Ph.D. Candidacy Exam 2020

The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited Warfare - Ingo Trauschweizer

1. "Empirical study of the Army 1945-1989." Institutional history focused on doctrine, strategy, operational planning, organization, and technology. 2. Cold War: various agencies entertained different definitions of 'limited' war. The US army experienced 2 eras of critical reform: Mid 1950s, when it reorganized its basic structure, and late 1970s when it gradually built a real doctrine resulting in the enduring concept of "operational art." 3. Transformation 1: Gen. Maxwell Taylor argued Army reform should support current policy and strategy, not as alternative. PR as important as tactical utility. Taylor attempts to increase Army's public appeal by conveying image of service on cutting edge of technology. Use of nukes rendered past crowding and concentration on battlefield hazardous; dispersion and mobility highlighted. "Pentomic" system, a division lighter, leaner, and smaller formation based n battle groups not combat teams invented by Taylor. Later experience showed it lacked punch and resilience. But was a poltical success. 4. Conduct of Cold War becomes global, not European affair. By 1967 forces drained away in Vietnam—an unfortunate 'limited war.' Defeat dubbed "a blessing in disguise." (233). Didn't lead to breakdown in grand strategy since it was in a peripheral theater. US Army concentrated on fighting war on grand scale. General William DuPuy reaffirms importance of initial, decisive operations, by the 1980s defensive and tactical in outlook. Under General Donn A. Starry, the US army draws on German experience and embraces operational art (Thinking in terms of winning the campaign, not just first battle, with dynamic, offensive operations based on maneuver, supported by airpower—AirLand Battle. Starry judges this as only means NATO could avoid defeat. 5. Continuous flow of ideas and debate, rather than seeing evolution of American concepts as series of isolated episodes.

Makers of Modern Strategy - Edward Meade, ed. (1943)

1. 21 essays generated at IAS Princeton seminar on foreign security/policy. 2. Published in 1943 with argument that strategic thought should be studied by all people, help readers comprehend major military theories, thinkers, and causes of war, efficient use of force 3. Deemed an "objective scholarly contribution to America's arsenal of democracy." - Paret 4. Republished in 1986 by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, Craig Gordon 5. Themes: Covers main players (Jomini, Clausewitz, Machiavelli, Bulow, Liddel Hart, Mahan) and major themes: national tradition, geography, economy, etc.

The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (1989) - Victor Davis Hanson

1. A Face of Battle-esque breakdown of Greek hoplite infantry/phalanx warfare. 2. Argues the Greeks embodied certain cultural attributes--political freedom, individuality, free-thinking liberalism, close-order valor--that gave them the edge in infantry battles. (seed for carnage and culture) 3. Argues that rather than ambush, deceit--the Greeks had a cultural agreement to settle disputes decisively on the field of battle (Arrives at this conclusion based on geographic concerns/difficulty of "laying waste to the land") 4. Athenians were down to earth, pragmatic. Delves into nitty-gritty of hoplite warfare--psychological and physical elements (preparation, engagement, fate of wounded) role of commanders, democratic elements of universal service, communal responsibilities. 5. The set piece battle led many Western thinkers to romanticize the decisive battle as something inherited from Greek tradition--modern repugnance for hit-and-run tactics also stems from this tradition 6. Ignores fact hoplite warfare was highly elitist; ignores naval component--but first book to popularize the "Western Way of War" idea

War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 - J.R Hale

1. A brilliant analysis of the relation between state, war, and society in early modern Europe. 2. Covers causes of war (thirst for glory, expectation of booty, fear of overpowerful neighbor, redress of wrongs, succor of friends; maritime trade--competitive state system), progress of military techniques and organization (emergence of gunpowder--provokes social reactions of pride, awe, generates artillery treatises; association with black magic and superstition), modes of recruitment (when numbers needed, condotta or military entrepreneuer used, not bureucracy--money, not manpower, vital), reception by Second and Third Estates (resist taxes), professional soldiers and their terms, direct and indirect influence of war on civil society, economy, and government. 3. Broadening the scope of "renaissance" military history to social, economic, cultural realms. 4. Civilianization of traditional armored caste as nobles reorient to peaceful society--Third Estate becomes fodder for army--could be escape from domestic ills and life of promise, or hard life. Society of soldiers formed through shared burdens, long campaigns, increased mobility, severed ties with civilian life. 5. Those left behind in society affected by war: Civilians vulnerable to direct attack; food shortages; malnutrition; bore expenses and billeting--fiscal cost of war strained Renaissance economies. 6. Early Modern is awkward vacuum between Chivalry and Regimental Soldiering: understanding the interplay between armies, technology, society, economy crucial to fill void. He calls it a "Military Reformation"

Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin - Timothy Snyder

1. A narrative of victimhood for peoples in Central and Eastern Europe torn apart by war. A history of the deadliest cost of totalitarian utopianism. 14 million deaths. 2. The "bloodlands," a region including Poland, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (Baltic), Ukraine, Romania, and western Russia, were the areas that Stalinist and Hitler's regimes, despite conflicting goals, interacted to increase suffering and bloodshed worse than any seen in Western history. 3. The similarities between these totalitarian regimes were notable; both enabled and reinforced destruction on noncombatants. (blamed enemy of choice, used millions of deaths to argue the necessity or desirability of policies, each had transformative Utopia). 4. "Bloodlands": where Hitler's vision of racial superiority and Lebensraum, resulting in Final Solution and other atrocities, met in conflict, and cooperation, with Stalin's vision of communist ideology that resulted in deliberate starvation, imprisonment, murder of innocents, in Gulags, etc. 5. More deaths than the Holocaust. THESE ARE WHO DIED OUTSIDE CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND THE GULAG. Stalin starved 3 million Ukranians. Stalin is not on a different moral plane than Hitler. 6. "Revisionist History of the best kind!" Confronts simplistic view of WWII history—Nazis bad, Soviets good. Individual regimes don't act alone, absent from influence from outside (Soviet support for Warsaw Uprising followed by non-support after). Don't study atrocities separately. 7. Synthesizes new primary and secondary scholarship from Central/Eastern Europe. Landmark—exhaustive/transnational account of who was murdered by Stalin and Hitler, where and how and why they were murdered. Decentralization of Western narratives.

The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 - John Brewer (1990)

1. After Glorious Revolution, peculiar British fiscal-military state emerged in Britain. Constant war with France/Spain makes British state mushroom in hands of propertied class via House of Commons--Powerful treasury, highly centralized bureaucratic financial system, deficit spending, standing parliament, heavy taxation, large navy and armies. 2. These "hidden [financial+political] sinews" allowed Britain to establish its empire and drastically altered British society. Direct taxes evolves to indirect (items) 3. Paradox: in period famous for liberty, individualism, British state expands considerably to fuel military expansion. Expansion of state marched hand in hand with "rule of law" to legitimize state growth. 4. Certain people resented growth of state, prompting backlash and revolt against taxes, imperial administration, trade controls. 5. New framework for understanding how Britain emerged as Great Power in 18th century through fiscal and military dimensions.

The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War - Brian Linn (2007)

1. America has never developed a singular "Way of War." Our doctrine is pragmatic and battle focused. Distinguishes three martial traditions with their own concepts of warfare that were developed to win wars and their results over three centuries of warfare. 2. Coins idea that peacetime thinkers, as much as wartime commanders, determined professional standards and created distinct approaches to warfighting. In war's aftermath, U.S. Army develops strategies, weapons, doctrine, and commanders it hopes will guarantee future victory. 3. Guardians: 19th century—viewed war as art/science—Halleck, Upton, Powell. Believed America should defend behind coastal forts and ocean defense (Sumter). Deterrence a common strategy in much of U.S. history. (Link to pre-emptive warfare of 2000s). National security at all costs. 4. Managers: War is an organizational problem; leaders understood logistical, policy requirements for warmaking—men like Marshall, Eisenhower. Other not-so-greats embraced paradigm. Attempt to be reformers, modernizers. Try to justify panacaea weapon systems and fit warfare into neat equations. 5. Heroes: War is merely the larger canvas of battle; character and morality everything; frontline commanders—Patton, Pershing. This one goes wrong when proponents claim civilian leadership and public stabs military in back when things go wrong like Mogadishu and Saigon. 6. Critique: Metaphor overwhelms the text. Oversimplifies motivations and drives of individuals. Selective use of history picking historical characters that fit his argument

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare - Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston

1. An historical approach to COIN from 20th cent. To present; 13 author edited vol. 2. Insurgency is the oldest form of warfare on the planet; conventional forces unprepared to fight it often make the mistake of inappropriately dealing with enemies, inflicting civilian casualties. 3. Armies almost universally underestimate the nature of the problem, which is that firepower may be necessary but never sufficient. There is an inescapable political dimension to counterinsurgency; police work and intelligence gathering play central roles. Managing campaigns becomes very complex. To gather intel on insurgents, you must focus on people. 4. Two major successful counterinsurgencies: British in Malaya and Thirty-year war in Ireland. Both involved plenty of trial and error before winning formula was found. Success in one counterinsurgency does not guarantee success in another. (i.e. British subsequent failure in Aden). Political and military institutions never remember unless carefully prompted to do so—which is why cycle of failure so often repeats itself. Well crafted manuals (FM3-24) can't prevail against institutional inertia. 5. One of the best volumes on counterinsurgency. Clearly no easy solutions to a complex problem. Success a product of determination, will, and patience. Clear lesson is that lessons learned were not applied from other conflicts. Political and military aspect must go hand in hand to ensure success—even if media portrays failure. Brute military force rarely succeeds. (Algeria, Germany/Russia, Vietnam, Indochina, Al-Aqsa Intifada).

The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions - Peter Mansoor

1. Analysis of all 89 American divisions; Thesis: U.S. Army infantry divisions were more combat effective than their equivalent in the Germany Army and became so in a far shorter time. Quality of forces, not numbers, ensured Allied victory. The ability to mobilize, train, and replace soldiers in combat environments proved important to American success. American combined arms and logistical prowess at tactical and operational level far outshone capabilities of Wehrmacht. 2. Traces training, deployment, combat record, and logistical support of U.S. divisions in ETO from 1941-1945. Highly critical of decision to raise only 89 units—Smaller divisions than WWI, fewer than many thought necessary (put burden on men to stay in combat zones longer). 3. Covers campaigns in Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, France, Bulge, and Germany. Findings: 1.) U.S. carried out in 2 yrs. What took Wehrmacht six to complete. 2.) Nat'l guard units needed complete revamping of leadership before fighting as well as regular army units in Europe, 3.) U.S. divisions developed effective training regimens integrating lessons learned from front—divisions not broken up to feed replacements to other units had excellent combat records (Kasserine, Bloodied, Doctrine refinement). 4.) Triangle model (3 regiments per divisions) provided continuity and standardization superior to German ad-hoc replacement of brigades. 5.) Individual replacement system enabled units to remain together for longer, unlike Germans who combined diminished units into new kampfgruppen. 6.) U.S. had significant materiel advantages—artillery, observers, firing authority—US. Units thus suffered minimal casualties and allowed their organizational culture to build continuity in units. Too many had to learn on fly; regular army better than national guard; personnel turbulence as they were all moved around—ANTI INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENT POLICY. 4. Debunks SLA Marshal myth that 15% of U.S. soldiers fired their weapons. M-1 didn't win war; artillery, tanks, aircraft did. Army intelligence and logistics proved crucial. 5. Disputes Trevor Dupuy (official Army historian), Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld who all argue for innate superiority of German units over American ones during the war and that mass, not quality, led to final allied victory. Prevailing historiographical strain that Allies won because of manpower/material; Wehrmacht superiority in operations. Fewer army divisions in 2 theaters left America barely able to manage. Americans had better logistics and personnel systems than Germans.

Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 - Tami Davis Biddle

1. Anglo-American rhetoric on application of air power differed from application; rarely achieved results promised. 2. Playing on ideas of Giulio Douhet, early bombing aimed to produce destruction, psychological shock, social disruption (Gotha Raids angered pop, demanded reciprocal raids). 3. Post WWI: 1932 "The Bomber Will Always Get Through": Strategic bombing possible alternative to trench warfare--justification of air force creation (Arthur Harris, UK; Billy Mitchell, US). 4. WWII: Focus moves to cities--civilian morale hard to diminish, resource reallocation--debates over target nodes (city area bombing, ball bearings, oil production, transportation) and timing (night vs. day). RARELY DELIVERED DECISIVE BATTLE, but air superiority crucially enabled decisive victories and was established through unexpected means (development of fighter escort) 5. Military ideas (air power) often spread in the absence of good data--air power continues to be touted as decisive (RMA, precision guided munitions,

Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire - Richard Frank

1. Argues against revisionists; Americans had to drop the bomb in the end and it wasn't a racial decision. (Response to Dower, War Without Mercy). 2. Don't be too moralistic and presentist when assessing end of WWII; painstaking reconstruction of decisionmaking, choice to drop a-bomb shows it was rational, relatively moral, and not racist. 3. Shows dev. of Am. strategic bomber theory, US belief only war-related targets moral--then moves to "railroad plan"--hit marshalling yards, etc., but in center of city. Experimentation with napalm, incendiaries. 4. Under LeMay, 20th Army Air Force in Pacific moves from precision bombing, but with realities of cloud cover, air defenses, jetstream, etc., moves to low night flight firebombing. A-Bomb was cheaper, easier, cleaner way to do what firebombing was already doing. 5. Were there alternatives? Shifting resources from ETO to PTO would be hard, unconditional surrender taking too long, invasion of home island would be slaughter, US already war weary, etc. Blockading and firebombing continuation would have killed/starved millions more. 6. Doesn't believe Japanese on verge of surrender; Soviet invasion of Manchuria a major impetus.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period - Murray and Millett

1. Assessment of technological, doctrinal, and operational innovation among major powers during interwar era. 2. i. Armored Warfare: Germany and Russia compelled by geography/lack of allies. France focuses on defense; US/Britain have geographic barriers to rely on. ii. Amphibious Warfare: US and Japan develop different concepts for different needs iii. Strategic Bombing: Britain, U.S. develop as operational plan iv. Close Air Support (CAS): Germany, Russia develop for armored doctrine v. Aircraft Carriers: US and Japanese (maritime, big oceans) vi. Submarine Warfare: Germany, Britain, U.S. vii. Radio to Radar: Germany, Britain, U.S. 3. What affects military innovation? Geography, change in balance of power, political frameworks, national assessments. Failure to innovate caused by misreading past (French doctrine, Kriegsmarine High Fleet, not U-Boat?), rigidity (French high command, Anglo-American belief bomber could penetrate; Stalin's military purges) 4. Why significant? No such thing as "revolutionary military change" (unless innovation fundamentally alters context of warfare--i.e. strategic bomber in interwar). 5. Technological change is not enough to assure victory; the interaction of technological and organizational adaptation within realistic strategic assessment determine if real ideas turn into military capability.

The Military Revolution Debate - Clifford Rogers, ed. (1995)

1. Best compilation of scholarly voices on subject of Military Revolution. 2. Contains Roberts, Parker, Parker, Rogers, Jeremy Black, John Lynn, Thomas Arnold, others. 3. Most accessible text.

A War to be Won - Murray and Millett

1. Best operational synthesis of World War II 2. Includes social, political histories, strategy, individual leaders, technologies 3. Begins with Revolution in Military Operations (1919-1939; German designs and triumph leading up to 1940; Italy enters; Barbarossa; Origins of Asia-Pacific War; Battle of Atlantic; Combined Bomber offensive; Destruction of Japanese Naval Power; Invasion of Europe; End in Europe, end of Asia Pacific War; etc. 4. Critique: 12 pages on Italian campaign 5. An illuminating view of why major operations are undertaken, and effectiveness with which they were conducted. Original analysis of ideas, ideological aims, technology, social consequences, and international impact of conflict.

The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000 - William H. McNeill (1982)

1. Big-picture synthesis of evolution of art and science of warfare and military methods since 1000 a.d. Military development influenced by economics, social structures, populations, technological development. 2. 2 tiered framework: Chronological and geographic. Most of book occurs in critical moment between 1600 and 1918. 3. A. Economic: Wars won in marketplace as much as battlefield (expanding traditional scope of field)--economic infrastructure and market forces (which become command forces) affect course of warfare. Nation that can maintain well-fed and well-equipped fighting force dominates enemies in long term. Warfare stimulates national awareness, industrial production, coordination, creativity, and favors a command economy (Xerxes, supply lines; China, local defenses; WWI, various strategies); B. Social impact: Armies are shaped by societal pressures and influence society in return. Public entities, focal point for national pride, represent nation. Armies spread cultural beliefs (religion, language, etc) across world. (Medieval focus on drilling, hierarchy affects broader societal worker discipline; expenses of armor/weapons restricts upper positions to nobility). Population determinism KEY--most wars caused by population pressure either direct or indirect--led to new imperialistic strategies and industrialized slaughter, birth regulation. C. Technology: Present in ALL STAGES OF WORLD HISTORY--fundamental aspect of balance of military power. Balance of power upset by development of offensive/defensive tech. Wartime industry conducive to technological innovation. 4. Critique: Oversimplifying deterministic assumptions, Eurocentric (1 chapter non-Western, China); McNeill does take the technological determinism a bit too far (modification and continued use of older technologies is often the deciding point in warfare: despite the fact that World War I featured the introduction of the tank, battles were won and lost by the use of established older technologies, such as railroads and even horse transport systems) 5. McNeil documents global repercussions of European developments; If his analysis of current events is somewhat lacking, it is because he chose to focus upon the bigger picture, cropping out some of the trees to capture as much of the forest as he can.

The Franco Prussian War - Michael Howard (1961)

1. Bismarck's invasion of France in 1870 transformed the continental Balance of Power as well as the moral and political thought of both nations. 2. Germany's victory inspired military innovation along Prussian lines; led to power politics, state growth preceding WWI. 3. France blundered into conflict through combination of ill-luck, stupidity, ignorance without allies and in a bad cause 4. Bismarck had engineered wars with Denmark (1864) and Austria (1866) prior; unified German statelets. Prussian general staff innovates railway mobilization, better artillery, discipline. French leadership chaotic, no defined central authority; lacked ammunition. 5. 1.) France invades Saarbrucken, halted, repelled, then never stops retreating. 2.) Prussians surround Metz, divide French armies--sieges Bazaine, pursues MacMahon into Belgium, annihilated in the hills of Sedan. Third Republic in Paris continues to hold on; Northern France occupied. 6. Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 leads to German unification, annexes Alsace Lorraine, humiliates France, ushers in new era of large, state-mobilized armies (no longer small professional ones), harnessing industrial strength, educated classes, practical intelligence, logistics of future, breech-loading tech. Wilhelm II initiates aggressive foreign policy.

Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich - Omer Bartov

1. Challenges myth of "clean" professional Wehrmacht separate from National Socialist ideology and simply carrying out orders. Wehrmacht became Hitler's Army in word and deed. Ideology central. 4 theses: 2. Professional Army vs. Demodernization of Eastern Front: Primitive conditions, barbarous fighting led to loss of primary groups, brutalization, made them more receptive to ideological indoctrination. Only way to cope with reality was to idealize it. 3. Heavy losses led to breakdown of primary groups (same conscription zone, officers, old argument for why so well organized)--Army cohesion due to ideology. 4. Harsh, perverted discipline and propaganda led to brutal treatment of POWs; legalized crime, license of brutality toward enemy (sanctioned atrocities)--all stemming from ideology 5. Propaganda, pseudo-religious nature of ideology (deification of Hitler) fueled a distortion of reality endemic on Eastern Front--contributed to "collective amnesia" after war (memory) 6. Great answer to question of "why soldiers fight on, despite conditions." i.e. Combat motivation--not all were fanatics, but this is how they justified atrocities and poor behavior 7. Worldview of soldiers mirrored Weltanschauung of regime (lebensraum, dehumanization, indoctrination)

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire in the First Century AD to the Third - Edward Luttwak (1976)

1. Changing Roman Strategy from Julio-Claudians onward. 2. Romans combined military strength, diplomacy, and fortifications to respond to changing threats over time. Empire sustained by logic of collective security 3. Julio-Claudian (Augustus-Nero) relied on client states to minimize absorb damage of invasion from outside and deployment of armies for internal security; From Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius, Rome turns to frontiers buttressed by roads, forts, and infrastructure. 4. Made mobile offensive warfare possible into enemy territory to discourage incursions. Insulated barbarians within from those without and promoted Romanization at margins; In 3rd century, self-contained strongholds assumed prominence while mobile forces used for rearward defense. Enemy dealt with inside imperial territory—incurring heavy cost to peasant agrarian countryside. Security maintenance reached limits of empire's resources. 5. Used "realist" perspective gained in wake of Vietnam to challenge perspectives on Grand Strategy: "For the Romans, as for ourselves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to provide security without prejudicing the vitality of its economic base and without compromising the stability of an evolving political order." (1)

Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era - James MacPherson (1988)

1. Civil War era from 1840s to 1865 resulted in drastic changes to American society. Federal government greatly expanded, slavery ended, 600,000 Americans lost their lives, and the US was reaffirmed as one, united nation. 2. Begins with U.S. midcentury through 1860—highlights importance of manifest destiny, Mexican War, Transportation Revolution, and expansion of nation to both coasts. Economic opportunity swells in North. Political history of 1850s vital in contextualizing Civil War: Dred Scott case, Bleeding Kansas, Rise of Lincoln and Republican party. 3. Coins Revolution of 1860 followed swiftly by Counterrevolutions of 1860 (South Carolina secession). Moves to early years of war: Lincoln's political dilemma after Ft. Sumter, preserving Union, Upper South had huge impact on war. Lincoln draws recruits from them. Bull Run, Wilson Creek, initial engagements highlight amateurism of armies who believed war would be short. 4. Moves into discussion of war: discusses all major battles and campaigns; political relations woven in and decision making on both sides; Army of Potomac and Sherman's armies enlistment ends, forcing backfilling with fresh recruits—quality issues plague Grant's campaign with Lee in 1864. Civil War bolstered Northern Economy and wrecked Southern economy for generation. Surrender of Lee at Appomattox ends narrative. Generous peace terms extended by Lincoln. 5. Historiographic debates of fields charted—Lost Cause mentality chief among them. Stresses unequivocally that war was fought over slavery. Major turning points include: Summer Confederate Counteroffensives that wrested initiate from Union in Tennessee in front of Richmond; Fall battles of Perryville and Antietam that halted these invasions and forestalled recognition of South by European powers; Victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Chattanooga in summer and fall of 1863 giving North strategic initiative; seizure of Atlanta in 1864 by Sherman and Sheridan's devastation of Shenandoah valley. Political power shift from South to North by end of war. Single best volume on Civil War Era.

War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness - Williamson Murray

1. Collection of essays outlining Dr. Murray's role history should play in thinking about present and future 2. History does not provide a clear path for understanding the future; rather, despite the uncertainty and ambiguity of its lessons, history provides the best laboratory we possess for understanding the future. 3. 13 essays covering a range of issues—comparative study of writings of Thucydides and Clausewitz, analysis of air effort during First Gulf War, intrinsic value of military culture; German military effectiveness between 1900 and 1945; analysis of Combined Bomber Offensive of WWII; effectiveness of Red Teaming in challenging assumptions; British intelligence during World War II; questioning the value of a set "Principles of War." 4. Firm belief we can learn from the past. Argues that military leaders since WWII have lacked true PME, relying instead on combat experience as junior and middle ranking officers. 5. Don't get seduced by theoretical, technological, template based approaches to war—nothing is a panacea to solving what, in reality, are complex human activities. 6. Technology does play a key role, but war is a social phenomenon at heart; human thinking and decisions, good and bad, have driven events, human genius is a rare commodity. 7. Today's leaders "must possess the historical and cultural background to offer sage political and strategic advice about the consequences involved in war."

