Locke, Williams, and Parfit

Suppose you think that bodily continuity is a necessary condition on personal identity. Suppose the psychological states of a prince completely replace those of a cobbler without radically changing the cobbler's body. Who should you say that resulting person is: the prince or the cobbler?

Prince. His consciousness, actions, fears, and beliefs are now relocated in a new body. If you hurt the cobbler's body the cobbler does not fear it, the prince does.

psychological connectedness vs. continuity

Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct psychological connections. Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness (roughly, at least half the number of direct connections that hold from day to day in the lives of nearly every actual person).

Conclusions of Scenarios 1 and 2

Scenario 1 seems to support the view that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity; Scenario 2 seems to support the opposing view that bodily continuity is necessary for personal identity.

quasi memory

Someone has an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if: (1) she seems to remember having that experience (i.e. has an apparent memory of it); (2) someone did have that experience; (3) her apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on that past experience.

The argument from impermanence

The Argument from Impermanence (Siderits 39-40) (1) Each of the five skandhas is impermanent. (2) If the self existed, it would be permanent. (3) Exhaustiveness claim: There is no more to any person than the five skandhas. The self does not exist. Two Versions (depending on how we interpret the words "permanent" and "impermanent")

Explain how Parfit uses the "combined spectrum" case to argue against non-reductionist theories of personal identity.

The Combined Spectrum, that you exist in every case is not plausible on either view. There isn't any physical or psychological connection between me and the Garbo replica at the far end. It doesn't seem like there could ever be any evidence for the sharp boundary between you and Garbo either. Parfit claims we should accept the reductionist view, that there is a range of cases about which there is no fact of the matter if I exist or not.

Explain how the ancient Greek concept of a soul (in general) differs from Descartes's concept of a soul.

The Greek concept of the soul is that it is the "psyche" of a person responsible for a person's functioning. Descartes view of the soul is that it is a distinct from the body and is responsible for higher thinking/ rationality.

Explain Parfit's argument, derived from Locke and Kant, for the claim that we would have no way of telling whether we had numerically the same soul (subject of experience separate from our brain, body, and mental states) from one moment to the next. Do you think that this argument is sound? Defend your answer.

The soul is often referred to as the "self" responsible for perception. However, people's experiences are caused by stimuli that are constantly changing. Each time we have a new thought or experience a new sensation that could be a different soul responsible for a different perception. In each new moment, people are not the same as they once were because they are experiencing a new consciousness. The illusion of an enduring self is caused by these streams of consciousness being closely connected to one another.

Discuss Locke's thought experiment that is supposed to show that having the same material body is not necessary for being the same person. Do you think that the thought experiment really does show this? Defend your answer.

The thought experiment that is supposed to show having the same body is not necessary for personal identity is the Prince and Cobbler case. I think it does show this because personal identity grounds just reward and punishment. The prince, even though he is using the body of the cobbler, will receive punishment for his action. The cobbler will not feel the punishment inflicted on his old body so that is not a part of him anymore.

direct vs. continued memory

There are direct memory connections between X (at t2) and Y (at t1, say, twenty years ago) if X at t2 can remember having some of the experiences that Y had at t1. There is continuity of memory between X and Y if there is an overlapping chain of direct memories between them.

Explain what a four dimensionalist about persons would say about the numerical identity of a person in a fission case

They would take the reductionist view and say that A is identical to neither B nor C and B and C are distinct. Neither B nor C is wholly present after fission. There are, and always have been, two distinct four-dimensional people here. One person extends from A's birth to B's death (call this person 'A- B'); the other person extends from A's birth to C's death (call this person 'A-C').

