International Relations Readings

The Quiet Coup By Simon Johnson

-all the crises look similar -each country needed a loan and had to make big changes so the loan could work -real concern is the politics of the country in crisis -countries are in desperate economic situations because elites overreached in good times and took too many risks, EM governments and private sectors for an oligarchy, running country like a profit-seeking company -conditions get worse as credit is unavailable, economy paralyzed, conditions worsen -government will restructure banking system, squeeze some of its oligarchs -most EM governments first victimized the working class before the riots got too large -many IMF programs go off track because government can't stay tough on its cronies, global investors stop lending, banks can't roll over debt -elite business interests played central role in creating crisis, making huge gambles with implicit backing of government until inevitable collapse and now use influence to prevent remorse that are needed -US has most advanced oligarchy, gained power by amassing a cultural capital/belief system: what's good for big business is good for the country -executives truly believe they control the world -every time a loan was sold, banks took transaction fees and hedge funds reaped huge fees -because the national economy depended on growth of real estate and finance, Washington had no cause to question the process -government has taken extreme care not to upset interests of financial institutions or to question the outlines of the system that got us here -big banks have gained political strength since crisis began because when the system is in such a fragile state, a major bank failure could cause huge damage -IMF would tell US to nationalize troubled banks and break them up if necessary -government must force bank to acknowledge issues, which is easily done by nationalizing -big banks sold in medium pieces, divided regionally or by specialization -everyone has elites, but you have to change them from time to time -Two scenarios: complicated bank-by-bank ears and repeated bailouts or global economy collapses, motivates overhaul

America's Energy Edge By Robert Blackwill and Meghan O'Sullivan

-between 200 and 2012, US shale gas production rose over 50 percent each year -with fracking, US poised to become an energy superpower -global energy trade maps are bing redrawn as US imports decline and exporters find new markets -energy was a liability as it relied on other countries, but now an asset used as leverage around world -global supply of energy will continue to increase and diversify -as US production increases, international price decreases -revenue decreases for the Middle East as prices fall -countries that usually use oil as leverage against US will see influence shrink -Moscow has most to lose: additional suppliers give European customers leverage to negotiate better terms with Russian suppliers -drop in oil prices could destabilize Russia's political system -a weaker Russia is not a less challenging Russia, will have ever reason to actively counter Europe's efforts to develop own resources -Saudis can't maintain public services with low prices, will lose legitimacy -consumers should welcome energy revolution, good for China and India -common cause for Russia and China: the largest producer and consumer could form partnership -US is huge beneficiary: new jobs and wealth, fueling investment in US infrastructure, more energy independence -however, a change in supply abroad still changes US price -US can't insulate itself from shocks to global economy, so remains deeply involved overseas -have to address environmental concerns and secure economic benefits of production -energy boom will sharpen instruments of US statecraft -can gain international support for Iran sanctions if it can assuage fears of oil price spike -new way for US to reinforce alliances, support others, help states produce more climate-friendly energy without sacrificing economic growth, prevent bullying by less friendly suppliers -share expertise on unconventional energy with China, who share same concerns -enhance US leadership on climate change -Us comes close to being a net energy exporter, undercut OPEC's role as manager of global energy prices -US can profit and seize new opportunities

The Clash of Civilizations By Samuel P. Huntington Constructivism

-future conflicts will be cultural -war of nations rather than princes -world divided into First, Second, and Third Worlds during Cold War, but that's no longer relevant -divisions are now between cultures -civilization: cultural entity common heritage, highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have -civilizations have common objective elements, like language, history, religion, and subjective self-identification of people -civilizations sometimes include more than one state -lines between civilizations aren't sharp but are very real -civilizations are dynamic, rise and fall -7-8 major modern civilizations: Western Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, African -differences among civilizations are real and basic, religion is hugely important -differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict doesn't necessarily mean violence -world is becoming smaller, intensifying awareness of differences and commonalities -awareness invigorates animosity, enhances civilization-consciousness -modernization and social change throughout the world separate people from longstanding local identities and strengthen religion -end of western influence creates the desire to shape the world in non-Western ways -cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and less easily resolved than political or economic ones -economic regionalism is increasing within civilizations -regional us vs. them attitude -clash occurs on two levels: adjacent groups along fault lines between civilizations and states from different civilizations competing for relative power -Velvet Curtain of Culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of Ideology -In Arab world, Western democracy strengthens anti-West sentiment -violence against immigrants in West -religion revives ethnic identities -after the Cold War, underlying differences between China and US have reasserted themselves -interactions and competitions may be economic or violent -Islam has bloody borders -kin-country syndrome: rally to support other members of own civilization -West against Islam -people apply one standard to kin countries and a different standard to others -religious concerns trump political concerns -conflicts and violence can occur within civilizations, but likely to be less intense -West currently has no superpower opponent -"the world community" gives global legitimacy to actions reflecting interests of the West -West runs the world to protect its own interests -Western concepts don't resonate with others: individuality, liberalism, human rights, equality -"universal civilization" is a western concept -the values that are most important in the west are least important worldwide -To escape Western pressure: isolation, join West, balance West by joining the rest -countries with people from different civilizations are candidates for dismemberment -torn countries: countries are divided over which civilization their society belongs in (Turkey, Mexico) -to redefine civilizational identity, a torn country must have a supportive elite, be willing to redefine, and dominant groups in the receiving civ must be willing to accept it -West vs. Confucian-Islamic states focuses on weapons -West wants nonproliferation treaties and control -Non-West wants to assert their rights to acquire weapons and ensure safety from US -civilization consciousness is increasing and therefore transcivilizational conflict will increase, non-western civilizations will become actors and not simply objects

Blowback By Chalmers Johnson

-American service personnel victimizing foreign civilians in post-Cold War world -troops stationed all over world but no other countries have bases on US soil and no other countries have bases in other countries -don't have the excuse of the Cold War to hide behind -unacknowledged empire wracking up crimes, accidents, atrocities -blowback: unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people -a lot of terrorists and drug lords etc are products of previous US operations -drug trade in US and Latin America field by dictatorships the CIA installed -Russia also experiencing blowback from former satellites -arming mujahideen gave birth to Taliban -because of increasingly interconnected nature of world, we are living in a blowback world -US role in Chilean military coup had little impact on US but lethal consequences for people in Chile -terrorism strikes at innocent to draw attention to the sins of the invulnerable

ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group Audrey Kurth Cronin

-ISIS's ideology is similar to al Qaeda's and so many assume that the current challenge simple necessitates a refocus of Washington's counterterrorism apparatus -ISIS represents post-al Qaeda jihadist threat -unlike al Qaeda, ISIS has 30,000 fighters, territory in Iraq and Syria, extensive military capabilities, commands infrastructure, funds itself, pseudo-state led by a conventional army -strategy of offensive containment is needed: combination of limited military tactics and broad diplomatic strategy to halt ISIS' expansion, isolate group, degrade capabilities -al Qaeda created after 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ISIS by 2003 US invasion of Iraq -Sunni -took advantage of revolt against Assad, seizing territory in Syria's northeast -ISIS captured Mosul, Tikrmt, al-Qaim, and renamed itself Islamic State, proclaimed territory to be new caliphate -Al Qaeda saw itself as vanguard of global insurgency against secular rule -ISIS seeks to create pure Sunni Islamist state governed by brutal interpretation of shari'a law, obliterate borders imposed by West -can't use drones to kill ISIS like you can with al Qaeda, and killing leaders wouldn't cripple organization because have complex administrative structure -can't be defeated by traditional US counterterrorism tactics, can't cut off funding because controls 60% of Syria's oil production capacity, stealing taxes, extortion -US could delegitimize al Qaeda by publishing their violence, make them hated in Muslim world -ISIS's brutality designed to intimidate foes and Muslim revulsion doesn't impact it -hard to combat recruitment, attracts people who want adventure, power, sense of self, violence, enslave women, offers primitive, short-term gratification, radicalization in a way that can't be countered by logic -al Qaeda unappealing, austere, unsexy -Shiite Iraqi government has lost political legitimacy, US can't win over Sunnis -ISIS is less an insurgent group fighting against an established government than one party in a conventional civil war -ISIS led by capable, ex-military Iraqis who know US techniques because US trained them -third option besides counterterrorism and counterinsurgency: conventional war waged with goal of completely destroying it, but US public would be against it and wars pursued at odds with political reality can't be won -US has no good military options, must resurrect role as diplomatic superpower -support Iraqi military, assist regional forces like Kurds, humanitarian assistance to civilians fleeing ISIS -US can't rebuild Iraqi state or determine outcome of Syria's civil war -ISIS seeks to challenge current international order, coming closer than al Qaeda to achieving this goal -no government supports ISIS, has made an enemy of every state in the region, US should pursue more aggressive diplomatic agenda with major powers and regional players

The Failure in Our Success By George F. Kennan

-advocating containment in previous article -West did't want to negotiate when they had the opportunity after the Berlin airlift, wanted unconditional surrender, too timid to negotiate -we paid for unconditional surrender with huge military expenditures, nuclear cultivation, and 40 years of Communist control in Eastern Europe -new age: no great power rivalries that threaten world peace -new challenge: people are unaccustomed to dealing with a world with no clear focal points or threats -there is no vast common denominator to give instructions on how to handle the situations, stop solving problems by putting them in broad categories, use sound principles -remember there are limits to what one sovereign country can do to help another, and have to preserve our own prosperity before we can help others

