Court cases

Wolf v. Colorado (1944)

(4& 14th amendment) Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendant would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in the federal court. Question- where the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the 4 and 14th amendment? -NO, THE 14 amendment did not impose specific limitations on criminal justice in the states, and that illegally obtained evidence did not necessarily have to be excluded from trials in all cases. -The court held that the 14th amendment did not subject to criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The court reason that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to Deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the due process clause. Civil remedies, such as "The internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.

Weeks v. United States (1914)

(4th amendment right) Illegal search & seizure, 1st use of exclusionary rule ◦ Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions. Question: did the search and seizure of weeks home violate the fourth amendment? -YES. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection of the fourth amendment six wearing the right to be secure against such charges and seizures would be no value whatsoever. This is the First application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule."

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

(5th, 6th, and 14th amendments, rights of the accused ) ◦ Arrested for kidnapping and sexual assault, Ernesto Miranda signed a confession including a statement that he had "full knowledge of his legal rights..." After conviction, he appealed claiming that without counsel and without warning, the confession was illegally gained. The court agreed with Miranda that "he must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to... An attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him..."although later modified by Nix v. Williams, 1984, and other cases, Miranda firmly up help citizens rights to fair trials in State courts. Question-Do the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination extend to the police interrogation of a suspect? -YES. The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.Therefore, prosecution may not use statements arising from a custodial interrogation of a suspect unless certain procedural safeguards were in place.

Furman v. Georgia (1972)

(8th amendment capital punishment) -3 different death penalty cases, including Furman,raised the question of racial imbalances in the use of death sentences by state courts. Furman had been convicted and sentenced to death in Georgia. In deciding to overturn existing state death penalty laws, the court noted that there was an "apparent arbitrariness of the use of sentences..." Many states rewrote their death penalty statutes and these were generally upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 1976 Question-does the imposition and caring out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and 14th amendment? -YES. The courts one page opinion her that the position of the death penalty in these cases constitutive cruel and then usual punishment and violated the Constitution

Adarand Contractors v. Pena (1995)

(Equal protection clause, 14th amendment; Due process, 5th amendment) Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales. -Question: is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment as well as the due process clause of the 5th amendment? -YES(for Adrand construction) A Supreme Court ruling that states that federal programs that classify people based on race, even to help minorities, are unconstitutional. the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

Clinton v. New York City (1998)

(Presentment Clause of Article 1) This case consolidates two separate charges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J Clinton under the line item veto act ("Act"). In the first, the city of New York, to hospital association, a hospital, and to healthcare unions, challenge the presidents cancellation of a provision in the balanced budget act of 1997 would relinquish the federal governments ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes love you against Medicaid providers by the state of U in the first, the city of New York, to hospital association, a hospital, and to healthcare unions, challenge the presidents cancellation of a provision in the balanced budget act of 1997 which relinquish the federal government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes love you and against Medicaid providers by the state of United State of New York. In the second, the snake River farmers cooperative and one of its individual members challenge the presidents cancellation of the provision of taxpayer relief act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refineries and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a distinct court hold the act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal. Question- did the presidents ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, enjoy the line item veto act, violate the pres did the presidents ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, enjoy the line item veto act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article 1? -YES. And I 63 decision in the court first establish that both the city of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperatives suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the presidents actions. The court then explained that under the Prestatement clause, legislation that passes both houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. Signed) or rejected (i.e. Vetoed) "by the president. The court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the act, the president in effect amended" The laws before him. Such discretion, The court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" I just laid of procedures of article 1 as envisioned by the Framers.

• United States v. Nixon (1974)

(Separation of power) ◦ During this investigation of the watergate scandal, in which members of president Nixon's administration were accused of participating in various illegal activities p, a special prosecutor subpoenaed tapes of conversations between Nixon and his advisors. Nixon refused to release the tapes, rejecting his arguments that they were protected by "executive privilege." The President's "generalized interest in confidentiality" was subordinate to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." -Question: can president use his executive priviledge confidentiality power and thoroughly immune from judicial review? -conclusion: NO. The court granted that needed the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalize need for confidentiality of high-level communications with out more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but give preference to the fundamental demand of the due process of law in the fair administration of justice. Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

(equal protection clause, 14th amendment) At 34, Allan bake applied to U.C (Davis) Medical school. Bakke had good recommendations, GPA, and scores on the MCAT admission test but was rejected in 1973 and 1974. UC (Davis) had an affirmation action plan that set up a 2-tier admission policy for medical school where of 100 spots in each 1st year class, 16 were set aside for minority applicants. Applicants for the 16 spots did not have to meet the same GPA, or MCAT scores as other applicants. Bakke sued in superior court, charged the university with reverse discrimination. 1.) Question: does U.C's admission's policy violate Bakke's rights under the 14th amendment's equal protection clause? -YES, the specific admissions program was unacceptable because it discriminated against one group of people in favor of another on the basis of race. Question-is race in admissions always unlawful? -NO, IF IT IS WEIGHED AGAINST OTHER CHARACTERISTICS. it is possible to use race as one element in a selection process but it has to be weighed against other characteristics and U.C's policy did not -reverse discrimination is not allowed; no saving a set number of places for minorities

McConnell v. FEC (2002)

Ban on "soft money", donations made directly to political parties, limits on the advertising that union, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election -Question- does the "soft money" ban of the campaign finance reform act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under article 1, section 4 of the United States constitution and/or violate the first amendment's protection of the freedom to speak? Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the campaign finance reform act of 2002 violate the 1st amendment's free speech clause? -NO. the court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision. The court rejected the argument that congress had exceed its authority to regulate elections under Article 1,section 4 of the constitution ◦ Upheld the constitutionality of most of the bipartisan campaign reform act of 2002

Korematsu v. United States (1944)

During World War II president executive order 9066 and congressional statutes did the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from Aries team is critical to national defense and attentionally phone Rible to espionage.Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated civilian exclusion order of the US military army. Question- did the president and Congress cool be on the war powers I implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese dissent? -NO, The exclusionary order applying to Americans of Japanese dissent was lawful. The court set with the government and how about the need to protect against espionage outweighed korematsu's rights. ‣ Decision: The court upheld the military order in light of the circumstances presented by World War II. "Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group."The court noted, however, that racial antagonism itself could never form a legitimate basis for the restrictions.

Illinois v. Caballes (2005)

During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Cabelles appealed and argued the search violated his 4th amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and route Palese performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "justifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the courts 7 to 2 opinion that Caballes' 4th amendment rights were not violated. The constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the court argued, because the dogs only alerted to an illegal drug. Question- Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop? Conclusion - NO because police do not need reasonable suspicion to use drug dogs to sniff vehicle during the German traffic stop in a 6 to 2 ruling the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment is not impacted when police use a dog sniff during the course of a legal traffic stop.

