KANT DEFINITIONS

example to distinguish them ?

"All bodies are extended" vs. "All bodies are heavy" Do they have the same status? Are they analytic or synthetic? Answer: they don't have the same status! "All bodies are extended" is analytic "All bodies are heavy" is synthetic

what is direct and indirect realism?

Direct realism We directly perceive real objects out there in the world. E.g. 'I see the tree'. Indirect realism What we are directly aware of in perception is not the tree itself. Rather, it is a mental image of the tree. We perceive an idea. ⇒ On the basis of that image, we infer the existence of the tree itself out there. E.g., Locke, Descartes

6. AGAISNT RATIONALISM REFUTATION what are the aims of the refutation of idealism

Due to criticisms he adds this section to show he's a different idealist Negative aim: to refute 'problematic idealism' Problematic idealism: the claim that the external world may not exist; may not be able to prove satisfactory that their is. Adversary: Descartes as he is strongly against skepticism Positive aim: to prove the existence of the external world External world: A world made of outer objects, objects that stand outside of me in space External world is the world we perceive, world we experience- filled with material objects NOT the noumena (Noumenon, plural Noumena, in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, is the thing-in-itself as opposed to what Kant called the phenomenon—the thing as it appears to an observer). The world is not just in my mind it exists in the world. in brief - Here Kant aims to prove that we have experience of outer objects - objects distinct from us in space - and thus to refute skepticism about the external world, the continued existence of which Kant describes as a 'scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general

against empiricism (the only source of knowledge is experience)

Enemy is the empiricist We have a concept a priori of causation The mind is a tabula rasa informed by the experience of the world Against Descartes, no innate ideas. Kant aims to show that the empiricists are wrong. The mind is not a blank sheet. Against Hume, we have a priori concepts

what are the steps of the argument?

P1 'I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.' (B 275) P2 'All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception.' (B 275) P3'But this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me.' (B 275) P4'Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.' (B 275f.) P5'Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination. Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination.' (B 276)

perceptions are what for Kant?

Perceptions are timeless Kant's crucial claim: 'time itself cannot be perceived' (A 182/B 225)- we instead see perception Our perceptions do not appear with their temporal order 'stamped on them' (Allison) I.e., unlike digital photos, perceptions don't have a date and time.

objections against Kant's decision

Maas (and many others): the distinction is merely psychological. Deciding whether the predicate is contained in the subject is a psychological issue. People may have different concepts and will end up disagreeing on what is analytic and what is synthetic. Quine: there is no such distinction! Analytic truths must be unrevisable, but no principles are unrevisable (not open to revision)

2. geometry

Many geometrical judgments are synthetic a priori E.g., "The straight line between two points is the shortest." The concept "straight" contains nothing about "magnitude" It only contains something about quality. ➔ The concept "shortest" is something "entirely additional to it, and cannot be extracted out of the concept of the straight line by any analysis. Help here must be gotten from intuition"

what is the task of these analogies?

Problem: Since perceptions do not appear with a 'time stamp', how can we determine their temporal order? What order do they occur? in order to be thought as objective, the relation of succession must be, Kant says, 'determined', meaning that it must be necessary and irreversible I.e., how can we determine the temporal order of perceptions if they don't appear with one? Kant's answer: We impose (on perceptions) rules that determine their temporal order I.e., we can only relate our perceptions to each other in time if we impose rules on them that determine their temporal order. It comes from us. We relate our perceptions with each other. Because, remember, the time order doesn't come from them The application of the categories of relation combines perceptions into representations of objects of experience- through a priori categories of relation I.e., that is how we get to perceive objects that stand in determinate relations to one another in time This takes place through the synthetic a priori principles that are based on these categories (the Analogies)

If Kant says knowledge begins with experience why isn't this the same as an empiricist?

Problem: Why isn't (1) a concession to empiricism? (1) 'All knowledge begins with experience' (2) 'All knowledge derives from experience'- If not grounded in experience- it is unjustified Because only (2) is a true empiricist claim. Kant allows that some parts of knowledge can be supplied by the mind rather than by experience. I.e., some parts of knowledge are a priori- before experience Contrast with Locke's tabula rasa A priori knowledge: Knowledge that is independent of experience. It arises purely from the mind. mins brings to experience, a priori categories which makes experience possible. 

Does sensibility make an a priori contribution to knowledge?

Question: what are the conditions that make sensibility and, in particular, a priori sensibility possible? Kant's answer: sensibility supplies spatially and temporally a priori Sensibility has a spatial and temporal form- so it puts everything we experience into this form

Synthetic a priori knowledge: mathematics, geometry and metaphysics what Kant claim on science then

Many sciences contain synthetic a priori knowledge Arithmetic E.g., 2+2=4 Geometry E.g., Thales law about triangles Natural science (i.e. physics) E.g., Newton's laws And metaphysics of course E.g., the world has a beginning Clarification: They do not all consist in SAK, but all are partly constituted by SAK.

What is the transcendental aesthetic - terminology

Meaning of Aesthetic: the condition of sensibility. The science of a priori sensibility Transcendental: it comes before experience, it makes experience possible. It only applies to experience- it only finds its expression and use in experience Philosophy of the condition of experience- applies to experience Transcendent: something which goes beyond experience (DOESN'T APPLY TO EXPERIENCE) Transcendental aesthetic: concerned with the conditions that make sensibility and, in particular, a priori sensibility, possible

what was metaphysics before the kantian revolution

Metaphysics before the Kantian revolution Mind-independent objects are at the 'centre' Subjects gravitate around them 'Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects We are passive viewers. We are the ones who need to adapt to objects in order to know them

aim of critique of pure reason

Metaphysics is not on the secure path of science It consists in endless disputes No progress has ever been made in metaphysics Always the same problems, no sign of an answer But some disciplines have reached the rank of a science: Logic, Mathematics, Natural Science Pb: How did they achieve this and can metaphysics do the same?

3. natural science

Natural science contains some synthetic a priori judgments as principles (B17-18). E.g., "In all alterations of the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unaltered." ➔ The concept 'matter' does not contain anything about the persistence of quantity. Rather, it just contains something about 'extension in space'. the three laws of motion, action reaction, all staments synthetic a priori truths .

1. KANTS COPERNICAN REVOLUTION What is the critique of pure reason?

One way of understanding the Critique is to read it as an answer to the question 'What can I know?'how do we acquire knowledge. Lot's of things we think we know but how did we come to get them Kant's Problem: Reason is naturally burdened with certain metaphysical questions. 'Is the world eternal? Does God exist? On the one hand, reason doesn't seem to be able to answer these questions Yet on the other hand, it cannot set them aside ➔ Reason attempts to answer these questions and falls into contradictions without being aware of it. E.g., metaphysicians disagree about pretty much everything. The main topic of the Critique of Pure Reason is the possibility of metaphysics, understood in a specific way. Kant defines metaphysics in terms of "the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience," and his goal in the book is to reach a "decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles" (Axii. See also Bxiv; and 4:255-257). Thus metaphysics for Kant concerns a priori knowledge, or knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience; and he associates a priori knowledge with reason. The project of the Critique is to examine whether, how, and to what extent human reason is capable of a priori knowledge. The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access only to the empirical realm of space and time. critique reason and the debate of innate to mind vs experience from outer world - and answer by saying all knowledge beguins with experience but does not follow that i all arise, mind doe bring it to all experiences a prori modes of cognition that are built into the structure of pure reason.

summary of destinations

The analytic / synthetic distinction concerns the content of a judgment e.g. if in predicate What makes a judgment true The a priori / a posteriori distinction is an epistemic distinction that concerns the origin of a cognition How a judgment can be known? Can you think of propositions that fall under each category? Swans are white Triangles have three sides analytic a priori - Leibniz- truths of reason and Hume - relations of ideas and Kant - analytic judgements are a priori a priori synthetic - Kant - there are synthetic a priori truths a posteriori synthetic - Leibniz - truths of fact and Hume - matters of fact and Kant - all a posterior judgments are synthetic

phenomenal world compared to noumena world

he takes the whole world and takes it into two halves p - world how we experience n - world in its self, independent of everyones experience,s cant experience, as soon as experience, its p n could could have space and time, and other fundamentals things which we experience - might but might not key distinction for ideas on free will and god certain ways of obtaining knowledge, are built into you so knowledge is as much a feature of us as it it a representation of the world.