International Relations: One World, Many Theories By Stephen M. Walt

-defensive realism: states have little intrinsic interest in military conquest and cost of expansion generally outweighs benefits, great power ward occur largely because domestic groups fostered exaggerated perceptions of threats -countered by saying benefits often exceed costs of war, anarchy encourages all states to try to maximize relative strength because no one knows when a truly revisionist state might emerge -offensive realists believe that anarch forces great powers to compete irrespective of internal characteristics -constructivism legitimized constructivism because realism and liberalism couldn't predict it -domestic politics: how domestic institutions can help states deal with perennial problem of uncertainty, use of cultural variables to explain actions -liberal theories identify instruments that states can use to achieve shared interests

History and September 11 Francis Fukuyama

-despite 9/11, modernity as represented by US and other developed democracies will remain the dominant force in world politics, and institutions embodying the West's principles will continue to spread -9/11 represents desperate backlash against the modern world -US believes their ideology is universal, but why did Western-educated people reject Western ideals and fly planes into Western buildings? -modern democracy is a secularized version of the Christian doctrine of universal human equality -technological advancement necessitates adoption of certain economic institutions to promote growth -economic development tends to engender liberal democrat -economic growth produces a middle class that wants property rights, a complex civil society, and higher levels of education, which lead to democracy -secularism is relatively recent development in West -modernization implies that Western values are't arbitrary cultural offshoots of Christianity but embody a more universal process -culture does not prevent advancement -Islam can only boast one working democracy and have seen no economic breakthroughs -nothing in Islam that prohibits modernity, just like Christianity -Ottoman millet system while Europe was torn by religious wars -issues with Middle East stem from US foreign policy -estimated 10-15% of Muslim world is radicalized -Islamic stagnation caused by Saudi promotion of extremism, indoctrination, root causes of poverty, authoritarian rule, no Arab leaders have stepped down in favor of democratic rule, and no governments have used wealth to create self-sustaining industrial society -Iran might lead the Islamic world out of current predicament, instituted successful revolution, now young people want more change, can demonstrate tolerant Islam

Libya: Our First Cosmopolitan War? By Jeremy Rabkin

-first military conflict fought under legal supervision of the International Criminal Court -fighting, conducting armed intervention by constraining rules -ICC imposed constraints on advantages of air power and weaponry because less developed nations couldn't deploy them -guerrilla fighters accorded new protections, even though some didn't observe customary rules of war -commanders have to focus on limiting enemy's immediate military capabilities, not impose larger costs -NATO restraining air strikes -NATO inhibited by determination to keep operations within bounds of Security Council resolution, which is concerned with protecting civilians and doesn't authorize outside powers to remove Gaddafi -want to remove Gaddafi, but insist it isn't the aim of the operations -the world now has rules that constrain warfare -Libya is armed intervention not fought like war, although Libya has in two months experienced as many fatalities as half of Iraq's fatalities over six years -long, inconclusive struggle will make NATO think twice before intervening in the future and may generate doubt -world we live isn't organized to protect humanity's rights -international institutions are completely reliant on forces of member states -can't fight a successful war while worrying about human rights

Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984 By Jack Snyder

-offense used to mean prestige -cult of the offensive: in 1914, reflected endemic preference of military for offensives, but also reflected particular circumstances that liberated or intensified that preference -civilian ignorance to military affairs and transition from aristocratic caste to specialized profession of officer corps produced an unfavorable combination, class conflicts reinforced civil-military conflicts -MAD works for stability and defense of status quo, no first-strike advantage -power to punish is a huge deterrent -in WWI, believed that first army to mobilize and strike would gain significant advantage, but no one believed two-day edge would allow a disarming surprise attack -offensive plans: self-fulfilling prophecy, states acting on the belief that states are vulnerable and conquest is easy needed up acting vulnerable and fearful -Germany's military's preference for unlimited offensive strategy and mismatch between military and domestic strategy caused instability rooted in civil-military relations -Schlieffen Plan: use two-month window in which Russia mobilizes to defeat France and cross through Belgium to approach from a more favorable angle, Schlieffen knew Germany was too weak for it, ignoring strength of defensive action by France -military views wars as realists: difficult to avoid and impossible to limit -view that war is inevitable becomes self-fulfilling prophecy -offensive plan gives illusion of certainty -operational autonomy of military most likely permitted when operation goal is to disarm adversary quickly -offense makes soldiers specialists in victory while defense makes them specialists in attrition -Schlieffen ignored political limitations on conduct of war or diplomatic means of ending it -Germany: civilians had no input into planning process -Germany couldn't even respond to precautionary moves without starting a total war -Germany: military organizations favor offensive strategies that promote prestige and autonomy, this will be extreme in mature organizations which have little civilian oversight and entrenched ideals, the destabilizing consequence of an inflexible military strategy are compounded when mismatched with diplomatic strategy based on assumption that risks can be calculated and controlled through fine-tuning threats -France: doctrinal bias is likely to become more extreme whenever strategic doctrine can be used as an ideological weapon to protect the military organization from threats to institutional interests -Russia: bureaucratic logrolling exacerbates normal offensive bias of military organizations, offensives that are moderately ambitious when considered separately become extremely overcommitted under pressure of scarce resources, military decision-makers tend to overestimate feasibility of operational plan if realistic assessment would require forsaking fundamental beliefs or values -offense tends to promote offense and defense defense in international system -all writings said offense was good, prevalence of offensive doctrines -offensive bias exacerbated when civilian control is weak -offensive bias grows more extreme when operational doctrine is used as a weapon -offensive doctrines are readily transmitted across borders -offensive strategies tend to spread chain reactions, since one's offensive creates impending dangers for another -evidence of infeasibility of offensive strategy will be rationalized away when linked to ideology

Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism By Mahmood Mamdani Constructivism

-political units are territorial, culture isn't -Contemporary Islam is global, like Christianity or Islam: fewer Muslims live in the Middle East than Africa -cultural explanations of political outcomes avoid history and issues -culture talks think of "traditional" cultures in authentic and original terms, identities shaped by unchanging culture, dehistoricizes construction of political identities -terrorism is a modern construction -"modern" culture stands for creativity while "premodern" culture stands for habit and instinctive actives with ancient rules, museumized people -Muslim salvation lies in philanthropy -told that a fault line separates moderate Islam from extremist Islam -the clash is inside, not between, civilizations -Islam and Christianity both have mission to civilize world, convinced they possess the sole truth -convince others of your truth or impose it on them? -coexistence and tolerance have been the norm in the political history of Islam -we can't read political behavior from religion or culture -America harnessed and cultivated terrorism in the struggle against regimes it considered pro-Soviet -political terror brought horrifying war to Africa: targeted civilian life, making civilians the preferred target, collateral damage became very point of terrorism -US gave aid to UNITA in South Africa -Reagan tried to unite Afghan Muslims in a crusade against the Soviets, turned Shi'a and Sunni differences into a divide -CIA created armed jihad in Afghanistan -Osama bin Laden was chosen to lead mujahideen by CIA -CIA financed war through the drug trade, leading to heroin and opium problems in the Middle East -The Taliban created by an Afghan population who had been displaced and had no education, born of a society brutalized by the CIA, angry, ignorant -Taliban is a result of an encounter of premodern people with modern imperial power -Cold War proxy wars destroyed many other countries -When the Soviet Union was defeated, Afghanistan lost 1/20 of its population, another 1/20 were maimed, 1/4 became refugees, and 1/20 have gone clinically insane due to decades of continuous war

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics By John J. Mearsheimer Offensive realism

-the claim that security competition and war between great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong -US still maintains 100,000 troops in Europe because recognizes dangerous rivalries would emerge if they withdrew -constant, eternal power struggle -every state wants to be a hegemony and they have to decide what price they're willing to pay -they will defend power balance when it's in their favor to do so and undermine it when it isn't -states fear each other because of the absence of a central authority, they always have some offensive military capability, states can never be certain about other states' intentions -survival necessitates pursuit of power -Bismarck didn't want to restore Poland to an independent state because it would create an ally for Germany's enemies, even though he had sympathy -government structure is irrelevant: democracies want hegemony as much as non-democracies -multipolar systems more war-prone than bipolar systems -great powers determined by strong military, have to be able to turn the conflict into a war of attrition -three main liberal theories: prosperous and economically interdependent states are unlikely to fight each other, democracies don't fight each other, international institutions help avoid war and cooperate -offensive realism: states are black boxes, domestic concerns are unimportant, only relative power matters, best way to survive in a dangerous world -power is the currency of great-power politics, acquired through blackmail and war -liberalism wants to reduce conflict, use reason, judgement of good or bad internal governments, populate world with good states -realism accepts a violent world, focuses mainly on great powers, actors influenced only be external environment, no good or bad states, may cooperate by have conflicting interests, zero-sum quality makes competition intense -human nature realism: states are led by human beings who have a will to power, insatiable appetite for power -defensive realism: states aim to survive, seek security above all else, international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to balance of power -Waltz: when great powers behave aggressively, potential victims balance against aggressor to thwart power gains, excessive strength causes states to unite against them, leaving them worse off than if they had stopped seeking power, wars are a result of uncertainty, maintain power balance -offensive: gain power at rival's expense, survival mandates aggressive behavior -realism unappealing to general population, doesn't have a moral crusade -realism opposes Americans' views of the world, want to believe in morality and optimism -American government sold Cold War as liberal fight when they were doing it for realist reasons, spun WWII to portray Soviet Union as compatible to liberal ideals -

