philo

The same holds true about knowledge of the

"Other". The "Other" (meaning simply beings or objects that are not the self) is a construct of reflective consciousness. A volitional entity must be careful to understand this more as a form of warning than as an ontological statement. However, there is an implication of solipsism here that Sartre considers fundamental to any coherent description of the human condition.[26] Sartre overcomes this solipsism by a kind of ritual. Self consciousness needs "the Other" to prove (display) its own existence. It has a "masochistic desire" to be limited, i.e. limited by the reflective consciousness of another subject. This is expressed metaphorically in the famous line of dialogue from No Exit, "Hell is other people." Sartre stated that "In order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life. To risk one's life, in fact, is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to any determined existence--as not-bound to life", meaning the value of the Other's recognition of me depends on the value of my recognition of the Other. In this sense to the extent that the Other apprehends me as bound to a body and immersed in life, I am myself only an Other as Ego.[27] The main idea of Jean-Paul Sartre is that we are, as humans, "condemned to be free."[28] This theory relies upon his belief that there is no creator, and is formed using the example of the paper knife. Sartre says that if one considered a paper knife, one would assume that the creator would have had a plan for it: an essence. Sartre said that human beings have no essence before their existence because there is no Creator. Thus: "existence precedes essence".[29] This forms the basis for his assertion that since one cannot explain their own actions and behaviour by referencing any specific human nature, they are necessarily fully responsible for those actions. "We are left alone, without excuse"

Where Does Voluntary Begin?

Beginning by defining, Aristotle soon realizes many situations are too complex for just black vs. white terms and he introduces another term; non-voluntary. This leads to discussion of choice and deliberation, bringing his viewpoints into applicable terms, out of philosophy and into everyday life.

involuntary action and ignorance

However, when involuntary actions begin to involve ignorance, Aristotle states the only type of valid ignorance is that in which the agent is unaware of the affect of his action on the thing or person affected. Aristotle would say a drunken man is acting in ignorance, while a man unaware of social customs is acting due to ignorance. Here is also where the distinction between involuntary and non- voluntary action is drawn.

thumos

Human beings can think, therefore they have intellects, and theoretical and practical wisdom are the virtues of this kind of soul. There is also a desiring part of the soul (orexis) which in turn divides into an appetitive soul that explains why human beings have appetites such as lust and hunger; a kind of soul that Aristotle calls thumos which explains why human beings feel emotions such as anger and pride; and a third element - identical

Force

In the case of force Aristotle draws a distinction between physical force and compulsion, saying that only the former renders an action involuntary; cases of compulsion, even extreme, are still voluntary. In the case of physical force the act has an external origin such that the agent contributes nothing to it - for example if I am kidnapped and taken to London by force then I do not have any involvement in the act of going to London. Such cases lack agency - I cannot really be said to "act" at all. But sometimes an act is done through compulsion - e.g. fear; for example, a tyrant has the agent's family captive and orders the agent to do something bad under the threat that his family will be harmed. Aristotle says that in these cases it is debatable whether the act is voluntary or involuntary - he calls such actions "mixed" - the agent acts voluntarily in the sense that his limbs are not forced, but involuntarily in the sense that he would not normally choose to do something like this.

involuntary action

Only when logical creatures lack knowledge or are under duress do they move away from choice and voluntary action to involuntary action. Aristotle states his point quite clearly when he says, "...actions done under constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary" (p.52). An action is involuntary when the source of initiative comes from outside, Aristotle use the example of a person carried away by the wind, he is obviously not responsible for his action of moving, this would be an example of involuntary action due to constraint.

The basis of Sartre's existentialism can be found in

The Transcendence of the Ego in which he says that the thing-in-itself is infinite and overflowing. Sartre refers to any direct consciousness of the thing-in-itself as a "pre-reflective consciousness." Any attempt to describe, understand, historicize etc. the thing-in-itself, Sartre calls "reflective consciousness." There is no way for the reflective consciousness to subsume the pre-reflective, and so reflection is fated to a form of anxiety, i.e. the human condition. The reflective consciousness in all its forms, (scientific, artistic or otherwise) can only limit the thing-in-itself by virtue of its attempt to understand or describe it. It follows, therefore, that any attempt at self-knowledge (self-consciousness - a reflective consciousness of an overflowing infinite) is a construct that fails no matter how often it is attempted. Consciousness is consciousness of itself insofar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object.

ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY

When Aristotle sets out to define a thing he typically first isolates which genus it belongs to and then gives differentia to uniquely specify it within that genus. Thus, when he defines man as a rational animal he places man in the genus "animal" with the differentia "rational". However, no such precise approach is to be found in his discussion of voluntary acts. He doesn't say that someone's action is voluntary because it exemplifies some property common to all voluntary actions. Rather, in the NE he takes a descriptive approach, and, moreover, the negative descriptive approach of describing involuntary actions. Aristotle says that they are actions which arise from force or from ignorance3. 2.1 Force In the case of force Aristotle draws a distinction between physical force and compulsion, saying that only the former renders an action involuntary; cases of compulsion, even extreme, are still voluntary. In the case of physical force the act has an external origin such that the agent contributes nothing to it - for example if I am kidnapped and taken to London by force then I do not have any involvement in the act of going to London. Such cases lack agency - I cannot really be said to "act" at all. But sometimes an act is done through compulsion - e.g. fear; for example, a tyrant has the agent's family captive and orders the agent to do something bad under the threat that his family will be harmed. Aristotle says that in these cases it is debatable whether the act is voluntary or involuntary - he calls such actions "mixed" - the agent acts voluntarily in the sense that his limbs are not forced, but involuntarily in the sense that he would not normally choose to do something like this. 1

The 19th-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is known as

a critic of Judeo-Christian morality and religions in general. One of the arguments he raised against the truthfulness of these doctrines is that they base upon the concept of free will, which he considers false[citation needed

hospers believed that we are always

acting on some compulsion or other

Will is something that determines man's

acts, thoughts etc. It is will what makes man reluctant to toss a coin for something (see The Antichrist, 44, about Christians: "in point of fact, they simply do what they cannot help doing"). The problem is, whether it is itself ruled? And here there are two terms which complicate the picture: the term "me" and "chance" (i.e. something independent from anything, uncontrollable). The term "me" (as in sayings "it's up to you", "it is you who wants things") is already recognized as empty in the preface of Beyond Good and Evil (or as connected with the superstition about the soul). Later, Nietzsche states more clearly that it is a tautology ("what will I do? what will my decision be?" - "it's up to you" - that actually means: your decision depends on your decision, something happens in your mind and not somewhere else...). See e.g. On the Genealogy of Morals[7]:

Next, he shows that it represents

an error of causa sui (X is a cause of X - whereas "cause" should mean something beyond): The desire for "freedom of will" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness.

hospers argument against responsibility

an occurence which we had no control is something we cannot be held responsible for. events occuring during our babyhood, were events we had no control over. therefore events today are events we cannot be held responsible for

John Hospers is a twentieth century philosopher who believed that man's actions

are not determined by freewill, but by the unconscious mind.

there is no "being" behind the

doing, acting, becoming. "The doer" is merely made up and added into the action - the act is everything. People basically duplicate the action: when they see a lightning flash, that is an action of an action: they set up the same event first as the cause and then yet again as its effect. (...) "We weak people are merely weak. It's good if we do nothing; we are not strong enough for that" - but this bitter state, this shrewdness of the lowest ranks, which even insects possess (when in great danger they stand as if they were dead in order not to do "too much"), has, thanks to that counterfeiting and self-deception of powerlessness, dressed itself in the splendour of a self-denying, still, patient virtue, just as if the weakness of the weak man himself - that means his essence, his actions, his entire single, inevitable, and irredeemable reality - is a voluntary achievement, something willed, chosen, an act, something of merit.

praise and blame presuppose that our actions are

done voluntarily.