Storm of Steel - Ernst Junger

1. Conveys realism of war with emotion ripped out; life in the trenches could be brutal, but was often banal and repetitive. 2. Arranged chronologically, starting in December 1914 and ending in September 1918. Was at Cambrai and Spring Offensives as enlisted rifleman. Wounded 7 times during war; given Germany's highest award. 3. Talks about transformative psychological nature of war and need for human support. Company like family; battle brings men together; can produce intense desire to rage, but often with regret after fighting ends. Discusses shift toward industrial nature of war (mechanization of battlefield) and laments British logistical and material superiority. 4. Like Sledge's memoir, provides an incredibly gritty look at the face of battle by those who lived it. Unlike Sassoon, Graves, or Remarque, war is a personal test of manhood and enlightening transformative experience. 5. Critique: Not pessimistic about war in any way. Edited down over his lifetime to not be so "pro war."

A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 - Alistair Horne (1977)

1. Covers significance of Algerian War, which caused collapse of six French governments, brought De Gaulle back to power, almost provoked French civil war. 1,000,000 Muslim Algerians died; same # of French settlers driven into exile. Revolutionary terror and state torture. 2. The French war in Algeria was perhaps the first postmodern war that predated future struggles in the Balkans, Middle East, where religion, nationalism, imperialism, terrorism assume massive degrees of significance. National Liberation Front (FLN) won the war and made Algeria independent. 3. Torture used by French to great tactical effect, especially during Battle of Algiers; when French public heard about it, turned tide of opinion and changed tone of debate about war. Civilian bombings, assassinations, collateral damage, organized torture 4. Called by experts the definitive history of Algerian War. After Invasion of Iraq, book circulated in American foreign policy circles, recommended to Bush by Kissinger.

Why the Allies Won - Richard Overy (1995)

1. Covers war in 4 zones of conflict: SEA, EASTERN FRONT, AIR, RECONQUEST OF EUROPE. Each introduced elements of success: Resource allocation, strategic judgment, moral contrasts, combat effectiveness, etc. 2. Thesis: "Material explanations, of resources, of technology, of fighting men, are not enough on their own...there is a moral dimension to warfare inseparable from any understanding of the outcome." (23) Nuancing the classic, oversimplified argument—that American, Soviet, and British forces won by employed superior means of production and technology over longer periods of time, and the Axis defeated itself. 3. SEA: Battle for Atlantic and decisive victory in Pacific put enemy on defensive. Coherent strategies. OST: Revival of Soviet manpower after Kursk in 1942 devastated German manpower; Soviet Economy, against all odds, rebounded. AIR: Strategic bombing eased pressure on Soviets, gave air superiority EURO RECONQUEST: 2 sided approach hinged on mastery of sea and air. RESOURCES: Germany lost lead in munitions, armor, air power--Allies imitated German practice of combined air/ground power. PERSONALITY: Allies maintain relations despite adversarial relationships; Germany/Japan underestimated resolve. IDEOLOGY: Hatred of Hitlerism bound Allies in moral cause--black and white. No clear consensus for Axis for war. Stalingrad causes moral crisis in Germany. 4. Why the Allies Won: Hitler always deflected blame, but his own failings cemented allied victory. Two-front wars, economic size alone can't explain German failure. Allies met and defeated Axis on battlefield; Allied endurance was thus the prime factor, among others unity, adaptability, quality technology, logistics, strategic planning, air superiority, sheer willpower, etc.

The Great War and Modern Memory - Paul Fussell (1975)

1. Cultural and literary analysis of how the trauma of WWI marked a departure from generations of European cultural tradition. 2. War dissolves bucolic memory of life before war, the rational faith underpinning it. In literature, correspondence, commemoration, irony, loss, trauma become norm. These attitudes influence a generation of politics, rhetoric, art. War disbands cult of romanticism, militarism, and naivety. 3. Blunden, Graves, Sassoon, Owen; writers of subsequent generations. Language itself loses meaning. Gas the least inhumane--but novelty spreads its notoriety. Angst and polarization 4. Critique: Religion dismissed as pigheadedness; Michael Howard said he equated legacy of WWI as "aesthetic and moral nihilism." 5. Shows not how soldier-writers catalogued the war, but how myths, rituals, literature, and theatre shaped the shocking new experience of the trenches and determined how it was understood in subsequent generations. Affected by "literary turn." Fussell broke "down the barrier between the literary study of war writing and the cultural history of war." (Jay Winter) Barrier never re-erected. Helped crystallize war & memory studies/social history.

Keep from all Thoughtful Men: How Economists Won World War II - James Lacey (2011)

1. Debates from 1940-1942 over American capacity to produce munitions. Economic history of how war economists came to influence American strategic discussions. 2. Describes bureaucratic fighting between civilian and military experts and military staff over the extent and speed to which the American economy could be reoriented to produce the munitions necessary for a serious military effort. 3. 3 economists at center: Simon Kuznets, Robert Nathan, Stacy May. These 3 men, along with other civilians in federal bureaucracy, used social-scientific methods (statistical techniques) to assess how large the US gov't could grow, how quickly it could do so, and how much war materiel they could produce. They dismantle notion of Wedemeyer's Victory Program of 1941 (allegedly matching American industrial production to Allied military needs) and Roosevelt's impossible production goals by creating concepts of National Income (GNP, GDP) and conceptualizing America's war capability. 4. The three forecasted in 1942 that June 1944 would be the moment at which the American Arsenal of Democracy could invade Europe. Help convince Marshall that 1943 would not be viable. Marshall alters plans to reflect forecasting by civilian economists. 5. Production capacity, not money, vital in wartime.

Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 - David Johnson

1. Demolishes myth that abrupt post-WWI demobilization, public indifference, congressional stinginess of 1920s-1930s enfeebled U.S. military. Internal culture at fault. Army entered war unprepared. 2. Interwar military culture—insular, anti-intellectual, committed to personal loyalty—created army that required drastic organizational overhaul in 1940-41. American troops sent into battle with faulty doctrine, inferior weapons, and scant regard for human life. 3. Part 1: Inefficient organization structure created during WWI; Congress establishes infantry, cavalry, artillery branch chiefs each exerting disparate power over doctrine, training, personnel assignments, and answerable to Army Chief of Staff. 4. Part 2: (1921-1930): Covers postwar malaise, development of infantry tank doctrine; tank becomes captive to conservative infantry, evolution of Air Force separate; branch chiefs competed for scarce resources, guarding individual turf, resisting initiative. 5. Part 3: (1931-1942) covers growth of crusade for democracy, minimal communication and interaction impede growth of armored and air forces, consolidation of active army. 6. Part 4: (1942-1945) shows how American armored doctrine met bloody test in North Africa, Air Force gains superiority, and joint-evolution of tank and aircraft. All doctrines had to adapt to rigors of war. American developed an arsenal of attrition during the war. 7. Argues sound defense does not hinge solely on money spent; soldiers just as responsible for lack of preparedness as politicians. Quality of military thought and openness of military organizations to change determines ability to innovate.

The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World - George Andreaopoulos, Michael Howard, Mark Schulman

1. Detailed case studies of limitations western societies have attempted to place upon themselves in war from Greece to Present 2. Restraint stems from Christian ethic/Renaissance thinking, transformed in 17-18th centuries into rationalistic, utilitarian ethic, limited war exists until Revolutionary France, constraints made increasingly specific by international law (Hague/Geneva) 3. Principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality underpin war 4. Jus ad Bellum (right to war) and Jus in Bello (right in war) today's metrics of Just War Theory; Pre Geneva (1949): The Way War is Fought Matters; Post-Geneva (Why Wars are Fought Matters) 5. Efforts to regulate violence are primarily negative; but restraints do exist

The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy - Adam Tooze

1. Determining element in Hitler's grand strategy was that Germany was fundamentally disadvantaged vis-à-vis the Western powers (i.e. the US) and given his racialized views of everything determined the only answer was Lebensraum in the East (appropriation of resources). 2. The "Compelling" reason for Hitler to widen war in 1941: not enough natural resources in W. Europe—grain and oil—to make prolonged conflict with UK, USA. American rearmament made this more problematic. No armaments lag in Germany in 1940-41. Hitler preparing for 2, maybe 3 wars and directed resources for use against USA and UK, necessitating quick war vs. Russia. 3. Men who engineered Germany's recovery post-Soviet crisis (Backe, Sauckel, Speer) ideologically committed to Hitler's vision. Speer's armaments miracle involved a systematic exploitation of Germany's Grossraum by every component of Nazi state apparatus, not fine retooling or mere rationalization. 4. Hitler rose when America came off Gold Standard in 1933 (no more reparations); Nazi work creation all smoke and mirrors--only concern was rearmament; Nazi intervention in economy pervasive--approaching Soviet control (rationing, forced conscription on a "normal capitalist" economy); Launching war in 1939 was an economic calculation--knew economic advantage of rearmament would slip as time went on; German financing by 1940 was a mess, had to impose "occupation costs"; forced conscription to gain coal in mines; prospect for quick victory gone by 1942 (goes for resources in Baku, E. Europe). Finds that the Anglo-American bombing for 6 months stopped Speer in his tracks; Hunger plan worked better than final solution (work camps). Impressed labor needs generated SS/Wehrmacht atrocities. 5. Understanding Nazi decisionmaking through economic lens (i.e. why they had to invade Soviet Union). Resource constraints made victory against Soviet Union impossible. Also stresses economic importance of Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign, challenges idea of economic miracle under Speer

The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy - Russell Weigley (1973)

1. Distinct American way of war emerged between the American Revolution and the Vietnam War based on two different strategies: Attrition and annihilation (destruction of enemy's armed forces/military power). Initially based on attrition due to lack of resources and power; by Civil War shifted to annihilation. Long-term conception of strategy generally focused on use of military force for offensive purposes in pursuit of total victory. 2. 1775-1815: Limited Resources—Washington pursued strategy of attrition against British, Jefferson used defensive system of militia, coastal fortifications, gunboats in strategy of 1912 that did not match U.S. policy goals. NO national coordinated strategy. 3. 1815-1890: America as Military Power—Campaigns against Seminoles, Mexican-American War, Civil War, and Indian campaigns helped hone American strategic thought. Dennis Mahan and Henry Halleck founded American strategic studies; based ideas on Jomini. Early in Civil War, strategic thought cautious and passive. Grant and Sherman great catalyst for strategy of annihilation. 4. 1890-1941: Introduction as World Power—Naval buildup based on Mahan's ideas, WWI participation, development of strategic bombing led to uneven applications. 1941-1945: America's Strategy in Global Triumph—Pacific was Mahanian triumph of sea power. American strategy followed in Grant's tradition—annihilation focused on devastating Germany's production. 5. 1945-Present: American Strategy in Perplexity—Nuclear weapons ended Clausewitz's "use of combats" as viable inclusive definition of strategy. Shifted from use of combats to use of military force as deterrence. Rise of civilian strategic thinkers. US had difficulty in developing new strategic doctrines (massive retaliation/flexible response). 6. Critique: Bifurcating strategy into two containers creates artificial limitations and eliminates contingency, context, and chance. Only focuses on large shooting wars. Claims U.S. military strategy is apolitical, national strategy nonexistent not supported by facts. b. Significance: Began debate on American Ways of War.

