Philosophy Midterm 1/2
In II.4 Aristotle wants to distinguish the virtuous person who does virtuous things from the nonvirtuous person who happens to do virtuous things. He says that in order to be virtuous (rather than merely happen to be virtuous), three conditions must be met. Name one.
"First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state," (1105a35). In other words: the virtuous person must (1) desire and choose to do something noble/fine/beautiful, (2) must do it because noble/fine/beautiful things are most choice-worthy, and (3) doing this regularly/habitually.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #6
(6) Mildness/Patience—the virtue regarding anger.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #7
(7) Truthfulness/Honest—another social virtue, this virtue concerns being forthright wih others about your qualities and abilities.
Aristotle gives about five reasons why pleasure and pain have much to do with virtue. Give reason #3.
"For there are three objects of choice—fine [noble/beautiful], expedient [useful, advantageous], and pleasant—and three objects of avoidance—their contraries, shameful, harmful, and painful. About all these, then, the good person is correct and the bad person is in error," (1104b30). Virtue is about taking pleasure in the correct/right/good sort of things. A person who pursues mere pleasure lives an animal, rather than human life, and a person who pursues tools (like money) foolishly spends his life acquiring the means of living.
Aristotle argues in II.1 that virtue not arise in us naturally. We do not simply grow into virtue. If becoming virtuous does not happen naturally, how do we become virtuous?
"Now death is the most frightening of all, since it is a boundary, and when Virtue is neither by nature nor against nature. Virtue is instead by habit. If it were by nature, then we would all be virtuous without any effort. If it were against nature, virtue would be impossible to us. A stone, when released from a height, falls without making the effort. It is impossible to condition the same stone, "even if you threw it up ten thousand times to habituate it," (1103a20), to move upwards. Regarding humans, we see that people develop one habit and lose another. They acquire and lost skills, have a 'changes of heart' or make conversions to one way of life or another. They can become virtuous by practicing virtuous things, in the same way that they become builders by practicing building.
According to III.6, what is the most fearful, most frightening thing of all?
"Now death is the most frightening of all, since it is a boundary, and when someone is dead nothing beyond it seems either good or bad for him any more,"
Aristotle gives about five reasons why pleasure and pain have much to do with virtue. Give reason #4.
"Pleasure grows up with all of us from infancy one," (1105a). All of our actions involve pleasure and pain. It has been this way from birth. From birth we have been being conditioned to take pleasure in certain things and to take pain in other things. Things as seemingly innocent as toy commercials you saw in your childhood are part of this conditioning.
In II.3 Aristotle talks at length about pleasure and pain. What do pleasure and pain have to do with virtue? Aristotle gives about five reasons why pleasure and pain have much to do with virtue. A more or less accurate description of any one reason is sufficient to answer this question.
(1) "But we must take someone's pleasure or pain following on his actions to be a sign of his state," (1104b5). People delight in doing the things they are habituated to doing, and are pained at doing things contrary to their habit. The things one likes doing reflects the condition of their soul. If virtue is about the condition of the soul, then it must have something to do with pleasure and pain. This reason is repeated 1104b20-30.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #1
(1) Courage—deals mostly with pains. The courageous person fights through genuinely fearful things for the sake of doing something noble/beautiful/fine.
Aristotle gives about five reasons why pleasure and pain have much to do with virtue. Give reason #2.
(2) "For pleasure causes us to do base actions, and pain causes us to abstain from fine ones," (1104b10). We do things either to avoid some pain or to acquire some pleasure. Virtue is about doing fine/noble/beautiful things, so we will be virtuous if we the pleasure we seek are fine/noble/beautiful things. However if we find doing fine/noble/beautiful things painful, we will not become virtuous.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #2
(2) Temperance—deals mostly with pleasures.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #3
(3) Generosity/Liberality—a social virtue, this virtue concerns the sharing of wealth and property with others (usually friends, neighbor, and the needy we encounter) for the sake of something fine.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #4
(4) Magnificence—another social virtue, this virtue concerns the sharing of large sums of wealth and property with many others (the community at large) for the sake of something fine. Think philanthropy
Aristotle gives about five reasons why pleasure and pain have much to do with virtue. Give reason #5.
(5) "It is more difficult to fight pleasure than to fight spirit...[And] both craft and virtue are in every case about what is more difficult," (1105a10). Nothing worth doing is easily done. The virtuous person accomplishes great things by overcoming great difficulties—as Aristotle says in Book III.6, the virtuous person overcomes the greatest fear, death, to do something beautiful.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #5
(5) Magnanimity/Greatness of Soul/Pride—the virtue of correct self-estimation. The magnanimous person knows what he's worth and gets what he's worth.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #8
(8) Wit/Humor—another social virtue, this virtue concerns saying pleasing/funny things. Sometimes humor is appropriate, but sometimes it is subversive. To portray noble, beautiful, and fine things as laughable, ridiculous, and silly is not virtuous.
In II.7 Aristotle lists several virtues. What are they? Virtue #9
(9) Friendliness—another social virtue, this virtue concerns being kind to others.
In I.2, how does Aristotle characterize political science?
