INTL 4440H Johnson Study Guide Terms

forward observer

CIA- Office of Slavic and Eurasian analysis (OSE) 205 people out at staff, 12 forward observers→ "forward deployment" Report back to Langley -environmental example

Tower

Eager to embarrass Kennedy, disagreed with Church a lot, old timer, seemed protective of CIA, was professor, first Rep. elected on Senate from Texas since 1870, Goldwater and Tower absent from press briefing of Church Commitee, Stennis-Tower Amendment Republican

IOB

Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB): in the executive branch, doesn't do much anymore as it is mostly filled with political appointees who want titles from the current administration; accountability

IRTPA

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act -create DNI, NCTC -DOD- paramilitary operations; all analytic efforts through topical centers -homeland security

Intentions v. Capabilities

Intentions: What a country/NSA's goals are, determined through SIGINT or HUMINT Capabilities: the (usually military) material capabilities of a countries, determined through OSINT or GEOINT (economic strength, military strength)

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Syria); further complicated the war on terrorism as ISIL has pretensions to being a state, controlling large amounts of territory and people; wide geographic reach

JIC

Joint Intelligence Committee (UK), gives uniform, homogenized view, but includes input from British ambassadors Goal of unified, homogenized info to not clutter brain of Prime Minister→ lose nuances, doesn't show disagreements Ambassadors take a more active role

aggregate intelligence budget

NIP + MIP; 70/30 Average of three years Intelligence budget hidden in DOD budget 85% ; all mip some nip

NIC

National Intelligence Committee (US) Mad of NIOs, responsible for NIEs and some other analyses Office of DNI; really under CIA (based at Langley) Nye, Treverton (Chairs)

NIO

National Intelligence Officers - Members of the National Intelligence Committee who serve as experts and advisors for certain areas related to intelligence and security for the United States. The NIC is composed of NIOs. Lost some of their status through creation of NIMs, each NIO is a part of NIM team as analytical expert NIO specifically for I&W; indicators and warning NIO not consulted about WMDs in Iraq Report directly to DCI Top analysts, create NIEs

NRO

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO): defense intelligence agency; administration organization; manages equipment (satellites), administrative agency for the NSA and NGA; objectives shifted after cold war- more diffuse and more non-state actors

threat assessment

Tiers of threat 1A: Pressing: Elections, Big Four (China, Russia, Iran, NK) 1B: WMD's, Space, Terrorism, new technology 2: Syria, turkey, Iraq/ISIS 3: Africa, Libya, Congo (ebola, Sudan, Europe (Brexit), Western Hemisphere

DIA

analytic organization (tactical intelligence); tries to make sense of what tactical forces do

covert action within intelligence cycle

-not included in intelligence cycle -policy formulation: id of problem, consider options (by decision makers, debunk rogue elephant), decion makers choose option and direct implementation) -intelligence not always driver of decisions -covert action kept secret -long term consequences not considered -intelligence officers are policy makers; attempt to be policy neutral does not apply! -covert action has never not been an option for presidents

Church Commitee

-prompted by family jewels relevations -legislative charters for all intelligence commun

Mondale

Domestic, argument with attorney and NSA, rising star in Senate, mentored by Humphrey, Picked by Carter as running mate, Democrat

dissemination and consumption

Producers to consumers PDB; WIR, DIA/J2 Exec highlights NIE's (long term)

DCI

"Director of Central Intelligence", made weak partially because the army worried a civilian DCI would be harmful to them, leads to weak leadership, Lack of power of DCIS form 1947-2004 + tendency to focus more on CIA responsibilities + individual alliance to Cabinet departments; effectiveness of staff tied to effectiveness of DNI

dni

"Director of National Intelligence", changed to this after IRPTA legislation - currently Dan Coats Now, DNI doesn't have control over CIA (most analysts, 25,000, knowledge is power) Ex.: NIC under DNI, but really under CIA; ironic given purpose of amendments

DCIA

"Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" - currently Gina Haspel (first women to hold this position, she was involved in the torture program) Competition with DNI over PDB and relationship with President; DNI Blair and DCIA Panetta example

HUMINT

"Human intelligence" sending clandestine service officers to foreign countries where they attempt to recruit foreign nationals to spy, the responsibility of the CIA through the DO, but the DIA also has the DCS, Cold War was battle of information All agents in Eastern Europe and Cuba turned against US Stan Turner (DCI- Carter) did not find HUMINT helpful Penkowski- # 1 human asset, star of David in Cuba, scared of death; sent message that Russia bout to strike Was executed by KGB, sometimes had plans for negotiating in hands Even most reliable assets can have unreliable tendencies BUT reliable HUMINT is priceless Helms- limits of TECHINT; need understanding of context Takes 12-15 years to build "spy-ring" DCIA- develop more HUMINT around world; more in NY than anywhere else Harder to surge Larger need for humint post cold war; better for terrorism

MASINT

"Measurement and signatures intelligence" intelligence on weapons capabilities and industrial activities, has six areas of interest: electro-optical, geophysical, materials, nuclear radiation, radar, and radio frequency, consists of collecting and identifying certain physical "signatures" so that when they are seen again, it is quickly understood what has happened, responsibility of the DIA and NGA -Afghanistan- unattended ground sensors- blend in with surroundings and can be linked into a network; many left behind after troops leave Afghanistan Still struggles for recognition, new May need more bureaucratic clout

MONGOOSE

"Primarily a relentless and escalating campaign of sabotage and small Cuban exile raids that would somehow cause the overthrow of Castro," which "also included plans for an invasion of Cuba in the fall of 1962"

SIGINT

"Signals intelligence", responsibility of the NSA (as well as protecting against SIGINT), includes COMINT, TELINT, ELINT, FISINT, but often refers to the interception of communications between two parties but is also the data relayed during weapons tests, electronic emissions from modern weapons and tracking systems -telephone antennas; 1980s-fiber optic cables + adapting to new technologies -STELLAR WIND -can be misused in name of security -ECHELON -risk v. take

fire hose analogy

"intelligence is like a firehose pointed at your mouth" refers to the large amount of information coming at analysts which they must sort through All different disciplines Challenge of processing; NSA metadata

OSINT

"open source intelligence", comes from media, public data, professional and academic sources, found in all the other INTs -95% of stuff that goes to Pres. Cold War- 80% secret, 20% open; reversed today Increased availability after Cold War; denied areas decreased; still requires some P and E Can give context Joseph Nye- Jigsaw puzzle - outer edges McConnell- Starting point for collection Echo or circular reporting is phenomenon

TECHINT

"technology intelligence" covers GEOINT and SIGINT, anything that involves technology -May be easier to surge than humint

