Court Cases - Brief

*Baker v. Carr (reprise)

(a) Representative Government and the Reapportionment Revolution 1962 Plurality Brennan, joined by Black, Warren Holding: The redistricting of state legislative districts is not a political question, and thus is justiciable by the federal courts. URBAN (LARGE SHIFT HERE) V. RURAL Facts of the Case Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state. Question Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment? Decision: 6 votes for Baker, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation.

*Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 883-885

(a) Representative Government and the Reapportionment Revolution 1960 Majority Frankfurter, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart Holding: Electoral district boundaries drawn only to disenfranchise blacks violate the Fifteenth Amendment. Facts of the Case An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty- eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived. Question Did the redrawing of Tuskegee's electoral district boundaries violate the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution which prevents the United States or any individual state from denying a citizen the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude? Decision: 9 votes for Gomillion, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Amendment 15: Fifteenth Amendment The unanimous Court held that Act 140 of the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" which the act was designed to serve. It was clear to the Court that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind, namely, to deprive blacks of political power.

*Bush v. Gore, 935-946

(c) The Court, Campaigns and Elections, and Conclusion (Electoral Politics) 2000 Per curiam. Concurrence Rehnquist, joined by Scalia, Thomas Holding: In the circumstances of this case, any manual recount of votes seeking to meet the December 12 "safe harbor" deadline would be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded. no standardless recount to determine "voters' intent" and effectively decides the 2000 presidential election so this is a revolutionary ruling (uniformity through 14th -JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICAL PROCESS), but also a counterrevolutionary decision (because only for this presidential election, and never again) Facts of the Case Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later. Question Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Decision: 5 votes for Bush, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held, 5 to 4, that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted.

*Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SMATA), 757-769

1. The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1985 Majority Blackmun, joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens Holding: Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to a municipal mass transit system operated by a governmental entity. District Court for the Western District of Texas reversed. Facts of the Case The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. Question Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act? Decision: 5 votes for Garcia, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

*McCulloch v. Maryland, 551-562 (reprise)

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1819 Majority: Marshall, unanimous Holding: Although the Const doesn't specifically give Congress the power to est. a bank, it does delegate the ability to tax and spend, and a bank is a proper and suitable instrument to assist the operations of the government in the collection and disbursement of the revenue. Because federal laws have supremacy over state laws, Maryland had no power to interfere with the bank's operation by taxing it. Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. Facts of the Case In 1816, Congress chartered The 2nd Bank of the US. In 1818, the state of MD passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. Two Questions (1) Did Congress have the authority to est. the bank? (2)Did the MD law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for McCulloch, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8 Clauses 1 [Taxing and Spending] and 18 [Necessary & Proper Clause] Bank--> Congress possessed unenumerated powers states retained the power of taxation, BUT... The Supremacy Clause is the provision in Article Six, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution that establishes the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties as "the supreme law of the land."

*Gibbons v. Ogden, 562-567

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1824 Majority: Marshall, joined by Washington, Todd, Duvall, Story Holding: The New York law was found invalid because the Commerce Clause of the Constitution designated power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce and that the broad definition of commerce included navigation. Facts of the Case A New York state law gave to individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license -- challenged the monopoly license granted by New York to Aaron Ogden. New York courts consistently upheld the state monopoly. Question Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Gibbons, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3 [Commerce Clause]; Act of February 1793, Section 1, Clause 8 The unanimous Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress.

*U.S. v. E. C. Knight, 574-579

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1895 Majority: Fuller, joined by Brewer, Brown, Field, Gray, Shiras, White, Peckham Holding: Manufacturing is not considered an area that can be regulated by Congress pursuant to the commerce clause. Also, intrastate commerce. Facts of the Case The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant combinations controlling tranportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States. Question Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for E. C. Knight Co., 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Sherman Antitrust Act; US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3 The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

*NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 590-596

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1937 Majority: Hughes, joined by Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, Cardozo Holding: Congress had the power, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate labor relations. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) discards Schechter ; std. "affecting commerce" OR INDIRECT V. DIRECT Facts of the Case With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (commonly known as the Wagner Act) was constitutional. It effectively spelled the end to the Court's striking down of New Deal economic legislation),... Congress determined that labor- management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. In this case, the National Labor Relations Board charged the Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. with discriminating against employees who were union members. Question Was the Act consistent with the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for NLRB, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; US Const. Amend 5; National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Yes. The Court held that the Act was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The justices abandoned their claim that labor relations had only an indirect effect on commerce. Since the ability of employees to engage in collective bargaining (one activity protected by the Act) is "an essential condition of industrial peace," the national government was justified in penalizing corporations engaging in interstate commerce which "refuse to confer and negotiate" with their workers.