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

During the 1984 Republican national convention, Johnson (defendant) participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration. Johnson publicly burned an American flag well protesters chanted. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a "respected" object (flag) in violation of a Texas statute. Hey state court of appeals of friends. However the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reverted, holding that the state couldn't punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. Question-whether a defendant's burning of the flag constituted express of conduct, permitting him to invoke the 1st amendment? Is someone protected by the First Amendment if he burns a flag? -YES. The states interest in preserving a flag is a symbol of nationhood doesn't justify contacting someone because it is not consistent with the 1st amendment. A conviction for burning the US flag based on the Texas law was over ruled after the US Supreme Court found the Texas law unconstitutional. The case resulted in a battle lines being drawn between those in Congress who wanted to amend the constitution to permit restraints on flag The case resulted in a battle lines being drawn between those in Congress who wanted to amend the constitution to permit restraints on flag desecration and those who supported new legislation rather than constitutional amendment.

Bush v. Gore (2000)

In Bush v. Gore (2000), a divided Supreme Court ruled that the state of Florida's court-ordered manual recount of vote ballots in the 2000 presidential election was unconstitutional. The case proved to be the climax of the contentious presidential race between Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush. The outcome of the election hinged on Florida, where Governor Bush led Vice President Gore by about 1,800 votes the morning after Election Day. Because the returns were so close, Florida law called for an automatic machine recount of ballots. The recount resulted in a dramatic tightening of the race, leaving Bush with a bare 327-vote lead out of almost 6 million ballots cast. With the race so close, Florida law allowed Gore the option of "manual vote recounts" in the counties of his choosing. Gore opted for manual recounts in four counties with widespread complaints of voting machine malfunction: Broward, Miami-Dade, Volusia, and Palm Beach. However, Florida law also required that the state's election results be certified by the Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, within seven days of the election (by November 14, 2000). Three of the four counties, frantically laboring through the tedious manual recount, were unable to complete the process by the deadline. On November 14, however, a Florida circuit court ruled that while Secretary Harris must respect the deadline, she could legally amend the certified results, at her own discretion, to reflect any late returns from the outstanding counties. Harris promptly announced that she would entertain late returns only if their tardiness was justified by each county in writing by 2 p.m. the following day (November 15). The three outstanding counties-Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Broward- immediately sent an explanation for the delay. Secretary Harris, however, rejected their explanations and announced that the final Florida vote count would be announced Saturday, November 18, 2000. On November 16, both Vice President Gore and Palm Beach County filed for an injunction against Secretary Harris to prevent her from certifying the election until the three counties could finish their recounts. The Florida Supreme Court issued the injunction on November 17, and on November 21 ruled that Secretary Harris must allow the counties until November 26 to finish their recounts. Meanwhile, Miami-Dade stopped manually counting ballots, allegedly certain that it could not complete its recount by the November 26 deadline. Gore sought but failed to obtain a court order for Miami-Dade to continue counting. On November 26, with, at this point, just 537 votes separating Bush and Gore, Secretary Harris certified the election for Bush. The next day, Gore sued the secretary, alleging that the certified results were illegitimate because the recount process was not yet complete. After a local court dismissed the suit, Gore appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which ruled on December 8 that all Florida ballots cast but not counted by voting machines ("undervotes") must be manually recounted if they had not been already. The court noted that in many counties, machines did not register votes because of defects in punch-card ballots ("hanging chads"). Governor Bush appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which expeditiously reviewed the case on December 9. On December 12, 2000, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 "per curiam" (non-specially authored) decision, ruled that the Florida Supreme Court's recount order was unconstitutional because it granted more protection to some ballots than to others, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This clause forbids states from denying "to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Court argued that voting for a president constituted a "fundamental right" strictly guarded by the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Florida Supreme Court's order violated this right because it was "arbitrary." The Court alleged that the order contained standardless and unequal processes to divine the "intent of the voter" that were above and beyond the settled processes required by Florida election law. December 12, 2000, the day Bush v. Gore was decided, was also the state deadline for selecting electors to formally submit Florida's choice for president to Congress. Thus, with no time left to recount votes consistent with the Court's ruling, George W. Bush became the de facto winner. While some celebrated the Court's firm stance on equal rights in the face of political controversy, others criticized the decision as hypocritical and even politically opportunistic. For example, the five justices of the majority had previously and conversely granted great deference to state court decisions, and all were Republican appointees. Yet perhaps the harshest criticism came from the Court itself. In the concluding lines of his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens proclaimed that "one thing ... is certain. Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Question/issue- Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? -YES, Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment. Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county.

Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)

In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. Question- Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? -YES. the court upheld the students' first amendment rights. Because students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," schools must show a possibility of "substantial disruption" before free speech can be limited at school. Students may express personal opinions as long as they do not materially disrupt class work, create substantial disorder or interfere with the rights of others. In this case, the wearing of black armbands was a "silent, passive expression of opinion" without these side effects and thus constitutionally could not be prohibited by the school.

Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)

Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominately Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. the Cantwells distributed religious material by traveling door to door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells or subsequently arrested for violating the local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of peace. Question- did the solicitation statute or the "breach of peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells'first amendment free speech or free exercise rights? -YES. In a unanimous decision, the court held that well general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds or not. Because the statue allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, if violated the first and 14th amendments. The court also hope that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of use." The Cantwells' message, well offensive to many, did not entail any threat of bodily harm and was protected religious spea message, well offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech. ‣ Religion speech is protected, even from door-to-door, and not be regulated, as it would violate the first and 14th amendment

Miller v. California (1973)

Miller after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling. Recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings. Question- is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the 1st Amendment freedom of speech guarantee? -NO, the court held that obscene material did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The court modify the test four of sanity established in Roth v.United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "the basic : guidelines for the tear of fact must be (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...(b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision

United States v. Lashawn Lowell Banks (1998)

On July 15, 1998 police officers, with a warrant, knocked on the door of suspected drug dealer Lashawn Banks. They waited between 15 20/, and one banks did not come to the door they smashed it open with a battering ram. Banks was arrested but, before his trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment, because he claimed, the fourth and she had been unlawful. When the request was denied, he plead guilty, but eventually attempted to retract his guilty plea on the advice of a new attorney. The new attorney Randall Roske, argued that the search was unconstitutional because officers did not wait long enough before breaking down the door, and had no evidence that waiting longer would have had negative consequences. A ninth Circuit court of appeals agreed, ruling the storage unconstitutional and suppressing the evidence found during it. Question- how long must officers way after knocking on a door before they use force to break it down in order to execute a warrant and whether it violated the 4th amendment? -NO. It DID NOT VIOLATE THE 4th AMENDMENT. The Court unanimously held that 15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable period for police to wait before entering by force when they were investigating drug charges because waiting any longer was likely to result in the destruction of evidence.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England et al. (2006)

Planned parenthood of northern New England challenged the Parental Notification Prior in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violate d the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, was unconstitutionally narrow. The federal district court agreed. The Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statue is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra day o'connor, writing for the court held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was necessary. Instead, o'connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting (only) the statute's unconstitutional application." New Hampshire enacted parental notification law prohibiting abortions upon minors until at least 48 hours of written notice of the pending abortion had been delivered to parents or guardians with 3 exceptions court concluded as long as lower courts remain faithful to legislative intent, lower courts could issue a more narrowly drawn injunction. -Question- the plan northern New England challenge the constitutionality of parental notification prior to portion act in federal court before it is put into act? Does the parental notification prior to abortion act, through judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking a portions? -(The court overlooked the most contentious question of the case and focus instead on the proper remedy when a portion of the statute is found unconstitutional.) The statute would be unconstitutional one applied to a very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to for serious damage to their house. The lower courts decision to invalidate the entire statue based on unconstitutional results in the small percentage of cases, however it was unnecessary.

Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)

Reaffirmed the one person one vote decision of the 1962 keys a baker versus car when redistributing for federal elections. Each congressional district must be approximately the same in constituent size. ◦ James P. Wesberry, Jr. filed a suit against the Governor of Georgia, Carl E. Sanders, protesting the states appointments game. The fifth congressional district, of which Wesberry was a member, had a population 2 to 3 times larger than some of the other districts in the state. Wesberry claimed this system diluted his right to vote compared to other Georgia residents. Question- did Georgia's congressional districts violate the 14th amendment or deprive citizens of the full benefit of the right to vote? - YES. The court held that Georgia's appointment skin grossly discriminated against voters in the fifth congressional district. Because a single congressman had to represent 2 to 3 times as many people as were represented by congressman in other districts, the Georgia statute contracted the value of some votes and expanded the value of others. The court recognize that "no right is more precious" than that of having a voice in elections and held that "to say that a vote is worth more than one district then in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a house of representatives elected by the people." ‣ The court hold of Georgia's appointment scheme Grossly discriminated against voters in the fifth congressional district.

Maryland v. Pringle (2003)

Respondent was the front seat passenger in a car that was stopped for speeding. Upon stop in the car, the arresting officer found money in the glove compartment and cocaine in the backseat armrest. The officer arrested all three occupants of the car and respondent was convicted for possession with the intent to distribute cooking after he signed a written confession. Respondent appealed, arguing that probable cause to arrest him did not exist. The state court sentence Pringle, the front seat passenger, for processing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding the mere finding of cocaine in the back arm rest when Pringle was in the front seat of the car being driven by his owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession. When a reasonable officer can conclude that a defendant is guilty, probable cause exists. Question- does an armrest of a front seat passenger in a car driven by its owner, after police find cocaine in the cars back armrest, lack probable cause and violate the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures? -NO, In the unanimous opinion delivered by the chief justice, the court ruled that because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not violate the fourth amendment. The court reasoned that "A reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe The Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine."

Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police and third John Lawrences apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and garter were arrested and convicted of deviated sexual intercourse in violation of the Texas statute for building two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. And affirming, the state court of appeals how that the statute was not unconstitutional under the due process of the 14th amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, (1986), controlling. Question- do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same -sex sex couples but not identical behaviors by different -sex couples, violate the 14th amendment guarantee of equal protection laws? Do you there criminal convictions of a dog consensual sexual intimacy in the home by later vital interest in liberty and privacy protected by the due process clause of the 14th amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) be overruled? -NO, YES, YES. the court held that Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the due process clause. After explaining what it themed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, The court reason that the case turned on whether Lawrence and garner we're free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the due process clause. "Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute for there's no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Accordingly the court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment

Locke v. Davey (2004)

The Washington State promise scholarship, created by the state legislator in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is talk to cause belief. Washington's Constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this band to college financial aid. Joshua Davie forfeited his promise scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at the private Christian college. David filed suit in US District Court, claiming the state constitutions ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the US Constitution). The district court rejected Davies claim. The ninth circuit court of appeals reversed, concluding David's free exercise rights were violated. Question- if a state provides college scholarships or secular instruction, does the first amendment free exercise clause require a state to fund religious instruction? -NO, In a 7-2 vote, The court ruled that a state does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause wanted fun secular college majors but excludes devotional theology majors. The court rejected Davies argument that the state scholarship program is unconstitutional because it is not neutral toward religion. "The state has an early chosen not to find a distinct category of instruction," The court wrote. Similarly the Washington Constitution- which explicitly provides state money from going to religious instruction- does not violate the free exercise clause unlike laws and programs the court has struck down under the free exercise clause, nothing in either the scholarship program or the state constitution "suggests animus toward religion." States have a "historic and substantial interest" in excluding religious activity from public funding.

Lau v. Nichols (1974)

The case involved a class action suit brought by non-English -speaking Chinese students living in San Francisco, who alleged a violation of title VI of the civil rights act because only 1700 of about 35000 Chinese students in need of special English instruction were actually receiving it. The court ruled that failing to accommodate LEP students' language needs is a violation of their right to a federally funded education free from national origin discrimination, and makes a "mockery of public education." -chinese students living in san francisco claimed that they were not receiving special help in school due to their inability to speak english -Question: did this violate Civil rights act of 1964 which bans education description on the basis of national origin? -YES, the court ruled in favor of the Chinese students (Lau) because there was a lack of linguistically appropriate accommodations and this denied the students equal educational opportunities on the basis of their ethnicity. Language based discrimination is a proxy for national origin discrimination because language is so closely intertwined with national origin

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

◦ (14th amendment) The Archbishop of San Antonio through local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 religious freedom restoration act, by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the archbishops church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance for bidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional in so far as its thought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit reversal of a district courts finding against Archbishop Flores, the court granted Boerne's request for Certiorari. Question- did Congress exceed its 14th amendment enforcement powers by and I think the RFRA witch, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulations? -YES, Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burdening" religious free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The court held that while Congress may enact such legislations as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states and force the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the court added, is presisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they do you most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest a Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise. ‣ What is the RFRA constitutional? ‣ No the RFR a was unconstitutional because it exceeded its limits of power and Congress was not enforcing constitutional religious freedom protections, but writing new protections against local governments above and beyond what the First Amendment guarantees. The Constitution does not give Congress such a sweeping power in section 5.