Kent

"the father of intelligence analysis", worked in OSS (operational support services) during WWI, then became the head of the ONE (Office of National Estimate) 1952-1967 - policy and intelligence should remain distant 3 wishes of intelligence analyst to know everything, to be believed, and to influence policy for the good → to know as much as possible about a given issue before being asked to write about it Desire to be kept informed about what policy makers are doing to enable the intelligence officer to play a meaningful role

indicators and warning

(I&W): giving policy makers advance warning of significant, usually military, events: primarily a military intelligence function one of the most important role of intelligence; giving policy makers advance warning of significant usually military events; emphasis on this reflects cold war legacy of long-term military rivalry and old roots of US IC in Pearl Harbor, classic failure; primarily military intelligence function- looking for anything out of the ordinary in comparison to the baseline; Can be a trap rather than opportunity; fear of crying wolf; classic failure is 1973 Yom Kippur War Korean War Entirely different concept needed to fight terrorism, catch smaller sigsn of impending activity; police work; obligation to tell citizens? Betts- mysteries, crystal ball

Metadata Surveillance

(STELLAR WIND): program by the NSA looking at the metadata of US citizens (all the data on calls except their content), was revealed by Snowden One program monitored metadata of telephone calls under USA PATRIOT Act- Section 215 Collected number of telphones involved in call, date, time, length; covered by FISC orders; telephone companies compelled to provide requested metadata 2800 volations of NSA Can info be queried if reasonable suspicion Other - PRISM= data base name; targets various internet communications of foreigners outside US; under FISA- section 702 → how Snowden able to access material and then release it; judicial and congressional oversight- failed vote; civil liberties v. national security

Dan Coats

) Current DNI, 2017-present CIA resurgence Previous Senate, House, and diplomat, Army released the DNI's "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community" on January 29, 2019

James R. Clapper Jr.

- 5th DNI, (his predecessors had lots of turnaround after the change from DCI to DNI, he was stable) 2010-2017, "integration", career intelligence guy All source fusion heads were coordinated, good formula; integration of collection and analysis didn't care about facetime, focused on integration Added stability to DNI position Established NIM system Mission manager system (managers oversee both collection and analysis, facilitate alternative analysis) and NIO system- confusion/redundancy; merge two functions Retired from USAF; nomination raised concerns about influence of military in IC National Intelligence Strategy 2014 Expanded FBI's role as coordinator for domestic intelligence; Special Agents in Charge (SACs) in certain cities as DNI representative; domestic equivalent of Chiefs of Station Created DCS

Boren McCurdy Legislation

-presented recommendations of the chairs of Senate and House intelligence Committees -creation of DNI; budgetary authority; two deputy DNIs, one for analysis and estimates and one for intelligence community issues; a separate director of the CIA; subordinate to the DNI; consolidate analytical elements under a deputy DNI

How has War on Terror affected GEOINT

1. Greatly increased use of commercial imagery, 2. UAVs (fly closer to areas and loiter over them + do not put lives at risk + real time images) (but weather effects and potential for hacking), 3. Utility of very small satellites (micro or nano satellites), 4. Space-based imagery capabilities have proliferated

FISA

1978, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; mandated court orders for surveillance; established FISC for this purpose Called for warrantless wiretops under certain conditions, press revealed more extensive use of warrantless wiretaps 9/11 wiretaps against people in US and suspected terrorists 2007 McConnell- warrants on communcications travelling through US, even if both parties both overseas 25 percent drop in intercepts 100 or fewer individuals under surveillance

9/11 errors

9/11: Aspin-Brown commission established in 1995, supposed to look at Ames spy cases, forces in Somalia, looking at the shift in the IC post-Cold War, there was a report created by the CTC, saying that terrorists were going to begin aerial terrorism, but this is lost in a list of several potential disaster and nothing is done, Reports of people learning to fly planes but not land them but nothing done because "insufficient evidence" for warrant, see below at Zacarias Moussaoui and Phoenix memo Another mistake: meeting of terrorists in Bangkok, CIA watches (couldn't get someone inside) but they follow terrorists after they leave, 2 go to San Diego but the CIA agents monitoring them drag their feet, lead to the agents losing the trail and the terrorists become 2 of the 19 involved, despite getting car licenses neither CIA or FBI are able to track

Zacarias Moussaoui

A former Chechen Terrorist who moved to the United States and was living in Michigan. Often known after 9/11 as the "Twentieth Terrorist," as he was part of the Aerial Terrorism team that attacked on 9/11. At the last minute, he was unable to join the unit. Post 9/11, all of the plans for the hijackings were found on his computers. An FBI agent named Crowley stumbled upon the man after he was registered going to flight school with a very specific request - he only wanted to know how to fly a plane, not how to land it or take off with it. The flight instructor reported him to Crowley, who went to the FISA court to get a warrant, but had the request rejected on grounds for "lack of evidence." Crowley later reigned in disgust. Chechen terrorists

high cost low probability event

Aerial terrorism 9/11 Nothing happens b/c low probabily

Phoenix Memo

An FBI agent in Arizona also found out about a terrorist who wanted to learn how to fly roughly five months before the 9/11 attacks, and the FBI said they would keep watch but made no real effort to investigate the potential hijacker. No warrant was served for the potential hijacker, who would go on to participate in the 9/11 attacks Curveball, Chalabi, Al-Libi

Ahmend Chalabi

An english speaking medical Doctor who escaped Iraq and fled to Tel Aviv. He fabricated intelligence that Iraq had WMDs and that the US needed to invade them. It was later found out that Chalabi was actively pining for the US to invade and overthrow the Iraqi government so that he could potentially become the leader of a new Iraqi Government.

Baker

Argument between Church and Baker about providing interim report on assassination in hearings on covert action or public hearings on assassinations (after learning more) Republican, more moderate, skeptical of CIA based on Watergate, potential swing vote

Project MJUltra

CIA mind control program; Experiments on humans were intended to identify and develop drugs and procedures to be used in interrogations in order to weaken the individual and force confessions through mind control. The project was organized through the Office of Scientific Intelligence of the CIA and coordinated with the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories.

