AP Gov Court Case Flashcards Chris Lovre

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)

Facts: A New York state law gave to individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license -- challenged the monopoly license granted by New York to Aaron Ogden. New York courts consistently upheld the state monopoly. Issue: Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? Holding: 6 votes for Gibbons, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: In a concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson argued a much stronger position: that the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power. Implications: The unanimous Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. Changes:US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Act of February 1793, Section 1, Clause 8

Brown v. Bd. of Education (1954)

Facts: After its decision in Brown I which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced Constitutional principle. Given the embedded nature of racial discrimination in public schools and the diverse circumstances under which it had been practiced, the Court requested further argument on the issue of relief. Issue: What means should be used to implement the principles announced in Brown I? Holding: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: Equal Protection Implications: The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. Changes: They were to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education (1971)

Facts: After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court. Issue: Were federal courts constitutionally authorized to oversee and produce remedies for state-imposed segregation? Holding: 9 votes for Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 0 vote(s) against Rationale: Equal Protection Implications: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that once violations of previous mandates directed at desegregating schools had occurred, the scope of district courts' equitable powers to remedy past wrongs were broad and flexible. Changes: The Court ruled that 1) remedial plans were to be judged by their effectiveness, and the use of mathematical ratios or quotas were legitimate "starting points" for solutions; 2) predominantly or exclusively black schools required close scrutiny by courts; 3) non-contiguous attendance zones, as interim corrective measures, were within the courts' remedial powers; and 4) no rigid guidelines could be established concerning busing of students to particular schools.

UC Regents v. Bakke (1978)

Facts: Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race. Issue: Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school? Holding: 5 votes for Bakke, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Equal Protection Implications: There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. Changes: So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)

Facts: Anticipating the FEC enforcement action, CMA filed a separate suit against the FEC on May 7, 1979, challenging the constitutionality of those provisions of the Act it had allegedly violated. (Civil Action No. 79-4426) Specifically, CMA asked the district court to certify the following constitutional questions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Whether 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C), which limits contributions to multicandidate committees to $5,000 per year, per contributor, abridges First Amendment rights of free speech and association. In particular, does §441a(a)(1)(C) unconstitutionally limit contributions by an unincorporated association (CMA) to a political committee (CALPAC) for the purpose of establishing, administering or soliciting contributions to the committee; and Whether 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)(C), which permits labor organizations and corporations (but not unincorporated associations) to pay costs of establishing, administering and soliciting funds to a separate segregated fund, abridges the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Issue: Whether the FEC is morally correct in its labor disputes? Holding: On June 26, 1981, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in California Medical Association v. FEC (Civil Action No. 79-1952) that affirmed the earlier decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Rationale: In its opinion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C), which limits contributions to a political committee to $5,000 per year, per contributor. The Court concluded that the challenged provision did not violate the First Amendment rights of appellants because it was an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976)). Implications: The Court found no merit, however, to the FEC's claim that the appellants' direct appeal to the Court (pursuant to Section 437h of the Act)2 was inappropriate because an FEC enforcement proceeding was pending against appellants (pursuant to Section 437g of the Act). The Court found that neither the legislative history nor the statutory language of Sections 437g and 437h indicated that a direct appeal should be limited to situations where no enforcement proceeding was pending. Changes: N/A

Miller v. Johnson (1995)

Facts: Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community." Issue: Is racial gerrymandering of the congressional redistricting process a violation of the Equal Protection Clause? Holding: 5 votes for Johnson, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Equal Protection Implications: In some instances, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race Changes:Applying the rule laid down in Shaw v. Reno requires strict scrutiny whenever race is the "overriding, predominant force" in the redistricting process.

