Korean Politics Readings

Joan E. Cho and Paul Y. Chang: Socioeconomic Foundations of South Korea's Democracy Movement

"Miracle on the Han River" Occurred under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan Massive economic growth Autocratic leader suppressed all forms of dissidence Focus on consolidating democracy Able to transition from conservative to progressive rule and vice versa Industrial Complex Export oriented Increased women's employment opportunities Specialized industrial complex Related industries together Free exchange of technology Econ growth meant more political legitimacy for leaders Thus more support for authoritarian regimes Higher Education Was intended to help with the strong central government Wanted a more skilled labor force This would support the rapid industrialization drive Technical and industrial curriculum Huge increase in number of vocational schools Labor Movement 1987 Manifest with the "Great Workers' Struggle: Huge strikes between July and Sept 1987 Due to accumulated past struggles Industrial complex with dorms allowed for easy organization communication for labor mobilization Churches also allowed for more interaction and organization as well Student Movement 4.19 Student Revolution 1960- students marched on presidential house protesting Syngman Rhee State violence shocked society Military would not mobilize to support government Police killed over 100 students Gwangju massacre May 18, 1980 Escalated the contest between the state and students Students and civilians took up arms against military sent in by Chun Doo-hwan Helped solidify Chun's power Spurred student;s convictions to engage in a revolutionary anti-government movement Students opened up to more radical ideologies Seoul 1973 Protest October 2, 1973 at Seoul National University Led to Park issuing emergency decrees Made student organizations illegal Micheong incident 1000 students rounded up

Van Jackson: Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Adversary in a Contested Regional Order: The "Trilemma" of US-North Korea Relations

A Threat to Successful Deterrence Maintain stability through deterrence A Threat to the Nuclear Taboo Focus on nuclear proliferation threat DPRK is A Threat to the Regional Order Focus on US role to sustain regional order How to get out of this trilemma US Presidents must step out from previous methods, take a gamble or DPRK will take advantage of the status quo

Seung-mi Han: The New Community Movement: Park Chung-Hee and the Making of State Populism in Korea

A compromise between the political and economic imperatives of the time and succeeded in mobilizing people's energy Meant to improve the quality of life and a political means to buttress the slipping popularity of the gov't among the rural population Increased rice prices to suppress grain imports and attain food security, though it would stop and the econ gap would increase again Spiritual training as a form of thought control to discipline society Non-economc, mental/social issues were addressed in order for economy to prosper Assumed the culture of poverty, that laziness, despair, and intemperance, was behind the slow economic growth in the countryside Though, it wasn't that people didn't work harder, rather there weren't enough resources to work 'Industrialize first, invest in agriculture later' approach Chaebols (large conglomerates) and farmers were the greatest supporters to Park's rule Park created symbiotic relationship w/ govt and business sector by strategically distributing or withholding favors, and in return, chaebol remained his faithful allies NCM mobilized countryside while keeping it poor to encourage urban migration NCM's popularity was due to its connection to Korea's modernization and economic success Common ground in state populism and minjung ideology which provided a social framework for rural villagers NCM tried to legitimize the government and capitalism NCM leaders from humble backgrounds were encouraged to tell their success stories—no one wants a leader who boasts education or lineage, stamina and drive should be all it takes Mix of Confucianism (as ruling ideology)/Non-Confucianism (means of mobilization Non-Confucianism Young and motivated individuals in their 40s with insignificant family backgrounds were mobilized by the state to check on the traditional elites The rich and powerful were obligated to lend their manpower or livestock to the community Tradition of village council pushed away—no more hierarchical lineage Confucianism Village elders were given no real power, but were ideological upholders of the regime in Confucian loyalty and filial piety NCM succeeded in mobilizing the country by appealing to newly reinforced egalitarian ethos—equal rights Success: ended starvation and absolute poverty His infrastructure/economic projects overshadowed his faults villages/bureaucrats coerced Urbanization (gov focuses on urban people) "Social control mechanism" Park "officially" supported Confucian ideology Focus on volunteerism worked at first Competition between strong state/defiant society Park took advantage of what Japanese did to make him seem better Huge demand for workers - made people hate urban more CAP (Catholic Assoc of Peasant) - forefront of peasant movement (favoreed NCM till 1970s) Minjung theology - social framework to think highly of Park Nationalism under Park Dictatorship National security Econ development Modernization State populism anti-elitist/populism Disciplined society Used "spiritual training" to control people Minjung ideology Social framework to thing good about Park Yushin system

Michael J. Seth: A Concise History of Modern Korea

DPRK consolidated power Rebuilt Japanese blueprint, USSR military aid Eliminated USSR/Chinese factions of his government Citizens in 3 groups Loyal Wavering Hostile Life dictated by place in society USS Pueblo - American spy ship taken by DPRK Kim focused on relations with 3rd World - like Africa, didn't work Used military style campaigns to combat econ slow down Cult of personality Juche - self-reliance Embraced all of Kim's family Cult-like environment Monolithic Ideological System Ideology = basis of society

Na Kim: Candlelight and the Yellow Ribbon: Catalyzing Re-Democratization in South Korea

Candlelight Movement Large scale gatherings of people holding candelights Candlelight also refers to the direct participation by individuals, each bearing a candle or an equivalent and adding their embodied presence to the collective action Led to Park's impeachment and paved the way for Moon's election Organized by a coalition made up of more than 1500 civic organizations Extensive coordination to hold massive public assemblies Used professional-grade sound stages, network of crews to handle set up, distribution of materials, etc. Obtained the support of Seoul mayor Gained traction in mid-autumn 2016 Yellow Ribbon Yellow ribbon associated with the candlelight movement, MJI wore such a ribbon as well in support Symbol of democracy Associated with calls for political and regulatory reforms, and protest Worn in remembrance of the Sewol Ferry Disaster Used among progressive activists across diverse social movement to visually define spaces of protest and to project a personal identity of political resistance Started by a coalition of students from various universities in Seoul Sewol Ferry Accident (April 16, 2014) Widely described in South Korea as a national trauma where many deaths could have been avoidable What happened? Teenage high school students on a field trip drowned and died because they were unable to escape a capsizing ferry Instructed to stay onboard even though they could have jumped into the water Initial reports gave the impression that all passengers were rescued—disorganized response and attempts to cover up mistakes committed by the Coast Guard and other gov't officials ⅔ of all passengers would perish Further investigation revealed that Sewol prioritized profit over safety Sewol was staffed with poorly trained irregular employees the Sewol's company prioritized stabilizing the ship in an attempt to save the cargo Captain and crew members abandoned ship without notifying passengers to escape Ship was structured dangerously to hold more passengers Overloaded, poorly secured cargo Demonstrated Park's incompetence in dealing with an emergency situation MIA for 7 hours during incident Was oblivious to what was going on Refused to launch a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding the ferry sinking Released a blacklist of people who were anti-gov't, with a focus on critics of gov't handling of Sewol Grievances over this incident led many to protest for Park's impeachment in the Candlelight movement Park Geun-hye's Impeachment Authoritarian leadership style Steady regression of hard-won political gains from Korea's struggle for democratization in the 1980s National security used as pretext to challenge dissent and anti-gov't Choi Soon-Sil Scandal Confidante of Park who held no official office was given political power without accountability Secured positions for her friends and family Could alter Park's official speeches Choi used her influence to amass a personal fortune funneled from Korea's largest companies through bribery and extortion Choi's daughter was secured a spot in Ewha Womans University despite being unqualified Approval ratings plummeted to 4% National Assembly passed an impeachment bill, which held that the President violated her oath and the Constitution While she agreed to cooperate, she refused to attend any hearings by the Constitutional Court and instead sent a statement that denied any wrongdoing Constitutional Court to rule in a unanimous decision to impeach Park

