16. Vicarious Liability (31 2-341)
326. (Continued from VCL 12A) What is imputed contributory negligence?
(Continued from back ofVCL 2A) NOTE: Situations where another's contributory negligence won't be imputed to the plaintiff include these: I. A parent's contributory negligence won't be imputed to his child; 2. A spouse's contributory negligence won't be imputed to the other spouse; and 3. A driver's contributory negligence won't be imputed to a passenger ( unless, as in the Frankenstein example above, the driver is the passenger's agent or employee). D §341, pp. 938-40.
325. What is imputed contributory negligence?
Imputed contributmy negligence bars the plaintiff from recovery due to someone else's negligence. There are only three principal situations in which someone else's negligence will be imputed to the plaintiff under Rest. 2d §485: (I) principalagent; (2) joint venture; and (3) a suit based on injury to someone else (e.g., wrongful death or loss of consortium-the victim's contributory negligence will be imputed to plaintiff). EXAMPLE: Say Igor is Dr. Frankenstein's chauffeur. Igor drives Frankenstein to his laboratory one day, when the limousine collides with a car driven by Madeleine. Frankenstein is injured. The accident was due to both Igor's and Madeleine's negligence. Frankenstein sues Madeleine. Madeleine can raise the contributory negligence defense; not Frankenstein's personally, but Igor's, which will be imputed to Frankenstein on the basis of the principal-agent relationship between them. (Please refer to the next card for further explanation.)
332. Prince Charming sends a messenger in his office, Cinderella, out on a company errand. Charming knows Cinderella has a history of erratic and reckless driving. While Cinderella is out on the road, Evil Stepmother trips on a curb and falls into the street. Cinderella (who's driving at a reasonable speed and paying attention) can't swerve out of the way in time to avoid hitting her. Can Charming be held vicariously liable for Evil Stepmother's injuries?
No, because Cinderella wasn't negligent. Vicarious liability requires an underlying tort. There's no tort here; Cinderella wasn't negligent. As a result, there's nothing for Charming to be vicariously liable for. RELATED ISSUE: Because Cinderella wasn't at fault, there's no basis for Channing's liability under "negligent entrustment" either. With negligent entrustment, you lend something (typically a car) to someone you knew or should have known was likely to use the loaned object to harm others. Rest. 2d §390. But unless the entrustee behaves tortiously, there can't be negligent entrustment.
340. Mrs. Merrick takes her five-year-old son John to the park. While Mrs. Merrick is chatting with her friend, she doesn't notice John wandering away. John negligently walks onto a bridle path, when Headless Horseman rides up and, not watching where he's going, negligently tramples John, horribly disfiguring him in the process. The jurisdiction applies contributory negligence. When Horseman is sued, will Mrs. Merrick's negligence in not supervising John be imputed to John, barring John from recovery?
No. A parent's negligent failure to supervise a child will not be imputed to a child when the child sues a tWrd party for negligence. (Some very old cases held otherwise, imputing the parent's negligence to the child.) D §341, pp. 938-40.
334. Robin Hood is driving toward Sherwood Forest. He sees his friend Friar Tuck on the sidewalk and asks him if he wants a ride anywhere. Friar Tuck says, "Well, if you can take me two miles down the road, I'd appreciate it," and gets into the car. (Friar Tuck has no reason to believe that Robin often drives carelessly.) Soon, Robin Hood negligently goes through a stop sign and hits Marian, a pedestrian. Robin is judgment-proof and underinsured. In most states, if Marian sues Friar Tuck in a negligence action, can she recover?
No. Friar Tuck wasn't himseH negligent, so he can be liable only if there is a basis for making him vicariously liable for Robin's negligence. To justify vicarious liability, there must be a relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant. The most plausible such relationship here"joint venture" or "joint enterprise"-is not available. That's because a joint venture will not exist unless the defendant and the co-venturer have, among other things, (1) a common pecuniary• interest in the venture; and (2) an equal right of control over the venture. Rest. 2d §491, Comment c. There's no evidence here of (1) (since Friar hasn't, for instance, offered to share expenses); and (2) is clearly not satisfied because there's no indication that Friar was to get any say in how Robin drove his car. D §340, pp. 933-34.