Baker v. Carr (1962)

Facts: Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state Issue: Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment? Holding: 6 votes for Baker, 2 vote(s) against Rationale: In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justifiable issue Implications: In his opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted Changes:the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

Facts: Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with a felony: having broken into and entered a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor offense. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court and argued that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief. Issue: Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state courts? Holding: 9 votes for Gideon, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: Right to Counsel Implications: Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the framers of the Constitution placed a high value on the right of the accused to have the means to put up a proper defense, and the state as well as federal courts must respect that right. The Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. Changes: Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply a watered-down version of the Bill of Rights to the states. Since constitutional questions are always open for consideration by the Supreme Court, there is no need to assert a rule about the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. In his separate opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel as a protection of due process, and there is no reason to apply that protection in certain cases but not others. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision represented an extension of earlier precedent that established the existence of a serious criminal charge to be a "special circumstance" that requires the appointment of counsel. He also argued that the majority's opinion recognized a right to be valid in state courts as well as federal ones; it did not apply a vast body of federal law to the states.

US v. Lopez (1995)

Facts: Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction. Issue: If a trial court judge wrongly denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his own choosing, is the defendant automatically entitled to have his conviction overturned? Holding: Decision: 5 votes for Gonzalez-Lopez, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. "[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'" Justice Scalia wrote. "It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe." Implications: Right to Counsel Changes:Right to Counsel

Boy Scouts v. Dale (2000)

Facts: Dale was expelled from his position of assistant scout master after he stated that he was gay. Issue: Should private organizations like the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) be allowed to exclude a person from membership when "the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints." Holding: Yes, 5/4 ruling Rationale: The first Amendment protects the Boy Scouts method of expression. Implications: It allows private groups/clubs to discriminate groups if it is their method of expression.

NY Times v. Sullivan (1964)

Facts: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. Issue: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Holding: 9 votes for New York Times, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Implications: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Changes:Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Mapp v. Ohio (1961)

Facts: Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Issue: Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) Holding: 6 votes for Mapp, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment Implications: The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. Changes: This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)

Facts: Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. Issue: Was Dred Scott free or a slave? Holding: Decision: 7 votes for Sandford, 2 vote(s) against Rationale: Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all. Implications: Slaves were property Changes:Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 5; Missouri Compromise

West Coast v. Parrish (1937)

Facts: Elsie Parrish, a chambermaid working at the Cascadian Hotel in Wenatchee, Washington (owned by the West Coast Hotel Company), along with her husband, sued the hotel for the difference between what she was paid, and the $14.50 per week of 48 hours established as a minimum wage by the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry, pursuant to Washington state law. The Washington Supreme Court, taking the case on a direct appeal, reversed the trial court and found in favor of Parrish. The hotel appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Issue: Chambermaid was paid less than the minimum wage established by the Industrial welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry. Holding: The trial court, using Adkins as precedent, ruled for the defendant. Rationale: The Constitution permitted the restriction of liberty of contract by state law where such restriction protected the community, health and safety, or vulnerable groups where the Court had found in favor of the regulation of women's working hours. Implications: The decision by the United States Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of minimum wage legislation enacted by the State of Washington, overturning an earlier decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). The decision is usually regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history during which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business.[1] Changes: N/A

Hirabayashi v. US (1943)

Facts: Following the February 19, 1942 issuance of Executive Order 9066, mandating the forced internment of Japanese Americans, Mr. Hirabayashi turned himself into the FBI on May 16, 1942 with a written statement titled "Why I refused to register for evacuation," despite initial opposition against his refusal to evacuate his mother, provided moral support but wanted him to stay with the family[i]. Mr. Hirabayashi, as an American citizen, believed that the curfew and imprisonment of Japanese Americans violated his constitutional rights. Issue: Mr. Hirabayashi completed his initial sentence of 90 days in federal prison in Arizona, before being sent back to prison once again for draft evasion in refusing to complete the government-distributed "loyalty questionnaire." Holding: 9-0, United States Supreme Court Rationale: However, the federal grand jury in Seattle charged Mr. Hirabayashi with the violation of Public Law 503 for failure to report for evacuation and for curfew violation. Implications: In 1999, the former Catalina Federal Honor Camp near Tucson, AZ, where Hirabayashi was sentenced to hard labor in the 1940s, was renamed the Gordon Hirabayashi Recreation Site. Since 2007, the East West Players, an Asian American theater company, has staged productions based on his life. Changes:In May 2011, acting U.S. Solicitor General Neal Katyal released an unprecedented "confession of error" in the Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases.In 1983, UC San Diego Professor Peter Irons, together with researcher Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, uncovered evidence of government misconduct from 1942, which proved that the government knowingly withheld from the Supreme Court crucial information that there was no military necessity for Exclusion Order 9066 [iv].