War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360 - Clifford Rogers

1. Edward III was not a poor strategist and was not solely motivated by chivalry 2. Edward III was a shrewd, adaptable commander who evinced both tactical and strategic acumen in his victories against France between 1337-1360. 3. England's House of Plantagenet loses territory to Scots in northern realm, conceding territory in 1328. English victories at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill reverse Edward's fortunes. Scotland was Edward III's "military apprenticeship." 4. Edward learns power of aggressive, consistent raids on enemy territory (chevauchee), and how to provoke enemy attack from handpicked, defensible ground. In France against Philip of Valois, uses longbowmen at Crecy. Other victories at Neville's Cross, Calais, and Poitiers. Great stuff on medieval economics, politics, social identity, religion, technology. 5. Impeccably researched (diss.). Strategy based on raid, siege, and pitched battle—contrary to decades of scholarship that said otherwise—effectively brought France to its knees. Hundred Years War the "midwife of the European Nation State" (1, 4)

The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During World War I - Timothy Lupfer (1981)

1. Examination of wartime evolution of German Tactical Doctrine during WWI. 2. There were two major doctrinal developments during the war—German defense in depth and stormtrooper tactics used in 1918 offensive. Reveals factors that made such innovation possible. 3. Defense-in-depth developed in June 1915 as German High Command began promoting siting of trenches on reverse slopes to avoid observation, as well as use of second line of defense. After Somme and replacement of von Falkenhayn by Ludendorff, the latter actively toured frontlines and solicited advice from combat commanders. Result was Principles of Command in the Defense Battle in Position Warfare (Dec. 1, 1916), advocating weak outpost zone followed by Main Line of Resistance (MLR). Deep 2+ km battle zone behind MLR would serve as attack attrition zone before immediate counterattack would repulse. 4. Second chapter covers "Offensive Tactics of 1918." Notes influence of 1915 pamphlet by French Captain captured by Germans—advocated sudden deep attacks, bypassing enemy strongpoints for later reduction. Enshrined in The Attack in Position Warfare (Published January 1, 1918). Units would attack until exhausted, keeping enemy off balance, working in close conjunction with artillery organized. Combination is described by Lupfer as "infiltration tactics." 5. German doctrinal success derived from corporate (collective) nature of doctrinal developments, use of frontline experience, attention given to practical implementation (especially training near frontlines), flexibility of mind that allowed commanders to adjust doctrine to their specific circumstances. 6. Germans develop major doctrinal innovations of WWI and WWII--The French adopt German WWI innovations and apply them to WWII; the Germans move on

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II - Mark A. Stoler

1. Examines government apparatus through which Roosevelt conducted diplomacy, formulated strategy, and directed American forces as member of Grand Alliance. 2. The JCS expanded its role in the development of national policy as the war drew on. It came to exercise "pivotal and unprecedented" influence in advising Roosevelt (ix). Roosevelt and the JCS proved effective at managing adversarial domestic and foreign relationships, helping the U.S. achieve total victory over the Axis. 3. US poor civ-mil relations pre-Pearl. Interwar era, politicians viewed war as abberation, not norm. No apparatus for politico-military cooperation to coordinate foreign policy on global scale. Strategic planners get sucked into presidential orbit. 4. Colored Plans, Plan Dog, shifts in thinking. Interservice, Anglo-American accord reached by 1941--coordination with Imperial General Staff, Combined Chiefs of Staff with JCS coordinated Allied relations. JCS helps FDR process conflicting strategic advice--disagreements fueled strategic creativity. Ultimate executive power rests with FDR (see N. Africa). 5. 2 important lessons: Coalitions must learn to overcome disagreement by sacrificing national interests for the interest of the whole. The adversarial element is never eliminated; coalitions simply must learn to manage it. Second, Global conflicts can no longer be fought without close domestic civil-military coordination. "A democracy could not indulge in a Seven Years' War." (George C. Marshall, 270). See Cohen, Supreme Command (ask right questions/civ. mil)

The Art of War - Niccolo Machiavelli (1521)

1. Florentine diplomat, philosopher, writer, poet during renaissance. Best known for The Prince. (1469-1527). 2. Explaining and predicting ongoing changes in European warfare as consequence of larger social, economic, and technological evolution. 3. Socratic dialogue between mercenary Lord Fabrizio Colonna and Florentine Nobles; straightforward advice on organizing and conducting military operations at the time. 4. Colonna urges nobles to raise militia based on Roman model to offset costs of condottieri. Tracks development of weapons and tactics of the time when gunpowder was starting to influence Western warfare. Since army allegiance was contested at the time, having locals wage wars and protect their own territory gave them a stake in the battle. Disciplining them would be the role of the state/ruler. Argues artillery should be used to disarm enemy. 5. Significance: Machiavelli understood the importance of gunpowder technology, but did not foresee the cost of implementing it on a mass scale; Reinforces early importance of growing civil-military relationship; foreshadows nation-states and bureaucracies raising armies from civilian population. Key text in early military revolution; sets intellectual foundations for further innovations in civil-military affairs.

Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times - Peter Paret (1976)

1. Focuses on the historical and psychological genesis for Clausewitz's theories. 2. Early Years: tied to Prussian state since birth, joined army in early French Revolutionary Wars, gave him impulse to "comprehend his military and political environment, its pasts, the changes that were occurring, and its contrasts." (35) 3. Details myriad social and military experiences—studying under Scharnhorst, historical inquiry into mechanics of state power, dynamics of politics, and war shaped future theories. Discusses fighting role during Prussian defeat of 1806, and internment in France, and time in Russian service. 4. Theoretical and philosophical influences—developed analytical system based on influences of German idealism, Fichte, Machiavelli, and Pestalozzi. Between 1812-1815, Clausewitz's third exposure to war becomes most significant—grants him observation to major campaigns and now "possessed both intellectual maturity and the technical and political information essential for an understanding of the manifold characteristics of modern war." (222) 5. FUNDAMENTAL TENETS: Tripartite definition of war, friction. Many of his ideas, such as dual nature of war, not fully incorporated into final version of On War. Used practical experiences to adjust and refine his theories. 6. The best biography on Clausewitz; shows substance of his theories rooted in human experience. New framework (Clausewitz as man of action and theory) to examine his writings in the context of his time.

Civilians in the Path of War - Mark Grimsley and Clifford Rogers (2002)

1. From Ancient Greece, to French Revolution, to 20th century, militaries forced to factor civilian casualties into war plans. Collateral damage has historical precedent. "This book is about occasions in which soldiers and governments have deliberately attacked the helpless." 2. 9 essays, 1993 conference. Covers Spartan and Athenian civilian losses; Civilians in Hundred Years War (Chevauchee); Devastation of the Palatinate (Civilian threats furthered objective of Louis XIV, 1688), US military conduct toward native Americans and White southerners; German military from Ludendorff to Hitler; French Revolutionary treatment outside France (liberty/equality didn't matter much); American strategic bombing, etc. 3. 4 major patterns: 1.) Sparing of civilians historically has been "instrumental (policy-serving) rather than absolute." 2.) If political leaders have instrumentally spared lives, decisions to attack them have also been instrumental. 3.) Regimes and people at war have used attacks on civilians as "negotiations" to gain advantage over enemies. 4.) Ideological/cultural conditions profoundly shaped treatment of civilians in war. 4. The sparing of civilians in war has not been an absolute and transcendent idea but relative, contingent, and contextual. What is often justified as "military necessity" frequently becomes immoral in practice. 5. More concerned with why attacks on civilians occurred rather than moral/ethical rationale.

For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States - Alan Millett and Peter Maslowski (1984)

1. General history of American military policy from 1607 until 2012. 2. Analyzes the development of American military policy, examining the characteristics and behavior of armed forces in execution of policy, exploring the impact of military policy on American international relations and domestic development. 3. Six general trends over course of American history: 1.) Military policies and programs rarely shaped by rational military considerations; political system and societal values impose constraints on defense prep. 2.) Despite belief American defense policy generally unprepared for war, most policy makers have done well in preserving national security—most often they devote resources to internal development rather than external army. 3.) National commitment to civilian control of military policy has always required careful attention to civil-military relations. 4.) Armed forces have become progressively more nationalized and professionalized. 5.) American defense policy built on pluralistic military institutions (i.e. mixed force of professional and citizen soldiers). 6.) Starting in mid 19th century, industrialization shaped way nation has fought. Technology often used to overcome limitations in manpower and logistics. 4. Covers armed forces in war and peace (use of army during strikes and racial reconstruction in "complex insurgency" of Reconstruction during 1870s and 1880s). Great way of envisioning policy, strategy, and domestic influences on each.

"Lessons of War" - Alan Millett and Williamson Murray (1989)

1. How best to gauge the lessons of war? How to gauge net assessment of military effectiveness? 2. Literary-historical approach—Thucydides, Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, Lenin, Mao, BLHart, etc. Give strategic guidance, but rarely applicable universally. There is the "great commanders" school"—Julius Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon—producers of "principles of war" and "military doctrine" weighed toward professional officers (few who deal with strategy at conventional level). By 20th century, these two traditions produced "hourglass of military thought"—heavy on either end of policy-strategy-tactics and thin in middle where operations meet strategy. 3. Utility erodes when applied to harder circumstances. Using history carries its own limitations, so "how does the analyst put historical experience to work for policy-makers without doing violent damage to the facts and interpretations of past experience?" (84) 4. Four-tier approach: Politics (pol. leaders often have more influence on strategy than mil. leaders); Strategy (op. effectiveness not same as strategic judgment, ask Germany in Russia); Operations and Tactics (Oftentimes commanders prepare for last war--Britain failed to do that--by end of 1918, had copied defense in depth, gained air, sea, tank superiority--none of this in 1939, Germany learned from AARs, tireless preparation for 1940); and Doctrine (what is needed to inculcate senior officers with operational and tactical approaches) 5. "Military Effectiveness suggests that political-strategic wisdom is far more important than tactical and operational performance on the battlefield." Argues for PME and sound political/strategic judgment to shape operational/tactical imperatives.

Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 - Paul Kennedy (1987)

1. How empires end. Great powers, to remain great, had to balance wealth/economic base with military power and strategic commitments. Greatness of a nation hinges on military strength; military strength hinges on economic power--Engels, "nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely the army and navy." 2. Constant tension between investment, defense, consumption. Failure to balance this triptych led to overextension and an economy vulnerable to predators. Thesis: Keep economy strong, balance expenditures between social and military; don't bite off more than you can chew. Statistics, data, detailed, repetitious. 3. Covers nineteenth-century China, Habsburg Spain, Financial Revolution, Industrial Era and British Empire, Crisis of "Middle Powers" from 1885-1914, Coming of Bipolar World, stagnating over-militarized power like Soviet Union. Concept of "latent power"--growth rate--or production, spending not necessarily in perfect tandem with military might, each overtaking and receding from the other depending on the strategic environment. 4. Declension arguments like this often have poor record of prediction; defense spending not necessarily unproductive drain on economy; American empire not analogous to land-hungry, exploitative empires of the past; Broad brush strokes a work of determinism, loses sight of contingency, choice, chance. 5. Restating an ancient idea (since Renaissance and Machiavelli); One of the first texts to opine that the Pax Americana could end; U.S. just another 'great power' subject to same dilemmas as Ottomans, Spanish, Napoleonic, Victorian empires. A welcome antidote to military histories portraying handiwork of generals, politicians, theocrats and denigrate the role of technology and economics. Power-shift from east to west over 500 years insightful--with return to Chinese cradle.

Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America - Fred Anderson

1. International History of Seven Years' War 2. Captures contingency, chaos, and choice inherent in war (resist tyranny of hindsight) 3. Charts dynastic squabbles, multilateral relations, strategic negotiations, but also shows personal, ground-level combat 4. Treats natives as agents 5. Reinforces globality of Seven Years' War; overturns myths that Revolutionary Change was foreordained in North America

The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (1890) - Alfred Thayer Mahan

1. Lecturer in Naval History and President of U.S. Naval War College 2. Revolutionary analysis of importance of naval power as factor in rise of British Empire. 3. Main Thesis: Navies decide wars, even between land powers, and many powerful and influential people listened; Book Thesis: British sea control, combined with decline in naval strength of Euro rivals, paved way for G.B.'s emergence as world's dominant military, political, economic power. Belief this lesson should be applied to U.S. foreign policy—expanding U.S. markets overseas. 4. Trade is a source of national power; strong blue-water navy vital to maintaining stable trade. Protect ports and sea lines of communication, thus extend state power. You need a navy, not coastal defenses. Ultimate expression of naval power is in winning the decisive battle at sea. String of worldwide naval bases and coaling stations would enable a navy to patrol seas. Argued for Central American canal and supported annexation of Hawaii. 5. Other Major Themes: i. Naval power is a deciding factor for all countries except the most land locked. ii. The proper goal of military operations is the reduction of organized enemy forces in the field. (Destroy enemy force, not taking objectives). iii. The pursuit of interrupting merchant shipping is a mistaken strategy, as British trade increased even during wars where French captured large numbers of British merchants 6. Critique: Did not foresee 3D air, sea, underwater naval components of warfare. 7. In the pantheon of influential works on strategy, it is probably fourth—On War, Art of War, The Prince, and this. At time of economic/social unrest in U.S. (economic depression 1893-94), work resonated with intellectuals and politicians concerned with American seizing economic opportunity abroad. Real significance is as a propaganda piece, not as a history. Complemented Turner's Frontier Thesis. Cult of decisive battle dominated naval thinking through World War I. (Finds strategic truths that always apply, in his opinion.)