Reno v ACLU (1997)

◦ (1st amendment) Several litigants Challenge the constitutionality of two provisions in 1996 communications decency act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable Internet material, the act criminalized that international transmission of "obscene or indecent" Messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed offensive by community standards. After being and joined by a District Court from enforcing the book provisions, except for one concerning obscenity and it's inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney a General Janet Reno appeal directly to the Supreme Court has provided for by the Act's special review provisions ◦ At issue is the constitutionality of 2 statutory provision enacted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet. The district court made extensive findings of fact about the Internet and the CDA. It held that the statute abridged the "freedom of speech" protected by the first amendment of the United States constitution. Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Question- did certain provisions of the 1996 communications decency at violate the first and fifth amendment by being overly broad and vague and their definitions of the type of Internet Communications which they criminalized? -(Did certain provisions of the 1996 communications Decency Act violate the 1st and 5th amendment's by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of Internet communications which they criminalizes?) -YES. The court held the act violated the First Amendment because it's regulations amounted to a content- based blanket restriction of free speech. The act failed to clearly define indecent communications, limiting its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of Internet Communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of offensive material is the void of any social value. The court added that since the first amendment distinguishes between indecent an obscene sexual expression, projecting only the former, The act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped The words "or indecent" from its text. The court refuses to address any Fifth Amendment issues. ‣ Result- the court held that the act violated the 1st amendment because it's regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. That Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restriction to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of Internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The court added that since the 1st amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the act could be saved from facial over breath challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent. From its text. The court refused to address any 5th amendment issues. PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET IS A PROTECTED RIGHT.

Roper v. Simmons (2005)

◦ (The 8th and 14th amendment) Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court decided Atkin v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day) violated the 8th and 14th amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmon's case. Using the reasoning from the Atkin case, the Missouri court decided, 6-3 that the US Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional. On appeal to the US Supeeme Court, the government agrued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decisions by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to change in the beliefs of the Americans people. -Question- Does the execution of minors violated the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the 8th amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th amendment? -YES. the court ruled that standard of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the 8th amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and it's own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US (1964)

◦ (civil rights act of 1964, Title II) Title II of the civil rights act of 1964 forebed racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The heart of Atlanta motel in Atlanta Georgia, refuse to except black Americans and was charged with violating title II. -Question: did Congress, and passing titled two of the 1964 civil rights act, exceed its commerce clause power by depriving motels, such as the heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers? -YES. The court does concluded that places of public accommodation had no right to select just as they saw fit, free from governmental regulations. Segregation by race of prime facilities engaged in interstate commerce is unconstitutional.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1819)

◦ (commerce clause, article 1, section 8 & supremacy) New York granted Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton executive rights of steamboat navigation on New York state waters. Livingston assigned to Ogden The right to navigate the waters between New York City and certain ports in New Jersey. Ogden (p) brought this lawsuit seeking an injunction to restrain Gibbons(d) from operating steamships on New York waters in violation of his exclusive privilege. Ogden was granted the injunction and gibbons appealed asserting that his steam ships were licensed under the act of Congress and titled "an act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." Gibbons asserted that the act of Congress superseced The exclusive privilege granted by the state of New York ◦ Fulton had a steamboat monopoly on the waterways of New York. ◦ Givens got a congressional contract saying that he can transport people on the coast of New York. Ogden sued gibbons because the monopoly Fulton had. The state ruled in favor of Ogden but it was apealed. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of gibbons. This ended the steamboat monopoly, increased authority and power of the national government by further defining commerce and was Used in the civil rights act of 1964 Question: Did the state of New York exercise authority in a room reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? -NO. The unanimous Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. The court decided the power over interstate commerce is in the hands of the Congress. (Article 1 section 8 says, Congress has the power to regulate commerce.)

Bob Jones University v. US (1983)

◦ 14 amendment in conflict with the 1st amendment Bob jones university, a private school, denied admission to applicants in an interracial marriage or dating. The Internal Revenue Service then denied tax exempt status to the school because if racial discrimination. The university of appealed, claiming their policy was based on the bible . The court upheld the IRS ruling, stating that "...government has a fundamental overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education." Question- can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the first amendment free exercise clause? - The court found that the IRS was correct and it's decision to revoke the tax exempt status of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian school. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing beneficial and stabilizing influence in the community like to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. the school cannot meet this requirement to today discriminatory policies.

Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept of Health (1990)

◦ 14th amendment, due process clause After Nancy Beth cruzan was left in a "persistent vegetative state" by a car accident, Missouri officials refused to comply with her parent's request that the hospital terminate life-support. The court upheld the state policy under which officials refuse to withdraw treatment, rejecting the argument that the due process clause of the 14th amendment gave the parents the right to refuse treatment on their daughter's behalf. Although individuals have the right to refuse medical treatment, "the incompetent" persons are not able to exercise this right; without "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired the withdrawal of treatment, the state could legally act to perserve her life. Question- did the due process clause of the 14th amendment permit Chrisman's parents to refuse life-sustaining treatment on their daughters behalf? -YES.The court held that well individuals enjoy the right to refuse medical treatment and the due process clause, incompetent persons we're not able to exercise such rights.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1894)

◦ 14th amendment, equal protection clause A Louisiana law required separate seating for white and African American citizens on public railroads, a form of segregation. Herman Plessy argued that his right to "equal protection of the laws" was violated. The court held that segregation was permitted if facilities were equal. The court interpreted the 14th amendment as "not intended to give Negroes social equality but only political and civil equality..." The Louisiana law was seen as a "reasonable exercise of (state) police power..." Segregated public facilities were permitted until Plessy was overturned by brown v. Board of education case of 1954. Question- is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on it strange unconstitutional infringement on both the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment? -NO, (for Ferguson), the state law is with them constitutional boundaries. Equal but separate accommodations for whites and blacks and post by Louisiana do not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The justice is based a decision on the separate but equal doctrine, that separates facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the 14th amendment so long as they were equal.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

◦ 14th amendment, equal protection clause Probably no 20th century Supreme Court decision so deeply stirred and changed life in the united states as brown. A 10-year old Topeka girl, Linda Brown, was not permitted to attend her neighborhood school because she was an African American. The Court heard arguments about whether segregation itself was a violation of the equal Protection clause and found that it was, commenting that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place... Segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." The decision overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896. Question-Does the segregation of public education based solely Andres finally pickle protection clause of the 14th amendment? -YES. The Supreme Court held that the separate but equal facilities are inherently unequal and violet the protection of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The court also how that's aggregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of every already that how do you sleep detrimental facts on the education and personal growth of African-American children.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)

◦ 1st amendment, establishment clause In overturning state laws regarding aid to church supported schools in this and a Similar Rhode Island case, the court created the Lemon testing limiting "... Excessive government entanglement with religion." The court noted that any state law about the two religion must need three criteria: 1. Purpose of the aid must be clearly secular, 2. It's primary effect must either advance nor inhibit religion, and 3. It must avoid "excessive entanglement of government with religion" Question- do you statutes that provides state funding for non-public, nonsecular school by a little establishment clause of the First Amendment? -YES. The court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the establishment clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, it's principal or primary effect must be one that need to promote no inhibits religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure a minimum secular education requirements were being met in a non-public schools.

