Forensic Cases A-Q

Frith's Case

(1790) An early English court decision which provided the beginnings of the precedent for determining a defendant's competence: the court found that trial must be postponed until the defendant "by collecting together his intellects and having them entire,...he shall be able so to model his defense and to ward off the punishment of the law." (123)

Holt v. United States

(1910) As referenced in the book, comments of Justice Holmes in this case illustrate how physical evidence does not fall under the protection of the fifth amendment and the importance of allowing physical evidence in trial. He is quoted as saying that failing to allow physical evidence under the 5th amendment would be tantamount to "forbidding a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof." The book goes on to discuss the implications of the 5th amendment for comments made by defendants during psychological evals, but that is not directly covered by this case specifically. (67)

Frye v. United States

(1923) Frye was charged tried for murder. At his trial, Appellant attempted to call an expert witness to testify that Appellant had taken a systolic blood pressure deception test, and to further testify as to the results of the test. The expert testimony was held inadmissible by the lower court, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of the D.C. held that scientific evidence can be presented by expert witnesses as long as the procedures, techniques, and principles used to analyze the evidence are "generally accepted" by the scientific community.

Brown v. Mississippi

(1936) Stuart, a white planter, was murdered. Arthur Ellington, Ed Brown, and Henry Shields, three black tenant farmers, were arrested for his murder. At the trial, the prosecution's principal evidence was the defendants' confessions to police officers. During the trial, however, prosecution witnesses freely admitted that the defendants confessed only after being subjected to brutal whippings by the officersThis was a USSC case that ruled that a defendant's involuntary confession that is extracted by police violence cannot be entered as evidence and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (168, 170)

Durham v. United States

(1954) Monte Durham was arrested and charged with housebreaking. He was then adjudged of unsound mind and committed to a hospital; he was later released, deemed competent, and convicted. Upon appeal, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." The holding of this case has become known as the "product test" for determining an insanity defense and ultimately was replaced by the American Law Institute standard because of its lack of clarity. (Pages; 61, 202-203, 205)

Brown v. Bd. of Education

(1954) plaintiff Brown filed a class-action suit against the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, in 1951, after his daughter was denied entrance to Topeka's all-white elementary schools. In his lawsuit, Brown claimed that schools for black children were not equal to the white schools, and that segregation violated the so-called "equal protection clause" of the 14th Amendment, which holds that no state can "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In this case, the Supreme Court gave the decision that overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of separate but equal. In the decision, Justice Warren wrote that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place," as segregated schools are "inherently unequal." As a result, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs were being "deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment."

Bedder v. Director of Public Prosecutions

(1954; case from England) The defendant was an important 18-year-old boy who was emotionally distressed about his condition. On the night of the offense he attempted to have sex with a prostitute, who then taunted him for his impotence and tried to leave. After an altercation, he stabbed her twice, killing her. The court instructed the jury that it could find provocation only if a "reasonable person, an ordinary person" not one who "is sexually impotent" might react in this way. The defendant was convicted of murder. This showed that provocation can only be viewed in terms of how an ordinary person would respond to such provocation (i.e., ordinary person standard)

People v. Gorshen

(1959) In this case, the defendant killed his foreman, and was charged with murder. At bench trial, psychiatrist testified that the defendant suffered from chronic paranoiac schizophrenia, resulting in a "disintegration of mind and personality." In finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the trial judge stated that although the psychiatrist's theories were "correct" and defendant "had no particular intent to commit the crime," his "hands were tied by the then-existing legal jurisprudence." Although the USSC held that the psychiatrist's testimony was admissible to negate the mental states required for murder and manslaughter, it rejected the defendant's contention that the judge's remarks demonstrated failure to give due weight to the testimony due to a mistake of law. The court concluded that notwithstanding the judge's remark, the judge "did in truth finally decide that his fact finding hands were not tied . . . because he received, considered and gave effect to the expert's testimony on the issues to which it was pertinent." This case recognized that an expert's testimony could be relevant to a "diminished capacity" defense.

Dusky v. United States

(1960) A USSC case that defined the qualifications for being competent to stand trial. Dusky, the defendant, was charged with assisting in the kidnapping and rape of an underage female. He was clearly suffering from schizophrenia but was found competent and received a sentence of 45 years. On petition of writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, they requested reversal of his conviction on the grounds that he had been incompetent to stand trial. The Court decided to grant the writ of certiorari, ruling that competent defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." (Pages: 124-125, 451, 468)

Jenkins v. United States

(1962) In a trial for housebreaking, assault and intent to rape, a defendant presented the testimony of three clinical psychologists in support of an insanity defense. All three psychologists testified, based on their personal contact with the defendant, review of his case history and standard psychological tests, that on the date the alleged crimes were committed, defendant had been suffering from schizophrenia. One of the three testified that he could give no opinion concerning the relationship between the illness and the crimes but the other two gave opinions that the two were related and that the crimes were the product of the illness. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the opinions of the psychologists in that psychologists were not qualified to give expert testimony on the issue of mental disease. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, and held that psychologists were qualified as expert witnesses on the question of mental disease. Beginning with this case, courts have admitted testimony by clinical psychologists. (22)

O'kon v. Roland

(1965) This case is discussed in the book in reference to what a psychologist's testimony can and cannot be used for as evidence in the court room. In this case, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York permitted psychiatric testimony that the defendant, charged with murder, was a passive person and unlikely to commit a violent act. (219)

Painter v. Bannister

(1966) Painter's mother and sister were killed in an automobile accident. The father, Harold Painter, after other arrangements for this seven-year-old boy's care had proved unsatisfactory, asked the maternal grandparents, Dwight and Margaret Bannister, to take care of Mark. Over a year later, the Harold sought the return of the child. The trial court awarded Harold custody. Dwight and Margaret Bannister appealed. The SC of Iowa reversed the trial court's award of custody to the father. The Court found that Mark had established a father-son relationship with his maternal grandfather, which he apparently never had with Harold. Mark was happy, well adjusted, and progressing nicely in his development. It was not in Mark's best interest to take him out of that stable atmosphere in the face of warnings of dire consequences from an eminent child psychologist and send him to an uncertain future in the home of Harold, who had a Bohemian approach to finances and life in general. Regardless of the Court's appreciation of the father's love for his child and his desire to have him with him, the Court did not believe it had the moral right to gamble with the Mark's future. The Court stated the child was to be encouraged in every way possible to know his father. (535)

Miranda v. Arizona

(1966) The USSC held that criminal suspects must be informed of their right to consult with an attorney and of their right against self-incrimination prior to questioning by police. (74, 164-167, 471)

Pate v. Robinson

(1966) The respondent was convicted in 1959 of murdering his common law wife, and given a life sentence. It was conceded at trial that he had shot and killed her, but counsel claimed that respondent was insane at the time of the incident, and also not competent to stand trial. It was uncontradicted that the respondent had a long history of disturbed behavior, had been confined as a psychopathic patient, and had committed acts of violence, including the killing of his infant son and an attempted suicide. Four defense witnesses testified that the respondent was insane. The trial court declined rebuttal medical testimony as to respondent's sanity, deeming sufficient a stipulation that a doctor would testify that, when respondent was examined a few months before trial, he knew the nature of the charges and could cooperate with his counsel. The trial court's rejection of contentions as to respondent's sanity was challenged on appeal as a deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the grounds that no hearing on mental capacity to stand trial had been requested and that the evidence was insufficient to require the trial court to conduct a sanity hearing sua sponte or to raise a "reasonable doubt" as to respondent's sanity at the time of the homicide. This Court denied certiorari. The District Court denied respondent's subsequently filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unduly hurried trial did not provide a fair opportunity for development of facts on the insanity issues, and remanded the case to the District Court for a limited hearing as to the sanity of respondent at the time of the homicide and as to whether he was constitutionally entitled to a hearing upon his competence to stand trial. Held: 1. The evidence raised a sufficient doubt as to respondent's competence to stand trial so that respondent was deprived of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the trial court's failure to afford him a hearing on that issue. 2. The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. 3. the record shows that respondent did not waive the defense of incompetence to stand trial. 4. In view of evidence raised over competence issues, the court is required to impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing, and could not rely on respondent's demeanor at trial or on the stipulated medical testimony. 5. In view of the difficulty of retrospectively determining the issue of an accused's competence to stand trial (particularly where, as here, the time lapse is over six years), a hearing limited to that issue will not suffice; respondent must therefore be discharged unless the State gives him a new trial within a reasonable time.

