Con Law

Knox v Service Employees Int. Union 132 S.Ct 2277 (2012)

Facts of the case All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a "Political Fight Back Fund" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Question (1) May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment intended solely for political and ideological expenditures without first providing a notice that includes information about that assessment and provides an opportunity to object to its exaction? (2) May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of union agency fees for purposes of financing political expenditures for ballot measures? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR DIANNE KNOX, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito Sonia Sotomayor Sotomayor Elena Kagan Kagan No, No. In his opinion for the 7-2 majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote that the structure by which nonmembers of a union have to pay chargeable expenses and must opt out of any others already strains the limits of the First Amendment. The actions of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) went beyond this allowable extension and infringed upon nonmembers' First Amendment rights. By failing to provide a new notice and a new chance to opt out, the union did not abide by the established procedure for handling nonmember payment. In order to respect the First Amendment rights of nonmembers, the special assessment should have come with a notice that allowed nonmembers to opt in. The Court held that, while it can be difficult to determine the yearly dues ahead of time, the union should err on the side of having nonmembers pay too little rather than too much and infringe on their constitutional rights. Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the union had not satisfied its constitutional obligation to provide nonmembers with notice of the purpose of the special assessment and a chance to opt out. However, she argued that the Court went beyond its authority by specifying that an opt-in system better fits the requirements of the First Amendment when there is no precedent to support such a statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and argued that the basic system that the unions uses to charge dues is both constitutional and fair to members and nonmembers. The union uses each year's ratio of chargeable vs. nonchargeable to determine the next year's fees, so an objecting nonmember might overpay one year, but will underpay the next and ultimately come out even. In the year in question, even with the special assessment, the objecting nonmembers paid less than what the constitution considers their fair share. The First Amendment does not require the union to provide more than one opportunity for a nonmember to object to the yearly fee. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Morse v Frederick 551U.S. 393 (2007)

Facts of the case At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful. Question 1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events? 2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR DEBORAH MORSE, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007)

Facts of the case Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the "as applied" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate "express advocacy" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were "issue ads" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were "sham issue ads," which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election. A three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights. Question Is the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for political advertisements in the 60 days before an election unconstitutional as applied to advertisements that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a candidate? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that BCRA's limitations on political advertising were unconstitutional as they applied to issue ads like WRTL's. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that the ads were genuine issue ads, not express political advocacy or its functional equivalent (which Congress can concededly regulate). The Court held that McConnell v. FEC did not establish the test that any ad intended to influence an election and having that effect is express advocacy. Such a test would be open-ended and burdensome, would lead to bizarre results, and would "unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech." Instead, the Court adopted the test that "an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." The Court further held that the compelling state interests invoked by the government to regulate advocacy did not apply with equal force to genuine issue ads. Neither the interest in preventing corruption nor the goal of limiting the distorting effects of corporate wealth was sufficient to override the right of a corporation to speak through ads on public issues. This conclusion, the Court held, was necessary in order to "give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship." The dissent by Justice Souter called WRTL's ads indistinguishable from political advocacy ads and accused the majority of implicitly overruling McConnell v. FEC.

Milton, Areopagitica

* Areapagitica is Miltion's response to Henry VIII's Licensing Order that outlawed printing without author's consent - kinda like modern copyrights. * KEYWORD: cloistered virtue - Milton considered this ironic because of free choice. * The Four Major Arguments * Who are the inventors of licensing? The Catholic church. * What is to be thought of reading? It is a necessary acquisition of knowledge of good and evil in a fallen world. * This Order is ineffectual in suppressing "scandalous, seditious, and libelous books." * This Order will discourage learning and the pursuit of truth. * They, who to states and governors of the Commonwealth direct their speech, High Court of Parliament, or, wanting such access in a private condition, write that which they foresee may advance the public good; I suppose them, as at the beginning of no mean endeavour, not a little altered and moved inwardly in their minds: some with doubt of what will be the success, others with fear of what will be the censure; some with hope, others with confidence of what they have to speak. Defends right to freedom of speech and expression Work in response to his own government's prior restraint - needed licence approval from government before publishing work Statement - heretic in the truth - doesn't believe orthodoxy of Catholic church - right of truth Profess belief in church without reason Best way to do this is to know both sides

Mill, On Liberty

-Free speech is good in and of itself Allows people to get closer to the truth Allows for better policymaking Ch. 1 Thesis: arguing for proper understanding of legitimate boundaries for government/society in terms of civil/social liberty Mill concerned with tyranny in government but also tyranny in society Harm principle - society can restrain your individual action when it harms others Speaking/writing goes beyond individual - social effect Government implies force/coercion but society does not have this power, they can only persuade Two part division p. 20 Human beings need to hear both sides - true and false sides "the object of his essay." He writes that he will argue that the only time individuals or society as a whole can interfere with individual liberty is for self-protection Mill asserts that a person should be held accountable for both the direct harm to another person or inaction that results in harm being done to an individual. Mill believes human liberty should encompass 1) the inward domain of consciousness, 2) liberty of thought and feeling 3) liberty of expressing and publishing opinions, 4) liberty of tastes and pursuits, and 5) the liberty of individuals to join a collective group Ch. 2 - Liberty of Thought and Discussion Mill asserts that the government shouldn't act at the beckon of the people because the public shouldn't have the power of coercion over their elected governing body Omission of minority opinions is very hurtful to the public whether the opinions are wrong or right If a minority opinion can be wrong, it leads to "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth." Mill also points out that a man doesn't have to be evil to argue against the basic beliefs upheld by society, invoking Socrates as proof that people can misjudge even the most competent and well-intentioned minds He says that both popular and opposing opinions are rarely completely right and a balance between the two should be reached in order for the real truth to be found Mill extends this theory to religion, saying that those who adhere to the Bible as the complete truth are misinterpreting its intent to supplement the strong Objections Can't restrain speech because infallibility, can bring it up with any political action → presumably you'll have consulted Argument of utility Ch. 3 Corn-dealer story - inciting corn-dealers to violence Environment important Importance of individuality He professes his belief in autonomy except when a person proves to be placing others in danger with their actions; he asserts that "no one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions." Mill disagrees with the Calvinistic theory that humans can only be good through compromise and that "whatever is not a duty, is a sin." Any will, religious or not, that suppresses individuality is tyrannical Liberty and individuality are essential to individual and social progress. Seeing people's dissimilarities is key in learning about one's own weaknesses Ch. 4 - Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual Mill contends that there needs to be a clear distinction between where individual liberty takes precedence and where society has the right to intervene Refutes Locke's idea of a contract For people who injure others in ways that cannot be punished by law, Mill believes that society's opinion and judgment will serve as punishment However, when a person is only hurting himself or herself, Mill says that people can advise him/her to adopt self-regarding virtues but ultimately, each person has the complete freedom to make their own decision. If a person does not adopt self-regarding qualities, society cannot publicly denounce him/her, although they can hold their own personal negative opinions Ch. 5 In this chapter, Mill enumerates how all of his theories and ideas for humankind can and should be applied in real-life scenarios and explains when liberty has to be sacrificed He recaps his two main maxims: One, that the individual should not be punished for their actions if they are only affecting themselves Two, that for actions that do adversely affect others, society should hold the agent responsible for his/her actions and take the necessary step to punish them, be it in a courtroom or a social setting Mill's 3 ideas Suppressing idea that's true Suppressing idea that's false Probably the case that it's mixed

FCC v League of Women Voters 468 U.S. 368 (1984)

=Facts of the case The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to "engage in editorializing." Question Did the ban on editorializing violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Yes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, "since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity," Congress must use the First Amendment to "inform and give shape" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."

Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260 (1988)

ADVOCATES Leslie D. Edwards Argued the cause for the respondents Robert P. Baine, Jr. Argued the cause for the petitioners Facts of the case The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court. Question Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION FOR HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

The Alien and Sedition Acts 1798-99

Alien and Sedition Acts A series of laws in response to French foreign threat These laws included new powers to deport foreigners as well as making it harder for new immigrants to vote Sedition Act → prohibited public opposition to the government Important to note the distinction between freedom of the press and freedom of speech Made it a crime to "write, print, utter, or publish...any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings" that would have the effect of bringing officeholders "into contempt or disrepute" in the opinion of "the good people of the United States." Also provided that those charged were absolved if they could prove the truth of what they had asserted in their publications (differs from English Common Law)

Blackstone on libel (from Commentaries)

Blackstone on Libel Libel → defamation, destroying someone's reputation Criminal Libel (seditious) → defame government official Publication could be punished for being seditious even if what it stated was true

Brutus Essays I-II (hand out)

Brutus Essays I-II Fears the scope of power in constitution - there will be none left for the states Wants tax allocation for states and to limit the tax power of federal government

Brutus, Essays, XI, XV

Brutus Essays XI, XV XI → concerned with judicial review XV → gives Courts too much power - should be elected or not - power of judicial review

Sherbert v Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)

CITATION 374 US 398 (1963) ARGUED Apr 24, 1963 DECIDED Jun 17, 1963 Facts of the case Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday. Question Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR SHERBERT John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Earl Warren Earl Warren Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark Arthur J. Goldberg Arthur J. Goldberg The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from setting unemployment benefits eligibility requirements such that a person cannot properly observe key religious principles. In a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right. Justices Douglas and Stewart concurred in separate opinions. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that Seventh-Day Adventist was unavailable for Saturday work just as anyone who refuses Saturday work for personal reasons is unavailable, and that the effect of the Court's decision was to require South Carolina to make an exception in favor of those whose unavailability for work stems from religious convictions.

Declaration of Independence

Contrasts with Winthrop's Puritanism Enlightenment → law of nature differens, man with man (not God), purpose of community is preserving individual rights - securing them Law of nature more like Hobbes - solitary

Edwards v South Carolina 372 U.S. (1963)

Facts of the case 187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law. Question Did the arrests and convictions of the marchers violate their freedom of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of their grievances as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR EDWARDS The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Free Petition Clause to extend to the states as well as the federal government. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court reversed the criminal convictions of the black students. It was clear to the Court that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the students under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the state infringed the students' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances. Justice Clark dissented.

Cohen v California 403 U.S. 15 (1970)

Facts of the case A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "**** THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail. Question Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "**** the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR COHEN Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).

Hill v Colorado 530 U.S. 703 (2000)

Facts of the case A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment. Question Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Gooding v Wilson 405 U.S. 518 (1972)

Facts of the case A Georgia state court convicted Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Georgia statute prohibiting the use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace" violate the First Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-2 DECISION Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Quoting Speiser v. Randall, the Court noted that "the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than (Georgia) has supplied." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented. He disagreed with not only the manner in which the majority reached its decision, but also its conclusion. Ultimately, he argued that the statute was narrowly tailored and did not suppress or deter "important protected speech." Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He found it implausible that a state could not restrict speech that was as wildly offensive as in this case.

Edwards v Aguillard 482 U.S. 578 (1987

Facts of the case A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well. Question Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science" along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."

Globe Newspaper Co. v Superior Court 457 U.S. 596 (1982))

Facts of the case A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial. Question Did the Massachusetts law violate the First Amendment's freedom of press guarantee as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-2 DECISION FOR GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.

Mueller v Allen 463 U.S. 388 (1983)

Facts of the case A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions. Question Did the law violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor No. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.

Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness 452 U.S. 640 (1981)

Facts of the case A Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair. Question May a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, confine religious organizations wishing to sell and distribute religious literature at a state fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR HEFFRON Using the "valid time, manner, and place" criteria which the Court employs to assess government restrictions of First Amendment activities, the Court held that Rule 6.05 did not violate the Constitution. Since the rule was applied equally to all groups wanting to solicit at the fairgrounds, not making restrictions based on the content of a group's message, and because the state had an important interest in "protecting the safety and convenience" of the fair's patrons, Justice White argued that the rule's restrictions were legitimate. Allowing all religious, nonreligious, and commercial groups to move about the grounds distributing literature and soliciting funds would result in "widespread disorder" which would be potentially dangerous to the fair's visitors.

Nebraska Press Assoc. v Stuart 427 U.S. 539 (1976)

Facts of the case A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused. Question Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NEBRASKA PRESS ASSOC. MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

Wooley v Maynard 430 U.S. 705 (1977)

Facts of the case A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto "Live Free or Die." George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words "or Die" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence. Question Did the New Hampshire law unconstitutionally interfere with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates. The Court found that the statute in question effectively required individuals to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." The Court held that the State's interests in requiring the motto did not outweigh free speech principles under the First Amendment, including "the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster. . .an idea they find morally objectionable."