Sunhyuk Kim and Jong-Ho Jeong: Historical Development of Civil Society in Korea

Civil Society: sphere intermediate between the family and state, in which societal actors pursue neither profit within the market nor power within the state. Consists of sustained, organized social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family Characteristics Dual Autonomy: civil society independent of public authorities and private units of production and reproduction Capacity for collective action in defense of or in pursuit of their interests and concerns Non Usurpation: doesn't seek to replace state agents or to run the polity Voluntary in nature Characteristics of Korean Civil Society Diversification of the relationship it forges and develops with the state Authoritarian rule = confront and conflict, suppression and resistance Democratization = competition and cooperation Compete to come up with better policy proposals Cooperate to generate and disseminate policy solutions Example: Rivalry between CCEJ and PSPD Increasingly shown politicization and ideological polarization Example: Attitude towards North Korea Engaged in real politics, civil leaders to join political circles Political socialization of civil society, where individuals or groups of civil society have directly joined or switched to political society Deep involvement in emergence and governance of past administration Examples: CCEJ for KYS, PSPD for KDJ and RMH, New Rights for LMB Co-governance with civil society—sizable number of social movement activists and civic leaders appointed as presidential staff and cabinet members of MJI gov't Most civic groups' activities concentrated in Seoul and focused on politics at the center Gap between civil society at the center compared to that in local areas where they are more underdeveloped Need to reduce gap to deepen democracy in Korea Civil society post-democratization have become financially dependent on the state KDJ legislated "NPO Assistance Act" Support civic groups who played a major role in democratization Made the dependent on state funding Past administrations were favorable towards civil society groups based on their ideological preferences and provided them more state funding Preferential state funding aggravated civil society's financial dependency but also cast doubt on neutrality and autonomy of civic groups All of Korea's civil society characteristics show that Korea is a strong state Use civil society elements selectively for various political purposes, results in politicization and ideological polarization of civil society arena Politics revolves around the central government with its vast bureaucratic apparatus → explains financial dependency on the state

Gregg Brazinsky: National Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy

Creating a Gov't Created Korean People's Republic (KPR) Local Branches: People's Committees to maintain order and local admin functions Goal: Destroy vestiges of Japanese imperialism via land reform and social changes Aligned with the left USAMGIK Reconstituted the centralized bureaucratic structure used in Japanese colonial times Suspicious of KPR ties to communism Established military gov't with Koreans from the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), rival conservatives who collab with the Japanese Wiped out people's committees from official seats Tried to establish a coalition of conservativs and moderates to govern in a liberal, democratic way Problem: moderates were scarce and American undermined their own efforts at coalition building by stacking key institutions with conservatives who obstructed US' promotion of moderation US recruited Rhee to govern ROK in hopes that he would use his prestige as a nationalist to rally people against communism and for democracy Rhee had his own agenda and was not interested in joining or promoting a coalition of moderates Sabotaged and refused to Joint Commissions by US and USSR to create a unified gov't Rhee's bureaucracy stood upon loyalty and personal connections Reward allies, exclude dissenting opinions By 1948, US was critical of Rhee's autocratic and intractable tendencies, though, Rhee was popular as he was unaffiliated with Japanese colonialism and willing to resist leftists at any cost Agriculture and Land Reforms Rhee's most serious rivals were conservative landlords Land reforms were less radical in ROK than in DPRK Pros Created new social structure During Korean War, the majority of the rural population remained loyal despite DPRK's attempts to foster subversion Agricultural villages beacme one of Rhee's few reliable sources of political support Cons Reduced agricultural poverty but limited size of landholdings thus restraining agricultural production Made ROK more dependent on US aid for economic recovery Internal Security US funded and provided the bulk of the ROK forces, which was used to eliminate opponents and suppress dissent Ex: Guerillas still in Jeju and South Jeolla The North Korean invasion in 1950 greatly expanded American commitment to South Korea's security. Cost-effective for ROK, and America couldnt refuse as it was a test of their credibility Rhee's security and military forces became a political tool to intimidate his opponents US too scared to call off funding for military in fear that ROK would collapse into communism Economic Rehabilitation and Development 1945-1948: US economic assistance for short term necessities rather than long-term capital investments to stimulate growth US aid policy focused on increasing agricultural production and mining "balanced growth" approach Wanted to restrain domestic consumption and increase exports to Japan, which would be used to import machines, equipment, and other goods to expand production Rhee did not like this plan as he saw it as an effort to benefit Japan at the expense of ROK → obstructed the plan → ROK forced to rely almost entirely on US for resources Favored closed economic system where Rhee kept ROK dependent on US aid and ROK entrepreneurs dependent on the state (can buy loyalties) No way to punish ROK without injuring US and Free World objectives National Security Law (NSL) Response to the Yosu rebellion Officially empowered the state to deploy the army and police onto threats to state's authority, thus enabling state to monopolize the means of coercion Vaguely worded language made citizens who criticized the gov't subject to punishment Prison/Punishment for those who show sympathies for DPRK Also used by many presidents to crack down on political opponents