It was Sartre's view that doing the best we can requires

first and foremost, an honest appraisal of the degree to which we are responsible for ourselves and for each other. We have to choose what will be good and what will be evil. Such norms are not fixed in advance. Wherever norms do exist, someone has chosen them to be authoritative. That realization does not mean that values are arbitrary or irrational. It does mean that we can and must decide what we ought to do. Responsibility for these uses of freedom is ours and ours alone.

though a man acts out of pressure, even outside pressure...

his actions are still voluntary because the man freely chose between two alternatives

Involuntary actions are performed due to

ignorance, or because one is forced to do so. For example, slavery would be considered an involuntary action, because

And so, it all comes down to this: Without responsibility, we are

innocent, and thus our innocence does not require the existence of a supreme judge—God—because there is nothing to judge in the first place. We have forgotten that we were free from the beginning—free from the tyranny of responsibility—of judgement—and now we must remember and redeem ourselves. We must inoculate ourselves from the disease the "theologians" have infected us with. We must remember that we were once innocent and that we still are. So the question becomes: What is holding us back?—tradition?—concepts of morality?—a plethora of troublesome memes? Perhaps, ironically, our own "free will"?—hah!

Nietzsche argues that "free will" is an

invention—by the priests, of all people—to make humanity accountable for its actions; to feel guilty; to be sinners. If humanity can be free to be responsible, it can be free to be punished as well! However, since humanity has no "free will," it cannot be subject to such responsibilities—to such a thing as punishment. Here Nietzsche invokes his concept of eternal recurrence—by claiming that humanity has invented the "concept of 'end' " as well, he sets up the final blow. If there is no "end" then there could not be any responsibility in the first place because we are all apart of the same existence—to hold ourselves responsible would mean to hold existence itself responsible as well, and that's just silly. Going back to causality, Nietzsche was showing that if cause and effect exist, then something must be responsible for the cause—something accountable—to judge. As causality is merely an illusion, there is no supporting argument for the existence of responsibility.

We are responsible, Sartre asserted, for

making what we can of the world. Because such responsibility is awesome, our freedom can be dreadful, and we may try to flee from it. Sartre called that flight "bad faith." Unlike lying, a situation in which I know the truth and try to hide it from others, "in bad faith," said Sartre, "it is from myself that I am hiding the truth." Whenever we deny ourselves by ignoring or repressing the fact that our free decisions are crucial ingredients in determining the situations we are in, bad faith intrudes. In its place Sartre wanted to put honesty and responsibility. Even though he called human existence a useless passion because it is so radically free, that same freedom makes it possible for us to do the best we can with the lives we have.

The Id contains

our most basic instinctive and primitive urges, it looks for immediate gratification.

Men generally agree that will is

power. "Freedom" of will then in fact means: power of will (see argument from The Antichrist, 14). Will has power over actions, over many things; therefore, things are determined by will. But is this power unlimited? Does a will rule without being ruled itself? Does a Christian want to sin? - Nietzsche disagrees. A godless man becomes pious as a "grace", he did not want it; and likewise a pious man becomes godless without any merit or guilt. Nietzsche suggests in many places that if a pious man becomes godless, it is because of the power of his values, of the will for truthfulness... [edit] "Me", will, and chance

it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which

praise and blame are given"

Nothing is (nor can be) fully

resistant to stimula, for that would mean it is unchangeable: whereas nothing in this world is or can be unchangeable[6]. He therefore continues Schopenhauer's question of "whether you will, what you wanted to will".

The Superego is our

social self, it is how we want the world to perceive us. The unconscious as a whole, consists of childhood experiences that are repressed because they are unpleasant. Repression is the unconscious attempting to protect us from these unpleasant experiences. These experiences manifest or show themselves through anxiety or neurosis.

Hospers believed

that man was not free to make choices, but predestined by his past experience and it's influence on our unconscious development.

Non-voluntary action is when

the action causes no regret or pain from its consequences. Actions could range from throwing cargo off a ship in a storm to a serial killer's rampage of murder. These are actions performed under constraint but constraint in such a way that voluntary action is still possible. Aristotle uses the example of a man asked to commit a heinous crime and so saves his family from death. This is not involuntary as the man has a choice on whether to commit the crime or not but he makes his decision under distress and most likely will not regret his decision, thus making it a non-voluntary action.

aristotle believes that as long as the action is considered ofand performed by the doer with no inescapable force

the action is voluntary.