*US v. Darby Lumber Co., 597-600

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1941 Majority: Stone, joined by unanimous Holding: The Fair Labor Standards Act was a constitutional exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.--> to regulate employment conditions. THROWS OUT PRODUCTION V. DISTRIBUTION ARGUMENT The unanimous decision of the Court in this case overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart

*Wickard v. Filburn, 601-604

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1942 Majority: Jackson, joined by unanimous Holding: Production quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 were constitutionally applied to agricultural production that was consumed purely intrastate, because its SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC effect upon interstate commerce placed it within the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Southern District of Ohio reversed. IF OTHER FARMERS PRODUCED HOW HE DID.......AGGREGATION PRINCIPLE: farmer's refusal to comply with a federal quota. Wickard articulated the aggregation principle: that effects of the entire class matter rather than composites of the class, so even if the single farmer did not substantially affect interstate commerce, all farmers - the class to which he belonged - do - they compete with the national market. Facts of the Case Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. He claimed that he wanted thewheat for use on his farm, including feed for his poultry and livestock. Fiburn was penalized. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use. Question Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Wickard, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Agricultural Adjustment Act According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"

*Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. and *Katzenbach v. McClung, 604-613

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1964 Majority: Clark, joined by Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Goldberg Holding: Congress did not unconstitutionally exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause by enacting Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations. Northern District of Georgia affirmed. Facts of the Case Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II. Question Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers? Argument Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for U.S., 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation. Katzenbach v. McClung Majority: Clark, joined by Warren, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White Holding: Section 201(a), (b), and (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids discrimination by restaurants that serve interstate travelers and that serve food that has moved in interstate commerce... is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power of Congress. Facts of the Case The owner of Ollie's Barbecue, in Birmingham Alabama, refused to serve blacks in apparent violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part of the Act said restaurants serving interstate travelers, or receiving a substantial amount of their food from interstate commerce, could not discriminate on the basis of race. Question Does a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks burden interstate commerce to an extent that Congress can legitimately prohibit such discrimination? Argument Katzenbach v. McClung - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Katzenbach, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II The Court found that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. Congress's solution to this problem was appropriate and within its bounds to regulate interstate commerce.

*South Dakota v. Dole, 669-672

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1987 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Scalia Holding: Congress may attach reasonable conditions to funds disbursed to the states without running afoul of the Tenth Amendment. Facts of the Case In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law. Question Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age? Argument South Dakota v. Dole - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Dole, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: 23 U.S.C. 158 No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.

*US v.Lopez, 613-625

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1995 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Holding: Possession of a handgun near school is not an economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. A law prohibiting guns near schools is a criminal statute that does not relate to commerce or any sort of economic activity. (and states not fed. regulate criminal activity?) Facts of the Case Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Question Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? Decision: 5 votes for Lopez, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922 Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.

*City of Boerne v. Flores, 629-639 (reprise)

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1997 Majority: Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia (all but part III-A-1), Thomas, Ginsburg Holding: Enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded congressional power under Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance (denied archbishop to expand his church in Boerne, TX)

*U.S. v. Morrison, 639-651

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 2000 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Holding: The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, is unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Facts of the Case In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Morrison, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1398 No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

*Reno v. Condon, 625-629

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 2000 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by unanimous Holding: The DPPA did not run afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, and was a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Facts: Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism. Question Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 violate the constitutional principles of federalism? Argument Reno v. Condon - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Reno, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2721 No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.