Eleanor Albert: North Korea's Military Capabilities

DPRK spends 25% of GDP on military Successfully tested ICBMs 6 nuclear tests conducted - 2006, 2009, 2013, Jan 2016, Sept 2016, 2017 Has know-how to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium Many more tests under Kim Jong-un, than in Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-un combined What are North Korea's nuclear capabilities? Nov 2017: Halted nuclear testing June 2018: Discussed denuclearization w/ Trump First meeting between sitting US and DPRK leaders Agreed to provide DPRK security and cease joint military exercises with ROK Kim pledged to halt missile testing and work toward nuclearization Feb 2019: Trump and Kim disagreed over sanctions relief and denuclearization May 2019: Resumed testing activity by firing several new short-range projectiles Oct 2019: Tested underwater launch of a ballistic missile (first test in 3 years) Have other countries aided North Korea's nuclear program? Late 1950s-1980s: Moscow assisted in building nuclear research reactor and provided missile designs, light water reactors, and some nuclear fuel 1970s: China cooperated on developing and producing ballistic missiles DPRK benefited by having scientists go on academic exchanges with USSR and Chinese counterparts 1970s: Pakistan collaborated with DPRK in Iran to work on ballistic missiles during Iran-Iraq War 1990s: Acquired access to Pakistani centrifuge tech and designs from scientists, as well as uranium warhead Third parties to assist through illicit shipment of metal components needed for centrifuge construction and nuclear weaponization Possesses biological weapon capabilities and chemical weapons Does it pose a cybersecurity threat? Has developed some cyberattack capabilities What drives North Korea's militarization? Juche and Songun In the eyes of Pyongyang, the only way to guarantee national survival is to develop asymmetric military capabilities to thwart its perceived threats Kim Jong Un National strategy to build up economy and nuclear capabilities jointly Failed in economic promises, thus seeks to consolidate through unquestioned military might Nuclear program has dual purpose: to deter external threats and to bolster image of Kim

Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind: Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: The Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea

DPRK's Authoritarian Tool Box Restrictive Social Policies Prevents potentially hostile social classes from forming Ex: Clergy, Students, Businessmen, Workers prone to influence revolutionary change Ex: Middle class prone to promote democracy Creates dependency on the state Prevents development of independent civil society All organizations created, operated and monitored by KWP Ex: Kim Il-sung's Socialist Youth League for students, responsible for political indoctrination Restrict free speech and right of assembly Prevents people from developing relationships and networks of trust that can be used to mobilize political opposition Lift long-abused DPRK peasants into position of the favored caste and created an elite class composed of revolutionaries Stripped the possessing class of ownership of the factors of production, thus preventing development of bourgeoisie Eliminated clergy Relied on intellectuals to craft propoganda, but these intellectuals are technically trained bureaucrats imbued w/ Kim Il-sung's teachings Manipulation of Ideas and Information Increase regime's legitimacy and weaken that of potential opponents (as it makes it more difficult to gain popular support) Develop a cult of [charismatic] personality Nationalistic credibility important form of regime legitimacy Leaders emphasize that "the peopel" should have sovereignty and should be the locus of political loyalty and identity Xenophobic in nature, denounces foreign enemies Leaders dodge responsibility for country's problems by pushing it as a foreign fault and casts domestic political rivals as traitorous pawns of foreign enemies to justify high military budgets Juche Amass control over education, arts and entertainment, monuments and memorialization Prescribed citizens to use creativity and independence to build a thriving society Supreme leader (suryong) system, compatible with Confucianism "Eternal President" = Kim Il-Sung → filial piety His birthday is the most important ceremonial day of the year; year of birth is the first year of the North Korean calendar Sets mythology of the anti-Japanese insurgency in Manchuria, which is at the heart of Korean propaganda, storytelling, and arts Deeply racist overtones of North Korean nationalism—denigrates Japanese and Americans as bastards, jackals, and swine North Korean narrative depicts South Koreans as contaminated by association with Americans and as juche's mirror image—servile flunkeys to American masters Education of Juche and Kim worship (Cult of personality) Education throughout elementary school to university is political education Textbooks rewritten to narrate Kim family as miracle heroes Regulations, Limited Contact with Outside World State-run media to regulate information Almost no internet access, except among few elites whose computer usage is closely monitored Cellphone usage is similarly and severely curtailed, despite the limited successes of human rights groups to distribute phones to northerners to break the regime's information grip Denies its people direct contact with foreigners Not permitted to travel abroad Visitors are not permitted to travel unaccompanied or have spontaneous contact with its people There has been a decrease in information control since 1996-97 famine Bribery common → more North Koreans are increasingly crossing borders in search of food and livelihoods from smuggling → witnessing China's and South Korea's relative prosperity Heavy use of force Deter or crush potential resistance Creates collective action problem for would-be revolutionaries Force makes protests more costly Suppress individual and mobilized opposition Rely on infiltration and informers to discover anti-regime activity Use force against suspects to prevent their involvement in any future activity and to deter others—foster fear Post-totalitarian v. Totalitarian Post Totalitarian: Disloyalty = loss of employment, children are refused higher education, or suffer other sanctions Totalitarian Disloyalty = torture, orchestrated disappearances, exile to gulags or eecution. Family members of suspects may face similar punishment Dissent detected through elaborate network of informants working for multiple internal security agencies Inminban: neighborhood grouping of thirty to fifty families watched over by a middle-aged woman who makes sure that nothing improper is going on Police to support and monitor her by conducting surprise home checks Party officials installed in workplace for surveillance Punishment for dissent Minor: reeducation Serious: prison camps Most serious: executed or worse camps "3 Generations Policy" Regime punishes not only the individual responsible but his or her whole family may be punished to varying degrees of severity Effective in deterring individuals from going against Kim regime Preventing Coups against Kim Regime Rely heavily on security forces though they are their greatest potential threats (coups) Easy for armed, organized, and disciplined group to take over civilian gov't Co-optation The process of adding members to an elite group at the discretion of members of the body, usually to manage opposition and maintain stability Based on the provision of private goods Regimes distribute economic rewards to selectorate Political fortunes of communist leaders depend on their provision of private goods to selectorate of party and military officials Drawbacks to co-optation Scope is limited to elites Rather than address grievances, it merely seeks ti limit opposition rather than stop it altogether May not endure as leaders become discredited and can no longer sway the community When funds for luxury goods dry up, or if elites believe they can get a better deal from a rival leader, there is little left to tie them to the regime For DPRK, health of the overall economy is less important than the regime's ability to bribe elite supporters Kim Jong-il Co-opt military by bestowing it policy influence and prestige, and a large share of the national budget Songbun Class system within society determined socioeconomic origin At the top are working class with family members who fought against Japan or South Korea The bottom are relatives who had been landed elites or Japanese collaborators, who fought for the South, or who were judged as disloyal by Kim Il-sung Upward mobility is extremely difficult, downward is very easy Demotion from perceived disloyalty, marriage to someone of lower class, or a relative's transgression This determines where you live, how much food you eat, education, and occupation Core Class: high quality of life in exchange for loyalty Safest and most desirable jobs Coveted access to hard currency Granted residency in Pyongyang and housing the "special class" More and better food rations Core class not supplied through general PDS, but through the "court economy" which include special stores that sell coveted products Wavering/Hostile: low quality of life Banished to countryside or imprisoned in camps (high malnourishment and where most of the famine deaths occurred) During the famine, the elite/core selectorate was shielded and concentrated the famine's devastation upon the wavering/hostile classes Manipulation of Foreign Governments Use external threats as a means to whip up xenophobic nationalist that helps legitimize the regime Kim Il-sung USSR provided econ aid, subsidized oil and a market for DPRK's noncompetitive exports China aided DPRK in war, sent military material, oil, food, and econ aid Kim Jong-il Rely on foreign governments to generate the hard currency needed to buy off the selectorate Extract extensive aid from adversaries Ex: Took advantage of Sunshine Policy Sunshine Policy: Enacted by KDJ to expand exchanges between Seoul and Pyongyang, and lay groundwork for more peaceful and less costly future unification Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang were built Provides DPRK with sig. revenue Nuclear extortion Received tons of aid from US, China, Japan, and ROK Extracted cash payments from ROK Ex: KDJ paid Kim to attend 2000 summit, DC paid fee to inspect one of DPRK's nuclear facilities China bribing Pyongyang to participate in nuclear talks by offering cash and energy aid, and providing DC with incentives to sit at negotiating table Coup-Proofing Institutions Exploit communal and family loyalties Staffed key positions with people bound to them by family or other close ties Pyongyang rulers are either extended Kim family or descendants of former guerilla fighters who fought in Manchuria School ties to Kim—alumni of Mangyongdae Revolutionary School Create Parallel armed forces In addition to regular armed forces, Kim also has large paramilitary forces Guard Command to protect Kim if there were to be a coup, all armed with high quality equipment Pyongyang Defense Command shares responsibility of countercoup defense and protection of capital Military Security Command is a counterweight agency to the General Political Bureau Parallel military protects Kim in event of the army's betrayal Build rival security agencies Relies on multiple and competing internal security agencies to reduce the unity of security forces and to maximize the information he receives about anti-regime activities Central Committee of KWP oversees nine bureaus involved in intelligence operations Other agencies are also tasked with the same missions Each report to Kim via different supervising authority within different branches of the government or military

