Comps Prep Tom Lorenson

Mao Zedong

(1893-1976) Leader of the Communist Party in China that overthrew Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalists. Established China as the People's Republic of China and ruled from 1949 until 1976. • Tao: 'The Way'; Bingfa: war methods in line with Tao; Bingfu: if a ruler loses mandate of heaven, his rule is no longer in line with Tao and revolution is justified Mao influenced by Engels, Marx, and Lenin • Confucianism focuses on man's relationship between man, state, and the universe • • Live in harmony with the Universe; lose mandate of heaven: war part of universe Mao Revolutionary War: Victory of Agrarian class over capitalists/imperialists • More Jominian than Clausewitzian; prescriptive (focused on warfare) • Two Types of Guerilla War: Broad people-based, oppressive, contrary to the people's interests • Protracted War (3 Stages): enemy strategic offensive and our strategic defensive (primarily mobile war supplemented by guerilla/positional war); strategic stalemate (guerrilla war in enemy rear supplemented by mobile war); counter-offensive to recover lost territory (mobile war supported by guerrilla and positional war) Moa's China Protracted War Characteristics: China is vast, our enemy is big and powerful (Japan), the Red Army is small and weak, communist party leadership and the Agrarian Revolution will bring us victory

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History

(499) Apostle of imperialism... thesis in 1890... countries with sea power were great nations of history. US started shipbuilding program and became 5th in world naval power 1898 and 3rd in 1900. "It can scarcely be denied that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas,.. was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue [victory]" Strategically importance of Sea Power: Destroy opposing navy and transport Soldiers Trade and transport resources and supplies Project a nation's power Naval Power is decisive and has universal principles (Jominian) Maneuver Mass Offense Six conditions that determine a nation's sea power Geographic Position Physical Conformation Extent of territory Number of population Character of the people Character of the government

War Fighting Functions

1. Mission Command 2. Movement and Maneuver 3. Intelligence 4. Fires 5. Sustainment 6. Protection

MDMP Steps

1. Receipt of Mission 2. Mission Analysis 3. Course of Action Development 4. Course of Action Analysis 5. Course of Action Comparison 6. Course of Action Approval 7. Orders Production

Luttwak's five levels and two dimensions of strategy?

1. The Technical Level of Strategy - weapon system vs. defensive system. Technical performance counts through its tactical consequences (e.g. good pilots can shoot down better aircraft; better tanks can be defeated by better tank crews) 2. The Tactical Level of Strategy - tactical-level actions are subordinated parts of larger actions, but the many tactical level actions form the operational level and influence its results; factors conditioned by the logic within the tactical level are details of topography and disposition 3. The Operational Level of Strategy - operational-level interactions determine the consequences of what is done or not done at the tactical level; a. overall interaction of the rival schemes of warfare determine outcomes. If guided by a superior overall scheme, tactically weaker forces may defeat stronger ones b. Events are usually large in scale, but are not autonomous - they are conditioned by the broader interaction of the armed forces as a whole within the theater of warfare 4. The Theater Level of Strategy - consequences of single operations affect the overall conduct of offense and defense a. Broad military purposes include both offensive and defensive operational-level actions b. Key determinants in ground warfare are the entire geography, the length of frontages, depths of territory, roads and other transport infrastructures. c. Characterized by more space and time d. Supply is decisive - needed for the many fights within an entire campaign, ensuring the combat strength of the theater forces cannot exceed their supply 5. The Level of Grand Strategy - the entire conduct of warfare in one or more theaters as well as peacetime preparations for war characterize the national struggles at the highest national level 1. The Vertical Dimension of Strategy - made up of the different levels that interact with one another The Horizontal Dimension of Strategy - in which the dynamic logic of action and reaction unfolds within each level

Mintzberg- Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning

1. Why, according to Mintzberg, is strategy an emergent phenomenon? Strategy is emergent in that sometimes it occurs without formal intention, for example through the accumulation of learning decisions made without a plan or as a result of conditions in the environment. 2. What accounts for the difference between strategy as intended and strategy as it emerges? Intended strategies, or deliberate strategies, require formulation, the process of formalized planning in order to produce an articulated strategy. Emergent strategies require no formulation, but in fact are formed out of circumstances. 3. How does Mintzberg differentiate between planning and strategy? 1. Planning is a formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions. Strategy is plan (intention), pattern (reality), position (determination of an organization/product/service current location within the situation), and perspective (the way the

Mission Command Philosophy 6-0

1.) Build Cohesive Teams through mutual trust 2.) create shared understanding 3.) provide a clear commanders intent 4.) exercise disciplined initiative 5.) use mission Orders 6.) accept prudent risk

Army Design Methodology (ADM) Steps

1.) Frame the operational Environment 2.) Frame the problem 3.) Develop the operational Approach 4.)Reframe the Operational approach 5.) Critical and Creative Thinking 6) collaboration and Dialogue 7.) framing 8.) narrative construction 9.) visual modeling

Thirteen Elements of Operational Design

1.) Termination Criteria 2.) Military End state 3.) objective 4.) effects 5.) center of gravity 6.) decisive points 7.) lines of operations and lines of effort 8.)direct and indirect approach 9.) anticipation 10.) operational reach 11.)culmination 12.)arranging operations 13.)force and function

Elements of Operational Design

1.)Arranging Operations 2.)Culmination 3.)Centers of Gravity 4.)Objectives 5.)Military Endstate 6.)Anticipation 7.)Termination 8.)Effects 9.)Decisive Point 10.)Forms and Functions 11.)Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

Commanders Role in Planning Process

1.)Understand 2.)Visualize 3.)Describe 4.)Direct 5.)Lead 6.) Assess

Hull - A Scrap of Paper

317-international law defined most clearly what was at stake in the war.....the laws of war were the lowest common denominator of behavior 318- War Positivism: might makes right // the alleged nature of new weapons erased old laws and general principles in the interest of the untrammeled use of new technologies 319-the consequent regularity of state behavior creates stability, makes planning possible, enhances security, spreads the cost of enforcement, and regulates conflict 321-German leaders planned to violate Belgian neutrality, they did not set out to deliberately destroy the whole edifice of European law. That fell because it could not survive neither the collapse of post-Napoleonic Europe nor the way of waging war that the German military had developed by 1914 322-Germany had interpreted the war from the beginning as a struggle over law 324-When it comes to making international law, power is the ability to arrange circumstances so that many divergent interests may be brought more or less under one legal umbrella Western allies focused their war aims from the beginning on reestablishing the intrinsic value of law 327-what distinguishes law from mere morality is its imperative binding quality 329-in 1914 Britain and France understood power and prestige in diametrically opposite ways to Imperial Germany 331-basic assumptions behind Germany policies were profoundly destructive of the legal order and incapable of replacing it with an abiding legal framework based on those assumptions

Jena and Auerstadt (1806)

Battle of Jena, also called Battle of Jena-Auerstädt, (Oct. 14, 1806), military engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, fought between 122,000 French troops and 114,000 Prussians and Saxons, at Jena and Auerstädt, in Saxony (modern Germany). In the battle, Napoleon smashed the outdated Prussian army inherited from Frederick II the Great, which resulted in the reduction of Prussia to half its former size at the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807. DATE October 14, 1806 LOCATION Germany Jena Saxony PARTICIPANTS France Prussia CONTEXT Napoleonic Wars KEY PEOPLE Charles William Ferdinand of Brunswick Louis-Nicolas Davout, duke of Auerstedt Friedrich Ludwig, prince zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen Napoleon I Frederick William III of Prussia prepared for war after signing a secret alliance with Russia in July 1806. In early October the Prussian-Saxon army, under Charles William Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick, moved slowly westward through Saxony in an attempt to threaten Napoleon's communications to the west. Napoleon advanced northward rapidly through the eastern end of the Thuringian Forest to cut the Prussians off from the Elbe River and engage them before their Russian allies could join them. The Prussians had to face about to meet this attack from their rear. Frederick William III placed 63,000 men under Duke Charles William Ferdinand at Auerstädt and about 51,000 under Prince Friedrich Ludwig of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen on a 15-mile (24-kilometre) front between Weimar and Jena.

Haidt - The Righteous Mind

FROM THE BOOK: CHAPTER 1: Where Does Morality Come From? (p3-31) 4-morality differs around the world, and even within societies 7-growing knowledge comes in orderly stages.....the essence of psychological rationalism -we grow into our rationality 11-many other aspects of life are social conventions, which are arbitrary and changeable to some extent 13- groups create supernatural beings not to explain the universe but to order their societies 17-Most societies have chosen the sociocentric answer, placing the needs of groups and institutions first, and subordinating the needs of individuals. In contrast, the individualistic answer places individuals at the center and makes society a servant of the individual. 20-Even in the United States the social order is a moral order, but it's an individualistic order built up around the protection of individuals and their freedom 26-The moral domain varied across nations and social classes. 30-31-Where does morality come from? is innate (the nativist answer) or that it comes from childhood learning (the empiricist answer) morality is self-constructed by children on the basis of their experiences with harm 31-If morality doesn't come primarily from reasoning, then that leaves some combination of innateness and social learning as the most likely candidates We're born to be righteous, but we have to learn what, exactly, people like us should be righteous about. CHAPTER 2: The Intuitive Dog and its Rational Tail (p32-60) 36-Plato said that reason ought to be the master, even if philosophers are the only ones who can reach a high level of mastery.9 Hume said that reason is and ought to be the servant of the passions. Jefferson gives us a third option, in which reason and sentiment are (and ought to be) independent co-rulers, like the emperors of Rome, who divided the empire into eastern and western halves. 40-reasoning requires the passions. 51-Yet moral judgments are not subjective statements; they are claims that somebody did something wrong. 53- Emotions are a kind of information processing moral judgment is a cognitive process, as are all forms of judgment 54- Reason is the servant of the intuitions. 56-But intuitions (including emotional responses) are a kind of cognition. They're just not a kind of reasoning. 58-If you really want to change someone's mind on a moral or political matter, you'll need to see things from that person's angle as well as your own.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

Fear, Honor, Interest: Athenian dialogue at Sparta (Book I). Moral Decline: Melian dialogue (Book V); realism combined with collapsing human values from extended period of conflict. Affects on Decisions and the Consequences: Syracuse Expedition (Book VI); leads to downfall of the Athenian Empire Circa: 460-400 BCE Societal Status: Athenian citizen, descended from Thracian royalty, wealthy. Education: Educated in formal philosophical and rhetorical training Perspective: Military general (strategos) exiled from Athens and living among the Peloponnesians

Yom Kippur War (1973)

Frustrated by their losses in the Six-Days War, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur on October 6, 1973. Israel counterattacked, won a decisive victory, and had even occupied portions of northern Egypt.

Douhets command of the air

Giulio Douhet 1869-1930, Italian Army Officer prior to being an aviator, trained in Engineering and sciences. Deeply affected by WW1, admits planes weren't that important, but sees them as weapons of the future. Sees bombing as a morale weapon, a good defense is a good offense, hard to defend against planes. Command of the air theory. Mass of self defending bombers to terrorize enemy. 3 types of weapons, HE, gas and incendiary, especially latter 2. Make war more terrible, make it over faster. British, French, German and American theorists influenced by it. Theory unproven until WW2.

Cohen Wrote on Political leaders During war

Great War leaders discard Huntington's advice and interfere and inject themselves into military matters. Winston Churchill asserted that at the summit, true politics and strategy are one in the same

Karl Marx

Karl Marx (1818-1883) Economist and sociologist Communist Manifesto Das Kapital Frederick Engels (1820-1895) The Condition of the Working Class Co-author and supporter of Marx Industrial Revolution in Europe Enclosure acts More workers than jobs - wage competition Working conditions - child labor Revolutions of 1848 Began in France Numerous countries Communism Represent common proletariat interests Independent of nationality Form proletariat into political class Immediate aim of Communists Abolish private property Abolish bourgeois family Abolish nationalities Abolish religion and eternal truths All people are equal / communal ownership

Jervis- System Effects & Complexity

Key Concept: Three Notions of Systemic Interactions i. Results cannot be predicted ii. Strategies depend on the strategies of others Behavior changes the environment Jervis, Robert. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Chapters 1 and 2. Key Concept: Three Notions of Systemic Interactions i. Results cannot be predicted ii. Strategies depend on the strategies of others iii. Behavior changes the environment About the Author: Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University,[1] and is a member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in the School of International and Public Affairs. He has been a member of the faculty since 1980. Jervis was the recipient of the 1990 University of Louisville Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.[2] Jervis is co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, a series published by Cornell University Press, and the member of numerous editorial review boards for scholarly journals. Robert Jervis was born in 1940. He holds a B.A. from Oberlin College (1962) and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (1968). From 1968 to 1972, he was an assistant professor of government at Harvard University, and was an associate professor from 1972 to 1974. From 1974 to 1980, he was a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He served as the President of the American Political Science Association. He is the father of Lisa Jervis, who co-founded Bitch magazine. He has worked on perceptions and misperceptions in foreign policy decision making. While Jervis is perhaps best known for two books in his early career, he also wrote System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, 1997). With System Effects, Jervis established himself as a social scientist as well as an expert in international politics. Many of his latest writings are about the Bush doctrine, of which he is very critical. Jervis is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 2006 he was awarded the NAS Award for Behavior Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War from the National Academy of Sciences. He participated in the 2010 Hertog Global Strategy Initiative, a high-level research program on nuclear proliferation. Outline: One 1. Introduction i. Definitions and Illustrations a. WE CAN NEVER DO MERELY ONE THING ii. Emergent Properties iii. Interconnections a. KINDS OF INTERCONNECTIONS iv. Games against Nature Are Not Games against Nature Two 2. System Effects a. Indirect and Delayed Effects b. Relations Are Often Not Bilaterally Determined c. Interactions, Not Additivity i. FIRST INTERACTIONS: RESULTS CANNOT BE PREDICTED FROM THE SEPARATE ACTIONS ii. SECOND INTERACTIONS: STRATEGIES DEPEND ON THE STRATEGIES OF OTHERS iii. THIRD INTERACTIONS: BEHAVIOR CHANGES THE ENVIRONMENT 1. Products of Interaction as the Unit of Analysis 2. Circular Effects d. Outcomes Do Not Follow from Intentions i. A QUALIFICATION e. Regulation f. Implications for Testing and Method 1. POWER 2. CAUSES AND EFFECTS 3. TESTING PROPOSITIONS 4. YARDSTICKS AND INDICATORS