Cox v New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

Facts of the case A New Hampshire state statute prohibited parades, processions, and open-air gatherings in public spaces without a special license granted by the town selectman or licensing body. On July 8, 1939, Willis Cox, Walter Chaplinsky, John Konides and nearly 80 others gathered in a hall in Manchester, New Hampshire with the purpose of conducting an "information march" during which they would carry signs and hand out leaflets. The group did not apply for a permit. They were convicted in municipal court for violating the statute prohibiting unlicensed parades. The Superior Court conducted a new trial before a jury that also found the defendants guilty, and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the conviction. Question Does the New Hampshire state statute that prohibits unlicensed parades violate the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that a municipality's ability to impose regulations that create order and safety for its populace does not infringe on the civil liberties of its people. Because the statute in question only grants a town selectman or licensing board the limited authority to ensure that a proposed parade will not interfere with the proper uses of streets, there is not opportunity for it to wield undue or arbitrary power that would infringe on constitutional rights. The Court also held that there was no evidence that the statute had been administered unfairly in this case.

Everson v Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

Facts of the case A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds. Question Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR BOARD OF EDUCATION The New Jersey law reimbursing parents for transportation costs to parochial schools did not violate the Establishment Clause Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black Robert H. Jackson Robert H. Jackson Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Wiley B. Rutledge Wiley B. Rutledge Harold Burton Harold Burton Fred M. Vinson, Jr. Fred M. Vinson, Jr. Stanley Reed Stanley Reed Frank Murphy Frank Murphy William O. Douglas William O. Douglas A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school. Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissented.

New York v Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1983)

Facts of the case A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances. Question Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NEW YORK No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.

Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District 509 U.S. 384 (1994)

Facts of the case A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court. Question Did the District violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel the use of school premises to show religious-oriented films? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR LAMB'S CHAPEL Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.

Posadas de PR Associates v Tourism Co of PR 478 U.S. 328 (1986)

Facts of the case A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists. Question Did the law violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION 5-4 DECISION No. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a "substantial government interest." The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.

*Gregg v Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

Facts of the case A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina . Question Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY POTTER STEWART Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders

Hustler Magazine v Falwell 485 U.S. 46 (1988)

Facts of the case A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Question Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST First Amendment free speech guarantees protect parodies of public figures from being civilly liable for intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.

Boos v Barry 485 U.S. 312 (1988)

Facts of the case A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to "bring that government into public odium or public disrepute." Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy. Question Did the District of Columbia Code violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 6-3 DECISION FOR BOOS District of Columbia Code § 22-1115's display clause facially violates the First Amendment. 5-3 DECISION FOR BARRY District of Columbia Code § 22-1115's congregation clause does not facially violate the First Amendment. The Court found that the Code's restriction on sign displays violated the First Amendment while the ban on congregations did not. First, Justice O'Connor argued that the prohibition on signs failed to meet the high standards that the Court uses when evaluating the content-based regulation of political speech in a public forum. The "dignity" standard that the Code used was similar to the "outrageousness" standard which the Court found unconstitutional in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) because it was too subjective. Second, O'Connor reasoned that since the language of the ban on congregations was narrowly drawn and could only be acted upon by the police in situations where a threat to security or peace were present, it did not prohibit peaceful gatherings.

Braunfeld v Brown 3667 U.S. 599 (1961)

Facts of the case Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law. Question Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Earl Warren Earl Warren Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Charles E. Whittaker Charles E. Whittaker Potter Stewart Potter Stewart In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.

Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984)

Facts of the case According to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law. Question Did Minnesota's attempts to enforce the anti-discrimination law violate the Jaycees' right to free association under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR ROBERTS Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR ROBERTS Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked "the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.

*Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Facts of the case Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari. Question Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-1 DECISION FOR KATZ John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Earl Warren Earl Warren Abe Fortas Abe Fortas Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Virginia Pharmacy Bd v Virginia Cons Coun. 425 U.S. 748 (1976)

Facts of the case Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review. Question Is a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices by licensed pharmacists a violation of "commercial speech" under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-1 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY HARRY A. BLACKMUN Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.

Adamson v California 332 U.S. 46 (1947)

Facts of the case Adamson was convicted in California of murder in the first degree. During the trial, the prosecutor, in accordance with a California law, made comments to the jury which highlighted Adamson's decision not to testify on his own behalf. Question Is a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against himself applicable in state courts and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? Conclusion A divided Court found that the the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not extend to defendants a Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against themselves in state courts. Citing past decisions such as Twining v. New Jersey (1908), which explicitly denied the application of the due process clause to the right against self-incrimination, and Palko v. Connecticut (1937), Justice Reed argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend carte blanche all of the immunities and privileges of the first ten amendments to individuals at the state level. In a lengthy dissent which included a deep investigation of the Fourteenth Amendment's history, Justice Black argued for the absolute and complete application of the Bill of Rights to the states.

Richmond Newspapers Inc. v Virginia 448 U.S. 368 (1980)

Facts of the case After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action. Question Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-1 DECISION FOR RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS INC. Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."

Branzburg v Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972)

Facts of the case After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. Question Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

NAACP v Alabama 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

Facts of the case Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists. Question Did Alabama's requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE John M. Harlan II Harlan Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Earl Warren Warren Tom C. Clark Clark Felix Frankfurter Frankfurter Charles E. Whittaker Whittaker Harold Burton Burton In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Young v Mini Theatres 427 U.S. 50 (1976)

Facts of the case American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Question (1): Did Detroit's 1972 ordinances violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2): Did the ordinances qualify as a restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR COLEMAN YOUNG MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS No and no. In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. Justice John Paul Stevens doubted that Voltaire's observation - "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" - applied to pornographic films. This prompted a stinging rebuke from Justice Potter Stewart who maintained that the free expression is neither defined nor circumscribed by popular opinion.

Wallace v Jaffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985)

Facts of the case An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile. Question Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Massachusetts v Davis 162 Mass 510 (1895); affirmed 167 U.S. 43 (1897)

Facts of the case An ordinance in the City of Boston prohibited any person from making "any public address" on public grounds without permission of the mayor. In 1894, Rev. William F. Davis attempted to preach in Boston Commons, a public park. Davis was arrested, fined, and jailed for violating the ordinance. Davis appealed his conviction, arguing, in part, that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause's protection of property entailed a right to access public property. On appeal, in an opinion authored by future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rejected Davis' contention and denied his claim. Question Did Davis' arrest for violating the city ordinance banning addresses on public property violate his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property? Conclusion No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Edward D. White, the Court found the law did not contain "any proof whatever as to the nature of the ownership in the common from which it can be deduced that the plaintiff...had any particular right to use the common apart from the general enjoyment." The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the legislature and the state had the power to exercise authority over public property, the Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding. "The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not destroy the power of the states to enact police regulations as to the subjects within their control."

Bartnicki v Vopper 532 U.S. 514 (2001)

Facts of the case An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake. Question Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. "In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance," wrote Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern." Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the "debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."

Rankin v McPherson 483 U.S. 378 (1987)

Facts of the case Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson. Question Did the Constable's action infringe upon McPherson's freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.

Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v Bennett 131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011)

Facts of the case Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech. The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found "minimal" impact on freedom of speech. Question Does the First Amendment prohibit linking the funds participating candidates receive in an election to the amount of money raised by or spent on behalf of their opponents? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB FREEDOM CLUB PAC, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor Elena Kagan Elena Kagan Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny," the chief justice writing for the majority, noted that the holding does not contend that the First Amendment forbids all public financing. Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate," Kagan argued, adding: "Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.'"

Brown v Entertainment Merchants Ass'n 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011)

Facts of the case Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective. Question Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.

Bethel School District No. 403 v Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986)

Facts of the case At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days. Question Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."

Barron v Baltimore 7 Peters 243 (1833)

Facts of the case Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down. Question Does the Fifth Amendment deny the states as well as the national government the right to take private property for public use without justly compensating the property's owner? Conclusion DECISION FOR MAYOR OF BALTIMORE The provisions of the first eight amendments applied only to the national government, not to the states Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the development of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) as an exclusive check on the federal government, Marshall reasoned that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. This meant that Barron was not entitled to damages for his property loss from the city under the Fifth Amendment provision on just compensation for a government taking.

Virginia v Black 538 U.S.343 (2003)

Facts of the case Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech. Question Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR VIRGINIA MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie-evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

City of Los Angeles v Alameda Books, INC. 535 U.S. 425 (2002)

Facts of the case Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime. Question May a city rely on a study it conducted to demonstrate whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR CITY OF LOS ANGELES PLURALITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Yes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the city of Los Angeles may reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the present version of section 12.70(C) to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interest in reducing crime. Three other Justices joined in this holding. Concurring, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded that Los Angeles may impose its regulation in the exercise of the zoning authority, and that the city is not, at least, to be foreclosed by summary judgment. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Souter argued that the 1977 study, while pursuing a policy of dispersing adult establishments, evolved to a policy of breaking-up combined bookstores/video arcades, for which the study's evidence was insufficient.

Bob Jones University v United States 461 U.S. 574 (1983)

Facts of the case Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution. Question Can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clauses? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."

Brandenburg v Ohio 394 U.S. 444 (1969)

Facts of the case Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Question Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Kovacs v Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949)

Facts of the case Charles Kovacs was driven around Trenton, New Jersey. He played music and spoke through an amplifier that he had placed on the truck in which he was riding. He was convicted for violating Ordinance No. 430 of the City of Trenton, which prohibited the use of sound amplifiers and other instruments that emitted "loud and raucous noises" on public streets. He appealed his conviction to the New Jersey Supreme Court, alleging that the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld his conviction, as did the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals. Question Did Trenton's Ordinance 430 violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 decision, the court affirmed the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals and upheld Kovacs' conviction. Writing for the three-justice plurality, Justice Stanley F. Reed reiterated that the "fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute", and as in Saia v. New York, "the hours and place of public discussion can be controlled." Trenton was granted the authority to prevent "disturbing noises" and "protect the wellbeing and tranquility of a community." Since the ordinance furthered Trenton's interest in maintaining "the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers," the ordinance did not violate the Free Speech Clause. Justices Robert H. Jackson and Felix Frankfurter each concurred separately.

Whitney v California 274 U.S. 357 (1927)

Facts of the case Charlotte Anita Whitney, a founding member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for helping to organize a group that sought to effect economic and political change through the unlawful use of violence. Whitney argued that she had not intended the organization to act this way and did not plan to aid it in those objectives. She claimed the California law violated the First Amendment. Question Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court held that the state, in exercise of its police power, can punish those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other words, words with a "bad tendency" can be punished. Writing a separate concurrence, Justice Louis Brandeis, joined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued that restrictions on government action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not extend to situations in which speech creates a clear and present danger of an evil outcome. The actions that the defendant took posed only a remote potential harm to the public, and she was involved only in contributing to the preparation of the actions. To satisfy the clear and present danger standard, the risk of harm must be severe, probable, and imminent. Broad statements advocating for revolution at some indefinite date in the future are protected by the First Amendment. Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred rather than dissented because the record showed evidence of a criminal conspiracy, which meant review was inappropriate without proof that constitutional rights were infringed during the criminal trial.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)

Facts of the case Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her. Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply. Question Does the ministerial exception, which prohibits most employment-related lawsuits against religious organizations by employees performing religious functions, apply to a teacher at a religious elementary school who teaches the full secular curriculum, but also teaches daily religion classes, is a commissioned minister, and regularly leads students in prayer and worship? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor Elena Kagan Elena Kagan Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act's ministerial exception, dismissing Perich's suit and her claims for damages. Chief Justice Roberts described the history of the "ministerial exception", established by courts to prevent state interference with the governance of churches, a violation of the First Amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. He rejected the EEOC and Perich's argument that these clauses of the First Amendment are irrelevant to Hosanna-Tabor's right to choose its ministers. Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Perich indeed functioned as a minister in her role at Hosanna-Tabor, in part because Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister with a role distinct from that of its lay teachers. He also noted that Perich held herself to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Perich performed secular duties in her position and that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as Perich, but reasoned that Perich's status as a commissioned minister outweighed these secular aspects of her job. He also rejected the EEOC and Perich's suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor's religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual, explaining that the purpose of the ministerial exception is not limited to hiring and firing decisions made for religious reasons.

Police Department v Mosley 408 U.S. 92 (1972)

Facts of the case Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; the law made an exception for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting "black discrimination." Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Question Does the Chicago ordinance violate the freedom of speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION The exemption for labor picketing violated the equal protection clause. Government regulation of message content is presumed unconstitutional unless there are compelling justifications. And regulations that selectively exclude speakers from a public forum must undergo careful judicial examination to ensure the minimal degree of furthering an important government interest. Mosley fashions an important principle from the values of freedom and equality: equal freedom of expression.