Olli Hellmann: Party System without Parties: Evidence from Korea

Electoral Volatility: The degree of change in voting behavior between elections Low volatility means that there is a great deal of continuity in the distribution of votes among parties High volatility can reflect either elite-driven changes in the party system (like the emergence of new parties or party mergers) or changes in voters' party preferences Party System Institutionalization Stability of Interparty Competition Clientelism: Based on distribution of material goods, as to when benefits are only distributed to individuals or small groups who have already delivered or who promise to deliver their votes Least favorable conditions for interparty competition stability—based on personal relationship between voter and vote broker Programmatic/Ideological Attachments: Based on distribution of material good when politicians develop "packages of policies that they commit to enact if elected to political office with sufficient support", in which these packages "award benefits to citizens regardless of who they voted for in the election" Most favorable—promotes lower electoral volatility How to build a programmatic platform Differentiated position along key policy dimensions Brand Personality Traditional/Affective Ties: emerge from shared physical or cultural traits between the voter and politician (e.g. language, region, or ethnicity) Stabilizes only in certain circumstances Extensiveness and "Systemness" of political party organization Makes brand building easier, opportunistic behavior by party leaders harder if party is based on extensive formal membership organizations in that they are closely linked with civil society organizations Allow members to receive ideological education before moving into public office, thus adds stability to party's programmatic platform (prevents major policy shift by leaders) Parties' Roots in Society Degree of Legitimacy attributed to parties and the electoral process Uneven Party System Institutionalization in Korea Korean political parties don't really have strong roots, though recent elections have shown that partisanship is steadily increasing and election outsiders aren't getting many votes Low party legitimacy—voters don't trust parties Korea lacks extensive and elaborate organizational structures, which makes it easy for ambitious leaders to capture parties for their own personal interests Widespread perceptions of corruption and deep distrust in politicians have consistently fueled a prevailing sense of democratic crisis among the Korean people During 3 Kims Era party bosses ran their parties as if they were feudal lords Whenever KDJ, KYS, or KJP founded a party, they brought with them their own leadership group, funding and popular support base—whenever they left to form another party, they gutted the organization, leaving it to wither Political parties unable to acquire an independent status vis-a-vis their leaders because of their organizational properties Parties never developed a formal rank-and-file membership, instead, local party branches based on personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and followers. Party members mobilized for a particular politician's political success and not to contribute towards a collective goal No check on party leader's power To maintain clientelistic machines at the local level, individual politicians depended heavily on financial support from the top, as it was presidential candidates who collected the major share of corporate campaign contributions Highly skewed informal power distribution, party leaders were able to monopolize all formal decision making, including the nomination of candidates for public elections Party System Stability: Toward ideological competition Decline of clientelism ties Middle class voters moved beyond the reach of patron-client networks, clientelism began to only perform strongly in rural areas 2004 Campaign funding reform by Roh Moohyun made it impossible for individual politicians to maintain clientelistic ties with voters Decline of affective ties How Korea can get Programmatic Linkages Requires that political parties take committed and differentiated positions on key policy issues Development of Programmatic/Ideological linkages prevents political parties from being hijacked by ambitious leaders and their own self-serving interests 3 Important Organizational Elements that Korea doesn't possess Extensive grassroots membership Inclusive procedures for nomination of candidates Transparent financing structures Party brand building faces severe problems in Korea Lack of formal party organization creates strong incentives for goal displacement Example: Roh Moo-Hyun presidency—despite tapping into Anti-Americanism and promise to limit the influence of export-oriented conglomerates in politics, he committed to providing military troops to support US in Iraq and pushed for Korea-US free trade agreement Intransparent financing structures of political parties encourage self-serving rent-seeking and "money politics" Example: Repeated allegations of corruption and illegal money transfers in Lee Myung-Bak administration Puts out the message that no matter the brand's value proposition, it won't stop politicians from pursuing their own narrow interests Political parties tend to go to extreme lengths to distance themselves from outgoing government by changing brand image Adopt new name, logo, or tagline Lawmakers to defect in large numbers and form a new political party Party brand is influenced by party's policy proposals and decisions Policy programs usually developed by presidential elections To be nominated, candidates must put themselves and their policy proposals to a vote (party members, or open primary, or both) Korean political parties have succeeded in developing programmatic linkages with voters, despite lacking extensive organization structures Set of formal rules to select the presidential candidate, though not regularized and institutionalized, seems to be enough to ensure that parties' campaign platforms stay within a certain ideological framework Informal "home" and "school" networks also seem to play a role in building a distinctive brand image, as they allow parties to lay claim to historical events and help parties to prefilter presidential candidates on the basis of their political values Parties deal with problems of goal displacement and individual rent seeking by discarding their brand names, logos, and taglines, thereby communicating clear break with outgoing leaders and renewing commitment to collective programmatic goals 3 Kims Political parties were mere clientelistic networks, connecting resource-rich presidential candidates at the top with individual candidates and their political machines at the local level Whenever KDJ, KYS, or KJP founded a party, they brought with them their own leadership group, funding and popular support base—whenever they left to form another party, they gutted the organization, leaving it to wither Affective ties also played a role as regional ties became strong voter bases for candidates Example: KYS controlled southeaster region Yeongnam, KDJ controlled southwestern Honam