318. In general, are employers vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of independent contractors?
No. However, exceptions to this general "no vicarious liability for torts of independent contractors" rule include situations where: I. The work involves a "peculiar risk" of injury unless special precautions are taken (e.g., high-voltage electrical work); 2. The work is "ultra-hazardous," so that the owner would be strictly liable if he did the work himself (e.g., blasting); 3. The work involves land held open to the public, so that the owner would owe a duty of care to the public if he himself did the work (e.g., a retail store); 4. The work is done in a public place (e.g., a sidewalk or road). E Ch.12-JII(B)(2); Rest. 3d §§58-64. NOTE: An employer can be directly liable for his own negligence vis-a-vis an independent contractor (e.g., choosing an incompetent contractor or giving her inadequate instructions). If that happens, then injuries (Please refer to the next card for further explanation.)
336. Isolde, a licensed driver, borrows her mother's car, ostensibly to drive to the drugstore two miles away. Isolde's mother tells her, "Under no circumstances are you to visit that no-good bum Tristan!" Isolde hops in the car and immediately hightails it for Tristan's house, 30 miles away. On the way, she negligently hits Tristan's father, Mark, who is out jogging. In a state that recognizes the Family Purpose doctrine, will Isolde's mother be vicariously liable for Isolde's tort?
No. Under the Family Purpose doctrine, a car owner is liable for the negligence of a family member driving the car, as long as the family member is driving with the owner's express or implied permission. The reason Isolde's mother ,viii escape vicarious liability here is that she put restrictions on the use of the car that Isolde ignored, making the use nonpermissive. NOTE: This result would not occur if the variation was insignificant, or if Isolde had repeatedly ignored the rule (in which case her mother's consent to the supposedlyimpermissible use would be implied). RELATED ISSUE: Say there wasn't a Family Purpose doctrine in effect. The result would be the same. Isolde's mother wouldn't be liable because the general rule is that car owners are not liable for the torts of others using tbe car, even ,vith the owner's permission. NOTE: Restrictions on the manner of use--e.g., "Don't speed"-will not negate the car owner's liability, if the Fan1ily Purpose doctrine otherwise applies. D §340, pp. 935-36.
316. What's the difference between vicarious liability and negligent entrustment?
With vicarious liability, you've done nothing tortious yourself; you just have a relationship with someone else that justifies making you liable for bis or her torts. With negligent entrustment, you did do something tortious-you lent something (typically a car) to someone you should have known was likely to use the loaned object to harm others. So if someone works for you and causes a car accident on company business, you're vicariously liable due to the employer-employee relationship. If, on the other hand, you send an employee out to run an errand with the company car when you know he's drunk, and he hits a pedestrian, that's negligent entrustment because you should have known he'd likely injure someone in his drunken condition. In that case, you'd be liable for your own negligence in sending him on the errand. You can combine both types of liability in one setting, say where you negligently entrust your vehicle to one of your employees to use on the job. Rest. 2d §390.
320. Are business partners ever vicariously liable for the torts of other partners?
Yes, as long as the torts are committed within the scope of the partnership. The same rule applies to joint ventures (similar to partnership, but generally entered into for a limited time and purpose). In a partnership, there is a more-or-less permanent business arrangement, creating a mutual agency between the partners for the purpose of carrying on some general business. So it's appropriate for the acts of one to be charged against the other(s). D §340, pp. 932-34.
328. Harvey Bangbang owns the Shoot 'M Up Gun Store. He strictly instructs his employees not to load guns before demonstrating them to customers. One employee, Annie Oakleaf, is having a hard time selling a gun to a customer, Long John Silver. She loads a gun and fires at a target on the wall. She accidentally (and negligently) shoots Silver's leg off in the process. Will Harvey be liable for Annie's negligence?
Yes, even though Annie had strict instructions not to load the gun. Because the tort occurred within the scope of the employment relationship and Annie was serving Harvey's objectives (albeit in a prohibited way), Harvey will be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. If violating the employer's instructions was treated as an exception that takes the case out of vicarious liability, the exception would swallow the rule: employers would almost always escape liability simply by giving their employees instructions (but not enforcing them) about how to be careful. E Ch.12-II(C); D §335, pp. 910-15.
319. (Continued from VCL 6A) In general, are employers vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of independent contractors?
(Continued from back of VCL 6A) inflicted by the contractor will be recoverable as direct damages from the employer. (But this isn't vicarious liability.) NOTE: How do you distinguish an independent contractor from an employee? The main factor is that the details of how a contractor is to perform the services are not subject to the control of the employer, whereas the details of an employee's performance are subject to employer control. NOTE: Regarding the vicarious liability of landowners, the general rule is that the owner of land or a building who entrusts repairs or other work to a contractor remains liable for any negligence by the contractor injuring those on or outside the land. But that's not true as to contractor negligence occurring while the contractor is actively doing the work, assuming the contractor has taken over the daily details of handling the job. Rest. 3d §62, Comment g and Illustr. 3.