*Gonzales v. Raich, 652-660

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 2005 Majority: Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Holding: Congress may ban the use of marijuana even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes. Facts of the Case In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Question Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Gonzales, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 801 No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

*National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 672-688

Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 2012 The Affordable Care Act Cases Injunction: a judicial process or order requiring the person or persons to whom it is directed to do a particular act or to refrain from doing a particular act. upholds individual mandate, but not medicaid provision that would revoke their funding if they didn't comply to its expansion tax is a penalty, but treated as a tax... Majority: Roberts (parts I, II, III-C), joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan Holding: (1) The Tax Anti-Injunction Act does not apply because the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s labeling of the individual mandate as a "penalty" instead of a "tax" precludes it from being treated as a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act. (2) The individual mandate provision of the ACA functions constitutionally as a tax, and is therefore a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. (3) Congress exceeded its Spending Clause authority by coercing states into a transformative change in their Medicaid programs by threatening to revoke all of their Medicaid funding if they did not participate in the Medicaid expansion, which would have an excessive impact on a state's budget. Congress may withhold from states refusing to comply with the ACA's Medicaid expansion provision only the additional funding for Medicaid provided under the ACA.[1] Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 706-711

NO STAR 1. Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 2. The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1851 Majority: Curtis, joined by Catron, Nelson, Grier, Taney Holding: Commerce Power extends to laws related to pilotage. But States' laws related to commerce powers can be valid so long as Congress is silent on the matter. --> "selectively exclusive power" "legitimate government interest" INDIRECT EFFECT Facts of the Case A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine. Question Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Board of Wardens, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3 According to Justice Curtis, who wrote the majority opinion, the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exlusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 579-583

NO STAR Congress's Legislative and Regulatory Powers 1918 Majority: Day, joined by White, Pitney, Van Devanter, McReynolds Holding: Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to regulate labor conditions OR PRODUCTION. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Facts of the Case The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill. Question Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Dagenhart, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; US Const. Amend 10; Keating-Owen Act of 1916 Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.

Maine v. Taylor, 717-719

NOT IN LECTURE The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1986 Majority: Blackmun, joined by Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor Holding: States may prohibit the importation of out-of-state goods moving within the flow of commerce only if the prohibition serves a legitimate local concern and there are no other means of protecting that interest. Facts of the Case In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities. Question Did the Maine law unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, violating the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Maine, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power was not absolute and that the States "retain[ed] authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern.'" The Court found that Maine's ban on the importation oflive baitfish served a legitimate local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Court argued that the ban was not a simple case of "arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce."

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 529-535

The Court and Congressional Politics 1963 Majority: Goldberg, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan Concurrence: Black Concurrence: Douglas Facts of the Case In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called "subversive organizations." Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt. Question Did the Florida Committee, in attempting to inform itself about activities of subversive organizations, violate Gibson's right to free speech and association as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion In a close decision, the Court found that Gibson's rights had been violated. In his opinion, Justice Goldberg recognized the important right of states to inform themselves on "legitimate and vital interests." However, even though inquiring about the actions of a group such as the Communist Party may have been one of these legitimate interests, argued Goldberg, Florida did not prove that a "substantial connection" between the Miami NAACP and Communist Party activities existed. Thus, a "compelling and subordinating governmental interest" would not have been served by forcing Gibson to disclose his group's membership list. Holding: violated "RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION" protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Powell v. McCormack, 509-514

The Court and Congressional Politics 1969 Majority: Warren, joined by Black, Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and White Concurrence: Douglas Facts of the Case Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him. Question May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Powell, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 6: Paragraph 1: "Speech or Debate Clause" (members of both Houses shall be exempt from arrest in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace); The opinion stated furthermore that Congress being the sole judge of its members' qualifications (Art. I, § 5, cl. 1) and the Speech and Debate Clause (Art. I, § 6) do not preclude judicial review of Constitutional issues raised in this case No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him. Holding: Congress may not in any way alter the qualifications of its members from the exclusive list given in the Constitution (age, length of citizenship, and inhabitant of state where elected). Therefore, "excluding" a Congressman by a two-thirds majority vote is not allowed although the Constitution allows expulsion by a two-thirds vote.

Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 522-524

The Court and Congressional Politics 1979 Majority: Chief Justice Burger Facts of the Case In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the "nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss. Question Were Proxmire's activities and statements against Hutchinson's research protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Hutchinson, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 6, Paragraph 1: Speech or Debate Clause No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process."

Nixon v. US, 535-537

The Court and Congressional Politics 1993 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Concurrence: Stevens Concurrence: White, joined by Blackmun Concurrence: Souter Facts of the Case Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate COMMITTEE "heard the evidence and reported its findings." The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute. Question Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 3, Paragraph 6 No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Holding: The contention that Senate committees appointed to gather evidence in an impeachment trial are unconstitutional is nonjusticiable, because impeachment is a political question.

*SC v. Katzenbach, 860-865

b) Controversies Over the Voting Rights Act 1966 Majority: Warren Holding: The Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. so not to have retrogressions (or de facto reversions to discriminatory voting practices) Section 5=PRECLEARANCE REVIEW Facts of the Case The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Federal examiners, under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities. Question Did the Act violate the states' rights to implement and control elections? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Katzenbach, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965 The Court upheld the law. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.

US Term Limits v. Thorton, 514-521

The Court and Congressional Politics 1995 Majority: Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Concurrence: Kennedy Facts of the Case On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas. Question Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Thornton, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Composition of the House of Representatives No. The Constitution prohibits States from adopting Congressional qualifications in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution. A state congressional term limits amendment is unconstitutional if it has the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and "has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly." Furthermore, "...allowing individual States to craft their own congressional qualifications would erode the structure designed by the Framers to form a 'more perfect Union.'" Holding: States cannot impose qualifications for prospective members of Congress stricter than those in the Constitution.

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 256-263.

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (a) The President as Commander in Chief and In Foreign Affairs 1981 Facts of the Case In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power. Question Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legal claims against Iran? Argument Dames & Moore v. Regan - Oral Argument Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Regan, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: 50 U.S.C. 1702 The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case. Hence, used Jackson's "Twilight Zone" when he acts independently but NOT acting contrary to Congress or the Constitution. Rehnquist Majority: Executive orders=dissolving judgments and suspending pending civil claims against Iranian government were constitutional. Court membership -->response to the Iran hostage crisis

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 366-381

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (a) The President as Commander in Chief and In Foreign Affairs & (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers-->Black said NO INHERENT POWERS IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY 1952 The Steel Seizure Case Majority: Black, joined by Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton Facts of the Case In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America. Question Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art. II In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." United States Supreme Court decision that limited the power of the President of the United States to seize private property in the absence of either specifically enumerated authority under Article Two of the United States Constitution or statutory authority conferred on him by Congress. It was a "stinging rebuff" to President Harry Truman. While a concurrence, Justice Jackson's opinion is used by most legal scholars and members of Congress to assess executive power-->Jackson's opinion took a similarly flexible approach to the issue, eschewing any fixed boundaries between Congress' and the President's power. Jackson divided Presidential authority vis-à-vis Congress into three categories (in descending order of legitimacy): 1. Cases in which the President was acting with express or implied authority from Congress-->strongest 2. Cases in which Congress had thus far been silent--> the "TWILIGHT ZONE" in between for president 3. Cases in which the President was defying congressional orders--> weakest Key Terms: The Taft-Hartley Act = was seen as a means of demobilizing the labor movement by imposing limits on labor's ability to strike and by prohibiting radicals from their leadership [DIDN'T USE HERE BC SAW PROBLEM AS THE INDUSTRY ITSELF AND NOT THE UNION]

U.S. v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation, 253-255

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (a) The President as Commander in Chief and In Foreign Affairs: 1936 Majority=Sutherland Dissent=McReynolds Facts of the Case Curtiss-Wright was charged with conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia, which was engaged in an armed conflict in the Chaco. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt. Question Did Congress in its Joint Resolution unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art. II The Court agreed that the President was allowed much room to operate in executing the Joint Resolution; it found no constitutional violation. Making important distinctions between internal and foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland argued because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Holding: [executive, by its very nature, is empowered to conduct foreign affairs in a way that Congress cannot and should not] -->The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution Key Terms: plenary, exclusive = absolute power "sole organ theory" implicit power (not enumerated) non-delegation doctrine = based on "separation of powers," one branch of government must not authorize another entity to exercise the power or function which it is constitutionally authorized to exercise itself [CAN'T DELEGATE POWER THAT CONSTITUTION ALREADY DELEGATED TO IT] President's "unfettered discretion."