Backfire Bomber

CIA thought used to bomb America; Air Force to bomb Europe; document to present both of these views; plane= backfire bomber ; footnotes allowed for policymakers to see both sides

CORONA

CIA's first satellite Reconnaissance program, 1958

COS

Chief of Station (head of CIA command in each country in the world), caused debate between Blair- selected to be DNI by obama; CIA below him Before, DCI picked every COS in world (top CIA officer in country); Blair thought he should be one to pick; thought COS in Australia should be from NSA; Panetta (DCIA), angered by this, Obama sides with Panetta (popular house); blow to DNI Blair Tensions between US ambassadors and COSs+ CIA officers Ambassador in charge of entire country team- all US personnel, regardless of parent organization COS not always kept Ambassador updated on intelligence activities Issues Who does COS represent- DNI or DCIA (think of CIA as home, HUMINT, promotions, evaluations, assignments)

processing and exploitation

Collection far outruns P and E Buying collection systems attractive "Downstream activities" TPEDs problem

current v. long term intelligence in intelligence cycle

Current or daily intelligence is most useful product for policy makers (quick, easy read); summarizes events, explain how they fit into some context, suggest what might happen next, journalistic methodology) → current intellignece hardly ever leads to policy decisions Not designed for specialists Criticism of 9/11; daily publication reported likelihood of terr....but this intelligence product not used for warning In-depth studies; designed to provide in-depth analysis on specific subjects, meant for policy officials at working levels rather than senior decision makers Production grew gradually; studies product b/c analysts are directed by intelligence managers or themselves, not by policy makers Reality of estimates One most likely to drive policy process in theory, but rearely do Forecast of the future, drawn by analysts of all producing agencies Coordinated with dissenting views included; signed off by agency leaders, sent to the top However, policy makers often decide before they receive estimate and hope product will confirm the wisdom of path already chosen; not as useful

analysis and production

Current v. long-term intelligence Groupthink problem Footnote wars- only goal to maintain a separate point of view regardless of salience of issue at stake Goals of increasing connections between collection and analysis ; "analytically driven collection"; integration Mission centers

Woolsey

DCI 1993-1995 View on the "wall" I would remind the president that I'm the DCI, present facts; but then I would let room empty out, stay behind, and then give advice Had little access to to President Bill Clinton Ended up in constant public squabble with chair Senate Intelligence Committee, Dennis DeConcini Said that ECHELON used to detect attempts by European firms to bribe foreign officials to make sales and to uncover the illicit transfer of dual-use technologies

DS&T, DA, DS, DO, DDI: the five branches of the CIA

DS&T: Directorate of Science and Technology- has a role in some technical collection programs Project BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, AND MKULTRA Among its early interests were the use of drugs, hypnosis, and isolation in interrogation.[2] These experiments were conducted under the program Project BLUEBIRD, later known as ARTICHOKE, and MKULTRA, which led to the suicide of Frank Olson, a US Army scientist who was given a dose of LSD.[2][10] Aerial reconnaissance program CORONA spy satellite ELINT In 1958, the OSI made the first significant attempt to measure the power of a radar for intelligence gathering, known as the Quality ELINTprogram. It consisted of installing electronic measuring equipment into a C-119 aircraft, and flying missions, disguised as supply-runs, through the air corridors of Germany.[ DA: Directorate of Analysis; largest producer of all-source intelligence; CIA/DA Analysts are now housed in mission centers alongside DO officers DS: Directorate of Support- The Directorate of Support provides necessary "housekeeping" administration functions, but in a manner consistent with the need to keep their details protected. These functions include personnel, security, communications, and financial operations. DO: Directorate of Operations; similar to DCS in DIA; responsible for both espionage and covert action; Proximate v. distance schools DDI: Directorate of Digital Innovation

intelligence cycle

Direction, collect, processing, analysis, dissemination -failures: -9/11 (Bangkok, CTC aerial terrorism, Moussaoui, Phoenix memo) -WMDs in Iraq (yellow cake uranium, lack of NIE, George Tenet, groupthink, very little middle east expertise, bad HUMINT) -Model of intelligence cycle is unrealistic; how does info goes to Holnick; still somewhat helpful, interchange; sometimes parsimony can be helpful -requirements issues; priority creep, ad hocs, feedback -not necessarily linear

PDB

Distributed only to between 12-20 high-level officials. Contains most important daily intel. Most tightly held document in U.S. About 25 pages long Put together by entire intelligence community Good example of interagency cooperation Begins with TOR (terms of reference) from Langley Identifies priorities for daily brief Call goes out around noon with 5pm deadline → Important to have good relations with consumer CIA continues to dominate despite DNI; most of knowledge power at Langley Interaction with senior briefer from CIA / DCIA / DNI; newspaper that you can talk to for President Importance of informed decisions of president Depends whether intelligence briefing and media is better Classified better with intel Media- politics "Baseball cards" Profiles of foreign leaders Backgrounds, bargaining positions, Most policymakers won't pay attention to intelligence briefings → ex.: PDB, Bin Laden determined to strike U.S. Specificity important People love to read PDB to see what President is reading Bigot list= listing of people who are witting, in the loop when it comes to certain information (PDB); people in the know about information Couple of dozen people "Witting circle" Official people and assistants

Defensive Counterintelligence within intelligence cycle

Do not fit traditional model Often lumped as various aspects of sec. Background checks, polygraph interviews, monitoring of employees, guarding of facilities, protective systems for electronic monitoring, security awareness Secret agreements with CIA, even before submitting chapter

NIE

Estimate; Snowflakes National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): Statement of what is going to happen in any given country, in any area, in any situation, and as far as possible in the future - crown jewel of intel community, because analysts gets to let go - prepared in 2 to 6 months - 80% of NIEs are self-generated, created by intel community initially - because policy makers are very busy they are thinking of new NIE's - policy makers don't like NIE's, but PDB's are sexy and short - NIE's are proactive, and a good source for analysts to get quick info - average of 23 a year No NIE on Iraq Risk of politicization Key Judgements now made public after Iraq WMD; could use these as confirmation of political stances Ended publishing after Iran NIE; can affect willingness of analysts/NIE managers to make strong calls b/c don't want to be in partisan debates NIEs are shorter; judgements now have confidence/probability statements Measure of whether IC is treating issue strategically?

requirements (intelligence cycle)

Evolves as national security priorities change Sometimes policymakers fail to convey priorities to IC; strict line between policy and intelligence Two options: fill requirement vacuum or base collection on past priorities Conflicting and competing priorities NSC and DNI set priorities, but competing departments Based on likelihood of event v. relative importance Resources decided by NIPF from NSC; PIPs + all others Concerns that NIPF does not meet mil. Priorities Priority creep= issues do not receive significant attention until after moving up, must compete with other issues in that bracket ; difficult to move issues back down (static) Ad hocs= unexpected issues (tyranny of ad hocs); cannot be responsive to all of these Mandated for DNI to develop comprehensive national intelligence strategy every four years

feedback (intelligence cycle)

Few policy makers give necessary feedback

Church

Focus on foreign relations, head of committee, ran for presidency, took hardstances, against sensationalization Goals of reform, to hold the investigations as public as possible Initial questions of executive privilege Knew that committee could backfire politically, not looking to gain voter popularity Composition had been a debate, wanted various ages, views, geographical areas, philosophies Committee was mostly lawyers All senators had time before next reelection time to potentially recover Focus on CIA cover action Argument between Church and Baker about providing interim report on assassination in hearings on covert action or public hearings on assassinations (after learning more) Criticism of Church for focusing too much on abuses, can of worms, distraction from "important cases broker and conciliator of ideas, did fight tough battles though (assassination plots, NSA surveillance, assassination plots, etc.) Balancing act Democract