North Carolina v. Alford

(1970) Alford allegedly got in a fight with Young and was later accused when Young was found murdered. There were no eyewitnesses, but witnesses swore that Alford had taken his gun from his house declared he was going to kill the victim, and upon returning, stated that he had killed the victim. Alford pleaded guilty to second-degree murder but declared to the court that he was in fact innocent, and was pleading guilty only to avoid the death penalty. The USSC ruled that a plea of guilty may be accepted for the purpose of a lesser sentence from a defendant who maintains that he or she is innocent. This type of plea has become known as an Alford plea.

Allen v. Illinois

(1970) Allen was accused of attempting to force a woman to have sexual relations with him. The victim escaped without further injury. The State of Illinois charged Allen with the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. While charges were pending, the state moved to declare Allen a "sexually dangerous person" which provided for the indefinite civil commitment of such persons. The State presented the examining psychiatrists' testimony, over petitioner's objection that they had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The Illinois Supreme Court held that that privilege was not available in sexually dangerous person proceedings because they are "essentially civil in nature" and the state may compel an individual charged under this statute to undergo psychiatric evaluation of their dangerousness if the results will be used only as a basis for seeking civil commitment under the statute.

Jackson v. Indiana

(1972) In this case, Jackson (a "mentally retarded" man with the "mental level of a preschool child) was found incompetent when being adjudicated for two counts of petty theft. Up to that point, many individuals who could not eventual attain competence faced lifelong hospitalization. In this case, USSC ruled that incompetent defendants could not be held for "more than a reasonable period of time" to determine if competence can be reached in the foreseeable future. (131-133, 157-158, 190, 319)

Morrissey v. Brewer

(1972) Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions, but soon exhausted his state remedies. Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. On April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher's petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher. Neither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man's parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 en banc ruling. Due process rights require a prompt, informal, two-stage inquiry before an impartial hearing officer before parole may be revoked. The parolee may present relevant information and confront witnesses. (336)

Lessard v. Schmidt

(1972) Plaintiff Alberta Lessard was picked up by two police officers and taken to a mental health center, where she was held on an emergency basis. After an ex parte proceeding, the judge issued a confinement order for 10 days. The doctor sought permanent commitment. The judge found that Lessard was mentally ill and ordered her commitment for an additional 30 days. Lessard brought a class action in federal district seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the involuntary commitment based on the Wisconsin civil commitment statute. The district court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to afford persons alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural safeguards. The scheme failed to require effective and timely notice of the charges for detention, permitted a detention for longer than 48 hours without a hearing on probable cause, and allowed the admission of hearsay. Psychiatric evidence was admissible without the detainee being given the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, the statute did not require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainee was both mentally ill and dangerous. Finally, less restrictive alternatives to commitment were not considered. (73, 319-320, 325, 328)

Furman v. Georgia

(1972) The USSC found that the imposition of capital punishment was often racist and arbitrary. Court ordered a halt to all death penalty punishments in the nation until a less arbitrary method of sentencing was found. The Court invalidated all death penalty schemes in the United States in a 5-4 decision, with each member of the majority writing a separate opinion. Following Furman, in order to reinstate the death penalty, states had to at least remove arbitrary and discriminatory effects in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Humphrey v. Cady

(1972) The petitioner was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum sentence of one year. In lieu of sentence, he was committed to the "sex deviate facility" in the state prison, for a potentially indefinite period, pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. The US court of appeals 7th circuit decided that involuntary civil commitment to a mental hospital is a massive curtailment of liberty requiring due process protections, subsequently reducing the previous reliance solely on medical professionals to make civil commitments. (319)

United States v. Alexander and Murdock

(1973) A black defendant wanted to present evidence of his "rotten social background" and experience with racial oppression to explain why he shot two marines who had responded to his taunts with racial slurs. The court did not permit his testimony and upheld his conviction, failing to uphold the argument of "diminished responsibility" which gives mitigating effect to mental disorders (or other impairing circumstances) that cause cognitive or volitional impairment, but produce neither insanity nor an inability to form the "mens rea" for the offense.

United States v. Alvarez

(1975) (Hard to find good summary info on this case) This appeal sought reversal of the judgment and commitment entered on a jury conviction for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap by Alvarez. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 3rd circuit held that the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is curtailed when the state is permitted to use experts the defendant has discarded: "[the] attorney must be free to make an informed judgment with respect to the best course for the defense without the inhibition of creating a potential government witness." In other words, when raising a mental health defense, the defendant can retain more than one expert and only use information from that one without being subpoenaed for the records of the unused experts. In contrast, US ex rel. Edney v. Smith took that opposite opinion, saying the state should have access to unused expert opinions once an MSO defense has been properly raised.

Drope v. Missouri

(1975) Drope was charged with the rape of his wife and she had testified about his "strange behavior" during the assault and since. Two days into his original trial, the defendant shot himself in attempted suicide. The USSC held that the Missouri trial court deprived the defendant of due process by failing to order a competency examination after he was hospitalized following an attempted suicide and as a result missed a portion of his trial for a capital offense. They established that an inquiry must be made into a defendant's competency if "bona fide doubt" exists as to the defendant's competence, and that in deciding if such doubt exists, the judge should consider whether the subject is mentally ill.

Goss v. Lopez

(1975) Nine students, including Lopez, were suspended from Central High School (Columbus, Ohio) for 10 days for destroying school property and disrupting the learning environment. Ohio Law empowered the school principal to suspend students for 10 days or expel them, requiring that parents be notified within 24 hours and that a reason be given. Normally, if students were expelled, they could appeal to the Board of Education, but that law gave no such allowances if they were suspended. This USSC case held that a suspension without a hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and a public school must conduct a hearing before subjecting a student to suspension. Thus, schools may not: 1. Suspend or expel children without some sort of fair, impartial due process procedures 2. Schools may not label children (mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed - change of placement or label) without due process.

Bright v. United States

(1975) This case helps illustrate why clinical testimony about "mens rea" should generally be admissible. The defendant was charged with possession of stolen checks which requires proof that the accused person knew the checks were stolen. The circumstances of the case were such that most people would have suggested to most people that the checks were stolen. However, according to a psychiatrist, the individual had a "passive-dependent" personality which led her to trust implicitly those close to her. A close friend of her boyfriend gave her the checks and told her they were legitimate, she did not think the checks had been stolen. Even though his testimony was phrased neither in terms of capacity or on the finding of severe mental illness, it was clearly relevant to the issue of whether the defendant knew the checks were stolen. To exclude it on irrelevance grounds would have permitted conviction of a person who might not have been guilty of the crime as defined by the legislature. The case was appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, who opined, "The appellant presses two points...First, she argues that the District Court committed error in failing to permit the defense to introduce psychiatric evidence to negate her knowledge that the checks were stolen, although no insanity defense was tendered. Second, she argues that the District Court committed reversible error in its charge to the jury with respect to the element of knowledge required under 18 U.S.C. § 1708. We affirm the District Court on the first of these contentions, but reverse on the charge to the jury...the trial judge had instructed the jury, using language similar to that used here, that it could infer guilty knowledge from the defendant's conscious avoidance of knowledge, we reversed the conviction because the trial court had failed to balance the instruction with the caveat that the jury should acquit if it found that the defendant had believed the checks not to have been stolen."