The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World By Richard Rosencrance

-military worlds contain homogeneous states, strive to be leading power, don't want to depend on anyone else -if one power gains hegemony, other members stop resisting because no other advantage can be gained, compete for favors instead -only the Romans ever achieved this -military-political world involves a continual recourse to war because the units within it compete for primacy -destruction of war can't outweighs the evil it seeks to prevent -trading world: composed of nations differentiated in terms of function, not ranked in order of power, dependence,form alliances against military states, war absent because it would disrupt trade, scarcity necessitates restraint of competition over power -Industrial Revolution resulted in dependence -trading states don't need larger territories and populations -size of a state increases as military technology developments make predecessors more vulnerable to attack -states with efficient administration create larger navies and conquer empires -the greater the obedience of unquestioning citizenry means the more acceptable were the demands of the military-political world -military-political and territorial states are homogeneous competing countries, each seeks to gain independence from foreign control, don't cooperate except when balance of power requires it -attempting to maximize trading and military-political possibilities has failed, and hegemony has never been achieved by any state except Rome -every state procures both trade and defense, because they would be at a disadvantage if they didn't -some rely on military force and sometimes engage in trade, and some make their living in trade and use defense only when absolutely necessary, and some focus on internal economic development without using either trade or military force -international interdependence is growing, and increased communication results in unavoidable interaction -to conquer territory, mustn't destroy the home country or the opponent, so military technology allows a defeat while keeping both areas in tact, and aggressor must be able to govern the territories, assimilation of new territory -uncertainty that results in war is a deterrent -expense of engaging in an arms race is a huge deterrent -disincentives for war (expensive, destructive, futile) don't prevent war because of ideological conflict -have to watch for usurpers during war -if war is to be avoided, its costs must be high and outcome sufficiently uncertain to deter aggressors, but not so high to prevent others from considering stopping the expansive power -costs of war increase with its destructiveness, social impact, and financial exactions -economic restrictions hurt everyone -trading world works best with a mediative state that is the intermediary between internal and international pressures -nations modify behavior in face of experience and theory -for nations to act as if they were totally sovereign means they should strive to control the whole world

Irresistible Empire By Victoria de Grazia

-rise of a great imperium with the outlook of a great emporium -Market Empire -American hegemony built on European territory, had to confront authority Europe had accumulated -Marshall Plan tried to bind them to own concept of consumer democracy and warring to overturn Soviet's state socialism -American encroachments showed that Europe needed to unite to resist -as Europe moved toward unification-military dissolved and cultural pride sacrificed for consumer progress-it came to demonstrate as no other place in the world the confidence Wilson placed in the pacifying powers or allying salesmanship to statecraft -as Europe became a place of well-being, it became less relevant to US as testing place for hegemonic models -conflicts between US and Europe focused on contrasting lifestyles and material interests rather than clashes of civilization

What Went Wrong Robert Kidelsky

-Black Swans: unexpected evens carrying huge impacts -popular explanation of GFC: underpricing of risk worldwide, technical failure of risk-management models, inability to manage the risk of the entire financial system breaking down -American house prices fell, debt balloon deflated, subprime mortgages drove banks to failure, stopped lending, credit crunch -2005: rise in cost of borrowing and downturn in house prices, raised federal funds rate -false AAA ratings -housing boom built on securitization -in 2008, general panic, institutions locked up liquidity, Lehman brothers went bankrupt, Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America -banking system close to collapse -central banks cut rates to .5% -banks became highly leveraged speculators in newly developed securities, misplaced faith in risk management models -emerging markets were less exposed to toxic securities, but commodity prices started failing and they went down too -crude oil reached high, commodities down, EM interest rates soared, currencies fell against dollar -DJIA fell by a third in a year -global GDP contracted 6.25% -lending crisis became a spending crisis: people weren't borrowing even as money became cheaper -$787 billion stimulus paid for by government bonds -Government defaults are rare but not unknown (Greece, Russia) -quantitative easing: government sells securities to central bank in exchange for cash, central bank can inject cash by buying government bonds, increase supply of money in economy -bankers weren't evil, just incorrect -perverse incentives: short-term bonuses encouraged recklessness and excessive lending -people shouldn't attack bankers for reckless lending and then expect them to lend -if they didn't act as they had, bankers might have been accused of failing to maximize shareholder value -credit-rating agencies gave unreasonably high ratings -crisis wasn't failure of character but failure of ideas

How the West Has Won By Stephen Sestanovich

-Russia's policy is very old, West isn't responsible for Ukraine -NATO is threat to Ukrainian unity, didn't have strong domestic support -Putin seized Crimea to make up for own mistakes, aggression boosted his poll numbers -Putin made rash decisions, subordinated Russia's national interests to his own motives -international institutions have stabilized Europe, not as frightened by Russian aggression -Ukraine isn't ready for NATO membership, may be very divisive, but Putin has forced the issue

The Misleading Mystique of America's Material Power By Christian Reus-Smit

American material power alone is insufficient to deliver sustained and effective political influences in contemporary global order -American leadership needs to be deemed legitimate by international society -present international order less conducive to American hegemony than after WWII -diplomatic frustration: unable to get approval for Iraq War by UN, cannot destroy Kyoto Protocol -impoverished understanding of legitimacy, met be socially ordained, auto-legitimation is impossible -assumption that everyone values freedom, democracy, and free enterprise

The Global Financial Crisis as World Politics Jonathan Kirshner

-Change in the trajectory of IR: GFC bought an end to second US postwar order due to collapse in international legitimacy, crisis accelerated relative erosion of power of US and increased political influence of other states, brought a new heterogeneity of thinking with regard to ideas about how to best manage money -Great Depression and GFC have many similarities, but GFC didn't spiral out of control because lessons had been learned from Great Depression -no guarantees that the international security environment will remain benign indefinitely -every international monetary regime rests on a particular political order -new classical macroeconomics: rational expectations theory and efficient markets hypothesis -Clinton deregulated US financial sector, finance became most profitable sector of US economy and had huge political influence -failure of free market and efficiency -financial crises are common throughout economic history and the factors that contribute to them are well understood, yet the ideology of uninhibited capital endure -US financial sector grew so quickly and generated so much wealth that it skewed the balance of the economy -model shifted to one of selling the mortgage instead of retaining them until maturity -individual risk: risk associated with certain instruments or players -Systemic risk: even sensible levels of risk taken by individual firms can produce an unhealthy level of risk for the financial system as a whole -concerns for system risk vanished from economic textbooks and government -for a lot of the world, the GFC was the second major crisis in ten years, the US was the epicenter, raised new doubts about American model, US financial system following the crisis is characterized by greater continuity than change -loss of faith in US strategy has altered China's strategy -new attempts at diversification -major players of the international monetary game have diverse and conflicting political interests for the first time -US concerns over long-run trajectory of the dollar as an international currency

The Political Economy of International Relations By Robert Gilpin Marxism

-Evolutionary Marxism and Revolutionary Marxism -capitalism: private ownership of means of production and existence of wage labor -capitalism's own success will hasten its downfall -Three inherent contradictions of capitalism -First law is disproportionality: economic equilibrium doesn't exist, recurring economic crises because of overproduction and low wages become increasingly severe and proletariat rebel -Second law is that the concentration and accumulation of capital, middle class eliminated, wages decrease -Third law is that as capital availability increases, rate of return decreases and results in economic stagnation -individual capitalist is rational, the system itself is irrational -Lenin converted Marxism from domestic economy theory to international relations theory among capitalist states -imperialism maintained capitalism by allowing it to escape three laws overseas -capitalist economy has to expand abroad and capture colonies or suffer stagnation -capitalist economy develops world but not evenly -fourth law: as three laws take effect, capitalist economies seize colonies and create dependencies to serve as markets, divide up colonial world in accordance with their relative strengths, war between rising and declining imperial powers -law of uneven development: capitalist economies grow at different rates, so capitalist international system can't be stable for long -conflicts among powers would produce revolts in colonies and weaken capitalism's hold on colonialized races -capitalism develops world and diffuses military and technological power, creates foreign competitors with lower wages and standards of living who can outcompete previously dominant economy -capitalist system couldn't survive absence of open-world economy -weakness of Marxism as international political economy theory: fails to appreciate role of political and strategic macros in international relations

Huntington's Clash Revisited By David Brooks Constructivism/Liberalism

-Huntington correctly predicted the Arab regimes were fragile -Huntington committed the Fundamental Attribution Error: ascribed traits qualities that are actually determined by context -Huntington argues that Arab lands are not intrinsically nationalistic and don't want democracy, but they were actually just living in circumstances where these couldn't surface -like all people, the have multiple authentic selves -they're willing to risk their lives for pluralism and openness -Huntington wrong in definition of culture by minimizing power of universal political values and exaggerated distinct cultural values -culture is important, but underneath differences there are universal aspirations for dignity, democracy