Galula's COIN Strategy

LTC David Galula - the Father of Modern Counterinsurgency Good that you compared 8 operational steps to current doctrine as 8 imperatives Good explanations of highlighted steps, particularly emphasis on control of the population Interesting that "winning over" remaining guerillas is a consideration; tied into the anecdote about Iraq you told in laws and principles Laws and Principles - re-iterated the importance of population support Emphasis on Vast Resource requirements, not a politically popular 'law' Core Elements - Repetition of REVOLUTIONARY WAR is (political, protracted, unconventional) - implies the perspective of the insurgency to bring about a change in their society, which is the mindset we fight in counterinsurgency ops - relating to the difference in perspective and its difference in the ethical boundary (greater enmity) than the CI force

John Lewis Gaddis Landscape of History

Main theme - the historian is set apart from history as a man on a mountain peering through clouds at a distant landscape. The 'theory of history' is the use of remote sensors to penetrate the clouds and better understand the landscape beyond. "We can only represent it. We can portray the past as a near or distant landscape, much as Friedrich has depicted what his wanderer sees from his lofty perch. We can perceive shapes through the fog and mist, we can speculate as to their significance, and sometimes we can even agree among ourselves as to what these are. Barring the invention of a time machine, though, we can never go back there to see for sure." p3 The specifics of a historical representation are derived from interpretation of artifacts such as memoirs, diaries, historical accounts, etc. What I'm suggesting, therefore, is that just as historical consciousness demands detachment from—or if you prefer, elevation above— the landscape that is the past, so it also requires a certain displacement: an ability to shift back and forth between humility and mastery. Niccolò Machiavelli made the point precisely in his famous preface to The Prince: how was it, he asked his patron Lorenzo de' Medici, that "a man from a low and mean state dares to discuss and give rules for the governments of princes?" Being Machiavelli, he then answered his own question: For just as those who sketch landscapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the nature of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low places place themselves high atop mountains, similarly to know well the nature of peoples one needs to be [a] prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to be of the people.12 In comparing to other "orthodoxies," Gaddis indicates that his is a method in the statement, "The historical method, in this sense, beats all the others." 10 Historians are bound in time and space, but the discipline of history is not, and historians may manipulate time and space within their representation, to include representing simultaneous action that no single person could witness in reality. 17-18

Maurice Du Saxe

Maurice Du Saxe, -1752 Author, My Reveries Biography: Born to Augustus II, King of Poland Provides him with title of Count of Saxony Joined at 12, first combat at 13, Colonel by 17 Commander in the War of Polish Succession Commander in War of Austrian Succession • 1741 - Captured Prague • 1744 - Assumes command of French Army • 1745 - Wins Battle of Fontenoy - demonstrates many of his theoretical concepts • 1745 - 1748 - Continues to victory • 1748 - made Marshal-General of France Humanistic Approach and Leadership • Respect for Life • Preserve Force • Physiology, psychology, and "heart" of the Rennaissance (see Pichicherro from TOA 2) • Soldier mentality on battlefield success • Mutual support between cavalry and infantry, integrated throughout the lines • Requirements for General Officer Contributions to Military Operations and Tactics • My Reveries, written 1732, published posthumously in 1757 • Prescriptive, simple language, two parts • Influence on Napoleon, maneuverability and mobility • Maneuver and Mobility (cadence); Organization (combined arms) • Technology: Breech loading, strong points, "amusettes" • Organization: Numbered regiments, division organization - extended the history of the unit beyond the name of the Commander after the Commander left the regiment Impact to Professionals • Maurice de Saxe Approach to Theory and Doctrine ○ All science has principles but war has none • Lessons Relearned during World War I ○ Liddel-Hart references him with regard to lessons laid out in History that were ignored leading into WWI • Combined Critical Approach with Historical Lines ○ Accepting vs critiquing present approaches in light of history

Military End State

Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military operations.

Endstate

Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military operations. National and strategic end states are Often defined by the president or the secretary of Defense. More often than not senior military leader will help the president craft a endstate.

Mission Variables

Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations

Moral Relativism (Whetham)

Moral judgments are relative to culture or system of belief

Operational Reach

Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 5-0

operational variables

PMESII-PT political military economic social information infrastructure physical environment time

Joint Phases (0-5)

Phase 0: Shaping Phase 1: Deter Phase 2: Seize the Initiative Phase 3: Dominance Phase 4: Stabilize Phase 5: Enable Civil Authority

area of interest

Places outside of you AO that may affect your operations within your AO

The Ethical Triangle

Principles, Values, Consequences The ethical triangle considers these three different approaches to ethical reasoning. As the Army's leadership manual states, "Leaders use multiple perspectives to think about ethical concerns, applying the following perspectives to determine the most ethical choice. One perspective comes from the view that desirable virtues such as courage, justice, and benevolence define ethical outcomes. A second perspective comes from the set of agreed-upon values or rules, such as the Army values or Constitutional rights. A third perspective bases the consequences of the decision on whatever produces the greatest good for the greatest number as most favorable. The ethical triangle considers these three different perspectives.

Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs)

Step 1 - Receive the mission. Step 2 - Issue a warning order. Step 3 - Make a tentative plan. Step 4 - Initiate movement. Step 5 - Conduct reconnaissance. Step 6 - Complete the plan. Step 7 - Issue the order. Step 8 - Supervise and refine.

TOA3: Kahneman 'Thinking, Fast and Slow'

System 1 vs. System 2 • S1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; S2 is slower, more deliberative, and logical S1 uses heuristics, biases for judgement • What you see is all there is (WYSIATI) Attempting to help people recognize situations where mistakes are likely • and help people avoid mistakes when stakes are high Bias: system errors; recur predictably in particular circumstances; distorts • our thinking, influences our beliefs, and sways decisions and judgements we make every day Heuristic: rules of thumb and strategies that guide choice and behavior; • assuming certain things automatically without thinking through them are assumption heuristics

Phillip Tetlock

Ten Commandments: 1. Focus efforts. 2. Break problems down. 3. Consider context. 4. Constantly reframe understanding. 5. Embrace alternate views. 6. Accept uncertainty. 7. Humble. 8. Learning. 9. Be precise. 10. Try try again.

Operational Art

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means

Operational Art (Army) 3-0

The pursuit of strategic objectives in whole or in part, through through the arrangement of tactical operations in time space and purpose. Operational art applies to all aspects of operations and integrates ends ways and means while accounting for risk. Operation art is applicable at all levels of war.

Center of Gravity JP 3-0

The source of power and strength that provides moral or physical strength and the will to act.

Tempo

The term tempo, as defined by Army Doctrinal Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense, is a rate of speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. The doctrine should also relate tempo to the capabilities and supporting efforts within an organization.

Humanitarian Intervention

The use of military force by external actors to end a threat to people within a sovereign state.

Jamshid Gharajedaghi

This book is a way of thinking through chaos and complexity. To understand the complex problem, one must accuratly define the problem through the four foundations of system thinking: 1) holistic thinking (iteration of structure, function and process); 2) operational thinking (dynamics of multi-loop feedback systems; chaos and complexity); 3) self-organization, movement toward a predefined order (sociocultural model); 4) interactive design (redesigning the future and inventing ways to bring it about) o Five principles of systems: openness, purposefulness, multidimensional, emergent, counterintuitive. o Designers require a core concept and basic understanding of the subject to be designed. Ex: require a concept of cars to design cars o Designers replace the existing order by operationalizing their most exciting image of the future - the design of the next generation of the system. The way to learn and understand a system is to redesign it. o Everything depends on everything else, this "everything" can be grouped into two categories: those elements that somehow can be controlled and those that cannot. o The Mess is formulated to develop understanding by exposing the problem and identifying the points of potential leverage and attention. Formulation of the mess is a three-phase process of searching, mapping, telling the story o The why question is the matter of purpose, that of choice. And choice is the product of the interactions among the three dimensions: rational, emotional, and cultural. * multiple iterations are key for developing understanding What do I observe, How did it begin, Why did it happen, How is it interpreted by us and others? Interactive design = goal to replace existing, malfunctioning shared image with a shared image of a more desirable future ex: what do I want something to look like?Operational Thinking = Identify the rhythm (iterative cycle) of various feedback looks to understand change, emergence Defining the problem = searching, mapping the mess, telling the story via narrative and graphics Designers seek to choose rather than predict the future . . . Two distinct outputs of interactive design are defining problems (Formulation of the Mess), and designing solutions (Idealization). (126) "we fail more often not because we fail to solve the problems we face but because we fail to face the right problem" In general, we have routinely been taught how to solve problems, but rarely how to define one p 142. (TOA link to Rosenau An Instance, Kahneman Framing, Ryan Picking right system approach)

Unified Land Operations

Unified Land Operations are simultaneous offensive and defensive tasks and stability or defense support to Civil authority task to seize, retain and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict.

Young men and fire

Young Men and Fire' • • You can have incorrect theories on a situation that lead to dire consequences • Mustknowthebackgroundunderlyingthe theory • Small things cascade into larger outcomes • Complex environment • Place stock in investigations over first impressions • Framework for critical thinking • Theory helps prevent anchoring on personal experience that may be inadequate • Operational art connections: • Preparationforthefuturecanbegininthe past • Linksrequirementstocapability

Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq

"Success in battle is a matter of morale." Deductions for leadership: Discipline and esprit de corps.

Principles of Joint Operations

(MOOSE-MUSS-PLR) Mass Objective Offense Surprise Economy of Force Maneuver Unity of Command Security Simplicity Perseverance Legitimacy Restraint

Twiss and Chan - The Classical Confucian Position

1. Background History and Normative Concepts 449-50- over time, the lord-protector role gradually drifted from the original goal of defending the royal house of Zhou and protecting weaker states into becoming an aggressive hegemony in its own right, using the pretext of protection and aid in order to intervene in, and gain advantage over, smaller states during their internal quarrels Mencius, "Heaven did not create the people for the sake of the lord; Heaven created the lord for the sake of the people" 451-What the people need and deserve above all else is security and peace in a harmoniously functioning cooperative society focused on welfare and justice for all 452-The Kingly Way, then, is rulership by humaneness and rightness with a focus on developing policies oriented to the people's moral life and welfare, which, in turn, is understood in terms of adequate food, clothing, housing, education, and the like ( 453-A lord-protector is a trustworthy but morally imperfect ruler. 2. Criteria for Legitimate Use of Force 455-First, given the Confucian commitment to humane, peaceful, and orderly rule, the general intent in the use of such force is to restore peace and order in interstate relations and to restore peaceful and humane rule internal to a state disordered by tyranny. justifications (or justifiable causes) for undertaking military actions are the punishment and rectification of aggression (including usurpation) and tyranny. 456-Punishments, then, are largely intended to protect and restore social order in the state 458- one other justification for military action: self-defense against invasion or impending invasion by another aggressive state 459-In the case ofXunzi, the principal evidence for a reasonable prospect of success criterion comes in the form of his discussion of certain conditions under which a general cannot accept his ruler's orders, even under threat of death. Cannot be forced to take a position that is untenable Cannot be forced to engage the enemy when there is no prospect for victory 461- It is an open question perhaps as to whether this criterion of proportionality is a broad one pertaining only to justifying the legitimate use of military force in advance (prior to the decision to initiate the use of force), or whether it is best understood as a more narrow constraint applicable only to the way that force, once initiated, is employed (that is, not beyond a certain proportionate level). 3. Limits on the Way Force Is Legitimately Employed 461-military regulations of a true king include the army's not executing the aged or young, not trampling down growing crops, not incarcerating those who surrender, and not pursuing those who flee the battlefield 462-limits on how legitimate military force is properly employed: (1) prohibition of attack on the defenseless (for example, young, elderly, urban inhabitants); (2) prohibition of indiscriminate slaughter of enemy forces (narrow proportionality); (3) prohibition of abuse of prisoners (that is, releasing them after the action is concluded); (4) prohibition of plunder and destruction of civilian infrastructure (for example, temples, crops necessary for post-conflict survival); (5) prohibition of annexing an enemy state without the express approval of its people 463-Mencius subscribes to something close to a principle of non-combatant immunity that may underlie (at least) the prohibition of attack on the defenseless 4. A Case 465-Mencius also denies that Ch'i's ruler has the legitimate authority to attack, since he was not a Heaven-appointed office the Ch'i ruler's actions failed to meet both the criteria for legitimate initiation of military force and for its correct employment. 5. Concluding Reflections 467-With respect to the distinction between just and unjust war, Ching claims that the early Confucians tended "to be principled 'just war pacifists,' that is, they do not rule out war, but their criteria for a just war effectively limit (immediate or frequent) recourse to it"

Elements of Operational Art

1.)Decisive Point 2.)Risk 3.)Operational Reach 4.)Phasing Transitions 5.)Line of operation Lines of effort 6.)End-states 7.)Tempo 8.) Basing 9.)Center of gravity 10.)Culmination

Stephen Biddle

Biddle combines comprehensive research and a sophisticated methodology to provide a powerful but limited theory which demonstrates regular decisive battles are decided by force employment, not preponderance and technology.