Defeat into Victory - Field Marshal William Slim

1. Led 14th Forgotten Army in Burma Campaign. This is his blow-by-blow account of the retaking of Burma by Allied forces during WWII. 2. Take the art of command seriously--a good leader can mean the difference between defeat and victory. 3. Following 1942, British routed from Rangoon and Burma, forced into India. Army in shambles, men barely alive. Monsoon season hits. Japanese more adept to jungle warfare, British road-bound. Slim rebuilds his Army--organization, tactics, techniques--trains them for jungle warfare. 4. They learn swift navigation, patrols, no longer fear isolation, light travel, keep engineering formations close to front, build roads directly behind battle lines. Convert divisions into 2 mechanized and 1 air transportable brigade (air mobility pioneering). They carve out airstrips and use glider-borne troops to seize airfields. Timing, deception, tempo of warfare changes. 5. The essence of leadership in the field: Independent division/brigade commanders, troops always know big picture, feel involved. 6. Echoes of Burma in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq. Resourcefulness, knowledge of logistics and supply, proper training. With a ragtag army and limited supplies allotted to his forces, what he accomplished was amazing. Using innovative ways to bring troops and supplies to the front, reshaping an army trained for warfare in Europe or North Africa to fight in dense jungles, he used mechanized, air-landing, Gurkhas, marines, long-range patrols, tanks, and militias behind the lines. Had parachutes constructed out of jute fibers when silk parachutes ran out. Built their own personal navy and landing ships out of local resources.

With the Old Breed - E.B. Sledge

1. Marine at Peleliu and Okinawa, earned Ph.D. with G.I. Bill and taught Biology. 2. Touches on themes of isolation, character of war in Pacific, alienation, dehumanization in wartime, reasons for enlistment and service (Combat motivation). 3. Enlistment, training, no coverage of immediate postwar. Recurrent questioning of purpose; nihilism regarding purpose of combat. Shows war as "dirty business." Atrocities committed by both sides. Racial component of Pacific War, but varied by individual. Manliness tested, camaraderie key. Primary unit cohesion causes men to return to battle. 4. One of the best soldier-memoirs of WWII. Compare to Ernst Junger, Storm of Steel.

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime - Eliot Cohen

1. Military matters shouldn't be left solely to soldiers and officers. Civilians shouldn't necessarily stay away. (Soldiers aren't surgeons, civilians their patients). 2. Great Democratic war leaders--4 examples--reveal power of generating "unequal dialogue"--an avenue for strategic proposals to be openly debated, assumptions bared, and paths forward charted—forcefully and continuously. 3. Abe Lincoln: Oversight, grand strategy for Union, adapted to include new contingencies (Emancipation), interest in technology; Clemenceau: WWI, managed competing egos, interests of French General Staff (Foch - Petain), weekly visits to front, rebuilt public support after Nivelle Offensives, removed Foch (bellicose) from Versailles deliberations; Churchill: Asked right questions, used spoken/written word to mobilize people, interest in tech; questions his staff; Ben Gurion: Creates Israel out of practically nothing during 1948 Arab-Israeli war, realistic military objectives, molds Haganah into cohesive unit, seminars held to assess leadership capabilities, restrained Isreali attacks. 4. The alternatives, Cohen argues—for military leaders to simply execute the strategy set by civilian policy makers (such as in the Vietnam War) or for policy makers to largely turn over the development of strategy to military commanders (such as in the 1991 Gulf War)—are far worse. 5. Civilian leaders must be actively engaged in councils of war, poke, prod, must learn to ask right questions from their military leaders

The Culture of Military Organizations - Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray (2019)

1. Military organizational culture, not just leadership, doctrine, and equipment, make a fighting force effective. 2. Military organizational culture gives mission, identity, core competencies. Emerges over extended period of time, operates internally. Culture defined as "the assumptions, ideas, norms, and beliefs, expressed or reflected in symbols, rituals, myths, and practices, that shape how an organization functions and adapts to external stimuli and that give meaning to its members." 3. Examples: a.) Victorian-era British Army (book learning frowned upon, gentlemanly ideals of officer corps, pre-WWI tactical modernization stillborn, tribal conformity in regimental life). b.) Royal Navy's evolution from 1900-1945 (can't balance near-term training against higher order education in period of rapid technological change; rigid strategic thinking; Jutland serves as basis for reforms, reinvigorated ethos, etc.) c.) Millett covers Marines (intense internal operating system; ongoing redefinition after leaving behind amphibious warfare to adopt counterinsurgency) d.) U.S. Air Force (developed unshakable belief in high-altitude, daylight, and precision bombing as decisive form of warfare) e.) Non-Western examples—Indian Army, IDF (offensive nature, initiative, improvisation, not hierarchical and directive command). 4. Cultures influence a military's effectiveness over time. "Organizational culture is a resilient and even sluggish creature, which operates on cumulative knowledge, organically embedded into a coherent, powerful, highly restrictive mind-set." (Gil-li Vardi). 5. An organizational culture that is inclined to test its assumptions, assess external environment for routine changes, and experimenting with novel solutions is best suited for long-term success.

The Art of War - Sun Tzu (5th Century BCE)

1. Most influential strategy text in East Asian warfare. 2. Asked to train the palace's dainty ladies in warfare, Sun Tzu made the Kingdom of Wu's armies powerful enough to challenge their rivals in the state of Chu. 3. 13 chapters: Laying Plans (take terrain, leadership, weapons, etc. into account), Waging War (Win decisive engagements quickly), Attack by Stratagem, Tactical dispositions (defend, advance in safely), Creativity, Timing, Exploit enemy weakness, avoid direct contact unless decisive, evaluate enemy intentions. 4. Has come to influence more than strategic thinking on the battlefield—infiltrated businesses and other lifestyles in the modern world. 5. Translated into French in 1772, annotated in English in early 1900s. Used by Chinese revolutionary leaders Mao and Vietnamese Vo Nguyen Giap. You must know both yourself and your enemy.

The Face of Battle - John Keegan (1976)

1. Moving beyond the battle-piece and reading against the grain to understand combat. 2. The brutal reality of war for soldiers at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme was rarely captured in traditional histories. A Rankean attempt to transmit "battle 'as it actually was." (34) 3. Feel the weight of metal armor, cumbersome weapons ported by soldiers slogging through muddy medieval battlefields, understand the consuming fear of a creeping artillery barrage, grasp the complexity of decision making on a chaotic battlefield, probe the moral quandaries and consequences of combat. Covers their behavior, emotions, mentalities, reactions, and complicates the idea of combat motivation. 4. Recapitulates entire battlespace of the soldier, the "very small scale situation which will...be fought by its own rules—alas, often by its own ethics." (47 5. Encourages readers to understand mechanics of battle—longbows, defensive stakes, arrow clouds, plate armor, science of medieval wounds, etc. At Waterloo the scale of battle, bayonet charges, artillery barrages, skirmishes, geography, at the Somme exhaustion, noise, environment, morale-sapping experience of a failed charge, etc. 6. Includes a valuable introductory section where he offers advice for historians looking to read against the grain—coaxing a document to speak. 7. Overturns a generation of Win-Lose, Great-Mind, and Great-Battle military history scholarship. Shows that soldiers are not homogeneous automatons. Came at a time Mil. Hist was trying to establish itself in academia (1970s), not just a 'hobby' pursued by amateurs and pop. Writers. One of the earliest attempts to provide historiographical rigor. sociocultural studies of 1990s, especially on combat motivation, trace their lineage back to this groundbreaking book.

Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany - Dennis Showalter

1. Notably called for a "return to drums-and-trumpets" in the wake of the rise of the New Military History. 2. Analysis of evolution of war and tactics by the Prussian army in the 2nd half of the 19th century. 3. German military effectiveness came from reasoned innovation, implementation of new technologies (railroad transportation, needle gun, rifled steel cannons), and the close integration of these in training, tactics, and strategy. 4. Pt. 1) Railroads were not adopted immediately, but once adopted, were integrated into Prussian strategic thought—unlike Austria and France. Early on, practical costs, not narrow-mindedness, ruled out railroad use. Moltke had great influence over early theory and planning. German military observed foreign armies, successfully fought Denmark and Austria. End of gradual mass mobilizations. Pt. 2) Adoption of Needle Gun proved revolutionary against Austrians with smoothbores. But only in tandem with superior strategy, training, maneuvering, and tactics made all difference against France. Pt. 3) Adopting steel rifled cannons by itself did not ensure military effectiveness. Training on proper use, on role in combat, and integration did. Same cannons against Austria did not prove crucial, but they did against France. 5. Worked tried to correct excessive drive of "new military history" away from practical military history. Counters claims that 19th and early 20th century militaries as conservative. Corrects German military historiography that focused on certain, negative aspects of German history. Shows well how Prussian military responded to Industrial Revolution.

War and the Liberal Conscience - Michael Howard (1978)

1. Political and social thinkers of West (Europe/America) have since 1500s grappled with necessity/waste of war. Paradox has forced updated rationales 2. "Liberal Conscience" = people who believe the world is other than it should be (agency, democracy, international cooperation, international relations); and conscience as an inner compulsion to act on this belief. 3. Charts 1600-2000 intellectual opposition to war, from Thomas Moore to Communism. Moves from humanists (More, Erasmus, war = immoral or avoided) to views of war as retinue of Kings (only stopped by democracy), to enlightenment/revolutionary wars (nationalism sparks idea of war as necessary to achieve self-determination); war viewed as stabilizing force in wars of unification (Civil War, Franco-Prussian); Pre WWI hope for permanent peace; post-wwI hope in same, plus greater international ties, collective security; Liberal militarism sees apex in Britain as WWII viewed as just war against Fascism; forcible imposition of Democracy after WWII seen as normal; Vietnam sees shift back to realpolitik and Kissinger's attempt to preserve stability through Balance of Power 4. World Wars were instrumental in creating current liberal internationalist world order--though democracies are theorized to not war with one another, Howard concludes nevertheless that they are still bellicose--Liberal states thus go to war in order that they shouldn't go to war (similar to concepts of imperialism and fascism) 5. Helped expand military history from parochial battle pieces to wider discussions on sociological significance of war. Concludes that efforts of good men to abolish war only makes it more terrible holds true in the face of historical analysis.

Mussolini Unleashed - Macgregor Knox

1. Political/Military analysis of Mussolini's strategy from 1939 to 1941 2. Don't look down on Benito! Il Duce's desire to conquer living space in the Mediterranean and achieve military independence from Germany constituted a genuine military strategy, even though it led to irrational campaigns in the Balkans that relegated Italy to a junior partner status. 3. Context: Italian Fascist state dualist, not totalitarian—shared power with Catholic church. War part of plan from beginning; adventurist foreign policy aimed at creating legitimacy. Poor funding for military dogs plans from beginning. 4. The German Blitzkrieg "unleashes" Mussolini, who took his chance aligning with the Axis. Mussolini sought final blow to Egypt and invasion of Yugoslavia (Romania), then Greece to "restore balance" and gain internal prestige. At Taranto, Italian navy defeated at sea. Hitler forced to intervene in Greece to rescue Italian ally; sends forces to USSR. Further failures in N. Africa forces Germany to increase military support. 5. Recasts Mussolini with agency, not just as Hitler's pawn. Mussolini sought Italian nationalist utopia, not biological revolution. Argues against other historians who portray Mussolini's dictatorship as weak or "humane" and lacking strategy. Agrees with Giorgio Rochat that failures of high-level character in leadership causes military defeats and prolongs war.