Emma Campbell: The End of Ethnic Nationalism? Changing Conceptions of National Identity and Belonging among Young South Koreans

Ethnic nationalism Shared language, religion Civic nationalism Globalized cultural nationalism Shift to here

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland: Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea

Everyday Forms of Resistance Citizen uses alternative sources to get their info Less than half of people joked or complained about the Kim regime, despite having negative views of it Younger and more education wanted to resettle in US Older and less education wanted to go to ROK Unification overwhelming supported Those who have more negative opinion of regime more likely to consume foreign media Most felt Kim Jong-il regime was not improving Policies of DPRK govt constantly blamed for why DPRK isn't doing well Policies of foreign governments hit 25% blame during 1990s famine

Yangmo Ku, Inyeop Lee, and Jongseok Woo: Politics in North and South Korea: Political Development, Economy, and Foreign Relations

Existential antagonism (1948-1970) Fluctuations between reconciliation and confrontation (1971-1997) Sunshine and Engagement Era (1998-2007) Newly confrontational era (2008-2016) Prospects for Korean unification

Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Looked at 9 substantive areas Violations of the right to food The full range of violations associated with prison camps Torture and inhuman treatment Arbitrary arrest and detention Discrimination, in particular in the systemic denial and violation of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms Violations of the freedom of expression Violations of the right to life Violations of the freedom of movement Enforced disappearances, including in the form of abductions of nationals of other States

Michael E. Robinson: Korea's Twentieth Century Odyssey

Heightened class conflict—rural distress Property/tenancy issue What would happen to Japanese-owned land? Lack of empowerment—peasant migrations to cities for work Overcrowded cities with rural migrants and returnees Political Factionalism No broad coalition of nationalists to lead KOrea Too many diverse factions of nationalist movement to represent political spectrum Political factions and individual political leaders violent struggle to see who is to lead Korea as not one organization or person can be credited to have defeated Japan Delegitimization of Korea's social and intellectual elite Became successful and rich because collaborated with Japanese directly/indirectly, thus was hated What caused the Korean War Domestic Fatigue and factionalism of Korean National Movement Strong Korean Communist Party and allies like Kim Il-sung formed in the North, while Syngman Rhee and anti-Communist allies were mainly in the SOuth Deep divides Landowners v. Peasants Businessmen v. Factory Workers Police v. Civilians International Creation of 38th Parallel and stark difference in how the USSR and US organized their Koreas North-USSR Recognized People's Committees formed under the CPKI Highly centralized gov't and removal of Japanese and Koreans within gov't Redistribution of land was quick and peaceful South-US Didn't recognize people's committees Ousting committees were violent, long and slow Established US Army Military Gov't staffed by past Korean and Japanese officials that were dismissed by CPKI Formed Korean Dem. Party made up of socially prominent landlords and businessmen Police primarily made up of former mebers of colonial police Heightened animosity between USSR and US Continued failure to successfully come to an agreement in Joint Commissions Cold War (1947) USSR tightened grip to Eastern Europe; US policy on global containment of communism

Michael J. Seth: A Concise History of Korea

March First Movement (1919) Inspired by President Wilson's call for "national self-determination" after the Versailles Peace Conference Groups of Koreans outside of Korea organized in order to argue for Korean independence Paris, led by Kim Kyu-Sik Hawaii, by Syngman Rhee Japan, by Korean students "Korean Youth Independence Corps" Several demonstrations took place in the following days of the reading of declaration with US and Japan Large number and widespread mostly peaceful participation Repression by Japan was directed at Christians who were heavily represented in the movement Major turning point in Korean History, regarded by many as the birth of modern Korean nationalism. By others, it is not the birth, but a transformation from a small movement of isolated, scattered intellectuals and small exiled groups, to mass movement that cut across class lines. The Post-March First Period Taisho Democracy (1920s) Modest Japanese liberalism "Harmony between Japan and Korea" Appointed liberal navy admiral to be Government-General, mandated major administrative changes Less harsh punishments, more "equal" wage disparities, more Korean representation in government, business and trade liberalized—opened up Korean market to Japan by lifting tariff barriers In exchange for liberalism, the Japanese created more police stations and created the High Police. More sophisticated attitude towards control and Koreans were still very restricted in freedom. Moderate Nationalism Western-looking cultural nationalists Emphasizes education Used newspapers and magazines to propagate their ideas Promote and standardize Korean written language Korean Production Movement: Raised national consciousness and self-sufficiency by encouraging people to shop at Korean-owned stores and Korean-made products even if they are more costly Radical Nationalism Looked towards USSR and Communist for inspiration Rejected cooperation w/ colonial regime Wanted to overthrow the colonial regime and elite Sin'ganhoe united moderates and radicals Leaders were moderate but supported by leftists who gained control over many of its branches Japanese tolerated as it brough leftist intentions to light Wartime Colonialism and Forced Assimilation Forcible assimilation of Korean people into Japanese "Harmony between Japan and Korea" - more like Koreans to become Japanese Koreans forced to register at Shinto shrines Changing of Korean → Japanese name Restricted use of Korean language in schools "Koreans were now Japanese, but still maintain inferiority" The Great Depression hit Japan hard, tightened control over Korea and Japan became more conservative Mass mobilization of Koreans for war effort Education highly militarized and regimented, compulsory registration Comfort women Recruited or forcibly enrolled young Korean girls as sex slaves to serve Japanese troops

Cheehyung Harrison Kim: Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea

Mining in the North Minerals sent to USSR, build up military Regional damage allowed for industrial to rebuild some areas hit more than others Party document, state socialism, econ plans, state ownership Export oriented Collectivization of agriculture Land improvement Farm land expansion Land reform Elimination of private property Issue of class struggle Light industry = consumption Heavy industry = further production (like a tractor) Class alliance - mutual benefit Farms now cooperatives Farmers now wage earners Admin had wide berth of control Use of nationalism, state management, focus on production Hegemony- through work and life blended together Kim needed to control everyday life direct/abstract rule Directly making policy/implemented by others indirect/concrete rule Used loyalty Use of propaganda Repetition = structure embedded State campaigns to increase productivity "Mass lure" - mass movements, increase motivation Compare each other to work harder Increase competition and productivity Use of labor heroes Chollima Movement Propoganized mass movement