Missouri v. Holland, 266-269

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers 1920 Majority: Holmes, joined by White, McKenna, Day, McReynolds, Brandeis, Clarke Facts of the Case In December 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty to protect a number of migratory birds in the U.S. and Canada. Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty. When Ray P. Holland, the U.S. Game Warden, threatened to arrest citizens of Missouri for violating the Act, the state of Missouri challenged the treaty. Question Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Holland, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918; US Const. Amend 10 No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the national interest in protecting the wildlife could be protected only by national action. The Court noted that the birds the government sought to protect had no permanent habitats within individual states and argued that "[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with." The Court thus upheld the exercise of the treaty power and thus found no violation of the Tenth Amendment.[ Treaties made by the federal government are supreme over any state concerns about such treaties having abrogated any states' rights] Holmes: "Living Constitution" --> The case before us must be considered in the light of our "whole experience" and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether [252 U.S. 416, 434] it is forbidden by some "invisible radiation" from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. While protection of state's "quasi-sovereign right" to regulate is important, "supremacy clause", makes treaties the "supreme law of the land" [Article 6, clause 2] rise of exec agreements constitutional revisionism

United States v. Pink, 269-271

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers 1942 Majority: Douglas; Concurrence: Frankfurter Facts of the Case In a case similar to United States v. Belmont (1937), the United States attempted to assist the Soviet Union in recovering assets of the First Russian Insurance Company which the New York Superintendent (Pink) of Insurance refused to release. Question Did U.S. agreements with the U.S.S.R. compel New York to release the assets? Conclusion The Court required New York to release the assets. Justice Douglas affirmed Justice Sutherland's reasoning in Belmont and argued that New York could not "rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs . . . is vested in the national government exclusively." Such power is not accorded a State in our constitutional system... No state can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." The court ruled that rights to the property in question passed from the Soviet Government to the United States under the Litvinov Assignment. Litvinov Assignment of 1933 = An "executive agreement" made by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as part of the arrangements by which the United States recognized the Soviet Union. "sole executive agreements" are same as treaties

New York Times Co. v. U.S., 381-390

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers 1971 Concurrence: Black, joined by Douglas Concurrence: Douglas, joined by Black Concurrence: Brennan Concurrence: Stewart, joined by White Concurrence: White, joined by Stewart Concurrence: Marshall Facts of the Case In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. Question Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for New York Times, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. To exercise prior restraint, the Government must show sufficient evidence that the publication would cause a "grave and irreparable" danger. "Freedom of the press"

Goldwater v. Carter (reprise), 173-175

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers 1979 Concurrence: Marshall Concurrence: Powell--> would have been ok if there were formal opposition declared by Congress Concurrence: Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Stewart, Stevens-->"political question" Facts of the Case President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan. Question Did Congress have a constitutional role to play in the termination of the treaty? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Carter, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Without oral argument ,the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable. Rehnquist led a group of four others who believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. He reasoned that since Congress had not "formally challenged" Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve. The dissenters were prepared to hear the case. Whether President Carter could unilaterally break a defense treaty with the Republic of China without Senate approval was a political question and could not be reviewed by the court, as Congress had not issued a formal opposition. The case was dismissed. "Constitutional Silence" = As it stands now, there is no official ruling on whether the President has the power to break a treaty without the approval of Congress.

Medellin v. Texas, 274-283

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (b) Treaty Making, War Powers, and Emergency Powers 2008 Majority: Roberts, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito Concurrence: Stevens Facts of the Case Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution. Question Did the President act within his constitutional and statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined that states must comply with the U.S. treaty obligation under the Vienna Convention by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice? Does the Constitution require state courts to honor the treaty obligation of the U.S. by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Texas, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Treaty The Court upheld the rulings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. The Court held that the signed Protocol of the Vienna Convention did not make the treaty "self- executing" and, therefore, the treaty is "not binding upon state courts until it is enacted into law by Congress." Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the "presidential memorandum" as an attempt by the executive branch to enforce a "non-self executing treaty" without the "necessary Congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the opinion and Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, authored a dissent.