Engel v. Vitale (1962)

◦ 1st amendment, establishment clause The state board of regents of New York required the recitation of a 22 word nonsectarian prayer at the beginning of each school day. A group of parents filed suit against the required prayer, claiming it violated their 1st amendment rights. The court found New York's action to be unconstitutional, observing,"there can be no doubt that...religion beliefs (are) embodied in the Regent's prayer." Question-does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day Violate the establishment clause of religion clause of the First Amendment? -YES, (for Engels) . Yes neither the prayers nondenominational character no it's voluntary care to saves it from unconstitutionality by providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first series of cases in which the court is the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities

Schenck v. US (1919)

◦ 1st amendment, freedom of speech Charles Schenck was an officer of an anti war political group who was arrested for alleged violations of the Espionage act of 1917, which made active opposition to the war crime. He has urged thousands of young men called to service by the draft act to resist and to avoid induction. The court limited free speech in time of war, stating that Schenck's words, under the circumstances, presented a "clear and present danger..." Although later decisions modified the decision, the Schenck case created a precedent that 1st amendment guarantees were not absolute. Question- are Schenck's actions (words, expressions) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment? - NO. (for us) Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act of pens on the circumstances. During wartime, I don't see is tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)

◦ 1st amendment, freedom of speech In 198, the principal of hazel wood east high school in Missouri removed two articles from the upcoming issue of the student newspaper, deeming their content "inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable for student readers." Several students sued the school district, claiming that their 1st amendment right to freedom of expression had been violated. The court upheld the principal's action, stated that "a school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." School officials had full control over school- sponsored activities "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns..." Question- did the principal solution of the articles Violate to students right under the First Amendment? -NO, the court held that the First Amendment did not record schools to affirmatively promote particular types of students bitch. The court held that schools must be able to set high standards for students bitch disseminated under the auspices, and that schools retain the right to refuse to sponsor a speech that was inconsistent with the shared values of civilized social order.

New York Times Co. v. UnitedStates (1971)

◦ 1st amendment, freedom of the press In 1971 The New York Times obtained copies of classified Defense Department documents , later know as the "Pentagon Papers," which revealed instances in which the Johnson Administration had deceived congress and the American people regarding US policies during the Vietnam War. A US district court issued an injunction against the publication of the documents, claiming that it might endanger national security. On appeal, the Supreme Court cited the 1st Amendment guarantee of a free press and refused to uphold the injunction against the publication, observing that it is the obligation of the government to prove that actual harm to the nation's security would be caused by the publication. The decision limited "prior restraint" of the press. Question-did the Nixon administration's effort to prevent the publication overdetermined classified information violate the First Amendment? -YES. The court held that government did not overcome to have a presumption against prior restraint of the press in this case. Since publication for not cause an evitable, direct, and immediate ****ed in Pearland the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

Mapp v. Ohio (1962)

◦ 4th and 14th amendment, illegal evidence and due process clause ◦ Admitting evidence game by illegal stretches was permitted by some states before Mapp. Cleveland police raided Dollree Mapp's home without a warrants and found of seen materials. She appealed her f conviction, saying that the 4th and 14th amendments protected against improper police behavior. The court agreed, extending "exclusionary rule" protections to citizens and state courts, saying that the prohibition against unreasonable searches would be "meaningless" unless evidence gained in such searches was "excluded." Mapp developed the concept of "incorporation" be going in Gitlow v. New York, 1925 1.)Question- where the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? 2.)The evidence obtained through a search in violation of the fourth amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding? -1. IGNORED & 2. NO. (for Mapp)The court brushed aside the first amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by the fourth amendment, inadmissible in a state court . map had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtaining evidence.

New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)

◦ 4th and 14th amendments After T.L.O, a New Jersey high school student, denied an accusation that she had been smoking in the school laboratory, a vice principal searched her purse and found cigarettes, marijuana evidence that T. O. L had been involved in marijuana dealing at the school. T. L. O was then sentenced to probation by a juvenile court, but appealed on the grounds that the evidence against her had been obtained by an "unreasonable" search. The court rejected T. L. O's arguments stating that the school had a "legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place," and that yo do this "requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject..." The court thus created a "reasonable suspicion" rule for school searches, a change from the "probable cause" requirement in the wider society. Question- does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools? - NO, (for New Jersey ) The court held that while the fourth amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures a place to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable for the searches of students under their authority no withstanding the probable cause standard that would normally reply to search is under the fourth amendment. The court held that the search of TLO's purse was reasonable under the circumstances.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)

◦ 5th amendment, individual rights -This decision upheld property rights over human rights by saying that Dred Scott, s slave, could not become a free man just because he has traveled in "free soil"Dyayes with his master. A badly divided nation was further fragmented by the decision. "Free soil" federal laws and the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 were held unconstitutional because they deprived a slave owner of the right to his "property" without just compensation. This narrow reading of the Constitution, a landmark case of the Court, was most clearly stated by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, a States' rights advocate. Question- was Dred Scott free or slave? -NO, HE WAS PROPERTY. (for Sanford) how provisions of the Missouri compromise unconstitutional in violation of the fifth amendment treating Scott has property, not as a person. Dread Scott was a slave.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)

◦ 6th amendment, right to counsel -In 1961 a Florida court found Clarence Earl Gideon of breaking and entering and sentenced him to 5 years in prison. Gideon appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that he had been unconstitutionally denied counsel during his trial due to Florida's policy of only providing appointed counsel in capital cases. The court granted Gideon a new trial, and he was found not guilty with the help of a court-appointed attorney. The "Gideon rule" upheld the 6th amendment's guarantee of counsel of all poor persons facing a felony charge, a further incorporation of bill of rights guarantees into states constitutions Question- does the sixth amendments right to counsel in criminal cases extensive felony defendants in state courts? -YES, (for Gideon) yes the Supreme Court held that the framers of the constitution placed a high value on the right of the accused to have the means to put up a proper difference, and the state as well as federal courts what's respect that right. The court held that it was consistent with the constitution to require stay chords to. Chinese for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own.

Gregg v. Georgia (1976)

◦ 8th amendment, cruel and unusual punishment A Georgia Jerry sentenced Troy Greg to death after finding him guilty on two counts each of murder and armed robbery. Greg appealed the sentence, claiming that it violated the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the 8th amendment and cited Furman vs. Georgia, 1972, in which the court held that George's application of the death penalty was unfair and arbitrary. However, the court upheld Greg's sentence, stating for the first time that " punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution." Question- is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the eighth and 14th amendments as cruel and then unusual punishment? - NO. The court held that the punishment did not violate the eighth and 14th amendment under all circumstances. Aniston criminal case such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicial use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed.

Roe v. Wade )1973)

◦ 9th amendment, right to privacy A Texas woman challenged a State law forbidding the artificial termination of a pregnancy, saying that she "had a fundamental right to privacy." The court upheld a woman's right to choose in this case, noting that the state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life" became "compelling" at the end of the first trimester, and that before then, "...the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that... The patient's pregnancy should be terminated." The decision struck down the state regulation of abortion in the first three months of pregnancy and was modified by Planned Parenthood of southeastern PA v,Casey, 1992. Question- does the constitution embrace a woman's rights to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? -YES. (for roe) yes. The court held that a woman's right to an abortion pill with them the right to privacy protected by the 14th amendment.