Citizens United v FEC 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)

Facts of the case Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim. Question 1) Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional? 2) Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements because they are protected "political speech" and not subject to regulation as "campaign speech"? 3) If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA? 4) Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and therefore be subject to regulation under the BCRA? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION FOR FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY The BCRA's restrictions on advertisements regarding Citizens United's film "Hillary" do not violate the First Amendment. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor 5-4 DECISION FOR CITIZENS UNITED MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, despite the speaker's corporate identity. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions. In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.

Gideon v Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1965)

Facts of the case Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief. Question Does the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal cases extend to felony defendants in state courts? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR CLARENCE EARL GIDEON The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived. Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Clark and Harlan concurred in separate decisions.

Reed v Town of Gilbert 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)

Facts of the case Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication. Question Does an ordinance restricting the size, number, duration, and location of temporary directional signs violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR REED, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS The Sign Code's provisions are content-based regulations of speech that do not survive strict scrutiny. Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny because they were content-based restrictions, or restrictions that were applied differently depending on the message of the sign. Because these restrictions were content-based on their face, the Court need not examine justifications or the government's motives in determining whether the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Despite the Town of Gilbert's argument that the restrictions do not single out a specific nonprofit or church but restrict all, the Court stated that the First Amendment prohibits censorship of all speech on a whole topic. The Court also held that the restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny because they had no compelling interest in adding restrictions to only a certain type of sign. In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that this decision does not preclude towns from continuing to regulate signs, but it does stop them from restricting them in an unconstitutional manner. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that content discrimination should have been the consideration and legal analysis, and that this case did not trigger strict scrutiny. The presumption against constitutionality is too strong to use automatically and was unnecessary in this case as there was another, more appropriate method of analysis available. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that constantly using strict scrutiny to judge government-regulated communication is too restrictive and would water down the meaning of strict scrutiny. The risk that the government will limit the public's ability to debate ideas with these regulations is very low and does not warrant strict scrutiny. In this case, the restrictions were not brought on by any reason or need, and so they did not pass any level of scrutiny. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the concurrence in the judgment.

Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union II 542 U.S. 656 (2004)

Facts of the case Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used "community standards" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most "puritanical" communities from being displayed in more "tolerant" ones. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the "community standards" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation. The Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the "strict scrutiny" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally "overbroad" - that is, it applied to too much protected material. Question Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

United States v American Library Association 539 U.S. 134 (2003)

Facts of the case Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment. Question Does Congress have the authority to require libraries to censor internet content in order to receive federal funding? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 6-3 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES PLURALITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST The Children's Internet Protection Act does not require libraries to violate the Constitution. William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer 6-3 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES PLURALITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST The Children's Internet Protection Act does not violate the First Amendment. William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

Rubin v Coors Brewing CO. 514 U.S. 476 (1995)

Facts of the case Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act's (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent "strength wars" among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol. The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars. Question Does the Federal Alcohol Administration Act's prohibition of displaying alcohol content on beer labels violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest the government intended to protect by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the "strength wars" of competing beer companies, which could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring opinion emphasizing the regulation is unconstitutionality of the regulation because it did not increase consumer awareness, but instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.

Widmar v Vincent 454 U.S. 263 (1981)

Facts of the case Cornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events. In January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone's application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching. On December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university's Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone's members. It concluded that the university's ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment's establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students' free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri's compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the university's regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university's First Amendment obligations. Question Did the refusal of the University of Missouri to accommodate voluntary student religious meetings violate Cornerstone members' rights of equal access to a public forum protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Did the refusal of the University of Missouri to accommodate Cornerstone's religious meetings unconstitutionally abridge freedoms of speech, association, and exercise of religion? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. Yes and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court held that the university's policy violated Cornerstone members' First Amendment rights. He reasoned that when the university opened its facilities to student meetings, it created a public forum for those student groups; given no other justification, the university excluded Cornerstone based on the content of its members' speech. While acknowledging the university's obligation to comply with its constitutional obligations, Justice Powell agreed with the Eighth Circuit that a neutral policy toward religion would achieve this end. Justice Powell argued that any religious benefits from an open forum would be incidental because the forum was available to a broad class of both religious and nonreligious speakers and because the university was not showing approval of a particular religious sect or practice. Justice Powell rejected the university's argument that the Missouri Constitution compelled it to exclude Cornerstone, noting that Cornerstone's First Amendment interests outweighed this state interest through the supremacy clause. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He rejected the majority's description of the university's student meetings policy as the creation of a public forum, but agreed that the university failed to justify its refusal to allow Cornerstone to worship on campus. Justice Byron White dissented. He rejected the argument that the university created a public forum, but also suggested that the university's fear of appearing to subsidize religion was too extreme. He balanced the state's interest in enforcing its regulation with the burden on Cornerstone's members' ability to freely exercise their beliefs, concluding that the burden on Cornerstone was minimal.

United States v O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968)

Facts of the case David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. Question Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-1 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."

*Mapp v Ohio 367 U.S. 343 (1961)

Facts of the case Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Question Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR DOLLREE MAPP John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Earl Warren Earl Warren Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Charles E. Whittaker Charles E. Whittaker In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule. Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart concurred. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.

Dun and Bradstreet v Greenmoss Builders Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985)

Facts of the case Dun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders "continued in business as usual." Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Gertz only applied to cases involving defamation by the media. Question If a trial judge does not instruct the jury to only award punitive damages caused by intentional slander or reckless conduct, can a jury still award punitive damages to a plaintiff defamed by private speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Yes. Justice Lewis Powell authored the opinion for a 5-4 court. Although the trial court correctly perceived that the trial judge's instructions did not satisfy the requirements of Gertz, the Court held that Gertz did not apply since the present case did not involve public speech. Instead the Court looked to apply the logic of Gertz to situations concerning private speech. The Court reasoned that laws regulating defamation suits aimed to "balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type [Bradstreet's] of expression." Because the First Amendment offers less protection to private speech than to public speech, and especially less to speech "being solely motived by a desire for profit," damages caused by it can result in heavier penalties and broader conditions for convictions. Therefore states can allow the recovery of punitive damages in defamation cases involving private speech even when the perpetrator does not demonstrate "actual malice."

Schenck v United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919)

Facts of the case During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment. Question Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech? UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR UNITED STATES The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment does not shield advocacy urging conduct deemed unlawful under the Espionage Act The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress' wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the "clear and present danger test," Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.

FCC v Pacifica Foundation 438 U.S. 726 (1978)

Facts of the case During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, ****, ****, ********er, mother****er, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son. Question Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION FOR FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS 5-4 DECISION FOR FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

New York Times v Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

Facts of the case During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed. Question Did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, "malice" had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.

United States v Lee 455 U.S. 252 (1982)

Facts of the case Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes. Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund. Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community's elderly and needy citizens. Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government. The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied. The court also noted that §1402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal. Question Can the U.S. government require payment of Social Security taxes from those who religiously object to the receipt of the attached benefits? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR UNITED STATES MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR UNITED STATES MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Yes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the §1402(g) exemption only applied to self-employed individuals, not employers and employees like those involved in this case. The Court held that the tax was not unconstitutional as applied. By becoming an employer, Lee entered into commercial activity and accepted certain limits on the exercise of his beliefs. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, stating that the tax objector has the burden of showing that there is a unique reason for allowing an exemption from a valid law when the objectors religious obligation and civic obligation are irreconcilable.

Marsh v Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983)

Facts of the case Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Does the chaplaincy practice of the Nebraska legislature violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR MARSH Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."

Debs v United States 249 U.S. 211 (1919)

Facts of the case Eugene Debs delivered a public speech that incited his audience to interfere with military recruitment during World War I. He was indicted for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 for allegedly attempting to cause insubordination and refusal of duty in the US military. He was also accused of attempted obstruction recruitment and enlistment. He appealed his conviction on First Amendment grounds. Question Did Debs' conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 violate his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court upheld Debs's conviction. The Court reasoned that Debs's case was similar to Schenck v. United States (1919), in which the Court had concluded that the arrest of an individual for distributing leaflets encouraging readers to oppose the draft was constitutional. The Court found Debs's sympathy for individuals convicted of opposing the draft and obstructing recruitment analogous to the situation in Schenck. Thus, his conviction was valid.

Terminiello v Chicago 337 U.S. 1 (1949)

Facts of the case Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot. Question Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."

Palko v Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 (1937)

Facts of the case Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Question Does Palko's second conviction violate the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because this protection applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR CONNECTICUT Protection against double jeopardy is not a fundamental right and thus falls outside constitutional protection The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.

Burson v Freeman 504 U.S. 19 (1992))

Facts of the case Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari. Question Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION FOR BURSON PLURALITY OPINION BY HARRY A. BLACKMUN No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.

Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v Minn. Commissioner of Revenue 460 U.S. 575 (1983)]

Facts of the case From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax. Question Did the taxing scheme enacted by the Minnesota legislature violate the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 8-1 DECISION FOR MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRIBUNE COMPANY MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor 8-1 DECISION FOR MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRIBUNE COMPANY MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor The Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had "created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment." Noting that there was "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment," the Court held that when states single out the press "the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." The Court concluded that "recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme."

Duncan v Louisiana 391 U.S. 145 (1968)

Facts of the case Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied. Question Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in criminal cases such as Duncan's? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR DUNCAN Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision.

Reynolds v United States 98 U.S. 145 (1878)

Facts of the case George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Question Is religious duty or belief a defense to a criminal charge? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR UNITED STATES The federal anti-bigamy statute does not violate the religious Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Morrison R. Waite Morrison R. Waite Nathan Clifford Nathan Clifford Noah Swayne Noah Swayne Samuel F. Miller Samuel F. Miller Stephen J. Field Stephen J. Field William Strong William Strong Joseph P. Bradley Joseph P. Bradley Ward Hunt Ward Hunt John M. Harlan John M. Harlan The Court upheld Reynolds's conviction and Congress's power to prohibit polygamy. The Court held that while Congress could not outlaw a belief in the correctness of polygamy, it could outlaw the practice thereof. The majority reasoned that while marriage is a "sacred obligation," it is nevertheless "usually regulated by law" in "most civilized nations." Finally, the Court held that people cannot avoid a law due to their religion.

Rosenbloom v Metromedia 403 U.S. 29 (1971)

Facts of the case George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words "allegedly" or "reportedly" in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors "girlie look peddlers" and "smut distributors". Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges. Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied. Question (1) Should the knowingly and recklessly false standard for defamatory statements apply to private individuals? (2) If so, is the evidence presented at trial enough to support the damages originally awarded to Rosenbloom? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION In a 5-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the judgment of the court affirming the Third Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence, stating that the First Amendment protected the news media from libel judgments even where the broadcaster knows their statements were false. Justice Byron R. White also wrote a special concurrence, asserting that the press have the privilege to comment on official actions of public servants, such as the police, in full detail. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, expressing that states should be free to impose a duty of reasonable care in defamation actions involving private citizens. He would remand the case for further consideration of whether Rosenbloom sustained actual harm and whether Metromedia acted with actual malice. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissent, stating that the court should limit damages in libel actions by private citizens to actual losses. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

Gertz v Welch 418 U.S. 323 (1974)

Facts of the case Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling. Question Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 7-2 DECISION FOR GERTZ MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. The recklessness standard of New York Times v. Sullivan does not apply to defamation suits against news organizations by private individuals 5-4 DECISION FOR GERTZ MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. For private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media but any standard of fault lower than recklessness limits private individuals to awards for actual injury. The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state liable laws involving private individuals and the news media.

Gitlow v New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925)

Facts of the case Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a "Left Wing Manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York's Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state. Question Does the First Amendment prevent a state from punishing political speech that directly advocates the government's violent overthrow? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NEW YORK Freedoms of speech and press apply to to the states 7-2 DECISION FOR NEW YORK The Free Speech Clause does not shield Gitlow from the New York statute In an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications. Despite the small scale of Gitlow's actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too insignificant to have an impact. The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states. In dissent, Justice Olver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow's call to action was abstract and would not resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient imminence to warrant punishing the speech.

Goldman v Weinberger 475 U.S. 503 (1983)

Facts of the case Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties." Question Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.

Spence v Washington 418 U.S, 405 (1974)

Facts of the case Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence's argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. Question Does the Washington statute violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology DECISION FOR SPENCE PER CURIAM OPINION curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that that statute, as applied, violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that Spence's display was symbolic speech entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that each state should decide how the American flag should be protected. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, expressing that states have an interest in protecting the American flag as an important symbol of national unity. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Adderly v Florida 385 U.S. 39 (1966)

Facts of the case Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so. Question Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.