In Beyond Good and Evil, 21[5], Nietzsche criticizes the concept of free will

the concept of free will both negatively and positively. He calls it a folly resulting from extravagant pride of man; and calls the idea a boorish simplicity. The latter probably relates to ordinary-man's visions like there is a God which (after the ellapse of eternal waiting) creates the world and then waits and observes (being, however, still "beyond time"): and then he is surprised and subdued by what I do (and well, I am too!). (This vision is brought up by Nietzsche in The Antichrist, sect. 48).

The error of free will. Today we no longer have any pity for the concept of "free will": we know only too well what it really is—

the foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at making mankind "responsible" in their sense, that is, dependent upon them. Here I simply supply the psychology of all "making responsible." [1]

The Ego is considered

the mediator between the Id and the Superego, it is the reality check that balances the two extremes.

the person carrying out the act must also be aware of

the particular circumstances in which he or she acts.

voluntary action

the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are used with reference to the moment of action...because the initiative in moving the parts of the body which act as instruments rests with the agent himself" (p.53). So, a voluntary action is one about which we have power. Such as, what to eat in the morning, brushing teeth or even life altering decisions about jobs and marriage. Most of our everyday actions are voluntary, since we do not often act outsi

when someone does something wrong because of an external agent,

they are exempt from blame and punishment. "those actions that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied..."

aristotle describes voluntary actions as

those actions driven by an individual's ambition, passions, or desires.

aristotle describes involunary actions as

those actions where the principle of the actions lie outside of the doer.

The unconscious mind is divided into

three parts, the Id, the Ego and the Superego

Aristotle believed that virtue grew from

virtuous actions. In order to achieve happiness, an individual needed to be aware of his or her own actions and learn how to make the right choices. According to Aristotle, three types of actions exist: involuntary actions, nonvoluntary actions, and voluntary actions.

all decisions are

voluntary actions

Aristotle tends to agree that most actions are

voluntary and from this fact comes much of the praise we receive for our actions, "...sometimes people are even praised for doing them [voluntary actions], for example, if they endured shameful or painful treatment in return" (p.53). If others feel that an action is worthy or noble they will acknowledge the person's conscious choice of the action and see they receive due reward. In general, Aristotle feels that people are in control of their actions, whether a thoughtful choice is made or not. At this point one begins to relate to Aristotle's statements on the concepts of voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions. In fact one recent political issue begins to surface

aristotle focuses on three categories

voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary.

Wherever responsibilities are sought, it is usually the instinct of

wanting to judge and punish which is at work. Becoming has been deprived of its innocence when any being-such-and-such is traced back to will, to purposes, to acts of responsibility: the doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is, because one wanted to impute guilt. The entire old psychology, the psychology of will, was conditioned by the fact that its originators, the priests at the head of ancient communities, wanted to create for themselves the right to punish—or wanted to create this right for God. [2] Men were considered "free" so that they might be judged and punished—so that they might become guilty: consequently, every act had to be considered as willed, and the origin of every act had to be considered as lying within the consciousness (and thus the most fundamental counterfeit in psychologicis was made the principle of psychology itself). Today, as we have entered into the reverse movement and we immoralists are trying with all our strength to take the concept of guilt and the concept of punishment out of the world again, and to cleanse psychology, history, nature, and social institutions and sanctions of them, there is in our eyes no more radical opposition than that of the theologians, who continue with the concept of a "moral world-order" to infect the innocence of becoming by means of "punishment" and "guilt." Christianity is a

Sartre's point was that so long as we choose to live

we have in effect chosen to be born. Additionally, insofar as the world has significance, such significance is a result of consciousness. Our consciousness of being alive is what allows us to choose the goals and purposes we confront as we relate to other persons or project our own futures.

Finally, he suggests that the only real thing about will is

whether it is strong (i.e. hard to break) or weak: The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a question of strong and weak will.