Bush v. Gore (2000)

Facts: Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later. Issue: Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Holding: 5 votes for Bush, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining Implications: Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right Changes: the Constitution requires that every vote be counted

Reynolds v. US (1878)

Facts: George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the Utah territorial supreme court. Issue: Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural marriage is part of religious practice? Holding: No Rationale: The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Those who practice polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as part of their religious belief. Implications: Freedom of Religion stayed as was and people are free to practice what they wish. Changes:N/A

Gitlow v. NY (1925)

Facts: Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law. Issue: Is the New York law punishing advocacy to overthrow the government by force an unconstitutional violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of the liberty protected by due process that no state shall deny (14th Amendment). On the merits, a state may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished even if her speech created no danger at all.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

Facts: Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Issue: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Holding: 7 votes for Griswold, 2 vote(s) against Rationale: Due Process Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. Implications: The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void. Changes:N/A

Schenk v. US (1919)

Facts: Harry Bridges, the leader of a longshoreman's union, sent a telegram to Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor, regarding a case pending that was in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Bridges implied that he would have his union go on strike if the Superior Court ruled unfavorably. A copy of the telegram was given to James D. O'Neil, who distributed the telegram to various West Coast Newspapers. The Superior Court found Bridges in contempt of court and fined him. Similarly, the Los Angeles Times was also found in contempt of court and fined for publishing several editorials regarding a case pending in the Superior Court. Bridges and the Times challenged their punishments separately in the Superior Court. The Superior Court upheld their fines, and both appealed separately to the Supreme Court of California. The California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. Bridges and the Times appealed separately to the Supreme Court, where the cases were consolidated. Issue: Was the Superior Court's findings of contempt against Bridges and the Times in violation of the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of California and found the fines for contempt unconstitutional. Justice Hugo L. Black, writing for the majority, relied on the "clear and present danger" standard set forth in Schenk v. United States. Bridges' telegram was his exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government, and his supposed intention to call a strike was consistent with California law. The Times editorials, meanwhile, had "negligible" effect "on the course of justice." The dangers that the California Superior Court attributed to the telegram and the editorials were neither "serious" nor "substantial." Therefore, they did not pose the "clear and present danger" required to justify the restrictions placed by the California Superior Court. Rationale: e government, and his supposed intention to call a strike was consistent with California law. The Times editorials, meanwhile, had "negligible" effect "on the course of justice." Implications: The dangers that the California Superior Court attributed to the telegram and the editorials were neither "serious" nor "substantial." Changes:California Superior Court

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Facts: In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. Issue: The case presented two questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Holding: 7 votes for McCulloch, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme. . .they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them." Implications: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Changes:US Const. Art 1, Section 8 Clauses 1 and 18

Skokie (Collins v. Smith) (1977)

Facts: In 1977 Frank Collin, the leader of National Socialist Party of America, announced the party's intention to march through Skokie, Illinois. In the predominately Jewish community, one in six residents was a Holocaust survivor. Originally, the NSPA had planned a political rally in Marquette Park in Chicago; however the Chicago authorities thwarted these plans, first, by requiring the NSPA to post a public-safety-insurance bond, then, by banning all political demonstrations in Marquette Park. Issue: The challengers argued that the injunction violated the First Amendment rights of the marchers to express themselves. Holding: yes Rationale: The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the use of the swastika is a symbolic form of free speech entitled to First Amendment protections and determined that the swastika itself did not constitute "fighting words." Its ruling allowed the National Socialist Party of America to march Implications:In the summer of 1978, in response to the Supreme Court's decision, some Holocaust survivors set up a museum on the Main Street of Skokie to commemorate those who had died in the concentration camps. Ultimately the NSPA failed to carry through its march in Skokie. Changes: N/A