John Boyd's OODA Loop

COL John Boyd - known for the OODA loop, one of the most impactful theorists in history; every beligerent goes through a decision cycle or loop; Patterns of conflict briefing stressed interrupting the opponents decision cycle through speed and tempo to create a continuous dilemma to erode the enemy's will to fight

Army Core Competencies

Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security

A stability mechanism

Compel Control Influence Support

Huntington Model

Huntington theorizes that there should be a clear delineation between politics and the military. While a clean concept in theory the actuality of this in real political and military life is much more interactive in nature. Leaders exchange possible futures both militarily and politically and accept risk in both realms with strategic initiatives.

Operations Process

Plan, prepare, execute, asses

EOA5 and 6: Winfield Scott and Kearney (Mexican War)

Political Aim: The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848. During his tenure, U.S. President James K. Polk oversaw the greatest territorial expansion of the United States to date. A strong political division between the Wigs and the democrats. Political Aim: Mexico attempts to expel General Winfield Scott from the disputed border lands in Northern Mexico to expel American influence. This results in a cavalry skirmish that justifies further conflict. Santa Anna was still attempting to regain control over Mexico. Timeline 1820 Missouri Compromise 1821 Mexican Independence 1836 Texas Independence 1846-1847 Mexican American War 1861-1865 American Civil war Elements of Operational Art 1.)Decisive Point: The Seizure of Mexico City 2.)Risk: inciting a war that overextended the United States 3.)Operational Reach: 300mi and extending via SlOCs from New Orleans. This was mitigated through local purchases and mounted infantry. 4.)Phasing and transitions: Long pauses after each engagement to seek a political resolution to end the war with Mexico. 5.)Lines of operation and line of effort: 6.)End states and conditions: 7.)Tempo: Slow and methodical ensuring general Winfield Scott has ample time to negotiate with the Mexican. 8.)Basing: 9.)Culmination: 10.)Center of gravity: Mexican Congress and Mexico City The Battle of Veracruz These events brought within the control of the United States the future states of Texas, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Washington, and Oregon, as well as portions of what would later become Oklahoma, Colorado, Kansas, Wyoming, and Montana. General Winfield Scott invaded along the Sams axis of advance as Cortez had to Mexico City. Military: Comprised of a volunteer force from states militia and a professional officer corps. The militia were undisciplined and committed various war crimes throughout the campaign. General Winfield Scott arrived IVO Veracruz with 11k soldiers, he found 5 major battles and eventually captured Mexico City. Scott made certain not to wage war against the civilian populace and ensured his catholic soldiers could attend church alongside civilians. After the end of every major battle General Winfield scott attempted to sue for peace. Following the failure of Slidell's mission in May 1846, Polk used news of skirmishes inside disputed territory between Mexican troops and Taylor's army to gain Congressional support for a declaration of war against Mexico. On May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. Following the capture of Mexico City in September 1847, Nicholas Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State and Polk's peace emissary, began negotiations for a peace treaty with the Mexican Government under terms similar to those pursued by Slidell the previous year. Polk soon grew concerned by Trist's conduct, however, believing that he would not press for strong enough terms from the Mexicans, and because Trist became a close friend of General Winfield Scott, a Whig who was thought to be a strong contender for his party's presidential nomination for the 1848 election. Furthermore, the war had encouraged expansionist Democrats to call for a complete annexation of Mexico. Polk recalled Trist in October. Chief Clerk of the Department of State, Nicholas Trist Believing that he was on the cusp of an agreement with the Mexicans, Trist ignored the recall order and presented Polk with the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which was signed in Mexico City on February 2, 1848. Under the terms of the treaty, Mexico ceded to the United States approximately 525,000 square miles (55% of its prewar territory) in exchange for a $15 million lump sum payment, and the assumption by the U.S. Government of up to $3.25 million worth of debts owed by Mexico to U.S. citizens. While Polk would have preferred a more extensive annexation of Mexican territory, he realized that prolonging the war would have disastrous political consequences and decided to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Although there was substantial opposition to the treaty within the Senate, on March 10, 1848, it passed by a razor-thin margin of 38 to 14. The war had another significant outcome. On August 8, 1846, Congressman David Wilmot introduced a rider to an appropriations bill that stipulated that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist" in any territory acquired by the United States in the war against Mexico. While Southern senators managed to block adoption of the so-called "Wilmot Proviso," it nonetheless provoked a political firestorm. The question of whether slavery could expand throughout the United States continue to fester until the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865.

Just War Theory (JWT)

Restrain incident and destructiveness of warfare

risk

Risk manage to is the process of identifying assessing and controlling risks arising from operational factors. One musk make decisions that asses the risk probability with mission factors.

Carl von Clausewitz

TOA7 and 8: Clausewitz • Book One, Chapter One: What is War • War is a duel on a larger scale; war is a force to compel our will on the enemy; war is never an isolated act and does not consist of a single blow • Polarity lies not in things (Armies) but in their relationship; attack and defense are different and unequal in strength; polarity does not lie in the form of action (attack or defense) but in the object: the decision • Chance is never absent, making the outcome unclear • War is a serious means to a serious ends; it is the continuation of policy by other means • The Trinity: primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (best represented by the people); chance and probability (represented by the military commander and the Army); element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, makes it subject to reason (represented by the government) • Book One, Chapter Two: Purpose and Means of War • In war, we must consider three things, three broad military objectives: • The armed forces: the fighting forces must be destroyed (put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight) • The country: the country must be occupied, otherwise the enemy could raise fresh military forces • The enemy's will: so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for peace or the population made to submit, war still persists • If all three of these military objectives are accomplished, the enemy will be powerless. • Pure War (Total War) is subsumed by Real War (Limited War) • Each side must consider the magnitude and duration of sacrifices (means) to achieve the three military objectives • The magnitude and duration of your application of military means with the three military objectives will have political repercussions • The selection of a particular policy (ends) will have a positive or negative character (domestically and internationally) that will manifest itself in application/practice • Political defines the ends; ways are how to influence the enemy's expenditure of effort (make war more costly) through invasion, suffering, or attrition; the means are combat, warfare (course of fighting is an engagement, employing fighting forces is planning and organizing a series of engagements, which means all military activity must relate directly or indirectly to the engagement) • If the political aims are small, the motives slight, and tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions, exploit any weaknesses in the opponent's military and political strategy, and finally reach a political settlement. Must keep his eye on the enemy in order to be prepared should he be attacked by a massive force. • Book One, Chapter Three: On Military Genius • Genius is a highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation • Must have courage in face of personal danger and to accept responsibility (highest kind is a mixture of both) • The mind requires coup d'oeil (quick recognition of truth) and determination (accept responsibility in the face of moral danger) • Bernard Brodies says a strong mind is required rather than a brilliant one; temperament that possesses strength of will and energy in action; 'the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head' TOA 7 and 8: Clausewitz • Book One, Chapter Four-Six: • Discusses the impediments to thinking while bullets are hissing by one's head and people are being mutilated near you • Friction that arises because of the unbelievable physical effort in war • Introduces the 'fog of war' and the perennial inaccuracies of intelligence in war • Book One, Chapter Seven: Friction • Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest things are difficult; a battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may delay things • Book One, Chapter Eight: Concluding Observations • Only on thing reduces friction: combat experience, peacetime maneuvers are a feeble substitute; you can gain familiarity by bringing in foreign officers with experience • Book Two, Chapter Two: Classifications of the Art of War • The art of war is the using of given means in combat (conduct of war); the conduct of war consists in the planning and conduct of fighting • Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy is the use of engagement for the object of war; both activities permeate on another in time and space, but are different • Book Two, Chapter Two: On the Theory of War • Theory should be study, not doctrine; it becomes the guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books and will light the way, ease progress, train judgement, and help avoid pitfalls • It is the task of theory to study the nature of the ends and means • Book Two, Chapter Three: Art of War or Science of War • Art's object is creative ability while science's object is pure knowledge; war is neither, it is an act of human intercourse; Brodie: war is not an exercise of will directed at inanimate matter but will be directed at an animated object which reacts • Book Two, Chapter Four: Method and Routine • A method is a mode of procedure while a routine is not based on definitive individual premises but on the average probability of similar cases • Principles, rules, regulations, and methods are indispensable concepts to or for the part of theory of war that leads to positive doctrines (attack) • Route (training) contains a positive advantage because it leads to brisk, precise, and reliable leadership that reduces friction; routine (training) becomes more frequent and indispensable the lower the level of action, meaning it is more appropriate for tactics than strategy • Book Two, Chapter Five: Critical Analysis • The discovery and interpretation of unequivocal facts; tracing the effects back to the causes; investigation and evaluation of the means employed • A critical inquiry is the examination of the means and poses the question of what the unique effects of the means employed were and whether they conform to the intention they were used • In war, all parts are interconnected, and all effects produced influence subsequent military operations and modify the final outcome to some degree; every mean must influence the ultimate purpose • A critical analysis is not just an evaluation of the means actually employed but also all of the ways the means MIGHT have been employed so that alternatives are considered • Hindsight Bias: if the critic wants to level praise or blame, they must put themselves in the position of the commander (assemble everything the commander knew and the motives that affected the decision) and ignore all that he could not or did not know, especially the outcome. • Book Two, Chapter Six: Historical Examples • Historical examples clarify everything and provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences • The detailed presentation of a historical event, and the combination of several events, make it possible to deduce doctrine • Draw examples from modern military history as much as possible given the ability to know and evaluate it; the further back one goes, the less useful the history becomes • Book Six, Chapter Twenty-Seven: Theater of Operations • Strike the blow against the concentration of enemy forces (center of gravity); strike the blow that creates the biggest effect (center of gravity); there is only one center of gravity in a theater of war • Book Eight, Chapter One: • Theory should cast a steady light on all phenomenon so that we can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeks that always spring from ignorance • Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie on, but it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and their relationships, freeing individuals to rise into action • Book Eight, Chapter Two: Absolute War and Real War • No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is the purpose; the later is its operational objective. • War is dependent on the interplays of possibilities and probabilities, of good and bad luck, conditions in which logical reasoning often plays no part and that is likely to be an unsuitable and award intellectual tool. • War can be a matter of degree • Book Eight, Chapter Three: Interdependence of the Element of War • At the outset of war, you must determine the character and scope from political probabilities. If these probabilities drive war towards the absolute, you must not take the first step without considering the last • In war, too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm. This factor pushes one towards maximum effort, but then all proportion between action and political demands would become lost. You must use judgement to detect the most important/decisive elements of facts and situations • Book Eight, Chapters Four and Five: The Defeat of the Enemy and Limited Aims • Acts considered most important for defeating the enemy (center of gravity): destruction of the army (if it is large), seizure of the capital (if it is center of admin, culture, social, political, and professional), delivery of an effective blow against principal ally • Great physical and moral superiority are required or an extremely enterprising spirit willing to take risk; momentum is of critical importance to success: time favors the side that loses the first fight because it generally brings people to their side • Book Eight, Chapters Six-Nine • If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, approaching its absolute form. • A major victory can only be obtained by positive measures aimed at a decision, never by simply waiting.

Staffs Role in Mission Command

The commander leads the staffs tasks,under the science of control. The science of control consists of systems and procedures to improve the commanders understanding and to support accomplishing missions. The four primary tasks are... 1.) conduct operation process 2.) conduct knowledge manager 3.) conduct inform and influence operations 4.) conduct cyber and electromagnetic activities

Operational Approach

The operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state.