Haspel

Gina Haspel, Current D/CIA, first woman to hold that position, May 21, 2018- Haspel speech, DCIA Shift from CT to more espionage against strategic states Increase # of officers stationed overseas Analysts go to brush up on language skills, gain some knowledge, not to stay DO people Understaffed Larger foreign footprint How many people will be DOCs? Need more of these Limits to info you can gain from an embassy Bring those fluent in Arabic, Chinese, Urdu, French, spanish, Russian, Farsi Work with allies across the world → Liaison mission "deeply involved up to her scuppers" in torture programs

counterintelligence within the intelligence cycle

Largely defensive in nature, is not part of traditional intellgience cycle Earlier forms→ = counterespionage Today more diverse Countering terrorism, narcotics flows, global organized crime, and subversion Counterintelligence methodology is unique Must be able to locate evildoers Penetration (moles) Cold War Some cases of foreign service moles Some US intelligence officers gave away US secrets to soviets Harder with terrorist groups Surveillance (physical or technical) Mounted against potential targets as decision by intelligence managers; stricter rules in the US; legal process to get a warraent against a US citizen, resident alien, US person Informants Not recruited, but report suspicians to authorities Flight school managers before 9/11 Can have weaknesses; 2002 sniper crisis Intelligence derived from captured or detained individuals Post 9/11 detainment of Middle Eastern Muslims, required to register with government, not US citizens; harsh conditions and poorly treated Taliban fighters in Guantanamo Naval base; US legal rules did not apply; torture Detainnes from Iraq, imprisoned at some of Hussein's former prisons; Abu Ghraib Worst abuses Best interrogation methods not applied post 9/11; abhorrent; torture counterproductive Can use info to piece things together

FBI

Law enforcement; most visibility Counterintellignece role (neglected stepchild) (mainly collection, some analysis) Role changing since 9/11; tangled lines of jurisdiction with CIA Robert Mueller

collection- intelligence cycle

Most focus Single source v. all-source analysts Wheat v chaff problem; increased collection increases task of findnign truly important intelligence (more haystacks does not necessarily get more needles)

mysteries

Mystery: something no one may know- who built stonehenge, who will win election; policymakers can get this confused with secrets Secret: something which is known to someone and can be uncovered- ex.: Iran's details and intent of nuclear program- Iranians know this

challenges to production intelligence cycle

Myth of finished product being disseminated to policy officials; distorted Depends on type of intelligence product being delivered: Warning intelligence (breaking news) Current intellignence (update consumers on world events) In-depth studies on particular sit. Or issues Forecasts of the future → none realyl drive policy process Failure detecting Indian nuclear test 1998; 9/11 terorirst attakcs → policy officials expect intelligence system to be all-knowing, all-seeing, and always correct; is intelligence failure inevitable?

Bett's Famous Conclusion

No matter how much you spend on intelligence, mistakes will be made. There are no crystal balls. (can make no "Betts" on the future)

Curveball

Rafid Ahmed Alwan) - Pakistani scientist who had been working in Iraq who German intelligence made into an agent. Curveball explained that the Iraqi government had stockpiled large amounts of nuclear and chemical WMDs. The Germans dutifully passed this intelligence on to the US. It was later found out that Curveball was a pathological liar who simply wanted a cushy salary from the Germans.

MOCKINGBIRD

Recruitment of American journalists for CIA work

requirements; tasking

Requirements: defining those policy issues or areas to which intelligence is expected to make a contribution, as well as decisions about which of these issues has priority over the others Uncertainty about exact nature of relationship between policymakers and IC Policy agenda→ hard to cover everything, to change/know what to expect, limited resources, adhocs NIPF updated, IC responsible for insuring resource there for most important issues Evolves as national security priorities change Sometimes policymakers fail to convey priorities to IC; strict line between policy and intelligence Two options: fill requirement vacuum or base collection on past priorities Conflicting and competing priorities NSC and DNI set priorities, but competing departments Based on likelihood of event v. relative importance Resources decided by NIPF from NSC; PIPs + all others Concerns that NIPF does not meet mil. Priorities Priority creep= issues do not receive significant attention until after moving up, must compete with other issues in that bracket ; difficult to move issues back down (static) Ad hocs= unexpected issues (tyranny of ad hocs); cannot be responsive to all of these Mandated for DNI to develop comprehensive national intelligence strateyg every four years → crisis-drive requirements; current v. long-range intelligence victory Some matters receive less attention; and then can be unprepared; only so many resources; ex.: predicting Russia getting involved in syria Active combat and active intelligence operations tend to overwhelm other issues COCOM - call up national assets for any and all emergencies in AOR- try to shift away from this to theater intelligence assets Tasking: assigning agents/analysts to research a particular topic

Helms

Richard M. Helms, DCI 1966-1973, career intelligence honorable men quote- intelligence officials are honorable and do not need oversight Brakes v. horsepower, security v. liberty high, impermeable wall between intelligence officers and policymakers→ preserve objectivity, reduce politicization "When the NSC gathers, you are all policy wonks, have opinions; but here am I Helms, not policy wonk; make sure that facts are placed on the table! Helms testimony→ authority ambiguous, doctrine of plausible denial Richard Helms expunging intel reports Info on first strike capability of Soviet nuclear arsenal Did not send out intel report on Cambodia before Nixon ordered troops Indicated that operation would fail to thwart N Vietnamese efforts to gain supremacy Quote by DCI Helms, if one were to create I.C. from scratch, would still look similar; services are diverse Soft politicization→ Helms, Johnson did not want different opinion, wanted unified, bent to policy pressure Helms, pressure Nixon, Soviet estimates, improve estimates; made changes; pressured by Kissinger Still pushed out of political process

Gates

Robert M. Gates, DCI 1991-1993, career intelligence Graph NIEs per year Movement away from research/ long-term Spike 1991, DCI Gates loved NIEs Pushed for politicizatoin Gates Approach Actionable intelligence Policy staff have idea of what they need IC lacks time to conduct the independent, in-depth research needed to uncover threats and trends not on current policy agenda Lack of focus on Al Qaeda Gates Task Force 1991 DCI Gates comprehensive reexamination of post-Cold War Intelligence Community 14 sep. task forces Reorganized, analysis more responsive to decision makers, new process for human source intelligence, new offices for open source information and improve CIA support of military Central Imagery Office created under joint control of DCI and the Sec. of Defense -Boren-McCurdy Leg. Defuse regional crisis by allaying false perceptions of the other sides activities (DCI Gates did this in early 90's with India & Pakistan) Created centers, most of which focused on transnational issues- terrorism, nonproliferation, narcotics, etc. Criticism during second nomination hearing- Gates altered analyses of Soviet Union to meet policy makers' preferences; withdrew nomination Reagan during Iran-Contra Affairs; renominated 1991 Bush