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

Facts: In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." Issue: Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Holding: 6 votes for Gratz, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Implications: because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause Changes:N/A

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Facts: In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." Issue: Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Holding: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants." Implications: Racial integrity is ensured Changes:N/A

CA Democratic Party v. Jones (2000)

Facts: In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue: Does California's voter approved Proposition 198, which changes its partisan primary from a closed primary to a blanket primary, violate political parties' First Amendment right of association? Holding: 7 votes for California Democratic Party, 2 vote(s) against Rationale: Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States." Implications: AssociationYes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States." Changes:Association

Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

Facts: In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. Issue: Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? Holding: 7 votes for Buckley, 1 vote(s) against Rationale: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment Implications: Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association. Changes: a curtailment on free speech and association.

Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

Facts: New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation Issue: Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy? Holding: 5 votes for City of New London, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. Implications: The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'" Changes:N/A

NY Times v. US (1971)

Facts: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. Issue: Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? Holding: 6 votes for New York Times, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Implications: Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Changes:Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Korematsu v. US (1944)

Facts: Japanese Americans were moved into relocation camps by Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982. This order, and other similar orders, were based upon Executive Order 9066. Fred Korematsu was a Japanese-American man who decided to stay in San Leandro, California and knowingly violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. Fred Korematsu argued that the Executive Order 9066 was unconstitutional and that it violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He was arrested and convicted. Issue: Is the Executive Order 9066, which ordered Japanese Americans into internment camps during World War II regardless of citizenship, constitutional? Holding: 3 for Korematsu, 6 for US Rationale: The case had nothing to do with racial prejudice and the ruling rested on the fact that the US was at war with Japan and the US military was taking precautions to protect civilians. Implications: Despite the Fifth Amendment's command that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, both of these constitutional safeguards were denied by military action under Executive Order 9066. Changes: N/A However, it has been decided that the ruling was wrong.

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

Facts: Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. Issue: Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? Holding: 5 votes for Near, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding Implications: Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota Changes:The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding

Barron v. Baltimore (1833)

Facts: John Barron was co-owner of a profitable wharf in the harbor of Baltimore. As the city developed and expanded, large amounts of sand accumulated in the harbor, depriving Barron of the deep waters which had been the key to his successful business. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. Issue: Does the Fifth Amendment deny the states as well as the national government the right to take private property for public use without justly compensating the property's owner? Holding: 7 votes for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the development of the Bill of Rights as an exclusive check on the government in Washington D.C., Implications: Marshall argued that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. Changes:N/A

Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)

Facts: Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by Biblical commands. Issue: Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Holding: No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. Rationale: The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country." Implications: This decision described the case as a balancing of conflicting claims of liberty and authority. The school's interest in creating national unity was, in their opinion, more important than the rights of the students to refuse to salute the flag. The needs of authority won out over the needs of liberty - a familiar tune in American history. Changes: Later changed so it was not mandatory

Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)

Facts: Students in Des Moines planned to wear black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. The principals of the school heard about the plan and instituted a policy that any students wearing black armbands would be asked to remove them and if the students refused they would be suspended. 3 students over 2 days wore the armbands and were suspended. Issue: Does the policy instituted at the school in Des Moines violate the student's right to freedom of speech protected under the 1st Amendment? Holding: 7 for Tinker, 2 against Rationale: Students do not lose there 1st Amendment rights when they step on school campus

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)

Facts: Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. Issue: Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause? Holding: 5 votes for Zelman, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Establishment of Religion.The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Implications: It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. Changes:N/A