Liberal Internationalism 3.0 G. John Ikenberry

-International order 1.0: after WWI, Woodrow Wilson, international order organized around global collective security body in which sovereign states would act together to uphold peace, Westphalian sovereignty, flat political hierarchy, narrow policy system -2.0: post-WWII, Roosevelt, Truman, western-oriented security and economic system, hierarchical order with US provisioning of public goods, dense inter-governmental relations, enforcement of rules through reciprocity, expanded policy domains, human rights -3.0: universal scope, post-Westphalian sovereignty, increasingly intrusive interdependence, post-hegemonic hierarchy, expanded rule-based system

Moscow's Choice Michael McFaul

-Mearsheimer fails to explain why Russia kept troops out of Ukraine for the decade between NATO expansion starting in 1999 and intervention in 2014 -reset of US-Russian relations from 2009 to 2012, in 2010 60% of Russians held a positive view of the US -better if Putin embraced liberalism -Medvedev and Obama's mutually beneficial relationship -NATO expansion never discussed in Obama administration -sanctions didn't deter Russia's aggression -change in Russian policy because of internal change, not US actions -fraudulent elections brought Putin into 3rd term -social media exposed government's wrongdoings and organize protests -Putin recast US as enemy to draw attention from himself -no change in US policy that would provoke Russia -Putin's ideology framed Ukraine evens as struggle between US and Russia -Russian aggression formed strong pro-West identity in Ukraine -Puin and unconstrained, erratic adventurism have caused Ukraine conflict, West has to learn to deal with such behavior forcefully enough to block it but prudently enough to keep matters from escalating

Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault B John J. Mearsheimer

-NATO enlargement and larger strategy to integrate Ukraine into the West have provoked Russia -Putin said that admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO would pose direct threat to Russia, hinted he would invade Ukraine -Putin wanted Georgia week and divided and out of NATO, Russian forces took control of provinces after fighting between government and separatists -EU Eastern Partnership Initiative: foster prosperity in Ukraine and integrate them into EU economy, Russia sees this as EU creating sphere of influence -spread of Western values and democracy in Ukraine: US invested money in Ukraine, National Endowment for Democracy, demise of Russian imperialism -Yanukovych rejected major economic deal with EU to take money from Russia instead, antigovernment demonstrations, Yanukovych fled, new government was pro-West and anti-Russian, Washington backed the coup, Putin ordered Russian troops to take Crimea, support to Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, raised price of natural gas to Ukraine -Ukraine is buffer state for Russia, threat nearing own territory -Realists see Russia as declining, doesn't need to be contained -Liberals want to create new order to replace realism, make entire continent look like western Europe -West blames Putin, but US would feel just as threatened if Russia allied with Mexico -People claim Putin regrets demise of Soviet Union, wants to expand, but no evidence that he planned to take Crimea, spur of the moment, Russia lacks resources to take eastern Ukraine -Putin is defensive, not offensive -West should stop trying to westernize Ukraine and make it a neutral buffer between Russia and NATO -goal should be sovereign Ukraine that doesn't fall to either side -some claim this would damage US credibility, but continuing current strategy would be much more damaging -abstract rights like self-determination are meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states -Russia is declining, it'll only get weaker -granting Ukraine NATO membership could start a war -US needs Russian help to withdraw US equipment from Afghanistan through Russia, to reach nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize Syrian situation

Why We Fight Over Foreign Policy By Henry R. Nau

-People from different cultures interpret the same facts differently -We simplify the world to understand it, make it black and white -realist perspective: struggle for power, alliances, force, survival, protect themselves, no single authority -liberal perspective: expanding cooperation and interdependence through trade, international institutions, establish single authority enforces common rules, similar to domestic policies -constructivist: what people and states believe, how groups envision themselves drives use of power, seek to survive as a particular kind of society, international institutions used to shape a common discourse -realists see 9/11 as connotes between weak and strong which there's no rightful universal authority -liberals see 9/11 as a failure of the international community to include the weak and address grievances -constructivists see 9/11 as a demonstration of incompatible or insufficient shared identities -liberals want to integrate China into world economy and therefore reform -realists want to strengthen military alliances with Japan and South Korea against China -we select facts depending on what we are interested in -making judgement from terminally imperfect, biased intelligence -in 2003, all major intelligence services concluded that Saddam had WMDs -when looking at Saddam's actions, constructivism overwhelms the other two: he was out of touch -neocons didn't realize how big of a commitment the occupation would be, didn't trust ideologically different states -politics deny perspectives because people claim the facts speak for themselves when they in fact have been interpreted

Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box By John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt

-US choices on Iraq: containment or preventive war -claim: Hussein is reckless expansionist bent on dominating the Middle East -has only initiated 2 wars in 30 years: Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War, only goes to war when feels threatened, never gone to war in face of clear deterrent threat -used chemical weapons against Kurds because they couldn't retaliate, but the US can -US not vulnerable to nuclear blackmail -antipathy between secular Hussein and Al Qaeda -showing that we negotiate with states that have nuclear weapons and threaten those that don't, so everyone will want WMDs -preventive war: toppling Saddam means loss of life, expanse, harder to stop spread of nuclear weapons -attacking Iraq would result in a larger cost, the world is against us, undermine war on terrorism by spending money on other things, increase anti-American sentiments -keep Saddam in box but don't need war to keep him there

The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy Walter Russell Mead

-US has continued to employ devastating force against both civilian and military targets -public wants war before politicians do -public supports high-intensity war, hit enemies with all available force -Us is based on religion and military -American troops have a "warrior culture" that supports decisive use of force -Andrew Jackson brought American people into political arena: universal white male suffrage -Jacksonians: suspicious of federal power, skeptical about philanthropy, opposed to taxes, middle class -libertarians, care about second amendment -against international institutions, obstructionist -less a political movement than an expression of social, cultural, and religious values of a large portion of the American public folk community: strong common values, common destiny, no clear direction -Jacksonians are an element of US consciousness -nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-modernity -each generation more individualistic and less social -Jacksonian honor code, self-reliance -international relations: government should ensure the well-being of the folk community -wars should be fought with all available force, objective is to impose our will on enemy with few US casualties, attacking civilians is okay if it damages enemy's will to fight -honorable surrender, treated with dignity -policymakers encounter harsh Jacksonian resistance to reforms, and Jacksonian decision making is slow

Intervention in Vietnam and Central America: Parallels and Differences By Noam Chomsky Marxism

-US intervention significant and decisive -effects were horrifying -roots lie in fixed geopolitical conception that is rooted in US institutions -Grand Area to maintain disparity of wealth between US and rest of world, subordinate places to US needs -human rights, raising of living standards, and democracy can't be focuses while we do this -protect raw materials from local population -police brutality and terrible regimes in the name of anti-Communism -communism threatens non-cooperation with West, not danger to the West -a country with a government that cares about its people won't let the US do what it does, so we install terrible dictators -US brutality turns countries to Soviets in desperation, which then justifies further brutality -Domino Effect: if one country can extricate itself from the system we've imposed, then others with more resources might do the same, so we can't let anyone get away with it -as human rights (anti-torture rights) decline, US aid increases, no correlation with need -as GNP increases, so does starvation -we overthrow democratic governments because we can't control them -educated class controlled by indoctrination system to which they are directly exposed, act as purveyors and internalize it

Same War, Different Views: Germany, Japan, and the War on Terrorism By Peter J. Katzenstein

-US saw 9/11 as act of war, Germany saw it as crime, Japan saw if as opportunity to show Japan was part of war against terrorism -Germany wouldn't allow use of NATO to deal with terrorist networks -Germany and Japan exported problem of terrorism to others, avoid antagonizing other states -both displayed narrowness in outlook, inwardness in orientation, and lack of interest in effects on neighbors -terrorism is about politics of threat magnification -the weak fight in ways that expose weaknesses of the strong, use surprise and spread of psychological terror disproportionate to death and destruction it unleashes -Germany assumed military responsibility in a worldwide context after 9/11, three of the culprits from Germany -German military involved in war on terror and measures at home -intelligence organizations could access private records of individuals -Germany has more foreign residents than any other European country, fostering key terrorist cells -anti-authoritarian policies in Germany strengthened its liberal asylum policies and made Germany attractive for sleeper cells of terrorist organizations -Japan's counterterrorism policy resembles defense policy: less policy and more stance, values nonviolence and seeks to save lives through negotiation and ransom paying -Japan has low international profile because of low-key and reactive policies, while America's policies make it a more useful target for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda -US unfairly critiqued Britain for not understanding terrorism when it loves with the IRA, and extradited a German-Syrian suspect to Syria without telling Germany -US reluctant to share intelligence -huge diversity between even US's closest allies will doom an effort to impose one country's political logic on a pluralistic world -9/11 resulted in a huge curtailing of personal freedom -Waging a war on an enemy whose preferred staging areas for planning operations are the societies of America's liberal allies will risk fighting nations that are endowed with distinctive historical memories and different self-conceptions, and America's vision of international life will be tested by counterterrorist campaigns