COINTELPRO

Series of covert projects by FBI; surveilling, infiltrating, discrediting, disrupting domestic political organizations Civil rights movement, Black power, COmmunist Party, Vietnam war protest, Ku Klux Klan, Minuteman

SOCMINT

Social media intelligence, considered subset of OSINT; can be useful especially with terrorism, runs into privacy concerns; ex.: participants in Arab Spring Revolt against Mubarak identified through Twitter; Boston Marathon Bomber misidentified by social media intelligence

Stan Turner

Stan Turner: Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, DCI March 9, 1977-January 20, 1981 Stunned by different cultures just within the CIA Ex. analyst= nerds, collectors= interpersonal, get out and do things Rubs people the wrong way Library truth v. ground truth Bonafides agent stance- would not kill diplomat, exfiltrated asset; terrorist example Did not find HUMINT helpful Halloween massacre

SMO

Support for Military Operations; US budget is directed this way How IC is formed; one of highest intelligence demands

agent acquisition cycle

Targeting or spotting, - identifying individuals who have access to the information that the U.S. may desire accessing (asset validation system)- gaining their confidence and assessing their weaknesses and susceptibility to be recruited; done via the asset validation system recruiting (make pitch)- making a pitch to them, suggesting a relationship; a source may accept a pitch for a variety of reasons: money, disaffection with their government, or thrills; U.S. clandestine service officers state very firmly that blackmail is not used at least by them, to recruit spies Push - blackmail Pull- incentives handling (manage the asset) Termination- ending the relationship for any of several reasons- unreliability, a loss of access to needed intelligence, a change in intelligence requirements, and so on developmental= a potential source who is being brought along to the point where the developmental can be pitched May rely on sub-source Must meet regularly with officer, holding meetings in secret Diplomatic reporting is also type of HUMINT, although traditional sometimes preferred Requires time to develop HUMINT; clandestine officers have to learn a lot of skills and maintain their cover stories Official cover- government job, often at embassy; raises risk of being suspected as agent Immune from prosecution Persona non grata- expelled from country- US embassy official Ryan Fogle in Moscow; attempting to recruit source; Russia revleaed name of CIA chief of station in Moscow as retaliation Nonofficial cover- avoid overt connection, can be more difficult to keep in contact with government Issues with difference in pay cover and actual pay Do not have diplomatic status Clergy and peace corps off limits Journalists = ideal cover; but many protests Bad example- hepatitis vaccination problem; militants killed dozens of public health workers; tried to extract DNA from area where Bin Laden was livign New tech might make this more difficutl

TPEDs

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

Intelligence Producer

The 17 intelligence agencies of the United States

prior restraint

The attempt to restrain prior to the publication of a story the information within said story. Basically, the CIA (or some other agency) goes to the journalist and requests that they don't publish said sensitive information. Sometimes there are successful negotiations, sometimes there aren't. Media NY Times, went back and didn't publish, and did not even -version of compartmentation

Aerial terrorism

The prospect of terrorists utilizing hijacked aircraft as weapons of terror against the United States, either by hijacking the planes or filling them with explosives before flying them into US skyscrapers. This was first reported in a 1995 study from the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), and while it did reach the Oval Office, it was not exploited. Aspin Brown, Phoenix Memo, Mouassoui-Crowley High cost, low risk While there are reasons for this info not being exploited, it was embedded in a report that contained 45 other potential terrorist threats, which didn't help making it a priority.

traffic analysis; chatter

Traffic Analysis: monitoring changes in communications, has more to do with volume and pattern of communications than it does with the content Chatter: refers to less precise intelligence than to patterns of intelligence: communications and movements of known or suspected terrorists Tracking the amount of information; if it surges, should catch your attention Also important to pay attention if there is no traffic "Chatter"- reference to oral conversations (SIGINT?) Ex.: tracking ISIS lieutenants, information surge now called geospatial metadata analysis (importance to pinpoint location of sender/receiver)

cops v. spies dilemma

US does not have domestic intelligence service like MI-5 in GB or DST in France Relied on FBI (law enforcement org.) to gather counterintelligence and bring lawbreakers to Jusirce Barriers between national intelligence services (mostly abroad) and DBI (role in counterintelligence) Joint CIA and FBI team with Ames Since 9/11 barriers between FBI nad CIA weakened FBI may levy requirements on the US intelligence services to collect info specific to domestic needs Newly created National Security Branch (older counterterrorism and CI units with new intelligence bureau created after 9/11) Greater collaboration between FBI and CIA, but barriers still exist

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV): controversial new program which sometimes engages in assassinations, controlled by the CIA, large increase in usage under Obama and Trump Calls today for more transparency with UAVs and NSA collection programs; DNI Clapper 2015 released principles for transparency (fly closer to areas and loiter over them + do not put lives at risk + real time images) (but weather effects and potential for hacking) activity based intelligence + full motion video Issues: Processing and exploitation, large volume Weapons platforms, should intelligence conduct this or DOD, kill US citizens? Cyber attack vulnerability Unilateral advantage and permissive environments ; nation states are not permissive Export sale of drones Controversies of UAV operations in US

GEOINT

Used to be IMINT (Imagery intelligence), now "Geospatial Intelligence", responsibility of NGA, "information about any object--natural or man-made that can be observed or reference to the Earth and has national security implications" but mostly means intelligence based on photos, technology advance from planes to U2 to satellites -resolution power classified -averted invasion Cuban Missile crisis- aircrafts and U2 over Cuba -lots of potential environmental work -challenges with terrorists -self revela -need for more photo intepreters -negation search -shutter control issue

PHOENIX

Vietnam covert intelligence/assassination operation.