Palko v. Connecticut (1937)

Facts: Palka murdered two police officers and had been charged with first-degree murder but was instead convicted of second-degree murder and given a sentence of life imprisonment. Prosecutors won a new trial, in which Palka was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Issue: Is the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy applicable to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: 8-1 against Palka. Rationale: The Court upheld Palka's conviction on the basis that the Double Jeopardy appeal was not "essential to a fundamental scheme of ordered liberty." Implications: Palka was executed and the protection against double jeopardy was denied. Changes: Later, the court overruled Palko by incorporating the protection against double jeopardy with its ruling in Benton v. Maryland.

Weeks v. US (1914)

Facts: Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions. Issue: Did the search and seizure of Weeks' home violate the Fourth Amendment? Holding: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights.The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment Rationale: To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule." Implications: Police now need permits to search and seize Changes:N/A

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1987)

Facts: Reproductive Health Services, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, three physicians, one nurse, and a social worker, filed suit in a federal district court in Missouri to block enforcement of a state law that regulated abortion. They named the state attorney general, William Webster, who had ultimate responsibility for enforcement of the law, as defendant. The district court ruled seven provisions of the act unconstitutional. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed most of the lower court's decision. Issue: The four provisions of the Missouri statute under review were: (1) the preamble to the law stating that the life of each human being begins at conception and that, subject to Supreme Court decisions and the United States Constitution, state law be interpreted to give unborn children the same rights enjoyed by other persons, (2) a requirement that physicians performing abortions on women who are at least 20 weeks pregnant conduct testing to determine whether the unborn child is viable, (3) a prohibition on the use of public employees and facilities from performing abortions except those necessary to save a woman's life, and (4) a prohibition on the use of state funds to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life. Holding: The Court specifically declined to overrule Roe. Rationale: The Preamble. The Court noted that the preamble by its terms did not regulate abortion but merely expressed a judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, a judgment that prior case law, specifically, Maher v. Roe, permitted. Implications: Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor agreed with the decision to uphold the viability testing but she would have decided the issue in a different manner. Justice O'Connor found no conflict between the testing and the Court's prior abortion case law. She also indicated that the testing was constitutional because it created no "undue burden" on a woman's abortion decision. Changes: N/A

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Facts: Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. Issue:Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Holding: 7 votes for Roe, 2 vote(s) against Rationale: Due Process The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. Implications: As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. Changes:N/A

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)

Facts: Students enrolled in the Journalism II class at Hazelwood East High School were responsible for writing and editing the school's paper The Spectrum. Two of the articles submitted for publication in the final edition of the paper contained stories on divorce and teenage pregnancy. The divorce article featured a story about a girl who blamed her father's actions for her parents' divorce. The teenage pregnancy article featured stories in which pregnant students at Hazelwood East shared their experiences. To ensure their privacy, the girls' names were changed in the article. The school principal felt that the subjects of these two articles were inappropriate. He concluded that journalistic fairness required that the father in the divorce article be informed of the story and be given an opportunity to comment. He also stated his concerns that simply changing the names of the girls in the teenage pregnancy article may not be sufficient to protect their anonymity and that this topic may not be suitable for the younger students. As a result, he prohibited these articles from being published in the paper. Issue: Does the decision of a principal to prohibit the publishing of certain articles, which he deems inappropriate, in the school newspaper violate the student journalists' First Amendment right of freedom of speech? Holding: The U.S. Supreme Court held that the principal's actions did not violate the students' free speech rights. The Court noted that the paper was sponsored by the school and, as such, the school had a legitimate interest in preventing the publication of articles that it deemed inappropriate and that might appear to have the imprimatur of the school. Rationale: Specifically, the Court noted that the paper was not intended as a public forum in which everyone could share views; rather, it was a limited forum for journalism students to write articles pursuant to the requirements of their Journalism II class, and subject to appropriate editing by the school. Implications: The First Amendment protects the right to freedom of speech. Changes: N/A

NJ v. TLO (1984)

Facts: T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools. Issue: Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools? Holding: 6 votes for New Jersey, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment Implications: No decision. In an anonymous opinion, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse. Changes: Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, stressing that New Jersey chose not to include the Fourth Amendment question in their petition. Justice Stevens felt that it is not the role of the Supreme Court to offer guidance on questions the parties did put at issue.