314. (Continued from VCL 2A) HELPFUL HINTS CONCERNING VICARIOUS LIABILITY
(Continued from back ofVCL 2A) Joint venturers are vicariously liable for torts committed within the scope of the venture. (A joint venture requires an agreement, a common purpose, a common pecuniary interest, and a mutual right of control.) A car owner is generally not liable for torts committed while others drive his car (although some states have changed this by statute, making car owners liable for torts committed by family members using the car with the owner's permission [ this is the family car doctrine] , or anyone using it with permission [ the permissive use doctrine]). Parents are not vicariously liable for their children's torts (but they may be directly liable, e.g., for giving the child a dangerous object that the child lacks the maturity and judgment to control). E Ch.12.
321. What elements determine whether an activity is a joint venture?
1. An agreement, express or implied, between the members; 2. A common purpose shared by the members; 3. A common pecuniary interest; and 4. A mutual right of control. SIGNIFICANCE: If an activity is a joint venture, each "joint venturer" will be liable for the torts of others committed within the scope of the venture. NOTE: Most joint venture cases involve automobile trips. D §340, pp. 933-34.
317. Under what circumstances are employers vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of their employees?
Employers are vicariously liable when the tortious act occurs within the scope of the employment relationship. This is known as the doctrine of respondeat superior. NOTE: "Scope of employment" is obviously a slippery concept. However, in general, an act is within the scope if: ( I) the act's purpose to some extent is to seroe the employer's objectives, (2) the act is of a general type that the employee is authorized to perform, and (3) the act occurs substantially within the time and place authorized by the employer. BEWARE! An employer can also be directly liable for an employee's tortious conduct if the employer was negligent herself. For instance, sending a worker you know or have reason to know is drunk on a delivery would be negligence itself, making the employer directly liable to anyone injured by the drunk employee's driving. D §335, pp. 910-17.
313. HELPFUL HINfS CONCERNING VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Here's a thumbnail sketch of some important points to remember about vicarious liability ( these are fleshed out in the hypothetical cards to follow): Not limited to negligence: H any intentional tort occurs within the scope of employment, the employer will be liable (e.g., assault, battery, false imprisonment, emotional distress). Instructions don't insulate the principal: The principal can't insulate herself with careful instructions that the employee violates. Otherwise, every employer would simply instruct its employees, "Don't commit any torts," and would thereby immunize itself from any vicarious liability. A business partner is vicariously liable for torts committed by the other partner within the scope of the partnership. (Please refer to the next card for further explanation.)
324. What is a Dram Shop Act?
It is a statute that imposes civil liability on a liquor vendor for torts caused by a purchaser's drunkenness. A minority of states have such acts. D §332, pp. 899-901. NOTE: Such statutes modify the common-law rule, which was that a liquor vendor wasn't liable for any injuries caused by the purchaser's drunkenness. In general, actions under a Dram Shop Act may be pressed against the vendor only by third parties, not by the purchaser herself. Some, but not all, Acts impose strict liability, so that the third party injured by a liquor purchaser's negligence does not have to show that the liquor supplier behaved negligently (e.g., that the bartender continued serving after it was obvious that the patron was drunk). NOTE: Most Dram Shop Acts are applicable against commercial suppliers only (e.g., bars or liquor stores), not private individuals (e.g., social hosts).
327. What is an automobile guest statute?
It is a statute, found in a few states, mandating that non-paying passengers cannot nonnally sue the driver of a vehicle for negligence. Such statutes typically allow suits if the passenger's injuries resulted from conduct by the driver more seriotts /ban mere negfigence (i.e., gross negligence or recklessness-the standard varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction). NOTE: The aim of automobile guest statutes is to prevent collttsion between drivers and passengers ("sweetheart" suits), and to discourage "ingratitude" by passengers. NOTE: To constitute agues/, the passenger mu~1 typically be a non-pa)'ing passenger (although paying a few tolls or helping out with gas will not change his status); he cannot be a business guest (e.g., an employee or client); he cannot be a child; and he cannot be the vehicle's owner. NOTE: Passengers dislike guest statutes, since they prevent the passenger from holding the driver liable for mere negligence (and require proof of something more, such as gross negligence or recklessness). D § 130, p. 306.