Three kinds of suffering

Three increasingly subtler forms of suffering: Suffering due to pain - at least two levels: (i) first-order bad feelings/hurt, (ii) our negative reaction to this first-order state (e.g., Why did this happen to me? How long will it last?)—a kind of anxiety or "dis-ease" Note that, even when we avoid pain, we are often aware that others are in pain, and we feel sympathy and sadness for them. This sadness is compounded by the fact that our comfort is typically a matter of luck or chance (e.g., not being born in a war zone). Further, if we do not experience this kind of sympathy or sadness, then, noticing this indifference is also something that may lead to dukkha since we realize that we are not as good as we might like to be and may be ashamed. Suffering due to impermanence or change - "Existential suffering" - the frustration, alienation and despair that may result when one realizes that one is mortal. How can our lives have meaning, value, and purpose in the face of this fact? It arises "from the assumption that there is a [substantial] 'me'" that must exist in order for events to have significance. • You are suffering even when you get something you want, for, if you reflect, you will often feel sad or anxious at the prospect of losing it. • Pleasure is itself fleeting and impermanent. This general fact, together with facts about habituation and diminished marginal utility, causes us to constantly seek new sources of pleasure. (cf. the "hedonic treadmill") (Cf. footnote 7, p.22 and the "experience machine") Suffering due to conditions (or pervasive conditioning) - Suffering that results from the intentions and acts of will that allegedly give rise to rebirth. He seems to treat this as a subtle kind of existential suffering. Our genes, upbringing, and social, political, and natural environment are variable. We are subject to misfortune at any moment, and we must live with knowing that and with the resulting anxiety that it causes.

Nirvana

Through following the laws of Dharma, over the course of many lives a person can reach Nirvana by truly understanding reality. Nirvana is a state of peace in which an individual is no longer tormented by the suffering of life. "Nirvāna" literally means cessation or extinction. It is not a positive state of attainment, nor is it a state of complete non-being or annihilation. Rather, it is the state of no longer being driven, consumed, and tormented by suffering.

Scenario 1

We tell A and B that after coming out of the machine, one person will be given $100,000 and the other person will be tortured. We ask them to choose, on selfish grounds, which treatment will be given to the people that emerge from the machine. Cases: (1) Person A is still Body A. (2) Person A is now Body B. (3) Person A has ceased to exist. Because, under case 2, A gets what he chose but is unhappy and B doesn't get what he chose but is happy it follows A is now in B's body and personal identity is psychological continuation.

kinds of causes

What is the right kind of cause? Narrow version: the normal cause; Wide version: any reliable cause; Widest version: any cause. (Parfit thinks that it's not important which of these versions is true. Roughly, he thinks that the question of which one is true is merely a verbal issue.)

Physical Criterion of Personal Identity (Parfit)

Y in the past is numerically identical to X today if and only if X has Y's same functioning brain and the transition from Y to X did not take a branching form.

Suppose an oak tree loses all of its leaves in the fall. According to Locke, does numerically the same mass of matter survive this change? According to Locke, does numerically the same tree survive this change?

Yes the tree has the same life doing the same functions

Scenario 2

You are told that you will be tortured tomorrow. You're afraid and dread waking up tomorrow. Are you any less afraid if you are told: (i) that tomorrow you won't remember anything you can remember now? (ii) that you will be a complete amnesiac and other operations will lead to changes in your character? (iii) the same as (ii) and illusory, false-memory beliefs will be induced in you: these are of a fictitious kind and do not fit the life of any actual person? (iv) the same as (iii) except that both the character traits and the "memory" impressions are designed to be appropriate to another actual person, B? (over) (v) the same as (iv), except that the result is produced by putting the information into you from the brain of B, by a method which leaves B the same as he was before? (vi) the same as (v), but B is not left the same, since a similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction? A chooses for B to get the torture, so A must still identify with A body supporting bodily continuity

Can there be two persons connected to a single immaterial substance (soul) over time?

You don't have the memories of someone else, so souls don't have identities themselves

According to Locke, if person P at t2 has the "same consciousness" as person Q at t1, then this implies that: (a) P remembers some experience(s) that Q had. (b) P has all of the same thoughts that Q had. (c) P has the same soul as Q. (d) P has the same body as Q.

a

Personal identity:

a person is "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places." reason and self-awareness

numerical identity of an animal

animal identity is preserved in identity of life not identity of (material) substance.

