Gender in the Law Final Cases

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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:

Facts: After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a "hostile working environment" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank What was challenged: Did the Civil Rights Act prohibit the creation of a "hostile environment" or was it limited to tangible economic discrimination in the workplace? Court decision: The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins:

Facts: Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff. The district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board's decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination What was challenged: Did the Court of Appeals err in requiring the employer to prove it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination by clear and convincing evidence? Decision: Yes, in part. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals applied the right test, but should have placed the burden at "preponderance of the evidence" not "clear and convincing evidence". On remand, Price Waterhouse would escape liability if it shows it would have denied Hopkins partnership even if she were not a woman. Concurring/ Dissenting Opinion: White wrote a concurrence, stating that there was no requirement for the employer to submit objective evidence. The employer's credible testimony alone was enough. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a concurrence, expressing that the Court's opinion was only a supplement to McDonnell Douglas. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent, stating that he would stick with the evidentiary standards from McDonnell Douglas. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. Relevant Concepts: Hostile work environment, Title VII (McDonnell Douglas reference)

Dothard v. Rawlinson:

Facts: Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in "contact positions" that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal. What was challenged: (1) Do the height and weight requirements violate Title VII? (2) Does the ban on women in "contact positions" violate Title VII? Decision: Yes and No. Mieth: The Court ruled that the height and weight requirements were not rationally related to a government objective (Rational Basis). Rawlinson: Under Title VII, the height and weight requirements disproportionately affected women, and if strength is the matter at hand then there should be a test not a correlation between height and weight. Regulation 204: The basis of the law is gender stereotypes that do not meet the burden of proof.

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia

Facts: Gerald Bostock was fired from a government program helping abused children in Clayton County, GA after joining a gay softball league. What was challenged: Does Title VII protection from discrimination based on sex apply to the LGBTQ+ community? Decision: Yes, Title VII does protect members of the LGBTQ+ community from being fired on the basis of their identities.

Obergefell v. Hodges

Facts: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. What was challenged: Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? Decision: Yes and Yes, the due process clause applies to same sex marriage. Dissenting opinion: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr argued that, although gay marriage is good, the constitution does not explicity address it, and is therefore not up to the Courts to decide. Scalia and Thomas joined in the dissent, all arguing that the Courts have overstepped its bounds, the majority opinion invoked an overly expansive interpretation of the constitution, and that the states should decide their laws on gay marriage. Relevant Concepts: LGBTQ+ rights

Griswold v. Connecticut:

Facts: In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court. * A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal.* What was challenged: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Decision: The Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void. Concurring/ Dissenting Opinions: Goldberg, Harlan, and White concurred, stating that the 14th amendment was violated by the statute instead of the 3rd, 4th, and 9th. Stewart and Black dissented, claiming that the constitution did not infer a right to privacy. Relevant Concepts: Contraceptives, right to privacy

Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Facts: In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years). The state argued that it was not unconstitutional because the miscegenation laws applied to black and white people, but the Courts stated this argument failed to meet the "rational purpose" test What was challenged: Did Virginia's antimiscegenation laws violate the Equal Protection Clause? Court's decision: Yes, unanimous decision in favor of Loving, and stated the law was in violation of the Due Process Clause as well. Relevant concept: antimiscegenation law

Roe v. Wade:

Facts: In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff's identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor's orders to save a woman's life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments What was challenged: Does the Constitution recognize a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Court Decision: Inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental "right to privacy" that protects a pregnant woman's choice whether to have an abortion. However, this right is balanced against the government's interests in protecting women's health and protecting "the potentiality of human life." The Texas law, which broadly prohibited abortion without respect to the stage of pregnancy, violates the Due Process clause, which protects our right to privacy. The law must account for variability in the stage of pregnancy. In the FIRST trimester, abortion is legal, but in the second, the state can impose restrictions based on maternal health. In the third, the state can regulate or prohibit abortion except for life-saving reasons. Relevant Concepts: right to privacy

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services

Facts: Joseph Oncale was employed at Sundowner Offshore Services. His fellow employees subjected him sexual harrassment, on multiple accounts, including physical harassment and threats of rape. He reported it to his superiors, but no action was taken What was challenged: Does workplace harassment violate Title VII's prohibition against sex-based discrimination (42 U.S.C Section 2000e-2 (a)(1)) when the harasser and harassed employee are of the same sex? Decision: Yes, workplace harrassment involving same-sex individuals does violate Title VII. The Supreme Court held that same-sex workplace harassment is encompassed under Section 2000e-2 (a)(1)) of Title VII outlawing discrimination on the basis of sex, therefore reversing the Fifth Circuit's ruling against Oncale. Relevant Concepts: Title VII, hostile work environment

Bowers v. Hardwick:

Facts: Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. What was challenged: Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal? Decision: No, The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) Relevant Concepts: anti- sodomy laws

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992)

Facts: Pennsylvania amended its laws regulating abortion from 1988 to 1989, by which new provisions were added to their existing abortion-related laws, including a mandatory 24 hour wait period before the procedure as well as a requirement for the patient's informed consent. If a minor sought abortion services, they would need either parental or judicial consent (depending on the nature of the patient's relationship with her parent or external circumstances). For married women, however, Pennsylvania law required that her husband be notified prior to the procedure except for medical purposes, where an abortion would be necessary to save the woman's life. Lastly, medical centers that offered abortion services were required to report themselves to the state. These rights, as the appellants state, infringe upon the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment. These provisions were apart of the Abortion Control Act. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit against the state, alleging that these provisions violated the ruling of Roe v. Wade. What was challenged: Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, if married, notify their husbands, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade? Decision: The Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, White, Scalia (before he later filed a concurring opinion), and Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Relevant Concepts: Undue burden, abortion

Lawrence v. Texas:

Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling. What was challenged: Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled? Decision: No, yes, and yes. Overruled the Bowers v. Hardwick ruling. The Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. Dissenting/ Concurring Opinions: O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions. Relevant Concepts: antisodomy laws

Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc:

Facts: Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an "abusive work environment" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a "close case" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision. What was challenged: Must sexual harassment "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well being" in order to create an "abusive work environment" that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Court decision: No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)." Relevant Concepts: Title VII

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby:

Facts: The Green family, who owns Hobby Lobby, centers its business around Christian values that believe contraception is immoral. The ACA requires employment-based group health care plans to include services like contraception, with the only exemptions for religious institutions. In 2012, Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, was sued by the Green family on the contraception requirement. They argued this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. What was challenged: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? Decision: Yes, the fine (the penalty for non complying) created a substantial burden that did not satisfy any government interest. Concurring/ Dissenting Opinion: RBG dissented, arguing there was no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute (a reference to Oregon v. Smith). Sotomayor, Kagan and Breyer joined the dissent. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, stating that the courts needed to define the difference of for profit and non-profit organizations before the eyes of the RFRA. Relevant Concepts: contraception

Eisenstadt v. Baird

Facts: William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and overpopulation. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives What was challenged: Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment? Decision: The Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the courts did not have to rely on the ruling of Griswold v. Connecticut to invalidate the Massachusetts law. Relevant Concepts: right to privacy, contraception

Loving v. Virginia, 1967 (9-0 decision)

Invalidated state laws prohibiting interracial marriage.

Bowers v. Hardwick

Ninth Amendment - no Constitutional protection of sexual privacy

Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Struck down state's law banning interracial marriage as violation of the 14th Amendment equal protection clause (Warren Court)

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)

The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State.

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)

upheld anti-sodomy laws based on Judeo-Christian views - major privacy case


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