323. In general, are parents vicariously liable for the torts of their children?
No, on the theory that parents typically lack the control over their children's acts that would justify imposing vicarious liability. However, there are common situations where a parent is liable for a child's torts directry-that is, due to the parent's own negligence. These include: 1. Giving the child a dangerous object, which the child lacks the maturity or judgment to control (note that this is a kind or negligent entrustment). 2. Not protecting against a dangerous tendenC)' the parent knows the child has (e.g., not taking steps to control the child's known tendency to bu/(11 other children). 3. Not controlling the child when the parent and child are together. 4. Not warning others or a child's known dangerous tendencies (e.g., violence). D §340, pp. 935-36; Rest. 2d §316.
330. George is an architect working as an employee for Vandelay Architects on an expansion project at the Guggenheim Museum. While at the museum overseeing the construction, George spots an affluent-looking couple-Jerry and Elaine-who are taking a tour of the exhibits. George follows them out of the building and into a nearby parking lot, where he carjacks them, depriving them of their automobile. He crashes the car several blocks later and it is destroyed. Is Vandelay vicariously liable for George's tortious misconduct?
No. Because George's action was not in any way made in furtherance of the objectives of Vandelay Architects, his conduct would be viewed as a "frolic," a substantial departure from even the most general parameters of the employee's duties. Employers are liable only for those torts committed by their employees that are fairly viewed as within the "scope of employment." NOTE: If the employee's conduct has some flavor of business to it, the conduct will often be classified as falling ,vithin the scope of employment. (Example: The employee, while going from one customer site to another, stops off briefly at a store to buy a personal item, then gets into an accident in the store's parking lot.) Often these detenninations are very fact-specific questions for the jury to resolve. E Ch.12-II(C)(4); D §335, pp. 910-13.
322. In general, is a car owner vicariously liable for the torts of another driving his car?
No. However, a minority of states have altered this novicarious-liability rule with either the Family Purpose doctrine or the Permissive Use doctrine. Under the Family Purpose doctrine, the car owner is vicariously liable for the negligence of family or household members who use the car for their own personal use. (The user is said to be furthering a "family purpose.") Under the Permissive Use doctrine, the owner is liable for the negligence of anyone, not just family members, driving with the owner's permission. E Ch.12-V(D)(2); D §340, p. 933.
339. Lieutenant Gerard is taking his friend, Richard Kimble, on a drive through the country. Gerard negligently ignores a railroad crossing signal, and the car is hit by the Fugitive Express train, which could have stopped in time but, due to the engineer's negligence, failed to do so. Gerard is knocked unconscious and Kimble is injured. Kimble sues Fugitive Express for negligence. The jurisdiction applies contributory negligence. Will Gerard's negligence bar Kimble from collecting damages from Fugitive?
No. The issue here is whether Gerard's contrihu1011· negligence can he imputed 10 Kimble, barring Kimble from recovery. Under Rest. 2d §485, there are only thn.-e main ~tuations where the contributory negligence of someone other than P ( call him X) bars P from recovery: I. P and X are employer nod employee; 2. P and X are in a joint venture; or 3. P"s suit is ba.sed on a physical injury to X, not P (e.g., Pis married to X and sues for X's wrongful deathhere, X's contributory negligence r,•i// be imputed to P). None of these special silUations applies here. In particular, the contributory negligence of a dril!er is not imputed 10 the passenger, assuming that there is no employer/employee or joint-venrure relationship between driver and p~gL'I', and assuming the passenger is suing for his own physical injuries. REIATED ISSUE: Say that Gerard "" Kimble's paid cbnoffeur, not his friend. Because Gerard would be Kimble's employee, Gerard's contributory negligence uvuld be imputed to Kimble, barring Kimhle from recm~ry. RELATED i=: Whether Kimble can recover lrom Gerarrl depends on whether the jurisdiction has a guest :nature, as many do. Ir ii does, Kimble can recover from Gerard only If Gerard was more than negligent (e.g., grossly negligent or reckless). If the jurisdiction does not hm~ a guest statute, then Kimble cno recover even for Gerard"s garden-1-ariety negligence. Rest. 2d §§485, 486,491, and 494; D §341, pp. 938-40.