According to the early Buddhist texts that we discussed, which two of the following claims are true? (a) Persons do not exist (i.e., are neither ultimately nor conventionally real). (b) Substantial selves do not exist (i.e., are neither ultimately nor conventionally real). (c) Persons are nothing more than causally connected sequences of skandhas. (d) Substantial selves are nothing more than causally connected sequences of skandhas.

b, c

According to the A-theory of time, which two of the following claims are true? (a) Time is just like space. (b) There is an objective property of being present. (c) The word 'now' is just like the word 'here,' in that it does not pick out an observer-independent feature of the world. (d) The passage of time is an objective feature of the world. [Similar multiple choice questions could appear about the B Theory, presentism, eternalism, endurantism, and perdurantism.]

b, d

objections to Locke

being asleep, amnesia, being drunk, biting the bullet

prince and cobbler

being the same "man" (human animal) is not necessary for being the same person

Diachronic numerical identity

concerns the numerical identity of a thing over time. Why is my car the same car today as it was when it was first made? Why am I the same person today as I was yesterday or ten years ago?

The Just-Matter Theory

denies creation both objects do not survive because "matter is just matter" and can only be altered or scattered, not turned into something else gives us a generalizable rule about all of matter- it is neither created or destroyed

Nihilism

denies existence composite things are only particles arranged in a certian form only particles exist but, what if there are other universes within each particle. isn't each particle made of something else. Why cant objects such as the clay or statue be considered particles in this case. There is no smallest structure so why draw the line at atom. absolute anhilism- nothing exists at all, even particles

The Takeover Theory

denies survival there are not two objects becayse one "sort" takes over another ex. the statue sort takes over the clay sort however, our definition of sort is subjective (in and out sorts could be sorts, but logically that doesnt make sense) "anthropocentrism"

numerical identity of a person

having the same consciousness. So, being composed of the same material substance(s) is not necessary for being the same person

mind/soul dualism

immaterial substances (minds/souls) and material substances (bodies). Immaterial substances are not extended in space, while material substances are extended in space.

Three characteristics of reality: impermanence, interdependence, non-self

impermanence: interdependence: non-self (selflessness):

definition of a "person"

is a conscious thinking thing (whatever substance it is made of) which is conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned with itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Personality identity grounds our judgments of accountability, responsibility, and ownership of actions and thoughts.

non-reductionist view of Persona Identity

personal identity is a basic, unanalyzable fact. Parfit also sometimes calls non-reductionist views of personal identity "further fact" views. Views that think that personal identity consists in having the same Cartesian soul are non-reductionist, "further fact," views.

problems with the scenarios

psychological continuity can not consistently describe Scenario 2 because in step (v), A no longer exists

"Identity is suited to the idea"

substance, man, person

circular objection

the notion of experiential memory presupposes numerical personal identity. (You can only truly remember experiences that you (i.e. someone numerically identical to your current self) had.) So, in using memory to give an account of diachronic personal identity we are assuming the very notion we are trying to explain.

Williams objection to psychological continuity

the psychological spectrum and Scenario 2. There is no set point at which a change in a person's memories results in a different person. If I am Bn is me, Bn+1 is also me. Bn+m where m is any integer, is still me.

subject of experiences

the subject of experiences is a separate existing entity, distinct from a brain and a body, and a series of physical and mental events. Further, we don't seem to be directly aware of such a separate subject of experiences. And even if we were, Locke (and Kant) argues that we would not be aware that the subject of experiences is numerically the same from one time to another.

Parfit's objection to non reductionist views

there is no evidence that immaterial souls exist. And it's hard to understand how they could ever interact with the physical world if they did exist. And, even if immaterial souls did exist, it seems that we could never know if our soul is numerically the same from one time to another.

Standard view of the criteria for the identity of physical object over time (Parfit)

tracing a continuous path through space-time. This will be true only if the object's existence at any point in time is in part caused by the existence of an object of the same kind at the immediately preceding point in time. (Is "gappy" existence possible? When my watch is disassembled for repair does it go out of existence? Does it come back into existence when it is reassembled? Cf. also: the Ship of Theseus puzzle)

True or false? The Psychological Criterion implies that you are identical to the person created on Mars in the (simple, non-fission) Teletransportation case. (Assume that the "right kind" of cause is any cause.)

true. The person on mars has the same consciousness as the person from earth

biting the bullet

two disjoint consciousnesses acting in the same body (Day- Man and Night-Man) would be different people; if one consciousness could move between different bodies, then we would have one person in two bodies at different times (these bodies would be like different clothes).