An Army at Dawn - Rick Atkinson

1. Popular history of the North African Campaign 2. Book 1 of 3 in the Liberation Trilogy 3. Impeccably researched, Pulitzer prize winner 4. In order to understand the ETO, you must see the political, strategic, military role of North Africa and how that campaign solidified the Anglo-American alliance 5. Nice blend of strategy, operations, and tactics

Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II - Conrad Crane (1993)

1. Postrevisionist study of American air power strategy during WWII. 2. Contrary to Japanese, British, German practice, American airmen in World War II remained committed to precision bombing doctrine, not enemy civilian centers. 3. Responds to recent assertions by other historians that due to military necessity, vague policies, or the desire to maximise technology, Army Air Forces bombers in World War II exercised little restraint on attacks against civilians (guilty!). 4. Even though bombing policy was influenced more by the attitudes of airmen in operations rooms and in combat than by directives from leaders in Washington, Crane contends that air commanders in the field did consistently conform to the guidelines of precision doctrine. 5. Despite deviations from precision bombing doctrine in the Pacific (Curtis LeMay) that led to incendiary raids on Japanese cities, Crane contends that the pursuit of accurate bombing remained a primary goal throughout World War II and remains one today. 6. Beginning with the lessons gleaned from World War I, he traces the evolution of American doctrine and technology for conventional bombing through the wars in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. In limited wars since, air campaigns have accepted risk against civilians. In the process, he demonstrates how public opinion, combat conditions, technological innovation, and the search for "Victory through Airpower" have affected bombing operations and military policy.

The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (1988) - Geoffrey Parker

1. Primary challenge to Michael Roberts' 1966 thesis. Seeks to explain how 35% of world's surface controlled by Western global empires in 1800 preceding 84% by 1914. 2. Key to Westerners' success in creating first global empires between 1500 and 1750 depended on improvements in ability to wage war known as "the military revolution." 3. Three key innovations in 16th century set stage for military revolution in Europe: Gunpowder weapons, the trace italienne, and the capital ship (cannon galleons). Argues that strategic defensive (castles) succumbed to powerful siege offensives by 16th century. Trace italienne helped shift balance back toward defensive; armies increased precipitously. Cemented monarch's power. Discusses logistical problems caused by these developments—need for infrastructure and capital, political objectives aligned with military strategies. "The more land warfare became a stalemate, the more leading states sought a decision through naval power." (80) Arms race continued at sea—European nations built flotillas that traversed the world. East Asia possessed no reply. Volume concludes with examination of how these developments metastasized into industrial age, where Westerners could impose will on others across oceans. 4. The changing nature of states themselves due to this military innovation gives this thesis its broad appeal. Associates rise in military power with rise of absolutism. 5. Defends his thesis in afterword. Applauds subsequent works and addresses critiques. Agrees with Clifford Rogers' idea of "punctuated equilibrium." Incremental change with spurts of rapid development.

The Army and Vietnam - Andrew Krepinevich (1986)

1. Probing analysis and devastating critique of U.S. military policy in Vietnam 14 yrs. on 2. The war in Vietnam was lost before it was fought because of the widespread belief among senior military army officers that if they had enough soldiers and weapons, they could win. "If you've got 'em by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow." Fundamentally untrue. Can't develop local relationships of trust inside helicopter, tank, or drone. Likewise, can't pursue strategy of attrition without support at home or continued U.S. presence on ground. 3. Army's assumption it could apply to Indochina operational methods used in European theaters of WWII ill-suited to new challenge posed by Vietnamese Communist forces. 4. Insurgency, counterinsurgency required light infantry formations, firepower restraint, cultural understanding, and the resolution to political and social problems within the nation. Top military commanders refused to acknowledge this. 5. Documents rift between civil-military leaders over nature of war; great tension within U.S. army itself. Interviews and declassified material. Those in combat understood how different the conflict was. Reports, urgings ignored by generals. Laments excessive use of firepower and careerism in connection with body count as components of attrition strategy. 6. An army that spends its resources and manpower in profligate way without results will be pressed to secure long-term strategic victory. Strong applicability to Afghanistan and Iraq. Nowadays, firepower and aircraft useless where population is disaffected or indifferent and local gov't is corrupt and incompetent. One of the earliest books to classify the Vietnam war as an insurgency.

On War - Carl von Clausewitz (1835)

1. Quintessential treatise on psychological and political aspects of war, including causes ("War is a continuation of policy by other means") and conduct ("the fog of war") 2. Differentiates war in theory (principles, no limits, maximum use of force, total and zero-sum, fight until enemy is completely destroyed, apolitical and irrational), vs. war in reality (political settlements, interruptions, minimum amount of resources/force, friction, fog, role of genius, never accidental, politically defined and rational); theory is not doctrine or manual for action 3. Context: Napoleonic Wars--war is not purely about power, military capabilities, tactics (Jomini), but shaped by politics, psychology, and unpredictability 4. Backward looking approach (learning why previous wars happened, not prescriptions for future wars). 5. Defines War: "Act of force to compel enemy to do our will"--coercion (wrestling) 6. Trinity of War: Getting from theory to reality--interplay between between people (emotion and passion, human nature), military (chance, uncertainty, friction, luck), government (rational, policy, war as tool), each shaping the other--war is like a chameleon 7. Strategy vs tactics. Strategist must consider moral aspects of war; study historical battle in depth not breadth to determine true causes. Role of intelligence (uncertainty); Genius (mental aptitude); strategic planning (mathematical, statistical, geographical, moral, physical)

A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence - John Shy (ed), 1976

1. Reassessment of the military/socio-cultural/political aspects of American Revolution. 2. War changes society, strategy, and military policy; military service reflects and affects social structure; events/patterns of armed struggle help shape ways people think about themselves and others. Argues that violent military struggle for American Independence was crucially important in shaping post-war America. 3. i. Was American experience a real Revolution? Protracted war, reliant on popular and voluntary military service, is itself a kind of revolution. 18th c. American politics one of consent. ii. What is most important element of post-Revolutionary success? Not affluence, but the character of war itself and perceptions of war. Fighting from weakness early on and early defeats made Americans conscious of own political peril. Channeled political energies into struggle against anarchy. Broad public opinion fueled initial rebellion iii. What was the nature of the American Revolution: A "conservative" revolution, with surprising stability of institutions. Reliance on central army, not purely guerrillas, gave military external support and internal unity. Illusion of unified purpose, military strength, and political respectability. iv. Revolutionary militia looked like colonial militia—less draft board and reserve training unit, more police force and instrument of political surveillance. The armed organization became infrastructure of revolutionary government—insulated and restrained from extreme violence. 4. Legacy of American revolution: high casualties, social levelling, mobility, massive redistribution of wealth (land grants). American society gains military attitudes (1) deep respect for citizen soldier tied to definition of American nationhood, (2) concept of military security expressed in absolute terms (3) extraordinary optimism about what could be achieved with exertion of American military force. 5. Ties social, political, cultural, economic factors (new military history) together. Offers insight into both "revolutionary wars," and American military character.

The History of the Peloponnesian War, 431-404 - Thucydides

1. Son of Olorus, Athenian contemporary who was general in 424 and condemned to exile for rest of his days. Travelled Greek world and observed conflict firsthand, talked to participants on both sides. 2. Athens comes close to winning long, protracted conflict against Sparta. It was the fear of Athenian aggressive expansion that started the war. Fear, Honor, and Interest underpinned conflict from beginning. 3. 8 books that cover 21 of 27 years of Peloponnesian War. Athens relied on treasury and naval power; sparta on land power and raiding. Periclean strategy of defense employed with disastrous results when plague strikes. 4. Covers Mytilene Debate (should we kill all the men, saved last minute), commentary on Revolutions (war is place between civil war and peace), Athenian satellite state expansion, fort building, strategic debates, Melian dialogue, Sicilian expedition (Nicias and Alcibiades), Persian intervention. 5. Claims to objectivity, unlike Herodotus, his contemporary. Recorded truths regarding warfare as relevant then as they are today. Records relationship of human conflict to politics, conduct of military operations, grand strategy, morality, impact of war, values of civilized states.

Military Effectiveness (3 volumes) - Murray and Millett

1. Sponsored by Director of Net Assessment, Office of Secretary of Defense--Fundamental reexamination of how military organizations have performed in first half of 20th century. 2. Military Effectiveness is "the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military...derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available." 3. Utilizes definitions of political, strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness outlined in "Lessons of War." When each aligns, operational effectiveness reaches maximum level. 4. Book 1: WWI (tactical effectiveness could not make up for strategic/operational stagnancy; total mobilization of state tested effectiveness at all levels for first time) Book 2: Interwar (memory of past war clouds preparation for next; each nation had unique approaches/challenges) Book 3: Anglo-American strategy/Grand Alliance successful; Axis fail to capitalize on all four variables. 5. CONCLUSION: Nations can't succeed in war without being successful in all four. Germany does well in operational and tactical, poor in political and operational. Your success in one area is dissipated across other three.

"Military Histories Old and New" - Rob Citino (2007)

1. State of the field essay 2. Argues that military history is still big in the public eye, but often languishes in academia 3. Has become big tent for war and society, traditional (operational), memory, culture 4. Now includes race, gender, women in battle, POWs, military revolutions, identity, etc. 5. Encourages other disciplines to take a look. Now at the crossroads of many disciplines.

The Making of Strategy - Williamson Murray, ed. (1994)

1. Strategy as a process—constantly adapting to shifting conditions and circumstances. 2. Highlights wide variety of factors that influence formulation of national strategies. Stunning operational success cannot overcome defective strategic policy. 3. Geography, History, Religion, Ideology, Culture, Economics, Governmental and Military Systems all matter 4. Process of making strategy inherently involves significant chance, ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity. Process involves combination of internal political influences, idiosyncrasies of individual behavior, pressure of external events and threats.Strategic decisions are invariably made with incomplete information and under pressure. Continuity and revolution exists within making of strategy, changes spurred by bureaucracy, mass politics, ideology, and technology, and economic power. 5. Complement to "Great Mind" model in Peter Paret's Makers of Modern Strategy. Focus less on individual thinkers and more on factors that influence strategy.

The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon - Gunther Rothenburg

1. Survey of Napoleonic Warfare 2. Major changes to warfare under Napoleon: - Focus on movement, outmaneuver opponents, fight at time and place that suited him. Pick off enemy one by one, rather than allowing them to combine. - Artillery: Began his rise to power as artillerist, pushed French military toward field guns, moved quickly. Focused power of guns, coordinated firepower. - Supplies/Logistics: Not novelty, but critical--feed armies from land rather than transporting supplies to them. Supported war of movement, less dependent on supply lines to France - Corps Organization: Capable of independent operation, could move faster than entire army as one - Focus on Destruction: Aims unequivocal, smash enemy decisively--remove will to fight, force negotiation on his terms. - Scale of Warfare: Conscription, mobilization of state, campaigning all over on separate continents - Move onto the Rear: March around enemy communications, rear lines, cut off supplies, force decisive battle. - Central Position: When facing multiple threats, he split his enemies at the weak point. 3. Warfare during Ancien Regime maneuver, bloody indecisive battles, expensive armies manned by foreigners and officered by aristocrats. After Seven Years War, all Euro armies attempt to reform on Prussian lines. Frederick the Great's army the apotheosis of 18th century warfare. Surveys wars of French Revolution and Napoleon. 4. Argues that soldiers of Napoleonic warfare fought with more vigor and less constraints than predecessors. Concept of nation in arms gives France greater trust in its soldiers—greater use of flexible formations, skirmishers, attack columns. Levee en masse, revolutionary fervor, and luck give French early successes. Calvary weakens, artillery unchanged. 2/3rds of officer corps brought up thru ranks. Divisional system implemented. Napoleon revamps army via corps system, introduces widespread conscription, and reinstates Marshalate and Imperial Guard. 5. Excelled in tactical prowess. System relied on central position or flanking maneuvers to create decisive engagements. System could fail spectacularly (Germany 1813, Spain 1808-14). France's enemies respond slowly—over 20 years, each develops means to counter/defeat Napoleon. Mass and unity on parts of allies, failures of Napoleon; Brits and Prussians come off best. Staff systems develop haphazardly, medical services improve, siege warfare continues as it had during 18th century—takes back seat to battle. Concludes that Reforms by other armies were restrained by a slow return to a conservative balance of power in Europe.