The Prize Cases, 301-304

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (c) Emergency Powers (continued): Security v. Liberty 1863 Majority: Grier, joined by Wayne, Swayne, Miller, Davis Facts of the Case Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection [later treated Confederate states as "belligerents" rather than "insurrectionists" bc actually waging war] by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August 6, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861. The question before the court dealt with the seized ships. In admiralty, a ship captured during war may be kept as a prize. If there was no formal war, then capturing ships and impounding them is piracy. Question Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art 2 The President had the power to act. A state of civil war existed "de facto" after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of the Union, when states waged war against the United States government, the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself,without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name." Constitutional -->The President did have the authority to order a blockade and impound (seize & take legal custody of) ships, even without a formal declaration of war

Ex parte Milligan, 304-310

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (c) Emergency Powers (continued): Security v. Liberty 1866 Majority: Davis, joined by Clifford, Field, Grier, Nelson Facts of the Case Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War; he had engaged in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court. Question Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Milligan, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Amend 5 Davis, speaking for the Court, held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Martial law cannot exist where the civil courts are operating [BC WAS IN INDIANA]. Trial by military tribunal is constitutional only when there is no power left but the military, and the military may validly try criminals only as long as is absolutely necessary.

Korematsu v. U.S., 310-319

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (c) Emergency Powers (continued): Security v. Liberty 1944 Majority: Black, joined by Stone, Reed, Douglas, Rutledge, Frankfurter Concurrence: Frankfurter Facts of the Case During World War II, Presidential Executive Order 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the U.S. Army. Question Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Executive Order 9066; U.S. Const. amend. 5 The Court sided with the government and held that the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights. Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril." deference to Congress and the military authorities, particularly in light of the uncertainty following Pearl Harbor. Justice Black further denied that the case had anything to do with racial prejudice

Rasul v. Bush, 319-323

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (c) Emergency Powers (continued): Security v. Liberty 2004 Majority: Stevens, joined by O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Concurrence: Kennedy Facts of the Case Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Question Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Rasul, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus) Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional. [had been based on Eisentrager of 1950: The Court decided that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over German war criminals held in a U.S.-administered prison in Germany.]

Boumediene v. Bush, 325-342

The Court, the President and Foreign Affairs (c) Emergency Powers (continued): Security v. Liberty 2008 Majority: Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Concurrence: Souter, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer Facts of the Case In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo. In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier. Question Should the Military Commissions Act of 2006 be interpreted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by foreign citizens detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba? If so, is the Military Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution? Are the detainees at Guantanamo Bay entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions? Can the detainees challenge the adequacy of judicial review provisions of the MCA before they have sought to invoke that review? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Boumediene, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 9, Paragraph 2: Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause (Article 9, Section 1: The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.) merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions. Gitmo--> "de facto" sovereignty over this territory Foreign terrorism suspects held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba have constitutional rights to challenge their detention in United States courts-->Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 failed to provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.

Myers v. U.S., 396-407

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (a) The Institutionalized Presidency: Appointment and Removal Powers 1926 Majority: Taft, joined by Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, Sanford, Stone Facts of the Case An 1876 law provided that postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. President Woodrow Wilson removed Myers, a postmaster first class, without seeking Senate approval. Question Did the Act unconstitutionally restrict the President's power to remove appointed officials? Conclusion Yes. After tracing legislative debate of the First Congress in 1789 which dealt with the interpretation of the President's appointment power, Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove appointed officers is vested in the President alone. According to Taft, to deny the President that power would not allow him to "discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed." Holding: The President has the exclusive authority to remove executive branch officials.