Lehman v Shaker Heights 418 U.S. 298 (1974)

Facts of the case Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision. Question Did Shaker Heights' policy against political advertising on its streetcars violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY HARRY A. BLACKMUN No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Ohio and found no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun asserted that "no First Amendment forum is here to be found," as the streetcars did not qualify as a "public thoroughfare." Accordingly, the city "need not accept every proffer of advertising." The city could reject certain types of advertising as long as the policies were not "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious." Given the "reasonable legislative objectives" of minimizing "chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience," Shaker Heights' policy was not unconstitutional.

Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins 447 U.S. 74 (1980)

Facts of the case High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities. Question Did PruneYard's regulations violate the students' free speech rights? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens UNANIMOUS DECISION Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.

Abrams v United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919)

Facts of the case In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against Soviet Russia. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Question Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES The convictions under the Espionage Act satisfied the "clear and present danger" test. The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress' determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government's viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which he concluded did not meet the "clear and present danger" test.

Hague v CIO 307 U.S. 496 (1939)

Facts of the case In 1937, the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) gathered in New Jersey to initiate a recruitment drive. Police shut down the meeting based on a city ordinance that forbade labor meetings in public. Arguing that the ordinance violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of assembly, the CIO filed suit against several city officials. A District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed and invalidated the ordinance. Question Did enforcement of the Jersey City ordinance violate the CIO's right to assembly under the First Amendment? Conclusion In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Owen J. Roberts, the Court concluded that the actions taken by police violated the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The public long has used streets and parks to assemble and transmit ideas and speech on issues of public concern. Thus, the ordinances were void. Justices Stone, Reed, and Hughes concurred. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented.

United Public Workers v Mitchell 330 U.S. 75 (1947)

Facts of the case In 1940, Congress enacted the Hatch Act, which made it illegal for any officer or employee of the executive branch of the federal government to take an active role in political management or political campaigns. The appellants sued the members of the United States Civil Service Commission, responsible for enforcing the Hatch Act, and sought an injunction against the enforcement of the provisions of the Act regulating political action. They argued that section of the Act was unconstitutional. None of the appellants, with the exception of George Poole, were facing disciplinary action for violating the Act. The district court held the section in question constitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was not docketed until more than 60 days after the appeal was allowed. The appellees argued that, because the proper appeals process was not followed, the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the case. Question Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over an appeal that was not docketed within 60 days from the time the appeal was allowed? (1) Does the case present a justiciable issue if only one of the appellants was accused of violating the Act? (2) Does the Hatch Act unconstitutionally restrict the rights of employees of the federal government? Conclusion Yes, yes, no. Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the 4-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Court can still hear a case that was not docketed within the appropriate amount of time if dismissal procedures are not followed. The case does present a justiciable issue but only with respect to the appellant who was facing disciplinary action, because the Court cannot rule on hypothetical denials of rights. The Court also held that Congress has historically had the right to reasonably limit the political conduct of its employees to promote integrity in the performance of duties. In his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal was not filed during the 60-day period. However, on the merits of the case, he joins in the plurality's opinion. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the section of the Act in question deprived a large number of federal employees of their constitutional rights to fully participate in elections. He also argued that it was the interest of a democratic government to encourage maximum political activity from as many people as possible. Justice Wiley B. Rutledge dissented from the plurality's decision as it applies to George Poole for the same reasons as those stated by Justice Black. However, he did not think that this case was an appropriate one for addressing the broader constitutional issues. In his partial dissent, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that all of the appellants present justiciable issues, not just Poole, and that the plurality's opinion should have considered their claims. He also argued that there should be a distinction drawn between administrative employees, who have roles that may be affected by partisanship, and industrial workers, whose jobs do not vary based on the party in power. Justice Frank Murphy and Justice Robert H. Jackson did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette

Facts of the case In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency. Question Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR BARNETTE Compelling school children to salute the flag violates freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment Robert H. Jackson Robert H. Jackson Harlan Fiske Stone Harlan Fiske Stone Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Frank Murphy Frank Murphy Wiley B. Rutledge Wiley B. Rutledge Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Owen J. Roberts Owen J. Roberts Stanley Reed Stanley Reed In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity. Justices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions. Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law.

Dennis v United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951)

Facts of the case In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction. Question Did the Smith Act violate the First Amendment? Conclusion 6-2 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES The convictions based on the Smith Act did not violate the First Amendment despite the fact that the defendants advocated violent overthrow of the government In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. "No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids."

Time Inc. v Hill 385 U.S. 374 (1967)

Facts of the case In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari. Question Is a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR TIME INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. Absent proof that Time, Inc. published the report with knowledge of its falsity, speech and press protections precluded the application of the statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest. Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.

NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co. 458 U.S. 886 (1982)

Facts of the case In 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and "threats" to carryout the boycott. Question Are the nonviolent elements of the petitioners' activities entitled to the protection of the First Amendment? (1) If so, is a protest liable in damages caused by the nonviolent, protected activity? Conclusion UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE Yes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the nonviolent elements of the protesters' activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. In this case, the members of the NAACP exercised their First Amendment right of speech, assembly, and petition in a nonviolent way to bring about social change. The NAACP is not liable in damages for the consequences of their nonviolent activity and the damages cannot be recovered because the violence or threats of violence were not a proximate cause of the business losses. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Zurcher v Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547 (1978)

Facts of the case In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant. Question Did the search of The Daily's newsroom violate the First and Fourth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION FOR ZURCHER MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."

Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence 468 U.S. 288 (1984)

Facts of the case In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request. Question Did the National Park Service regulations violate the First Amendment by curtailing symbolic speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR CLARK In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.

Texas v Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989)

Facts of the case In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. Question Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Sable Communications Inc. v FCC 492 U.S. 115 (1989)

Facts of the case In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones. Question Did the amended Communications Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 3 >> 6-3 DECISION 8-1 DECISION The Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.

Eichman v United States 496 U.S. 310 (1990)

Facts of the case In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together. Question Did the Act violate freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION In a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC 512 U.S. 622 (1994)

Facts of the case In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels. Question Are the must-carry rules content-based and thus a violation of the cable companies' First Amendment right to free speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.

Capitol Square Review Board v Pinette 115 Sct. 2440 (1995)

Facts of the case In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds. Question Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Capitol Square Review Board v Pinette 515 U.S. 753 (1995)

Facts of the case In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds. Question Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston 515 U.S. 557 (1995)

Facts of the case In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech. Question Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR HURLEY MAJORITY OPINION BY DAVID H. SOUTER William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

FCC v Fox Television 129 S Ct. 1800 (2009)

Facts of the case In 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to "fleeting" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was "arbitrary and capricious" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful. Question Is the FCC's order imposing liability on Fox Television Stations for fleeting expletives spoken during two nationally broadcast awards ceremonies "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act, based on the FCC's previous acceptance of similar expletives? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR NO. 07-582 TITLE: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA No. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's order was neither "arbitrary" nor "capricious." Justice Antonin G. Scalia announced the judgment of the court in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in part, reasoning that the FCC need not prove that its change in policy is "better" than its prior stance. Rather, the FCC need merely prove that its new policy is "permissible" and that there are good reasons for it, as in this case. Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that when the FCC changes policy, such that it reverses its own precedent, it should explain why. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the FCC need explain why it changed its policy and disagreed that the word "indecent" allowed the FCC to punish the broadcast of "any" expletive that has a "sexual or excretory origin." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also dissented. She noted, that while the First Amendment issues surrounding the case were not addressed, they "cast a shadow", and the Court should be mindful that words "unpalatable to some may be commonplace for others." Lastly, Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. He argued that the FCC failed to adequately explain why it changed its policy and thus its order with respect to the Fox Television Stations was "arbitrary" and "capricious."

McCutcheon v FEC 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)

Facts of the case In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation. Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a "cognizable government interest" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit. Question Is the two-year aggregate campaign contribution limit constitutional under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR MCCUTCHEON PLURALITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. The limit is unconstitutional. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor Elena Kagan Elena Kagan No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the aggregate limit did little to address the concerns that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was meant to address and at the same time limited participation in the democratic process. Because the aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the "rigorous" standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional. The aggregate limit also prevents a donor from contributing beyond a specific amount to more than a certain number of candidates, which may force him to choose which interests he can seek to advance in a given election. The plurality held that the collective interest in combating corruption can only be pursued as long as it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual's freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit is not sufficiently closely tailored to accomplish this goal. The plurality also noted that there are many other means by which the government may fight election corruption without setting an aggregate limit on campaign contributions. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, a previous case dealing with limits on campaign contributions, should be overruled because it denigrates the core values of the First Amendment. Because the reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo could not sufficiently justify using a standard lower than strict scrutiny to examine limits on campaign contributions, Justice Thomas wrote that Buckley should be overruled and the BCRA should be subject to strict scrutiny. In his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the plurality's opinion misconstrues the nature of competing constitutional issues and destroys campaign finance laws, which causes great harm to the democratic process. Justice Breyer argued that the plurality's opinion was based on a definition of corruption that is too narrow to be effective. He went on to state the reasoning that the aggregate limit is faulty is because there is no substantial mismatch between Congress' goal of combating corruption and the means established to achieve it. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Agency for International Development v Alliance for Open Society International 133 S. Ct 2321 (2013)

Facts of the case In 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act ("the Act"). Through the Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act's funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations' speech and forcing them to promote the government's viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does a requirement that non-governmental organizations institute an explicit anti-prostitution policy in order to receive federal funding violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-2 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito Sonia Sotomayor Sotomayor Elena Kagan Kagan Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the majority opinion. The Court held 6-2 that the government may not use funding and the threat of the loss of funding as a method for the regulation of speech and policies of non-governmental organizations. Because the Act's funding provisions represent an ongoing condition on the actions of the group receiving funding, the provisions essentially act as government coercion. The Court held that the funding provisions require the groups to accept the beliefs of the government, which infringes on their First Amendment rights. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the government has the right to choose to give financial support only to groups which share its views on how to address a particular issue. The fact that the government must often choose among many policy options does not mean that the government is coercing groups to adopt its views. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision in this case.

Tinker v Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503 (1969)

Facts of the case In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. Question Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR TINKER John M. Harlan II Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)

Facts of the case In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA. The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling. Question Does the application of Colorado's public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about same-sex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY The Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause. Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Elena Kagan Elena Kagan Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Neil Gorsuch Neil Gorsuch Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor The Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court explained that while gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Constitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression. The Colorado law at issue in this case, which prohibited discrimination against gay people in purchasing products and services, had to be applied in a neutral manner with regard to religion. The majority acknowledged that from Phillips' perspective, creating cakes was a form of artistic expression and a component of his sincere religious beliefs. The Court also explained that in 2012, the year that Phillips refused his services to Craig and Mullins, the law in Colorado and across the country with regard to same sex marriage was much more unsettled than it became after United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). At the time, the State Civil Rights Division had also concluded in at least three other cases that bakers had acted lawfully in declining to serve same sex couples. Thus it was not unreasonable for Phillips to believe that he was acting lawfully at the time, and his claims before the Commission were entitled to neutral treatment. However, the Court stated that Phillips did not receive this neutral treatment, with members of the Commission showing clear and impermissible hostility toward his religious beliefs. The Court explained that commissioners' comments disparaging Phillips' beliefs and characterizing them as rhetorical were inappropriate, though these comments were not mentioned or disavowed in subsequent legal proceedings. The Court concluded that these comments cast doubt on the fairness of the Commission's consideration of Phillips' claims. The Court also pointed out that disparities between Phillips' case and those of other bakers with objections to making cakes with anti-gay messages, and who were victorious before the Commission, further reflected hostility toward the religious basis for Phillips' position. The Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. Justice Ginsburg authored a dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Justice Sotomayor, stating that neither the Commission's comments regarding Phillips' religious views nor its alleged disparate treatment of bakers objecting to making cakes with anti-gay messages justified ruling in favor of Phillips. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, in which she agreed with the majority that the Commission had not given neutral treatment to Phillips' religious views, but declined to assign any significance to the Commission's treatment of bakers who refused to create cakes with anti-gay messages because she believed that this did not violate the Colorado law at issue in Phillips' case. Justice Gorsuch also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, in which he argued that the cases of Phillips and the bakers who objected to using anti-gay messages in their baking were quite similar, and the Commission acted inappropriately in treating them differently. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justice Gorsuch. Thomas argued that an order requiring Phillips to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple would violate his First Amendment rights.

Curtiss Publishing Co. v Butts and Associated Press v Walker 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

Facts of the case In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case. Question In light of the Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, were the allegations made against Butts and Walker libelous? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION FOR BUTTS Public figures asserting a defamation claim must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not," the same standard to which public officials are held under New York Times v. Sullivan. UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR ASSOCIATED PRESS The conduct of the Associated Press did not constitute a severe departure from accepted publishing standards, so it may not be held liable for defamation of a public figure. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court noted significant differences between the circumstances of these cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court thus denied Walker's claims to damages.

Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois 497 U.S. 62 (1990)

Facts of the case In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination. Question Did Governor Thompson's practices in Illinois infringe upon the First Amendment rights of potential and current state employees? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR RUTAN Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."

Near v Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931)

Facts of the case In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court. Question Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR NEAR Under the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, and with limited exceptions, government may not censor or prohibit a publication in advance. Charles E. Hughes Hughes Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. Holmes Louis D. Brandeis Brandeis Harlan Fiske Stone Stone Owen J. Roberts Roberts Pierce Butler Butler Willis Van Devanter Van Devanter James C. McReynolds McReynolds George Sutherland Sutherland In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint. Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler.

McConnell v Federal Election Commission 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003)

Facts of the case In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures"). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals. Question Does the "soft money" ban of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak? Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 12 >> 5-4 DECISION FOR FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Banned the use of "soft" money by national party committees and by state and local parties affecting federal elections. John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor David H. Souter Souter Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Clarence Thomas Thomas Antonin Scalia Scalia 7-2 DECISION FOR MCCONNELL AND ECHOLS Forbade with many exceptions federal candidates or officeholders from raising or using "soft" money in federal elections. John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor David H. Souter Souter Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist Antonin Scalia Scalia Clarence Thomas Thomas 5-4 DECISION FOR FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION MAJORITY OPINION BY STEPHEN G. BREYER Required broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests. Stephen G. Breyer Breyer William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor David H. Souter Souter Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Clarence Thomas Thomas With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions. In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits. The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections. [In total, the Court addressed 21 sections of federal law. We have distilled these disparate components into 12 separate votes which we detail at the end of this document.]

Lee v Weisman 505 U.S. 577(1992)

Facts of the case In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. Question Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Gibson v Florida Legislative Comm. 372 U.S. 539 (1963)

Facts of the case In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called "subversive organizations." Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt. Question Did the Florida Committee, in attempting to inform itself about activities of subversive organizations, violate Gibson's right to free speech and association as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR GIBSON Absent a substantial connection between the NAACP and the Communist Party, the Court reversed Gibson's contempt conviction as a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment association rights Arthur J. Goldberg Goldberg William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Earl Warren Warren Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas John M. Harlan II Harlan Tom C. Clark Clark Potter Stewart Stewart Byron R. White White Yes. In a close decision, the Court found that Gibson's rights had been violated. In his opinion, Justice Goldberg recognized the important right of states to inform themselves on "legitimate and vital interests." However, even though inquiring about the actions of a group such as the Communist Party may have been one of these legitimate interests, argued Goldberg, Florida did not prove that a "substantial connection" between the Miami NAACP and Communist Party activities existed. Thus, a "compelling and subordinating governmental interest" would not have been served by forcing Gibson to disclose his group's membership list.

Buckley v Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976)

Facts of the case In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. Question Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 7 >> DECISION FOR BUCKLEY PER CURIAM OPINION Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens DECISION FOR BUCKLEY PER CURIAM OPINION Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens DECISION FOR BUCKLEY PER CURIAM OPINION Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

New York Times Co. v United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971)

Facts of the case In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. Question Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology DECISION FOR NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY PER CURIAM OPINION John M. Harlan II Harlan Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

Frohwerk v United States 249 U.S. 204 (1919)

Facts of the case Jacob Frohwerk circulated a German-language newspaper called the Missouri Staats Zeitung, which published articles criticizing the US involvement in World War I. Frohwerk was charged with violating the Espionage Act of 1917 because the government believed he sought to cause disloyalty and refusal of duty. A trial court found Frohwerk guilty and sentenced him to a fine and imprisonment. On appeal, Frohwerk challenged the statute under the First Amendment. Question Did Frohwerk's conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court concluded that Frohwerk's conviction was valid. The Court reasoned that the federal government has a valid interest in protecting the recruitment of members of the armed forces, and that in publishing the articles, Frohwerk engaged in a conspiracy to disrupt such recruitment. The Court dismissed the argument that Frohwerk never intended to obstruct recruitment, noting that "conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be criminal even if no means were agreed upon specifically by which to accomplish the intent." Of note, the Court reasserted its conclusion in Schenck v. United States (1919) that the First Amendment does not "give immunity for every possible use of language."

Zobrest v Catalina Foothills School District 509 U.S. 1 (1993)

Facts of the case James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Question May a school district decline to provide an interpreter to a deaf child based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR ZOBREST Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and is the result of the private decision of individual's parents. "The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Wisconsin v Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Facts of the case Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs. Question Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist In a unanimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law.Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder.

Beauharnais v Illinois 343 U.S. 250 (1952)

Facts of the case Joseph Beauharnais circulated leaflets petitioning Chicago government officials to halt the encroachment, harassment, and invasion of white people and call whites to unite against the violence perpetrated by African-Americans. He was convicted under a state law that prohibited libel against any class of citizens of a certain race, color, creed, or religion if it might cause unrest or a breach of the peace. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Question Did Beuharnais' conviction under the Illinois statute violate his constitutional right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that Beuharnais' speech amounted to libel and was therefore beyond constitutional protection. Citing the racial tensions of the day, the Court characterized Beuharnais' speech as provocative. The petition consisted of extreme racial and religious propaganda that was distributed to the public and was intended to have a strong emotional effect, so it properly fell within the ambit of the law and was not constitutionally protected. In his dissent, Justice Black (joined by Justice Douglas) argued that individuals rather than the state should determine the scope of issues that are appropriate for public discussion. Justices Reed and Jackson wrote separate dissenting opinions.

Houchins v KQED Inc. 438 U.S. 1 (1978)

Facts of the case KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media. Question Did the First Amendment guarantee news media a right of access to jails over and above that of other persons? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 4-3 DECISION FOR HOUCHINS PLURALITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557

Facts of the case Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials. Question Did the Georgia statute infringe upon the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR STANLEY The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.

City of Ladue v Gilleo 512 U.S. 43 (1994)

Facts of the case Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance. Question Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

United States v Kokinda 497 U.S. 720 (1990)

Facts of the case Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits "soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises." They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional. Question Is a sidewalk that is entirely contained by Postal Service property and intended only for traffic to and from Postal Service buildings a public forum? If it is a public forum, does a prohibition of solicitation pass strict scrutiny? If it is not a public forum, does it pass a "reasonableness" test? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy In a divided opinion, the Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a four-member plurality, wrote that the sidewalk was not a public forum. "Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness." The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this "reasonableness" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing separately, held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the sidewalk was a public forum because the regulation met the traditional standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v Cohn 420 U.S. 469 (1975)

Facts of the case Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims. Question Did the Georgia law violate the freedom of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR COX BROADCASTING CORPORATION MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE Warren E. Burger Burger William O. Douglas Douglas William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Potter Stewart Stewart Byron R. White White Thurgood Marshall Marshall Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR COX BROADCASTING CORPORATION MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."

Martin v Struthers 319 U.S. 141 (1943)

Facts of the case Martin was a Jehovah's Witness in Struthers, Ohio. She canvassed neighborhoods knocking on doors and ringing doorbells to distribute leaflets promoting a meeting. She was convicted and fined $10 for violating a city ordinance that prohibited a person who was distributing leaflets and other flyers from knocking on doors and ringing doorbells. She appealed her conviction in the Circuit Court of Mahoning County, alleging that the city ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech and free press rights. The Circuit Court upheld the ordinance and her conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed her appeal. Question Did the city ordinance prohibiting the ringing of doorbells and knocking on doors by a person distributing promotional materials violate the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio and held Struthers' ordinance unconstitutional. In the majority opinion written by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court acknowledged the city's interest in preventing crime and reducing nuisances. However, alternative solutions, such as trespassing laws, were also available that could achieve the city's purpose. Activities like Martin's were "so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." The ordinance was overly restrictive on door-to-door distributors, and therefore unconstitutional.

Pickering v Board of Education 391 U.S. 563 (1968)

Facts of the case Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes. The letter complained about the board's handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The school board felt the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools" and opted to terminate Pickering's employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. Question Was Pickering's letter constitutionally-protected free speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR PICKERING Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Pickering's dismissal violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court noted that similar speech is not protected if it contains false statements knowingly or recklessly made. There was no evidence that Pickering's statements were knowingly false or reckless. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, but took an even broader view of protected free speech. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, agreeing that the letter may be protected speech, but preferring to remand the case for further proceedings to decide whether the statements in the letter were knowingly or recklessly false.

Miller v California 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Facts of the case Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR MARVIN MILLER Obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment, but the definition of "obscene material" is lessened. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

Minnesota Voters Alliance v Mansky 138 S.Ct. 1876 (2018)

Facts of the case Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define "political", so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request. This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote. Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights. Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts' ruling was correct. EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit's ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned. Question Is Minnesota Statute § 211B.II facially overbroad, thus infringing upon the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by banning all political apparel at a polling place, effectively imposing a "speech-free zone"? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. The Minnesota law prohibiting political apparel at polling places violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Minnesota statute prohibiting individuals from wearing political apparel at a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court reasoned that a polling place is a nonpublic forum under its precedents, which means that the state may place reasonable limits on speech therein. Content-based restrictions on speech must be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression" based on the speaker's viewpoint. The text of the Minnesota statute made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, so it would be permissible so long as it is "reasonable." One component of reasonableness is the presence of "objective, workable standards" guiding enforcement of the law. Because the statute in question does not define the term "political" nor any other key terms describing the types of apparel subject to the prohibition, the law affords too much discretion in enforcing the ban and is thus unreasonable. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. The dissent would not have reversed and remanded the court of appeals below, as the Court did, but instead would have certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to give the state courts "a reasonable opportunity to pass upon and contstrue the statute."

Republican Party of Minnesota v White 536 U.S. 765 (2002)

Facts of the case Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA Minnesota's prohibition on judicial candidates announcing their views on disputed legal or political questions violates the Free Expression Clause of the First Amendment. No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc. v Lee 505 U.S. 672 (1992)

Facts of the case New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed. Question Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.

Ward v Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989)

Facts of the case New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression. Question Does the New York ordinance substituting a city-employed technician and mixing board for a performer's mixer and equipment violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR WARD No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."

Cantwell v Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)

Facts of the case Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace. Question Did the Cantwells' convictions violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR CANTWELLS The local ordinance requiring a permit to solicit violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells' actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.

Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal 546 U. S. 418 (2006)

Facts of the case O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca. The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to "narrowly tailor" its prohibition of the drug. Question Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown. The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.

Zelman v Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 (2002)

Facts of the case Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR ZELMAN MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice."

McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission 514 U.S. 334 (1995)

Facts of the case On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature. Question Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR MCINTYRE MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Cox v Louisiana (Cox I) 379 U.S. 536 (1965)

Facts of the case On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality ("CORE") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members. Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration "to the west side of the street" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox. Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the "courthouse picketing" statute. Question Does Cox's conviction based on violation of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "disturbing the peace" violate his rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Does Cox's conviction based on violation of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "obstructing public passages" violate his rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR COX The Louisiana statute prohibiting "disturbing the peace" is unconstitutionally vague and broad in scope and thus Cox's conviction under that statute violates his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. 7-2 DECISION FOR COX The application of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "obstructing public passages" violated Cox's rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Yes. Louisiana's "disturbing the peace" statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague in its overly broad scope, and the policy of Baton Rouge law enforcement of giving officers complete discretion in enforcing the "obstructing public passages" statute deprives Cox of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In a decision authored by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Court was unanimous in finding the "disturbing the peace" statute unconstitutionally vague, and a majority of the Court (7-2) found that Cox's conviction for "obstructing public passages" violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Hugo L. Black and Tom C. Clark each filed concurring opinions as to the "disturbing the peace" statute. Justices Black and Clark also concurred as to the "obstructing public passages" conviction, with Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting as to that issue.

Cox v Lousiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965)

Facts of the case On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality ("CORE") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members. Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration "to the west side of the street" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox. Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the "courthouse picketing" statute. Question Does Cox's conviction based on violation of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "disturbing the peace" violate his rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Does Cox's conviction based on violation of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "obstructing public passages" violate his rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR COX The Louisiana statute prohibiting "disturbing the peace" is unconstitutionally vague and broad in scope and thus Cox's conviction under that statute violates his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. John M. Harlan II Harlan Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas Potter Stewart Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Earl Warren Warren Tom C. Clark Clark Arthur J. Goldberg Goldberg 7-2 DECISION FOR COX The application of the Louisiana statute prohibiting "obstructing public passages" violated Cox's rights to free speech and assembly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Yes. Louisiana's "disturbing the peace" statute is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague in its overly broad scope, and the policy of Baton Rouge law enforcement of giving officers complete discretion in enforcing the "obstructing public passages" statute deprives Cox of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly. In a decision authored by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, the Court was unanimous in finding the "disturbing the peace" statute unconstitutionally vague, and a majority of the Court (7-2) found that Cox's conviction for "obstructing public passages" violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justices Hugo L. Black and Tom C. Clark each filed concurring opinions as to the "disturbing the peace" statute. Justices Black and Clark also concurred as to the "obstructing public passages" conviction, with Justice Byron R. White, joined by Justice John M. Harlan, dissenting as to that issue.