O'Connor v. Donaldson

(1975) This case, decided by the US court of appeals 5th circuit. Established that mental illness alone is not enough for involuntary hospitalization -- mentally ill cannot be confined against their will if they can survive on their own. Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for "a few weeks". Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years. When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O'Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O'Connor was also Donaldson's attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson's ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O'Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation. In February 1971, Donaldson charged O'Connor and other members of the hospital's staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O'Connor and Gumanis. O'Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury's verdict. The court rejected O'Connor's argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O'Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants' reasonable belief that Donaldson's confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions. (321)

Breed v. Jones

(1975) Typically, insanity defenses had not been used in juvenile cases since courts had held that there was no need for exculpation of those who are mentally disordered since juveniles are not subject to criminal penalties. However, in this case Chief Justice Burger wrote for the SC "it is simply too late in the day to conclude...that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years." Also, the main finding of the USSC was that the waiver of a juvenile to criminal court following adjudication in juvenile court constitutes double jeopardy.

United States v. Hearst

(1977) In this case, the 9th cir. court found Hearst guilty. Hearst was tried under a two-count indictment of armed robbery. The defendant had been kidnapped and forced, under threat of death, to participate in a robbery; however, he prosecution introduced evidence connecting Hearst with subsequent criminal activity after this. Heart said she was under duress at the time of the robbery and had been brainwashed by her captors. She was found guilty by the jury. (222)

Edney v. Smith

(1977) The defendant was found guilty of the murder of his former girlfriend's 8-year-old daughter. A defense psychiatrist testified that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, was unaware of the nature and quality of his acts and did not know that his acts were wrong. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. Daniel Schwartz, a psychiatrist, who had examined defendant at the request of defendant's attorney. The defense objected on the grounds of the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges. The US district court court held that in criminal cases the state should have access to the experts the defendant has decided not to use, once the issue of mental state at the time of the offense is properly raised (insanity is raised). (80-81, 95)

Lockett v. Ohio

(1978) An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that, to meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors. The trier-of-fact must be able to consider whatever factors presented - cannot be limited by a list. Any mitigating evidence relevant to the defendant's character and offense must be admitted during a capital sentencing proceeding. (279-280)

Bordenkircher v. Hayes

(1978) Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30, an offense then punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years in prison. The prosecutor threatened to charge the defendant as a "habitual offender" (which carried a life sentence) if he did not agree to plead guilty and accept a 5 year sentence. Hayes did not plead guilty and went on to receive a life sentence. When appealed, the USSC did not find this to be unconstitutional since taking the deal was voluntary, setting a precedent for considering accepting plea deals to be a voluntary act stating "there is no such element of punishment in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining as long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer." (173)

State v. Hayes

(1978) This case illustrates the problematic nature of allowing defendants to waive the competence requirement. Facts: The defendant was indicted for the murder of Alan Eno on February 16, 1977. He pleaded NGRI. Before he committed the crime the defendant had been taking medication, but had stopped the day before the crime. After his arrest, he was put back on psychotropic medication. The defendant moved that he be taken off medication seven days before his trial so that the jury could see his unmedicated state. The State offered expert testimony of two psychiatrists who held the opinion that the defendant would be incompetent to stand trial off medication. The Court concluded that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, revoked the previous order, and transferred the following two questions: May the Court force a defendant to be under drug medication at least four weeks prior to and during trial, against his will, where the evidence is uncontroverted that he is mentally competent to stand trial only while under the influence of said medication? Does defendant validly waive his right to be tried while competent by electing, while medicated and competent, to be taken off drug medication before and during trial? Decision: The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that incompetent defendants can forgo medication and be tried while incompetent, provided that when they decide to do so, they are medicated and competent to make such a decision. This is unlikely to be upheld by the USSC. (135)

Addington v. Texas

(1979) Frank Addington was charged with "assault by threat" of his mother and she filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. He was committed for psychiatric treatment by the trial court, but appealed his case to appellate court, and eventually the Texas SC. Their final verdict concluded that the constitution allowed the use of a "clear and convincing" standard of proof at a commitment hearing, a level of certainty which fell below the "beyond a reasonable doubt" typical for criminal cases, but above the usual civil burden of proof of "preponderance of the evidence."

Parham v. J.R.

(1979) Plaintiffs J.R. and other children being treated in a Georgia state mental hospital, instituted a class action in federal district court against defendant Parham and other Georgia mental health officials. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Georgia's procedures for voluntary commitment of children under the age of 18 to state mental hospitals violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and requested an injunction against their future enforcement. Under the Georgia statute providing for the voluntary admission of children to state regional hospitals, admission began with an application for hospitalization signed by a parent or guardian and upon application, the superintendent of the hospital was authorized to admit temporarily any child for "observation and diagnosis." If after observation the superintendent found "evidence of mental illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment" in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such period and under such conditions as may be authorized by law." Under the statute, any child who had been hospitalized for more than five days could be discharged at the request of a parent or guardian. The hospital superintendent had an affirmative duty to release any child "who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved that the superintendent determines that hospitalization of the patient is no longer desirable" even without a parent's request for discharge. The district court held that Georgia's statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to adequately protect the children's due process rights, which should have included at least the right, after notice, to an adversary-type hearing before an impartial tribunal. The USSC reversed and held that it was satisfied that Georgia's medical fact-finding processes were reasonable and consistent with constitutional guarantees. (322-323, 348)

United States v. Mendenhall

(1980) The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal of Ms. Sylvia Mendenhall as pertaining to Ms. Mendenhall's alleged unconstitutional seizure by two DEA agents at Detroit Metropolitan Airport where she was eventually found with two packages of drugs. The court ruled against the defendant. The defendant raised the defense that her 4th amendment rights against search and seizure were violated because of the circumstances under which she was taken to the DEA office at the airport. The decision notably set a standard by which a valid consensual stop could be converted into an unconstitutional Terry stop, such as by "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." the court determined that "seizure" occurs when an officer uses physical force or displays authority to detain a person. (279)

Estelle v. Smith

(1981) In this USSC case, Smith was indicted for murder after taking part in an armed robbery during which his accomplice fatally shot a clerk. The State of Texas ordered a competency evaluation for the trial; however, they later used his competency evaluation during his sentencing trial to obtain the death penalty. Following appeal, the USSC held that, per Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the admission of the doctor's testimony at the penalty phase of the trial violated Smith's Fifth Amendment privilege against forced self-incrimination as he was not told before the pretrial psychiatric examination that he had a right to remain silent and that any statement he made could be used against him at any phase of the trial, including the sentencing phase. (68-69, 72-73, 75-76, 88)

Minnesota v. Loebach

(1981) The appellant was charged with third-degree murder (Minn.Stat. § 609.195 (1980)) and first-degree manslaughter (Minn.Stat. § 609.20 (1980)) in connection with the June 1, 1978, death of his three-month-old son Michael. The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of third-degree murder and he was sentenced to a maximum term of 15 years. The appealed, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony as to appellant's background and personality traits used to prove he fit the diagnosis of a "battering parent", which was used to further show that the baby had been killed by multiple instances of abuse, rather than simple "accidents". The court held that the prosecution will not be permitted to introduce evidence of bettering parents syndrome unless the defendant first raises that issue. The supreme court of Minnesota upheld the conviction in the case because the expert testimony was held not to be prejudicial to the defendant. 219-220, 508

New Jersey v. Cavallo

(1982) Cavallo and Murro were indicted for abduction, sodomy, private lewdness, and rape. The indictments arose out of an incident when ST, a married woman who was two months pregnant, states that she was abducted from a Hunterdon bar and raped by defendants who in turn assert that she willingly accompanied them from the bar to engage in consensual sexual activity. Since there were no witnesses, the trial necessarily focused on the credibility of the conflicting descriptions of those events. The New Jersey SC affirmed the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony suggesting that Cavallo was "a nonviolent, nonaggressive person" who did not "fit within {the} mold" of a rapist. Applying the Frye "general acceptance" test, the court concluded that the defendants "have not met their burden of showing that the scientific community generally accepts the existence of identifiable character traits common to rapists. They also have not demonstrated that psychiatrists possess any special ability to discern whether an individual is likely to be a rapist. until the scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not admissible."