Antinomy of constitution

two objects can exist at the same point in space time These four claims all seem to be true, but they can not all exist together: creation- sculptors create statues survival- pieces of clay survive being formed into states existence- objects like statues and pieces of clay exist absurdity- two material objects cant exist in the same place at the same time

Synchronic numerical identity

"What is the nature of this molecule? What makes it the molecule that it is?"

the Physical Spectrum

(1) I would still be me if the surgeon does nothing. (P0 is me.) (2) I would still be me if only a few cells of my brain and body were replaced with different cells. (P1 is me.) (3) In general, whether I continue to exist cannot depend on a change in a few of the cells in my brain and body. (For any n, if Pn is me, then Pn+1 is me.) (4) So, I would still be me even if all of the cells in my brain and body were changed (so that there is no physical continuity with P0). (P10,000 is me.)

differences between the two scenarios

(1) The first scenario is described in the third-person (in terms of 'A' and 'B'), while the second is described in the second-person (in terms of 'you'). The torture is described as happening to you. Does this beg the question in favor of the bodily continuity view? Williams claims that it doesn't. Your fear was based on the principle that your undergoing physical pain in the future is not precluded by any other psychological state you would be in at that time (except those states which themselves exclude being in pain). Physical pain is almost completely independent of character and which particular memories you (seem to) have. (2) The second scenario doesn't mention the other person until (iv), where she or he is simply the source of your new psychological states.

Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity

(1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) it has not taken a "branching" form. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2)-(4).

Three questions about personal identity

(1) What is the nature of a person? (2) What makes a person at two different times one and the same person? What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time? (3) What is in fact involved in the continued existence of each person over time? Answering (2) is part of answering (1), and the answer to (2) is only part of the answer to (3).

Anti-reflexivity principle

(4) Anti-reflexivity Principle: Nothing can operate on itself. So, in particular, nothing can perform the executive function on itself. A part of the argument from control

three options of the combined spectrum and consequences

(a) Accept the reductionist view ; there is some range of cases about which there is no fact of the matter if I exist or not. (b) Claim that there is a sharp, definite cut-off between me and Garbo. (c)Believe that I exist in every case. (c) is not plausible on either view. There isn't any physical or psychological connection between me and the Garbo replica at the far end. It doesn't seem like there could ever be any evidence for the sharp boundary in (b). Parfit claims we should accept (a) because it is more plausible than (b).

Two General Principles About Identity:

(a) Two things of the same kind cannot exist in the same place at the same time. (b) Two things cannot have the same beginning in time and space, and one thing cannot have two beginnings in time and space.

Five skandhas

(i) Rupa: anything bodily or physical; (ii) feelings of pain or pleasure; (iii) perception; (iv) volition (dispositional cognitive and affective traits); (v) consciousness

rival views on what matters

1) Personal identity is what matters. The rational and moral importance of living is grounded in personal identity. 2) Personal identity is not what matters. Rather, what matters is relation R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right kind of cause. [This is Parfit's view; it makes the "non-branching" condition in his account more plausible. This is the most radical, and probably most important (if it is true), claim that Parfit makes.]

The four noble truths

1. All of life is suffering (dukkha). [It is incredibly hard to translate the Pali term "dukkha" into English; suffering, discontent, unease, stress, anxiety, and pain are all aspects of dukkha, but none of them exhaust it.] 2. Suffering has a cause. Namely, suffering is caused by ignorance of three characteristics of reality (impermanence, interdependence, and selflessness). Ignorance of the "chain of dependent origination" (the way in which everything is interdependent, impermanent, and has no intrinsic nature or essence) leads to misguided desire (attachment) and attitudes of appropriation and aversion. 3. Suffering can be ended (by removing our ignorance and, consequently, ending our attitudes of attachment, appropriation, and aversion). 4. The way to end suffering is the eightfold "middle path."

Explain why the concept of the soul needed by a non-reductionist account of personal identity cannot be what makes an individual person qualitatively distinct from all other people. (Hint: see Siderits pp. 33-34; some of Locke's and Parfit's ideas are also relevant here.)