Patrick McEachern: Interest Groups in North Korean Politics

Models of North Korea Politics Totalitarianism Political order using all-encompassing ideology Monopolize info sources Propaganda for change Does not tolerate pluralism or opposition Regularly purges officials to pursue revolutionary aims Utilizes terror and coercion to instill fear and anxiety in a population Short-lived Personalism Utilize coercion and fear, but doesn't govern by tradition or ideology, but by personal and arbitrary rule Use national resources to extract private wealth and use such wealth to maintain power Simple and unstable Corporatism "Neosocialist corporatism" for North Korea—noncompetitive, united entity where disharmony is harmful Regularized policy relations between interests in this top-down hierarchical model State controls interest groups Institutional Pluralism Ultimate authority under one person, but power is more diffuse State's dynamism as promoting continuity and stability No significant, organized civil society within the country challenges the existing regime 1972 Constitution Gave rise to personal power Created presidential position for Kim and concentrated his power Kim's advisors came from Manchurian guerillas, those with technical knowledge were not given senior positions Downgraded the Administrative Council, which was their main legislative body Kim Il-Sung and Totalitarianism (see below for timeline) Kim Il-Sung codified personal power, but maintained ideology as a guide and constraint on political action Bureaucracy staffed with party members under the eye of Kim Il-Sung, all of whom were selected by him Kim Jong-Il and North Korean's Evolving Institutions (see below for timeline) Was groomed for decades by Kim Il-sung to become successor 1998: "Kim Il Sung Constitution" Legally embodied juche state construction ideology and its achievements New constitution supported the politcal institutions and roles of Kim Il-sung in order to bolster legitimacy and hold onto power through references to the revered leader Appealed to aging revolutionaries in key positions Filial piety Military First politics replaced Juche Credited with safeguarding and building the revolution Famine State goals shifted to avoid collapse Korean Workers Party Role of KWP declined under Kim Jong-il Publicly chastised them and emphasized other competing institution Blamed them for policy failures during famine Imprisoned or executed many KWP officials but let military untouched KWP wasn't irrelevant but did not dominate the system like it did previously National Defense Commission Became the pinnacle of institutional power in 1998 Kim Jong-il did not become president of DPRK, but the chair of NDC May have decided to rule through military bureaucracy instead of KWP as it distorts his policy prerogatives (military-first) less Honored the military and raised its prestige, used as a cheap and effective motivating force Allowed KJI to dampen misturst and provide an excuse for dismantling much of the party's functions Has had an uneasy relationship with the NDC where he purged 600 officers after an alleged coup attempt in 1992 The Cabinet 1998 Constitution Changed Administrative Council into the cabinet and enhanced its management authority Cabinet as 2nd most important bureaucratic element Expanded responsibility in economic policy Responsible for implementing policy They were continually blamed publicly for distorting policy directions when policy outcomes did not meet expectations High in power, low in prestige Elite Similarities Top Ranking officials graduate from Mankyongdae Revolutionary School, Kimilsung University, or overseas Like local ties, school ties are particularly strong and long-lasting in Korea, officials with strong informal networks occupy each of the major bureaucracies 3 Groups First-Gen Revolutionaries Very cohesive group No challengers in this group (which havent been purged) Lack specific skills, so they gravitate towards general management positions Second-Gen Revolutionaries Cohesive Group Attended Mankyongdae Revolutionary School Selected for similar reasons and came to power through same path Hold high level positions in party, military, and govt Technocrats More diverse Gained positions due to their specialized or technical skills Educated in sciences, econ, or other areas, and received additional ideological training Graduated from overseas or Kimilsung University Their actions reflect a more risk-averse view of politics Value specialization and less emphasis on ideologically based actions Elite Differences Generational divide and institutional setting are important sources of differing opinions among elites National bureaucracies fight among themselves for ear and favor of the Dear Leader Three Reports System, Security Apparatus groups to check one another Small group of loyalists to secure Kim's access to reliable information (as he openly distrusts the bureaucracy) Small size prevents it from supplying full range of info required for effective rule Allows Kim greater control over the group Provides Kim with check on information that bureaucracies provide him

David C. Kang and Victor D. Cha: Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies

No US president willing to have DPRK be a nuclear state Greater focus on human rights since 2003 "North Korea is not a problem to be solved" Deterrence can be effective US/ROK alliance is effective deterrence Little threat of first strike/surprise attack "Is engagement or isolation more likely to produce change in North Korea?" Little hope of negotiated agreement on nuclear weapons DPRK is both a security and humanitarian issue Only way to solve hunger in DPRK is to bring country into world market and have it earn enough through trade to import enough food to feed everyone Difficult trade offs Increased cooperation between Japan, ROK, US - strengthen this alliance Military threat has changed in the last 15 years Concern over long-range missile development Cha argues that sanctions are effective, says everyone says they don't work till they work Rice prices have gone up "Maximum pressure campaign China has increased cooperation on enforcing sanctions Cut trade with DPRK on coal, seafood, oil, textiles China can be both part of the solution and the problem preventive war—a unilateral limited attack by the United States on North Korea to prevent the threat's growth

Wonjun Song and Joseph Wright: The North Korean Autocracy in Comparative Perspective

North Korea Familial state with mix of socialism/Confucious hierarchy

Justin V. Hastings: The Complex Relationship between Sanctions and North Korea's Illicit Trade

North Korea system encourages and often requires economic activities to be illicit Not only to bypass sanctions People need to do illegal econ activities in order to simply survive Use different countries, particularly China to help with doing illicit trade Not sure if we can really stop this illicit trade Not all illicit trade is from Kim regime, some is from private people, companies Weapons buyers need to be discouraged from buying from/through DPRK Sanctions can cut off revenues they can get from selling regular stuff (like food), instead of selling weapons

Andrei Nikolaevich Lankov, In-ok Kwak, and Choong-Bun Cho: The Organizational: Daily Surveillance and Daily Resistance in North Korea

Organizational Life: refers to the highly formalized array of surveillance and indoctrination practices that are conducted within a set of networks, each run by a particular gov't controlled "organization 2 purposes Delivers requisite propaganda and ensures that all North Koreans are involved with coproduction (indoctrination sessions) Surveillance system (mutual criticism sessions) OL is automatically switched based on age, gender, employment, and other variables 5 Organizations—every DPRK adult is in one and each organization arranges regular and frequent indoctrination meetings, mutual and self-criticism sessions Korean Workers' Party (Most Important) 18+ can join Highly competitive Coveted membership as it almost guarantees getting a prestigious job Necessary first step for a political/admin career Virtually every mid- and high- level full time managerial posts in various organizations are occupied by KWP members Youth Union (2nd Most Important) Membership almost bestowed automatically, so by default, all aged 14-30 are placed here Exceptions: Those who join KWP before 30 or if married woman becomes full-time housewife Trade Union All above 30 and not in other orgs Farmers' Union Agricultural employees Women's Union Housewives, unemployed women Remain here until 65 years old Coproduction: Implementation of decisions that have already been made Significant part of OL is a combination of coproduction and indoctrination Horizontal Propaganda: makes use of political indoctrination within large organization networks, with a relatively small role assigned to mass media but with special emphasis on group meetings Every week a cell of DPRK organization stages 3 events 2 indoctrination sessions—told about greatness of Kim Jong-il and his family, current political situations, evil nature of imperialist enemies Lectures Political study sessions 1 mutual criticism session Universal reach of OL system ensures that all adults are a member of a stable group existing for purposes of indoctrination Emphasis on active involvement of all individuals in the production of propaganda Every member requires to know political subjects thus they are an active manufacturer or propaganda OL's intensity is in the sheer amount of time a North Korean is expected to spend attending OL activities Media provides them with info on how they should see the outside world and how they should behave Mutual Criticism Sessions Every member of a cell is expected to publicly confess shortcomings and mistakes they have committed since the previous MCS, individual must also be criticized by another member of the same cell An exercise of self-policing where all members of a particular cell are required to act as a collective policeman, watching their peers and themselves, and reporting deviations Structure of MCS 1-2 minutes/person Quote a remark from Kim Analysis of mistake and reasons why mistake was made Vow of allegiance