Board of Education v. Rowley

(1982) Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy's parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a "free appropriate public education" to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students. The district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. (560-571)

MacDonald v. United States

(1982) MacDonald was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division ("CID"), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald's discharge, the U.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders. MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald's motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald's Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald's Sixth Amendment rights. (203)

Barefoot v. Estelle

(1983) Barefoot was convicted of murdering a police officer. During sentencing, the same Texas jury was to determine whether Barefoot should receive the death penalty. The Texas death-penalty statute required that the jury consider whether Barefoot would pose "future dangerousness". The USSC ruled on the admissibility of clinical opinions given by two psychiatrists hired by the prosecution in answer to hypothetical questions regarding the defendant's future dangerousness and the likelihood that he would present a continuing threat to society in this Texas death penalty case.

United States v. Lindstrom

(1983) Dennis Slater and Joanne Lindstrom (defendants) were charged with fraud due to their roles in a therapy company that allegedly defrauded insurance companies. At trial, the prosecution's primary witness was a former employee of Slater and Lindstrom's therapy company. She testified that she discussed alteration of patient insurance records with Slater and Lindstrom, that she and Lindstrom had in fact altered patient records, and that Slater and Lindstrom had ordered her to duplicate billing cards and had ordered patients to sign up for treatments they did not receive. In their cross-examination of the witness, Slater and Lindstrom sought to show that the witness's motive for initiating the investigation of the company and for her testimony was hatred of and a vendetta against Slater and Lindstrom. Slater and Lindstrom sought to question the witness about various actions that had resulted from her psychiatric illness, including the following: she offered a patient of the therapy company $3,000 to shoot the wife of the witness's lover; she attempted to shoot a shotgun through the window of her lover's house, after which she was involuntarily committed; and she had attempted suicide for the purpose of manipulating and punishing her boyfriend. Slater and Lindstrom claimed that by introducing evidence of her psychiatric history, they were attempting to show the witness's behavioral pattern of manipulative and spiteful conduct toward people close to her. Thetrial court excluded much of Slater and Lindstrom's line of questioning, including questions regarding the actions listed above. The trial court found Slater and Lindstrom guilty. Slater and Lindstrom appealed on the ground that the trial court's limitation of their cross-examination of the witness violated their Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against them. United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. (186-187)

State v. Hickman

(1983) Generally, actus reus testimony can be used only within certain circumstances, and prosecution can only introduce character evidence if it's already raised by the defendant as part of their defense. In Iowa SC case, the defendant, charged with rape, testified that the intercourse had been consensual; he did not testify to his own character or present any other type of character evidence. Nonetheless, the prosecution was permitted to present expert rebuttal evidence to the effect that the defendant fit in "the class of aggressive, antisocial or sociopathic, hatred rapists." The court's holding can be faulted not only for permitting questionable expert testimony, but also for allowing the prosecution to present character evidence in violation of the "defendant first" orientation of the character evidence rule. (220)

The Jones v. United States

(1983) Jones was charged with petit larceny, a misdemeanor, for attempting to steal a jacket from a store. The judge ordered a competency evaluation, which said that that Jones suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, but that he was competent to proceed to trial. Eventually, Jones plead not guilty by reason of insanity to the misdemeanor offense, which carried a one year maximum sentence; the prosecution did not contest the plea and Jones was automatically committed to St. Elizabeth's for a minimum of 50 days. Upon his first release hearing in May 1976, his request for release was denied. In his second release hearing held in February 1977, his request for either release or civil commitment was also denied, despite the contention of Jones' counsel that his cumulative hospitalization exceeded the maximum penalty of a one year incarceration for the crime. For the government's case, a psychologist from St. Elizabeth's Hospital testified that, in the opinion of the hospital's staff, Jones continued to actively suffer from paranoid schizophrenia and therefore remained a danger to himself and others. The USSC held that automatically committing insanity acquitees was justified. The second issue was the proportionality of the commitment compared to Jones' hypothetical maximum sentence had he been imprisoned. Although three judges at the District Court level agreed that the constitution does provide such a limit, but the Supreme Court rejected this line of thinking arguing that different considerations go into the choosing of a sentence than those underlying a commitment of an insanity acquittee. He argued against the idea that indefinite commitment amounted to punishment. (350-351)

Palmore v. Sidoti

(1984) Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida state appellate courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child. (532, 539)

People v. Bledsoe

(1984) Melanie, the 14-year-old victim, went to a party and, after missing her ride home, asked for a ride from Bledsoe. Bledsoe took her to his trailer and raped her. She was taken to the hospital later that night and reported it to police. Melanie received help for this emotional trauma from a rape counselor, Leslie Jacobson-Wigg, a licensed MFT. This counselor was called as an expert by the prosecution, over defense objection, to testify that Melanie suffered from "rape trauma crisis syndrome." The California SC rejected the rape trauma syndrome evidence, since the studies on this syndrome relied on experts based on reports from counselors who are trying to help rape victims, not probe the accuracy of the victims' accounts of the alleged rapes. However, they did state that such evidence would be admissible to help dispel myths about rape victims.

Irving Independent School District v. Tatro

(1984) This case (US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit) resolved difference between school health services versus medical services. A student required intermittent catheterization during class hours due to spina bifida and inability to empty her bladder on her own. The school refused to provide this care. The Court ruled against school, specifying schools are required to supply only those services that are necessary to aid children to benefit from special education. Schools must provided services that can be done by nurses (not by doctors) and defined these services as School health services (can be provided by school nurses or other qualified lay persons) and medical services (must be performed by licensed physicians). According to book, pertains to psychologists as being required to provide therapy to students depends on whether they are "necessary" to allow the student to function in the classroom. (561)

McKaskle v. Wiggins

(1984) Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. About two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. (175)

Ake v. Oklahoma

(1985) Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. Ake intended to assert the insanity defense, but could not afford a psychiatric eval; a lower court rejected Ake's argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake's insanity defense and convicted him on all counts and he was sentenced to death. After appeal, the SC held that a capital defendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance in capital punishment sentencing, although it also limited this assistance to one professional and made it clear defendants are not entitle to a clinician of their choice.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center

(1985) The USSC held the city's refusal to issue a special use permit to built a home for the mentally retarded was unconstitutional because the refusal was based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally disabled.