1. If a soul is defined as the fundamental traits that are most important to a person, then changes those traits would not result in a different person. The soul is therefore not responsible for identity. 2. You can share properties with some past version of yourself while still being a distinct person form them. The qualitative uniqueness off a person can be explained by things beyond the concept of a self. 3. Bodies make people numerically different, not souls. 4. A soul could be in two bodies without creating two distinct people. 5. Two souls could be in one body without creating a difference

Explain why Velleman thinks that the illusion of an enduring self gives rise to the illusion of the passage of time.

1. If we try to describe time as moving—to describe future events are drawing near and past events receding—in relation only to other events, we have to revert to eternalism and think of all events as being laid out on a timeline, all equally real, and use temporal relations that apply timelessly to those events. 2. Eternalism relies on the idea of perdurance however, an idea contradictory to the idea of an enduring self. Endurance is not compatible with eternalism because it asserts an object is wholly present in each moment, but in this case an object would not exist in the past or future, an idea oppositional to all moments in time being equally real. 3. If past and future "versions" of yourself are not truly existing, then the past and future are just present moments that have already or will occur. Ceasing to think of myself as an enduring subject should result in my ceasing to experience the passage of time.

young, adult, old man contradiction

1. Locke has a theory of the continuity of consciousness as the criteria for diachronic personal identity over time. 2. however, this theory seems implausible in the case of an old man who remembers being an adult but not a child, but when the old man was an adult, he was psychologically continuous with the child. 3. The theory of psychological continuity explains this objection. Strong chains of overlapping psychological connectedness can be used in replace of direct memory between the old man and the child. In this case, the old man is still the same numerically identical person as the child without remembering the experiences of the child.

Explain how Bernard Williams uses a thought experiment to suggest that bodily continuity is at least a necessary condition for diachronic personal identity. Do you agree with the conclusion Williams draws from this thought experiment? Why or why not?

1. Scenario 2 seems to support the opposing view that bodily continuity is necessary for personal identity and psychological continuity is not. 2. Objection: the information from B's brain was taken out, stored, and then transferred to the A-body-person. This seems like an acceptable way to preserve these psychological states as B's actual memories. So, after the experiment, the A-body-person will in fact be B. 3. It is a contradiction to psychological continuity that A ceases to exist in stages 1-4 in Scenario 2. It's also indeterminate when A reappears in B's body. A borderline case answer to these questions seems incompatible with the idea of a self.

Explain how Parfit uses fission cases to argue that numerical identity is not "what matters" in survival. Do you agree with Parfit? Defend your answer.

1. The "non- branching" constraint as a necessary condition for personal identity implies A is not numerically identical to B or C. 2. Instead of numerical identity mattering in survival, Parfit claims that "Relation R"— psychological continuity and/or connectedness with the right kind of cause—is what matters in survival. Thus, in fission cases, each branch has all that matters.Then, the importance of numerical identity becomes attached to psychological continuity and/or connectedness. 3. Note, though, that numerical identity, unlike psychological continuity is a one-to-one relation and cannot come in degrees.

Using the three kinds of suffering, explain how Buddhists defend the claim that all (ordinary, non- enlightened) life is suffering.

1. The three kinds of suffering are caused by pain, impermanence, and conditional things/ situations. 2. Pain is referred to as physical aliments and discomfort. Being comfortable however is often dictated by chance, so even if we are not in pain, we fear experiencing it in the future. In this way, even the absence of physical pain causes suffering. 3. Due to impermanence, even when a person fulfills a desire, they still fear losing it. In this way, impermanence makes even pleasurable things causes of suffering. Also, because of impermanence, the desires themselves are constantly changing. A person's desires can never be completely satisfied as they are endless. 4. In regards to things being conditional, even the pleasure of fortune can result in guilt or corruption of character.

Explain how the distinction between conventional truth/reality and ultimate truth/reality is arguably crucial, in the end, for defending the "argument from impermanence."