United States v. Lopez (1990)

◦ Article 1, section 8, Commerce Clause) Alfonso Lopez Texas high school student, was convicted of carrying a weapon in a school zone under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. He appealed his conviction on the basis that the act, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at place that (he) knows...is a school zone," exceeded Congress's legislative power under the commerce clause. The court agreed that the act was unconstitutional, stating that to uphold the legislation would "bid fair to convert congressional commerce clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the states." -Question: is the 1990 gun free school zone act, forbidding individuals of normally caring a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to register under the commerce clause? -YES. The possession of a gun in the local school zone is not an economic activity that might have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic activity

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

◦ Brandenburg, a A leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a clan rally and was later convicted under on Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons form to teach or advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism." Question- did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by The first and 14th amendments? -YES. the Court's Per Curiam Opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The court used a two pronged test to a valuate speech act: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to insight or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctors while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually insights imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

◦ Buckley the senator of New York; Voleo what's the secretary of the senate and member of the SEC who represented the US federal government ◦ In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns but restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the last set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The federal election commission was created to force the statue. Question- did the limits placed on the electoral expenditures by the federal election campaign act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment freedom of speech and association clauses? -YES & NO (DID NOT VIOLATE 1st AMENDMENT) Restrictions on the individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate first amendment since FECA limitations enhance integrity of representstive democracy. Governmental restrictions of independent expenditures in campaigns , the limitation on expenditurrd by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and limit on total campaign expenditurrd did violate first amendment. Only President can appoint people to prosecute against this. ‣ The Supreme Court struck down on First Amendment ground several provisions in the 1974 amendments to the federal election campaign act ◦ Impact- starting point for judicial analysis of the constitutionality of finance restrictions -A case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld federal limits on campaign contributions and ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally protected free speech. The court also stated candidates can give unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns.

Maryland v. Blake (2005)

◦ Following his arrest for murder, Leeandre Blake. Invoked his rights to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of charges against him. The statement of charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake " I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "no, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. If we cannot talk to him now." They have our later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore in admissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waves his previous request.) they county circuit court agreed with Blake, and wrote the statement in admissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blakes interrogation with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, but the officer's statements was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the detectives correction did not reduce the severity of the officers inappropriate statement. Since the officers statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blakes Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial. Question-when a police officer in properly communicate with the suspect after the suspect has both his rights to an attorney, does add words versus Arizona permit consideration of Edwords versus Arizona permit consideration of Curative measures by the police (such as the detectives quick correction of the officers improper statement) to conclude that is suspect later initiated communication with the police? -UNANSWERED. Shortly after oral argument, the court dismissed the case. The anonymous per curiam opinion stated simply: "the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."

NAACP v. Patterson L (1958)

◦ Freedom of association. The right to assemble and groups was protected here ◦ As part of its starting to enjoin in the NAACP from operating, Alabama required it to reveal to the states' attorney general The names and addresses of all the NAACP'd members and the agents in the state. ‣ Attorney general of Alabama wanted to stop the NAACP from operating in the state. Alabama law requires out of state corporations to register.NAACP refuses to release its membership list. ◦ In 1956, the attorney general of Alabama brought a suit to the state circuit court of Montgomery Alabama challenging the national Association for advancement of colored people for violation of a State statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify before doing business in the state. The NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation based in New York, have not complied with the statute, as it believed it was exempt.The State Theatre saw both to prevent the association from conducting further business within the state and, indeed, to remove it from the state. Referring to the association's involvement with the Montgomery boycott in 1955 And it's role in funding and providing legal assistance to black students seeking admission to the State University, the suit charge the association with "...causing era parable injury to the property and civil rights of the residence and citizens of the state of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afforded no adequate relief..." On the day the suit was filed, the circuit court agreed to issue an ex parte order restraining the association from conducting business in the state we're taking steps to qualify you to do so. The association order restraining the association from conducting business in the state we're taking steps to qualify you to do so. The association what represented through out by Robert L. Carterof the NAACP legal defense fund, responded by moving to dissolve the order on the grounds that it's activities within the state did not require it's qualification under the statute and that the states Suit was intended to violate its rights to freedom from speech and of assembly as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Before a hearing date was set the state issued a subporna for much of the association's records, including bank statements and leases, most notably the names and addresses of the agents or members of the association in Alabama. In it's response to the lawsuit, The association admitted that it was in breach of the statute and offered to obtain qualifications to continue business if that part of the ex parte order was lifted. Because the Association did not comply with the order to produce its records, the motion was denied and the association was held in contempt and find $10,000. The content order allowed for the reduction or promotion of the fine if the production order was complied within five days, after which the fun would be raised to $100,000. Contending that the state could not constitutionally force disclosure of documents, the association moved to dismiss the content judge once more. According to Alabama case law however, a petitioner could not seek a hearing or to dissolve an order until it purged itself of contempt. The United States supreme Court reversed the first contempt judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court then claimed the US Supreme Court had rallied on a "mistake and promise" and reinstated the content judgment, which the US Supreme Court reversed again. The NAACP move to try the case on the merits; this motion was denied and again appealed to the US Supreme Court, which reminded the case to Alabama, and ordered the federal district court to try the case on the merits if the Alabama quarts of them continue to refuse to do so. The Alabama state circuit court finally heard the case on the merits, and if I did the NAACP had violated Alabama law and order to stop doing business in the state; The Alabama appeals court upheld this judgment, refusing to hear the NAACP's appeal on constitutional grounds. Finally, the fourth time the case with heard by the US Supreme Court, since Alabama scored system was unreliable and bias. Question- did Alabama's requirements violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment? -(May a state require an interest group to reveal names and addresses of its members as agent in the state without regard to their positions or functions?) -YES. The unanimous court held that the compiled disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists would have the effects of suppressing legal association among the groups members. Nothing short of an "overriding valid interest in the state", something not present in this case, what's needed to justify Alabama's actions. (No they could not release the names.) ◦ Significance- by ensuring the privacy of members of the association The core protected supporters of the civil rights movement whom I have face persecution if their names were revealed, I neared by adding the movement in attracting new members.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

◦ Griswold was the executive director of Planned Parenthood league of Connecticut. Both she and the medical director of the league gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleagues were convicted under the Connecticut law which criminalized the provisions of counseling and other medical treatment, to marry persons for purposes of preventing contraception. -Question: does the Constitution protects the right of Marshall privacy against the restrictions on a couples ability to be counseled and the use of contraceptives? -YES. Implied. The first, third, fourth, and ninth amendments, created a new constitutional right, the rights of privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut's statue conflicts with the exercise of this right and therefore null and void.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)