Analytics Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein

-classic triad of constructivism, liberalism, realism -receptiveness to non-paradigmatic scholarship necessitates careful and systematic through about what will produce useful, coherent eclectic alternatives -eclectic scholarship explores points of connection between the three paradigms -each of the major paradigms encompasses discrete strands that can be distinguished in terms of relative priorities assigned to different assumptions within paradigms, so may not be as rigid as often assumed -because of internal heterogeneity, they have all produced a wide range of arguments which converge with others on certain issues -realist assumption that state's material interests are unproblematic isn't inconsistent with neoliberal premise that states are self-interested and rational, motivated by material gains -norm-guided behavior can emerge from material interests and rational action can be oriented towards socially constructed ideals -constructivism and liberalism: interplay of ideas, shared knowledge, multilateral institutions can shape actors' identities and preferences and engender reciprocal understandings and cooperation that ca't be reduced to state interests -Iraq: realists argued WMDs posed imminent threat and liberals argued invasion would spread democratic politics -paradigm boundaries produce excessive compartmentalization and widens chasm between academia and real-world dilemmas -analytic eclecticism is designed to highlight substantive intersections and practical relevance of theories originally constructed within separate paradigms

Commercial Liberalism Under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936 By Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard

-commercial liberalism: economic interdependence facilitates peaceful relations between states, increases opportunity costs of going to war -commercial liberalism is a systemic theory -in a crisis, leaders are more concerned with military-strategic factors than economic considerations -during WWI, Germany was dependent on England for access to strategic materials like foodstuffs and oil but considered it irrelevant -states are sensitive to changes in trade if they suffer in short term but can recover through policy change states are vulnerable if they can't avoid long term costs through policy changes -strategic goods test: identification of materials essential for national survival, determination of extent to which they secured these materials from external producers, estimation of nature and quantity terminated during war, ability to cope with disruption through use of alternative suppliers, analysis of whether goods' deficiencies are sufficient to warrant labelling state as vulnerable -Germany feared Britain's naval blockade more than its army because it would cut off supplies but little stockpiling was done -Germany had to have been aware of possible length of war: militaries of roughly same capabilities, war would last at least a year, first France then Russia, Dutch ports would serve as windpipe, government stockpiled two to five years of certain war materials -motives for risk-acceptance course of action: punish regicide, feared Austrian failure would further weaken Germany's declining ally, wanted to strike before Russia completed modernization -political and security concerns overrode constraints of dependence -both Britain and France were sensitive to disruption of trade with Germany: short-term lending and currency but they avoided military response because of political and strategic rather than economic reasons -commercial realism should not be used to predict conflict, because does not prevent it- strategic trump economic concerns

Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals By Carol Cohn Constructivism

-creating theory that informs and legitimates American nuclear strategic practice -technostrategic: language used to discuss nuclear strategic thinking -language: euphemism, "clean bombs" are fusion instead of vision and release less radiation but more blast, death is "collateral damage" -obsession with weapons: vertical erector launchers, deep penetration, phallic, Freudian, overcompensating, patting the missile -imagery connects masculine sexuality to the arms race, minimizing deadly consequences, competition for manhood, reduced to "boyish mischief" -rape culture, virginity -domesticity, "exchanging" means firing warheads, weapons systems can "marry up" -removal from grisly reality, playful, refusal of accountability -humanizes insentient weapons and dehumanizes human lives -weapons, not humans, get "killed" -fratricide occurs when your own warheads kill each other -when hoping bomb would work, hoped "the baby was a boy, not a girl" -male nuclear bomb has ultimate violent domination over feminine Nature -"I am become Death, the Shatterer of Worlds" -scientists create a dogma -speaking the language offers a feeling of control and a way to distance oneself from thinking about nuclear war -in learning the language, you become competent, wily, powerful purveyors of nuclear threats, threats become extension of self -speaking in the language prevents the expression of ideas that don't align with it, gives access to things you can't express otherwise but also excludes other things -terminology removes them from the realities of which they speak -weapons, not people, are the focus -the language is narrow and seems by its speakers as representing truths existing independently from any other truth -speaking a language, you can't hear it, and speaking it, you can't forget it, start to think in it

Constructing Norms of Human Intervention By Martha Finnimore Constructivism

-increase in multilateral interventions since 1945 -norms of human intervention have changed, intersubjective -defintion of a human being in the Western world has changed, and so more and more people are seen to warrant military protection -humanitarian intervention must be multilateral to be legitimate -unilateral military intervention is viewed as suspicious, too easily subverted, multilateralism cheaper -these are permissive norms, don't require intervention, and place strict requirements on the ways intervention may be carried out -nineteenth century intervention was strategic -these norms are structure of incentives

International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? By Robert O. Keohane

-international institutions begin after founding of UN in 1945 -UN paralyzed by conflicting views, influx of new countries and ideas "hostile" to US -international regimes: structures of rules and norms that could be more or less informal -states are uncertain about what partners and rivals value if they don't have full transparency so are less willing to enter into agreements -international institutions reduce uncertainty by promoting negotiations where transparency is encouraged -international institutions help states achieve collective gains -critique: institutions are insignificant since states wield the only real power -policies that emerge from UN are different than US unilateral policies -desire for absolute gains simply highlights difficulties of cooperation -focus on maintenance of robust democratic institutions at home, establishment of formal structures of international delegation, role of transnational networks -modern democracy requires international institutions that must be accountable to domestic civil society

Blood for Oil? Simon Bromley

-it is getting harder to distinguish US military operations designed to fight terrorism with those designed to protect energy assets -US dependence on oil has increased -oil capitalism: companies which aren't only involved in oil production but also active in many other energy sectors -since many energy products are substitutes, prices move in same direction -US promoted in international oil industry free trade and investment in energy worldwide -US has comparative advantage in geopolitical leverage -US uses military dominance to help economy -Invasion of Iraq was attempt to control global oil spigot and therefore global economy and powerful US military presence in Eurasia -trying to regain control of global oil spigot enjoyed before Iranian Revolution -US mass transportation reliance, car ownership, vital role in early US economy -US was independent in oil supplies after WWII but then became more reliant on ME -in the 1990s became clear that Central Asian oil was not a substitute for dependence on the Middle East -unilateral sanctions in Iran allowed non-US companies to take US business -creating a suitable investment climate for major oil companies became an increasing priority for US -state owned oil is problematic for the US -oil companies didn't want to invest in Iraq because of security risk and needed a legitimate government -geopolitics of ME matter to US because where most of the proven conventional oil is -US wants control that is open to capital, commodity, and trade of many states and firms -US using military power to fashion geopolitical order the provides political underpinning for preferred model of world economy: open, liberal international order -US wants open oil industry with markets dominated by large, multinational firms -state power is deployed not just to protect US consumption but also to guarantee general preconditions for the world oil market -danger of world economy is that price and investment cycles in international oil and energy industries make a smooth transition beyond conventional oil more difficult than it has to be, diversification will only take place if there's sustained and guaranteed period of higher-priced oil, can't be done if oil is kept cheap

Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace By R. Jervis

-leading states form pluralistic security community to whom war is unthinkable -Will the security community last?: nothing after Cold War points to unraveling, we understand causes of peace and believe they'll continue -constructivism: norms of nonviolence and shared identities of nonviolence cause advanced democracies to be friendly, the security community is democratic and has a common identity, spread of democracy might reduce importance of identity because it becomes less distinctive, turn away from importance of honor, learning war isn't good way to solve problems, thinks learning and identity are cause but are really effect of peace -democratic peace theory: democracies are peaceful to other democracies, flow of intelligence, voting -liberalism: pacifying effects of democracy, economic interdependence, and joint membership in international institutions -trade theory: high level of economic interdependence, assumes high priority placed on wealth, but conquest can also bring wealth, interdependence can cause arguments and states have leverage and fear of exploitation -international organizations: little impact, incentives aren't enough to tame strong conflicts of interest -realist: rise of common external threats, but hard to see current Russia and China threats as central, may disagree about how to deal with it -American Hegemony: countries dependent on US, couldn't fight a war without US assistance -Nuclear weapons: pacifying effect if possessed in sufficient numbers, deterrence, explains peace but not security community, mutual deterrence can be used for hostility and coercion -another explanation: conquest is hard and war is costly, expected benefits have declined, satisfaction with status quo, peace within security community is beneficial, war no longer means honor, security council homogeneous, depression could undermine democracy, undermine link between good relations and prosperity, these factors wouldn't have overcome traditional fears without the Cold War -security community is richer, more democratic, and more satisfied with status quo than others, more to lose in war, American security guarantee -several other regions, including South America, are likewise very peaceful -outcomes: distinctions between domestic and foreign policy continue to erode, or security community experiences more cooperation produced by internalization of interests of others, or US maintains hegemony and rejects limitations of freedom of actions, or US maintains hegemony but a counterbalancing coalition is formed -human nature and desire for dominance and glory don't necessarily lead to war -security community throws into question theories that leading powers always want more power through conflict -possibility of peace without central authority

How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace

-liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another and toward war with illiberal states -liberal democracy: state that instantiates liberal ideas, once where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions, free speech, regular, competitive elections -individuals are fundamentally the same -democracies seek their citizens' true interests and thus are pacific and trustworthy, while non-democracies seek other ends and are therefore dangerous -rally against non-democracies and for democracies -liberals must consider the other state a democracy to come to its aid -democratic structures are as likely to drive states to war as to restrain them -the more people are free, the better off everyone is -liberalism is more tolerant of own kind than other systems -liberal democracies are believed to be reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, because they are governed by their citizens' true interests, which harmonize with all individuals' true interests -liberals don't always fight illiberals, but usually see liberalization costs as too high -if a state's peer states don't believe it's a liberal democracy, they won't treat it as one -when a leader wants war, they define the rival state as despotic, and when they want peace, they define it as democratic -an opinion elite shapes public positions on issues and constrains foreign policy -liberals trust states they consider liberal and mistrust those they consider illiberal -when liberals see foreign state becoming liberal, they expect pacific relations -liberals claim that fellow democracies share their ends and illiberals do not -liberals won't change assessments of foreign states during crises unless institutions in those states change -liberal elites agitate for policies during crises -during crises, statesmen have to follow liberal policy -many realists think permanent peace between mutually recognized democracies is impossible -one reason for liberal-liberal conflict is that liberal democracies are sometimes governed by illiberal leaders who are somewhat autonomous (but doesn't this not fit the definition of democracy?) -when peace doesn't bring prosperity, war looks more attractive and liberalism may collapse -liberalism tends to destroy traditional ways of life and sources of meaning