312. What is vicarious liability?
Vicarious liability makes a person liable for another's wrongful conduct due to a special relationship between them. Note that this is really liability without fault because the person who's being held liable has done nothing wrong. You might think of this concept as guilt by association. NOTE: The most common context for vicarious liability is that of emplO)•ers and employees: employers are liable for their employees' tortious acts committed within the scope of the employment relationship, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. BEWARE! Always establish the existence of the tort itself first, before you consider vicarious liability. In an employer-employee context, that means you first have to check whether employee was negligent. Without that underlying tort, there's nothing for someone else (e.g., the employer) to be vicariously liable for. E Ch.12.
315. What's the difference between direct and vicarious liability?
When you're talking about vicarious liability, you're talking about situations where you're liable for someone else's tortious conduct, even though you yourself were not negligent. Distinguish this from situations where you may be liable for that person's conduct due to your own negligence. For instance, if in your absence your small child takes a pack of matches from your coffee table and burns down your neighbor's house, you wouldn't be vicariously liable because parents typically aren't vicariously liable for their children's torts. But if Junior has a long history of playing with matches and you leave a brandy snifter full of them within his reach, you could be directly liable because leaving the matches in the little firestarter's reach would be in itself negligent. E Ch.12-1.
329. Rock is employed as a bouncer at the Solid Boulder Cafe, a rowdy nightclub. One of the duties in his job description is to physically eject patrons onto the sidewalk if they get out of control. One day Rock picks up Victor (who's drunk and belligerent) and drops him headfirst outside on the pavement, injuring him. (Rock did not ask Victor to leave first.) Assume that Rock committed a battery on Victor. Assume also that Solid Boulder's owners never gave Rock specific instructions about what types of force were permissible in the discharge of his duties, and thus never discussed whether dropping a patron on his head was acceptable. Will the owners of the Solid Boulder be liable for Rock's intentional tortious conduct?
Yes, because Rock was acting to further his employer's business interests. The rule is that the master is held liable for any intentional tort committed by the servant where the act's purpose is wholly or in part to further the master's business. D §335, pp. 213-15. Since Rock was furthering his employer's interest in having belligerent patrons physically evicted, Solid Boulder will be liable even though it didn't approve of dropping such patrons on their heads. NOTE: This same principle would apply to impose liability on the employer for harassment by bill collectors, fraud by salesmen in signing the deal, etc. NOTE: A few courts impose liability on employers for the intentional torts of their employees as long as they are foreseeable, even if not done to further the employer's interests. On this basis, the Navy, for instance, could be liable for the intentional torts a sailor committed while he was drunk and on shore leave.
335. Esau and Jacob, housemates, borrow a neighbor's car to go to the butcher to pick up a few morsels of meat. They each put $5 worth of gas into the car. Esau drives to the butcher. Jacob, who drives on the way back, negligently hits a pedestrian. Will Esau be vicariously liable for Jacob's negligence?
Yes, probably, under ajolnt venture (or joint enterprise) theory. Most courts say that to be liable under a joint venture theory, the venturers must have (I) an agreement, express or implied, among themselves; (2) a common purpose; (3) a common jJeellnlary Interest in the venture; and (4) an equal right of control over the venture. Rest. 2d §491, Comment c. (I) is satisfied by the fact that Esau and Jacob expressly agreed on the terms by which they would take their trip together. (2) is satisfied by the fact that they were pursuing a common purpose of buying groceries. (3) is satisfied by their agreement to split expenses and their common desire to buy merchandise. ( 4) is implicitly satisfied by the fact that each was to drive one way and the fact that the car belonged to neither. Thus, Esau will be liable for the olher joint venturer's Qacob's) tortious conduct. NOTE: The "right to control" is satisfied by, for instance, having a say over the route taken. NOTE: A purely social purpose is usually held insufficient for joint-venture status. (Example: 1\vo friends driving togelher to go to a bar to have drinks for pure pleasure are not joint venturers.) D §340, pp. 933-34.
333. The Plen-Tee O' Food Co. organizes and runs country fairs. For the Lonomament County Fair, Plen-Tee contracts with Circe du Lune, a highly-respected holidaylight-show company, to run a laser-guided light show at night. Due to Circe's negligent running of the show, Patron, an audience member, is blinded. A light show of this sort is perfectly safe if proper techniques are used, which they weren't here. Circe is judgment proof. Will Plen-Tee be liable for Patron's blindness?