Command in War - Martin van Creveld (1985)

1. Survey of command in war from stone age to the present day. 2. Command is eternal function necessary for armies to operate. Focuses on gaining information about environment, enemy, and own situation. There are no universal "principles." Technology not a fix-all. 3. Successful armies give troops initiative, don't treat them as automatons. Subordinates given latitude, not controlled in all things. 4. Antiquity: Commander required at front at all times. Romans diffuse authority, standard tactics, limited communications. After 1500, fewer sovereigns in the field. "Strait jacketing strategy"; Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Marlborough the exceptions. Napoleon's Revolution in Strategy--genius in corps system (combined arms, big enough to survive, with wide latitude of generalship). Gen. staff develops. Personality, not central planning, does Napoleon in. Professional officers trained in peacetime during 19th century for first time; Prussian model. Tech innovation leads to decentralization at tactical level--more autonomy in field. WWI was a timetable war; huge increase in army size, killing tech. War did not conform to timetables, tech. Friction and fog everywhere. Covers other wars in 20th c. only cursorily. In Vietnam, US operational and strategic command diffuse so nobody and everybody in charge at same time. Specialization of personnel, complex command, slowed informational flow. Overreliance on technology backfired (helicopters/computers) in complex insurgency. 5. There are other means of command and control other than the 'technical means' that we tend to focus upon (abundant inattention to organization and procedure). 6. Move away from great mind command histories, toward structures and systems. Van Creveld's theory on the best organization of an armed force: tactically flexible, self-sufficient units, with just enough formal structure to manage their logistical needs, and loosely controlled with robust informal back-channels. All the technique and technology of modern command, control, and communications is of little help.

Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century - Jonathan House (1980)

1. The "art of war" over the twentieth century became one of combined arms warfare—infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other elements coordinated for maximum effect. 2. If you are better at combining military systems in complementary manner, you are more likely to destroy your enemy. 3. Traces evolution of tactics, weapons, and organization of five major militaries—American, British, German, Russian, and French—over 100 years of warfare from World Wars to Desert Storm 4. Command-and-control, problems of highly-centralized organizations, development of special operations forces, advances in weapons tech like ballistic and anti-ballistic missiles, trade-offs of using "heavy" vs. "light" armed forces, obstacles to effective cooperation between air and land forces. Critiques "air superiority" propaganda that came out of Gulf War. 5. Helped wide readership understand concept w/o extensive military jargon

The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 - Robert Doughty (1985)

1. The French got destroyed in WWII because their doctrine of methodical battle was based on faulty WWI assumptions that future battle would reflect later stages of last war and enemy would not innovate mobile warfare. 2. Interwar issues: How to defend industrial base on frontier? Shorter terms of military service (1 yr); lack of manpower due to declining birthrate. 3. French adopt logically, scientifically, and disastrously, a doctrine of methodical battle, focused on complex, centralized, firepower intensive operations--careful planning, preparation, overwhelming firepower, complex movements, piecemeal steps, pause and wait for artillery, pace set by infantry, tanks as infantry support--this played into hands of German mobile combined arms doctrine 4. Maginot Line did its job--contingency involved in German decision to attack through Ardennes; later Allied strategy reflected French original plans (tanks/inf work together in tandem, anti-tank makes warfare slow, attrition, careful artillery) 5. French military defeat in 1940 was not inevitable; seeds for it were laid over two decades. Cumbersome command structure exacerbated issues. Possession of clear, well-laid out doctrine is moot if the doctrine is based on faulty assumptions.

The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: From Marathon to Waterloo (1851)

1. The Quintessential Battle Piece: Great men, clashes of civilization, individual deeds of valor 2. Idea of war as progress (shaping Western course of history); western exceptionalism, Anglo-Saxonism, cultural superiority, lauds British imperialism (Marathon "confirmed the superiority of European free states over Oriental despotism). 3. Myth of the Decisive Battle: In 2300 years, 15 decisive battles--battles that effectively changed the course of world history. (Marathon, Syracuse, Gaugamela, Metaurus, Arminius, Chalon, Tours, Hastings, Orleans, Spanish Armada, Blenheim, Saratoga, Valmy, Waterloo) 4. Drives narrative of military history for close to 100 years 5. Free thinking democracy vs. despotism; military genius is crucial; a great period piece--Victorian to the core.

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost - Cathal Nolan (2017)

1. The end of the Great-Man/Decisive Battle theory 2. Wars are not won by the actions of gifted military commanders and decisive battles, but through endurance and attrition. Pro-materialism/society. 3. Thesis: Clashes labeled "decisive battles" by military historians are often much less pivotal than they seem, and misleading to understanding not only the eventual winner of a particular war, but a larger comprehension of war and conflict within the context of strategy, politics, and the humanity of war. Waging defensive war via attrition has proved more decisive in determining the outcome of wars and that the not only the notion of the decisive battle, but the idea of the "great captain" or "military genius" should be less of a dogma among military historians. 4. Content: Historical examples from Greece to WWII have shown how the dangerous vanity of aggressor nations and hubris of civilian and military commanders have led to catastrophic defeat. Victory is more often determined by which side has technological capability and stubborn willpower to outlast opponents and endure war of attrition. EXCEPTIONS: Prussian victory over Danes, Austrians, French (decisive, political strategic results, von Moltke) 5. Failed Decisive Battles: Agincourt/Crecy (no long-term territorial gains for England) Cannae (Who won war?) Wehrmacht over Russia (No) Cult of offensive usually precedes great slaughter. 6. Gray Area: Was 2003 Iraq war continuation of "decisive" First Gulf War? What would Napoleon's legacy look like if he'd stopped in 2009?

Surge - Peter Mansoor

1. The implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy and surge in troop strength ultimately decreased sectarian violence and promoted internal relation-building in Iraq. 2. Covers genesis of Surge, objectives, reasons for ultimate success. First chapter provides background as to how coalition and Iraqi fortunes reached nadir before 2007 Surge. Absence of strategy/post-hostilities planning dogged proceedings. 3. Bremer—head of Coalition Provisional Authority—made 3 critical errors promoting insurgency: 1.) de-Ba'athification of Iraqi politics (political) 2.) disbanding all branches of Iraqi military (military) 3.) Formation of Iraqi governing council out of Shi'a majority. Lack of cultural insight critical. 4. Surge attempted to rectify course of war—aim to produce sustainable peace based on development of sound political institutions. Surge gave policymakers opportunity to finish strong. Surge was both in troop strength and in ideas. It succeeded in 1.) Protecting Iraqis, 2.) Led to Sunni Awakening (response to radical Islamist special groups), 3.) Loyalty of the sheikhs in al-Anbar province, 4.) Defeat of Jaish al-Mahdi/"Special Groups" in Basra and Baghdad. Also helped coalition develop positive permanent presence in contested cities, garnered intelligence from locals, reconciled Iraqis to Maliki government, commitment to long-term U.S.-Iraqi security arrangement. 5. For brief window of opportunity, Iraq had means to achieving stability—2008-2011 with final withdrawal of American troops.

Carnage and Culture - Victor Davis Hanson

1. There is a western way of war--western superiority is attributed to a set of common cultural practices traced back through time to Classical Greece 2. These include: Political freedom, decisive battle, civic militarism, landed infantry, rationalism, free enterprise, discipline, individualism, dissent, and self-critique 3. Counters common arguments that superior technology alone, geography, or racial characteristics generated Western superiority 4. BIG ISSUES: Creasy 2.0 battle piece; how does one define "West"? Is Rome west Carthage East? Was Gaugamela a success of democratic politics? 5. Overly political, worried about America "gone soft"--neo-conservative blame game--John Lynn counters in Battle

Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America - John Lynn

1. This is the death of the universal soldier. 2. Conceptions on war driven by culture, shaped by tension between ideal and reality of warfare. Soldiers come from unique cultural contexts—even within the same geographical areas. 3. Greek: Civic militarism ended with Roman Empire; West didn't always dominate other cultures; Ancient China/India: Different, often advanced ways of war @ same time as Greeks, including battle elephant, battle avoidance (same as Vegetius)--oriental not completely unique from Western; Medieval Europe: Chivalry was an ideal of war that stressed masculinity, honor, courage while Chevauchee was gritty form of pillage; Enlightenment: Old order in France—aesthetics, uniforms, fortresses, formations, technology changed, constrained by new legal beliefs; Sepoy: Indian military tradition had Muslim and British influences to forge distinct Indian culture, western weapon not only factor in success; 19th C. Europe: Military theory and practice reached new watersheds—citizen army, levee en mass, military romanticism (Clausewitz); Pacific War WWII: Race didn't exert huge influence on American strategy (geography did) and racism derived from how war was remembered; Egypt: Changes in mil. Culture explains Egyptian military learning from loss to Israel and improved performance in 1973. 4. Organization cherry-picky. 5. Direct challenge to VDH thesis; casts doubt on John Keegan's conclusions on Oriental form of warfare. Be aware of artificial continuities in military history.

The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 - Robert Doughty

1. Though French Doctrine adopted over 1930s largely determined outcome of battle, it hung in the balance at Sedan and hinged upon luck of a few small-unit actions at Meuse Crossing 2. The German miracle was based less on supernatural forces than it was on sound military prep. Ultimately, Germany won because her military forces were better led, had a sounder strategy, and had developed more viable tactical and operational-level doctrines. And France lost because her leaders tried to manage rather than lead, her strategy was ill conceived and based on fallacious assumptions, and her tactical and operational-level doctrines were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her. What seemed to be almost a miracle at the time in fact came from a better prepared force rapidly overwhelming an inadequately prepared force. 3. At the Meuse, the best trained German units attacked the worst trained French ones; not a mechanized battle; combat engineers were crucial. 4. Sedan mythologized--blitzkrieg ultimate means of wear--The key difference between the two countries was not the weapons themselves, but how the weapons were employed. 5. French Army doctrine was unsuited and inadequate for the war Germany was prepared to fight in 1940, and the strategy of rushing forward into Belgium was particularly vulnerable to the German attack through the Ardennes. Adding to France's difficulties, her army and its leaders lacked the proper flexibility and responsiveness to reply to the unexpected. Whatever the advantages for the Germans, however, the campaign was not a walk through the sun for them. General Guderian acknowledged this when he described the German success as almost a miracle.