what is the problem and its legacy?

his problem leads to two types of solutions: Rationalism, which relies on God to guarantee the correspondence between ideas and objects E.g., Descartes Empiricism, which does not go beyond the realm of ideas / perceptions e.g., Hume

SAKS possibility poses a major problem in need of explanation- what is it?

how can i know things about the world before having experienced them? Hence 'the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?' ie give that they exist, how can we explain their possibility? as metaphysics presumes that statement increase knowledge and a priori knowledge, it is made up of synthetic a priori - how is it possible to have metaphysics -

potential issue ?

namely that although outer objects cannot be represented without space being represented, the reverse is also true, i.e. space cannot be represented without a world of outer objects being represented (as Leibniz's view implies). If the representations of space and an outer world were mutually necessary, then the representation of space would not be prior to the representation of an outer world, which would imply that space is after all an empirical representation.

reason vs understanding

reason - causes, ultimate principles, causality - purely theatrical matters and sciences. understanding - specific conditions and categories causes, causation applied the categories understanding mind brings to all experiences pure reason - a priori ideas or possibility practical - feelings, ethics, morality

What is the crucial implication of sensibility for Kant?

the 'a priori' structure of sensibility Our experience of the world is only possible if the mind gives structure to the content it receives through sensibility We do something to data to become aware of it so we can know our experience will have this shape. This is what Kant explains SAK possibility Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.

step 1-3

1) We have perceptions of appearances following one another. E.g. the experience of a house 'The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive.' (A 189/B 234) 2) We cannot perceive time itself. I.e., we cannot map our perceptions onto a perceived time-order. (3) From (1) and (2), what mere perception does not tell us is: If the order in time of what appears to us is in fact the same as the order of our perceptions of these appearances Cannot tell the order 4) ➔ All appearances are successive Whether they are appearances of events Or of simultaneous states.

what is a prior knowledge and what is special about it?

A PRIORI Independent of experience You don't need experience to know it Necessary- E.g. 'Bodies are extended', '2+2=4' Strictly universal- Is necessarily the case 'A triangle has three sides' 'All bodies are extended' criterion: Independent of experience The problem of metaphysics What are synthetic a priori judgments? Why is this the problem of metaphysics? 'the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?' (Bxix) I.e., given that they exist, how can we explain their possibility?

objections?

1- what about experiences of non-unitary space is perfectly imaginable. E.g. The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe: subjects travel back and forth between spatially discrete worlds Surely, space has different properties as it is non-singular space. Response: Such fictions still presuppose our ordinary intuitive grasp of space, in which it is given to us as unitary. In the real world it is still unitary as it is made up. I.e., this kind of thought experiment doesn't show that we can imagine non-unitary space in the relevant sense- says nothing about actual world. einstein - different times, and different time pockets - doesn't necessary undermine k insist - we are prisoners of human cognition - a priori forms of sensibility - mind perceive world in space and time - no pure object. human stage upon sciences can be built. 2. It's unclear that the oneness of space proves that space is a priori. It could still be a posteriori. The fourth argument deals with this objection

what is a posteriori knowledge then?

Dependent on experience You need experience to know it Contingent- E.g. 'Socrates is a philosopher', 'Roses are red' Cannot be strictly universal- Is not necessarily the case 'This cat is black' 'All bodies are heavy' criterion: Has its source in experience experience cannot teach us anything that is necessarily or universally true. If we have knowledge of necessary truths, this knowledge will be a priori.

STEP 2

'All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception.' I can only make sense of the flow of mental states if there is something persistence against which we can understand it as a flow When we think of own inner experience it is in a timely flow- all our experiences appear in a succession (flow of mental states). The fact we experience them as a flow is only possible if there's something persistent; x, against which we become aware of it as flowing. On a train- when through a tunnel there is nothing stable outside to give us a sense that you are going. But when outside tunnel and can see country we can perceive us as moving as the countryside is stable. Inner experience is a flow (now i am happy, hungry etc) Something that persists through time is a substance.

STEP 5

'Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination. Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination' empirical consciousness of my existence 'is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me' Since I am aware of my determined existence in time I must also be conscious of the existence of a persistent thing outside me onto which the stream of my perceptions can be mapped This persistent subject (X) is the external world, made of material objects. Their is an external world that persists.

STEP 3

'but this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me' This persistent 'thing' must be outside my own conscious mental states We can't find it in yourself, in our inner exterior. Because if it were merely 'inside me', it would belong to the ever-changing stream of consciousness → So it would not be permanent (unchanging) and would change All we have is a bundle of perception that is ever changing and not persistent- only time connects them together. Therefore I must presuppose the existence of something outside myself Something that is permanent (unchanging) In inner experience we can't find something persistent as inside us there's nothing but the flow of perception. We need something persistent to be aware of time. What's wrong with saying maybe there is just a flow of perceptions? If there was nothing persistent we cant be aware of our own existence. But WE ARE aware of our existence due to consciousness

what does Space and time are transcendentally ideal and empirically real mean?

(1) Space and time are transcendentally ideal Because they are properties of the world of appearances- as opposed to things in themselves Properties of objects that are mind independent- depend upon one perceiving them. Space is not a property of mind independent the constitution of a thing depends in the relevant way upon human sensibility, or upon any other limitation of the human standpoint, then the thing is transcendentally ideal, an appearance. (2) Space and time are empirically real - real thing but brought by the mind - human subject then brings spatial perception, pre condition for all experience - space not in things themselves - as its a stage, cant be the attribute in them selves. Because they are properties of real objects of experience Real in empirical sense- e.g. we can measure paper and rip it up. To say that space and time and spatio-temporal objects are empirically real is to say that they are real when considered from the human standpoint. As opposed to mere ideas in my mind Note: The same holds for the objects we can experience in space and time: they are transcendentally ideal and empirically real They are transcendentally ideal because they are merely the forms of intuition and not properties of nor relations between things as they exist in themselves. They are merely the "subjective" forms of sense experience. But as the necessary forms of all experiences, they apply universally within experience. Within the world as we necessarily experience it (within the "empirical world"), space and time are perfectly real. Space and time have empirical objectivity since they are a necessary precondition for experiencing (empirically) the world objectively. Space and time have transcendental subjectivity since they are forms through which the mind understands the world.

what is the argument p to c for SAK

(1) The mind gives objects some of their structure Because objects must conform to our cognitive structure to be part of our experience E.g., its spatio-temporal form, its causally linked structure, etc. (2) I can know that objects will have this structure before I experience them I. e., I can know that they will have this structure a priori Because I am the source of their structure, I impose it on them (3) So I only need know the a priori structures of my mind to know what structure objects will have. This is the aim of the CPR: investigate the a priori structures of the mind Thus, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and actual. I.e., I can know a priori about the structure of the world That's why I can do maths and geometry a priori But, there are a lot of things I cannot possibly know a priori. I need experience to tell me about the content of the world. .

3. SYNTHETIC APRIOI recap - the alternative offered by empiricism and rationalism Kant's logical formulation of the problem of metaphysics

(1) The mind knows the world passively by conforming to it: Either by experiencing it (empiricism) Or by reasoning about it (rationalism) According to the Rationalist and Empiricist traditions, the mind is passive either because it finds itself possessing innate, well-formed ideas ready for analysis, or because it receives ideas of objects into a kind of empty theater, or blank slate. (2) Cognition derives from 1 single source: Either experience (empiricism) Or reason (rationalism (3) There are only 2 types of truth: A priori analytic truth (e.g., All bachelors are unmarried) A posteriori synthetic truth (e.g., Socrates is a man) Kant's rejection of the common ground (1) K denies that the mind is merely passive Rather, the mind is both active and passive I.e., we receive sensory input but we transform it (2) K denies that cognition has a single source. Rather, cognition has two sources: reason & experience.Thus getting the best of both worlds (3) K denies that there are only 2 kinds of truth Rather, there is a 3rd kind: synthetic a priori truths E.g., '2 + 2 = 4', 'parallel lines never cross'- not contained in predicate- still need experience Kant's crucial insight here is to argue that experience of a world as we have it is only possible if the mind provides a systematic structuring of its representations. This structuring is below the level of, or logically prior to, the mental representations that the Empiricists and Rationalists analyzed. Their epistemological and metaphysical theories could not adequately explain the sort of judgments or experience we have because they only considered the results of the mind's interaction with the world, not the nature of the mind's contribution.

how can space and time be both forms of intuition and at the same time properties of experience in the world

(1) the forms of intuition- 'in our minds' and *at the same time* (2) properties of the objects of experience 'in the world' Kant's answer: Space and time are transcendentally ideal *and* empirically real

What is the relationship between the causal principle established in the Second Analogy and empirical causal laws?