Yes. Although employers in general are not vicariously liable for the torts of their independent contractors, they are liable in a number of special situations. One of those situations is where the work being delegated to the independent contractor poses a "peculiar risk" of physical harm if not properly done. That's the case here. So even though this was not an ultra-hazardous activity (because it's capable of being conducted with perfect safety), the mere fact that the activity posed a peculiar risk of harm if not conducted properly means that Plen-Tee is vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor, Circe. Notice that this result occurs even though Circe was apparently well qualified for the job when picked by Plen-Tee (so that Plen-Tee was not directly negligent in its own behavior in selecting and monitoring the contractor).
337. Mrs. the Great has heard on multiple occasions that her six-yearold son Alexander has beaten up other children. A reasonable person in Mrs. the Great's position would believe, based on the frequency of such reports, that there was probably some substance to them. But Mrs. the Great doesn't believe that the mild-mannered boy she knows could possibly be such a bully. Therefore, she has never warned him against bullying or beating up others, and she frequently lets him out to play unsupervised. One day he beats up five-year-old Napoleon Bonaparte, a puny neighbor boy. Will Mrs. the Great be liable for Napoleon's injuries?
Yes. Although parents are generally not liable for the torts of their children, where the parent knows or has reason to know of the child's vicious propensities, as here, and fails to use reasonable care to protect others, the parent will be liable. Rest. 2d §316. NOTE: This isn't a matter of vicarious liability; rather, Mrs. the Great will be liable for her own negligence in failing to take steps to protect others from Alexander's vicious tendencies. NOTE: One parent can be liable alone. For instance, here, if Mr. the Great had no reason to know of Alex's problem, he wouldn't be liable even though Mrs. the Great was. D §340, pp. 935-36; E Ch.5-IV(F)(l)(b).
341. Igor is a driver for a funeral home owned and run by Frank N. Stein. While Igor is driving a hearse, another driver, Brunhilda, negligently runs a red light. Igor, who isn't watching carefully, hits her. The hearse is wrecked. Stein sues Brunhilda for damages to the hearse. Brunhilda defends on the grounds that because Igor's contributory negligence will be imputed to Stein, Stein shouldn't recover. Is she correct?
Yes. Let's refer to the contributorily-negligent third person (here, Igor) as "T." Most courts apply the "both ways" rule to the threeparty scenario: T's negligence will be imputed to P in a suit by P against D if and only if, in a suit by D against P, T's negligence would be imputed to P. Since the negligence of an employee acting on business is imputed to the employer, in a suit by Brunhilda against Stein, Igor's negligence would be imputed to Stein, and Stein would therefore be liable. Consequently, under the both ways rule, in this suit by Stein against Brunhilda, Igor's negligence (this time, contributory negligence) would be imputed to Stein. See Rest. 3d (Apport.) §5 (applying the both ways rule). D §341, pp. 939-40.
338. Allnever Tell gives his four-year-old son, Willie, a real bow-and-arrow set for Christmas. As Tell knows, Willie frequently uses the set outside in the street, shooting at random targets. One day, Willie stands in the middle of the street and fires an arrow at his neighbor, Captain Hook, hitting him in the arm. Will Allnever be liable to Hook for negligence?
Yes. Parents are not vicariously liable for their children's torts. However, parents can be directb• liable for their children's torts under certain circumstances. One such circumstance is that when a parent allows the child to use a dangerous object in a way that the parent knows or should know is dangerous, the parent will be liable for torts committed with the object. See, e.g., Rest. 2d §316, Illustr. 1 (Dis told that his six-year-old son is using a .22 rifle to shoot at targets in the street in a dangerous manner; if D fails to take away the rifle, he is liable for shooting injuries). It's clearly unreasonable to give a four-year-old a real bow and arrow and let him use it in the street. That makes Allnever negligent and liable for Hook's injuries. D §340, pp. 935-36.
331. Casanova works as an outside salesman for the Naughty 'N' Nice Lingerie Co. At a lingerie convention, Casanova's boss encourages him to socialize outside of convention hours with buyers for lingerie stores. That night, he drives to a bar near the convention hall and, not finding any buyers, heads to another nearby bar where he believes some buyers may be found. On the way to the second bar, he negligently runs over a pedestrian, Bruce Boxershorts. Will Naughty 'N' Nice be liable for Bruce's injuries?
Yes. Scope of employment is interpreted very broadly in the vicarious liability context. Here, Casanova had some business purpose in going to the bars. Therefore, Naughty 'N' Nice can be held liable for his negligence. D §335, pp. 910-12.