Colorado v. Connelly

(1986) In this USSC case initiated by Connelly, he insisted that his schizophrenic episode rendered him incompetent, nullifying his waiver of his Miranda rights. He had approached a Denver police officer and expressed interest in talking about a murder that he committed. After being read his rights repeatedly by the officer and later a detective, Connelly continued to want to confess to the murder. Connelly then waived his right to counsel, and described the details of the murder. Soon afterwards, the court determined that Connelly was not of sound enough mind to stand trial. After the six months was completed, Connelly stood trial. During the trial, the psychiatrist that evaluated Connelly testified that he believed that God told him to confess to the murder, or commit suicide. The lower court ruled that Connelly's waiver of his Miranda rights was made when he was incompetent due to his mental illness, so the confession of Connelly was not permitted in court. The court upheld that a person's special vulnerabilities must be considered in assessing voluntariness but mental limitations or psychological problems do not automatically render a confession inadmissible. 166, 170

Ford v. Wainwright

(1986) In this USSC case, they held that the 8th amendment (against cruel and unusual punishment) prohibits the execution of an "insane" person. Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and sentenced to death in Florida. In 1982, while on death row, Ford's mental health diminished to a point resembling paranoid schizophrenia and his lawyers appealed his execution sentence. (34, 189)

Buchman v. Kentucky

(1987) David Buchanan was indicted on capital murder charges for the rape and murder of Barbel Poore. The prosecution rebutted the defendant's mental state defense at trial with information contained in a report summarizing a competence and treatment evaluation the prosecution and defense had jointly requested. The SC concluded that using the info in this report did not violate the Constitution because the defendant had raised a mental state defense had joined in the evaluation motion. The court held, in effect, that by requesting a competence eval, defendants forfeit their fifth amendment protection against use of examination results on any any mental state issues they subsequently raise.

State v. Norman

(1988) A wife killed her husband while he was sleeping. At trial, she testified that the killing was self defense under battered wife syndrome, as it was provoked after years of physical and psychological abuse. The jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the the trial courts conviction. The case was elevated on for review of judgment to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. The Court held that the wife was not entitled to self-defense as the defendant was not in imminent fear of death when homicide occurred. North Carolina law recognizes an imperfect right of self-defense in certain circumstances. For example, when the defendant is the initial aggressor, but without intent to kill or to seriously injure the decedent, the decedent escalates the confrontation to a point where it reasonably appears to the defendant to be necessary to kill the decedent to save herself from imminent death or great bodily harm. Although the culpability of a defendant who kills in the exercise of imperfect self-defense is reduced, such a defendant is not justified in the killing so as to be entitled to acquittal, but is guilty at least of voluntary manslaughter (199)

Honig v. Doe

(1988) Doe was a student at a developmental center for disabled children. He had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses and attacked a student/kicked him out a school window after being teased. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe and Smith (another student in a similar situation) brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. The court ruled that students couldn't be removed from school if the inappropriate behavior is related to the disability. Schools could suspend a student for up to 10 days, but not more than 10 days without due process. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. (558-559, 565, 570)

Baxter v. City of Belleville

(1989) The US District Court for Southern District of Illinois overturned a denial of a permit to a provider who wished to open a home for people with AIDS despite arguments that the proposed residents of the home posed a danger to the community. The District Court found that denying a special use permit to open a residence for people with AIDS violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA).

Maryland v. Craig

(1990) Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed. Supreme Court ruled that constitutionally the testimony of a six-year-old allege child abuse victim via one-way closed circuit television was permissible. the Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants face-to-face meetings with witnesses against them at trial, was not absolute. The Court found that "in certain narrow circumstances, 'competing interests, if closely examined, may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial." The State's interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children, the Court held, could be sufficiently important to outweigh defendants' rights to face their accusers in court.

Maryland v. Craig

(1990) Defendant Sandra A. Craig was charged with sexually abusing a minor child. At trial, the child was reportedly unable to testify in the physical presence of the defendant due to severe emotional trauma. In this case, the USSC ruled that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which provides criminal defendants with the right to confront witnesses against them, did not bar the use of one-way closed-circuit television to present testimony by an alleged child sex abuse victim in order to shield children who testify in criminal cases. (502-504)

Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health (363-364)

(1990) Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment. Conclusion: While individuals enjoyed right to refuse medical treatment under the due process clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. The state of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life are constitutional. (64, 504-506)

Perry v Louisiana

(1990) Perry murdered five people, including his parents and infant nephew around his parents' home. Following the murders, he fled the state, leaving behind a list of five other intended targets, including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. He was ultimately arrested at a hotel in Washington D.C., apparently on his way to kill O'Connor. A jury convicted him of the five murders and sentenced him to the death penalty. After his sentencing the trial court found that his competence to be executed depended on his taking psychiatric medication and ordered that he be forcibly medicated to be sure he remained competent. Ford v. Wainwright (1986) had already established that an insane inmate cannot be executed. Upon remand, the lower court ruled against the forcible medication of individuals in order to maintain their competency for execution. This decision was based on the distinction that, unlike the holding in Harper v. Washington concerning involuntary medication for treatment issues, forcing medication for the purposes of execution was not medical treatment (being "antithetical to the basic principles of the healing arts") but punishment. In addition, the lower court found two state laws on which to base its holding. First it found that forcibly medicating a person for the purposes of execution was cruel and unusual punishment under Louisiana state law because "it fails to measurably contribute to the social goals of capital punishment" by adding to the individual's punishment "beyond that required for the mere extinguishment of life," and could be "administered erroneously, arbitrarily or capriciously". It also held that forcible medication in this situation violated the right to privacy guaranteed by the Louisiana State Constitution because the inhumanity of the situation rendered the state's interest in executing a person under these conditions less compelling. (195)

Marble v. United States

(1991) In this case, the US District Court for the District of Columbia overruled a history of permitting imposition of the insanity defense on the ground that the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 had removed the technical and policy bases for imposing an insanity defense. (176-177)

Foucha v. Louisiana

(1992) A ruling by the US Supreme Court that states that a person found NGRI in a criminal trial could not thereafter be institutionalized indefinitely without a showing that he or she was either dangerous or mentally ill. The court ordered the release of a person acquitted by NGRI who was later diagnosed as having ASPD. Since a diagnosis of ASPD alone no longer qualified him as "mentally ill," and he had not been convicted, he had to be released. Dangerousness alone was insufficient to justify continued commitment. (274-275, 351-352)

Marbrunak Inc. v. City of Stow

(1992) Another type of municipal ordinance that might be challenged under the FHAA is one creating safety requirements for housing used by people with mental disabilities. Even if they are promulgated in good faith, such requirements are discriminatory if they are not based on empirically derived findings that the individuals in question require the equipment. For example, in this case, the city advised operators of a home for people with mental disabilities that a permit would not be issued unless the home was equipped with special sprinkling systems and with special doors to make access and egress easier. The provider challenged the requirements because they were on not imposed on the operators of group homes for other types of clients, and also argued that the extra cost associated with the requirements made opening the home more difficult. The court agreed, finding the requirements discriminatory. (432)

Medina v. California

(1992) Under the California penal code, a person cannot be tried while mentally incompetent. However, a defendant's competence is presumed under the statute, and the party claiming incompetence bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent. The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including first-degree murder. His counsel moved for a pretrial hearing to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. At the hearing, before a jury, conflicting expert testimony was heard concerning the defendant's mental condition, and the defendant engaged in several verbal and physical outbursts. The jury, instructed as to the presumption of competency and the defendant's burden of proof, found the defendant competent to stand trial. The defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court of California rejected the defendant's claim that the code violated his right to due process by establishing a presumption of competence to stand trial and placing the burden of proof on him to establish otherwise. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review. A California statute that requires that the criminal defendant bears the burden of proving incompetence to stand trial by preponderance of evidence does not to violate due process. If a defendant is incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense and understand the proceedings against him. The entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, by contrast, presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial and to enter a plea. Moreover, while the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, affords an incompetent defendant the right not to be tried, the Court has not said that the Constitution requires the states to recognize the insanity defense. (131)