WMD errors

We send CIA operatives in the UN inspection group, Iraq kicked us out entirely: we go blind As rumors go wild about WMDs in Iraq, they are too afraid of being wrong and extrapolate from their past conclusions that Iraq is close to having nuclear capabilities MI6 is doing the same thing, they tell Tony Blair that Iraq probably has chemical weapons, but they are only capable of being used if Iraq was invaded, Blair goes out and announces that Iraq has WMDs which could strike UK soil--no one resigns, some say contradictions would be "futile" Curveball: Rafid Ahmed Alwan (see above), Ahmend Chalabi (Iraqi National Congress): see above Idn Al-Saykh Al-Libi: see above Human intelligence: very poor Little expertise on the Middle East in general Yellow Cake Uranium: Cheney heard rumor from Italian intelligence that Saddam bought 50 tons of yellow cake uranium, but there is no evidence according to Ambassador Wilson, he becomes very angry and outs Wilson's wife (effectively blowing her cover), put it in the State of the Union address anyways George Tenet: knew that the Department of Energy, and Air Force strongly disagreed with the WMD conclusion, and he (as DCI) ignored this dissent and did not tell the president, because he wanted to go along with the President's plans (being part of the club) Final Conclusion: Bush administration did not care that much what intelligence said, they wanted to avenge Iraq. Why? Revenge against the attempt on his father's life, oil, help democratize region,

Bill Colby

William E. Colby, DCI September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976, featured in Season of Inquiry, career intelligence Operation Phoenix Cooperated with Church investigation Tries to add context to CIA assassination plot, "explain that they had another significance than guilt" Identify and destroy Vietcong Similar to Schwarz in style, lawyer Collecting chronologies Testimony by Colby, Helms, several CIA scientists→ agency had spent $3 million to develop poisons and biochemical weapons during past 18 years Diffuse disease carrying gas in NY subway to test Ambiguities in processing requests to destroy the poisons p. 73 top est. National Intelligence Officer system in lieu of Board of Estimates; appointed 6 NIOs

Snowflakes

a few sentences of intel communications, written; if it didn't make it to the PDB, few sentences that was not included

Team A Team B

a form of competitive analysis where a team of intelligence analysts and a team of outside participants look at the same data and draw conclusions, famous example of soviet intentions when team B concluded the soviets were overall interested in conquest; example was why Team A- CIA agents Team B- Russian defectors; Soviets attack, hit them Intent v. capabilities

modus operandi

a particular way or method of doing something, especially one that is characteristic or well-established Way before CIA did things before oversight; covert action Deutsch rule

UAV issues

activity based intelligence + full motion video Issues: Processing and exploitation, large volume Weapons platforms, should intelligence conduct this or DOD, kill US citizens? Cyber attack vulnerability Unilateral advantage and permissieve environemtns ; nation states are not permisive Export sale of drones Controversies of UAV operations in US

Competitive Analysis

an idea that is based on the belief that by having analysts in several agencies with different backgrounds and perspectives work on the same issue, parochial views more likely will be countered—if not weeded out—and proximate reality is more likely to be achieved. Footnoting → Key judgements (executive summary for reports) (test question) Movement to capture dissent Footnotes not included in this Team B/Team A by having competing analysts in several agencies, closer to proximate reality; antidote to groupthink and forced consensus (ex.: dangers of forced consensus during pre-war assessment of Iraq's WMD) Requires certain cost; many analysts in several agencies This function mostly lost during 1990s due to lack of analysts 23000 positions lost during 1990s under Tenet→ tendency for agencies to focus on certain issues exclusively; analytical traige estimative process that yields winners and losers, having different agencies with different points of view work on the same issue

INR

analytic organization in State Department; diplomatic cable

confidence levels

based on the scope and quality of information supporting our key judgments: high, moderate, low, tells the reader how sure they are of the validity of the intelligence

HTLINGUAL

beginning in the 1950s, the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation had intercepted, opened and photographed more than 215,000 pieces of mail by the time the program (called "HTLINGUAL") was shut down in 1973. This program was all done under the "mail covers" program (a mail cover is a process by which the government records—without any requirement for a warrant or for notification—all information on the outside of an envelope or package, including the name of the sender and the recipient). The Church report found that the CIA was careful about keeping the United States Postal Service from learning that government agents were opening mail. CIA agents moved mail to a private room to open the mail or in some cases opened envelopes at night after stuffing them in briefcases or in coat pockets to deceive postal officials

STELLAR WIND

bypass 1978 surveillance act (needed warrant, wiretap course) Metadata Surveillance (STELLAR WIND): program by the NSA looking at the metadata of US citizens (all the data on calls except their content), was revealed by Snowden -One program monitored metadata of telephone calls under USA PATRIOT Act- Section 215 Collected number of telephones involved in call, date, time, length; covered by FISC orders; telephone companies compelled to provide requested metadata 2800 violations of NSA Can info be queried if reasonable suspicion Other - PRISM= data base name; targets various internet communications of foreigners outside US; under FISA- section 702 -HOW Snowden able to access; judicial and congressional oversight

politicization

changing intelligence to meet political goals; should be avoided Helms→ high, impermeable wall between intelligence officers and policymakers→ preserve objectivity, reduce politicization; Politicization might occur in any situation; if pulled, then know that info is relevant Politicized intelligence = line separating policy and intelligence are crossed; intelligence officials not allowed to make policy recommendations based on their analysis Argument for fixed terms of intelligence official debate Ex.: WMD Iraq Accusations most likely with NIEs; support key policy decisions Overt politicization- less common Operation Market Garden, Rhine River Samuel Adama, Vietnam war, Bush outed Valerie Plama, Ambassadors Wilson's wife Inadvertent politicization Positive v. negative estimates Bureaucratic death General Westmoreland Harder to manage politicizaiton with information revolution Soft politicization- constrains intel leaders from being blunt about estimates that are frankly at odds with policy beliefs and preferences Avoiding politicization→ intel officials steer clear of policy world, renders intel irrelevant; fear is more dangerous than politicization itself? Betts- is polticization necessary to maintain relevancy See Ch. 14 article Soft politicization can amplify analytical errors by discouraging re-assessment; intelligence agencies are bureaucratically disinclined from objective reassessments after they stak out strong and unequivocal positions

MKNAOMI

code name for a joint Department of Defense/CIAresearch program lasting from the 1950s through the 1970s. Unclassified information about the MKNAOMI program and the related Special Operations Division is scarce. It is generally reported to be a successor to the MKULTRA project and to have focused on biological projects including biological warfare agents—specifically, to store materials that could either incapacitate or kill a test subject and to develop devices for the diffusion of such materials. Cave of Bugs

challenges intelligence collection

collection managers cannot wait for guidance in regards to gaps in the intelligence data Some variables in intelligence hard to control Satellites not always flexible May take time to find spy (HUMINT) OSINT (Open source) requires planning Real drivers of intelligence collection process are intelligence managers, not policy officials Do not always need new intelligence material to understand world events (large data base); incremental addition of new intelligence may modify process but does not drive it Analyzing consists of comparing new material with the existing data base and previous analysis Ex. of failure of only relying on one source→ WMD estimate in Iraq

NGA

collection organization; photographs; military budget is expensive due to satellites (NRO-administrative; manages, designs, produces, puts up satellites in orbit GEOINT

Key judgements

come with intelligence estimates created for policy makers: the IC's opinion of what is most likely, cover page or two saying what the overwhelming agreement of the NIE is Movement to capture dissent How policy makers use these; little time- get summary from key judgements