◦ Helped affirm the basic ruling of Roe v. Wade that the state is prohibited from banning most abortions. ◦ Planned parenthood of southeastern Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit against the state (Casey, governor of Pennsylvania) arguing that the abortion control act violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade. ◦ The Pennsylvania legislator amended it's a portion control in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour wait. Prior to the procedure. Reminder seeking an abortion required their consent of one parent (The law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upholds all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. Question- can A state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent within 24 hours, if married, notify their husbands, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? -(YES?) The court ruled saying they were staying with their first ruling in Roe v. Wade, that it was a woman's right to privacy if they wanted an abortion and that the state could not interfere with that.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989)

◦ In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that passed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statutes preamble indicated that "" The life of each human being begins at conception,and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mothers life; encourag and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians order to perform viability tests upon women in their 20+ week of pregnancy. Lower court struck down the restrictions. Question- did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment? -NO. (for Webster), <Held that the Due Process Clause does not require states to enter into the business of abortion and did not mandate governmental aid; states could restrict abortion although the Court upheld the right to an abortion> -a controversial and highly fractured decision, the court held that none of the challenge the provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete matter for the purposes of restricting abortions, and dusted not present a constitutional question. Second, the court hope that the due process clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. third, the court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the states interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The court emphasize that it was not revisiting the central portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.

United States v. Morrison g2000)

◦ In 1994, while enrolling at Virginia Polytech institute, Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala Filed a A complaint against Morrison and Crawford how do you think others would describe me under Virginia tax sexual assault policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the universities administrative system, more since punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive". Ultimately, Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawfords attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the violence against women act of 1994, which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford move to dismiss Brzonkala's threw it on the ground that section 13981's The civil remedy was unconstitutional. In discussing the complaint, the district court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the commerce clause or the 14th amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as a sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question- does Congress have the authority to enact a violence against women act of 1994 under the commerce clause or 14th amendment? - NO. the court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the car is clause or the 14th amendment since the statue did not regulate an activity that substantially affect in interstate commerce nor did it's free dress harm caused by the state. "if the allegations here are true, no supplies system of justice would fail to provide a remedy for the conduct of Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, not by the United States."

Lockhart v. United States (2016)

◦ In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted on operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart's computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of 1st° sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the presentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart's argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower courts decision. Question- does the mandatory minimum for a child pornography sentence apply when the defendant had previously been convicted of "aggravated sexual abuse" or "sexual abuse," even when the previous conviction does not involve a minor? -YES, A prior conviction of "aggravated sexual abuse" or "sexual abuse" May trigger a mandatory minimum sentence even when the prior conviction did not involve a minor. Justice Sonia delivered the opinion for the 6 to 2 majority. The court held that the last adjacent rule of statutory interpretation dictates that a limiting clause following a list of terms or phrases only modifies the one that directly proceeds it. Although that presumption may be overcome, there is no indication that the presumption is meant to be overcome in this case. The context of the mandatory minimum sentencing section indicates that Congress intended to Mirror the language of chapter 109A of the federal criminal code, The subdivisions of which nap onto the language is question was only the third of the group being limited to sexual abuse involving a minor. Additionally, when ambiguity can be resolved through basic grammatical analysis, there is no reason to apply other canons of statutory construction. ‣ Result- Lockhart's previous conviction is encompassed by the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement. Prior conviction of "aggravated sexual abuse" or "sexual abuse" may trigger a mandatory minimum sentence even when the prior conviction did not involve a minor.

Barron v. Baltimore (1833)

◦ John Barron Was co owner of a profitable wharf in the harbor of Baltimore. As the city developed and expanded, large amounts of sand accumulated in the harbor, depriving Barron of the deep waters which had been key to his successful business. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses Question: does the 5th amendment deny the states and national government the right to take private property for public use without justly compensating the property owner? -NO, the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. state government are not bound by the 5th amendment requirements for just compensation of case of eminent domain. (for Baltimore, dismissal). Ruled that the Bill of Rights cannot be applied to the states.

Clinton v. Jones (1997)

◦ Jones claimed Clinton sexually harassed her during events that took place prior to Clinton assuming the presidency. In May of 1991, jones worked as a state employee at a conference for which Clinton gave a speech. Jones claimed that a state police officer persuaded her to go to Clinton's hotel room, where Clinton proceeded to make sexual advances, toward her. Jones alleged experienced on the job retaliation because she rejected these advances. When Clinton was elected President in 1992, Jones claimed she was defamed when spokesmen for Clinton denied her allegations, branding Jones a liar. On May 6, 1994, Jones filed suit in District court and Clinton filed a motion to dismiss based on presidential immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but delayed the trial until after Clinton left office. Both parties appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but reversed the delay in the trial. Question- is a serving president, for separation of power reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office? -NO, in a unanimous opinion, the court held that the constitution does not grant a sitting president immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owned to the executive office,mother court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the constitution does not prohibit these branches from excess using any control over one another. This, the court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which article II jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief a Executive.

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow et al. (2004)

◦ Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in elk Grove unified school District in California. Elk Grove Teachers begin school days by leading students in a voluntary recite Tatian of the Pledge of Allegiance including the words "under God" added by a 1954 congressional act. Newdow's -sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate to the words "under God" violates the Establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's first amendment. The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The US ninth circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that Newdow's did not have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The ninth circuit court ruled that congresses 1954 act adding The words "under God" to the pledge and the school district policy requiring it to be cited both violated the First Amendment establishment clause. Question: Does Michale Newdow's have standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance? Does a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words "under God", violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment? - NO. The Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody of his daughter."When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay it's hand rather than reach out to resolve a Weighty question of federal constitutional law." Because he found that Newdow did not have standing, the court failed to reach the constitutional question. (Supreme Court Justice's wrote separate concurrences saying that requiring teachers to lead the pledge is constitutional.

Everson v. Bd. of Education (1947)

◦ New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on buses operated. By the public transportation system. Children who attend Catholic schools also qualified for this transportation subsidy. Question- Did the new jersey statute violate the Establishment clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the 14th amendment? - NO. A divided court held that the Law is not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the establishment clause, justice black argued that services like busing and police and fire protection for pariah coo no. I divided court held that the Lord is not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the establishment clause, justice black argued that services like busing and police and fire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was simply a law enacted as a "general program" to assist parents of all religions with getting the children to school.

Baker v. Carr (1962)

◦ One man one vote. Ordered state legislative districts to be as near equal as possible and population; warrens court judicial activism ◦ Charles W. Baker and Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's general assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth in population shifts within the state. Question -did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment? -YES (decision for Baker), in an opinion which explore the nature of political questions and the appropriateness of court action in them, the court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a judicial in an opinion which explore the nature of political questions and the appropriateness of court action in them, the court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative a portion meant was a justiciable issue. Justice Brennan concluded that the 14th amendment equal protection issues which baker and others raised in this case married a judicial evaluation.