All of our experience is already causal but how do we get to know which causal laws connect experience? We need to look to the world and experience. E.g., laws of nature à la Newton. Kant's claim: We cannot discover a priori the connection of any particular cause with a specific effect I.e., we have to look at the world, study it through science, in order to know that bodies fall (law of gravity) We only know laws through inquiring science, all we know a priori is that every event has a cause. 'How something could be altered at all; how it should be possible that upon one state in a given instance of time an opposite state could follow in another instance, of that we have a priori not the least conception. For that we require the knowledge of actual forces, which can be given only empirically.' (A 206/B 252)

Geometry/maths as science explain the basic formulation of a triangle

An isosceles triangle is a triangle with (at least) two equal sides (b). The two equal sides have length (b) and the remaining side has length (a). This property is equivalent to two angles of the triangle being equal. An isosceles triangle therefore has two equal sides and two equal angles.

Objection on step 3

Are we sure that we can't find something persistent inside of us?Even if there were something intuitable in me that remained constant throughout my experience (e.g. a 'feeling of selfness'), it would be a permanent representation, not a representation of a permanent - an intuition that abides, not a thing that remains the same throughout change. Yet I need something permanent to determine the modifications of my internal states Objection: Why is it necessarily the case that the intuition of that which is persistent, be an intuition of something outside me? Why could it not instead be an intuition of some persistent thing inside me? For instance, the thinking self- Descartes' cogito Reply: The self we are conscious of is just a succession of mental states. Think for instance of Hume's bundle of impressions There is not direct perception of the self as an identical object The only thing I can experience of myself is my empirical self 'I have no cognition of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself.' (B 157f.) We only see ever changing states But, some things don't change that much but they still will a little bit e.g. who you are. Inner experience is an experience of a self that changes both quick and slow- ALL CHANGES. Conclusion: The persistent thing has to be something outside me- external world. Surely, it could be God or Aliens. But key point is that it can't be inside us.

the sciences 1. arithmetic

Arithmetic judgments are all synthetic a priori. Kant's example: "7 + 5 = 12" "12" involves an amplification of the concept of "7 + 5" I.e., "12" is not contained in the concept "7 + 5". Nor is it contained in the concepts ("7" "+" "5") Many have thought that maths are analytic, but they were wrong. E.g., Mill, Hume, usually empiricists.

the problem

Assumption: The world is independent from us knowers. Problem: How can we know this mind-independent world? And how can we know that we know this world? Before Kant: No one has been able to answer it. From Plato onwards... Threat: Scepticism - perhaps we can't know anything. Not even that there is a world out there. Kant's aim: Securing knowledge by showing that we can know the world.

Kant's revolution - reversing the assumption before and after

Before The world is mind-independent. Mind-independent objects are at the 'centre' of knowledge Subjects gravitate around objects to try to know them 'Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects' ➔ We are passive viewers. Metaphysics after the Kantian revolution (1) Knowing subjects are at the 'centre' of knowledge (2) The world is mind-dependent. (3) Objects must conform to our cognitive abilities 'Let us...try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition' ➔ We are active knowers Objects adapt to our mode of cognition

Kant's response to Hume

Claim: Causation is an a priori concept - for Kant, its synthetic a priori status, and the possibility of its receiving a transcendental proof, i.e. justification through being shown to be a necessary condition of experience. it makes experience possible We impose it onto our perceptions so as to organise it in a certain order Note: We don't choose to do it, we do it automatically, unconsciously It is part of our transcendental activity, the activity that conditions the possibility of experience We must have applied concepts to experience unconsciously- it's already happened. The fact we experience things means concepts have structured experiences already. Concepts are rules. Thus, we impose the following rule: every event has a cause 'The change in time from one state to another must be caused' 'All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.' (B 232) Aim is to argue this is necessary to all of experience- causation is real In detail, the argument is this. The first analogy shows that all change must be regarded as change in substances. The next question is how change can be referred to substances rather than to the subject. The concept of substance alone is not sufficient for this. What is also necessary is that we be able to think of the relation of succession in appearances as objective, i. e. as a succession in the objects themselves, independent from the succession occurring in the subject's representations. Unless I am able to think that objective successions, as opposed to merely subjective successions, take place, we have, Kant says, only a subjective 'play of representations, relating to no object' (B239).

a priori concepts - what is the conceptual skeleton of experience

Claim: Every experience is always already transformed by our conceptual mental activity. Where do these concepts come from? Us! There are 12 a priori concepts (categories)- A PRIORI CONCEPTS- that prescribe the form of experience E.g. cause, substance, necessity, universal, identity etc. Allow us to put spatial temporal data → experience possible These concepts condition the whole of experience These a priori concepts structure our experience They are like conceptual glasses thoughts without concepts - empty and intuitions without concepts are blind - concepts of understanding and intuitions needs to have a fusion transecentdal logic - makes experience possible

Therefore how does Kant conclude

Conclusion: experience of events is possible only be conceiving of all change according to the concept of causality The concept of causality is the ground of our experience of objective succession in the world ➔ All events, as objects of experience, are caused The principle of the Second Analogy: 'All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.' Kant says we are key for causation in the world. World is causally ordered even though no perception of causation, but we have UNCONS

STEP 4

Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself' Through introspection, there is no fixed subject to be found only outer objects. I.e. in my consciousness of my inner states (in a rough sense) there is no fixed thing That is why 'inner experience itself is ... only mediate [indirect] and possible only through outer experience.' (B 277) ➔ My self-consciousness presupposes the existence of outer objects Berkeley says similar but says through God.

What is the first argument?

First argument- space as a priori Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experience Against view that you see properties of Space by studying it. Target: Locke and empiricists who maintain that space is a posteriori I.e., that it is derived from our observation of outer spatial relations Kant's claim: Representation of space must be a priori Because: (1) I have to assume 'space' in order to present objects as 'outside of me' (2) Thus my concept of space cannot be based on my experience of objects in space My representation of space must 'precede' my experience of objects- in order to distinguish between objects predisposes this. We can't get concept of space from objects as otherwise vicious circle. So it must be a priori. If space was predisposed i wouldn't be able to distinguish between myself and objects. Kant's argument must rather be the following. If the representation of space were not a priori, then it would be empirical; but if it were formed empirically, then it would be obtained from experience of outer objects. But this is impossible, since outer experience is impossible without the representation of space. So the representation of space must be a priori. In sum, because the representation of space is invoked in the very act of representing a world of outer objects, it cannot be based on experience of outer objects.

How is causation connected to events?

How am I able to distinguish between the two cases, given that my perceptions alone don't allow me to do so? Negative answer: The concept of such a necessary connection between two states cannot be found in experience Because experience is always contingent Therefore there can never be evidence for the necessity of a concept Positive answer: The concept of necessary connection has to be found a priori- must be found in us. Causality must be already applied as we can tell the difference between ships and houses. I.e. our successive perceptions of an event are given a necessary order by means of the a priori concept of causality Causality is a necessary condition of our experience This a priori concept is the concept of the relation of cause and effect ➔ The concept of causality is the ground of our experience of objective succession in the world

how does Kant refute problematic idealism?