1. What is the argument from impermanence 2. there exists the objection that the body lasts a lifetime 3. In response to this, Buddhists claim that bodies are only conventionally real. They are convenient designators for the sum of their parts, cells. The cells of the human body completely replace themselves every seven years, so one body does not last an entire lifetime. 4. There also exists the claim that certain volitions last an entire life time. In response to this, Buddhists claim that a person is again the sum of their parts. The way these parts are arranged result in mental processes such as volitions, instincts, and perceptions. For example, neurons in the brain are organized uniquely in each person. This organization of neurons is what causes our mental processes, not a distinct self. For example, the urge to run away from danger seems to be an instinct that lasts our entire lives. However, it can be argued this urge comes in and out of existence only when a person is directly experiencing that desire to run from danger.

more on the physical spectrum

A proponent of the Psychological Criterion would accept (4). A proponent of the Physical Criterion would reject (4). She, too, could claim that for a range of borderline cases there is no fact of the matter about whether I exist or not. There is no real difference in such cases between the resulting person's being me, and his being someone else. If you don't want to accept this claim, then it seems you must accept that there is some critical percentage of my cells such that, if that percentage were replaced, I would cease being me. That is, you must reject (3). But it seems that you could never know what that exact percentage is! What could you ever find out that would determine what it was?

Conventional truth/reality vs. ultimate truth/reality

A statement is conventionally true if and only if it is acceptable to common sense and leads to successful practice. Statements that are conventionally true use "convenient designators," or useful ways of referring to pluralities or arrangements of things. A statement is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any conceptual fictions (i.e., things that are not ultimately real but that are picked out by "convenient designators"). Underlying every conventionally true statement is a very complex ultimately true statement that explains why the conventionally true statement is useful for practice purposes. The ultimate reality underlying what we conventionally call persons is a causal series of temporary skandhas. All things that are conventionally real are composite, and all and only the simple parts of these composites are ultimately real.

endurance

An object persists through time by being "wholly present" at every moment in time in which it exists. Objects are three dimensional, having just three spatial dimensions. In response to endurance not accounting for change, you could argue change is just the holding of different properties or endorse presentism.

perdurance

An object persists through time by having different temporal parts that exist at different moments in time. The whole object is the sum or collection of these temporal parts. Objects are four dimensional, having three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

reductionist vs. non-reductionist responses to William's objection to psychological continuity

At what point do you cease being yourself on the psychological spectrum? The reductionist view says that there is no determinate answer to this question; there is a range of cases in the middle, called borderline cases, where there is no fact of the matter about whether I exist or not.But this kind of indeterminacy seems puzzling when applied to the self; it seems to find no coherent place in our expectations and emotions about future events.

Four Dimensionalism

B Theory, Eternalism, and Perdurantism in terms of constitution: denies absurdity accepts cohabitation but asserts that the statue is a part of the clay's entire temporal existence while it doesn't violate objection #2 to cohabitation (that the same parts create two wholes) becasue the clay has more parts than the statue because it exists before and after the statue is created, so it has more points in space time doesn't violate objection #1 to cohabitation (that the staue ceases to exist) because we choose to call temporal parts of the pieces of clay "a statue" only the temporal parts of the clay are in the artist's hand- the clay and statue are indirectly in the artists's hand

Reductionist view of Personal Identity

Both the physical and psychological criteria are reductionist views of personal identity; they claim that personal identity consists in some other (physical or psychological) relations obtaining over time. Since these other relations are matters of degree, we can describe cases where changes occur so that it is indeterminate whether the person survives.

moral implications of relation R

Change in drive for self interest. Egoism, the fear of a distant death, and the regret that so much of one's only life is gone are all strengthened by the belief that personal identity is what matters. If we give up that belief, then these beliefs should be weakened.

Explain the early Buddhist argument that composite entities are not ultimately real.

Composite entities are convenient designations for arrangements of ultimate truths/ things that are ultimately real. We must except that the components of a composite entity are ultimately real because if we assume only composite entities are real, then only the universe is ultimately real. Composite entities are not distinct from its parts assembled in a certain way. It's also not identical to its parts i.e. It's parts do not have parts. The composite thing can endure a change in its parts, but the parts themselves can not change. So if composite entities do not possess the properties of its ultimately real parts, it is not ultimately real.