Heller v. Doe

(1993) A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures. The USSC determined that Kentucky's involuntary commitment procedures for retarded persons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court upheld a statutory scheme that allowed commitment of people with ID under a lower standard of proof than is required for people with mental illness, under the erroneous assumption that treatment for intellectual disabilities was less intrusive than inpatient psychiatric care. They also granted party status to family members and guardians of people with intellectual disabilities. (351-352)

Daubert v. Dow Pharmaceuticals

(1993) This USSC case helped established the Daubert standard for determining whether a piece of scientific evidence is admissible in court i.e., "whether the reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert and another plaintiff's parents were suing Dow for a drug that the plaintiffs' mothers had during pregnancy, which was believed to cause birth defects in their children. The court offered 4 criteria to help determine admissibility of evidence: 1) whether the theory/technique has been tested 2) the known or potential rate of error associated with the technique being used, 3) whether the theory/technique has been subject to peer review and publication, and 4) whether it is generally accepted by relevant members of the scientific community. (pages: 531, 20-22, 46, 144, 147, 148, 268, 271)

Godinez v. Moran

(1993) in this USSC case, they endorsed The Dusky standard ruling that if a defendant was competent to stand trial, they were automatically competent to plead guilty, and thereby waived the right to counsel. Moran shot a bartender and a customer, robbed the cash register. Nine days later he shot his ex-wife, then unsuccessfully attempted suicide. He later confessed to the killings to police and was charged with three counts of first-degree murder. He pleaded not guilty and two court-ordered psychiatrists concluded that he was competent to stand trial. The prosecution sought the death penalty. Two months after the psychiatric evaluations, Moran stated to the court that he wished to waive his right to counsel and change his plea to guilty. After his trial he was sentenced to death, but Moran then sought state post conviction relief on the grounds that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and then it rejected his claim. (pages 171-172, 174-175, 177)

Altman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Co.

(1995) Altman, chief of the dept. of internal Medicine at one of the defendants hospitals before alcoholism led to his removal, sued the hospital for failing to reinstate him to that position after treatment of his addiction under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court (US District Court for Southern District of NY) decided that the plaintiff could no longer carry out the "essential functions" of that job despite intervening treatment for his condition.

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House

(1995) The USSC held that a city ordinance limiting the number of unrelated people in a single-family dwelling to 5 was not necessarily exempt from challenge under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHHA) by a group home that housed 10-12 persons recovering from addiction. Although the court avoided specifically deciding whether the FHAA prevented the city from prohibiting operation of the Oxford House, it indicated that on remand, the group home should prevail if the city could not point to "reasonable" health and safety considerations that explained the ordinance's distinction between such a home and dwelling housing single families larger than five people. 431

Montana v. Egelhoff

(1996) Egelhoff was tried for two counts of homicide and claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered and found him guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision and held that Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff. (224)

Montana v. Egelhoff

(1996) Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff. (224)

Jaffee v. Redmond

(1996) Mary Lu Redmond was a police officer who was the first to respond to a fight-in-progress call. Allen was chasing another man with a butcher knife. Redmond repeatedly ordered Allen to drop the knife, but Allen ignored her. When it appeared to Redmond that Allen was about to stab the man he was chasing, she shot Allen who died at the scene. The representative of Allen's estate (Jaffee) filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Redmond had used excessive force. During discovery, Jaffee discovered that Redmond had sought counseling from a licensed clinical social worker. Jaffee sought the social worker's notes for the purpose of cross-examining Redmond at the trial. Redmond opposed the request, claiming that the notes were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The USSC held that confidential communications made to licensed psychotherapists were protected by a common law privilege and in doing so adopted a multi part test to guide lower courts in other cases in which a common law privilege is asserted. Specifically, they held this based on the facts of the case that 1) she had not raised her mental state as an issue, and 2) because the therapy had taken place after rather than before legally relevant event (the shooting). (81)

Kansas v. Hendricks

(1997) The USSC concluded that any person who, due to mental abnormality or personality disorder, is likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence can be indefinitely confined. When Leroy Hendricks' was nearing the time for release from prison (having served for his long history of child sexual molestation) the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act. After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" brought on by "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder[s]." On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari. (272, 275-276, 326, 351-353)

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael

(1999) In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died and several others were severely injured. Kumho Tire Company and others was sued. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion." The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's "gatekeeping" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based. This expanded upon Daubert v. Merrell Dow in that the requirement also applies to expert opinions that are provided by those with technical or professional skills, such as clinicians. (21-22)

Mitchell v. United States

(1999) Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right "at trial to remain silent." At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. (72-73)

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring

(1999) Respondents L.C. and E.W. suffered from intellectual and developmental disorders; L.C. was also diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E.W., with a personality disorder. Both women were voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta (GRH), where they were confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit. Although their treatment professionals eventually concluded that each of the women could be cared for appropriately in a community-based program, the women remained institutionalized at GRH. Seeking placement in community care, L.C. filed a lawsuit in federal district court against petitioner state officials (collectively, "State"). She alleged that the State violated Title II in failing to place her in a community-based program once her treating professionals determined that such placement was appropriate. E.W. intervened, stating an identical claim. The district court granted partial summary judgment for L.C. and E.W., ordering their placement in an appropriate community-based treatment program. The court rejected the State's argument that inadequate funding, not discrimination against L.C. and E.W. "by reason of [their] disabilities," accounted for their retention at GRH. Under Title II, the court concluded, unnecessary institutional segregation constituted discrimination per se, which could not be justified by a lack of funding. The court also rejected the State's defense that requiring immediate transfers in such cases would "fundamentally alter" the State's programs. On the State's appeal, the he court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, but remanded for reassessment of the State's cost-based defense. The district court had left virtually no room for such a defense. The appeals court read the statute and regulations to allow the defense, but only in tightly limited circumstances. Accordingly, the appeals court instructed the district court to consider, as a key factor, whether the additional cost for treatment of L.C. and E.W. in community-based care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State's mental health budget. The State was granted a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the appellate court's judgment in substantial part. The Court held that the court of appeals' remand instruction was unduly restrictive. In evaluating the State's fundamental-alteration defense, the district court was required to consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing community-based care to L.C. and E.W., but also the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the State's obligation to mete out those services equitably.(330)

United States v. Duhon

(2000) Appellee Duhon pleaded guilty to one count of possessing child pornography. He was deemed incompetent to stand trial, and participated in a competency restoration group and was then stood trial. After appealing, a Federal district court ruled that Duhon remained incompetent to stand trial and that "rote" learning is not sufficient to establish competence; rather, an individual needs to have a cognitive/rational understanding and be able to apply the factual understanding, not just recite it.