More Will Be Worse By Scott D. Sagan

-military has biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and war -future states with nukes lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control -military involvement in domestic politics means their competence as a fighting force will suffer -government leaders try to be rational but are influenced by organization theory -organizations suffer from limited rationality, goal displacement, and conflicting goals -states are so influenced by organizations, inherently irrational, that they cannot be rational -first state to acquire nukes can't use preventive war because there will be worse war once other states have nukes -military for preventive war: war is likely, military logic, decisive and offensive doctrines, immediate problems are considered but not aftermath, focus only on their own job -new nuclear powers must build invulnerable second strike forces -fuzzy thinking may result in inadequate forces -military doesn't want to use own money to build these forces -military slow to coordinate and change -nuclear arsenals can't be prone to accidents -normal accidents theory: likelihood of organizational accidents, conflicting objectives inevitably exist inside any large organization with hazardous technology, redundancy

Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and German Cases By Michael Gordon

-neither's actions can be accounted for using traditional model -Germany: rash and aggressive policy, decisive advantage in education, productivity, and military -Britain: wavering between backing France and Russia and playing role of disinterested mediator, widespread confusion in cabinet and self-delusion, hesitant policy -both experienced a wave of unsettling events which caused social strife, economic dislocation, and left-right polarization -Germany: the more industrialized, the more the social structure was anti-Reich and pro-social Democrat, the social base for powerful reactionary mass movements was built into the very structures of Imperial Germany, strong state but weak regime -Britain: unrest, tension, suffragettes, civil war with Ireland, no strong state -German elites used foreign policy as a method of domestic control -Britain's industrialization proceeded at a fairly modest rate, while Germany's transformed quickly from agrarian to industrial -British were able to adjust to turmoil of industrialization, while unrest in Germany grew -British development began early and was thorough and competent, while German development was pioneered by the state and was unstable -Germany had monopolies and cartels while Britain had smaller firms -Britain developed a sense of national identity early, while Germany was an internally fragmented nation with a host of competing antagonisms -Britain a successful unitary state, Germany a mainly unsuccessful federal experiment, so British policymakers didn't have to manipulate foreign policy to maintain power domestically, while German policymakers did because while the state was powerful, the government was weak and inflexible -Britain allowed unions and supported the working class, while the German working class was harassed and unions disliked -British foreign policy remained moderate and defensive even with turmoil -German foreign policy became much more aggressive, even though domestic conflict was more latent and farther reaching -Germany's national destiny was too broad and the Kaiser's tolerance for dissent too narrow to permit anyone who dissented too much from taking office

The East Asian NICs in Comparative Perspective By Stephan Haggard

-newly industrialized countries -Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore -export-oriented development helped their rapid growth -three historical patterns of Third World industrialization: 1. import-substitution trajectory (Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, India) 2. export-led growth patter (Korea, Taiwan) 3. entrepôt path (Singapore, Hong Kong) -developing countries begin as primary-product exporters -primary sector produces food for local consumption and raw materials for export -import-subsituting industrialization (ISI): earnings from primary-product exports finance imports of producer goods, supplement import substitution with expansion of manufactured exports -export-led growth: same beginning, shift in incentives to favor export of labor-intensive manufactures, devaluation, selective import liberalization -entrepots: large service and commercial sectors to support their function as intermediaries between primary-product-exporting hinterlands and the world economy -four sets of political factors can affect the choice of national strategies: pressures emanating from the international system, domestic political coalitions, domestic political institutions, influence of ideology -policy plays important role in three growth trajectories -external shocks, whether from war or depression, played a critical role in development of local manufacturing capabilities -market size accounts for lure of continuing import substitution in larger Latin American NICIs, but a number of developing countries have pursued policies quite at odds with their comparative advantage -political development has lagged economic growth in East Asia -equal weight must be given to institutional development and policy reforms -the NICs' success is attributable to bureaucracy and decision-making structures that generated consistent and credible police -in supporting policy reform, international agencies should pay greater attention to creating the institutional infrastructure that would generate informed, if politically constrained, policy decisions

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use By Nina Tannenwald Constructivism

-normative reason for why nukes haven't been used since 1945 -nuclear taboo has stopped use of nuclear weapons, de facto prohibition against use of nuclear weapons, normative belief about the behavior -regulative effects of norms: how norms constrain existing activities -constitutive effects: how rules and norms, through practices, create or define behavior and identity -taboo defines category of WMDs distinguishable from conventional weapons -permissive effects: unintended consequences of operation of a norm -non-events to track action of the norm: absence of conventional wars between major powers, bipolar structure, division of Europe into spheres of influence -states can't use nuclear weapons without incurring moral opprobrium or political costs -how norms constrain and how they constitute -constructivism points out the way toward deeper constitutive and permissive effects -norms change the cost-benefit calculations of interests but also constitute those interests -norms can develop in face of seemingly contradictory behavior (US nuclear arms buildup) -taboo isn't universal but widespread

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better By Kenneth Waltz

-nuclear weapons have been second force, in addition to bipolarity, working for peace in post-war world -dissuades attack through defensive ideal (defenses so strong that no one will try to destroy them, creating peace), deterrence (scaring countries out of making threats), and coercion (threats to compel certain action) -nuclear weapons foster peace because countries won't take big risks for small gains and states will act carefully if the costs of war are high -nukes result in caution -relative strength of adversary improves prospects of peace -nukes mean unlimited suffering, annihilation is a possible threat -rulers want to preserve country they're ruling, so wouldn't risk nuclear war -the Third World won't risk more with nuclear weapons than without -radical foreign policy only occurs in very strong states, and freewheelers stay away from nukes -bipolarity, worries about retaliation for moves -military may be more cautious than civilians because dislike uncertainty and nukes multiply uncertainties -preventive war: stronger state fights weaker state to stop it from gaining power -pre-emptive war: one state attacks to blunt an attack the other is presumably preparing -uneven development of nuclear power may offer opportunities for preventive strikes -effective deterrent forces must still be able to launch after an attack -US and USSR handled nukes at early stages, so why can't other countries? -in a nuclear war, to act in a blatantly offensive way is madness, and generals will not obey a madman -unconditional surrender of a nuclear nation cannot be demanded because don't want to make them feel desperate -deterrence means no arms race, because balance is inherently stable

Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline By Robert Kagan

-perception of decline due to dismal economic situation, deficits, growth of China, India, Brazil, loss of soft power because of Iraq -indications of relative power: size and influence of economy, magnitude of military power, degree of political influence -British decline was gradual, American decline won't happen because of one crisis -America's position in world hasn't changed in economic terms, produces a quarter of world economic output still -US remains militarily unmatched -US never had complete global dominance. We had the Marshall Plan, NATO, UN, but also Communist Revolution, Vietnam, Korea, never able to persuade closest allies to do what it wanted -US isn't losing soft power, because it never had a lot, racism, segregation, Watergate, despite cultural impacts, Operation AJAX, no attempts at emulating American system by other nations, inefficacy in Middle East -American decline in 1970s: Iranian Revolution, hostage crisis, trade deficit, Japan's miracle economy, US too much military spending -US became sole superpower after Soviet Union, yet dealt with problems ineffectually, Gulf Warm, Asian financial crisis, nukes in Iran and North Korea -popularity elusive in 1990s, unilateral, hypocritical, exploitive -many countries relied on US leadership and support and US had global influence, but it wasn't omnipotent -record has always been mixed, US has never been able to always get its way

Civilizations in World Politics: China and Sanitization in Comparative Perspective By Peter J. Katzenstein Constructivism

-pluralist view of civilizations that are imbedded in a global ecumene—a universal system of knowledge and practices that differs from a competitive international state system reinforcing civilizational unity -alternative view: civilizations are unitary cultural programs, organized around core values that yield unambiguous criteria for judging good conduct -alternative view is European invention for distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized peoples -civilizations are pluralist -Islam doesn't cohere around religious fundamentalism, instead experiences conflicts over contested truths -Islam is a global civilization, a bridge between East and West -unitary conceptions assume that civ are naturally cohesive and unchanging -Huntington: states are coherent, consensual, invariant, equipped with state-like capacity to act -clashes occur primarily within civilizations -global ecumene: loose sense of shared values centers on material and psychological well-being of all humans -all polities claim to serve the individual and all individuals are acknowledged to have inherent rights -since civilizations are internally differentiated, they transplant selectively, and since they are loosely integrated, they generate debates -Huntington: civilizations balance power, West maintains status quo while non-West tries to revise, appears to be clash of states or empires instead, binary world -more than one form of ideas shapes a country -"multiple-traditions thesis": a complex pattern of apparently inconsistent combinations of traditions has shaped history -Chinese Confucianism and American Liberalism are just as contested -Confucianism is not an essential attribute of Chineseness, but a cultural rescue mobilized primarily along periphery of transnational Chinese networks -"East" and "West" do not exist -international politics of Anglo-America marked by conflict between external white "self" and domestic racially "other" -civilizations are becoming rather than being, a set of processes created by human practices and policies -processual view of civilizations reminds people that those who believe themselves to be civilized were once uncivilized and may become so again in the future -civilizations marked by debates and disagreements transcivilizational engagements: -cultural imperialism: unilateral imposition of norms and practices of one civilization upon local norms it seeks to destroy -wholesale adoption by local actors of the format but not content of imported practices -world of hybridization in which local norms are altered by selectively appropriating imported practices -world is characterized by intercivilizational encounters but rarely by civilizational clashes