Presentism vs. Eternalism

Eternalism: All moments of time—past, present, and future—are equally real. All facts about time can be expressed using temporal relations like earlier than and later than that truly apply "timelessly" and do not depend on the objective passing of time. Eternalism views the passing of time as temporal relations between events. The change from future, to present, to past occurs as the property of "being present" moves across events that are statically related to one another in terms of time. Presentism: Only the present moment exists. Past and future moments do not exist, but we can make true claims about them by referring to facts about the present using the past tense or the future tense. DENIES PERDURANTISM That an event occurs entails that it will have occurred and thus is a past event relative to the present. This entailment represents the transition of an object from he present into the past. Its occurrence in the present also entails that it was previously a subject of future tense fact. This creates a transition from the future to the present. That it did happen guarantees a transition from an uncertain future to a certain past. Presentism denies that people perdure by saying that the only you that exists is your present self. Your past actions, characteristics, and experiences are all relative to your present self. Velleman argues that these apparent advantages aren't genuine. Instead, we should acknowledge that the passage of time is itself an illusion.

Butler's circularity objection

I can only remember my own experiences (from the inside), so memory presupposes personal identity and thus cannot be used in a non-circular account of personal identity. having a genuine memory of experiencing X is just having an apparent member of experiencing X and being the same person who experienced X. If this is right, then having a genuine memory of an experience presupposes personal identity, and thus can't be used in a non-circular account of personal identity.

The "branch-line" case

If a person goes through a teleportation machine, there will exist a version of themselves on both earth and mars. This raises questions as to whether it is possible to have two numerically identical people existing at the same time. Parfit's psychological and physiological Criterion of Personal identity would say no because of the non-branching clauses they each contain. Also, if the person on earth dies of some complication after the teleportation, can we consider the person on Mars now the same as the person that was once on earth before the teleportation?

Explain John Locke's argument that the numerical identity of the immaterial soul is not necessary for personal identity. Is this argument sound? Defend your answer.

If the consciousness of past actions is "a present representation of a past action," then a distinct immaterial substance could represent a past action or thought as having been its own, even when it in fact was not. Thus, one "soul" or perception of experience could exist in two people. Secondly, having the same soul as someone else does not make you that same person. The experiences/ identity of one person is irrelevant to another, so even if they did have the same soul, it would not presuppose that they have the same persona identities.

The argument from control

If the self were to exist, it would seek to change each of the five skandhas at some point. In other words it would perform executive functions on itself. However, according tot he anti-reflexivity principle, nothing can operate on itself, so nothing can perform executive function on itself. There is therefore a part of you that you can never change. However, if a person is only the five skandhas then this leads to contradiction as we assumed we can change the five skandhas. Therefore, the self does not exist. Objection 1: (The big controller argument) exhaustiveness claim is false. There must exist something additional to the skandhas that compose the self if we seek to change the Skandhas but they can not operate on themselves. Response: (Shifting coalitions and conventional reality) The shifting coalition strategy, that different skandhas can perform executive functions on one another at different times reconciles the ARA, EC, and (1). People are only conventionally real so "I" can refer to a plurality of different components of the self. Objection 2: Some things can operate on themselves i.e. proper subsets and legislature

Can there be two immaterial substances (souls) connected to the same person over time?

If you can transfer memories to another person than yes. Identity of a soul is not necessary for personal identity

Explain the problem that Parfit's "branch line" case (i.e., a fission case) poses for the view that person X is numerically identical to person Y if and only if X is psychologically continuous with Y. State how the Psychological Criterion of personal identity handles this problem.

In the branch line case, there are two of same person alive on earth and mars at the same time. X is psychologically continuous with Y if there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness, this continuity has the right kind of cause, and it has not taken a "branching" form.

According to Buddhists, ignorance of which of the three characteristics of reality is most responsible for suffering? Explain your answer.