Hirschfield v. Stone

(2000) This case illustrates the limited usefulness of including substantial social history in conducting competency evals--while it may be useful for restoration to competence, "license to collect this information does not translate into a need to report such info to the court" according to the book. In this case, incapacitated criminal defendants currently or formerly confined to state psychiatric hospital sued hospital officials and physicians and New York mental health commissioner, alleging violation of constitutional privacy rights via disclosure of confidential psychiatric and medical information and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The US District Court stated in their opinion, "The fact that a criminal defendant is HIV positive and bisexual, was physically abused 14 years earlier, takes HIV related medications...or has siblings who served time in prison, is not essential information which a court must have before determining that defendant has sufficient ability to consult with his lawyers and to understand the proceedings against him." (159)

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett

(2001) Plaintiffs Ash and Garrett, both employees of the University of Alabama, were disabled under the definition of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Ash was a security guard with severe asthma & Garrett was a nurse diagnosed with breast cancer requiring time-consuming radiation and chemotherapy treatments. Both alleged that they had been discriminated against at their jobs as the university refused to assign Ash to duties that would alleviate his asthma and insisted on transferring Garrett because of her absences. They both filed suit in federal court against the UA for damages, arguing that the University had violated the ADA. The University responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the suit. It was eventually appealed to the USSC. The court held that Congress exceeded its authority when it permitted individuals to sue the states for monetary damages; however, this meant individuals in private universities could sue the university under the ADA, but not those at state universities/agencies. The majority opinion stated that Congress, in enacting the ADA, had satisfied the requirement that it make clear its intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity and allow states to be sued for damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the federal government could still bring damage claims against state governmental agencies. (426)

Atkins v. Virginia

(2002) Atkins and an accomplice abducted Eric Nesbitt, robbed him, and ultimately killed him. In custody, each man claimed that the other had pulled the trigger. Due to inconsistencies in Atkins's testimony, a deal of life imprisonment was negotiated with Jones in return for his full testimony against Atkins. The jury decided that Jones's version of events was the more coherent and credible, and convicted Atkins of capital murder. During the penalty phase of the trial, the defense presented Atkins's school records. The results of an IQ test confirmed that he had an IQ of 59. On this basis they proposed that he was "mildly mentally retarded". Atkins was nevertheless sentenced to death. On appeal, the SC of Virginia affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence after finding that an improper sentencing verdict form had been used. At retrial, the prosecution proved two aggravating factors under Virginia law—that Atkins posed a risk of "future dangerousness" based on a string of previous violent convictions, and that the offense was committed in a vile manner. The state's witness, Dr. Stanton Samenow, countered that Atkins was NOT mentally retarded, by stating that Atkins's vocabulary, general knowledge and behavior suggested that he possessed at least average intelligence. As a result, Atkins's death sentence was upheld. Nevertheless, the court did uphold that capital punishment is not a suitable penalty for intellectually disabled defendants as it is in violation of the 8th amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. However, they did leave the defining of intellectual disability up to the states.

Kansas v. Crane (2002)

(2002) In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- "mental abnormality or personality disorder" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding. (275)

Chevron USA v. Echazabel

(2002) Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rule-making under the ADA. This made it more clear that the direct threat exception to the ADA also encompassed threats to the self, not just others.

Kansas v. Crane

(2002), In this USSC case, the Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) as consistent with substantive due process. The Court clarified that its earlier holding in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) did not set forth a requirement of total or complete lack of control, but noted that the Constitution does not permit commitment of a sex offender without some lack-of-control. The Court ruled that the person has to have difficulty controlling sexual impulses, not just a general lack of self-control. More details: Several psychologists examined Crane, who had exposed himself to two people in the same day, and threatened to rape one. They diagnosed him with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. One psychologist concluded that the two diagnoses in combination placed Crane within the listed sexual disorders covered by the SVPA, "cit[ing] the increasing frequency of incidents involving [respondent], increasing intensity of the incidents, [respondent's] increasing disregard for the rights of others, and his increasing daring and aggressiveness." Another psychologist testified that Crane's behavior was marked by "impulsivity or failure to plan ahead," indicating his unlawfulness "was a combination of willful and uncontrollable behavior," id., at 584-585, 7 P. 3d, at 290. The State's experts agreed, however, that "[r]espondent's mental disorder does not impair his volitional control to the degree he cannot control his dangerous behavior." (275)

Lawrence v. Texas

(2003) A Texas law classifying consensual, adult homosexual intercourse as illegal sodomy violated the privacy and liberty of adults to engage in private intimate conduct under the 14th amendment. There was also brief mention of custody legalities pertaining to LGBTQ parents. The book states, "the USSC...state that one reason why criminalization of homosexuality is unconstitutional is that it facilitates discrimination against gays and lesbians in matters relating to 'family issues'." (539)

Blakely v. Washington

(2004) Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty." Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review. Other than previous conviction, any penalty for a crime that exceeds normal type must be checked by the jury. Amendment 6.

Crawford v. Washington

(2004) In this USSC case, they gave a decision that reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that cross-examination is required to admit prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have since become unavailable. They avowed that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was intended to restrict a prosecutor's ability to offer "testimonial" hearsay statements as evidence. Other details: Michael Crawford and his wife confronted Lee over an allegation that Lee had attempted to rape Mrs. Crawford. Crawford stabbed Lee, claiming he had acted in self-defense when he believed Lee had picked up a weapon. Lee denied doing anything to indicate he had a weapon. Both Mr. and Mrs. Crawford were questioned by police after receiving a Miranda warning. Mrs. Crawford, being interrogated separately, at first said that she had not seen the attack, but under further questioning said that she had seen the attack and that Lee was not holding a weapon. At trial, Mrs. Crawford could not be compelled to testify by the state under Washington's spousal privilege law. The deputy prosecutor introduced Mrs. Crawford's statement to the police as evidence that Mr. Crawford had no reasonable belief that he was in danger from Mr. Lee. Generally, out-of-court statements by persons other than the accused are excluded as hearsay. Here the court allowed the statement to be admitted on the basis that the statement was reliable, as it was partially corroborated by Mr. Crawford's statement to police. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the wife's statement, on the ground that Mr. Crawford would be unable to confront (i.e., cross-examine) Mrs. Crawford on her statement without waiving spousal privilege, and that this would be a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The statement was allowed into evidence at the trial, and the prosecution relied on it heavily in its closing argument.

United States v. Booker

(2005) is a United States Supreme Court decision on criminal sentencing. Booker was arrested after police officers found him with 92.5 grams of crack cocaine and Booker later admitted to selling an additional 566 grams. In 2003, Booker was found guilty of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, for which Federal law provided a statutory sentence of ten years to life in prison. However, at sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant (1) distributed 566 grams over and above the 100 grams that the jury had to have found and (2) had obstructed justice. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that increased the defendant's base offense level, making Booker's sentencing range increase to 30 years to life; the judge sentenced Booker to the minimum. Booker appealed claiming the sentencing guidelines violated his Sixth Amendment rights since the judge was able to find facts absent the findings of the jury, other than his criminal history, to determine his sentencing range. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires that other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed statutory maximum sentence, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial. 263, 267-270, 282

United States v. Andrews

(2006) Andrews was seen by a witness smoking a cigarette outside a bank, which was later robbed by a man of his description. The DNA on the cigarettes matched Andrews's. Andrews appealed his conviction to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals based on his claim that his amnesia for the time surrounding the crime rendered him incompetent to stand trial based on his inability to assist his attorney in preparing his defense. The court affirmed Andrews' conviction, and provided several considerations for courts rendering decisions on cases involving amnesia: 1) whether the defendant has any ability to participate in his defense; 2) whether the amnesia is temporary or permanent; 3) whether the crime and the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the crime can be reconstructed without the defendant's testimony; 4) whether access to government files would aid in preparing the defense; and 5) the strength of the government's case against the defendant.