Jiso Yoon: Advocacy and Policymaking in South Korea

Power of the President Power is highly concentrated on the president and his party because of Agenda-Setting abilities on the activities of the National Assembly Great levels of public attention President's policy ideas often fail to be implemented as intended due to bureaucratic discretion (i.e. feasibility, public mood) Less visible as policy advocates—other actors in policy community are unlikely to include their names as major actors in policy debates Although, most issues discussed received attention in the first place because they were part of administrative agenda Power of the National Assembly Weak in policy-making Parties are weak and have difficulties providing a coherent set of policy agendas Parliamentarians tend to propose a large number of bills without any expectations to pass them especially since interest groups use this as a way to gauge the legislative activity of parliamentarians Lack of tenure and expertise Important agenda-setters as they are the first point of reference for nongovernmental groups trying to set an important policy agenda Though, they lack the resources to offer policy alternatives and policy influence is limited Bills often never reach the floor due to lack of attention Policy change is more difficult in the legislature than in executive ministries bc nonpartisan issues rarely generate enough attention, whereas partisan/political issues often require a bargaining process across political parties in the National Assembly before members vote on them It's possible to advance issue debate BUT again, it requires the involvement of bureaucratic ministries Power of Bureaucracy Limited agenda-setting power but important in the policymaking process Procedure Policymaking occurs mostly independent of the legislature through orders of the president, PM, and executive ministries to fully facilitate implementation of policies Organization Specialization Functional division of labor Well-defined areas of jurisdiction Personnel Expertise and longevity Fixed salary and pension rights Key advocates for changing or protecting an existing policy Each issue debate involved the participation of at least one, if not multiple, bureaucratic ministries Policy changes more likely when bureaucratic ministries get involved as policy advocates supporting change

Hazel Smith: North Korea's: Markets and Military Rule

Regime Vulnerability At the end of the Cold War, DPRK could not rely on USSR and other communist states for support USSR and China developed better relations with ROK and US Russia Federation leader, Boris Yelton, held Kim Il-sung in contempt Diluted support for DPRK in time of war Stopped providing loans, cheap oil, and subsidized tech Unwilling to buy DPRK's poor-quality exports Trade lowered significantly Increased military vulnerability Large Iraqi forces (similar to KPA's Army, but with actual battle exp) was wiped out by US in just a few days → signals to DPRK leaders that their confidence in their military may be misplaced Increasingly tired, hungry, and demoralised DPRK's response to vulnerability Tried to reduce risk of DPRK-ROK armed conflict Re-engaged diplomatically w/ ROK DPRK premier, civilians, and military officials met counterpart in Seoul 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation and Non-Aggression 1992 North-South agreement on denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula First Nuclear Crisis (1994) First nuclear crisis was when DPRK, US, and ROK anticipated a nuclear war Sense of military vulnerability underpinned DPRK's intent to develop a nuclear capacity President Bush's administration tried to ease tensions Assured that no tactical nuclear weapons would be stationed in Korea in exchange for DPRK signing of Safeguards Agreement (1992), which allows regular inspection of its nuclear facilities 1992: suspended joint military exercises More substantive relations between KPA and US military 1993: US-ROK resumed joint military exercises US saw DPRK's withdrawal from Non-Proliferation Treaty as a declaration of intent to develop nuclear weapons IAEA passed resolution cutting off technical assistance to DPRK because of "noncompliance" with its safeguards commitments Former President Carter visited Pyongyang to meet Kim Il-sung in 1994 and defused the crisis Agreed Framework signed by US and DPRK Cessation of DPRK nuclear development in exchange for US building light water reactors for energy DPRK agreed to close its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors DPRK agreed to remain in NPT and permit IAEA to monitor the freezing of its nuclear program Famine (1995-1998) Causes Early 1990s: DPRK lost subsidies from USSR, China, and former communist states of eastern and central Europe Didn't support DPRK's policies (which were economically anachronistic and would lead to dangerous political instability in north-east Asia) Too engaged in resolving their own domestic economic problems DPRK didn't have many resources to fill Russia and China's gap 1992-1966: per capita income fell $1,005 → $481 Fuel and Oil became scarce Fuel: transport, electricity, and heating Oil: industrial and agricultural productivity declined Natural Disasters 1995 and 1966: Floods in the middle of crop-growing season Destroyed harvests, emergency food reserves, irrigation, infrastructure, coal mines 1997: Drought Lost a lot of grain, grain production failed DPRK's Response Focused on 1993/1994 nuclear crisis and appeared oblivious to domestic crisis 1990-1991: Tighter rationing and "Eat Two Meals a Day" campaign Leadership didn't publicly address the famine and conducted business as usual Routine visits at workplaces, visited farms to express satisfaction Late 1995: Gov't refused to admit the scale of the economic catastrophe and food crisis, requested food aid from UN (US, Japan, and ROK) 1996: Acknowledged scale of economic crisis for the first time—blamed natural disasters and Americans Public Distribution System Public system that rationed food, clothing and other necessities to families During famine, it did not have enough food to guarantee minimum rations or provide basic health supplies in response to an increase in ill-health Methods of surviving Bartering Petty Trade Selling assets Emigrating to China Role of Women Scavenged for food while men participated in military Roamed the country to find food (relaxed travel restrictions) Women ate last, ate tree bark which would sometimes result in death from permanent chronic digestive problems Looked after sick and dying children as hospital ran out of medicine Would walk long distances to find food Marketization Primitive market economy made by DPRK civilians to survive during the famine and continued on until today Government tolerated market activity during famine Ended Kimilsungism Generated incentives for poorly paid officials to waive and reduce penalties, thus reducing state repression Party to become the driver and de facto legitimator of marketization which lessened ideological education and revolutionary discipline during famine Private production and commercial trade Families grew food for their own consumption, surplus sold at markets Deforestation to grow more crops Created small-scale production of handicrafts and basic goods Transportation services created Local currency was used as a last resort as it was subject to mega inflation, preferred using foreign currency State enterprisers also became crucial players in market activities Officials and workers sold metal and building components from decaying factories for scrap to Chinese traders Marketization of the Party Became legitimized and normalized Party became less feared as an instrument of state control as officials had little motivation in enforcing laws that threatened their own economic interests Party less able to carry out its historic functions of inculcating Kim Il Sungism by way of ideological education and revolutionary discipline as officials were not rewarded for such activities and had less time to carry out these duties Party membership became important as they leveraged political connections to supplement insufficient income they earned from state Officials to earn kickbacks and receive gifts in return for allowing people to get away with breaking the law Marketization of Law and Order Police bribed to turn a blind eye Marketization of Military Military camps instructed to be self-sufficient in agricultural production, and wherever possible, to earn foreign currency Marketization of the Family Women's participation in market activities thus translated into increased flexibility in personal decision-making and diminished state control of family life Women to become breadwinners within marketized DPRK End of Kimilsungism/ideology Diminishing capacity of Party to carry out ideological education, no time, profit or reason to do so State employed fewer officials to carry out propaganda activities No more self-criticism sessions, though compulsory study sessions remained part of workplace routines, but it was more of a systematic necessity than meaningful Party-directed local neighborhood assoc (inminban) no longer were effective surveillance Stay-at-home women were no longer gave status, income or guaranteed food rations → went towards market activities Became traders and benefited from 'sideline' payments as an inducement to ignore semi-legal trading activity Info on outside world leaked into the society through Chinese traders and various foreigners that regularly visited DPRK from all over the world Knew that China's political history was similar to DPRK, yet they were far better off economically Knew that DPRK being a great country surrounded by less fortunate neighbors was false Questions of governmental legitimacy and capacity Tendency for population to treat government as irrelevant except as an obstacle around which everyday economic life needed to be constantly negotiated Learned to circumvent the regular attempts by govt to prevent growth in market activity where they were always acting outside the law and in defiance of govt

