Law Psych and Mental Heath Expert Witness

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) analysis

Analysis: 702 language makes no relevant distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. Neither is the evidentiary rationale that underlay the Court's basic Daubert "gatekeeping" determination limited to "scientific" knowledge. Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case. The petitioners ask more specifically whether a trial judge determining the "admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony" may consider several more specific factors that. Daubert said might "bear on" a judge's gate-keeping determination. These factors include: -Whether a "theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested"; -Whether it "has been subjected to peer review and publication"; -Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high "known or potential rate of error" and whether there are "standards controlling the technique's operation"; and -Whether the theory or technique enjoys "general acceptance" within a "relevant scientific community." 509 U.S., at 592—594. Emphasizing the word "may" in the question, we answer that question yes. (Saying judge SHOULD consider. Doesn't have to but SHOULD) Expanded upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow in that the requirement also applies to expert opinions that are provided by those with technical or professional skills, such as clinicians.

People v. LeGrand (2007) analysis

Analysis: First the court sets the stage: "After a Frye hearing, Supreme Court found that the proposed testimony was relevant to the facts of the case, that defendant's witness was a qualified expert and that the proposed testimony was beyond the ken of the typical juror. However, the court denied defendant's motion to admit expert testimony, ruling that the proposed expert testimony was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. " (Ken= knowledge. After Frye we determined these facts were relevant and that the person was qualified and its knowledge was more) "For the reasons that follow, we hold that where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness's identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror. Taking into account that trial courts generally have the power to limit the amount and scope of evidence presented, we nevertheless conclude that, in this case, the court erred when it precluded the testimony of defendant's eyewitness identification expert in its entirety." (If it turns on eyewitness-- then they have nothing else. (no other evidence) if it is resting on the fact of eyewitness then the trial court cannot exclude exert testimony. ) Analysis: We now conclude that this case falls in the latter category and that defendant's expert should have been allowed to testify. In reaching this conclusion, we first note that the hearing court recognized the importance of the evidence to the defense and found that the proposed expert testimony was relevant to the issues and facts of this case. Further, we consider this case in light of Lee. It is clear that this case turned solely on the accuracy of the witnesses' identification; however, unlike Lee and Young, there was no corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the commission of the crime charged. Plainly, in light of these facts, the testimony of defendant's expert would have benefitted the jury in evaluating the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. In spite of the foregoing, the court excluded the testimony as not generally accepted in the scientific community under Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, 54 App DC 46 [DC Cir 1923]. In Frye, the court stated "[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" (id. at 1014). Accordingly, "the Frye test asks 'whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally' " (Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 446, 857 NE2d 1114, 824 NYS2d 584 [2006], quoting Wesley, 83 NY2d at 422). Further, this test "emphasizes 'counting scientists' votes, rather than . . . verifying the soundness of a scientific conclusion' " (id. at 447, quoting Wesley, 83 NY2d at 439 [Kaye, Ch.J., concurring]). Once the general reliability concerns of Frye are satisfied, the court will consider whether there is a proper foundation "for the reception of the evidence at trial" (id., quoting Wesley, 83 NY2d at 429). We conclude that it was not error for the court to conduct a Frye hearing, although we recognize that this Court and other New York courts have permitted and upheld a qualified expert's testimony regarding research findings on patterns of human behavior without first requiring a Frye hearing. Although the trend has been of late to more liberally admit such testimony--as recognized in Lee and Young--the admissibility of such evidence would also depend upon the existence of sufficient corroborating evidence to link defendant to the crime. In the event that sufficient corroborating evidence is found to exist, an exercise of discretion excluding eyewitness expert testimony would not be fatal to a jury verdict convicting defendant. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the hearing court abused its discretion in failing to admit eyewitness expert testimony on the question of identification. (Yes we tend to now grant this type of evidence but only in this case if there is no corroborating evidence linking the evidence to the crime. If we find the evidence they can deny testimony because if denied it wont be detrimental to a crime that was committed. Currently are we allowed to introduce evidence for the accuracy of eyewitness testimony? Yes if there is no other corroborating evidence, if it it generally accepted, provided by an expert, if it is not common knowledge of the jury, and if it it relevant. Does not necessarily mean that if there is corroborating evidence that they cant do this. )