Ibn Al-Shaykh Al-Libi:

computer specialist for Al-Qaeda; played a role in the 1998 embassy bombings. He was expatriated by the CIA to Cairo in the early 2000s, where he was interrogated and tortured by Egyptian intelligence for information on the Iraqi WMD program and potential connections between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi Government. Under the pressure of torture, Al-Libi lied about how the Iraqi government had WMDs and was thus used as a source of intelligence for the invasion of Iraq.

soft politicization

constrains intel leaders from being blunt about estimates that are frankly at odds with policy beliefs and preferences Soft politicization can amplify analytical errors by discouraging re-assessment; intelligence agencies are bureaucratically disinclined from objective reassessments after they stak out strong and unequivocal positions Soft politicization may render intelligence unable to persuade policymakers Policymakers are likely to trust own sources if intel deteriorates; Engaging in soft politicization means that intelligence officials are deliberately withholding details that might challenge policy beliefs

current v. research intelligence

decrease over time of research intelligence in comparison Current intelligence: reports and analysis on issues that may not extend more than a week or two into the future, "pays rent" for intelligence community, PDB, currently makes up about 85% of all intelligence Research intelligence: NIE; snowflakes

compartmentation

decreasing the amount of information spreading to prevent leakage

NSA

defense intelligence agency; collection organization; two purposes- listening to telephone conversations and code-breaking reputation, wiretapping, Snowden revelations; collection Signals intelligence (telephone); Russian signals- often false, disinformation Code breaking- mathematical puzzles; change code every single day Requires translation "Never say anything"; archance STELLARWIND

Sources and methods

details of collection capabilities, highly classified One of primary concerns of entire IC, task specifically assigned by law to directors of national intelligence Several levels of classification are in use Driven by concerns that the disclosure of capabilities will allow those nations that are collecting targets to take steps to prevent collection, thus effectively negating the collection systems Goal of counterintelligence is to protect

footnote wars

endless notes of which the only goal is to maintain a separate point of view regardless of the salience of the issue at stake

Niche Intelligence

ex.: breaking with tradition: trump skips president's written intelligence report and relies on oral briefings Trying to fit needs of intelligence consumers/ policy makers Good as long as don't politicize

Rockefeller Commission

family jewels report; focused on proposals to prevent recurrence and to direct CIA to solely foreign intelligence activities

all source fusion

fusion-intelligence, intel based on as many collection sources as possible to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength

Worst Case Analysis

gauging the worst level of threat a state is likely to face, generally in combat; useful for defense planners to overcommit forces, can be useless for analysts

ECHELON

government program that searches through collected SIGINT for economic espionage, some claim it was used to steal advanced technology secrets from other countries -Five Eyes; late 1960s; monitored military and diplomatic communications of Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc

Goldwater

had known about the President consenting to covert action→ unrest old timer, seemed protective of CIA, one of most popular conservatives criticisms- no putting blame on Kennedys for Cuba Goldwater and Tower absent from press briefing

Verification

he ability to ascertain whether treaty obligations were being met; trust but verify

Self licking ice cream cone

how intel agencies might act if disconnected from policy priorities

counterintelligence model

identification→ penetration → exploitation→ interdiction → claim success Exploitation= process of learning as much as possible about bad guys before moving against them Seomteimes cut short if pressure Case of Lackawanna Six interdiction= arresting law breakers or pre-empting their operations Pre-emption sometimes preferred course of action US Predator missile in Yemen Drone aircraft launched against Ayman al-Zawahiri Sometimes innocent victims slain with intended target Claiming success Rare step, normally want to keep successes secret so they can be repeated "The secret of our success is the secret of our success" (CIA) Going public can be good for PR (Hoover) Failures usually go public quickly Admiral Turner became director of CIA→ Public affairs office Tenet - respond to media Goss- more secret "CIA can neither confirm nor deny allegations of intelligence activity"

foreign liasion

important adjunct to HUMINT is capabilities of allied or friendly services; ex.: war against terrorists in Afganistan and Pakistan; work with Pakistan intelligence; collab with Saudi intelligence- stop bombs sent from Yemen to US ; meet with someone

SHAMROCK

in which the major telecommunications companies shared their traffic with the NSA from 1945 to the early 1970s. The information gathered in this operation fed directly into the Watch List. In 1975, the committee decided to unilaterally declassify the particulars of this operation, against the objections of President Ford's administration

stovepiping issues collection and analysis process/relationship

intelligence collection and analysis process may operate independent of each other (stovepiping) Due to restrictions info sharing, psychological barriers, fears of compromising sources, security concerns Used to be physical barriers; now distrust Different pesonality types and stereotypes Fear that each other would mishandle Efforts to inc. communication between the two not always successful Degree of stovepiping varies depending on agency (DIA- mostly analytic) Mixed bag→ establishment of centers where representatives can talk easily to counterparts in order to promote communication; 9/11 Counterterrorism center did not share all information CTC morphed into National Counterterrorism Center controlled by DNI

Analysis and Production

intelligence is given to analysts and turned into reports for policymakers Current v. long-term intelligence Groupthink problem Footnote wars- only goal to maintain a separate point of view regardless of salience of issue at stake Goals of increasing connections between collection and analysis ; "analytically driven collection"; integration Mission centers

bean counting

intelligence products that tally up the number of forces, equipment, and manpower in foreign militaries, critics do not see this insightful or analytical however it is necessary (knew every single Soviet weapons system); some guesswork involved, but Soviets were relatively conservative in world spread (buffer of Soviet satellites)-> didnt have to expect assault all the time Tech evolution (bomber planes→ U2, satellites) arguing that tracking the military inventories was undertaken largely to justify bigger defense budgets (intel products that tally up the number of forces, equipment & man powers in foreign militaries)

Actionable Intelligence

intelligence you can act upon, usually very specific, best form of intelligence New goal after 9/11 Had lack of actionable intel; Al Qaeda- red light blinking Lack of specificity; FBI and CIA did not share (different cultures and bureaucracies, and pride and divisions)

Operation Gladio

is the codename for clandestine "stay-behind" operations of armed resistance that was planned by the Western Union (WU), and subsequently by NATO, for a potential Warsaw Pactinvasion and conquest in Europe. Although Gladio specifically refers to the Italian branch of the NATO stay-behind organizations, "Operation Gladio" is used as an informal name for all of them. Stay-behind operations were prepared in many NATO member countries, and some neutral countries

Risk v. take

issue in SIGINT, specifically in COMINT, need to consider the value of intelligence that is going to be collected (to take) against the risk of discovery (either in political terms or collection technology that will be revealed to another nation)

the wall

line that intel people can't cross into policy world Richard Helmes - must be a wall between intel officers & policy makers, to preserve objectivity to reduce politicization to zero - when NSC, all are policy wogs, Helems is there to ensure facts are placed on table - so many politicians, need someone who will be straight up Gates believes the opposite, Anti-Helems - climbing over the wall - it's okay to give your opinion