The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Towards Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 - Mark Grimsley

1. Traces change in Union army practice from conciliatory posture to pragmatic approach to hard war (epitomized by Sherman/Sheridan). 2. Charts escalation of war—no one moment of decisive change or codified document 3. Grant and Sherman stage a deliberate, albeit restrained policy of military necessity, targeting enemy's resources and base of production rather than army/capital. 4. Tempering the total war debate—not unbridled violence against civilians and soldiers alike or a radical departure from warfare and tactics in the past. 5. Chevauchee a historical precedent for pragmatic Union policy

Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871-1914 - Terrence Zuber

1. Traditional history of Schlieffen plan needs revision. Argues it was a post-war concoction, a denkschrift rather than a deliberate war plan that was used to orchestrate invasion of France in 1914. 2. German officers post-1918 invented the concept to escape blame for Germany's defeat. 3. Schlieffen's intentions more sensible, less aggressive than plan--whether or not it existed is up to reader. Shows how Schlieffen's ideas for European war evolved gradually, not rigid offensive plans. Use mobility of railroads, counterpunch France or Russia, no concept for 2-front war, effective training crucial, practice finding and attacking open flank wherever it appeared. Argues von Moltke (the younger) and Schlieffen believed in operational flexibility and mobility, planned to strike wherever French was weak; German inflexibility in mobilization and deployment predetermined. 4. 1906 memorandum Gerhard Ritter/others argue was blatant outline of war plan. Zuber says it was a political plot--hope to get German gov't to recognize impending 2-front war and mobilize German manpower like Russia/France. Argues no sane war planner would create plan based on non-existent units; document irrelevant to his strategic thinking. 5. Plan becomes entrenched as officers seek to displace blame for loss after war. Their careers depended on who at general staff took blame. Publicity offensive in journals, newspapers, official history argue that if Schlieffen's tenets had been followed. Gerhard Ritter, influential postwar historian, misinterprets documents and historians have accepted Ritter's analysis ever since.

Reconsidering the American Way of War - Antulio Echevarria

1. US has no distinct "way of war"; but there is an American way of battle: builds on assumption that tactical victory is sufficient to achieve strategic success. 2. US Way of War should be defined as how US uses force to protect/promote interests--there have been many strategies beyond Attrition, Exhaustion, Annihilation that have been applied: Decapitation, coercive diplomacy, terror/intimidaiton, deterrence. 3. Case studies from Revolution, Mexican American War, Civil War, Boxer Rebellion, Carribbean Wars, WWI, WWII, Korea, Guatemalan Coup, War on Terror 4. Major Conclusions: 1.) AWW is political in every respect and in every period; 2.) AWW is not astrategic, but drew from variety of military strategies; 3.) US rarely employs overwhelming or decisive force; 4.) Presidents, not the public, determine what's best for nat. sec; 5.) American strategic and operational practice rests on assumption tactical victory leads to successful campaigns/wins wars. 5. A knowledge of any AWW cannot predict what a future AWW will look like.

"U.S. Grand Strategies in the Second World War" - Peter Mansoor, Successful Strategies

1. US transformed into great power through first rate strategy 2. With Roosevelt as architect and Marshall and JCS as chief guides, American strategy guarded American neutrality, managed entry into war, and shaped contours of postwar world—all without the "massive national security bureaucracy that guides current administrations in their handling of foreign policy and military affairs." (314) 3. Early color coded plans (Pacific based); Roosevelt consolidates authority; Five Rainbow Plans; Lend-Lease strengthens allies, protects neutrality, improves economy; Marshal unique appointment--speaks mind to FDR; Ships on slips before Pearl Harbor; France's fall sparks mobilization; Harold Stark's "Plan Dog" represents most complete and coherent strategy at beginning (US-Anglo effort against Germany, defensive Pacific). Covers major conferences (eight). Atlantic Charter (4-Freedoms) crystallizes American opinions against Nazism; CCS critical for coordinating allied strategy; vigorous debate actually refined strategy. 4. "The annihilation of the Wehrmacht and the forces of Imperial Japan in the campaigns of 1944-45 was the result of a carefully crafted grand strategy that established the conditions for total victory over the Axis." (349). 5. Political decisions CENTRAL AND CRITICAL to U.S. grand strategy—overturning notion it was military thought alone that prevailed. Alliance harmony critical to the effort. Significant inter-alliance disagreements. American strategy was opportunistic.

The Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age - Paret, Craig, eds. (1986)

1. Updated version of earlier 1941 edition. 2. Great-mind model 3. Machiavelli, Maurice of Nassau/Gustavus Adolphus, Vauban and Science of War, Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Revolution in War, Jomini, Clausewitz, Engels/Marx on Revolution, Prusso-German school (Moltke, Schlieffen), Alfred Thayer Mahan, Liddel Hart and De Gaulle 4. 800 page tome, redefined basis of strategic study, inspired works by Murray (ed), The Making of Strategy

"Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War" - Alan Beyerchen

1. War is non-linear interaction inseparable from context. 2. Don't use On War to prescribe predictive theory to modern conflict 3. Pendulum and Magnets example--fewer variables/factors you involve, the more linear war becomes 4. Unpredictability in war arises from 1.) Interaction, 2.) Friction, 3.) Chance 5. "Theory must be based on a broader sense of order rooted in historical experience, leading to descriptive guidelines. Theorists must not be seduced into formulating analytically deductive, prescriptive sets of doctrines that offer poor hope and worse guidance."

The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare - Timothy Travers

1. Warfare--and ideas about warfare--are socially produced and historically contingent. 2. Thesis: Brits during WWI were product of military system that prided personal relationships, cult of offensive as indicated in staff colleges, and had difficulty meeting exigencies of modern war until 1918. 3. Argues that "military history is not a separate entity, but that warfare and ideas about warfare are socially produced and vary with the evolution of society." (i.e., the Western Front can be used as a model to better understand the middle-and-upper class of Edwardian society). 4. Pt. 1: Edwardian society--Brit army pre-WWI small colonial response force, amateurish, personalized command. Cult of offensive (ignore lessons of Boer War, focus on Russo-Japanese) and concept of psychological battlefield (morale and will critical). These split into 2 offshoots--1.) Breakthrough concept (human capital, morale) and 2.) deliberate advance concept (limited objectives, massive artillery prep, rather than morale, takes high ground). Haig proponent of first; Kitchener, Rawlinson proponents of second. Takes until 1918 to adapt second approach. Pt. 2: Focus on Haig: Morale and discipline, not technology. Fails at Somme, Passchendaele. Pt. 3: Somme case study: Haig can't bridge gap b/t 19th conception of war and modern reality--rigid structures/timetables, not conditions on ground. Pt. 4: Official histories of these disasters exonerate Haig. Comparison of various high commands reveals German superiority. 5. Critiques official history of war. Tries to present Haig in time and place, giving clearer accounting of his command of BEF. Important book for its analysis on Edwardian Army, less on analysis of British tactical and operational culture on Western Front.

Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (1998) - H.R. McMaster

1. Who is responsible for the debacle that was the Vietnam War? Everyone in political leadership—presidents, secretary of defense, presidential military advisors, Congress, and especially the JCS. 2. Thesis: The JCS and other political leaders were derelict in their duty for not challenging flawed strategy and publicly revealing inadequacies of president. Arrogance, weakness, lying in pursuit of self-interest, and abdication of responsibility to American people their crime. 3. 4 major claims: 1. Johnson and MacNamara lied to American people about cost of war. Johnson was profoundly insecure; unwilling to entertain divergent views on conflict. 2. Johnson allowed domestic political agenda to supersede war effort 3. Chiefs misrepresented their views to Congress to support president. They were ineffective as an advisory group. "Five Silent Men." 4. Chiefs allowed themselves to be bought out of their opposition by increases in budget and force size 4. Begins with Bay of Pigs, souring Kennedy on judgment of military leadership. Cuban missile crisis saw military excluded from decision making. JCS marginal by the time they got to Vietnam—far outside presidential orbit. Kennedy's New Frontiersmen viewed Eisenhower's JCS with suspicion. Johnson's unexpected ascension thrust great responsibility onto inexperienced and insecure political leader with ambitious domestic policy. Robert MacNamara's "Whiz Kids" relied on quantitative analysis to produce numerical goals as stand-ins for progress. Despite disdain for military leadership, McMaster charts rise of Maxwell Taylor as military representative to president and loyaly defers to him. White House considered Vietnam commitment too costly to renege on. JCS felt they had little influence in correcting course. They resigned themselves to make a bad strategy successful. 5. Do not allow civil-military adversarial rift to inhibit transparent strategy formation. Wars can be lost in Washington D.C. before American ever assumed sole responsibility for fighting in 1965.

"Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War" - Holger Herwig

1. a. Between 1914 and 1919, German leaders consciously organized documents and materials to explain the origins of WWI—a disinformation campaign later weaponized by the Third Reich. 2. Before Fisher's 1961 revision, common interpretation of origins of WWI dominated by notion of "Patriotic self-censorship"—an official Weimar Republic campaign to counter allied charges of war-guilt. Selectively edited documentary compendiums, suppressed scholarship, underwrote propaganda. a. Shows how censors directly influenced public opinion. Importance of scholarly integrity; role of historian in society.

Personal Memoirs - Ulysses S. Grant

Incredible work of clarity and expression; covers experience from Mexican American War to US Commander in Civil War to Presidency. One of the best memoirs ever written.

Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present - John Lynn (ed)

M.Van Creveld's Supplying War one of the earliest historical accounts of wars and military ops through lens of logistics--this is another attempt to broaden that paradigm. 1. Edited volume discussing key role of logistics in warfare from Byzantium to Vietnam. 2. Luttwak argues logistics often treated as mere precondition and area for specialists. "Literacy desires have often trumped good history with 'whatever is dramatic easily displacing what is merely important.'" 3. Lynn critiques Van Creveld's Supplying War, saying it argues for continuity in logistical practices from Thirty Years War thru WWII—says rise of nationalism presented new challenges. Naval warfare requires more than land warfare 4. Byzantine logistics went from fortress/land barriers to strategies of attrition and diplomacy; as state apparatus grew during Charlemagne, Crusades, etc, power projection grew; covers naval ops in Hundred Years War; Spanish power in 16th century (drinking water for galleys), but overstretch led to decline; Lynn covers Louis XIV and resource mobilization by levying contributions from foreign territory and allowing raiding parties; goes into modern era to cover impact of railroads, trucks, etc. Civil War, WWI, US Army trucks during WWII, Vietnam. 5. "Logistics...were not handmaidens to strategy—but played critical supporting roles in shaping military conflict." (107) One of the few books to discuss importance of logistics.

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 - MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (2001)

Mil Rev: Big Steps; RMA: Bricks that make up steps 1. Released at the tail-end of America's unipolar moment, when technological/military/economic superiority contributed to an overvaluing of technology as a "silver bullet" (i.e. tech, space, combined with precision guided munitions theory propagated by Soviet theorists in 1970s) and American singular hegemony an antidote to war. RMA coined by Office of Net Assessment in 1990s. This is an attempt to turn away from New Military History and give military historians capital in policymaking realm. 2. Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs), as opposed to Military Revolutions, are transformations, "clusters of less all-embracing changes," which are highly susceptible to "human direction" and confer a significant advantage on the military institution that pioneered them. RMAs exist within broader Military Revolutions. There were essentially 5 Military Revolutions with their associated RMAS: Preliminary RMAs: Longbow, offensive-defensive strategy, gunpowder, fortress architecture, centrally funded infantry in England 3. Military Revolution 1: 17th Century creation of modern state and modern military institution A. Associated RMAs: Dutch and Swedish Tactical Reforms, French Tactical Organization, naval revolution, Britain's Financial Revolution, French military reforms subsequent to Seven Years' War 4. Military Revolutions 2 and 3: French and Industrial Revolution A. Associated RMAs: National political and economic mobilization, Napoleonic Warfare, financial and economic power based on industrialization, technological revolution in land warfare and transport (telegraph, railroads, steamships, quick-firing smokeless powder small-arms and artillery). Big-gun battleships. German/Prussian use of railroads and remade general staff. 5. Military Revolution 4: First World War combines all three previous A. Associated RMAs: Combined-arms tactics, Blitzkrieg operations, strategic bombing, carrier operations, submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, radar, signals intelligence 6. Military Revolution 5: Nuclear Warfare and Associated Delivery Systems A. Associated RMAs: Precision reconnaissance and strike capability; stealth; computerization and networking, increased lethality of conventional munitions 7. Lingering Questions: What is the relationship between an RMA and a Military Revolution? Which causes which? How does one define "Revolutionary" 8. Important Takeways: RMAs (Unlike military revolutions) do not affect society outside military. Book written for military, not academics.