How does Kant refute problematic idealism? By proving that inner experience is only possible on the assumption of outer experience Why start from inner experience? Because it is the sole thing that Descartes does not doubt, he cannot doubt it. The cogito (first certain truth in mediations) is the first thing that he finds to be indubitable When he finds the truth of cogito there is no external world at this point. 'I think therefore I am'- there is no God, Mathematics, world. Key claim: you can prove own existence without reference to other things. Crux of the argument: (1) Grant that inner experience is indubitable, (2) Inner experience is possible only if outer experience is presupposed. (3) Therefore, the outer world (that we experience) exists You can't think about your own experience without thinking about outer experience.

SPACE AND TIME - the asetic - sensory experience - pace and time making sensory experience possible what is sensibility?

How we get to perceive objects in the world It is the faculty of sense data- it receives intuitions and sends data E.g. the empiricist part that refers to experience It corresponds to the dimension of objects as perceived through the senses Sensibility is the cognitive power that gives rise to intuitions, and it is a capacity of 'receptivity': the subject forms its sensible representations passively, through being 'affected Note: The sense of 'intuition' in Kant is different from what we mean by the word today (gut feeling, special insight)

walk through of each step STEP 1

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time - That is: I take myself to make true judgements about objective changes in my experience, I locate my mental history in an objective time-order. We have a consciousness of our existence in time- when I reflect on my experience I can think about future so i am conscious of myself. Even the sceptic accepts this- Including Descartes' evil demon I locate my mental history in an objective time-order. My inner experience is temporally structured (i.e. structured by time) due to a priori concept. I.e., I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time [B275], but the temporal ordering assumed is only of my inner or subjective states Time is an a priori form of intuition (spatially, temporal) we always were the temporal glasses- so always have.

problematic idealism-Kant directs the Refutation against problematic idealism alone

If the world is independent from us, Then we cannot account for our knowledge of the world. Pb: How can I know that there is an external world if all I have access to are my ideas? On the basis of Descartes' account, I cannot know that there is an external world

how does this show the subjective order vs objective order of perceptions?

In both there is a subjective succession: my experience changes, different representations coming one after the other. But in the first case, the change is just in experience, the house itself remaining unchanged, and my experiences could just as well - as regards their objective content - have occurred in the reverse order: I could have walked round the house clockwise instead of anti-clockwise. In the case of the ship, where my experience changes because the object itself is changing, it is not the case that my experiences could just as well have occurred in the reverse order: if they had, my experience would have been of something different, a ship moving upstream instead of downstream. So in the case of the ship, unlike that of the house, there is an objective succession, corresponding to my subjective succession, and what makes the difference, according to Kant, is that in the case of the ship I organise my experience according to a rule which makes the order in which I experience things necessary and irreversible. And the concept of a necessary and irreversible succession is, Kant says, the concept of a causal relation: the relation of cause and effect is both necessary and irreversible. The principle of causality is justified, therefore, on the grounds that only an a priori rule, by virtue of which one appearance can be regarded as necessitating another, allows us to refer change to objects, as required for an objective time-order. Again, no further question concerning the nature of causality can arise. Implications: Objective orderings are events in time. E.g. ship is an event and order matters. Subjective orderings are the successive occurrences of our stream of consciousness I.e., they are not events, nothing happens there.

2. METAPHYSICS what is the battle ground set out

In dealing with metaphysical questions, reason "falls into obscurity and contradictions"... "The battlefield of these endless controversies" is called metaphysics. (A viii)The degree and quality of disagreement in metaphysics makes it a 'battle-ground', a site of 'mock-combats' in which 'no participant has ever yet succeeded in gaining even so much as an inch of territory' To make peace, Kant proposes to answer the following questions: Is metaphysics possible? If so, how is metaphysics possible? Can it reach the rank of a science?

illustration of this argument

In order to observe the relation in space between 2 objects, I have to assume space I have to assume space in order to present 2 objects alongside one another. Otherwise we cannot distinguish between the two balls. ➔ Kant is not arguing that space is presupposed in order to represent something as in space. This would be a terrible argument! Rather Kant is arguing that space is presupposed in order to represent an object as distinct from another object Similarly, to observe the relation between an object and myself, I have to assume space to present an object outside of me. Objects are spatial so distinguishing them predisposes a spatial background.

distinction between intuition and concepts

Intuitions relate to objects immediately: an intuition 'is that through which it [an object] is in immediate relation to us' - mental representations from sensation - space = pure intuition and empirical intuition - derived form sensory data, the realm of sensibility. Concepts, by contrast, when they relate to objects, do so mediately, 'by means of a feature which several things may have in common' (A320/B377). Having a concept does not therefore imply a relation to an object: once an object is given, it can be thought about, but what allows it to be given in the first place is something other than an act of thought; concepts must 'relate ultimately to intuitions' (A19/B33) if they are to have objects. The distinction of intuition and concept thus corresponds to the distinction between the particular and the general. Intuitions are 'singular representations' (B136n): an intuition is a representation of one particular, individual thing, 'a single object' (A32/B47). Kant regards this feature of intuition as of a piece with the immediacy of its relation to the object. A concept by contrast is inherently general: necessarily a concept can apply to more than one particular, since to apply a concept to an object is to say that it belongs to a kind of which there are or could be other instances. An intuition is needed in order that there should be an object to which a concept may be applied. And a concept is needed to provide intuition with a relation to an object: conceptualisation transforms the primitive object-directedness which intuitions possess intrinsically into a genuine relation of representation. The mutual dependence of intuitions and concepts is an absolutely fundamental proposition of Kant's epistemology

What is Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy ?

Kant's strategy in the Critique is similar to that of the Inaugural Dissertation in that both works attempt to reconcile modern science with traditional morality and religion by relegating them to distinct sensible and intelligible worlds, respectively. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. As Kant's letter to Herz suggests, the main problem with his view in the Inaugural Dissertation is that it tries to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge about a world that is entirely independent of the human mind. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. Kant's revolutionary position in the Critique is that we can have a priori knowledge about the general structure of the sensible world because it is not entirely independent of the human mind. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. we are born with a priri ideas, which we are born with which we bring to experience.

how can we apply this revolution to metaphysics?

It is the knowledge of certain kinds of object e.g. God, the Soul through concepts Knowledge of God through concept of God E.g. Descartes prove God's existence Question: is this kind of knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, possible? Synthetic a priori claims, Kant argues, demand an entirely different kind of proof than those required for analytic a priori claims or synthetic a posteriori claims. Indications for how to proceed, Kant says, can be found in the examples of synthetic a priori claims in natural science and mathematics, specifically geometry. Claims like Newton's, "the quantity of matter is always preserved," and the geometer's claim, "the angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees" are known a priori, but they cannot be known merely from an analysis of the concepts of matter or triangle. We must "go outside and beyond the concept. . . joining to it a priori in thought something which I have not thought in it." (B 18) A synthetic a priori claim constructs upon and adds to what is contained analytically in a concept without appealing to experience. So if we are to solve the problems generated by Empiricism and Rationalism, the central question of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason reduces to "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" (19) (All references to The Critique of Pure Reason will be to the A (1781) and B(1787) edition pages in Werner Pluhar's translation. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996.) If we can answer that question, then we can determine the possibility, legitimacy, and range of all metaphysical claims

what was the intellectual context in which Kant wrote in?