Frye v. US (1923) analysis

Analysis: In short, the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court, noting that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." -we did not make a mistake to get rid of the expert testimony because there wasn't enough factual basis. -Frye was called the general acceptance rule You can only talk about things that are generally accepted in the field New technology was the problem. Not enough science behind it so it is not generally accepted

Frye v. US (1923) citation facts procedure

Citation: 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir 1923) 54 App.D.C. 46 Facts: James Frye convicted of murder of a white physician. He initially confessed to the murder, but repudiated his confession days before the trial. Procedure: Case started in DC trial court, then was appealed to the U.S. Court of appeals, District of Columbia circuit.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) citation, facts, and procedures

Citation: 509 U.S. 579 Facts: Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit against respondent that the children's serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by respondent. During District Court summary judgment, court determined that 8 experts presented by the petitioners did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard (Frye) for the admission of expert testimony. Procedure: Initial District Court summary judgment denied admission of expert testimony, Court of Appeals (ninth circuit court) agreed and affirmed, Supreme Court grants cert.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) citation, facts and procedure

Citation: 526 U.S. 137 Facts: On July 6, 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out. In the accident that followed, one of the passengers died, and others were severely injured. In October 1993, the Carmichaels brought this diversity suit against the tire's maker and its distributor, whom we refer to collectively as Kumho Tire, claiming that the tire was defective. The plaintiffs rested their case in significant part upon deposition testimony provided by an expert in tire failure analysis, Dennis Carlson, Jr., who intended to testify in support of their conclusion. District Court disallowed Carlson's testimony, Eleventh's Circuit court reversed noting that "the district court erred as a matter of law by applying Daubert in this case." (They reversed that there was a standard used that shouldn't have been used. (does not mean he can testify) Procedure: Civil law suit in District Court, taken to Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Supreme Court granted cert.

People v. LeGrand (2007) Citation, facts, and procedure

Citation: 94 A.D.3d 99 or 939 N.Y.S.2d 444 Facts: On June 15, 1991, livery cab driver Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death. A number of people witnessed the attack, and within days four of them collaborated on a composite sketch of the perpetrator. In 1993, defendant was deemed a suspect in the homicide after he was arrested for an unrelated burglary and an officer thought that he resembled the composite sketch. The police were unable to locate any of the witnesses and the homicide case remained dormant until April 1998 when defendant was arrested for another burglary and the police again concluded that he resembled the composite sketch. First trial ended in mistrial. Prior to his second trial, defendant made a motion to introduce expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. After a Frye hearing, although it found that the proposed testimony was relevant and the witness was a qualified expert, the trial court excluded the testimony as it was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) analysis

Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, an expert may testify. To summarize: "general acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence--especially Rule 702--do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.

expert testimony cases

Frye v. US (1923) Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) People v. LeGrand (2007)

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) issue and holding

Issue: Does Daubert apply to expert testimony that might be characterized as based not upon "scientific" knowledge, but rather upon "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge. Holding: Reversed (Supreme court reversed the 11th courts reverse. Means that daubert does apply. Dennis Carlson never testified and never will in this case)

Frye v. US (1923) issue and holding

Issue: Was the exclusion of expert testimony in the case an err by the trial court? Holding: Affirmed

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) issue and holding

Issue: What standard should be used when determining whether to allow expert scientific testimony? Holding: Judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

People v. LeGrand (2007) issue and holding

Issues: "The main issue before us is whether the hearing court erred when it refused to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications, which it concluded was based on novel scientific principles, theories or techniques that are not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community." Holding: reversed and a new trial ordered. -Questions: was the court wrong in denying testimony based on Frye and its standard of general acceptance? -No the second court Already at its 3rd couort Went to the court of appeals before this Supreme court of NYS