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 407-410

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (a) The Institutionalized Presidency: Appointment and Removal Powers 1935 Majority: Sutherland Facts of the Case President Hoover appointed, and the Senate confirmed, Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [consumer protection independent agency]. In 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation since the latter was a conservative and had jurisdiction over many of Roosevelt's New Deal policies. When Humphrey refused to resign, Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. However, the FTC Act only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Since Humphrey died shortly after being dismissed, his executor sued to recover Humphrey's lost salary. Question Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere with the executive power of the President? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Humphrey's Executor, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const Art 1 and 2; Federal Trade Commission Act The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which relied heavily on the Court's decision in Myers v. United States (1926). In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove officers who were "units of the executive department." The FTC was different, argued Sutherland, because it was a body created by Congress to perform "quasi-legislative" and "judicial" functions. The Myers precedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation. Holding: The President may not remove any appointee to an independent regulatory agency except for reasons Congress has provided by law.

Bowsher v. Synar, 410-418

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (a) The Institutionalized Presidency: Appointment and Removal Powers 1986 Majority: Burger, joined by Brennan, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor Concurrence: Stevens, joined by Marshall Facts of the Case Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar. Question Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Synar, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to (would obey unquestionably) the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch. Holding: Congress cannot reserve removal power over executive officers to itself, except for impeachment (ONLY UNLAWFULNESS). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the separation of powers doctrine.

Morrison v. Olson, 418-435

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (a) The Institutionalized Presidency: Appointment and Removal Powers 1988 Majority: Rehnquist, joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor Facts of the Case The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws. Question Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Morrison, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 49 The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch. Holding: The Independent Counsel Act is constitutional, as it does not increase the power of the judiciary or legislative branches at the expense of the executive.

U.S. v. Nixon, 483-491

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1974 Majority: Burger, joined by Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell Facts of the Case A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States. Question Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Art. II No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an "absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege". The Court granted that there was a "limited executive privilege" in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes. The Supreme Court does have the final voice in determining constitutional questions; no person, not even the president of the United States, is completely above the law; and the president cannot use executive privilege as an excuse to withhold evidence that is "demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial."

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 444-450

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1935 Majority: Hughes, joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Roberts Facts of the Case Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to implement industrial codes to regulate weekly employment hours, wages, and minimum ages of employees. The codes had standing as penal statutes. Question Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Schechter Poultry Corp., 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: U.S. Const. Art I; U.S. Const. Amend. 10; 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933) (National Industrial Recovery Act § 3) The Court held that Section 3 was "without precedent" and violated the Constitution. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity. In other words, it did not make codes, but simply empowered the President to do so. A unanimous Court found this to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Holding: Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive, and was not a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause power. Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Industrial Union Dept., AFL CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 450-452

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1980 Plurality: Stevens, joined by Burger, Stewart; Powell (parts I, II, III-A, III-B, III-C, III-E) Concurrence: Powell Concurrence: Rehnquist This case represented a challenge to the OSHA practice of regulating carcinogens by setting the exposure limit "at the lowest technologically feasible level that will not impair the viability of the industries regulated." OSHA selected that standard because it believed that (1) it could not determine a safe exposure level and that (2) the authorizing statute did not require it to quantify such a level. A plurality on the Court, led by Justice Stevens, wrote that the authorizing statute did indeed require OSHA to demonstrate a significant risk of harm (albeit not with mathematical certainty) in order to justify setting a particular exposure level. Facts of the Case Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute. Question Did the Secretary exceed his authority to set standards? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Amer. Petroleum Inst., 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health Yes. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary had acted without knowledge that the new standard was necessary to "provide safe and healthful employment" as mandated by the Act. Nothing in OSHA's administrative record indicated that exposure to benzene at 10 ppm would cause leukemia and that exposure to one ppm would not. Since the Secretary had not made a threshold finding that exposure to 10 ppm posed significant health risks, he was powerless to promulgate the new standard. Holding: The Secretary applied the act inappropriately. In order to comply with the statute, the secretary must determine 1) that a health risk of a substance exists at a particular threshold and 2) Decide whether to issue the most protective standard, or issue a standard that weighs the costs and benefits. [POWELL IN REGARDS TO JIMMY CARTER'S MOST PROTECTIVE] Rehnquist thought OSHA should be invalidated on the basis of the non delegation doctrine bc of agency/administrative rulemaking