Aristotle characterizes political science as "the most controlling science—the highest ruling science," (1094a27). The reason for this is because politicians decide what the law is and how it should be enforced. Accordingly they decide what is allowed and forbidden in a given community or nation, and which activities will receive public funding and support. In this way, politicians decide what sorts of activities or inquiries will be pursued and which activities or inquiries will be considered good and which bad. See 1094a27-1094b13.
Who is Milo?
Aristotle uses the example of Milo in II.6 to illustrate what he means when he says that we must choose the "mean between extremes." As an Athlete, Milo must be physically fit, and this makes certain demands on his diet.
In III.8, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with five sorts of people who come quite close to bring courageous. They look an awful lot like the courageous person, but are nonetheless not courageous. Who are they? Type #1.
First are the ignorant (1117a22-28). They are not courageous, because they, being ignorant, do not recognize the frightening situation to be frightening.
In III.8, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with five sorts of people who come quite close to bring courageous. They look an awful lot like the courageous person, but are nonetheless not courageous. Who are they? Type #4.
Next are the experienced, the mercenary soldiers, "private contractors" as they're called today (1116b5-25). They are not courageous, because they, like the ignorant and hopeful, do not correctly appreciate the danger of the frightening situation. Unlike the ignorant, they are knowledge of warfare in general, but mistaken about the dangers of the present dangers. "Professional soldiers, however, turn out to be cowards whenever the danger overstrains them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment. For they are the first to run, whereas the citizen troops stand firm and get killed," (1116b16-18).
In III.8, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with five sorts of people who come quite close to bring courageous. They look an awful lot like the courageous person, but are nonetheless not courageous. Who are they? Type #2.
Next are the hopeful (117a10-22). They are not courageous, because they, being hopeful, do not properly estimate how dangerous the situation is.
In III.8, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with five sorts of people who come quite close to bring courageous. They look an awful lot like the courageous person, but are nonetheless not courageous. Who are they? Type #3.
Next are the spirited, the passionate (1116b25-1117a10). They are not courageous, because their reason is impaired or overruled by a temporary passion. "They are not brave, then, since distress and spirit drives them in an impulse rush to meet danger, foreseeing none of the terrifying prospects. The passionate are closer to animals than they are to reasoning humans.
Death comes in many forms, and the courageous person is more concerned with some than with others. The courageous person is concerned with the noblest, finest, most beautiful kinds of death. According to Aristotle, where does the courageous person find such a death?
Now such deaths are those in war, since they occur in the greatest and finest danger. Hence someone is called fully brave if he is intrepid in facing a fine death and the immediate dangers that bring death. And this is above all true of the dangers of war.
According to I.1, what does every craft, line of inquiry, decision, and action seek?
The goal of every craft (some activity that produces some physical object, whether food, buildings, artwork, etc.), line of inquiry (some activity that yields knowledge of producing food, constructing buildings, making art), every decision, and every action is "some good," (1094a2).
In I.5, Aristotle criticizes three of the most favored kinds of lives. Describe one criticism.
The life of pleasure or gratification is criticized thus: there is nothing distinctively human in the life that seeks physical pleasures. This life is "completely slavish," the "life for grazing animals," (1095b20). The life of fame or honor is criticized thus: It is superficial, because honor is not something that one can possess in and for oneself, but must receive from others. Further, fame-seekers pursue fame and honor to convince themselves that they are good. It would be better that they sought virtue. The life of money-making is criticized thus: Money is not a good in itself. Money is good only as a means to some other good thing, some good thing that one can purchase. Accordingly, to live for money is to live for the sake of the means of living, which is absurd.
In I.5, Aristotle examines the three or four most favored kinds of lives. What lives does he examine?
The lives are these: the life of pleasure or gratification (1095b18-23), the life of fame or honor (1095b23-1096a1), the contemplative or philosophic life (1095b5), and the live of money-making (1096a6-11).
In II.5 Aristotle says that three kinds of conditions arise in the soul. Which one is virtue?
The three states are "Feelings, capacities, states," (1105b20). The one that is virtue is "state". We are not virtuous just because we want to be virtuous. We are not virtuous just because we feel like it would be good to do something noble/beautiful/fine. We must actually do those things.
In III.7, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with two sorts of people who fail to be courageous. These two are in a way opposite to each other, and do not at all look like the courageous person. Who are they?
There is, first of all, the coward, who is overcome by fear. There is, in the next place, the rash person, who makes a big show of himself, pretends to be fearless, and does reckless things in order to appear courageous.
In II.2 Aristotle talked about how states of the soul are destroyed by excess and deficiency. Aristotle applies the results of II.2 to virtue in II.6. How does Aristotle describe virtue in II.6?
Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what is intermediate, The "mean" is how the virtuous person tries aims at something noble/fine/beautiful. The virtuous person will pursue something beautiful in a way appropriate to them.
In III.8, Aristotle contrasts the courageous person with five sorts of people who come quite close to bring courageous. They look an awful lot like the courageous person, but are nonetheless not courageous. Who are they? Type #5
nearest in appearance to the courageous person, are brave citizens (1116a18-1116b5). The courageous person will fight because it is noble/fine/beautiful to fight, but the good citizen will find because he will be honored by his peers for doing so. The sole reward that the truly courageous person desires is the satisfaction of having done something beautiful.