Kant (Kant's life is, famously, characterised by outward uneventfulness. Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in the East Prussian city of Königsberg, where he spent almost all of his days) wrote the Critique toward the end of the Enlightenment, which was then in a state of crisis. Hindsight enables us to see that the 1780's was a transitional decade in which the cultural balance shifted decisively away from the Enlightenment toward Romanticism, but of course Kant did not have the benefit of such hindsight. The Enlightenment was a reaction to the rise and successes of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The spectacular achievement of Newton in particular engendered widespread confidence and optimism about the power of human reason to control nature and to improve human life. One effect of this new confidence in reason was that traditional authorities were increasingly questioned. For why should we need political or religious authorities to tell us how to live or what to believe, if each of us has the capacity to figure these things out for ourselves? Enlightenment is about thinking for oneself rather than letting others think for you, according to What is Enlightenment? (8:35). In this essay, Kant also expresses the Enlightenment faith in the inevitability of progress. A few independent thinkers will gradually inspire a broader cultural movement, which ultimately will lead to greater freedom of action and governmental reform. The Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason was tied to the expectation that it would not lead to any of these consequences but instead would support certain key beliefs that tradition had always sanctioned. Crucially, these included belief in God, the soul, freedom, and the compatibility of science with morality and religion. The Enlightenment was about replacing traditional authorities with the authority of individual human reason - the right of eahc to make up his own mind on matters, but it was not about overturning traditional moral and religious beliefs. Kant identifies enlightenment with the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act. So modern science, the pride of the Enlightenment, the source of its optimism about the powers of human reason, threatened to undermine traditional moral and religious beliefs that free rational thought was expected to support. This was the main intellectual crisis of the Enlightenment. The Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's response to this crisis. Its main topic is metaphysics because, for Kant, metaphysics is the domain of reason - it is "the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically" (Axx) - and the authority of reason was in question. Kant's main goal is to show that a critique of reason by reason itself, unaided and unrestrained by traditional authorities, establishes a secure and consistent basis for both Newtonian science and traditional morality and religion. In other words, free rational inquiry adequately supports all of these essential human interests and shows them to be mutually consistent. So reason deserves the sovereignty attributed to it by the Enlightenment This entry describes the main tendencies of Enlightenment thought in the following main sections: (1) The True: Science, Epistemology, and Metaphysics in the Enlightenment; (2) The Good: Political Theory, Ethical Theory and Religion in the Enlightenment; (3) The Beautiful: Aesthetics in the Enlightenment.

What analogy does Kant offer

Kant characterises this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Metaphysics needs a revolution To become a science, metaphysics needs a revolution. We need to reverse the way we think about metaphysics - our method. Kant calls it a 'Copernican revolution'- change the entire way of thinking. After Copernicus, who revolutionised astronomy- sun moves around Before Copernicus: Geocentric Solar System (1) The Earth is the centre of the universe (2) The sun and other planets move around it. Two observations supported this theory: The sun seems to revolve around the Earth. Observers perceive that the Earth is not moving. Copernicus' revolution: Heliocentric Solar System (1) The sun is the center of the universe. Not the earth (2) The earth (and other planets) move around it. Not the sun Contrary to the way things appear: (1) We are the ones who move. (2) It is our motion that gives the appearance of the sun and stars moving. Copernicus to Kant Copernicus' revolution: The centre of the universe has been switched. Before: We thought everything was turning around us. After: We're the ones doing the turning. Kant wants to instigate a similar 'revolution'. How? By switching the 'centre of knowledge'. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.

Kant against the transcendental realist world

Kant puts both rationalism and empiricism in the same bag Together with all other philosophical systems before him- He calls them 'transcendental realists They are all wrong because they are all based on the same (false) presupposition. Presupposition: The world we are acquainted with exists independently of us. I.e., it is a mind-independent world

Kant's answer to the rejection of the common grounds

Kant's answer to the problems generated by the two traditions mentioned above changed the face of philosophy. First, Kant argued that that old division between a priori truths and a posteriori truths employed by both camps was insufficient to describe the sort of metaphysical claims that were under dispute. An analysis of knowledge also requires a distinction between synthetic and analytic truths. In an analytic claim, the predicate is contained within the subject. In the claim, "Every body occupies space," the property of occupying space is revealed in an analysis of what it means to be a body. The subject of a synthetic claim, however, does not contain the predicate. In, "This tree is 120 feet tall," the concepts are synthesized or brought together to form a new claim that is not contained in any of the individual concepts. The Empiricists had not been able to prove synthetic a priori claims like "Every event must have a cause," because they had conflated "synthetic" and "a posteriori" as well as "analytic" and "a priori." Then they had assumed that the two resulting categories were exhaustive. A synthetic a priori claim, Kant argues, is one that must be true without appealing to experience, yet the predicate is not logically contained within the subject, so it is no surprise that the Empiricists failed to produce the sought after justification. The Rationalists had similarly conflated the four terms and mistakenly proceeded as if claims like, "The self is a simple substance," could be proven analytically and a priori.

Kant's distinction as epistemological

Kant's characterisation of certain judgements as synthetic a priori is not logical in any ordinary sense but rather epistemological, i. e. concerned with the grounds or justification of judgements. This accords with Kant's statement in the Prolegomena (266) that the analytic/synthetic distinction concerns the 'content', not the 'logical form' of judgements. If so, the notion of synthetic a priority needs to be understood in terms of the conception of transcendental philosophy described in the previous chapter. In this light, synthetic a priori judgements are those that define the structure of experience, this structure being manifest in, and identifiable through, our acceptance of certain judgements as non-logically necessary; to say how synthetic a priori judgements are possible is to account for the structure of experience. This explains why synthetic a priority should be anomalous for empiricism and rationalism, since these philosophical traditions either fail to recognise that experience must have a structure (empiricism) or falsely suppose it to derive from logical principles (rationalism).

implication for Descarte's idealism

Kant's claim: Descartes is stuck with his problematic idealism He can't prove that the world exists for certain Descartes skeptical doubt was intended only as a methodological tool To reach indubitable knowledge of the world, we need to start by doubting that it exists But for Kant, Descartes traps himself in solipsism Solipsism: the view that the self is all that can be known to exist For if only the inner self is known immediately, there is no inferential route to the external world. Stuck in the solipson bubble. If only have your own ideas you have to end up in a skeptical sense towards the external world. Note: Kant ignores Descartes' appeal to God as guarantor of our knowledge claim Since on Kant's account, God's existence is not a legitimate ground of knowledge Kant groups Berkeley and Descartes together as material or empirical idealists on two counts: first because both assume that the immediate and primary objects of knowledge are exclusively subjective, private, mental entities, rather than empirically real objects, whereby they accept that knowledge of objects in space rests on inference from knowledge of inner states; and second, because neither, according to Kant, succeeds in defending common sense belief in empirical reality

summary so far

Kant's claim: experience cannot be all content- It has form and content Makes sense data into spatial and temporal form. What gives structure to sensation cannot itself derive from sensation- it cannot come from experience It concerns the shape of sensation- its formal structure It is not content it is structural It is intuition as it is not conceptual Therefore, it is an a priori form of intuition A priori because it comes from us Form because it organises sensations Intuition because it is not conceptual. Cookie dough- shape of dough is spatial form but the cookie cutters used are the concepts.

what is the example Kant give

Kant's example: perceiving a moving ship vs. a house Question: How am I able to distinguish between the two cases, given that my perceptions alone don't allow me to do so? Viewing a house This series of perceptions has an arbitrary order to it E.g., I could look at the roof first, then the door, then the window OR any other order. The order has nothing to do with the house as an object- learn nothing different from any order- still the same house Viewing a sailing ship this series of perceptions does have something to do with the object. The order makes a big difference- if the ship moves in a different way it makes a difference as its sailing to a different direction. E.g., first I see the boat up here, then down there- no control. I can't look at it in any other order. The order of my perception is necessary. I.e., if things didn't happen in that order, it could not be a boat floating down the river.

whats Kant's rejection of the common grounds

Kant's rejection of the common grounds 1- K denies that the mind is merely passive Rather, the mind is both active and passive E.g. we receive sensory input but we transform it 2- K denies that there are only 2 kinds of truths Rather there is a 3rd kind: synthetic a priori truths E.g., '2 + 2 = 4', 'parallel lines never cross' A priori but answer not contained in the subject (3) K denies that cognition has a single source. Rather, cognition has two sources: reason & experience Pure reason is not just thinking about stuff, it is reason that thinks independently of experience. It is the equivalent of a priori Transcendental ideas (beyond experience) that come from pure (no empirical content) reason = psychological idea (an idea of the thinking self- transcendental ego) Cosmological idea (world and its identity), theological idea (idea of perfect being- God) These ideas are projections of the faculty of reason. I have experiences and they have a succession in time and an order to them. Reason wants unification

the best of both words - the role of experience

Rationalism: all knowledge begins with and is derived from reason, independently of experience- in a vacuum. No experience only there is pure thought. Empiricism: All knowledge begins with and is derived from experience, independently of reason. Kant's solution: get the best of both. How? By distinguishing between two theses: All knowledge begins with experience. All knowledge derives from experience. He will agree with (1) but not with (2) as we need experience for knowledge to begin but it can also derive from us independently of experience 'In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.' (Bi)

what is the war of the worlds: rationalism vs empiricism

Rationalism: all knowledge is derived from reason Independently of experience E.g. Descartes, Leibniz Empiricism: All knowledge is derived from experience Independently of reason E.g. Berkeley, Hume, etc. Threat: Scepticism - perhaps we can't know anything. Not even that there is a world out there. Kant's aim: Securing knowledge by showing that we can know the world. We need a THIRD way Kant's solution: Getting the best of both worlds. Kant's method: By rejecting the claim that they are the only two alternatives

what is the analogy given to prove space and time as a priori forms of intuition?

