Ethics: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Quotations/Kant/Exam 2)
"... All moral concepts have their seat and origin completely in a priori in reason" (22)
, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason just as much as in the most highly speculative. They cannot be abstracted from any empirical, and hence merely contingent, cognition. moral concepts come from knowledge before experience and can't be abstracted from knowledge learned through experience and thus are highly contingent and worthless in serving as a supreme principle (Universal Value) thank Kant's wants. Killing People and Lying is are knowledge that is known before experience.
"Now if that being's preservation, welfare, or in a word, happiness..." (8)
Here Kant is criticizing Aristiol by saying that "no organ is to be found for any end unless it be the most fit and the best adapted for that end." no part of the body is made to carry out the same function of has the same end and thus our end is ingrained into us from us having reason and will. Theses are natural in essent and if happiness was our true end we would have it in us and it would be manifested instinctually more than it every would be by reason.
"But if I think of a categorical imperative..." (29)
I know immediately what it contains. For since, besides the law, the imperative contains only the necessity that the maxim should accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to restrict it, there remains nothing but the university of a law as such with which the maxim of the action should conform. This conformity alone is properly what is represented as necessary by the imperative. Kant is talking about the makeup of a categorical imperative and how it clearly offers beneficial content. The notion of it being an imperative/command that must be followed in every instance. It allows any maxim to be in accord with it and conform to the law put out from it.
"...Happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination" (28)
Kant is talking about the Infirmity (Physical or mental weakness) of the body and happiness resides in the bodily realm resting solely on empirical grounds
"... The moral law is of such widespread significance ..." (20)
That is must be for all rational beings and must not be valid under just contingent conditions, but it must be absolutely necessary.
"The moral worth depends... " (13)
Therefore, not on the realization of the object of action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done. Moral worth depends on acting from duty doing things that are right, but only because they are right. Volition or intent don't madder.
"Now I say that man..." (35)
and in general every rational being, exists as a end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end.
"There is no possibility of thinking anything .." (7)
at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence , wit , judgement, and whatever talents of the mind one might want to make to name are doubtless in many respects good and desirable, as are such qualities of temperament as courage, resolution, preseververance. But they can also become extremely bad and harmful if the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature and which in its special constitution is called character, is not good. He is talking about people's will or intention, their drive to do something and how if a person does not have a good will even the most desirable traits for a person to hand become tainted and bad. Intelligence => Supervillains Wit => Kathy Griffin whatever skills you have can be used for bad.
"To be truthful from duty is, however, quite different...." (15)
from being truthful from fear of disadvantageous consequences. Basically doing a action from duty is clearly the right thing to do, but there are consequences that come from actions and some may not be very advantageous. Thus, we may want to break our maxim to benefit ourselves, but when looking at a maxim to be a universal law it becomes clear that something like lying is not the right thing to do as you wouldn't want everyone lying just because it benefits then in the presence moment.
"If I think of a hypothetical imperative..." (29)
in general, I do not know beforehand what it will contain until its conditions is given. Kant is referring to the notion that hypothetical imperatives don't clearly lay out what they contain. They are not laws and can't house a maxim. They tend to focus on wants of individuals and wants reside in the bodily realm and thus can not be used to make moral actions.
"The present Grounding [Grundlegung]..." (5)
is however, intended for nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality. This is referring to Kant's project: The Supreme Principle Morality. The as in the only one & he thinks that he can do it. Kant wants a system with no exception & everyone acts in accordance (obedience) to The Supreme Law. Thus everyone acts the same in each moral circumstance. This means you would have a Universal Morality.
"A hypothetical imperative thus says..." (25)
only that an action is good for some purpose, either possible or actual. They are good to achieve some end in the bodily world thus, has nothing to do with morally.
"I am willing to admit out of love for humanity..." (20)
that most of our actions are in accordance with duty; but if we look more closely at our planning and striving, we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always turning up, and upon which the intent of our actions is based rather than upon the strict command of duty (which would often require self-denial) Kant is talking about how the bodily realm effects our will or intent to do certain actions. We put intent or reasoning behind actions from our wants, emotions, feelings, ect. This is against what he want us to do.
"We like to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a more noble motive..." (19)
we like to think we are doing things for noble reasons, doing things for the right reasons, but we can never get rid of secret incentives of our actions. For when moral value is being considered, the concern is not with the actions, which are seen, but rather with their inner principles, which are not seen.