Texas v. White (1869)

Facts: Texas had received $10 million in United States bonds as part of the Compromise of 1850. In 1861, the legislature authorized the sale of the bonds. The governor had to sign the sale of bonds but Texas feared that the sale price would be lowered if the United States Treasury refused to honor bonds sold by a Confederate state. The legislature then repealed the requirement for the governor's endorsement in order to hide the origin of the bonds. Issue: Had United States bonds owned by Texas since 1850 been illegally sold by the Confederate State legislature during the Civil War? Holding: Yes Rationale: The court ruled that Texas had remained a state ever since it first joined the Union, despite its joining the Confederate States. In deciding the bond issue, the court held that the Constitution did not permit states to unilaterally secede from the United States, and that the ordinances of secession, and all the acts of the legislatures within seceding states intended to give effect to such ordinances, were null. Implications: Radical Republicans saw the case as evidence that Chase, the Supreme Justice was abandoning a cause he had once enthusiastically supported. Conservatives condemned Chase for a decision that would allow congressional reconstruction to continue. Changes: N/A

Abbington v. Schempp (1963)

Facts: The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Issue: Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Holding: 8 votes for Schempp, 1 vote(s) against Rationale: Establishment of Religion The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Implications: the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause Changes:N/A

Lochner v. NY (1905)

Facts: The Bakeshop Act was a New York state labor law which prohibited bakery employees from working for more than sixty hours per week or ten hours per day. Lochner permitted an employee to work in his bakery for more than sixty hours in one week and was convicted of his second offense and fined. Lochner appealed his conviction on the grounds that the law violated his freedom to contract under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue: What is the test for determining whether legislation which seeks to impose restrictions upon an individual's general right to make a contract in relation to his business is not invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: The general right to make a contract in relation to one's business is an individual liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The states' police powers however empower them to prevent individuals from making certain kinds of contracts. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from prohibiting a contract if the state has the right to do so through the legitimate exercise of its police power. Rationale: Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that in this case there was no reasonable ground for interfering with the right of free contract by determining a baker's hours of labor. Under such circumstances, the freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their employment cannot be prohibited or interfered with without violating the Constitution. Implications: Employers are allowed to let their employees work for more than 60 hours a week as long as it does not interfere with the decisions made by the states' police. Changes: N/A

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Facts: The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian--took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. Issue: Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holding: 7 votes for Ferguson, 1 vote(s) against Rationale: US Const. Amend 14, Section 1 Implications: No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.) Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races before the law. Changes: Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful discrimination.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

Facts: The Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of a number of instances, ruled on jointly, in which defendants were questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom in any significant way." In Vignera v. New York, the petitioner was questioned by police, made oral admissions, and signed an inculpatory statement all without being notified of his right to counsel. Similarly, in Westover v. United States, the petitioner was arrested by the FBI, interrogated, and made to sign statements without being notified of his right to counsel. Lastly, in California v. Stewart, local police held and interrogated the defendant for five days without notification of his right to counsel. In all these cases, suspects were questioned by police officers, detectives, or prosecuting attorneys in rooms that cut them off from the outside world. In none of the cases were suspects given warnings of their rights at the outset of their interrogation. Issue: Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment? Holding: 5 votes for Miranda, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Self-Incrimination Implications: The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Changes: The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.