Jus ad Bellum Standards (6)

just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, probable success, proportionality

Moral Pluralism (Haidt)

many moral matrices coexist within each nation. Each matrix provides a complete, unified, and emotionally compelling worldview, easily justified by observable evidence and nearly impregnable to attack by arguments from outsiders

Berger and Luckman

social construction of reality Typifications: social reality of knowledge approved in a continuum of judgement about objects • Objectivations: give objects character and meaning • Socialization: language most important • Externalization: institutions exist as external reality • Internalization: becomes a part of an individual's consciousness • Legitimization: process of explaining and justifying

Just War Theory

set of principles outlining conditions when the use of violence would be acceptable 1. A SWEEPING HISTORY OF JUST WAR THEORY "Some political theories die and go to heaven; some, I hope, die and go to hell. But some have a long life in this world ..." —MICHAEL WALZER1 People have wrestled with the ethics of war and peace since the beginning of human history, and not just in Western civilization but world-wide. Almost all major civilizations—from the ancient Egyptians to the Aztecs, from Babylon to India, from China to medieval Europe and contemporary America—have featured quite colorful beliefs about acceptable reasons for going to war, and permissible means of fighting it. Nearly all the major religious documents—from the Bible to the Bhagavad Gita, from the Book of Tao to the Koran—refer to warfare and moralize about it.2 The Old Testament, for instance, is filled with fierce battles. Yahweh and the prophets repeatedly permit, or even command, the Israelites to go to war against their enemies. Sometimes the commands seem quite blood-thirsty, other times restraint in fighting is urged.3 Jesus, by contrast, fills the New Testament with words and actions which seem at least anti-war and are, perhaps, pure pacifism. The Prince of Peace, as Christians know him, once famously commanded Peter to put away his sword.4 In the ancient Sanskrit epic The Mahabharata, a spirited debate erupts between five brothers, focused on whether the suffering created by war can ever be justified.5 Sun Tzu's The Art of War—from ancient Chinese civilization, yet often taught in today's Western business schools—details various kinds of battle, and the strategies required for victory. Yet it, too, includes a kind of ethic: of fighting only smartly and with honor, and not with rage, blunder, and blood-lust.6 So, in a way, the ethics of war is everywhere, and is as old as the hills.7 One of just war theory's credits is that, over time, it has developed probably the most comprehensive consideration of the ethics of war and peace. So, even though just war theory first developed in the West—and, more narrowly, among Roman lawyers and then Catholic theologians—it genuinely deserves universal attention. The fact that just war theory has had such impact on international law—which is truly global—only emphasizes how important it is for anyone wanting to think incisively about the ethics of war and peace.8 Just war theory, as we mentioned in the Introduction, is a coherent set of concepts and values which enables moral judgment in wartime. Traditionally, it's split into two categories: jus ad bellum (i.e., when it's just to start war) and jus in bello (i.e., how it's just to fight war, after it has begun). International law, by contrast, refers generally to treaties freely agreed to by sovereign states, wherein they promise to behave in a way detailed by the treaty. Treaties are like international contracts—solemn promises of behavior—between countries. And so the concepts and values first originating in the moral philosophy of just war theory have, over the centuries, made their way into binding treaties regulating state conduct during war—treaties we collectively refer to as "the laws of armed conflict."9 The purpose of this opening chapter is to sketch out the history of just war theory itself: who contributes what, and then when and why. Above all: what's the context here? Which events and personalities are crucial? Which mistakes get made, and strengths endure? What are the trends and cycles, discussions and debates? Where did we come from in this regard, and where are we heading? It must be stressed, however, that all that can be offered in one chapter is but a sweeping sketch. This book is not mainly a history book. It is a book about the ethics of war and peace in our time. So, while whole books could be written about the topics in each of the following paragraphs, it is not our goal to know every little detail and personality in the very long history of just war theory. The goal, rather, is to hit the high points and, above all, to set the context for the concepts which are going to be detailed in subsequent chapters. 1. The Greco-Romans So where does just war theory specifically come from, and why should we care? Paul Christopher credits ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE) with being the coiner of the term "just war."10 This concept was in contrast to the older idea of a "holy war," as mandated by some Divinity and described in some of the religious texts mentioned above. Just war theory is, at heart, a secular concept—i.e., a way of thinking about war's rightness or wrongness without appealing to God or scripture. But we'll see that, historically, just war theory does come to be associated, for some time, with Christianity and, more narrowly, Catholicism. Aristotle, and his teacher Plato (427-347 BCE), reflected on war's justice, no doubt spurred on by all the wars fought between Greeks and Persians and, indeed, amongst the Greek city-states themselves. Plato, for instance, grew up during the destructive Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta and it profoundly affected his life and thinking.11 Aristotle thought it morally justified to go to war to prevent one's community from being attacked and enslaved by another. Just war theorists today agree that self-defense from aggressive attack is the most obvious just cause for war. More controversially, Aristotle thought it alright to go to war to gain an empire, provided: 1) this empire would benefit everybody, including the conquered; and 2) this empire would not become so large and rich that it would attract attackers and hence result in more wars. Most notoriously, and appallingly, Aristotle did allow warfare to gain slaves for one's community—providing that such slaves were "naturally servile" to begin with. Not a single just war theorist would today endorse these last two propositions but the empire issue retains real life. For example, does America now have an empire? Has it come by this empire justly? Have its many recent wars been those of defense or, rather, of expanding and fortifying its dominion?12 After the Greeks came the Romans, and they clearly did have an empire. The shattering success of Rome upon the battlefield provoked thought amongst such luminaries as the senators Cato and Cicero and the emperors Julius Caesar and Marcus Aurelius. Cicero (106-43 BCE) probably developed the deepest reflections on war among them, and probably deserves credit for co-founding just war theory with Augustine (still to come) and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Aristotle. James Turner Johnson's observation—that just war theory is, in its origins, a synthesis of Greco-Roman and Christian values—rings true.13 Cicero endorsed wars of self-defense, and was not immune to the allure of empire. Crafty lawyer he was, though, by framing his support for imperial expansion with the rhetoric of defense: defense of Rome's honor or glory might call for wars of empire whereas defense of Rome's safety strictly might not. But Cicero rejected wars for gaining slave labor. He was also a stickler for procedure. And so, to Aristotle's primordial just cause requirement for a decent war, Cicero added the rules of proper authority and public declaration. So often did the Romans find themselves in battle—almost annually—that they developed a formal procedure for going to war. Rome would first send a diplomatic party (ambassadors and their aids) to the target city or rival empire, announce the problem, and demand rectification. The party would return to Rome and wait for one month. If nothing satisfying happened, the party would return to the enemy and threaten war. If they did not get an immediate, positive reply, the party would return to Rome and inform the Senate (seen as the proper authority for deciding war). If the Senate voted for war, the party would return to the enemy, read aloud the Senate's public declaration of hostilities, and then symbolically throw a sharp-pointed javelin into the enemy's soil. The party would then, obviously, quickly evacuate before the Roman army invaded and—more often than not—destroyed. There are, in this procedure, some shades of the later rule of war only as a last resort: the military had to hold off until the political procedure had worked itself out to the end. Cicero also insisted on vague rules of right conduct in fighting, too. He commented repeatedly on the need for restraint in battle, and advocated loudly and effectively that soldiers surrendering to Rome deserved to be protected rather than slaughtered. Those who refused to surrender, however, deserved a different fate in Cicero's eyes.14 2. Early Christianity and Augustine Church father Augustine (354-430 CE) is often credited with inventing just war theory all by himself. This is a huge exaggeration which downplays the Greco-Roman contribution, which we've just seen is substantial. Indeed, Augustine wasn't even the first Christian thinker to consider the justice of war: Tertullian (160-230 CE); Origen (185-255 CE); Lactantius (260-340 CE); and Augustine's mentor Ambrose (340-397 CE) all made contributions. Indeed, Ambrose added content to Cicero's vague jus in bello by stressing that soldiers should strive to display the classical virtues—courage, prudence, justice, and moderation—while fighting. More significantly, Ambrose added to the Greco-Roman rules of jus ad bellum—just cause, proper authority, public declaration, last resort—by saying that wars approved by God were also just. Augustine followed Ambrose in this regard; the result was a blurring of the line between just wars and holy wars, lasting about 1,000 years, and providing support for the pope-ordered Crusades—of Christianity against Islam—between approximately 1100 and 1300 CE.15 Taking all this in, it's very hard to conclude that Augustine was the sole founder of just war theory. He was, however, a very high-profile and influential proponent of the theory, and Christianity's subsequent triumph in Western civilization led later thinkers to want to identify a Christian, rather than a Greco-Roman pagan, as the founder. (If we have to put names and faces on the foundation of just war theory, it would probably be the triumvirate of Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine. Traditions take some time to be created and congealed.) Now, Augustine did add to the theory in an original way. He insisted on the rule of right intention, both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Augustine wrote during a time when Christianity had become—thanks to the emperors Theodosius and Constantine—the official, state-sanctioned religion of the Roman Empire. How could one, consistently, be both a Christian and a public official of Rome—especially when the Empire was coming under increasing armed attack from non-believing barbarians? Christianity seems, after all, to imply love and non-violence whereas the responsibilities of Roman officials regularly involved deploying armed force to hold the Empire together and to keep "the heathen barbarians" out. Augustine wrestled greatly with this dilemma, and concluded that a just ruler might permissibly use force to protect the innocent (i.e., ordinary civilians) from aggressive attack. A Christian ruler has to show love for his own people, and is duty-bound to ensure their survival and well-being. But such a ruler must order war with only the greatest reluctance, and not with any pleasure, or hatred for the enemy, whatsoever. The right intention must be love for, and desire to protect, the endangered innocents. Soldiers executing this command of the ruler must likewise get no joy out of bloodlust and violence but, rather, should protect the innocents and fend off the guilty attackers with nothing but solemn duty as their mental focus. So, in addition to objective just causes, such as the defense of one's community from attack, there is the subjective requirement of being psychologically motivated strictly by love and duty alone. Augustine summarized his thoughts this way: The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars.16 3. The Dark Ages and Holy Wars The Roman Empire collapsed in Western Europe in the 400s CE, fragmenting in the face of repeated barbarian invasions. It had grown too large to govern efficiently, and too often its governors were corrupt and incompetent, lacking the skill and drive displayed by such original builders as Caesar and Augustus. It managed to endure in the Near East—as the re-styled Byzantine Empire—for over a thousand years more, but in the West the only institution to survive the collapse of Roman civilization was the Catholic Church. The western empire otherwise dissolved into a series of small ethnic groups, and tribe-like families, and many wars between them ensued.17 Not much information survives from this period, and so we call it the Dark Ages. What little does survive tells us, sporadically, of an anarchical and bloody existence, a dirty and decrepit life. Europe took major steps back during the Dark Ages, which lasted from about 500-1000. At the same time, Islamic civilization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Eastern civilizations in China and India, flourished.18 During the Dark Ages' latter years, starting around 800, attempts were made by ambitious local warlords to consolidate their control over larger pieces of territory. Alfred did this in Britain and Charlemagne on the Continent. While not immediately successful, these efforts pointed the way towards the future: local tribal heads gradually winning control over larger and larger pieces of territory, declaring themselves champions of the people in the process. They re-established law and order, by force of arms, farm-by-farm and forest-by-forest. A handful of such warlords eventually became self-styled kings, monarchs of their realms. All the while, such warlords had to deal with the Church: its longevity; its substantial land holdings; its moral authority over its flock. Most warlords were eager to win the Church's approval, for it was a powerful ally and could provide their rule no better stamp of legitimacy. As a result, many European warlords heeded the call when the Church, between 1000-1300 CE, demanded a series of military crusades, against the encroachment of Islam into Europe. These Crusades were massive armed invasions of Muslim strongholds in Eastern Europe, and throughout the MENA.19 It is important to distinguish just war and holy war, especially since so many early Christian thinkers conflated the two. A holy war (bellum sanctum) is a war approved of—either commanded or permitted—by God. The approval is thought to come from sacred scripture itself or from religious authorities, such as the pope. Pope Urban II, in 1095, inaugurated the First Crusade by declaring "Deus vult!" (i.e., "God wills it!"). God was thought to "will it" so that Christians would retake Jerusalem from Islamic control and prepare it for Christ's second coming to Earth. The Christian conquest of that city did indeed happen in 1099. The Muslims, under Saladin, later took it back, and the Second and Third Crusades were thus motivated. The other main feature of a holy war (labeled a "jihad" in the Islamic tradition)20 is that soldiers fighting on behalf of the cause are seen, thereby, to be cleansing their sins and paving their entry into Paradise. Salvation of self, so to speak, through mutilation of others. A just war (bellum justum), by contrast, is not thought to be sacred, merely moral. There is no pretense of having divine approval, rather merely good reasons (like self-defense, or protecting innocents) for fighting a war. And while soldiers fighting just wars might be thanked or even praised (e.g., on Remembrance or Veteran's Day), there is no claim that their participation in the war has guaranteed them membership in Heaven. We see, then, that there need be no necessary connection at all between doctrines of just war and those of holy war. But Dark Age Christians, especially those involved in the Crusades, did forge such a connection—and so jus ad bellum became, frankly, polluted with some dark religious dimensions, like self-righteousness, inflexibility, demonization of others, and fanaticism. It was to be a long time before such pollution was met with sufficient dilution, and today no just war theorist endorses the holy war concept as a good reason to go to war.21 While perhaps regressing on the jus ad bellum side, this era did manage big progress on the jus in bello front. Great specificity was added to Cicero's vague calls for moderation, Ambrose's insistence on fighting with virtue, and Augustine's command for purity of intention. Two papal edicts—the "Peace of God" of 989 and the "Truce of God" of 1027—combined with the decrees of the Second Lateran Council of 1139 and Gratian's Decretum of 1148 to form quite concrete and sensible rules of jus in bello. Non-combatants were specified—notably, women and children—and held to be ethically immune from attack or hostage-taking. (This rule of non-combatant immunity is today seen, widely, as jus in bello's most important rule.) A whole range of new weapons were prohibited, including cross-bows and anything—swords and arrows especially—dipped in poison or pestilence. Attacks on food sources, like crops, were completely ruled out, and churches officially declared "sanctuary" from military, and indeed police, activity. The sources of these rules were the Bible, Augustine's writings, experience with the new weapons, and even aristocratic sporting tournaments (featuring jousting) and their customs regarding fair play, honorable conduct, and chivalry.22 4. Aquinas and Legitimacy By the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), we can properly speak of a reasonably settled and articulated "just war tradition," with many different people deploying the same concepts and values in aid of judging the same thing—in this case warfare—and often arriving at very similar conclusions. We have at this time clearly separate and quite developed categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Under the former, we have rules of: just cause; right intention; public declaration by a proper authority; and not exactly "last resort" but something like "give the enemy a chance to make amends before fighting." Under the latter, we now have: non-combatant immunity; right intention; non-use of prohibited weapons; an obligation to accept offers of surrender without slaughter; and something like "behave with virtue and chivalry on the battlefield." This constitutes, over 1500 years, huge theoretical progress from Aristotle's quick and spare declarations regarding just cause. Aquinas was a huge fan of Aristotle's and, to the existing set of rules, the Italian theologian added proportionality to each category. This was good Aristotelian sense: war should be a proportionate, or balanced, response to the grievance (i.e., the problem must really be so severe—like an armed invasion—that war can be considered a fitting response) and the quantum of force deployed should be appropriate to the objective at hand on the battlefield. Aquinas also invented something called the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), which has important applications within jus in bello, to be discussed in subsequent chapters. Aquinas was also a transitional figure on two issues. The first is the acceptability of holy war as a just cause. Aquinas notably backed off here, saying that defensive wars to protect Christians from death (or severe persecution) at the hands of non-Christians might be permissible but aggressive wars designed to coerce non-believers into Christianity definitely aren't. Jesus himself, after all, didn't create Christians by cracking skulls. The spotty record of the Crusades also prompted Aquinas to pour cold water on the holy war concept. Unfortunately, the idea would still come and go, at least in the West, until Hugo Grotius's authoritative proclamations against holy wars in the early 1600s. Truly, even after that, holy-war-style rhetoric has been known to infect justifications of war to this very day. Aquinas also marks a transition on the important issue of proper authority for declaring war. In Greece, the proper authority was the head of the (city-) state, whether dictator or elected assembly. In Rome it was (during the Republic) the Senate and (during the Empire) the Emperor. During the Dark Ages, it was the Pope. But in the run-up to Aquinas's life, there was a very fluid political situation in Europe. There was still the Pope and the Church, of course, but there was also the development of these tribal or national kings, like King John in England. Furthermore, some areas of Europe were essentially Greek-style city-states, for example Venice. There were also very wealthy trading enterprises, with their own private militias or armed security corps—some so powerful they dwarfed the armed forces of towns and other political associations. Also sporting private militias were aristocrats out to challenge the king, on the belief that their families were just as entitled to the throne. Aquinas, perhaps surprisingly, did not