Space and time are like glasses that we necessarily wear and can't take off Spatio-temporal glasses. E.g. don't know your wearing until today. Space and time are structures through which experiences sense data is filtered into a spatial-temporal form Everything we perceive is in space and time. Whatever is perceived through intuition has the form of space and time World is in space and time due to the glasses being worn. This claim is a priori

what does Kant hold?

Space and time as a priori contributions of sensibility Kant holds: Kant's own view of space and time he expresses by saying that they are a priori intuitions. To say that they are a priori is to say that they do not derive from experience. And to say that they are intuitions is to say that our awareness of them is immediate and non-conceptual, and that each of space and time is in some sense a 'single object' space is the first inutuion which makes all the intuitions possible - the pure form which makes mental representations of phenomena. purely inate, human mind presupposes it. Against Leibniz: space and time are irreducible Against Newton: space and time are not real in an absolute sense Option 3: Space and time belong to a priori forms of intuition. They provide a structure to the content of experience By putting sense data into a spatio-temporal form Kant gives arguments for this claim- individually they are not great.

what is his second argument?

Space is a pure intuition (rather than a concept) Space and time are a priori forms of intuition I.e. when we speak of "different spaces", we only mean different parts of the same space The representation of the parts of space is dependent on the representation of the one space of which the parts are only limitations Insofar as space is unitary and singular, it fulfils the criteria of an intuition rather than a concept Because a concept can include a lot of different things that fall under it E.g. concept of chair → applies to lots of different types of chair- it is not singular. Many things fall under it. BUT, Space isn't. Whereas with space, it is always necessarily the same thing that is represented e.g. space in chair or lecture theatre is all the same. However, this does not mean that we cannot also have the concept 'space'. Rather we must first have the intuition of space before we can form the concept Space is a form of intuition

step 4

Step (4): We can distinguish between the subjective order of appearances in perception and the objective order of actual states Crux of the argument: we can distinguish between: (1) the succession of our perceptions And (2) the temporal order of actual states in the world It is the distinction is between: (1) the subjective order of our representations (what first?) I.e. as I perceive them and (2) the objective order of the things that we represent I.e. things are the objects of experience

kant vs transcendental realism

TR encompasses all philosophers until Kant, and in particular: Rationalism: Descartes (1596-1650) Spinoza (1632-1677) Leibniz (1646-1716) Empiricism: Locke (1632-1704) Berkeley (1685-1753) Hume (1711-1776) Transcendental realism problem If the world is independent from us, Then we cannot account for our knowledge of the world. E.g. we cannot see trees or make ideas of trees I.e., we cannot understand how we can possibly know the world. *And* how we can know that we know it. Because we can't step outside of our minds All philosophers (before Kant) have failed to see this. They are all transcendental realists in this sense

4. THS SENSIBLE CONDITIONS OF OBJECTS Kant's analysis of cognition

The Aesthetic's discussion of space and time is prefaced by Kant's analysis of cognition, which introduces an unfamiliar philosophical terminology Kant holds that if we clear our minds of the doctrines of rationalism and empiricism, and try to say how in the most general terms our cognitive powers are composed and relate to objects, we find that the deepest distinction to be drawn is between, on the one hand, an object's being given to us, and, on the other, its being thought about. Intuitions are those representations by means of which objects are given to us, and concepts those by means of which we think about objects. The cognitive power in us that enables objects to be given, Kant calls sensibility, and the power that enables objects to be thought he calls understanding.

5. AGAISNT EMPERICISM SECOND ANALOGY -ANALYTIC - aim to establish the principle of causality the sense of understanding for Kant?

The Analytic has defined the 'land of truth' (A235/B294): it has told us under what conditions we can rightfully claim that our thoughts have objects, and that our judgements are capable of truth. These conditions are those of possible expehence, and the Analytic implies that they are necessary as well as sufficient for knowledge. It follows that the limits of knowledge coincide with the limits of experience, and that the claims of transcendent metaphysics are unfounded. Faculty of applying concepts to spatial-temporal sensations It produces concepts and applies them to spatial-temporal data Act of spontaneous part of our mind Understanding: it produces concepts and applies them to what is given through sensibility It corresponds to the dimension of objects being thought about through concepts I.e., the rationalist part that refers to rational concepts It is active and spontaneous Note: The sense of 'understanding' in Kant is different from what we mean by the word today (comprehension). concerned with categories of understanding, judgments derived therefor necessary fro any correct thout on objects formal rules of logic reason - ideas in metaphysical sense - not directed towards nature at all, create cosmological worked images. understanding - concepts , outer directed towards a mastery over nature faculty for forming judgements about representation - either intuitions received from outer worlds or concepts synthesis - primary function of understandin - synthesisi represnations into one larger unity - analyses imaginations synthesies we have one one hand - model of the machinery of the human mind sensibility -imagination- understanding imagination shuttles back in forth between both

what are the two alternatives

The alternatives offered by empiricism and rationalism (1) The mind knows the world passively by conforming to it: Either by experiencing it (empiricism) Or by reasoning about it (rationalism) (2) There are only 2 types of truth: A priori analytic truth (e.g., All bachelors are unmarried) A posteriori synthetic truth (e.g., Socrates is a man) (3) Cognition derives from 1 single source: Either experience (empiricism) Or reason (rationalism)

shall we carry on doing metaphysics therefore or should we give up?

The answer is a bit of yes and a bit of no NO.. as Kant's conclusion will be that we can never go beyond the bounds of possible experience We cannot have knowledge of things in themselves We can't go beyond experience e.g. can't find metaphysics This means no knowledge of God, the soul, the origin of the world, etc. Traditional metaphysics seeks transcendent knowledge and is impossible. AS we cannot experience/know them. We might as well give up as we can never know. 'there emerges a very strange result.... namely that with this faculty we can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience, which is nevertheless precisely the most essential occupation of this science [metaphysics]' (Bxix-xx) Outcome: positive or negative? This might seem like a disadvantageous result as if its about knowledge we want then it was all a waste of time Because going beyond the bounds of experience has been what metaphysics was mostly about until then. But this result becomes positive Because when we finally realise that all the previous ventures beyond the bounds of experience didn't actually extend our knowledge On the contrary, they attempted to extend illegitimately the bounds of experience This gave rise to illusions- we thought we discovered something but we didn't Famous quote in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience ... Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith [or: mere belief] Deny knowledge of certain objects e.g. God, freedom but doesn't mean that we cannot think about God/the Soul It is an issue of faith- you can have hope/belief but it cannot be called science We give up knowledge of metaphysical objects but we gain immanent metaphysics (capacities and reason)- we give up transcendental metaphysics (God, Soul). Yes because Metaphysics turns into epistemology- we can know how our mind functions and acquired knowledge Kant's 'immanent' metaphysics takes the form of a "critique" of pure reason. The metaphysics of experience We can have a priori knowledge of those things whose experience is determined by the a priori conditions of the mind.... We can have a priori knowledge of those things that are a priori in the mind.

first analogy?

The argument, in brief, is that in order to think of appearances as being in time, I need something fixed and unchanging, and since I do not perceive time itself, I need to conceive of something permanent in appearances, which is as much as to say that I need to employ the concept of substance. he means is that time is unitary, all changes taking place in one and the same time, and that time is the itself unchanging framework to which all change is referred (it cannot be true at one moment that A preceded B, and true at a later moment that A followed B; the temporal locations of events cannot themselves change).

connection to geometry?