Oleg Penkovsky

most important CIA asset in the Cold War; he gave the intel about the Star of David configuration about nuclear weapons in Cuba during Cuban Missile Crisis 1 human asset, star of David in Cuba, scared of death; sent message that Russia bout to strike Was executed by KGB, sometimes had plans for negotiating in hands Even most reliable assets can have unreliable tendencies BUT reliable HUMINT is priceless Walk-ins - volunteer HUMINT sources ex: Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet Union

co location

offices of analysts and operatives are located close to each other in Langley; helps facilitate cooperation and communication (original idea) place people with intelligence experience in different agencies→ integration (new idea)

Deustch Rule

ohn Deutch (D/CIA under Clinton) took on the DO; do not hire anyone on CIA payroll who has been in gross violation of human rights; amendment: Unless they can help us fight terrorism

challenge to requirements step of intelligence cycle

olicy makers/ intelligence consumers do not provide guidance to intelligence managers to begin intelligence process Can sometimes indicate main concerns, but not main drivers of intelligence process Managers often have to take initiative to connect with policy makers System of National Intelligence Topics created during Carter Center (Key Intelligence Questions); sometimes policy consumers failed to submit NITs or KIQs Intelligence managers have to make decisions about subjects that ought to be covered; guidance comes from within system → filling in gaps is what drives the intelligence collection process, not guidance from policy makers

cia

only intelligence agency not embedded in policy department (better objectivity)

indication and warning

outside of pattern -after pearl harbor -one of primary goals of intelligence -boy crying wolf

cherry-picking

part of the dissemination cycle: subset of politicization (only using intel from a previous report that supports your preconceived notions)

Aspin-Brown Commission

put together in 1995 to look at (a) Aldrich Ames- spy in CIA working for Soviets (b) intelligence failure in Somalia; wanted to examine refocusing from Cold War to a wide range of global issues (poisonous snakes) Said IC needed to function more as a true community, overcome agency barriers Recommended closer tie between intelligence and policy to improve direction of roles, collection, analysis Second deputy DCI for IC Fixed six year term for deputy DCI responsible for CIA Realignment of intelligence budget under discipline managers reporting to DCI Transfer Defense HUMINT Service clandestine recruitment role to the CIA DO

gorillas in the stovepipes

referring to the large personalities of the people leading each of the intelligence agencies, from the phrase "The IC is a series of gorillas in the stovepipes" -each of 17 intel agencies; each by itself is silo/world, each led by a gorilla (not 800 lb gorilla who leads Sec Def) → series of gorilla in the stovepipes -Dan Coats, DNI, 16 gorillas who want to go their own way, all going different directions -Sec Def / department of war dates back; DNI 2004

tradecraft

refers to the techniques, methods and technologies used in modern espionage (spying) and generally, as part of the activity of intelligence. This includes general topics or techniques (dead drops, for example), or the specific techniques of a nation or organization (the particular form of encryption (encoding) used by the National Security Agency, for example).

FIS Court

set up by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1979 Chief justice of US slects FISC members among sitting federal judges; 11 FISC judges from at least seven judicial circuits; one miust be from District Court of D.C. Criticism about secrecy, only one party is representing Permanent public advocate to argue against government applications? No investigateive powers, dependent on intelligence agencies to report noncompliance with its orders NSA leaks Snowden- approved metadata program, calls to release court proceedings USA Freedom Act- basis for warrants more specific Court similar to FISC for drone attacks?

signals v. noise

signals one wishes to receive and to know are often embedded in a great deal of surrounding noise"; wheat v. chaff, vacuum cleaner

PFIAB/PIAB

supposed to advise the president, but often become dumping grounds for campaign contributors PFIAB: "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board", renaming of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities created by Eisenhower, but changed to PFIAB in 1961 by JFK Reagan changed it- Iran Contra PIAB: "President's Intelligence Advisory Board", renamed during the Obama administration (renamed after IRTPA, Foreign becomes intelligence brings in scientists + social scientists; low profile; some status Land (Eisenhower) invented cameras- revolutionized cameras on satellites Kissinger has become campaign dumping ground, reward; not making large contributions today Team A- Team B

Hughes Glomar Explorer

surveillance satellite spots fire on sinking Soviet submarine, E. Howard Hughes lends a boat to collect the submarine under the cover of an oil ship, they pull it up but half the sub falls off, media leak leads to them being unable to get the second half (interesting instance of the NYT cooperating with the CIA), brought up in season of inquiry: Goldwater loved, Church thought it was a waste Sunken Soviet submarine; known based on surveillance satellite "Red plume of fire" Looking for Russian ICBM launch IMINT/GEOINT Weapons plans or coding information E. Howard Hughes→ magnesium module mining as one of his business investments Knew precisely where submarine was based on technology Soviet destroyers found those looking for submarine Use of cables to bring it up Cables wrenched, half of submarine fell Retrieved and bring it back to LA Journalists heard about it in a bar; published on NY Times Colby disgruntled by it, now Soviet intelligence knows about it; can't retrieve the other part of the submarine Goldwater- great use of 200 million dollars; Church viewed this as excessive Legendary CIA

challenges to analysis intelligence cycle

telligence collection and analysis operate in parallel Raw reporting usually goes to policy makers and analysts at about the same time Watch centers at policy agencies Raw intelligence may be incomplete, contradictory, or just wrong; dangers of raw reporting as officials may view this as being judged and evaluated

Deception

the target can use knowledge to transmit false information to a collector Denial and deception (D&D) Target can use knowledge about collection capabilities of an opponent to avoid collection (denial), target can use same knowledge to transmit info to a collector (deception) Ex.: Soviet Union tried to convince US it had more strategic bombers than it actually had; inflation Inflation might prevent attack D-Day operation, falsifying maps of UK → Increasing amount of resources dedicated to D and D Can lead to a potential pitfall of self-deception

analytical stovepipes

the three all-source analytical groups exist to serve specific policy makers, efforts to manage and coordinate their activities with bureaucratic imperatives and a clears preference for responsibilities reveals this, each of the 17 agencies in their own silo, unconnected -technical and non-technical processes have end-to end processes -swarm ball -competing authorities -stovepipes within stovepipes --appears in all-source community; CIA's DA, DIA Directorate of Intelligence, INR exist to serve specific policy makers and come together on a variety of community analyses (usually NIEs);

processing

turning the material into something digestible to the reader needle in haystack issues Finding info in noise Translation, photo interpreters 500 billion telephone conversations Greatest challenge at NSA Processing Advanced computer technology; watch list- words will trigger Terrorism, bombing, etc. → filter through Collection far outruns P and E Buying colelction systems attractive "Downstream activities" TPEDs problem Increased reliance of UAVs exacerbates this problem

Collection Overload

wheat v. chaff, vacuum cleaner, noise v signals; needle in a haystack