side with the Church. Not so surprisingly, he condemned the private militias and armed trading companies. He favored the non-proliferation of armies. Common sense told him: the more armies we've got, the more likely they'll step on each other's toes and start fighting, leading to bad consequences all around. Aquinas's middle-of-the-road solution was that only genuinely political—and not merely mercantile—associations could declare war, and the body which spoke for the political association was the one that: 1) was capable of ordering that society; and 2) demonstrated clear intentions to rule for the common good of all (as opposed to the private greed of some, such as ambitious barons, dukes, and earls). Essentially, then, Aquinas favored more central authority, such as a national king or prince, but still strongly advised such a ruler to heed the advice of the Church, what with its centuries of experience in developing and applying just war theory. In this sense, Aquinas sided with the rise of the modern nation-state.23 5. Vitoria and the Spanish Conquest It is important to note that, from the start, just war theory has been applied to real world conflicts and has served not just to legitimize but also to criticize the conduct of the powers that be. Augustine, it's true, was mainly looking for a legitimation of state violence: he wanted to square public Roman control with his private Christian beliefs. But later thinkers realized that, when a state (or prince) fails to meet the standards of just war theory, then it (or he) must be morally criticized and urged to stop. For instance, in Spain in the early 1500s, numerous figures used just war theory to condemn Spain's aggressive invasion and colonization of parts of the New World. Spain was motivated neither by love nor by any kind of defense or protection, they said. The kingdom, delighted by Columbus's 1492 discoveries, became driven by greed and love of power and conquest, and the harsh treatment of the natives by the infamous "conquistadors" revealed this, and was a separate evil besides.24 Key figures involved in the debate over the justice of the Spanish Conquest were: Bartolemé de las Casas (1474-1566); Sepulveda (1490-1574); Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546); Francisco Suarez (1548-1617); and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Sepulveda and Gentili tried to use just war concepts to justify the conquest, with Sepulveda even resurrecting Aristotle's old canard about natural slavery. De las Casas, by contrast, offered a clear, eloquent, and principled denial and critique. The entire faculty of the University of Salamanca, in 1520, bravely resolved in public that Spain's actions constituted an unjust war. It's important, indeed, to note that European colonialism and imperialism did not proceed with unanimous support. Vitoria's work has stood the test of time as the deepest theoretical contribution from this fertile period.25 Vitoria was the first to say clearly that even non-Christian communities have the rights implied by jus ad bellum (notably, a general right not to be attacked and enslaved). He rejected the concept of holy wars, and insisted on the secularism of just war theory. He helpfully suggested that all plausible just causes for going to war be subsumed under the one concept of "a wrong received." He thus banned both aggression and pre-emption (because the wrong had to be received before one could justly respond to it). On this latter point, he memorably commented: "It is quite unacceptable that a person should be killed for a sin he has yet to commit."26 Vitoria did allow for armed humanitarian intervention as a kind of war of "other-defense." He actually justified the Spanish Conquest on this basis, at least in terms of just cause. He sharply criticized Spanish intentions of greed and power but did believe that the Conquest liberated the natives of the Americas from indigenous oppression and such brutal home-grown practices as human sacrifice and ritualized cannibalism. So self-defense and other-defense were, for Vitoria, the only just causes for going to war, and in either case it had to be defense from attack which already occurred and not from an imagined one merely suspected to come in the future. One of the most important contributions made by Vitoria was his stress on the quality and objectivity of the evidence needed to support a decision to go to war. Vitoria strongly rejected the idea that the ultimate decision should rest with only one man—even the king—since any given man is so subject to strong emotions, subjective biases, and incomplete understandings. A just ruler must first invite counsel from groups of wise men: 1) learned in just war theory; and 2) who represent different opinions about the war action contemplated. A hawkish ruler surrounding himself only with "yes-men" is not being responsible and may find himself ordering, and then later accountable for, an ultimately unjustifiable war.27 6. Grotius and The Wars of Religion Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was similarly motivated by the imperial experience, in his case by the colonizing Dutch, particularly in the Caribbean Indies. His landmark work, The Law of War and Peace, was also driven by the terrible Wars of Religion—between Catholic and Protestant—then rocking Europe in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the end of the Catholic Church's religious monopoly over Western Europe.28 The savagery of the fighting in both the New World and the Old concentrated Grotius's mind powerfully, and he vowed to do what he could to bring warfare within the confines of law once more. One of his biting remarks in this regard was: Throughout the Christian world I have seen a lawlessness in warfare that even the barbarian races would think shameful. On trifling pretexts, or none at all, men rush to arms and when once arms are taken up, all respect for law, whether human or divine, is lost as though by some edict a fury had been let loose to commit every crime.29 Grotius's work—not so much original as pains-taking, comprehensive, and levelheaded—is credited not only as being one of the landmark pieces of just war theory but also as one of the first productions of the laws of armed conflict. Grotius thus straddles the gap between morality and law, and he intoned that the very point of law is to realize the ideals of morality. Not surprisingly, given the Wars of Religion, Grotius was a relentless secularizer, echoing Vitoria's rejection of holy wars and essentially sealing the debate on that issue for the remainder of the just war tradition (though not, as we noted, in popular political culture). Religion is a matter of conscience and choice—or at least for each nation to decide for itself, he wrote—and so it cannot figure into any just cause for war. On just cause, Grotius essentially shared Vitoria's understanding of self- and other-defense. Grotius did go further, however, in specifying that it was allowable not merely to defend against aggression in the process of happening (whether against self or others) but also to punish past aggression which still stood uncorrected. Grotius, as a lawyer, was strongly in favor of concrete penalties for violations of principle, and so wars of punishment (as well as defense) figured into his system. He actually justified some of the colonial conquests as punishment for iniquitous (ungodly?!) practices on the part of the natives. He also contributed the criterion of probability of success to jus ad bellum: one should only go to war if one has a decent chance of winning. It is, I suppose, lamentable that the two just war giants from this period—Vitoria and Grotius—both supported European colonial conquests, viewing them as justified forms of other-defense or humanitarian intervention, designed to rescue innocents in another country. That's true, but they also both criticized the intentions of the European imperialists and so, in the end, took a rather dim view of colonialism or, at the least, viewed it as a mixed bag of crimes and benefits.30 We can see that, with Grotius, most of the general principles of modern just war theory became set. Disagreements about what the theory exactly implied in terms of each particular war, of course, remained—and just cause remained especially contentious, and does so to this day. But the essentials were all in place, and indeed a new focus for the theory developed: getting nation-states to agree to the general moral principles in exact, formal, written, legal treaties. Just three years after Grotius's death, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) brought the Thirty Years War (the bloodiest of the Wars of Religion) to an end.31 Often seen as the first piece of modern international law, Westphalia enshrined a form of tolerance over religion, with national signatories pledging not to go to war with each other in attempt at armed conversion. A principle of non-intervention in "the internal affairs" of other nations was generated, and just war theorists Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1704) and Emmerich Vattel (1714-67) solidified this trend by rejecting humanitarian intervention as a just cause for war. This strong interpretation of state sovereignty, and hostility to any foreign intervention in local affairs, was to endure almost to the end of the 1990s. The prevailing interpretation of just cause was thus: 1) defense of one's nation from foreign attack; 2) defense of another nation (especially one's ally or friend) from foreign attack; and 3) (possibly, depending on the theorist) pre-emptive attack. War as punishment was not generally accepted, and humanitarian interventions were largely prohibited. "Westphalian state sovereignty" reigned supreme.32 7. Locke, Kant, and the Revolutionary Era Other prominent thinkers wrote in a just war vein in this era of Pufendorf and Vattel, for example John Locke (1632-1704) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). But they failed to add much of originality to the theory. Increasingly, the just war tradition declined in prominence because it dealt with war between states whereas the issue increasingly at hand was the right to make a war of revolution within a state or empire. Here, of course, Locke had much of import to say and his writings partly inspired the American Revolution (1775-83) and, through it, the French Revolution (1789-1800).33 Now, the question of revolutionary war can logically be incorporated within just war theory. It is, after all, a form of war—indeed, a kind of civil war. As such, it would fall under the principles to be defended in Chapter 3. These principles, we'll see, revolve around the legitimacy (or moral adequacy) of the state in question. Locke remains the classical source for insisting that, to be legitimate (i.e., to have the right to rule), a government must respect the natural (or human) rights of all its individual citizens to: life, liberty, and property (Thomas Jefferson substituted for this last, the pursuit of happiness). A government which fails in this regard is illegitimate and, should it forcefully resist reform, it may be forcibly resisted and overthrown, paving the way for a rights-respecting regime which the people support and recognize as their government. Locke's work on violent revolution is perhaps the first clear linkage between jus ad bellum and human rights, a linkage which was to be cemented following World War II and which remains absolutely central today. But Locke did not think of himself as a just war theorist, nor did the tradition embrace him in return. This is unfortunate since Locke drew substantially on Aquinas and, indeed, venerable old Aristotle had much to say about revolutionary struggles. Perhaps Locke's staunch Protestantism prevented a complete connection to what then remained very much a Catholic or "scholastic" doctrine.34 This religious difference also prevented Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) from connecting his thought with the just war tradition. Indeed, Kant explicitly distanced himself from the tradition, even poked sarcastic fun at its classical figures. However, as I've shown elsewhere,35 Kant's thoughts on war and peace shared much of the moral logic of just war theory as it existed in his day—with one big exception. This was the whole issue of jus post bellum (justice after war). More than any other thinker before him, Kant reflected intensively on the justice of peace treaties, of forcing regime change in a defeated society, of post-war reconstruction, and of what might be needed for longer-term peace between nations. In particular, Kant favored widespread internal regime change in the direction of rights realization, and thought some international policies—like diplomatic engagement, cultural linkages, and free trade—would help bring this about. Pro-rights societies, he predicted, would eventually band together to form a prosperous, peaceful federation of free nations. Their success, in turn, would spur other nations to change internally so as to join the club, and a kind of peaceful "cosmopolitan federation" would grow and grow.36 In my view, we can all but completely credit Kant for inventing jus post bellum. It's true that Vitoria did insist that justice after war had to be part of just war theory—but he failed to add content to this observation. It's also true that just war theorists stretching all the way back to Aristotle intoned that peace must be the sought-after goal in war. But this assertion is banality itself: every war ends in peace, including an unjust one. This is to say that even an aggressor aims at, and looks forward to, the peace at the end of a conflict. The real question is: what kind of peace can justly be imposed via war? And on that difficult issue, there was fundamental silence, or else sweeping vagueness, until Kant came along. Indeed, to this very day a rather large number of just war theorists completely ignore jus post bellum. But they can't do that and pretend they have a complete theory. We have Kant to thank for "priming the pump" of our thoughts on this issue, which is so vital to our own times. Jus post bellum will be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 8. The Coming of Codification It really is remarkable that it was not until the mid-1900s that just war theorists equal to the stature of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel appeared. Many of the figures, in the 1750-1950 period evidently believed that the existing synthesis could not be much improved upon. And those who did clearly improve upon the status quo—like Locke and Kant—weren't recognized as card-carrying members of the tradition. There is another factor relevant in the explanation: after 1850, there is a veritable explosion in the number of international treaties and laws regulating armed conflict, in particular jus in bello. Grotius's dream of codification came true—200 years after his death. The period 1850-1914 was extremely fertile in this regard. I've no doubt that many of the diplomats, academics, and lawyers who worked on such treaties and codes would have made first-rate just war theorists. But the opportunity was ripe for them to engage in legal construction instead of theory-building, and so pragmatically they chose the former. This may have come at the price of anonymity but the gain was the world's first formal codes enshrining just war principles within law. European powers, for their part, signed the Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868, which prohibited certain bullets and projectiles, but the US Civil War was truly the major spark in this regard. The North (Union) forces—in 1863—issued very detailed instructions on proper ways to fight to its soldiers. These jus in bello rules were called the "Field Army Manual" or "Lieber's Code" after their author. The American Civil War also brought into stark relief moral issues of jus ad bellum—e.g., the justice of fighting a war to end slavery—as well as jus post bellum issues of proper post-war pacification and reconstruction of the vanquished enemy. In these manifold senses, this war remains a very relevant case for even the most contemporary just war theorist.37 The culmination of this nineteenth century move towards codification (i.e., translating moral principles into specific legal codes) was the Hague Conventions, drafted and proclaimed in ten different treaties between 1899 and 1907. Incredibly detailed, particularly with jus in bello rules, they stand today as living and active pieces of international law which are a credit to their authors. They are, in many ways, the complete realization of Grotius's dream.38 9. World War I and Collapse Grotius could not, of course, have foreseen the scale and depth of World War I (1914-18), which shocked the conscience of the world and provided an ugly birth to the ultra-violent twentieth century. The war—begun as a struggle of imperial rivalries between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey on the one side and Britain, France, and Russia on the other—degenerated into a long and tragic slaughter. The human meat-grinder which was this war was halted only when America intervened, in 1917, on the side of Britain and France. It's fair to say that the bleak experience of World War I—causing 20 million deaths—made people very cynical about linking justice and warfare, and so once more just war theory fell into disuse. Indeed, even one of the popes declared just war theory out of date! There are three important exceptions to these general observations. The first is that many people strongly criticized the 1919 Treaty of Versailles as an unjust peace treaty. (But no one went on to articulate a general theory about what a just peace treaty fully should be. They contented themselves with particular observations, like "Germany was treated too harshly," "Britain and France extended their empires out of greed," "America simply let all this happen," and so on.) The second exception was that, with the post-war formation of the League of Nations, there was an attempt to change the emphasis within jus ad bellum rules away from self-defense ("unilateralism") towards collective security and mutual responsibility in the face of aggression ("multilateralism"). The final exception was that the chemical weapons deployment experienced in the trenches of Europe—on both sides—spurred the development and signing of a treaty, in 1925, banning the use of poisonous gas in wartime. But it must be admitted that these were all political and legal developments, and they went unaccompanied by any new major piece of just war theory at this time.39 10. Rebirth and World War II The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was an ambitious piece of international law, designed to shrink radically the number of just causes for going to war, and to buttress the war-authorizing power of the multilateral League of Nations. We see, during this period, the first attempts at making the declaration of war an international responsibility and power. The rise of the fascist dictatorships, in the '30s, effectively gutted both these institutions, but it also resurrected interest in just war theory. Many Catholic scholars, and political leaders like Winston Churchill, explicitly used just war concepts to justify and generate public support for the war against Hitler's Nazis in Germany and Mussolini's fascists in Italy. Indeed, dissidents in Spain used just war theory to justify their civil war against Franco's fascists earlier in the 1930s. While not invoking just war theory explicitly, Franklin D. Roosevelt harkened all the way back to Aristotle when he explained that America had to enter the war in 1941, as a matter of self-defense following Japan's Pearl Harbor attacks.40 By 1941, the world no longer dismissed just war theory as sterile and of use only to European scholars of the history of Catholicism. Systematic works appeared, including English-language works by John Ryan and John Ford.41 Extensive effort was placed into the justification of the war on the part of the Allies. But this rebirth was not merely one-sided, superficial Allied propaganda. It was the just war community, after all, who first raised the questions and criticisms which still haunt historians today: should the Allies, especially Britain, have engaged in deliberate terror bombing of Germany's residential areas—and emphatically the purposeful razing of Dresden to the ground in 1945? Should America ever have used the atomic bomb on Japan? There were no clear laws on these unprecedented issues—and so thoughtful people turned back to just war theorists for answers, or at least guidelines. It's fair to say most just war theorists were critical of these Allied actions, and this criticism perhaps reached a highpoint after the war when Elizabeth Anscombe wrote a much-read pamphlet, "War and Murder," criticizing Oxford University's decision to award an honorary doctorate to Harry S. Truman, the US President who had ordered the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.42 World War II, and its immediate aftermath, had profound impacts upon just war theory. Grotius's emphasis on proper punishment found ready application in the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals, the first in modern history.43 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations (UN) rigorously addressed jus ad bellum, placing even more emphasis on collective security and international authorization than the League of Nations did—but realistically allowing for armed self-defense as well. Echoes of voices of the University of Salamanca faculty could be heard in the set-up of the UN's Trusteeship Council, an institutionalized process for aiding the gradual end to European colonialism, especially in Africa and Asia. But the clearest impact on, and expression of, just war theory resided in the 1948 Convention Banning Genocide, and the landmark 1949 Geneva Conventions, which are devoted to jus in bello, especially regarding the specification of "benevolent quarantine" for prisoners of war. These are two of the most important laws of armed conflict to this day.44 The main impetus for these legal reforms was the Holocaust and its horrors, which also inspired the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.45 This was a moment of great significance for just war theory, because now theorists saw that the new moral basis for the age was destined to be human rights—the proper treatment of individual persons—and so they got to work interpreting traditional just war theory in light of human rights. This took some doing, and it wasn't done in a clearly satisfying way until perhaps the 1970s. But the move was made and it probably saved just war theory from ethical oblivion. In other words, and at long last, the just war tradition essentially had to welcome John Locke in from the cold, and forcefully and fully deal with core issues of state legitimacy, human rights, and—above all—the deep connection between the two, and how armed force maybe required to defend them. This linkage is one of the most vital, and still challenging, to this day—as aspects of this book will demonstrate. 