The doctrine of pure intuition of space allows Kant to make a claim about geometry (B40-1). The Aesthetic contains three distinguishable claims about geometry, and the first of these is that pure intuition of space allows it to be explained how the synthetic a priori judgements of geometry are possible. In all cases of synthetic a priori judgement, we need to discover a 'something X' synthesising subject and predicate, and we know that this X cannot be experience because the judgement is a priori. Our pure intuition of space is fitted to play the role of the non- empirical 'X' synthesising subject and predicate in geometrical judgements: geometry may be regarded as knowledge derived from pure intuition of space. This accords with the fact that the necessity of geometric truths can be grasped simply on the basis of mental constructions of lines, triangles and so on, i.e. by representing space empty of appearances, without our minds being affected in any way. Not only does pure intuition of space permit space to be studied independently of physical objects: it also makes possible synthetic a priori knowledge of the spatial properties of outer objects, since appearances in space must of course conform to the laws of geometry. one has to produce a priori intuition in mind of triangle - magic x like experience for the synsisi of predicate for subject - triangle from three lines produced from mind to do with representations. pure intuition of triangle - assumed to be necessary and universal space is the pure form in the mind which make the pure intuition of the triangle possible. space pure from of intuition for outer objects.

quick recap?

The empiricist picture of the mind as tabula rasa (individuals are born without built-in mental content and that all knowledge comes from experience or perception) is incorrect I.e., knowledge cannot be 'all content' Because otherwise, we couldn't achieve any knowledge of the world Rather, our cognitive faculties already possess some structure They impose this a priori structure upon the sensations we receive Because content has to be organised for us to be conscious of it Thus, knowledge / experience is the combination of two sources: Understanding, which provides a priori the structure of knowledge- has content to it Sensibility, which provides a posteriori the content of knowledge Space and time- are a priori forms of intuition. Everything we experience is in space and time space a priori form fro outer objects time a priroi from for inner objects - underlies all thoughts, mode of temporally. mind brought about as things as they manifest themselves phenomenally to u - cant know things as they only as they appear to us through space and time - form of outer sense a priori intution - which allow us to experience anything. space and time are obejctive innateness of space and time enables the mind to from synthetic a prioi truth and synthesis predicates and have universally valid statements.

what is a synthetic statement and what is the criteria needed to become one?

To synthesise is to combine parts together - true a posteriori The predicate goes beyond the subject - synthesised by the subject Ampliative - it adds to our knowledge E.g., 'All bodies are heavy', 'All bachelors live on their own - how to find out they are heavy and have weight - the mysterious x allows us to synthesis the predicate weight with the synthesised bodies. The negation isn't contradictory 'This cat is black' 3 criteria: No concept containment Negation is not contradictory Amplification rather than mere clarification A third thing is presupposed which joins subject and predicate, e.g. experience. experience is the thing outside predicate and subject which allows us to synthesise 2 together all synthetics. statements increase knowledge, through synthetic statemtns.

what is Kant's answer to this problem?

The empiricist picture of the mind as tabula rasa is incorrect I.e., knowledge cannot be 'all content' Because otherwise, we couldn't achieve any knowledge of the world Rather, our cognitive faculties already possess some structure They impose this a priori structure upon the sensations we receive Because content has to be organised for us to be conscious of it Thus, knowledge / experience is the combination of two sources: Understanding, which provides a priori the structure of knowledge Sensibility, which provides a posteriori the content of knowledge The anti-rationalist and anti-empiricist strategy initiated in the Introduction is expanded on in the Critique in the following way. Kant will side with empiricism in rejecting the rationalist claim that knowledge can be derived from concepts alone: concepts, he will claim, suffice only for analytic judgements and so do not provide for truths about objects. But he will also, agreeing with rationalism, reject the empiricist claim that knowledge of objects can be derived from experience of the unconceptualised kind that empiricism presupposes: Kant will seek to show that 'experience is itself a species of knowledge that involves understanding' (Bxvii). On Kant's view, neither concepts nor sensory experience are individually sufficient for knowledge: they are jointly necessary (and sufficient) for knowledge; sense experience is needed to provide the content of knowledge and concepts give it its form. In this picture the judgements that Kant calls synthetic a priori hold centre stage because, as will be seen, they determine the manner in which sensory experience and concepts are conjoined. what is the basis of the synthesis fro synthetic a priori - which experience is for synthetic knowledge - answer = structure of the human mind itself

connection again to copernicus' revolution

The idea that the mind plays an active role in structuring reality is so familiar to us now that it is difficult for us to see what a pivotal insight this was for Kant. He was well aware of the idea's power to overturn the philosophical worldviews of his contemporaries and predecessors, however. He even somewhat immodestly likens his situation to that of Copernicus in revolutionizing our worldview. In the Lockean view, mental content is given to the mind by the objects in the world. Their properties migrate into the mind, revealing the true nature of objects. Kant says, "Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects" (B xvi). But that approach cannot explain why some claims like, "every event must have a cause," are a priori true. Similarly, Copernicus recognized that the movement of the stars cannot be explained by making them revolve around the observer; it is the observer that must be revolving. Analogously, Kant argued that we must reformulate the way we think about our relationship to objects. It is the mind itself which gives objects at least some of their characteristics because they must conform to its structure and conceptual capacities. Thus, the mind's active role in helping to create a world that is experiencable must put it at the center of our philosophical investigations. The appropriate starting place for any philosophical inquiry into knowledge, Kant decides, is with the mind that can have that knowledge.

Descartes idealism according to Kant

The problematic idealist doubts the existence of the external world because it cannot be proven Descartes' version: the external world may not exist. Descartes shows that the thing we are most certain off is not existence of world but the existence of ourselves as thinking beings. The cogito is the first truth. He "thought everyone at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world because it could never be proved satisfactorily" (P §13 4:293). Descartes proves the corporeal world exists in Meditation VI But Kant argues that Descartes asserts the existence of an external world to be possible but 'doubtful and indemonstrable' Because Descartes' claim to knowledge of the external world involves a problematic inference from inner states to outer objects (see A367-8) I.e. from the cogito and our ideas to the existence of the world Meditation 3: "As to my ideas of corporeal things, I can see nothing in them which is so great as to make it seem impossible that it originated in myself."

why else id the CPR challenging?

The project of the Critique of Pure Reason is also challenging because in the analysis of the mind's transcendental contributions to experience we must employ the mind, the only tool we have, to investigate the mind. We must use the faculties of knowledge to determine the limits of knowledge, so Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is both a critique that takes pure reason as its subject matter, and a critique that is conducted by pure reason. Kant's argument that the mind makes an a priori contribution to experiences should not be mistaken for an argument like the Rationalists' that the mind possesses innate ideas like, "God is a perfect being." Kant rejects the claim that there are complete propositions like this one etched on the fabric of the mind. He argues that the mind provides a formal structuring that allows for the conjoining of concepts into judgments, but that structuring itself has no content. The mind is devoid of content until interaction with the world actuates these formal constraints. The mind possesses a priori templates for judgments, not a priori judgments.

Case-study: causation I.e., the idea of necessary connection Humes skepticism about causation

The second analogy is less straightforward. It aims to establish the principle of causality: 'all alterations take place in conformity with the law of connection of cause and effect' (B232), i.e. every event must have a cause. Hume's empiricism: The only valid source of knowledge is experience. habit, assume one things follow another, because we continually observe it p custom and culture is thleads to beleive evenyti is causal to anohter - no neccesity in the causaility of an event. Claim: we do not perceive the necessary connection between a cause and an effect. There is no "flash" between them- We can't see causation happening See no causal power We only perceive constant conjunction I.e., the white ball moves following the yellow ball hitting it Nothing in experience tells us that the yellow ball caused the movement of the white ball Since the concept of cause doesn't come from experience, it is invalid.

response?

