LAW 200: Midterm

Holding of Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska...we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their children."

Question(s) presented in Loving v. Virginia (1967)

"Whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to precent marriages between persons on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?"

Question(s) presented in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

"Whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy"?

Question(s) presented in Perez v. Sharp (1948)

"Whether the state can restrict that right on the basis of race alone without violating the equal protection of the laws clause of the United States Constitution?"

Question(s) presented in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

"Whether the statute, as applied, arbitrarily infringes the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?"

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Eisenstadt v. Baird builds off of the holding of Griswold v. Connecticut.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Perez v. Sharp (1948)

Extensive Precedent (Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Skinner v. Oklahoma). Policy and Practical Implication (the law was hard to enforce).

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Poe v. Ullman (1961)

*Harlan wrote: "I consider that this Connecticut legislation, as construed to apply to these appellants, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. I believe that a statute making it a criminal offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life." He also said the right of the doctor to advise his patients is under his First Amendment rights. In this case, a doctor is silenced because he has to observe the law. "The state ought not to have to control him."

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Roe v. Wade (1973)

-Burger expressed minor concerns that "Court has taken notice of various scientific and medical data reaching its conclusion." -Stewart, who dissented in Griswold v. Connecticut, now believed that "liberty protected by the DP Clause of the 14th Amendment covers more than just just those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of rights."

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

-Chief Justice Burger's concurrence emphasized historical negative attitudes toward homosexual sex. Burger concluded, "To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." -Justice Powell voiced doubts about the compatibility of Georgia's law with the Eighth Amendment, noting that even consensual sodomy could be punished with up to twenty years in prison, the same sentence as aggravated battery or first-degree arson. However, since Hardwick had not been tried or sentenced, the question of the statute's constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment did not come up in the case. Powell was considered the deciding vote during the case. He had initially voted to strike down the law but changed his mind after conservative clerk Michael W. Mosman advised him to uphold the ban. It has been claimed that Powell's decision to uphold the law was influenced by his belief that he had never known any homosexuals, even though one of his own law clerks was gay.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

-Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the fundamental right to an abortion, the "right to privacy," and the strict scrutiny application in Roe. He also questioned the new "undue burden" analysis under the plurality opinion, instead deciding that the proper analysis for the regulation of abortions was rational-basis. -Justice Scalia argued for a rational-basis approach, finding that the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety was constitutional. He argued that abortion was not a "protected" liberty. To this end, Justice Scalia concluded this was so because an abortion right was not in the Constitution, and "longstanding traditions of American society" have allowed abortion to be legally proscribed.

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

-Goldberg found the right to privacy in the 9th. He said that marital rights are clear in precedent. -White, concurring only in judgment, said that privacy and choice is a liberty in the 14th Amendment. -Harlan, concurring only in judgement, said that we should look to the Due Process Clause and history, but we shouldn't just create a new right.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

-Justice Blackman dissented and said that adultery and incest are different because there is a risk to a third part and it may not be consensual. He also said there was an "uncanny" parallel to Loving v. Virginia in that there were bans and disproval when the case was heard and there was a religious justification. -Justice Stevens dissented and said that the court fails to see the case is about liberty and prior cases protect intimate conduct. Also, Georgia's law technically applied to all people, but they only enforced it on homosexuals. Stevens said you can't apply it only against a disfavored group (sounds like Eisenstadt v. Baird).

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

-Justice Douglas argued that since Baird was engaged in speech while distributing vaginal foam, his arrest was prohibited by the First Amendment. -Justice White and Justice Blackmun declined to reach the issue of whether Massachusetts could limit distribution of contraceptives only to married couples. They argued that Massachusetts had asserted an implausible health rationale for limiting distribution of vaginal foam to licensed pharmacists or physicians.

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Perez v. Sharp (1948)

-Justice Edmonds held that the statute violated the religious freedom of the plaintiffs, since the anti-miscegenation law infringed on their right to participate fully in the sacrament of matrimony. -Carter stated that "all human beings have equal rights regardless of race, color, or creed" and those rights are laid out in the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment. He also said it seemed like a eugenics law.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

-Justice Roberts argued that no prior decision had changed the core component of marriage, that it be between one man and one woman; consequently, same-sex marriage bans did not violate the Due Process Clause. Roberts also rejected the notion that same-sex marriage bans violated a right to privacy, because they involved no government intrusion or subsequent punishment. Addressing the Equal Protection Clause, Roberts stated that same-sex marriage bans did not violate the clause because they were rationally related to a governmental interest: preserving the traditional definition of marriage. -Scalia stated that the Court's decision effectively robs the people of "the freedom to govern themselves," noting that a rigorous debate on same-sex marriage had been taking place and that, by deciding the issue nationwide, the democratic process had been unduly halted. -Thomas rejected the principle of substantive due process, which he claimed "invites judges to do exactly what the majority has done here—roa[m] at large in the constitutional field guided only by their personal views as to the fundamental rights protected by that document"; in doing so, the judiciary strays from the Constitution's text, subverts the democratic process, and "exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority." -Justice Alito argued that Court stated the Due Process Clause protects only rights and liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

-Justice Thomas stated that these cases should be left in the hands of legislators. -Justice Alito argued that there is no direct causal link between the Texas law and the closings of abortion clinics, and they may have also been affected by the withdrawal of state funds, declining demand for abortions, and retirements of doctors.