11. Our Time 11.1. THE 1960S: EARLY COLD WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE The onset of the nuclear age posed new problems for just war theory, and attention focused on the morality of atomic weapons and of nuclear deterrence—i.e., of the threat to use such weapons second so that the enemy won't use theirs first. This was especially the case in the 1950s and early 1960s, and then again during the 1980s when Ronald Reagan was US President. But America's experience during the Vietnam War, 1955-75, sparked the biggest development in just war theory at least since World War II and perhaps even stretching all the way back to the Spanish Conquest. It's important to note that, historically, it tends to be the questionable wars—the Spanish Conquest, the Wars of Religion, Vietnam—which provoke the most soul-searching, and thus the biggest developmental spurts in just war theory. Some might wish to include on that list America's 2003 invasion of Iraq. The center of action, in just war theory, moved at this time firmly out of the Catholic Church and into the corridors of international law and power, as well as into the groves of academe and even the streets of non-violent protest. English-language works, especially by Americans, now became the "must-read" contributions to the theory—and it has stayed that way since, though of course one cannot discount the contributions of others, such as Australians, British, Canadians, Europeans, and Israelis. (Israel's many post-1948 wars have sparked keen interest there in just war theory.46) In the 1960s, the work of Ian Brownlie, Joseph McKenna, William O'Brien, Robert Osgood, Paul Ramsey, and Robert Tucker stood out very prominently.47 11.2. THE 1970S: VIETNAM, AND WALZER'S JUST AND UNJUST WARS In the 1970s, literally scores of important articles appeared, such as those published in the distinguished journal Philosophy and Public Affairs by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare, R.K. Fullinwider, David Luban, and Thomas Nagel. Vital books were written by Sydney Bailey, Yehuda Melzer, J.N. Moore, and Richard Wasserstrom.48 But Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars, of 1977, remains the breakthrough work of that decade, directly inspired by Vietnam. It's not much of an exaggeration to say this work has been to current just war theory what Grotius's The Laws of War and Peace was to prior centuries. As such, it will be referred to throughout this work as well: there's simply no avoiding it. Even when it is disagreed with, Walzer's book remains the fundamental contemporary reference, which everyone "in the business" must read and understand. It is in Walzer's book, above all, that the cementing of human rights theory within the core propositions of just war theory occurs, and is offered some satisfying treatment. On the application side, Walzer's book is devoted to showing that World War II exemplifies just, but Vietnam unjust, wars.49 In terms of the laws of armed conflict, so many treaties were signed in the '60s and '70s that the reader is simply directed to Appendix A for topics, listings, and locations. It was a tumultuous and therefore fertile time for just war theory. Just war theory grows in spurts, in reaction to war-ravaged events, and—as noted—especially in response to wars about which people are skeptical and critical. The 1980s, 1990s, and forward have seen an explosion in the number of just war theorists, and important developments in the theory itself. In the '80s, nuclear deterrence was front and center, as Reagan's America stared down the USSR, and the Catholic Church got back in on the action, so to speak. In 1983, the US Catholic Bishops published a reflection on nuclear ethics which was high profile and influential, eliciting responses from European bishops, and academics and think-tanks world-wide. Also important was the topic of training new soldiers in ethics and international law. The US military in particular—stung by episodes of misconduct during Vietnam—invested large resources in the education of its soldiers and officers in just war theory. Other militaries followed suit. Walzer was a primary reference, as were new works by Sidney Axinn, Anthony Hartle, James Turner Johnson, Douglas Lackey, John Langan, Robert Phillips, Jim Sterba, and Jenny Teichman. (Johnson deserves special mention as probably the most learned historian of the tradition.) The morality of indirect (but still armed) American intervention in such Latin American countries as Nicaragua—highlighted by the Iran-Contra scandal—was also very topical in the 1980s, with proponents justifying the controversial moves as part of the larger chess game of defeating the USSR. Sometimes such figures justified the Cold War struggle between America and Russia in realist terms as a fight for survival between utterly opposed enemies; other times they made explicit appeals to morality, urging the need to destroy "the evil empire" and its godless, rights-violating system of police-state communism.50 11.3. THE 1990S: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND THE NEW "R2P" DOCTRINE In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and America's triumph in it, just war theorists returned to issues of collective security and the vigor of the United Nations, which the Cold War in many ways had sapped and frustrated. The 1991 Persian Gulf War generated a big just war literature—indeed, US President George Bush Sr. argued for the war using just war language51—as did the nasty civil wars and severe humanitarian crises ranging from Bosnia to Somalia, from Rwanda to Kosovo. We will detail each of these wars later in this text. The ethics of humanitarian intervention became the largest just war issue in the 1990s, and it generated deep critical thought about whether the old defenses by Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel for non-intervention in local affairs, were mistaken. Perhaps, instead, renewed attention to the pro-humanitarian intervention doctrine of, say, Vitoria was more in order. The catastrophic consequences of the failure to intervene in Rwanda—800,000 people slaughtered, in an attempted genocide, in the spring of 199452—put some clear pro-intervention flavor back into many just war works, and resulted in pro-intervention policies on the ground later on in Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011). Indeed, far from Westphalian state sovereignty, there has emerged since the '90s the so-called "R2P Doctrine," short for "Responsibility to Protect."53 We will detail the full content of this doctrine in Chapter 3. For now, we note how the humanitarian crises in the '90s provoked a revolution within just war doctrine and, through it, international law, allowing today for a much more expansive use of force on behalf of victimized innocents, wherever they may be.54 11.4. OTHER '90S DEVELOPMENTS: SWEEPING SANCTIONS AND THE ICC Intervention was the big jus ad bellum issue of the '90s; the big jus in bello issue was the set of sweeping sanctions slapped on Iraq following its defeat in the Persian Gulf War by America. Did the sanctions violate the principle of discrimination, wrongfully inflicting serious harm on millions of innocent civilians?55 We'll consider this issue in detail in Chapter 4. Prominent just war pieces were penned this decade by: Paul Christopher, Jean Bethke Elshtain, G.S. Davis, Michael Ignatieff, and Richard Regan.56 The major reform in the laws of armed conflict was the 1998 Treaty of Rome, which created the first permanent and international war crimes tribunal—the International Criminal Court (icc)—set up to judge war crimes committed anytime, anywhere, by anybody. Grotius the punisher would've been pleased.57 11.5. AFTER 9/11 This brings us to the very present, and of course we're not far enough removed to make good judgments about which works will last and which issues will endure the most. Scores of smart people are actively creating important pieces of writing, and others are crafting vital military and foreign policies on the ground. Clearly, though, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in 2001, dramatically impacted the debate, and raised questions in particular about just wars against non-state actors. The subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq created heated debate about the justice of preemptive war and/or preventive strikes. This is one issue around which there is very little consensus amongst just war theorists, stretching all the way back to its origins: may you justly strike another before he strikes you, if you sincerely believe he is just about to do so? Or is it as Vitoria says, that you cannot punish someone for a sin they have yet to commit? These are big issues for Chapter 3. An even deeper issue is whether, as some have argued, the laws of war and just war theory must be completely re-thought in the "Age of Terror." Why might this be? Well, the laws of armed conflict and just war theory have generally been constructed assuming that state governments, and their armed forces, are the main belligerents. But 9/11 revealed that so-called "non-state actors," such as terrorist groups, can now pose state-scale levels of threat and destruction. Are new principles needed to handle such "asymmetrical warfare"? Or do we have the tools already to evaluate the so-called "War on Terror"? And what of other non-state actors using force, such as so-called private military companies (or PMCs)?58 An emerging theoretical issue of jus in bello, which has caught on like wild-fire in the past decade, attracting the attention of some of today's most talented moral philosophers,59 concerns the moral status of the ordinary soldier. Must s/he always obey commands? Should s/he refuse to fight a war s/he believes unjust? What is the true connection between the jus ad bellum issue of whether a war is just or not and the particular jus in bello controversies surrounding: 1) who is a proper target; and 2) what may soldiers do on behalf of the countries for which they fight? The difficult and multi-faceted occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan—now just about to end—raise profound issues of jus post bellum. Just war theorists are increasingly coming around to the importance of this topic,60 which Walzer himself has recently called one of the two most vital for the theory's future. The other is the jus in bello issue of soldiers striving to carve out a risk-free fighting environment for themselves via technology, perhaps off-loading their own risks upon powerless civilians. (Think here of the long-range, high-altitude bombing of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, or, more obviously, the use of unmanned, weaponized "drones" over the MENA today.)61 I might add a few more issues to Walzer's list of the most consequential current topics. The first concerns the ethics of detaining and torturing suspected terrorists to gain information thought needed to prevent future terrorist attacks. The second would be the justice of overthrowing governments and setting out, right from the start, to forcibly reconstruct their societies along better, more pro-human rights, lines. And the third: the so-called EMTs ("Emerging Military Technologies"), especially cyber-warfare, which form the focus of Chapter 5.62 12. Conclusion It might seem strange—in this sweeping but still substantial history of just war theory—that no mention has been made of realism or pacifism. This was deliberate, since the focus was on just war theory and, to a lesser extent, the laws of armed conflict. But of course the other two doctrines have their own robust histories, and at times these histories have impacted on just war theory. This is true of realism in particular. Realism has been the main rival to just war theory, in terms of affecting the behavior of those with the war power. Pacifism is principled, and it has had its own kind of influence through time, but pragmatically no nation-state or empire has ever based its foreign policy on pacifism. The only exceptions to this might be old, isolated religious communities and conquered nations engaging in non-violent (or, at least, non-warring) resistance.63 Which has had more influence on foreign policy: realism or just war theory? The answer is that there is a kind of cycle, and at times realism is on the ascendant and at others just war theory. Walzer, in 2002, wrote an article entitled "The Triumph of Just War Theory." He clearly believes just war theory is ascendant in the post-Cold War era.64 Perhaps this fact is connected with American hegemony during this era and America's self-image as an ethical force in world history, concerned with fighting only just wars. (There is some irony in traditionally Catholic just war theory living and thriving perhaps most strongly in historically Protestant America.) But perhaps that's not relevant. Perhaps it's more a fact—just like with Rome and Spain in their days—that the most powerful nation just naturally asks itself the most questions about the justice of its influence and its frequent resort to force. There is something substantial to Walzer's claim, no doubt. Recent armed conflicts have indeed been justified by vocal moral appeals to just war concepts like humanitarian intervention and self-defense. Other people have criticized the exact same wars using just war rules like right intention, proper authority, last resort, and proportionality. Scholars like Martin Cook, George R. Lucas, Jr., and Alex Bellamy have all shown the continued utility and impressive resilience of just war theory, even in light of brand new technology and drastically changing circumstances.65 But perhaps the triumph of just war theory is already fading. The post-9/11 world does, after all, concern itself mightily with national security. Some have suggested the on-going War on Terror is the next Cold War; the original Cold War (approximately 1946-91) was obviously a time of realism triumphant, what with the balance of nuclear terror and the cold-blooded chess game of geopolitical struggle between communism and capitalism. Only time will tell, of course. Other commentators view the recent wars not as isolated conflicts to be evaluated one-at-a-time with the tools of just war theory. They view them, rather, as parts of a larger, over-all strategy—an empire-building strategy—by the United States, as it seeks (in arch-realist fashion) to protect itself and to extend its domain, values, economy, and influence as far and as deeply as it possibly can. And America has done so—and is still doing so—in part to check the rise of potential future rivals, notably China (but also such others as Germany and Russia, and countries/movements in the MENA committed to doctrines, such as radical Islamic extremism, seen to be at odds with American interests).66 More will be said about the specific histories of realism and pacifism, and their competition with just war theory, in Part Two. For the moment, now that we've completed our sketch of the history of just war theory—and laid down some context of people and places, of wars and peaces—we must turn to the conceptual task of understanding the rules and values of present-day just war theory, and then applying such to recent cases of armed conflict. Notes 1 Michael Walzer, "The Triumph of Just War Theory" in his Arguing About War (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2004), 3. 2 Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994), 8-16; Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1998); John Kelsay, Islam and War (London: John Knox, 1993); Steven J. Rosen, Holy War: Violence and the Bhagavad Gita (Bombay: Deepak, 2004). 3 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 20, Joshua, or the Chronicles. 4 Matthew 26:52; John 18:10. 5 John D. Smith, ed. and trans., The Mahabharata (New York: Penguin, 2009). 6 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford UP, 1963). 7 Gregory Reichberg et al., eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006). 8 Alexander Gillespie, History of the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (London: Hart, 2011); Stephen Neff, War and The Law of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008). 9 W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, eds. The Laws of War (New York: Vintage, 1994); Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., Documentation on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000); Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010). 10 Christopher, Ethics, 10-11, citing Aristotle's Politics [1256b, 25]. 11 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Penguin, 2004). 12 Christopher, Ethics, 7-13; Niall Ferguson, Colossus (New York: Basic, 2004); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); Ivan Eland, The Empire Has No Clothes (Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 2005). 13 James Turner Johnson, The Quest for Peace (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1987), 45. 14 Cicero, De Re Publica, 3, XXIII, trans. Clinton Walker Keyes (New York: Putnam, 1928), 211-15; Christopher, Ethics, 13-16. 15 John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (Washington, DC: CAIP, 1935); Christopher, Ethics, 17-29; Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed., The Oxford History of the Crusades (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999). 16 Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York: Columbia UP, 1963); Christopher, Ethics, 30-48; quote from Augustine, The City of God, trans. Robert Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 1:21. 17 Christopher Kelly, The Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006). 18 Fern Braudel, History of Civilization (New York: Penguin, 1995). 19 Barbara H. Rosenwein, A Short History of the Middle Ages (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2002); John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (London: University College of London, 1999). 20 Alia Brahimi, Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010). 21 As a result, just war theorists tend to be very skeptical of any politician today making use of pro-war rhetoric which seems to skate on the edge between just war and holy war. See also: Riley-Smith, ed., Oxford History; James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (Philadelphia, PA: Penn State UP, 1997); John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, Just War and Jihad (New York: Greenwood, 1991). 22 Peter Temes, The Just War (New York: Ivan Dee, 2003); Christopher, Ethics, 49-52; Paul Robinson, Military Honour and The Conduct of War from Ancient Greece to Iraq (New York: Routledge, 2006). 23 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975); Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 2-2, Qs 40 and 64; Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas and Grotius (London: SPCK, 1975). 24 Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004). 25 James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and The Limitation of War (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1975); James Turner Johnson, The Just War Tradition and The Restraint of War (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1981); Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, Democrates Alter, trans. Stafford Poole, in Contemporary Civilization Reader, 6th ed. (New York: American Heritage, 1997), 39-51; Bartolomé de las Casas, In Defence of the Indians, trans. Stafford Poole (Chicago: Northern Illinois UP, 1992). 26 Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 315-16. 27 Christopher, Ethics, 58-67. 28 Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001). 29 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. by Louise Ropes Loomis (Roslyn, NY: W.J. Black Inc., 1949), 10-11. 30 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Christopher, Ethics, 70-110; David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empire, 1415-1989 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2001). 31 Peter H. Wilson, The Thirty Years War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2009). 32 David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998); A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005). 33 Tuck, Rights, 166-96; John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992); William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990). 34 Tuck, Rights, 169-99; Richard H. Cox, Locke on War and Peace (New York: Rowman Littlefield, 1983). 35 Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2000). 36 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, trans. Hugh Bar Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995); Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. Ian Johnston, ed. Brian Orend (Peterbo