Welsh v United States 398 U.S. 333 (1970)

Facts of the case On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid. Question Can Welsh claim conscientious objector status even though he professes no religious-based objection? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION FOR ELLIOT ASHTON WELSH II John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Yes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." According to Justice Black, the term "religious" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term "places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs." The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."

Wisconsin v Mitchell 508 U.S. 476 (1993)

Facts of the case On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. Question Did the increase in Mitchell's sentence based on his bigoted motives violate his First Amendment rights? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR WISCONSIN No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.

Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)

Facts of the case On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "a Goed-damned racketeer" and "a damneed Fasciset." He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague. Question Did Chaplinsky's conviction violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE "Fighting words" fall outside the protections of the First Amendment Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinksy's conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." He found that Chaplinsky's insults were "fighting words" since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.

Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Tornillo 418 U.S. 241 (1974)

Facts of the case Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision. Question Did Florida Statute Section 104.38, the "right to reply" statute, violate the free press clause of the First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER William O. Douglas Douglas Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER William O. Douglas Douglas Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's "right to reply" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the "true marketplace of ideas" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, "press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and...cannot be legislated." The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the "right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. authored a concurring statement. Justice Byron R. White authored a concurring opinion.

*Missouri v Seibert 542 U.S. 600 (2004)

Facts of the case Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17 -year-old Donald Rector, who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Several days after the fire, Seibert was interrogated by a police officer. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get a confession from her first. Once she had confessed, the officer took a short break from questioning, then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. Based on this second, Mirandized confession, Seibert was convicted. She appealed, charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession, though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights, inadmissable. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Elstad to argue that an initial, un-Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert, overturning the conviction. Question Does the rule from Oregon v. Elstad that a defendant who has made an un-Mirandized confession may later waive her Miranda rights to make a second confession (admissible in court) still apply when the initial confession is the result of an intentional decision by a police officer to withhold her Miranda warnings? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY DAVID H. SOUTER William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer No. In a decision with no majority, a four-justice plurality found that the post-Miranda confession is only admissible - even if the two-stage interview was unintentional, as it was in Elstad - if the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the suspect the reasonable belief that she has the right not to speak with the police. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote, found that evaluating the warning and accompanying break was only necessary if the police used the two-stage interrogation intentionally. Justice Kennedy wrote, "The admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by Elstad's principles unless the deliberate two-step strategy is employed. Then, the postwarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before they were made."

Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe 120 S.Ct. 2266 (2000)

Facts of the case Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech. Question Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

District of Columbia v Heller 128 S Ct. 2783 (2008)

Facts of the case Provisions of the District of Columbia Code made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns, though the chief of police could issue one-year licenses for handguns. The Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered firearms to keep them unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or other similar device unless the firearms were located in a place of business or being used for legal recreational activities. Dick Anthony Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. Heller sued the District of Columbia. He sought an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code and argued that they violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The district court dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and the District of Columbia's requirement that firearms kept in the home be nonfunctional violated that right. Question Do the provisions of the District of Columbia Code that restrict the licensing of handguns and require licensed firearms kept in the home to be kept nonfunctional violate the Second Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA The ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violate the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the first clause of the Second Amendment that references a "militia" is a prefatory clause that does not limit the operative clause of the Amendment. Additionally, the term "militia" should not be confined to those serving in the military, because at the time the term referred to all able-bodied men who were capable of being called to such service. To read the Amendment as limiting the right to bear arms only to those in a governed military force would be to create exactly the type of state-sponsored force against which the Amendment was meant to protect people. Because the text of the Amendment should be read in the manner that gives greatest effect to the plain meaning it would have had at the time it was written, the operative clause should be read to "guarantee an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." This reading is also in line with legal writing of the time and subsequent scholarship. Therefore, banning handguns, an entire class of arms that is commonly used for protection purposes, and prohibiting firearms from being kept functional in the home, the area traditionally in need of protection, violates the Second Amendment. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the Second Amendment does not create an unlimited right to possess guns for self-defense purposes. Instead, the most natural reading of the the Amendment is that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes but does not curtail the legislature's power to regulate nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons. Justice Stevens argued that the Amendment states its purpose specifically in relation to state militias and does not address the right to use firearms in self-defense, which is particularly striking in light of similar state provisions from the same time that do so. Justice Stevens also notes that "the people" does not enlarge the protected group beyond the context of service in a state-regulated militia. This reading is in line with legal writing of the time that contextualizes the Amendment in relation to state militias and post-enactment legislative history. Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests, and it does not provide absolute protection from government intervention in these interests. Historical evidence from the time of ratification indicates that colonial laws regulated the storage and use of firearms in the home. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt an interest-balancing test to determine when the government interests were sufficiently weighty to justify the proposed regulation. In this case, because the interest-balancing turns on the type of analysis that the legislature, not the court, is best positioned to make, the Court should defer to the legislature and uphold the restrictions. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in the dissent.

44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island 517 U.S. 484 (1996)

Facts of the case Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question Is Rhode Island's statute an infringement on the First Amendment right to commercial freedom of speech? If it is, can Rhode Island still pass such legislation under the Twenty-first Amendment which limits the dormant Commerce Clause by empowering the states to regulate the sale of alcohol? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR 44 LIQUORMART INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS Yes and no. In a fractious opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's statutory ban on liquor price advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of the liquor sellers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In response to Rhode Island's claim that it passed the statutory ban to protect consumers from "commercial harms," Justice Stevens held that governmental impediments to truthful and accurate commercial messages rarely protect consumers. On the contrary, courts must take "special care" when considering such "protective" measures since they often hinder public choice and obstruct necessary debate over public policy issues. Furthermore, Rhode Island failed to show that its statutory ban would lower market-wide liquor consumption, must less alter alcohol consumption among abusive drinkers who are most in need of assistance. Finally, Justice Stevens held that although the Twenty-first Amendment did empower Rhode Island to regulate the sale of liquor, such regulatory power is not to be exercised to the detriment of its constitutional obligation to protect and abide by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.

United States v Stevens 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010)

Facts of the case Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest. Question Is 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to "prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty." He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.

Rosenberger v Rector, University of Virginia 515 U.S. 819 (1995)

Facts of the case Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines. Question Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR ROSENBERGER MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

Roth v United States 354 U.S. 77 (1957)

Facts of the case Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products. Question Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 3 >> 6-3 DECISION 7-2 DECISION In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).

Torcaso v Watkins 367 U.S. 488 (1961)

Facts of the case Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed. Question Does a state requirement that a candidate for public office profess a belief in God in order to be eligible violate the First Amendment protection of the freedom of religion? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR TORCASO John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Earl Warren Earl Warren Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter Charles E. Whittaker Charles E. Whittaker Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result.

*United States v Patene 542 U.S. 630 (2004)

Facts of the case Samuel Patane was arrested at his home for calling his ex-girlfriend in violation of a restraining order. During the arrest, police offers began reading Patane his Miranda rights. Patane told the officers that he knew his rights. The officers then stopped reading them, at which point Patane told police that he had a gun in his house. They searched the house with his permission and found the gun. As an ex-felon, Patane was not permitted to possess a gun and was prosecuted for possession. During the trial on gun possession charges, Patane argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself because there was not probable cause to arrest him and because the gun had been found as a result of an un-Mirandized confession. The district court initially ruled that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that it was therefore unconstitutional. A 10th Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed, holding that Patane's ex-girlfriend had given police probable cause for the arrest. However, the panel held that gun could not be used as evidence because it had been found as the result of an un-Mirandized (and therefore unconstitutional) confession. The government appealed, arguing that physical evidence found as the result of un-Mirandized testimony could be used in court, despite the fact that the testimony itself was inadmissable. Question Can physical evidence found as a result of un-Mirandized but voluntary testimony be used in court? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES PLURALITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes. In a decision without a majority opinion, three justices wrote that the Miranda warnings were merely intended to prevent violations of the Constitution, and that because Patane's un-Mirandized testimony was not admitted at trial the Constitution (specifically the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination) had not been violated. Physical evidence obtained from un-Mirandized statements, as long as those statement were not forced by police, were constitutionally admissible. Two other justices also held that the physical evidence was constitutionally admissible, but did so with the understanding that the Miranda warnings must be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system. They did not discuss whether the Miranda warnings were, in themselves, constitutionally required.

Frisby v Schultz 487 U.S. 474 (1988)

Facts of the case Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was "the protection and preservation of the home." When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment. Question Does a city ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of residential homes violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR FRISBY MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR The state ordinance is facially valid under the First Amendment because it is content neutral and serves a legitimate government interest. Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court held that since the street constituted a traditional public forum, the ban must satisfy strict standards in order to remain. Since the ban is "content neutral," "leaves open ample alternative channels of communication," and serves a "significant government interest," the Court ruled that it passed the strict standards and could remain. The city government had a legitimate purpose in protecting the homes of its residents, and did so without favoring one idea over another or eliminating the ability to communicate an idea.

Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v FCC 518 U.S. 727 (1996)

Facts of the case Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict "patently offensive" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC. Question Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 4 >> 7-2 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY STEPHEN G. BREYER 6-3 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY STEPHEN G. BREYER 7-2 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY STEPHEN G. BREYER No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.

United States v Seeger 380 U.S. 163 (1965)

Facts of the case Seeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his personal morals. He argued that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being. Question Was the exemption provision unconstitutional for requiring proof of a Supreme Being? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Earl Warren Earl Warren Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark Arthur J. Goldberg Arthur J. Goldberg A person can have conscientious objector status based on a belief that has a similar position in that person's life to the belief in God. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional. Since there are over 250 religious groups in the United States, the Court reasoned, Congress could not be expected to specifically cover each of them in this federal law. In general, a conscientious objection is based on a religious belief rather than political, sociological, or philosophical views. The term "Supreme Being" should be interpreted to cover all types of faith, and the defendant's belief system fell within them, so it qualified for the exemption. However, the statute was held to be constitutional on its face.

McDonald v City of Chicago 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010)

Facts of the case Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR OTIS MCDONALD, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Justice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's "text, history, or underlying rationale" that characterizes it as a "fundamental right" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.

R.A.V. v City of St. Paul 505 U.S. 377 (1992)

Facts of the case Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR R.A.V. MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."

Connick v Meyers 461 U.S. 138 (1983)

Facts of the case Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the questionnaire that Meyers distributed constitutionally-protected speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR CONNICK MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that speech of public employees is generally only protected when they speak on matters of public concern. Meyers' speech only dealt with personal and internal office issues. The district court also erred in placing too high of a burden on Connick to show that Meyers' speech substantially interfered with the operation of the office. It is sufficient to show that the employer reasonably believed Meyers' speech would interfere with office operations. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing his view that speech concerning the way government is run is protected under the First Amendment. Meyers' questionnaire addressed that subject and interfered with the operation of the office, so her termination violated the First Amendment. Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent

Matal v Tam 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017)

Facts of the case Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band's name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards "persons of Asian descent." The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that "[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." Tam appealed the trademark officer's decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment. Question Is the Disparagement Clause invalid under the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR TAM MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. The Disparagement Clause prohibits trademarks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Sonia Sotomayor Sotomayor Elena Kagan Kagan Clarence Thomas Thomas Neil Gorsuch Gorsuch The Disparagement Clause prohibits trademarks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, the plain meaning of the text clearly indicated that the Disparagement Clause applied to racial and ethnic groups, and therefore the Clause applied to the mark at issue in this case. The Clause also facially discriminated based on viewpoint, as giving offense constitutes a viewpoint. Because the PTO simply approved trademarks, they were not government speech--to which the First Amendment prohibitions on viewpoint regulation did not apply--and holding otherwise would constitute a massive and unwise expansion of the government speech doctrine. Similarly, PTO approval of a trademark did not constitute government-provided subsidy, an area of cases in which viewpoint discrimination was sometimes determined to be constitutional. The Disparagement Clause was also not a permissible regulation of commercial speech because it was not narrowly drawn to serve a substantial interest. Any asserted interest of avoiding offense clearly contravened the purpose of the First Amendment's protection of free speech, and the Clause was too broad to serve the government's other stated interest of protecting the orderly flow of commerce. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the First Amendment's protections against viewpoint discrimination clearly applied in this case. There are very narrow and specific categories in which the government may regulate speech--such as fraud, defamation, and incitement--and the trademark at issue here did not fall within these categories. Instead, the Disparagement Clause specifically singled out a subset of messages that the government determined to be offensive and prohibits them, which was plainly unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Justice Kennedy also wrote that the majority opinion does not govern how any other provisions of the Lanham Act should be interpreted under the First Amendment, nor was the government speech doctrine at issue in this case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that all government regulation of commercial speech should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in

McDaniel v Paty 435 U.S. 613 (1978)

Facts of the case Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel's name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute. Question Does the Tennessee statute barring "Minister[s] of the Gospel or priest[s] of any denomination whatever" from serving as legislators violate the free exercise of religion guaranteed through the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR MCDANIEL PLURALITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of religious rights and therefore violated the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to strike down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee could not prove that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern political processes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Tennessee statute essentially established a test of religious conviction in order to be eligible for office that disqualified anyone with a strong enough belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the burden to choose between one's religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that the Establishment Clause does not give the government the power to discriminate against religious persons seeking or holding office. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that this case was covered by the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court held that states may not condition public office on any type of religious belief. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He argued that, rather than violating the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers, it implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering with their governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able to prove the necessity of this restriction. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Paris v Adult Theatre 413 U.S. 49 (1973)

Facts of the case State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution. Question Did the Georgia injunction against the films violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR PARIS ADULT THEATRE I In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law. The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.