West VA v. Barnette (1943)

Facts: The Respondent, Barnette (Respondent), is a Jehovah's Witness who refused to pledge allegiance the United States flag while in public school. According to the Petitioner, the West Virginia State Board of Education's (Petitioner), rule, the Respondent was expelled from school and charged with juvenile delinquency. Issue: Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Holding: Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individual's intellect and right to choose their own beliefs. Rationale: The right to not speak is as equally protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) as the right to free speech. Implications: The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not. Changes: N/A

Santa Fe Independent S.D. v. Jane Doe (2000)

Facts: The Santa Fe Independent School district in Texas allowed students to offer Christian prayers over the public address system at home football games. Issue: Does student-led prayer at high school football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Holding: Yes, 6-3 Rationale: Determined unconstitutional as it led to the mixture of religion and state when state should be considered completely secular. Implications: Religious prayer cannot be sponsored by the school and that such speeches or prayers should be in private.

Shaw v. Reno (1993)

Facts: The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue: Did the North Carolina residents' claim, that the State created a racially gerrymandered district, raise a valid constitutional issue under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: 5 votes for Shaw, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Equal Protection Implications: The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances Changes:After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan.

US v. VA (1996)

Facts: The Virginia Military Institute had a male-only admission policy. Issue: Did VMI have justification for its sex-based admissions policy? Did it violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Holding: Yes, Yes Rationale: 14th Amendment. VMI failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its sex-based admissions policy. Virginia proposed a parallel program for women, but it was struck down as it wouldn't provide the same rigour as the male-based program. Implications: Equal rights have to be given to both genders. The high court effectively struck down any law which, as Justice Ginsburg wrote, "denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature — equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society." Changes: N/A

Clinton v. City of NY (1998)

Facts: This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal. Issue: Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I Holding: 6 votes for City of New York, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers Implications: In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions Changes:The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

Facts: This case was heard concurrently with two others, Earley v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions." Issue: Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state financial aid available to "church- related educational institutions"? Holding: 8 votes for Lemon, 0 vote(s) against Rationale: Establishment of Religion Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. Implications: The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support to religious schools. Changes:N/A

Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990)

Facts: Two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization, ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." Issue: Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? Holding: 6 votes for Employment Division, 3 vote(s) against Rationale:Free Exercise of Religion. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Implications: Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Changes: N/A

Hardwick v. Bowers (1986)

Facts: is a United States Supreme Court decision, overturned in 2003, that upheld, in a 5-4 ruling, the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral and anal sex in private between consenting adults when applied to homosexuals. Issue: The majority opinion, written by Justice Byron White, argued that the Constitution did not confer "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy Holding: The law was up holded Rationale: "To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside a millennium of moral teaching." Implications: The Georgia law upheld in Bowers criminalized oral sex and anal sex whether engaged in by people of the same sex or different sexes, but Justice White's decision was restricted to homosexual sex. Changes:N/A

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Facts: is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court. In the 6-3 ruling the Court struck down the sodomy law in Texas and, by extension, invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states, making same-sex sexual activity legal in every U.S. state and territory Issue: Garner and Eubanks had a tempestuous on-again off-again romantic relationship since 1990. Lacking transportation home, the couple were preparing to spend the night. Eubanks, who had been drinking heavily, left to purchase a soda from a nearby vending machine. Apparently outraged that Lawrence had been flirting with Garner, he called police and reported "a black male going crazy with a gun" at Lawrence's apartment Holding: The Court held that homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity; that homosexuals' moral and sexual choices were entitled to constitutional protection; and that moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate justification for Texas's law criminalizing sodomy. Rationale: Kennedy wrote: "The petitioners [Lawrence and Garner] are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Implications: It affected all other homosexual cases after it took place. Changes:The Court held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process under the 14th Amendment. Lawrence invalidated similar laws throughout the United States that criminalized sodomy between consenting adults acting in private, whatever the sex of the participants.

