cabbies see and follow him to house. Cabbies call cops, say saw guy go into this house · Cops show up and knock, woman answers and allows cops to come in. Cops split up and search entire house, find Hayden feigning sleep in bed · Other cops search and find weapons hidden in various parts of house - flush tank of toilet, washing machine . . . one of the cops also finds clothes matching robber's description Bottom line is YES this was exigent - there was potentially armed and dangerous criminal on the loose in this house, even though it turned out to be his own (cops didn't know at time). Could search washer/dryer because reasonable place weapons could be hidden, and finding weapons necessary to quell risk to public Risks that qualify as exigency usually are: (1) harm to officers/public; (2) risk of escape; (3) risk of evidence destruction

Bouie Hypos

· Instead of finding clothes in stack out in open, they were in washing machine: o NOT OK - person would not be hiding in washing machine unless contortionist. Scope of the "Bouie Sweep" is only cursory look with eyeballs where person might be. Maybe different if you heard rumbling inside machine · (2) Bouie in front yard when arrested. Can you sweep the first floor of his house? o NO - Bouie only applies to arrests inside the home. And SCOTUS later said no in subsequent case.

Permissible Actions During Terry Stops in Traffic Context

· Pennsylvania v. Mimms (Pg. 517) (1977) o If you are stopping someone for traffic violation, you may order them out of the car any time, no matter what. Do not have to have any suspicion. Officer safety rationale. o You can ONLY FRISK that person if you have reasonable suspicion they are armed and dangerous.

Special Needs Doctrine

· Terry broke the mold with 4th amendment, from warrantless search seizure is per se unreasonable to case-specific balancing. AND, on something less than probable cause. o Balancing the government interest with the privacy interest · There are other instances where a balance is warranted based on the government interest and nature of the case - airports, schools . . . the special needs doctrine o Make post-9/11 discussion BLACKMUN CONCURRENCE: from NJ v. TLO Creates Special Needs Doctrine - "only in those exception circumstances in which special needs, beyond normal need for law enforcement, make warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the framers" · MUST be outside context of criminal investigation - like inventory searches or enforcing school rules. Where has court applied it? · Schools · Government employees · People on Probation · Security searches at airports, courthouses, prisons . . . · Roadblocks/random DUI checkpoints o Stop every 5th car indiscriminately - interest is community safety, not criminal investigation o If roadblock designed for crime control, outside special needs doctrine

4th Amendment

· The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. o First clause = Reasonableness Clause o Second clause = Warrant Clause

Georgia v. Randolph

· Woman calls cops, says husband beat me and is using drugs. Cops show up, ask for permission to search. Wife says yes, but husband is there as well, and unequivocally says no. Cops go search, find drugs, use to get warrant, and find more drugs. All used at trial against husband for possession of cocaine. · Issue - if one party denies consent, but someone with actual authority grants it, can fruits of search be used against party who denied? Bottom Line - NO. The warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident is unreasonable as to the resident who denied consent. · Why? Because this doctrine is based on reasonable social expectations, NOT property law. So even though W might have property right to allow cops in, if H is there saying don't you dare, a typical person would not enter.