The Sources of Soviet Conduct By George F. Kennan

-political personality of Soviets product of ideology and circumstance -central features of communism: central factor in the life of a man is the system by which goods are produced and exchanged, the capitalist system leads to exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class, capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads to war and revolution -revolution is inevitable -revolution focused more on overthrowing the Czar than the future of the country -Communists were only a small minority of the Russian people, so they had to establish dictatorial power -only the Party had structure, nothing else -no debate, only following the Party -cared little for the comfort and happiness of Russians, only concerned with power and security -blame capitalism for the dictatorial government, stress menace abroad -Moscow defined the cause of Socialism as the support and promotion of Soviet power -Truth is created by Soviet leaders, nothing that flows from an objective reality -Kremlin is dealing in ideological concepts that are of long-term validity, can afford to be patient -USSR feels no urgency in achieving its goal -US policy must be patient and firm but long-term, can't be too detrimental to Russian prestige -Russian population is physically and spiritually tired from war and hardship -Russia tried to industrialize quickly and sloppily, no agricultural industry, able to export ideas but not back them up with material power or prosperity -changes in Soviet life aren't reflected in leadership -growing divergence of age, outlook, and interest in the Party -no collective action -Soviet ideological power is mostly outside of USSR -US needs to look strong to discount Russian belief in the inevitable failure of capital -US can strain Soviet policy, moderate it -US-USSR relations are a test of the worth of the US

Jihad vs. McWorld By Benjamin Barber

-race reflecting tribal past, soul anticipating cosmopolitan future -jihad: trivialization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshot, culture pitted against culture, Jihad in the name of narrowly conceived faiths against interdependence, war on modernity -McWorld: technology, homogeneity, entertainment -world caught between Babel and Disneyland, spinning out of control, have anarchy in common, absence of common will and democracy -use each to keep other in context -choice between market's universal church and detribalizing politics of particularist identities -America taken as model for benign multiculturalism, but there is an American Jihad being waged by the radical right -less than ten percent of the modern world's states are truly homogenous and are therefore tiny (Denmark) -in US, multiculturalism is rule, homogeneity is exception -Jihad and McWorld conspire to undermine hard-won civil liberties and the possibility of global democratic future -Jihad, noise and more obviously nihilistic, is more likely to dominate the near future, creating climate of instability and genocide -McWorld will dominate in long run: homogenization established micropeace that favors triumph of commerce and entertainment ultimate control over human destiny

Reductionist and Systemic Theories By Kenneth N. Waltz Defensive realism

-reductionist theories explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels, internal forces produce external outcomes, international system is an outcome -reductionist theory is about the behavior of parts -legitimate international order: accepted by all major powers, tends toward stability -revolutionary: one or more major states refuses to deal with other state according to the conventional rules, unstable -circular reasoning: defining the states by the system by the states -you can't infer condition of international politics from internal composition of states -many people examine international politics in terms of what states are like and how they interact but not in terms of how they stand in relation to each other -in order to think at reductionist level, have to assume that results achieved correspond with actors' intentions, which rarely happens, because causes operating collectively interfere -What accounts for repetition of wars even if causes vary? -systemic theory: structure of a system acts as a constraining and disposing force, and therefore can explain and predict continuity within a system, but cannot explain change, structures appear to be static because they endure for long periods but are dynamic because they alter the behavior of an actor -Emergence of Russian and American superpowers permitted effective cooperation among former powers in Europe, changing from a multipolar to bipolar system -once the possibility of war between states disappears, they can risk suffering relative loss -Systemic theories explain why different units behave similarly and produce expected outcomes -Unit level theories tell us why different units behave differently despite similar placement in a system -units of greatest capability set scene for others -states act in circularity: stimulus and response cannot be distinguished, agency is unclear -the differences of a society's members are greater than the differences in their observed behavior -from uniformity of outcomes, one cannot infer that attributes and interactions of a system have remained constant

The Theory of Hegemonic War Robert Gilpin Offensive Realism

-stable system: changes can take place if they don't threaten vital interests of dominant states and therefore cause war -unstable system: economic and other changes erode international hierarchy and undermine position of hegemonic state -hegemonic war caused by broad changes -relations among individual states can be conceived as a system hegemonic war threatens and transforms structure of international system -Thucydides: human nature is unchanging and therefore events would be repeated -Thesis of hegemonic state: organizes international system in terms of its own interests -Antithesis: growing power of the challenging state, try to transform international system and therefore create conflict with hegemonic state -Synthesis: the new international system that results from inevitable clash between dominant and rising challenger -hegemonic war involves all states in the system -victor remolds the vanquished in its image -both the declining and rising powers may suffer and a third party may be the ultimate victor -war enables new world -decision: fight sooner while the hegemon still has power, or wait until the tables may have urned -three hegemonic wars: Thirty Years' War, 100 Years' War, World War I and WWII (because WWI failed to reflect the new realities of the balance of power) -MAD: nuclear weapons have made costs of hegemonic war too high, but humankind has to be willing to subordinate all other values and goals to preserve peace -war unleashes forces unanticipated by protagonists order in the nuclear age had been built on mutual deterrence -war triggered by the belief of each protagonist that it had no alternative but to fight while advantage was still on its side

Understanding Change in International Politics By Rey Kozlowski and Friedrick Kratochvil Constructivist

-succession of mostly nonviolent revolutions that replaced Eastern European communist governments in 1989 and the lack of Soviet action to stop them transformed the international political system -these changes were not driven by changes in relative capabilities, so didn't follow neorealism -the revolutions changed the rules of governing superpower conflict and the norms underpinning the international system -link between domestic and international structures and political practice and shows that international systems consist of ensembles of social institutions -these institutions change with distributions of capabilities, redefinition of actors' identities, changes to state-society relations -international relations isn't an autonomous sphere but part of a larger endeavor of institutionalizing identities and political communities -number of Warsaw Pact weapons and forces didn't change between 1989 and 1991, but the political context of their potential use did, which resulted in deterioration of Soviet capabilities -have to view military capabilities in terms of political practices and underlying conventions

Anti-Americanisms and the Polyvalence of America By Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane

-symbolism generated by America is so polyvalent that it creates a diversity of material on which to construct anti-Americanism -backlash against globalization -US hegemony -conflicting identities in US and elsewhere -US open and critical society, deeply divided -project cacophony onto others and is amplified around world -US dislike of American policies isn't anti-American, yet similar views in non-Americans are considered anti-American

Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revolutionism By Douglas J. Macdonald

-traditional view of Cold War: Soviet Union was an expansionist nation primarily responsible for political and military contention, and there was a real and global Communist threat to independent but internally weak nations, so US security policies were reasonable and necessary -revisionist view: US primarily to blame for Cold War, unreasonable hostility to Communism, Soviets had only tenuous influence over communist groups, US actions were overdone and criminal -post-revisionist view: accepted US European policy while separating sharply from US third world policy, some US responsibility, strongly critical of US actions in developing nations, found credible Soviet threat in Europe and Japan -realist view: spread of communism posed little threat to US because self-interest and nationalism, not ideology, are what drive states to act -New evidence: ideology was important decision-making factor for USSR, US not far off in threat perception -most countries agreed with US in early Cold War and on threat of Communist expansion -shift from multipolarity to bipolarity after WWII caused bandwagoning -ideologies shape foreign policies by constraining the form and substance of information used to make decisions, shared world views can be as important as power factors in seeking allies -Mao took advice from Stalin, wasn't independent as was believed, as did non-ruling communist parties -Soviets constrained and promoted revolutionary actions in non-ruling communist parties in bloc international policies -ruling parties often acted in concert under Soviet leadership to threaten non-communist nations -Stalin aided China, aloof to throw US off -Stalin would support communist revolts if he understood probable Western responses and had a high estimate of the revolution's success -British communist spies revealed US and UK plans in Asia to Moscow -cognitive but not political dissonance in bloc -major Soviet aid to China, economic advisors to Manchuria, socialism inChina was world victory -Therefore, US didn't misinterpret actions or intentions of communists in early Cold War -there was a system-wide Soviet bloc threat with a significant amount of unity