.E. Lawrence 7 Pillars of Wisdom

• Changed the narrative to rebellion and decentralized ops within centralized intent "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them." (stakeholder needs skin in the process) When targeting an enemy reality, do more with less and attack what they value (thousand cuts)

Normative Ethics (Feiser)

• Consequentialism • Egoism • Altruism • Utilitarianism • Virtue Ethics Deontology

Jus Post Bellum

• Discrimination in punishment • Claims of victory proportional to the character of war Compensation

Responsibility to Protect

• Duty to prevent mass killings, protect women from rape, children from starvation • War is an obligation • Justified when the state violates humanitarian rights R2P v. JWT (Friberg-Fenros) • Tension between responsibility to engage in war and the Permission to Engage in War Respect for sovereignty vs. humanitarian intervention

Moral Foundations (Haidt)

• Fundamental emotional responses based on evolutionary adaptive challenges • Vary in demonstration depending on culture • Foundations: • Care/harm • Fairness/cheating • Loyalty/betrayal • Authority/subversion • Sanctity/degradation Liberty/oppression

Jus in Bello

• Military necessity • Discrimination • Proportionality Responsibility

Powell-Weinberger Doctrine

• The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved; • U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed; • U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives; • The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary; • U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress; • The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort

Thomas Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

• Thomas Kuhn was a philosopher and was interested in 'the philosophy of science' during a time when physics was going thru a shift from newton to quantum so he wrote about why the shift occurred and it has GREAT application to psychology • Paradigms guide all scientific inquiry and thought in a particular area • A paradigm is a guiding (or confining) set of assumptions (what you ask or what you think), theories, and methods (research tools) • All research and inquiry is guided by the dominant paradigm