It can seem that I am a special subject that is distinct from all other objects and that I know myself directly but can only know other objects indirectly. It can seem like I am the center of the universe. But this arguably can't be true because this attitude is available to every potential subject. Since we are conscious creatures, when we interact with things in the world, we feel pain, pleasure, and indifference. And so we desire pleasure and desire to avoid pain. When these desires are combined with ignorance (of interdependence and of non-self), they lead to attitudes of attachment, appropriation, and aversion. I become attached to some alleged self, assigning special ontological and moral importance to the referent of the word 'I'. And I then see everything else as existing in relation to this self, as either mine (my friends, my possessions, my field of interest) or not mine. In short, there is a positive feedback loop between ignorance and suffering. We think that we have a permanent, substantial self, and we think that our happiness (flourishing, well-being, or fulfillment) depends on the existence of such a self. We cannot achieve this happiness conceived in this way, and this frustration leads to further ignorant actions and more suffering. The way out, Buddhists suggest, is to give up the assumption of a permanent, substantial self, which, in their view, generates the feedback loop in the first place.

Cohabitation

It is accepting that two objects can in fact exist at the same point in spacetime. It rejects the absurdity objection on principles of endurantism. However, how can someone squash the statue and make it cease to exist, but not alter the clay when they have the same material constitution and properties? If a whole is the sum of its parts, its parts can't form two wholes

Locke would endorse which solution to the antinomy of constitution? (a) The Just Matter Theory (b) The Take Over Theory (c) Nihilism (d) Cohabitation (e) Four Dimensionalism

Just matter

Explain how a four dimensionalist can respond to the objection that they must say that (temporal parts of) multiple people exist before fission occurs.

Lewis's response is to claim that sometimes we count people, not by using identity, but by using a logically weaker relation, call it 'schmidentity.' The two people A-B and A-C are not numerically identical (even before fission), but they are schmidentical before fission because they share temporal parts at those times. That is, two (or more) people, P1 and P2, are schmidentical at time t if and only if P1 and P2 both exist at t and have exactly the same temporal parts at t. Having introduced this new relation, Lewis claims that in a fission case we should count people by schmidentity

Numerical identity of different kinds of things

Masses of matter: their numerical identity consists in being made up of the same parts Plants, animals and "men" (human animals): their numerical identity consists in "partaking of the same life," having parts organized in a way that allows for nourishment, respiration, elimination, etc. "An animal is a living organized body" being a human animal is having a body shaped, or organized in, a certain way. Their identity can not be tied to a "soul" b/c more than one person could potentially have the same soul

Suppose that someone commits a horrible crime and then develops irreversible retrograde amnesia (so that she is no longer able to remember committing the crime). Does Locke believe that it would be justifiable to hold this person accountable for her crime? Explain your answer. How can Locke explain why it might still be practically advisable to hold this person accountable for her crime?

No, he would consider the two distinct streams of consciousness in the person as two distinct people. The law does not punish a sane man for his actions when he was temporarily insane. It would be practically advisable to punish the person because it would show a society that breaking the law can not go unpunished. It would prevent people from escaping punishment by claiming lunacy or amnesia.

Consider the claim that a person S is numerically identical to person T if and only if S is able to remember experiences that T had (or vice versa). Explain two objections to this account of diachronic, numerical personal identity and suggest a modification or response to each of these objections.

One objection is that this claim implies there are two people in one body. If one consciousness could move between different bodies, then we would have one person in two bodies at different times (these bodies would be like different clothes). These different people or streams of consciousness can be referred to as day and night man. This objection seems to refute the existence of an immaterial soul because if Locke's theory follows the day and night man scenario, there is not one distinct immaterial substance that acts as a "soul." Also, a person who was blackout drunk or has amnesia is still the same person before and after being blackout or forgetting themselves although there seem to be two streams of consciousness acting in this one person. In these cases, you are only the same "man" (human animal), not the same person. Despite these objections, Locke is saying you are the same person if and only if you have the same stream of consciousness.

Buddhist conception of a substantial self

People are real, selves are not.

Using an example that highlights the similarity between temporal parts and spatial parts, explain why a perduring self cannot be used to explain the passage of time.

Perdurance is the idea that an object is the sum of its temporal parts and is never wholly located in any particular moment. The passing of time is just a change in temporal parts. Consider temporal parts of a person being like the spacial parts of a road. Some sections are smooth, some are not. Moving between the smooth and bumpy parts of the road gives illusion to the passage of time. Really you are just experiencing a different spacial part of the road. Similarly, experiencing an event that was once deemed a future event creates the illusion of the passing of time. You in the present moment before and after the "future" event occurred however.