World Politics and the Causes of War Since 1914 By Amos Yoder

-two themes: leadership of countries making critical decisions was deficient, and delays in communication to many different centers of power prevented effective action -Serbia resented Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation by Austria-Hungary -Only Apis, leader of Black Hand, wanted Ferdinand dead -Emperor manipulated Kaiser into supporting him -Serbia accepts ultimatum except the ones impinging on its sovereignty and suggested negotiating these, declaration of war from Austria-Hungary follows -German strategy: crush France first in a quick sweep through Belgium and then turn to meet slow-moving Russia -Czar tried to talk with Kaiser and they tried to stop war, but too late, because everyone around them acted as though war was inevitable -Russia's purely defensive actions against Austrian threat angered Kaiser -Germany invaded Belgium to get to France, Britain declared war on Germany -although US was neutral, trade with Central Powers declined, while trade with Allies rose -Lusitania, Mexico telegraph, and unrestricted submarine warfare brought US into war -Versailles Conference claimed war was premeditated by Germany and Austria-Hungary, forced Germany to sign war guilt clause -Leaders of Austria-Hungar and Serbia bear most of blame, AH used war as excuse to punish Serbia -emperors were inept, too old or uninformed or uninvolved or unbalanced -Britain and France had incomplete knowledge and little time to make decisions, wanted to strengthen defense and not go to war -they had days or weeks to make decisions, now they have minutes -Pentagon warning system falsely reported Soviet attack three times between 1979 and 1980 -after WWII, none of the great powers were ruled by absolute monarchs -peace settlement resulted in Great Depression and WWII -lack of strong international institution to keep peace

The Long Peace By John Lewis Gaddis

-we know little about causes of war or peace -international system: interconnections between units in system, collective behavior of the system differs from expectations and priorities of individual units -stability of a system means the likelihood it retains its essential characteristics -self-regulating systems counteract stimuli that threaten its survival -self-aggravating systems allow situations to get out of control -is the post-WWII system stable? -behavior alone doesn't ensure stability but can impose stability -power with morality (Wilson after WWI) neglects the realities of power -post-WWII: first true polarization of power in modern history -bipolar system reflects were military power was at end of WWII, simple and didn't require sophisticated leadership, alliances more stable, defections tolerated -US and USSR never actually went to war -liberals believe more contact results in more peace, but the ten bloodiest interstate wars grew out of conflicts between countries that were adjacent or actively traded -distance results in peace -US economy needs imperialism, extend US system without inefficiency of colonialism: Open Door -military-indusrial complex -as Kennan says, Kremlin hostility was used to contain domestic unrest and was unlikely to initiate military action, doesn't assume inevitability of war -nukes are a vivid awareness of war, balance -reconnaissance revolution: technology to stop surprise attacks -US and USSR have antithetical ideologies but have demonstrated capacity to ignore this to preserve international order -conclusion that there would be no victors in the next war between great powers -US didn't call for unconditional surrender with Soviets, didn't contemplate elimination of the Soviets from world affairs -all this confirms that systemic interests take precedence over ideological interests -Rules of superpower game: respect spheres of influence, avoid direct military confrontation, use nuclear weapons only as ultimate last resort, prefer predictable anomaly over unpredictable rationality -Cold War was one of the longest stable periods ever

Globalization and the Trade of Human Body Parts By Trevor Harrison

-while the trade in human body parts is conditioned by technological advances, it must be understood in the broader context of globalization, specifically the extension of capitalist mode of exchange -trade in human body parts mirrors the normal system of unequal exchanges that mark other forms of trade between the developed and undeveloped regions of the world -since early 1980s, number and variety of organ transplants have increased hugely -in underdeveloped world, body parts are sourced coercively from the disadvantaged and consumers of organs are from other countries -need for transplants have increased, waiting lists -globalization results in entry of capitalist values into previously unpenetrated cultural corners and ideological spaces, formation of specifically capitalist exchange relationships, traditional unequal relationships between developed and undeveloped countries -globalization involves a form of particularly capitalist alienation, labor becomes an object, objects produced no longer appear in their human form -three major technical problems for transplants: removal, preservation, and anti-rejection -cyclosporine was anti-rejection mediation that increased survival of non-related organs -decline in risk increased demand -several renal transplant centers opened in undeveloped countries -organs are sold for a huge amount of money but very little of that goes to the donor -poor donors flown to wealthy nations -extraction companies in poor countries formed -organized crime involved, people kidnapped and murdered for their organs -coercive effects of starvation and poverty motivate some to become donors -state should relate HBP trade -HBP trade reveals unequal trade in other parallel industries between developed and less developed countries, unleashed new forces of exploitation, ethical absence -globalization underpins HBP trade -regulation won't occur because demand outstrips supply and will widen with further technological advances

US Strategy in a Unipolar World By William Wohlforth

-why hasn't a counterbalancing reaction to US unipolarity taken place? -to counterbalance, great powers must increase military strength or aggregate their capabilities in a alliance- internal or external balancing -during unipolarity, neither has taken place -balancing can be difficult: security made by international equilibrium can be enjoyed by all, whether or not they pay for it by balancing, politics are mostly local because most salient threats are usually nearby, and alliance commitments affect both security and autonomy -in any system, there's a threshold of power in the strongest state that makes counterbalance prohibitively costly -US is far more capable relative to other great powers -US possesses a more complete portfolio of material capabilities -US has already achieved unipolar dominance, so it's the status quo -US capabilities are offshore -international system is global and all other great powers are in Eurasia -a continued strategy of engagement will prompt a counterbalancing reaction on the part of other major powers and therefore the US should disengage itself from Eurasian security affairs -direct link between engagement strategy and terrorism

A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium By Peter Katzenstein

-world of regions, embedded deeply in an American imperium -American imperium has had a profound effect on regions -regions differ in institutional form, identity, internal structure -spurred by American policies that reflect its non-territorial and territorial powers, complementary processes of globalization and internationalization are making this a world of porous regions -regional porousness is enhanced politically by vertical relations that link core regional states to America -the American imperium isn't just an actor that shapes the world; it is a system that reshapes America -imperium: conjoining of power that has both territorial and non-territorial dimensions -regions reflect power and purpose of states, made porous by fusion of global and international processes and variety of relations that link them to political entities -US postwar policy anchored Germany and Japan in US imperium, unconditional surrender and US occupation created two client states that became core regional powers -in the Middle East, no porous regionalism has emerged because importance of territory claimed by three monotheistic religions trumped nonterritorial dimensions of US power -American imperium is creating a world politics that is enabling and constraining, relative importance of territorial and non-territorial power has waxed and waned, shaped by domestic political struggles -victory in defeat in domestic struggles shape American foreign policy to porous regions in world politics -in Cold War, containment was no longer restricted to geography, became a label or protecting values of an entire way of life -regions have both material and ideational dimensions, absence of full agreement on boundaries of Europe and Asia haven't stopped politically actors form invoking and exploiting regional terminology -materialist theories: interstate war over territory was inevitable -ideational, critical theories of geography: regions are politically made -behavioral theories of geography: how regions are shaped and reshaped by political practice, regions are material structures which have behavioral effects and express concepts that both shape and reflect shifting political practices -geography has behavioral consequences: distance shapes intensity of economic exchange and likelihood of war -regions are made porous by a variety of processes, vary greatly in their institutional form, and differ in having or not having core states that support US power and purpose -three processes that link American imperium to a world of porous regions: globalization and internationalization which keep regions porous and regionalization which produces and reshapes different regional orders -when US sees vital security and economic interests at stake, it supports the creation of regional powers but not in any other world region -US based on an imperium: entire country was a colony, expanded against indigenous population, Mexico, France -America's universal nationalism is a strong force -America's duty is to guide, it's a part of something larger than ourselves, spreading freedom, self-righteousness

Theoretical Reprise By I. Wallerstein Marxism

-world system is a social system, made up of conflicting forces that hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks to mold it to its own advantage -social system: self-contained, dynamics of development are internal -world-system: self-containment based on extensive division of labor and contain multiplicity of cultures within them -world-empires: single political system -world-economies: no single political system -socialist world government: reintegration of levels of political and economic decision-making -capitalism based on constant absorption of economic loss by political entities, while economic gain is distributed to private hands -the size of a world-economy is a function of the state of technology -world-system divides the labor occupationally but also geographically, so the grange of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system, legitimizes the ability of some groups to exploit others and receive a larger share of the surplus -world-economy: political structure links culture with spatial location -core-states: advantaged areas of the world-economy, strong state machinery and national culture to maintain disparities that have developed -peripheral areas: indigenous sate is weak, either nonexistent or with a low degree of autonomy, either colonial or neocolonial) -semiperipheral area: between core and periphery in terms of development, some move up to core, often have vital skills that are politically unpopular, deflect political pressures which the peripheral might direct against core-states -world-economy tends to expand the economic and social gaps among its varying areas in its development -external area sometimes becomes periphery in the future and so on, and core can move backwards -world-economy fosters feudalism and forced labor -formula for a world-economy is national homogeneity within international heterogeneity -core-states, because of complex internal division of labor, begin to reflect the pattern of the system as a whole, and results in regional homogeneity within relative heterogeneity -in a world-economy, where there are a multitude of political entities, all the entities cannot be equally strong, because if they were, they could block operation of transnational economic entities -it also cannot be possible that no state machinery is strong, because then capitalism would have no way to protect their interests -a strong state is a partially autonomous entity, has a margin of action where it reflects the compromises of multiple interests, must have state managers and bureaucracy -in a one-class system, the others fight the class-conscious group in the name of tradition -exploitation and the refusal to accept exploitation are inevitable or constitute the antinomy of the modern era