Jomini

• Focused on warfare, theory of action • War is simple, can be broken down into rules (divisions, corps, armies) • Mass armies for a strike against the enemy decisive point; strength against weakness • Basing, LOO, decisive points, principles of war, doctrinal language 'Strategy is the art of making war on the • map' • Grand tactics, tactics, strategy, logistics, engineering, diplomacy (know middle four, be familiar with bookends) Biographic Data: · 1779-1869 - 90 years; published and wrote more than Clausewitz (38 years more) o Able to criticize Clausewitz without refutation · 1779 - born in a French speaking area of Switzerland, Swiss citizen · Short stint as banker in Basel · Sent to the business world of Paris · 1798-1802 - Secretary to the Swiss Minister of War · caught up in French nationalism and joined the French Army · 1803 - A young protégé of Marshal Ney, Napoleon's "bravest of the brave" and later a staff officer, chief of staff during several of Napoleon's great campaigns (Austerlitz, Spain, Prussia, Moscow) · 1808-1810 - Spanish campaign · Staff officer for Napoleon during Jena and Eylau campaigns: a first hand observer of Napoleonic warfare and the transition of dynastic war (ancien regime of Prussia) to the nation at arms o Influenced by Buelow, Guibert, Lloyd and Frederick II, all of whom he considered great tacticians but inadequate as strategists and whose writings he felt were lacking in a clear theory of war o Praised history as a source and guide · 1813-1869 - leaves the French Army and joins the Russian Army, where he served until his death o Spent his first years in the Russian Army in Paris conducting research and writing o Advisor to Czar Alexander I at the battle of: § 1815 - Vienna § 1820 - Aix-la-Chapelle § 1822 - Verona o Tutor to Czar Nicholas I and Czar Alexander II o Helped establish the Russian Military Academy o 1828-1829 Participated in the Russo-Turkish War o 1853-1856 Participated in the Crimean War Key Quotes: "There are a small number of fundamental principles of war which may be disregarded only with the greatest danger and the application of which has, on the other hand, been crowned in nearly every case with success. The practical applications which derive from these principles are also few in number and, though they are modified sometimes by circumstances, they may nevertheless serve in general as a compass for the commander-in-chief of an army to guide him in the task..." The Art of War "That strategy is the key to warfare. "That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and "That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory." Treatise Jomini Encapsulated: · Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. o Ends-means-ways o What we would more likely call operational level of war · Strategic (operational) maneuver is the key - how you will maneuver from your base, cut the enemy's lines of communication, and eliminate the enemy's ability and will to fight Jomini's Theory: I. Scientific Principles control strategy: Jomini asserts four basic Principles of War, which appear as a simplistic geometric process of moving armies on the map: to get the right number of forces at the right place at the right time will ensure success every time. "That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory." Treatise 1. "To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. 2. "To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces. 3. "On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. 4. "To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy." The Art of War II. The education of officers in the principles of war is critical to their success III. War and the task of the commanding general is an intellectual exercise IV. Maxims, general rules can apply to all wars V. Can derive certain fundamental principles that will guide a commander to success VI. Divorce battle/war from politics: this simple peace to war to peace framework implies that a tactical victory will always lead to a strategic victory. a. The King decides to go to war b. The King converses with the generals regarding the objective scale and scope of the war c. The generals fight the war without the political interference of the king d. The general returns to the king upon the successful completion of the war e. The King conducts the political affairs related to setting the terms for ending the war VII. First to distinguish between STRATEGY (movement on a map) and GRAND TACTICS (what we would describe as operational level maneuver), the approach to fighting the battle once the formations have reached their designated start points. VIII. One of the first theorists who elevates LOGISTICS to a fundamental principle of warfighting, the idea that you must supply the army as well as fighting in order to exert control over conditions and reduce dependence on pillaging IX. The Base of Operations is critical to establishing lines of communication with formations What is War? - Jomini's Six Parts of War - Jomini's approach to answering "What is War?" similar to the way Clausewitz did. 1. "Statesmanship, in its relationship to war" 2. "Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion" a. The art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations, of strategy and tactics b. The art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war 3. Grand tactics: the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. 4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies, comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans 5. Engineering - the attack and defense of fortifications 6. Minor Tactics of the different arms Jomini's Ten Forms of War: how Jomini looked at the concept of war, broke it out into various parts to describe them more fully so that the principles may be applied 1. Offensive wars for claiming rights 2. Wars defensive in policy and offensive militarily 3. Wars of convenience 4. Wars with or without allies 5. Wars of intervention 6. Wars of invasion through a spirit of conquest or other causes 7. Wars of opinion 8. National wars 9. Civil and religious wars 10. Double wars, and the danger of undertaking two wars at once Why do we have wars? Thucydides had three: Fear, Honor, and Interest. Jomini breaks it down into... Jomini's Nine Reasons for War 1. To claim rights or to defend them 2. To satisfy great public interests, such as those of commerce, of industry, and of all that concerns the prosperity of nations 3. To sustain neighbors whose existence is necessary to the security of the state, or to the maintenance of the political equilibrium 4. To fulfill stipulations of alliances, offensive and defensive 5. To propagate doctrines, to suppress or defend them 6. To extend its influence or its power by acquisitions necessary to the safety of the state 7. To save menaced national independence 8. To avenge outraged honor 9. Through a mania for conquests, and through a spirit of invasion Circumstances Affecting the Nature of a War (what we call the Character of War), or what makes one war different from another: 1. A state may simply make war against another state 2. A state may make war against several states in an alliance 3. A state in an alliance with another may make war on a single enemy 4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary 5. In the latter case, a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced 6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own* 7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory; it may be prudent and cautious; or it may be bold and adventurous 8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy 9. The war may be a civil or religious war *Here, Jomini is thinking in terms of the theater in the sense of a campaign, not of a single battle but of many battle linked together such as he witnessed from Napoleon's campaigns Key Elements of Strategy: Jomini's geometric approach to war, like a geometric proof 1. Agreement between commander and head of state upon the character of the war 2. Study of the theater of operations - understand what the theater of war looks like militarily and geographically 3. Select the base of operations - answers where the base will be located, where the lines of communication will be, and the limitations of operational movement constrained by lines of communications* 4. Determine the zone of operations 5. Determine the objective point 6. Determine the lines of operation *Here, Jomini departs from Napoleon, who did not concern himself with the reach of his logistical support but relied on conquered territory to provide for his needs. Jomini and Strategy: mechanistic approach to warfighting 1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits. 2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations - are they geographic or terrain, or an enemy force? Jomini almost always favors the terrain as a decisive point. 3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base* and of the zone of operations. 4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive 5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations 6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front 7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases 8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves* 9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers 10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army 11. Fortresses regarded as strategic means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered 12. Points for entrenched camps, tétes de pont, &c. 13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary *Where depots and bases are located and their connection via lines of communication with marching formations will drive how the campaign may be conducted. Jomini and the Theater of Operations · Independent of terrain, each theater of operations consists of: o A fixed base of operations o A principal objective point o Fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense o Zones and lines of operations o Temporary strategic lines and lines of communication o Natural and artificial obstacles to overcome or to oppose the enemy o Geographical strategic points (what we call key terrain), whose occupation is important, either for the offensive or the defensive o Accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective point and the primary base o Points of refuge in case of reverse (what we call subsequent battle positions) Theater of War: a very geometric approach · Theater of operations as a box · Usually, each side initially controls two sides of the box · Goal is to control three sides of the box, while... · Cutting across an opponent's lines of communication, forcing the enemy to retreat back to their base of operations and allowing for the pursuit · Jomini does not account for what might happen if the opponent's lines of communication are cut but the opponent does not retreat to the base of operations, such as in Grant's Vicksburg Campaign "To illustrate Maxim 3 on direction of Lines of Operation" Figure 3, The Strategic Field of 1806, The Art of War. Jena-Auerstaedt, 1806: a battle won by Napoleon that Jomini adapted as a textbook example of geometric warfare · Clausewitz is present at the defeat of the great Prussian Army, a trauma that inspired him to explore and study the nature of Napoleon's campaigns to discover why the Prussian Army was defeated · Jomini is a staff officer at Jena, present at the battle. · The "Box" is present, with the French in control of the Rhine and the Main rivers, two sides · The French cut off the Prussian lines between Jena and Berlin and gain control of the third side Jomini's Influence · Jomini's works were in a common military language (French), were readily digestible, refined and direct. As a result, they were widely read and accepted. · The idea of a set of enduring principles of war remains widely accepted in the military profession · Critical to the development of a theory of strategy (as opposed to war), how does one employ forces on the battlefield to achieve objectives, which catered to a broad appetite at the time · Key to the evolution of strategic thought over the course of about 50 years. · Embraced and made sense of the new, Napoleonic way of war, the new paradigm · First to link ENDS, WAYS, and MEANS, as well as STRATEGY, OPERATIONAL ART, and TACTICS.* · Introduced logistics as a strategic (operational) consideration · Spurred development of military professionalism and education · Although he did not refer to it as such, he is considered the father of the operational level of war · Enduring influence on generations of military thinkers o U.S. Military § Dennis Hart Mahan - the principle military history instructor at West Point for 38 years, went to France to compile and condense French military thought into his texts and lessons given to the cadets at West Point who were to represent both sides of the Civil War as... § U.S. Civil War Generals** § Alfred Thayer Mahan - (Dennis' son) naval academician, instructor, adapted Clausewitz and much of Jomini in his theories of naval warfare *Very easy to trace these contemporary concepts back to Jomini **Prof. Carol Reardon, Sword in one Hand and Jomini in the Other, argues that, because the cadets didn't read direct translations of Jomini but were taught indirect lessons, that Jomini was not a great influence. o In Europe - the most widely read military author in the first half of the 19th century. He is his own publicist, makes money § Russia § France § Germany - Influence on Moltke and Schlieffen, based on the idea that the French must be crushed quickly at the decisive point so that attention may turn to Russia § Great Brittain 12 Principles of Joint Operations (JP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 - the 9 Principles of War plus the 3 counterinsurgency principles) demonstrate Jomini's influence 1. Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal 2. Offensive - Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative 3. Mass - Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results 4. Maneuver - Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power 5. Economy of Force - Expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts 6. Unity of Command - Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective 7. Security - Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage 8. Surprise - Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared 9. Simplicity - Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders 10. Restraint - Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force 11. Perseverence - ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic objective 12. Legitimacy - Maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations Jomini and Terms of Operational Art, 1838 · Theater of operations · Bases of Operations · Strategic Lines · Decisive Points · Objective Points · Zone of Operation · Lines of Operation o Interior o Exterior o Concentric o Divergent · Strategic Lines of Maneuver Jomini's Shortfalls - while inaccurate in many details, his key insights remain influential and relevant · Reductionism and prescription - the idea of reducing war to a checklist of ordered steps that must be followed to achieve success; contradictory principles (mass vs. economy of force vs. security); fails to account for situations where the principles don't apply to the specific context of certain conflicts, which results in applying a hammer to every situation perceived as a nail as opposed to crafting a strategy to fit the environment; · Separated war from policy · Facilitated a civil-military divide; divorced the decision of going to war from the conduct of war · Failed to recognize the dynamics of modern war, especially the changes wrought by revolutionary war · Focused on elements of military power at the expense of integrating all instruments of power: diMe · While not entirely his fault: o Promoted an obsession with the "Great Battle" - battle=campaign=war § John Warden's idea of concentric warfare: find the right decisive point and win the war, which may or may not take the will of the opponent into account o Reinforced what would become "the cult of the offensive" - the Western Way of War, strike fast and hard at the right place and time and win a sweeping victory quickly · Too rigid in his rationalizations of zones and lines of operations · Insufficient appreciation for the effects of technology on war and strategy, particularly the impacts of technology to change the geometry of the battlefield; smooth bore muskets transition to rifled barrels · Too much faith in the durability and inviolability of his principles Jomini vs. Clausewitz · Clausewitz wrote from a desire to explore and explain war, Jomini made writing about war into a career - it's not enough for either to simply understand warfare, both are trying to understand what present day implications are for the future of warfare · Jomini sought to understand the changes wrought by revolutionary warfare, to clarify the nature of war by explaining Napoleon's success, and to use scientific study to: o Reduce war to a set of principles o Provide solutions to military problems o Educate officer corps in the basic principles he discovered · Jomini was more a strategist than a philosopher, while Clausewitz was attempting to establish a theory that would apply to all wars · Jomini sought to divorce battle/war from politics, while Clausewitz believed war was nothing more than an extension of politics by other means. Jomini's advocacy of divorcing the decision to go to war (political) from the conduct of war (military) fails to allow for the affect of the conduct of war on the political situation, making Clausewitz a more useful theorist in this sense. · Jomini's framework involving a general returning control of a situation to a king following the tactical victory is simple, based on witness of Napoleon's success, and conflicts with Clausewitz who believes that the result of a battle is not final because a victory in battle does not necessarily translate to winning the political objective. · Clausewitz' writings in the original German are harder for native German speakers to read than the Howard Paret translation in English. Jomini's works were readily digestible, written in French (the language of the ruling class and the military), widely read, and generally accepted · Clausewitz' writings are unfinished and represent sketches exploring both sides of an argument, with explanations of trains of logic leading to his conclusions. Jomini is very straightforward, a "bottom line up front" kind of guy with clear instructions designed to clearly educate and inform. · Clausewitz influence is more prevalent with regard to present day military education. Jomini's influence persists in doctrinal principles, tenets, and concepts, particularly at the operational level of war. Further readings (if you don't want to read Jomini himself): Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in Edward Meade Earle, ed., The Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. John Shy, "Jomini," in Peter Paret, ed., The Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986. John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: A History of the Principles of War, Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1982. Carol Reardon, With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. John R. Elting, The Super Strategists, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985.

Defeat Mechanisms

Destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, isolate

Colonel (Ret.) John Warden

5 Rings, Leadership,System essentials,Infrastructure, population, fielded Forces

center of gravity

A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral and physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz: "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point, identifying sources of strength and weakness.

area of influence

A geographic area where the commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems

Decisive Point

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.

Virtuous Consequentialism (Fisher)

• Appropriate weight to all facets of moral agency Internal qualities and external consequences

Liddell Hart

"The object in war is to obtain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct the war with constant regard to the peace you desire" (Liddell Hart, 1967, 353). It is in this spirit that we conclude this course by examining war termination. Although war termination is logically at the conclusion of warfare, Iklé reminds us that policymakers must plan for it at the beginning

Army Design Methology (AMD)

A methodology for Applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approach's to solving them

strategy

A theory of action that leads to a position of continued advantage

Combined Arms Maneuver

The Application of the Elements of Combat Power in Unified Action to defeat Enemy Ground Forces; to Seize, Occupy, and Defend Land Areas; and to achieve Physical, Temporal, and Psychological advantages over the Enemy to Seize and Exploit the Initiative

consolidate gains

The activities to make permanent any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a sustainable stable environment allowing for a transition of control to civilian authority.

Nassim Taleb

o Antifragile: the combination aggressiveness plus paranoia— clip your downside, protect yourself from extreme harm, and let the upside, the positive Black Swans, take care of itself. o Barbell strategy:playing it safe in some areas and taking a lot of small risks in others o Contrasts to fragility and robustness o Seeking too much stability in a system is detremental to the system. Volitivity and randomness within boundaries enhances the system. Attempts to artificially stabilize complexity can contribute to weakness and harm over time. ex. Keynesian economics attepts to stabilize the markets vs Hayek and free markets over time. o We create fragile systems in our attempt to reduce volatility in the short term. o Intentionally creating disturbance in the system can be used to recalibrate the system metrics o Risk at Strategic, Operational, Tactical: risk and external relevance varies at each level o Instead of trying to predict what is going to happen, position yourself that you have options. Antifragility is beyond fragility or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better and stronger. When the Black Swan event occurs, only the antifragile will remain.

Thomas - Russia's Reflexive Control Theory

theory of reflexive control (RC) can be used against either human-mental or computer-based decision-making processors as it attempts to control more than manage a subject Reflexive control is defined as a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action. The side that is best able to think like its opponent and predict their behavior will win Reflexive control focuses on the role played by a particular person or group of persons (history, leadership, subordination, etc.). 249- RC as "the process of intentionally conveying to an opposing side of a certain aggregate information (attributes) which will cause that side to make a decision appropriate to that information."

Tukachevsky

• Tukachevski (S.U.): thought air integral to a joint force • 1: annihilate enemy air force, then act against enemy columns and reserves • Purgesmadetheimpactunclear • Germany: air was inherently offensive • Interdiction in support of army; light and heavy bombers, heavy bombers low priority • Developedasaninterdictionandtactical support, rather than long-range strategic force