Other thoughts on Roe v. Wade

-RBG: reads like "rules and regulations," omitted "a woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course...as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen." -Powell: drawing line at viability is more defensible in logic and biology; concept of liberty was underlying principle

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Roe v. Wade (1973)

-Rehnquist dissented said that the right to abortion is not a "fundamental" right therefore we should use a rational basis test, not strict scrutiny. He also believed that the Founders had no intention of the 14th Amendment to be used this way. -White said that the Court was creating a new right to abortion and overstepping their powers as the judicial branch in doing so.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

-Scalia objected to the Court's decision to revisit Bowers, pointing out many decisions from lower courts that relied on Bowers that might now need to be reconsidered. He noted that the same rationale used to overturn Bowers could have been used to overturn Roe v. Wade, which some of the Justices in the majority in Lawrence had upheld in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Scalia also criticized the majority opinion for failing to give the same respect to stare decisis that three of those in the majority had insisted on in Casey. -Justice Thomas wrote that the law the Court struck down was "uncommonly silly", a phrase from Justice Potter Stewart's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, but he voted to uphold it as he could find "no general right of privacy" or relevant liberty in the Constitution. He added that if he were a member of the Texas legislature he would vote to repeal the law.

Holding of Perez v. Sharp (1948)

-Violates EP and DP clause -The California Supreme Court held that marriage is a fundamental right and that laws restricting that right must not be based solely on prejudice. -Statute was too vague and uncertain to be enforceable restrictions on the fundamental right of marriage and that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment by impairing the right to marry on the basis of race alone.

Holding of Loving v. Virginia (1967)

-distinctions drawn according to race were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. -state had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination" and reinforcement of white supremacy -The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites, said there was no evidence that the children would be inferior, and that saying the marriages would cause tension is basically double counting racism -Violation of Due Process: "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State," and marriage is a fundamental right.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

-should be in the legislator's hands - the right to privacy isn't written anywhere in the Constitution -Stewart said that the law isn't vague and it doesn't violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses. He also said that the law is bad, but it's not unconstitutional therefore the people of Connecticut need to persuade their elected officials to repeal it. He also said that Justices need to remove their own social and economic beliefs form the Court.

Holding of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

-the Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. -"If the right of privacy means anything, wrote Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for the majority, "it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." -The MA law was meant to protect purity and chastity, but the purpose of the legislation was to discourage premarital sex→ but "we cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital sex was the purpose of the MA law" → really trying to stop non-procreative sex. -The purpose of the law was to prevent crimes against chastity and morality, but prevented a physician giving someone contraceptives for health reasons; no public health purpose.

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

-violation of "procedural due process" (no fair hearing or proof that Skinner would pass on a "criminal" gene) - limits" to which a "majority may conduct biological experiments" on a minority, even if they commit what the majority defines as a crime.

Holding of Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

5-3 majority, which held that the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion, thus imposing an undue burden. In this case, the evidence presented before the district court showed that the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 did not advance the state's interest in protecting women's health but did place a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion by forcing about half of the state's abortion clinics to close (40 --> 20). Similarly, the requirement that abortion clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers did not appreciably lower the risks of abortions compared to those performed in non-surgical centers. These requirements were so tangentially related to the actual procedures involved in an abortion that they were essentially arbitrary.

Facts of Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Poe v. Ullman (1961)

Brennan wrote: "Until the law [shows real and substantial controversy], or until the State makes a definite and concrete threat to enforce these laws against individual married couples-a threat which it has never made in the past except under the provocation of litigation-this Court may not be compelled to exercise its most delicate power of constitutional adjudication."

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Chief Justice Burger dissented alone, arguing that there were no conclusive findings available to the Court on the health risks of vaginal foam since that issue had not been presented to the lower courts, and thus no basis for the Court's finding that the Massachusetts statute served no public health interest. Burger also held that the Massachusetts statute independently advanced the state's interest in ensuring couples receive informed medical advice on contraceptives.

Holding of Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Court held that engaging in sodomy isn't a fundamental right and that state was allowed to outlaw those practices. The Court believed that intimate same-sex conduct is not "deeply rooted" in history and tradition. The statute passed the rational basis test because it reflected morality.