The second argument says that although we can think space empty of objects, it is impossible to represent the absence of space. Space 'must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them' (A24/B38-9). From which it follows that space is a necessary and therefore again an a priori representation. The second argument is accordingly designed to secure the a priority of space by establishing that the representation of outer objects is not necessary for that of space, and it does this by indicating a difference in the behaviour of the two representations. We can represent the absence of outer objects by representing space empty of objects: empty space is conceivable, whether or not we could have cognition of it (something which Kant in fact denies, for independent reasons). But we cannot in the same objective sense represent the absence of space, for in order to do so it would be necessary to represent an outer world from which space was missing, and this is something which, the first argument has indicated, we are unable to do. The representation of space can survive the subtraction of all outer objects but not vice versa. Kant's argument has therefore nothing to do with the merely subjective, psychological impossibility of ridding ourselves of the idea of space. Jointly the two arguments establish an asymmetrical relation of dependence between the representation of space and that of a world of outer objects: the former is presupposed for the latter, but the reverse is not the case.

what is the upshot here

The upshot is that inner and outer experience are necessarily correlated: they are 'bound up in the way of identity' (Bxl). If so, the crucial Cartesian assumption that subjective states can be known independently from the external world, that self-consciousness is prior to knowledge of objects, is undermined: Kant has shown that Cartesian 'indubitable certainty' attaches in the first instance not to empirical self-consciousness, as Descartes supposed, but to transcendental self- consciousness, and that knowledge of inner experience (empirical self-consciousness) is a further matter, which presupposes outer experience. The 'game played by [material or empirical] idealism has been turned against itself' (B276): the Refutation has shown that the move from a subjective to an objective view of one's own existence - a move which the skeptic must make if he is to refer to facts of inner experience as grounds for skeptical doubt - compels the move from inner to outer objects. It tells us why there must be an external world, and explains why its existence should be self-evident in the way we take it to be.

summary

The world is mind independent as we have spatial, temporal glasses that filters the sense data → so our experience is casual etc. Idealist- world is made of appearances formed in the mind- there is no external world. There is an external world outside mind- but it is not mind independent as now the world is real and is the way it is partly because of us so it's now mind dependent.

what do these sciences prove?

These sciences provide us with evidence that there is synthetic a priori knowledge. Mathematics ('2 + 2 = 4'), geometry, natural science, etc. So for Kant, SAK is not a hypothesis, it's a fact. Of course, you may disagree because you think This knowledge is not synthetic, it's analytic This knowledge is not a priori, it's a posteriori But either way, you have to agree that we have such knowledge I.e., we have mathematical & geometrical knowledge. Unless you are sceptics. SAK is very special because its possibility makes no sense. We do not understand how it is possible to have SAK Because SAK implies that we can know non-trivial (i.e., synthetic) things about the world without looking at the world (i.e. a priori). E.g. I can know that isosceles triangles will have 2 equal angles without having ever seen such a triangle.

what are space and time?

Two dominant answers when Kant was writing: 1--Space and Time are real (Newtonian view) E.g. like containers of existing objects. E.g., Newton's containers: they are existent objects or substantive containers of physical objects I.e., they are ontologically reducible. 2- Space and time are relations between objects- features of relations. E.g., Leibniz's logical constructions out of relations between objects I.e., they are nothing in themselves, but only relations between objects Thus, objects are not essentially either spatial or temporal Both hold space to be independent of the human mind. Space and time are mind independent- Newton says space is independent of everything as logically reducible Leibniz makes space dependent on things, and reducible to relations between things. But not dependent upon minds in any sense.

what is Kants task here

Understanding the possibility of knowledge First answer the question what can I know? How can we understand knowledge? First by explaining the activity of the subject E.g. how the subject contributes to the world? Remember the copernican revolution Thus, the critique of reason 2nd: by showing that the subject cannot know everything E.g. there are limits to what the subject can know The infamous things in themselves cannot be known Thus, the critique of reason

what is the revolution behind geometry?

We don't observe the world try and find triangles and observe them We construct the concept Because we reversed our way of thinking about geometrical objects. We don't need to find triangles to figure out what they are like. An isosceles triangle is not something that we "find" and then inductively discover its properties. Rather, we construct them through concepts and then deduce their properties a priori. I.e., we know a priori what every isosceles triangle will be like. "The true method ... was not to inspect what he (the Mathematician, e.g. Thales) discerned either in the figure (e.g. the triangle), or in the bare concept of it; but to bring out what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori (Bxi-xii). We state through actions that things are a certain way We concept concepts and then we deduce properties that necessarily follow- not looking for triangles in the world but constructing them a priori- independently of experience

what do these forms of realism have in common?

What do these forms of realism have in common? (1) We are passive knowers (2) Objects are at the 'centre' of knowledge I.e., subjects need to gravitate around them to know them (3) Objects exist independently from us I.e., they are mind-independent (4) But they all face the same difficulty: How to prove that our knowledge of objects is justified? I.e., how can we know that our ideas correspond to the objects they are meant to represent?

potential misunderstanding when Kant talks about something outside me

When Kant talks about something outside me, he is NOT talking about things in themselves Not noumena world but the material object world of experience. Rather, he's talking about the external world of experience I.e., the world of objects There is an ambiguity in the notion of things 'outside us' I.e., either independent of us; or in space (A373). For Kant, things are outside us in space, but not independent of us. Because...he is a transcendental idealist!

baby example

concept = distance between objects baby experiencing world for first time that object is there and i'm over here so there must be space in between - as that fact in order to say that object is over there, means u already have the concept of space in your head, cant get it just through experiencing the world. at the same time you cant just figure it out, its not like 2 plus 2 is for- nothing definitely true about space. space, number and time - built into us from the beginning, brains haired wired to experience the world this way, as soon as baby experiences anything they are experiencing it specially these synthetic apriori - condition of having a mind, all minds have them pokemon anaolgy go out in th world and capture knew knwoeldge - love and gain knwoldeh on those things but always have a started pokermon and poker balls to get u on your way - have to have a starter to become master pokermon s a c - like starter pokermon transcendental arguemnt - when we say we do thngs like this, whather neccersay backround conditions to allow us to do these thngs, must be neccesary - trascendent just means gong beyond the things we have infront of us some concepts - built into us as a confition fo having the mind - but i u have to experince the world in those ways - how do ub know the world is really like that - glasses you cant take off. what was the world of pokomon wolrd, ithout being a trainer.

doctrine of transcendental idealism

the basis of the doctrine of transcendental idealism is the distinction of appearance and thing in itself. When this distinction is introduced in the Preface, it is explained in terms of the Copernican reversal of the relation of the object to our mode of cognition: a thing considered as necessarily conforming to our mode of cognition is an appearance (transcendentally ideal), and a thing to which our cognition must conform is a thing in itself (transcendentally real). The Aesthetic reworks the distinction of appearance and thing in itself in terms of Kant's theory of sensibility. It now expresses the more definite contrast between things as apprehended through the lens of human sensibility, and things as they may be conceived apart therefrom (A26-7/B42-3). Objects given in human sensibility are appearances (transcendentally ideal), objects considered apart from it are things in themselves (transcendentally real). Now human sensibility, Kant has argued, is distinguished by spatio-temporality: all objects of our intuition are either temporal (inner objects) or spatial and temporal (outer objects). (Henceforth 'spatio- temporal' will be used for convenience to cover both cases.) All spatio-temporal objects are therefore appearances (transcendentally ideal), and since they are the only objects given to us, all objects for us are appearances (transcendentally ideal).

what is analytic statement and the criteria needed to become one?

to analyse is to decompose a concept or judgment into more basic constituents - truths of definitions The predicate is contained in the subject - analysed outside of the subject Explicative E.g., 'All bodies are extended'; 'All bachelors are unmarried' unmarried essential to world bachelors The negation is contradictory - always true prioi to experience 'A triangle has three sides' its truth can be determined by the principle of contradiction 3 criteria: Concept containment Negation is contradictory Clarification rather than amplification

transendental and transendent

transcendental - what makes knowledge possible - a proiori conditions which make them possible - prior to experience transcentdent - arrow up - those ideas god, eternal forms, transend our possibility of having any experience.