New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)

◦ Supports freedom of the press -The Court protected statements about public officials. -This case is about a full-page ad alleging the arrest of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. For perjury in Alabama. The false statement's intention was to destroy King's effort to integrate public facilities and encourage black Americans to vote. Mr. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, issue a libel suit against the New York Times and 4 blacks listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against Montgomery police defamed him personally. However, Sullivan didn't have to prove that he harmed under Alabama law. In NYT v. Sullivan, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgement to respondent, since it failed to support finding that the statements were made with actual malice or that related to respondent -Question: did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe the 1st amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an ad caused him personal harm and dismiss the same as untruthful due to factual error? -YES (uninimity decision for NYT). the court held that the 1st amendment protects all the statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public official except when the statement is made with actual malice. Under this standard, Sullivan case collapsed.

Reynolds v. Simms (1964)

◦ The 1961, M.O Sims, David J. Van (Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson county, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. The Alabama Constitution prescribed that each county was entitled to at least one representative and that there were to be as many senatorial districts as there were senators. Population variance ratios of as great as 41 to 1 existed in the Senate. Question- did Alabama's apportionments scheme violate the 14th amendment equal rights protection clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances? -YES. the court upheld the Challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal protection clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens." Noting that the right to direct representation was "A bedrock of our political system," The court held that both houses of bicameral state legislators had to be apportioned on a population basis. The states were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practical.

• McCreary County, Kentucky et al. v. ACLU of Kentucky et al (2005)

◦ The American Civil Liberties Union suit three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying frame copies of the 10 Commandments in courthouse and public schools. The American Civil Liberties Union argued that displays violated the First Amendment establishment clause, which prohibited the government from passing laws "respecting understand the smell of religion." The district court and the 6 Circuit Court of appeals rule the displays violated the Establishment clause. Question- 1.) do the 10 Commandments displays in public schools and in court houses violate the First Amendment establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2.). Was a determination that displays purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays invalidation? - 1.YES. & 2. YES. In a 5 to 4 opinion, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the court held, an observer would have concluded that government was endorsing religion. The first display for representing the 10 Commandments in isolation; The second for showing the commandments along with other religious passages; The third for representing the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for anyway to keep a religious document on the walls of court houses." ‣ The display of the 10 Commandments was unconstitutional

Malloy v. Hogan (1964)

◦ The court Inc. the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination and a 5 to 4 decision. The main significance of this case is the setting rejection of the older view ◦ William Malloy was arrested during a gambling read in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a Mr. meaner, he was sentenced to one year in jail and find $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two-years probation. Psalm 16 months following his plea, a superior court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, "on the grounds it may tend to incriminate him" he was in prison for content and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut supreme court of Aries ruling, upholding an adverse superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question- does the 14th amendment protects is state witnesses fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding? -YES.. In a 5 to 4 both the court held that the fifth amendment exception from compulsatory self-incrimination is protected by the 14th amendment against abridgment by a state. When determining if state officers properly obtained a confession, one must focus on whether the statements were made freely and voluntarily without any direct or implied promise or improper influence. Noting that the American judicial system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, the court ruled that the 14th amendment securest offense against self incrimination and compels state and federal officials to establish guilt by evidence that is free and independent of a suspect's or witnesses statements.

Gratz et al. v. Bollinger et al (2003)

◦ The university of Michigan's office of undergraduate admission considers a number of factors in it's a valuate of process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, Alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The office of undergraduate admissions also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be "underrepresented minorities." Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a points system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an under represented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an admissions review committee to provide an additional level of consideration. In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admissions to the university of Michigan College of literature, science, and the arts as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admissions and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstdt. They argued that he admission procedure discriminated against certain racial an app in the groups in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and title six of the civil rights act of 1996. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethically diverse student body produce significant academic benefits but that the admissions policy of 1995 through 1998. Were problematic because they amounted to "holding seats" for certain my Nordie groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policy for 1995 through 1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The US court of appeals for the six circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, it's similar case, and upheld. The universities admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue. Question- did the University of Michigan's use of racial preference in undergraduate admissions violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and title six of the civil rights act of 1964? - YES. In a 6-3 majority vote, The court held that the office of undergraduate admissions policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy did not provide individual consideration, but rather resulted in the admission of nearly every applicant of underrepresented minorities status, it was not narrowly tailored in the manner required by previous jurisprudence on the issue. Because the committee played only a small part in the overall admissions process, it was not sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. The equal protection clause prohibits any racial discrimination for the purposes of higher education admission. The admission policy in question fail because it did not allow for sufficient consideration of nonracial factors in determining the admissibility Of a candidate from an underrepresented minority group. In cases dealing with that you could protection clause, the court should distinguish between policies of inclusion and policies of exclusion because the former are much more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the clause. ‣ Do universities admission policy that automatically give preference to minority students on the basis of race, without additional individualized consideration, pilots the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.

National League of Cities v. Usery (1974)

◦ This case marks an effort to devise a doctrine to protect state rights against federal intrusion. Congress past amendments to the fair labor standards act of 1938. The purpose of the amendment was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees the National League of cities, as well as several States and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments. Question- may Congress, acting under its commerce power, regulate the labor market of state employees, which the 10th amendment reserved to the states? -NO, Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The 10th amendment prohibits Congress from an acting legislation which operates "to directly displays the states freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions." while the power of Congress under the commerce clause is "plenary", The power has constitutional limits. In this case the exercise of the commerce power ran a file of the 10th amendment which protects the states traditional activities. ‣ Ruled that the national government did not have the right to extend the minimum wage or maximum hours because that the state power

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983)

◦ This court case ruled that the one-house legislative veto violated the constitutional separation of powers. - Chadha was born in Kenya to Indian parents, but wasn't a citizen or resident in either. In fact, he held a critics have passport. He was legally admitted into the U.S I. 1966 on a student visa.After studying in Ohio, his nonimigrant student visa expired, neither Kenya nor India would accept him into its territory. In 1973, the InS required Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for overstaying his 5 year student visa.Chadha wanted to suspend his deportation and appealed to the board of immigration appeals. Chadha met the requirements that allowed a suspension of deportation because he had resided in the U.S for 7years, was of good moral character, and would suffer hardship of deported. A report of Chadha's deportation suspension was sent to congress and the representative Eilberg introduced a resolution that denied granting permanent residency to 6 aliens. Chadha appealed the order on the basis that the House of Representatives alone decided his fate with the legislative veto. He won and is now a citizen living in California Question: was the 1 house legislation veto to allow chadha to remain in the U.S unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers? -YES. the voted 7-to-2 that this is unconstitutional and the Chief Justice Burger wrote that the 1-house legislative veto is unconstitutional because it requires both chambers to pass it and the president to sign it according to 1. 7. 2 of the constitution.