Question(s) presented in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

Did the act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Dissent in Poe v. Ullman supports the holding of Griswold v. Connecticut

Question(s) presented in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled? "whether petitioners' were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of there liberty under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Am."

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Lawrence v. Texas and Loving v. Virginia support the holding of Obergefell v. Hodges.

Extend to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Roe v. Wade (1973)

Griswold v. Connecticut supported the holding of Roe v. Wade because it established a right to privacy.

Facts of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist opened a birth control clinic with the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court. Now they have standing.

Facts of Loving v. Virginia (1967)

In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

Facts of Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions.

Holding of Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

In a 6-3 opinion the Court held that the Texas statute violates the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Unlike in Roe v. Wade, the basic facts of Bowers v. Hardwick were wrong, no one relied on this law, the history was overstated and incorrect (the proscriptions were against all non-procreative sex, not against homosexual behavior), and the question was framed incorrectly. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers.

Holding of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third (prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house), Fourth (freedom from search), Fifth (right against self-incrimination), and Ninth Amendments (we have rights not specifically said in the constitution) create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore struck down.

Holding of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe (the right to choose, pre-viability), but it upheld all of the Pennsylvania provisions, except for the husband notification requirement because many many women were abused, 95% already told their husbands, and the woman is the one actually carrying the child. The legal standard changed from strict scrutiny (Trimester Framework) to intermediate scrutiny (undue burden test). The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." The court also explained that women relied upon the decision or Roe v. Wade and the decision wasn't "unworkable."

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

Justice Ginsburg wrote, "Many medical procedures, including childbirth, are far more dangerous to patients, yet are not subject to ambulatory surgical-center or hospital admitting-privileges requirements. ... Given those realities, it is beyond rational belief that H. B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law 'would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.' ... When a State severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners. ... [L]aws like H. B. 2 that 'do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion' cannot survive judicial inspection."

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she offered a different rationale for invalidating the Texas sodomy statute. She disagreed with the overturning of Bowers—she had been in the Bowers majority—and disputed the court's invocation of due process guarantees of liberty in this context. Rather than including sexuality under protected liberty, she would strike down the law as violating the equal protection clause because it criminalized male-male but not male-female sodomy. O'Connor maintained that a sodomy law that was neutral both in effect and application might be constitutional, but that there was little to fear because "democratic society" would not tolerate it for long.

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Justice Stewart said that "'it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act dependent upon the race of the actor' (McLaughlin v. State of Florida)."

Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

Justices Stevens and Blackmun concurred in part and dissented in part. They believed that the other three laws were also unconstitutional and that the Court should continue using strict scrutiny. They believed that women had a right to bodily integrity, and a constitutionally protected liberty interest to decide matters of the "highest privacy and the most personal nature." As such, they felt that a State should not be permitted to attempt to "persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion."

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

Living Constitution (the Constitution doesn't say anything about parental right). Precedent (Adams v. Tanner). Policy and Practical Implications (became a key case in the future).

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters support the holding of Skinner v. Nebraska because they established family rights. However, Buck v. Bell (1927) had established that sterilization of the "feeble-minded" didn't violate due process.

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

Meyer v. Nebraska supports the holding of Pierce v. Society of Sisters because it established parental rights and extended the meaning of liberty.

Facts of Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual oral sex with another man in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Poe v. Ullman (1961)

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Extent to which a previous decision supported a holding or dissent in Poe v. Ullman (1961)

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Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

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Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

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Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

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Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

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Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

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Principal arguments in support of the concurring opinions of Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

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Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Loving v. Virginia (1967)

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Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

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Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

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Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions of Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

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Facts of Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

Nebraska passed a law prohibiting teaching grade school children any language other than English. Robert T. Meyer, who taught German in a Lutheran school, was convicted under this law.

Facts of Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

Oklahoma's Criminal Sterilization Act of 1935 allowed the state to sterilize a person who had been convicted two or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude." After his third conviction, Skinner was determined to be a habitual offender and ordered to be sterilized. He argued that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

Originalism ("proscriptions have ancient roots"). Precedent ("no connection between family, marriage, or procreation...and homosexual activity...has been demonstrated).

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Originalism in holding (Framers purposely left the Constitution vague). Originalism in dissent (marriage was between a man and a women when the Amendment was ratified). Living Constitution in holding (marriage has changed: arraigned marriages, women as property, interracial marriage). Structure of the Constitution in holing (shouldn't go to the legislative branch because its a fundamental right). Structure of the Constitution in dissent (going against separation of powers). Precedent in holding (overruled Baker v. Nelson, but the court has gotten it wrong before). Precedent in dissent (Loving v. Virginia was different because of the history of slavery's oppression). Practical Implication in holding (confusing that it was legal in some states and not others, impact on children, taxation and other responsibilities that come along with marriage). Practical Implication in dissent (politicizes the court).