Clark v. Arizona

(2006) The USSC decided the following: 1) Althought it stated that "observation evidence" relelvant to mens rea should always be admissible, it upheld an Arizona statute that limited clinical opinion testimony in criminal cases to the insanity issues. The court gave several reasons, but they boiled down to three related concerns about opinions that address the capacity of those with mental disorder to form mens rea: 1) such opinions are of suspect reliability 2) they may mislead the jury and 3) they may address legal issues rather than clinical ones. 2) They did emphasize that observational data should be used as mens rea issues even if it comes from a mental health professional. According to the Court, observational evidence includes what the defendant did and said during the period of the alleged offense, and ALSO "testimony that an expert witness might give about [the defendant's] tendency to think in a certain way and his behavioral characteristics." This is in contrast to "mental disease evidence" that describes a defendant's particular disorder and with capacity evidence about a defendant's capacity for cognition and moral judgment. The latter two types of testimony may constitutionally be excluded. 3) Lastly, the USSC declined to constitutionalize the insanity defense, stating that states had the right to define it. States have the right to exclude mental health evidence that does not bear directly on an insanity defense. (Pages 204, 216-217)

Panetti v. Quarterman

(2007) Panetti held wife and daughter hostage and murdered his wife's parents. He was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, claiming mental illness. A psychiatric evaluation found that while Panetti was clearly mentally ill, that he was also aware of his crime, of the fact that he was to be executed, and of the State's stated reason for executing him. The District Court concluded that he was sufficiently sane to be executed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court, rejecting the argument that an inmate cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the State's motivation for the execution and holding that an inmate need only have an awareness of the State's reason for execution. However, they didn't clarify what a rational understanding of states reason for execution consisted of. (190-192)

Indiana v. Edwards

(2008) Edwards, who suffered from schizophrenia, was charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft after he was caught trying to steal a pair of shoes from a store and fired a gun at a store security officer, wounding a bystander. This U.S. Supreme Court case held the dignity and fairness of the trial process required that defendants who are competent to stand trial and waive counsel may nonetheless be required to accept counsel if they "still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves." The case also called for a higher level of competence than competence to stand trial. (174-175)

Hall v. Florida

(2014) Atkins essentially allowed states to decide a definition of "intellectual disability" in relevant cases. In this case, the USSC held that the professional/scientific definitions of what constituted an intellectual disability should essentially be used in all relevant court cases. Hall got a 71, but because of Florida law was not entitled to show evidence of adaptive functioning. The USSC ruled Florida's method unconstitutional in part on their understanding of the concept of standard measurement of error, which was not guided by current scientific guidelines for understanding an IQ score. (page 279)

Potomac Group Home Corporation v. Montgomery County

(2015) In 1995, Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation. Brumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (432)

Brumfield v. Cain (2015)

(2015) In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation. Brumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Chavez v. United States

135 (2018) In 2013, Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Per the book, this case the ninth circuit ruled that the offender subject to sentencing must be able to understand the nature of proceedings and be able to "participate intelligently to the extent that participation is called for." MORE FACTS: At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135-168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had "tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Palmer v. Circuit Court

According to the book, this case is an example of how the courts have essentially eliminated any requirements in the ADA to provide accommodation when an employee's mental disability leads to disruption or dangerous behavior. In this case specifically, they mention how the 6th circuit court of Illinois has "written out" these requirements by "noting that employers have a duty to create reasonable accommodations but 'we cannot believe that this duty runs in favor of employees who commit or threaten to commit violent acts." (422)

Frendak v. United States

Frendak shot a coworker. She was adjudicated competent although several experts opined she was likely insane when she committed the crime. Frendak refused to use the insanity defense, but was forced by the court to plead insanity. The decision was reversed upon appeal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, in contrast to the "Whalem approach" (where the defense attorney can raise the insanity defense against the defendant's own wishes), the defendant's decision regarding assertion of the defense be followed when the defendant is competent to make it. (The textbook asserts that, in light of Moran, the USSC would likely hold that someone who is competent to stand trial is also competent to waive the insanity defense). (176-177)

State v. Hallman

Hallman was convicted of first degree murder and attempted sexual assault after murdering the man he lived with and attempting to rape the man's girlfriend. In this case, the Arizona SC held that expert testimony regarding the defendant's "impulsive personality" was admissible because it tended to disprove the pre-meditation necessary for a first degree murder charge (although this would not prevent lesser homicide charges for which this was not a requirement), demonstrating the breadth of situations where character evidence for mens rea may be introduced. (219)

Hayes v. Murphy

In this case, the 10th cir. court of appeals (1981) Mrs. Hays mother of Thomas Lee Hays, a prisoner at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, alleged that her son was incompetent and thus incapable of maintaining the proceedings himself or of protecting his federal constitutional rights not to be subjected to an illegal sentence of death (imposed on her son after a previous charge of first degree murder). In this case, the court upheld the importance of assessing the competency of an inmate in a setting that facilitates valid clinical assessment. Specifically, the court required that the evaluations be performed somewhere other than on death row and include "the type of extended close observation in a proper setting which is generally recognized as essential for all psychiatric and psychological evaluations." (193)

Gore v. Shalala

In this case, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) concluded that the agency sufficiently accommodated an individual with an alcohol abuse disorder. They determined that it was sufficient that the company dropped removal proceedings against him and allowed him unpaid leave to get treatment. They did not grant other requests, such as a request to relocate to a location closer to his family during treatment. The EEOC determined this was acceptable acceptable. This case illustrates that the precept that the ADA does not require an accommodation to be the best possible.

People v. Poddar

The Tarasoff case. Berkeley graduate student Poddar sought out Berkeley student Tarasoff while she was alone in her home and killed her. Podder became enamored with Tatiana Tarasoff and was confused and enraged when she rejected his advances. Previous to this, Poddar sought and received emergency psychological treatment from Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of California at Berkeley. Poddar saw Dr. Moore seven times. On August 20, 1969, during his 7th therapy session, Poddar confessed that he planned to kill Tatiana Tarasoff. Dr. Moore diagnosed Poddar with having an acute and severe "paranoid schizophrenic reaction." He and two other doctors determined that Poddar should be committed to a psychiatric hospital for observation and contacted the police. However, the police only briefly detained Poddar, releasing him after he promised to stay away from Tarasoff. Following Poddar's release, Dr. Harvey Powelson, Dr. Moore's superior, instructed the police to return the letter from Dr. Moore instructing them to detain Poddar, ordered that the letter and all notes taken on Poddar be destroyed, and instructed Dr. Moore to take no further action in detaining Poddar. The doctors who examined Poddar never notified Tarasoff or her family about Poddar's threatening statements. Poddar never returned to therapy and killed Tatiana Tarasoff as planned. Although the trial court convicted Poddar of second-degree murder, the Court of Appeal reduced the crime to manslaughter. On appeal, the California Supreme Court determined that even the charge of manslaughter was too harsh under the circumstances and reversed the conviction. Poddar was never retried and was allowed to return to India, where he reportedly married a lawyer and led a normal life. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (Tarasoff II) Following Poddar's criminal trial, Tarasoff's parents sued the psychiatrists and police who were involved in treating Poddar. The charges against the police were ultimately dropped because the police were immune to the suit. Although the trial court and California Court of Appeal determined that Tarasoff's parents had no cause of action, the California allowed Tarasoff's parents to amend their complaint to state the following: "[R]egardless of the therapists' unsuccessful attempt to confine Poddar, since they knew that Poddar was at large and dangerous, their failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger constituted a breach of the therapists' duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana." The California Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded the Court of Appeal's decision. In its holding, the California Supreme Court considered the following factors: -Foreseeability of harm to Plaintiff; -the degree of certainty that Plaintiff suffered injury; -the closeness of the connection between Defendent's conduct and the injury suffered by Plaintiff; -the moral blame attached to Defendent's conduct; -the policy of preventing future harm; -the extent of the burden to Defendent and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; -and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Of these factors, the California Supreme Court held that foreseeability was most important when establishing a duty because a defendant generally owes a duty of care to all persons endangered by his or her conduct, with respect to all risks that make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Moreover, when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control or warn about the conduct of another person, a defendant is generally liable only if the defendant had a special relationship with the dangerous person or to the potential victim. Since the relationship between a therapist and the patient constitutes a special relationship, the Court determined that the defendant-therapists had a duty to use reasonable care to protect Tatiana Tarasoff and breached that duty. (215)

Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service

The court upheld the discharge of an individual with schizophrenia who periodically refused her mediation and had a history of carrying a concealed weapon into the office of the state's governor and attempting to force entry into the White House. (423)