Pleasant Grove City v Summum 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009)

Facts of the case Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest. Question Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech rights when the park already contains a monument from a different religious group? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning, he also noted that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court as "having an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that "government speech" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that sometimes the Court should ask "whether a government's actions burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government objective." Justice Souter also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public monuments should not be considered government speech categorically.

Stone v Graham 449 U.S. 39 (1980)

Facts of the case Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky. Question Did the Kentucky statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology DECISION FOR STONE PER CURIAM OPINION Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Byron R. White Byron R. White Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens In a 5-to-4 per curiam decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature." The Court noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the Sabbath Day.

*Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

Facts of the case Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. Question Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION Earl Warren Earl Warren Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Byron R. White Byron R. White Abe Fortas Abe Fortas Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Turner II 520 U.S. 180 (1997)

Facts of the case The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Question Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

McCreary County v ACLU of Kentucky 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005)

Facts of the case The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause. Question Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY DAVID H. SOUTER William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly 533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Facts of the case The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid. Question Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempt portions of the Attorney General of Massachusetts' cigarette advertising regulations? Do portions of the Attorney General's regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. "We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Brown v Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966)

Facts of the case The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested "for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer." Question Did the actions of the arresting officer infringe upon Brown's (and his companions') freedom of speech, assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for redress of grievances as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR BROWN The divided Court found that the actions of the police violated the Constitution. Justice Fortas argued that states may only regulate the use of public facilities in a "reasonably nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all." Maintaining separate library facilities clearly violated this principle. Fortas also reasoned that the demonstration did not disturb the peace of other library patrons or disrupt the library's activities; the time and method of the sit-in were carefully chosen and executed. Justice Black dissented, joined by three other justices. He argued that the First Amendment "does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas."

Forsyth County, Georgia v Nationalist Movement 505 U.S. 123 (1992)

Facts of the case The Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement's free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement's permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums. Question Does an ordinance that permits a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order violate the free speech guarantees under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY HARRY Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ordinance violated the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it contained no reasonable or definite standards to guide the county administrator's calculation of permit fees. Additionally, the ordinance required the administrator to examine the speech's content to assess the likelihood of public hostility to the message and adjust the fee accordingly to account for security and law enforcement costs. In the Court's view, a nominal fee lower than $1000 could not save the ordinance from the constitutional infirmities it found. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent in which he disagreed with the argument that the Constitution limits a parade license fee to a nominal amount and argued that the Court should have remanded the case to determine the scope of the ordinance and how it was administered. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissenting opinion.

Boy Scouts of America v Dale 530 U.S. 640 (2000)

Facts of the case The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message. Question Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234 (2002)

Facts of the case The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747. Question Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech when it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah 509 U.S. 520 (1993)

Facts of the case The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities. Question Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict strutiny.

New York State Club Ass'n v City of New York 487 U.S. 1 (1988)

Facts of the case The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not "distinctly private." Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights. Question Did the City of New York violate First Amendment rights to free association when applying anti-discrimination laws to social clubs that were not "distinctly private"? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court examined the clubs subjected to anti-discrimination laws closely and found "no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom the Law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private viewpoints." In addition, many of the clubs showed characteristics of a public nature. Often strangers attended club functions, partook in meals, and made financial contributions. So long as the clubs were sufficiently open to this type of exposure to outsiders, the clubs could not be closed to certain types of people on account of their race, sex, or religion. Prohibiting this type of discrimination did not impair a club's ability to advance a viewpoint because clubs could still select people for membership based on whether they shared similar beliefs.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC 395 U.S. 367 (1969)

Facts of the case The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged. Question Do the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations, concerning personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR RESPONDENT The fairness doctrine does not violate the First Amendment. Earl Warren Warren Byron R. White White Hugo L. Black Black John M. Harlan II Harlan Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan William O. Douglas Douglas In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum scarcity made it "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment. With respect to the regulation of personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates, the FCC's requirement that the subject of the attack be provided with a tape, transcript, or broadcast summary, as well as an opportunity to respond without having to prove an inability to pay for the "air-time," insured a balanced and open discussion of contested issues. The requirement that political editorializing be presented for and against both sides of the debated issues also contributed to the balanced discussion of public concerns.

Burwell v Hobby Lobby 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014)

Facts of the case The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Question Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR HOBBY LOBBY STORES MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows for-profit companies to deny contraception coverage to employees based on a religious objection. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. John G. Roberts, Jr. Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Elena Kagan Elena Kagan Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Sonia Sotomayor Sonia Sotomayor Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears. In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the requirement violates the RFRA. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Additionally, judicial precedent states that religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties, as the sought-after exemption would do to women seeking contraception in this case. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the majority opinion misconstrued the RFRA as a bold legislative statement with sweeping consequences. Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden the respondents claim is not substantial, and the government has shown a sufficiently compelling interest, Justice Ginsburg argued that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. In their separate dissent, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan wrote that the Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.

Board of Education v Pico 457 U.S. 853 (1982)

Facts of the case The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the "Board"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. Question Did the Board of Education's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.

Legal Services Corp. v Velazquez 531 U.S. 533 (2001)

Facts of the case The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment. Question Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce 494 U.S. 652 (1990)

Facts of the case The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that "the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption." The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement. Question Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR AUSTIN MAJORITY OPINION BY THURGOOD MARSHALL William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Thurgood Marshall Marshall Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy No. In making its case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the Chamber was a "nonprofit ideological corporation" which was more analogous to a political association than a business firm. The Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process.

NAACP v Button 371 U.S. 415 (1963)]

Facts of the case The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business." Question Did the law, as applied to the NAACP's activities, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR NAACP Virginia's prosecution violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Hugo L. Black Black Earl Warren Warren Arthur J. Goldberg Goldberg William O. Douglas Douglas Byron R. White White John M. Harlan II Harlan Tom C. Clark Clark Potter Stewart Stewart Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACP-initiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences," argued Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who authored the majority opinion. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and Tom Clark.

National Endowment for the Arts v Finley 524 U.S. 569 (1998)

Facts of the case The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: "artistic and cultural significance," with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public education and appreciation of the arts." In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider "artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari. Question Are the statutory funding guidelines requiring the NEA to consider artistic excellence, merit, and general standards of "decency and respect," overly vague and conducive of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantees? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 8-1 DECISION FOR NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer 8-1 DECISION FOR NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra 138 S.Ct. 2361 (2018)

Facts of the case The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively "NIFLA") sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "Act"). The law's stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act's requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA's motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA's argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived. The Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny. Finally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari did not include this issue. Question Do disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate protections arising from the free speech clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology DECISION FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE ADVOCATES BY CLARENCE THOMAS Pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act violated the First Amendment. Clarence Thomas Thomas Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Neil Gorsuch Gorsuch Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Elena Kagan Kagan Sonia Sotomayor Sotomayor Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "FACT Act" or the "Act") violated the First Amendment. In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court began its discussion by explaining that the licensed notice was a content-based regulation that likely violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the licensed notice as regulating professional speech, stating that the Court had never recognized "professional speech" as a separate category of speech that was subject to different free speech rules. The Court explained that it had only granted lesser protection to professional speech in two situations--where professionals were required to disclose "factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial speech,''' and where states regulated professional conduct that incidentally implicated speech--and that neither of those lines of authority were applicable in the instant case. The Court further stated that it had a long history of protecting the First Amendment rights of professionals outside of those two contexts, emphasizing that imposing content-based regulations on professional speech created a risk of the government seeking to suppress unpopular ideas rather than advance legitimate regulatory objectives. The Court also concluded that the licensed notice did not survive even intermediate scrutiny, as it was "wildly underinclusive" in light of the Act's stated purpose of providing low income women with information about the state-sponsored health services at issue. The Court also held that the unlicensed notice unduly burdened protected speech. Assuming without deciding that rules requiring professionals to disclose "factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial speech'" applied here, the Court stated that California was required to show that such disclosures were only justified if they addressed a potentially real and not simply hypothetical harm, and that here, the state had only presented hypothetical risks. And even if the state had overcome this requirement, the Court ruled that the unlicensed notice was still unduly burdensome because it "impose[d] a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that [wa]s wholly disconnected from the State's informational interest," possibly leaving unburdened speakers whose messages aligned with the state's views. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The dissent argued that both notice requirements were likely to pass constitutional scrutiny. Regarding the licensed notice, Breyer highlighted the Court's precedent permitting state notice requirements as to abortion alternatives, such as adoption, and asked why a state law couldn't require healthcare provider to provide information about abortion and childbirth services in this case. Breyer also rejected the majority's assertion that the unlicensed notice was supported by only a "hypothetical" interest, as well as the conclusion that this particular requirement should be deemed facially unconstitutional due to the fact that it could create an undue burden in some situations.

Engel v Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Facts of the case The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments. Question Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-1 DECISION FOR ENGEL John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas Potter Stewart Potter Stewart William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Earl Warren Earl Warren Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark Felix Frankfurter Felix Frankfurter The state cannot hold prayers in public schools, even if participation is not required and the prayer is not tied to a particular religion. In an opinion authored by Hugo L. Black, the Court held that respondent's decision to use its school system to facilitate recitation of the official prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the policy breached the constitutional wall of separation between church and state. The Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition of laws establishing religion meant that government had no business drafting formal prayers for any segment of its population to repeat in a government-sponsored religious program. The Court held that respondent's provision of the contested daily prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment on the ground that the state's financing a religious exercise violated the First Amendment. Justice Stewart dissented, arguing that no "official religion" was established by permitting those who want to say a prayer to say it.

Perry Educational Assoc. v Perry Local Educators' Assoc 460 U.S. 37 (1983)

Facts of the case The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Question Does a local school board violate the First Amendment by disallowing a nonofficial teachers union from using its internal school mail system? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION FOR PERRY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor 5-4 DECISION FOR PERRY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION No. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. The school board chose to grant exclusive access to the official teachers union in order to facilitate a collective-bargaining agreement. It did not act to suppress the speech of rival teachers unions. The school board entrusted PEA with obligations as the sole representative of teachers that would require the use of the mail system. PLEA did not have these obligations and could communicate effectively though many other channels. Since the mail system was not a "public forum," PLEA had no unassailable right to access it. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. contended that the mail system constituted government property and PLEA lost access privileges because its viewpoints differed from those of the official union.

Central Hudson Gas v PSC 447 U.S. 557 (1980)

Facts of the case The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals. Question Did the PSC's ban on advertising violate the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.

Rumsfeld v FAIR 547 U.S. 47 (2006)

Facts of the case The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds. Question Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John Paul Stevens Stevens Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc. 485 U.S.439 (1988)

Facts of the case The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng. Question Did the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibit the government from harvesting or developing the Chimney Rock area? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-3 DECISION FOR LYNG MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate "if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires," and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.

Board of Regents, University of Wisconsin v Southworth 529 U.S. 217 (2000)

Facts of the case The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights." Question May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR BOARD OF REGENTS , UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society v Stratton 536 U.S. 150 (2002)

Facts of the case The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation. Question Does a municipal ordinance that requires a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC'Y OF NEW YORK, INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN PAUL STEVENS Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.