Facts of Poe v. Ullman (1961)

Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts of Perez v. Sharp (1948)

Perez (Mexican but considered white) and Davis (black) applied for a marriage license with the County Clerk of Los Angeles. The County Clerk refused to issue the license based on California Civil Code, Section 60: "All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void" and on Section 69, which stated that "no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race". At the time, California's anti-miscegenation statute had banned interracial marriage since 1850, when it first enacted a statute prohibiting whites from marrying blacks or mulattoes.

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

Planned Parenthood v. Casey supported the holding of Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) because it created the "undue burden" test.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Precedent (Dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (there isn't a right to teach a foreign language in the Constitution, but the First and Fourteenth Amendments create it), Meyer v. Nebraska). Living Constitution.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Precedent (Griswold v. Connecticut).

Constitutional interpretation used in Roe v. Wade (1973)

Precedent (Griswold v. Connecticut, Meyer v. Nebraska, Loving v. Virginia, Pierce v. Society of Sisters). Living Constitution.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

Precedent (Loving v. Virginia, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, Meyer v. Nebraska). Living Constitution. Policy and Practical Implications (Women have been relying on Roe v. Wade).

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

Precedent (Meyer v. Nebraska ("establish a family and bring up children) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters). Policy and Practical Implication (protecting criminals who don't have political power).

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

Precedent (Meyer v. Nebraska). Living Constitution.

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

Precedent (Planned Parenthood v. Casey). Policy and Practical Implications (shut down half the clinics, tons of women now lived more than 150-200 miles away from the clinics).

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Precedent (Skinner v. Oklahoma). Living Constitution (allowed liberty to evolve to fit new societal standards).

Constitutional interpretation relied upon in Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Precedent. Living Constitution. Practical Implications.

Facts of Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

Roe v. Wade supports the holding of Planned Parenthood v. Casey because Casey upheld the central holding of Roe.

Facts of Roe v. Wade (1973)

Roe, a single Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life.

Principal arguments in support of the dissenting opinions in Perez v. Sharp (1948)

Shenk argued that "such laws have been in effect in this country since before our national independence and in this state since our first legislative session." He also said that "the regulation of the incidents of marital relation involves the exercise by the state of powers of the most vital importance." And that the church supported these laws.

Facts of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Sixteen same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Skinner v. Oklahoma supported the holding of Loving v. Virginia because it established the fundamental right to marry and procreate.

Extent to which a prior decision supports a holding or dissent in Perez v. Sharp (1948)

Skinner v. Oklahoma supports the holding of Perez v. Sharp because the case established family rights and the fundamental right to marriage and procreation.

Facts of Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy. The Society of Sisters were able to show injury (declining enrollment) even though the law hadn't come into play yet.

Holding of Poe v. Ullman (1961)

The Court dismissed the case because it involved the threatened and not actual application of the Connecticut law. Since there was no immediate injury, there was no standing.

Holding of Roe v. Wade (1973)

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: "This right to privacy, whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment's concept of personal liberty, as we feel it is, or [in the 9th Amendment] is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The fetus is not a person until viable (could survive outside the woman's womb. The Court found that the states had two valid interests: "protecting the woman's own health and safety" and "protecting potential life." The Court then established the Trimester Framework (strict scrutiny): 1st Trimester: no regulation, doctor and patient are "free to determine" that a "pregnancy should be terminated" 2nd Trimester: reasonable health-based regulation when it relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health 3rd Trimester: states may ban abortion, except when it's "necessary to protect a woman's life"

Holding of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples. Marriage is one of continuity and change. Same-sex couples don't want to devalue marriage, they want it for themselves. Sexuality is not a choice.

Holding of Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)

The Court struck down Nebraska's statute because it violated the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Cause. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see fit. "We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state."

Facts of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

Holding of Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)

The unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that certain crimes, such as embezzlement, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction without explanation or reason (larceny vs. embezzlement). Moreover, the Court reasoned that because of the social and biological implications of reproduction and the irreversibility of sterilization operations, compulsory sterilization laws should be subject to strict scrutiny (marriage and procreation are fundamental rights). Court was also protecting rights that the political process would likely ignore since criminals don't have political power.

Question(s) presented in Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt (2016)

Whether a court's "undue burden" analysis should take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health?

Question(s) presented in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (2003)

Whether a state can require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, if married, notify their husbands, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

Question(s) presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)

Whether the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children?

Question(s) presented in Poe v. Ullman (1961)

Whether the Connecticut statute violates the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Question(s) presented in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Whether the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on the use of contraceptives?

Question(s) presented in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Question(s) presented in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972)

Whether the Massachusetts law violates the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state instrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment? Whether there is any reasonable ground for the distinction between married and unmarried people in the use of contraceptives?

Question(s) presented in Roe v. Wade (1973)

Whether the Texas statutes "improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by a pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy?"