INS v. Chadha, 453-463

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1983 Majority: Burger, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor Concurrence: Powell Facts of the Case In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha. Question Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine? Decision: 7 votes for Chadha, 2 vote(s) against Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and "congressional authority." Holding: Congress may not promulgate a statute granting to itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch which is inconsistent with the bicameralism principle and "Presentment Clause"=(Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3) of the United States Constitution outlines federal legislative procedure by which bills originating in Congress become federal law in the United States-- of the United States Constitution. The case is a judicable question, not exempted by the "political question" doctrine; the constitutionality of a statute is a question for the courts. Legislative vetoes continued to be enacted after Chadha, although various presidents have issued executive signing statements disclaiming the unconstitutional legislative veto provisions.

Clinton v. Jones, 495-499

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1997 Majority: Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg Concurrence: Breyer Facts of the Case Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity. Question Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive. Holding: The Constitution does not protect the President from civil litigation involving actions committed before he entered office.

Clinton v. City of New York, 464-475

The President as Chief Executive in Domestic Affairs (b) Legislative Powers and Accountability 1998 Majority: Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg Concurrence: Kennedy Concur/dissent : Scalia, joined by O'Connor; Breyer (in part) Facts of the Case This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal. Question Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for City of New York, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

*New York v. US, 769-795

The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1992 Majority O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, as well as White, Blackmun, Stevens (parts III-A and III-B only) Holding: The "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act violates the Tenth Amendment and exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Facts of the Case The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management. Question Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four? Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.

*Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 786-795

The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1996 Majority Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Holding: Congress does not have the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the sovereign immunity afforded to states under the 11th Amendment; the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which allows parties to seek relief against state officials for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not apply where Congress has already created what it deems a sufficient remedy. Facts of the Case The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit. Question Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit? Decision: 5 votes for Florida, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.

*Printz v.U.S. & Mack v. US, 775-786

The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1997 Majority Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas Holding: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's interim provision commanding the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of each local jurisdiction to conduct background checks, §922(s)(2), is unconstitutional. Facts of the Case The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States. Question Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks? Decision: 5 votes for Printz, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922 No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

*Alden v.Maine, 796-803

The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 1999 Majority Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas Holding: Article I of the United States Constitution does not provide Congress with the ability to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in its own courts. Facts of the Case A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunitythe probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court. Question May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for Maine, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

*Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 803-808

The States and American Federalism: State Regulatory Papers and the Tenth And Eleventh Amendments 2003 Majority Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Holding: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. Facts of the Case William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed. Question May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993? Conclusion Decision: 6 votes for Hibbs, 3 vote(s) against Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

*Shaw v. Reno, 909-914

b) Controversies Over the Voting Rights Act 1993 Majority O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas Holding: Redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause while bodies doing redistricting must be conscious of race to the extent that they must ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act. "Colorblind constitution" After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court REMANDED • dissenters said wait a minute, what about United Jewish Organ where it was deemed a POLITICAL QUESTION; this is both POLITICAL (Bush and blacks who vote for democrats) and RACIAL gerrymandering... should defer to the political process Facts of the Case The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question Did the North Carolina residents' claim, that the State created a racially gerrymandered district, raise a valid constitutional issue under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Decision: 5 votes for Shaw, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection Yes. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan.

*Hunt v. Cromartie, 914-921

b) Controversies Over the Voting Rights Act 1999 Majority: Breyer Hunt v. Cromartie (2001) 5:4 (WHR-CT-AS-AK) -upholds use of race in North Carolina redistricting as long as not the "predominant factor" • main decision before the Alabama caucus one that is being debated TODAYYYY [Roberts Court: must now decide this question in Alabama Caucus case of today... is it political OR racial gerrymandering to CREATE supermajorities of blacks... who vote disproportionately for democrats] • Shaw v. Reno was too serpentine in NC, but now the district is FATTER (redrawn) • so O'Connor changed her mind and agreed with Breyer, RACE CAN BE A FACTOR, BUT IT CANNOT BE THE "PREDOMINATE FACTOR," CAN'T TIP, OR BE OVER 50%