Locke v Davey 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004)

Facts of the case The Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to cause belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid. Joshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in U.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the U.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated. Question If a state provides college scholarships for secular instruction, does the First Amendment's free exercise clause require a state to fund religious instruction? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL. MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a state does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause when it funds secular college majors but excludes devotional theology majors. The Court rejected Davey's argument that the state scholarship program is unconstitutional because it is not neutral toward religion. "The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction," the Court wrote. Similarly the Washington Constitution - which explicitly prohibits state money from going to religious instruction - does not violate the free exercise clause. Unlike laws and programs the Court has struck down under the free exercise clause, nothing in either the scholarship program or the state constitution "suggests animus towards religion." States have a "historic and substantial interest" in excluding religious activity from public funding.

Lynch v Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984)

Facts of the case The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket. Question Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR LYNCH Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country." Cite this page

Renton v Playtime Theatres Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986)

Facts of the case The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of "any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement. Question Did the Renton ordinance violate either the First or Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION FOR CITY OF RENTON In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication."

Metromedia, Inc. v San Diego 453 U.S. 490 (1981)

Facts of the case The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only "onsite" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment. Question Does a city ban on "offsite" outdoor advertising signs violate First and Fourteenth Amendment provisions for free speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR METROMEDIA, INC. ET AL. Yes. Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for a 6-3 court. The ban's exception allowing "onsite" advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented and viewed the "onsite" exception to the ban as "essentially negligible" rather than unconstitutional favoritism. However the Court held that affording "a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech" reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.

Snyder v Phelps 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)

Facts of the case The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words." Question Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Rust v Sullivan 500 U.S. 173 (1991)

Facts of the case The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services. Question Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST Thurgood Marshall Marshall Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Board of Education v Mergens 496 U.S. 226 (1990)

Facts of the case The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requiremes that schools in receipt of federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express "religious, political, philosophical, or other content" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari. Question Was Westside's prohibition against the formation of a Christian club consistent with the Establishment Clause, thereby rendering the Equal Access Act unconstitutional? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.

*Woodson v North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 (1976)

Facts of the case The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana . Question Did the mandatory death penalty law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR WOODSON PLURALITY OPINION BY POTTER STEWART Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of "the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die." Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that "the fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.

Texas Monthly Inc. v Bullock 489 U.S. 1 (1989)

Facts of the case The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision. Question Does a state violate the Establishment Clause and the Free Press Clause by exempting religious publications from paying taxes that all nonreligious publications must pay? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR TEXAS MONTHLY, INC. PLURALITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Schenck v Pro-Choice Network of Western NY 519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Facts of the case This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari. Question Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

*Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Facts of the case This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation. On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel. Question Does the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination extend to the police interrogation of a suspect? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION FOR MIRANDA The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody. Earl Warren Earl Warren Hugo L. Black Hugo L. Black William O. Douglas William O. Douglas William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Abe Fortas Abe Fortas Tom C. Clark Tom C. Clark John M. Harlan II John M. Harlan II Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Byron R. White Byron R. White The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant's interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.

Van Orden v Perry 545 U.S. 677 (2005)

Facts of the case Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. Question Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION PLURALITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of New York State Crime Victims Board 502 U.S. 105 (1991)

Facts of the case To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal. Question Did the Son of Sam law violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR Yes. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.

Employment Div. Oregon Dept of Human Resources v Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990)

Facts of the case Two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization, ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The counselors lost their battle in state court. But the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the free exercise clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture. Question Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTONIN SCALIA Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.

Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos 483 U.S. 327 (1987)

Facts of the case Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities. Question Does Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 violate the Establishment Clause by allowing religious employers to choose employees for nonreligious jobs based on their religion? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a "secular legislative purpose." The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither "advance nor inhibit religion." The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the "Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence." In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not "entangle" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.

Regan v Taxation With Representation of Washington 461 U.S. 540 (1983)

Facts of the case Two non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in "substantial lobbying," the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's "substantial lobbying" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an "unconstitutional burden" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the "substantial lobbying" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights. Question Does the IRS violate the First Amendment by denying 501(c)3 tax-deduction privileges to non-profit groups that participate in "substantial lobbying"? Does the IRS violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by denying 501(c)3 tax-deduction privileges to non-profit groups that participate in "substantial lobbying"? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR DONALD REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Warren E. Burger Burger Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor No and no. Justice William H. Rehnquist authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Allowing a non-profit to solicit tax-deductible donations is a form of paying for its operations. Pointing to its decision in Cammarano v. United States, the Court maintained that "Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying." The federal government does not have to sponsor every activity that the First Amendment protects, and its choice to sponsor one type of activity does not force it to sponsor every related type of activity. The federal government can choose to support veterans' lobbying organizations without also having to fund the lobbying of other groups. Non-profit groups interested in offering tax-deductions to donors can separate with the parts of the organization engaged in lobbying.

Allegheny County v Greater Pittsburgh ACLU 492 U.S. 573 (1989)

Facts of the case Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh. Question Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> 5-4 DECISION Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy 6-3 DECISION FOR COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."

Gannett Co. v De Pasquale 443 U.S. 368 (1979)

Facts of the case Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al. Question Did the press and members of the public have a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to attend the trial? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 5-4 DECISION Potter Stewart Potter Stewart Thurgood Marshall Thurgood Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. William J. Brennan, Jr. Byron R. White Byron R. White Warren E. Burger Warren E. Burger Harry A. Blackmun Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.

Bd of Comm., Wabaunsee CO. v Umbehr 116 S.Ct. 2342 (1996)

Facts of the case Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari. Question Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-2 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.

Good News Club v Milford 121 S Ct. 2093 (2001)

Facts of the case Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Question Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR GOOD NEWS CLUB MAJORITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Good News Club v Milford Central School 533 U.S. 98 (2001)

Facts of the case Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Question Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR GOOD NEWS CLUB MAJORITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS William H. Rehnquist William H. Rehnquist John Paul Stevens John Paul Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor Sandra Day O'Connor Antonin Scalia Antonin Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Anthony M. Kennedy David H. Souter David H. Souter Clarence Thomas Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Stephen G. Breyer Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Ashcroft v American Civil Liberties Union I 535 U.S. 564 (2002)

Facts of the case Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad. Question Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR ASHCROFT MAJORITY OPINION BY CLARENCE THOMAS No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Board of Directors of Rotary International v Rotary Club of Duarte 481 U.S. 537 (1987)

Facts of the case When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination. Question Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violate Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >> UNANIMOUS DECISION Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia UNANIMOUS DECISION Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Powell William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.

Madsen v Women's Health Center, Inc. 512 U.S 753 (1994)

Facts of the case Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order. Question 1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Federalist 10

Federalist 10, Madison One of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions JM wants Bill of Rights because the people want it and constitution not ratified yet

Federalist 84

Federalist 84, Hamilton Discusses concern over Bill of Rights Says that the Bill of Rights is already within the separation of powers

John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity"

John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity" Puritanism → law of nature is the gospel, men with God, Christian charity Moral law is the law of the Gospel

Masses Publishing Co. v Patten 244 Fed 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1917)

Learned Hand To assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. Judge Hand affirmed that if a citizen "stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law," then he or she is protected by the First Amendment. One may, for example, "admire" resistors of the draft, but may not, under the "incitement" test, "counsel or advise" someone to violate the law at a specific time and place. FOCUS ON CONTENT WORDS NOT NECESSARILY CONTEXT

Levy, "Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800"

Levy, "Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800" Freedom of speech and press didnt' come about until 1800s Libertarian view Two arguments New argument rooted in freedom of speech - prevent states from libel punishment (?)

Locke, Letter on Toleration

Locke argues that more religious groups actually prevent civil unrest. Locke argues that civil unrest results from confrontations caused by any magistrate's attempt to prevent different religions from being practiced, rather than tolerating their proliferation. Locke's primary goal is to "distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion." He seeks to persuade the reader that government is instituted to promote external interests, relating to life, liberty, and the general welfare, while the church exists to promote internal interests, i.e., salvation. The two serve separate functions, and so, must be considered to be separate institutions. Adopts Milton's formulation that truth/good win out Church can expulse person but can't punish them with government Locke makes division that Mill doesn't make What are truthful doctrines for Mill? - lack of explicit discussion of what truth may be Notion that truth wins out

Feiner v New York 340 U.S. 315 (1951)

PETITIONER Irving Feiner RESPONDENT New York DOCKET NO. 93 DECIDED BY Vinson Court CITATION 340 US 315 (1951) ARGUED Oct 17, 1950 DECIDED Jan 15, 1951 Facts of the case In 1949, Irving Feiner, a white student at Syracuse University, made an inflammatory speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. In urging his racially mixed audience to fight for equal rights, Feiner made several disparaging remarks about local politicians, organizations, and President Truman. Two officers on the scene, fearing violence, asked Feiner to end his speech. After he refused, the officers arrested Feiner for inciting a breach of the peace. A trial court found Feiner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. On appeal, Feiner argued his arrest violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. Question Did Feiner's arrest for inciting a breach of the peace violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment? Conclusion In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, the Court upheld Feiner's arrest. The Court applied the "clear and present danger" principle it originally articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919). According to the Court, Feiner's arrest was a valid exercise of "the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets." The Court found that Feiner's First Amendment rights were not violated because his arrest came when the police thought that a riot might occur; the police attempted to suppress Feiner's message not based on its content but on the reaction of the crowd. The Court reaffirmed that a speaker cannot be arrested for the content of his speech. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion. In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black argued the evidence did not show that the crowd was about to riot. Justices Douglas and Milton wrote a separate dissent.

Planned Parenthood v American Coalition of Life Activists 290 F. 3d 1058 (9th Circuit 2002)

Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists (2002) Facts of the Case: -Website with WANTED list of doctors who perform abortions -Drew lines through names of those who were killed or injured Decision: -The list is unconstitutional because it threatens violence Opinion: (Ninth Circuit) -Distinguishes this from Claiborne -Draws a line between advocating violence (protected) and threatening violence (unprotected) -Claiborne is less directed at individuals and threatening towards individuals

Plato's Apology of Socrates

Socrates on trial for 1) corrupting youth 2) not believing in the Gods the city believes Socrates could not get let off - could not have his freedom of speech Responds to charge of him being an atheist because it is easier to reject

Brandenburg test

Speech can be prohibited if its directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action.

Storing, "The Constitution and the Bill of Rights"

Storings Essay Federalists gave us constitution, Anti-Federalists the Bill of Rights Federalist Bill of rights passed gave substantial Federal Powers Storings looks at how american law would have developed without Bill of Rights - undue weight put on confirmations of judges, etc.

Declaration of Rights, Virginia and Massachusetts

The Virginia Declaration of Rights is a document drafted in 1776 to proclaim the inherent rights of men, including the right to reform or abolish "inadequate" government. he Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and Constitution, drafted over a six-month period, was adopted in Spring 1780. ... The Massachusetts Preamble confirmed the "right of the people to set up what government they believe will secure their safety, prosperity, and happiness."

lemon test

The three-part test for Establishment Clause cases that a law must pass before it is declared constitutional: it must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not cause excessive entanglement with religion.

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 1799-1800

Virginia (Madison) and Kentucky (Jefferson) Resolutions 1799-1800 In response the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison and Jefferson went to their respective state legislatures The resolutions argued that the states had the right and the duty to declare as unconstitutional those acts of Congress that were not authorized by the Constitution Powers not enumerated, not necessary and proper State's power not Congress New understanding of freedom of speech and liberty of the press Seditious Libel is inconsistent with government where we want people to criticize it

The Virginia Report of 1800 (Madison)

Virginia Report of 1800 (Madison) Arguing in response to Virginia Resolution Argued for full freedom of speech and press as indispensable checks on officeholders under a republican form of government Addressed concern over freedom of press and its relationship with the first amendment - would this be a federally controlled issue or a state's one? Madison began his treatment of speech and press in the report by countering the argument that under English common law "freedom of the press" meant only freedom from prior restraint on publications. He argued that the understanding of press liberty in English common law was inapplicable to a republic like the United States, which was founded on the principle that "the people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty."

Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance"

Written in response to a proposed tax in Virginia to support Christian preachers, Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" argued that government involvement in religious matters has principled limits Highlights creator and man - duty to one's creator Conception of religion - community vs. individuals

Federalist #78

discusses the power of judicial review. It argues that the federal courts have the duty to determine whether acts of Congress are constitutional and to follow the Constitution when there is inconsistency. Hamilton viewed this as a protection against abuse of power by Congress. Federalist 78, Hamilton Discussion of judicial review Undemocratic tenure of judges (lifetime appointments) - concern of the anti-federalists Comes with unintended consequences Hamilton said that the Judiciary branch of the proposed government would be the weakest of the three branches because it had "no influence over either the sword or the purse, ...It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." Two part argument for judicial review Constitution supreme over acts of congress because ratified by the people Consult the people - in Fed 78 - leave it to people - difference between making law and interpreting law