Hazel Smith: Bad, Mad, Sad, or Rational Actor? Why the 'Securitization' Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy Analysis of North Korea

Security perspective Bad thesis Assumptions DPRK pursues alien objections which are not part of the "civilized" international system ('rogue' state) Presumes DPRK as a rational instrumental actor Presented as immoral with its resources diverted to military instead of the starving population Population ready to wage total war against peace-loving neighbors DPRK is a huge human rights violator Hard People so brainwashed DPRK in unreadable Only eradication of regime will solve this Soft Accept the assumptions of the bas perspective DPRK would like to rule the whole peninsula, but it knows that the goal in unachievable and foolish to pursue Doesn't see it as totally intractable Does not see it as possessing overwhelming military capacity, not enough power to invade ROK successfully Mad thesis Assumes that the DPRK possesses evil intent Presumes DPRK as an irrational, unknowable, unpredictable actor who is dangerous They don't negotiate in a conventional manner, don't honor outcomes of agreement Regime's devotion to strategic secrecy" Seen as experts of deception as seen as there is no indication or evidence of planning the ROK invasion in 1950 Hard: Terrible and inexplicable taboos, like cannibalism, occur inside DPRK Soft: DPRK is unknowable therefore uninterpretable because there's no reliable information about the country Bad and Mad thesis distorts the complexities of DPRK policies and politics, lacks utility for contemporary international foreign policy-makers Attempts to ignore date that doesn't fit into framework Distort data to meet requirements Claims are so start that there are little qualifications "Hermit kingdom" Juche subordinates any foreign influence Ability to shield population from outside influences A little bit of interaction with int'l community Used to do little trade outside the Soviet bloc Securitization Paradigm Assumes DPRK has unchanging persona in world and domestic affairs that can't be altered unless DPRK is eradicated Diplomacy or negotiations with DRPK is fruitless as interests of int'l community and DPRK don't coincide Since it can't assimilate change as a variable so it can't help to inform negotiators when and why DPRK foreign policy behavior is changing Only choice available for policymakers Assumes DPRK is such a singularly bad or mad entity that only the starkest descriptors are appropriate Filters out facts and conceptions that don't fit fundamental assumptions so contrary behavior isn't analyzed If data assimilated through lens of the paradigm, they are sublimated to the fundamental assumptions so that their meaning The 'sad' thesis All its children under 10 have suffered from lack of food and 62% are malnourished An entire generation sustaining physical and mental damage by inadequate nutrition Development paradigm DPRK needs assistance to modernize and integrate itself within the world economy and int'l policy objectives should direct themselves towards thsoe objectives Core of approach located in studies made by int'l humanitarian comm

Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland: Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea

Six Party Talks US, ROK, DPRK, China, Russia, Japan Concern over the effectiveness of sanctions Huge international aid effort during 1990s famine Songun - military first Practiced by Kim Jong-il Sunshine Policy Introduced by Kim Dae-jung Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Chinese's closer direct commercial ties with DPRK Pretty much sanctions used to drag DPRK to the table Overall sanctions not very effective

Paul Y. Chang: Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement

Tactics "Recognized patterns of activities that express the claims and demands of protesters" Some quite dramatic, others less disruptive Declaration were quite popular Often had organization meetings Some unique tactics Symbolic enactments (like street theater) "Everyday forms of resistance" Actor-Tactic Symmetry Different tactics that suited different groups better Christians used less disruptive ones and primarily used formal declarations Prayer protests, resolutions, petitions, creation of orgs Diversification of Issues Padt violence by govt criticized Workers' rights Media censorship Yushin constitution Laborers focused just on workers' rights UN Universal declaration of Human Rights Rhee adopted it in 1950 Rather a symbolic gesture than actually following through on that

A. David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim: South Korea: The Puzzle of Two Transitions

Why did 1979-80 transition to Dem fail and 1987 did? Personal interests of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo At first focused on solidifying powder after Park died Now focus on cementing legacy Unity of Protest movements Chaeya Achieved much more efficiency and solidarity because they learned from failed movement in 1979-80 Contrast in how Carter/Reagan administration approached both US-ROk diplomacy and the challenge of democracy promotion Chaeya Umbrella organization Used to coordinate coalition's efforts against the government Included Religious groups Intellectual groups Human rights groups Writers' groups Cooperative relationship with Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae jung US policy towards ROK gov 1980-1987 1980 memo Maintain security and strategic stability on Korean peninsula Express a careful degree of disapproval, but nothing that would lead to instability Fundamental dilemma "How can democratic governments promote democratic transitions abroad without compromising their own security"

Asan Institute for Policy Studies: South Korean Perceptions of the Denuclearization of North Korea

Youngest generation more conservative than previous generations More hard-line stance towards North All they know is the confrontations between the two, close calls to nuclear war Kind of similar to those who lived through the Korean War, though not as severe People born in the 60s who were students in the 80s are most progressive Student protests, democratic transition in 1987