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

Facts: was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that invalidated prohibitions on desecrating the American flag enforced in 48 of the 50 states Issue: The court said, "Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First Amendment freedoms, a government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol." The court also concluded that the flag burning in this case did not cause or threaten to cause a breach of the peace. Holding: The Court rejected Texas's claim that flag burning is punishable on the basis that it "tends to incite" breaches of the peace by citing the familiar test of Brandenburg v. Ohio that the state may only punish speech that would incite "imminent lawless action," finding that flag burning does not always pose an imminent threat of lawless action. The Court noted that Texas already punished "breaches of the peace" directly. Rationale: As to the "breach of the peace" justification, however, the Court found that "no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson's burning of the flag," and Texas conceded as much Implications: . More than two decades later, the issue remained controversial, with polls suggesting that a majority of Americans still supported a ban on flag-burning. Congress did, however, pass a statute, the 1989 Flag Protection Act, making it a federal crime to desecrate the flag. In the case of United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), that law was struck down by the same five person majority of justices as in Johnson (in an opinion also written by Justice Brennan) Changes:The Court's decision invalidated laws in force in 48 of the 50 states

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Facts: was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States under Article III of the Constitution. The landmark decision helped define the boundary between the constitutionally separate executive and judicial branches of the American form of government. Issue: Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to force the new Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the documents. The Court, with John Marshall as Chief Justice, found firstly that Madison's refusal to deliver the commission was both illegal and correctible. Nonetheless, the Court stopped short of ordering Madison (by writ of mandamus) to hand over Marbury's commission, instead holding that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that enabled Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional Holding: On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered a unanimous (4-0) decision, that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Rationale: In deciding whether Marbury had a remedy, Marshall stated: "The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right Implications: Because the Constitution lacks a clear statement authorizing the Federal courts to nullify the acts of coequal branches, critics contend that the argument for judicial review must rely on a significant gloss on the Constitution's terms Changes:. Despite such criticisms of Marbury v. Madison, judicial review has been accepted in the American legal community.

US v. Nixon (1974)

Facts:A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States. Issue:Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review? Holding:8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against Rationale:US Const. Art. II Implications: The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. Changes:The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002)

Facts:Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used "community standards" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most "puritanical" communities from being displayed in more "tolerant" ones. Issue:Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available? Holding:5 votes for American Civil Liberties Union, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly. Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." Implications:barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material. Changes:N/A

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

Facts:Five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 authored by Rep. Stephen F. Freind were being challenged as unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, which first recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The informed consent rule under the Act required doctors to inform women about detriments to health in abortion procedures. The spousal notice rule required women to give prior notice to their husbands. The parental notification and consent rule required minors to receive consent from a parent or guardian prior to an abortion. The fourth provision imposed a 24-hour hold before obtaining an abortion. The fifth provision challenged in the case was the imposition of certain reporting mandates on facilities providing abortion services. Issue:The case defined where the role of women was seen in law. Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. Holding: N/A Rationale: This resulted in a precarious five Justice majority consisting of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Byron White, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas that favored upholding all the abortion restrictions. However, Kennedy changed his mind shortly thereafter and joined with fellow Reagan-Bush justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter to write a plurality opinion that would reaffirm Roe Implications:Except for three opening sections of the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion, Casey was a divided judgment, as no other sections of any opinion were joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality decision jointly written by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each of its parts was concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit different ones for each part. Changes:N/A

Rasul v. Bush (2004)

Facts:Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. Issue:Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba? Holding: 6 votes for Rasul, 3 vote(s) against Rationale: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus).Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Implications: The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional. Changes:N/A

Engle v. Vitale (1962)

Facts:The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country." Issue:Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment? Holding:6 votes for Engel, 1 vote(s) against Rationale:Establishment of Religion Implications:Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. Changes:This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies. Despite the passage of time, the decision is still unpopular with a majority of Americans.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

Facts:The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. Issue:Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? Holding:5 votes for Planned Parenthood, 4 vote(s) against Rationale: Due Process. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Implications:Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. Changes:N/A