PHIL 530 - Final Exam

The IDEAL MORAL CODE:

That moral code whose currency in that society would produce greater total utility than any other. Candidate Codes Ranked according to how much utility they would produce if current in the society in question: C1← The Ideal CodeC2. . . Cn A CORRECT RULE for a Society: A Rule that is in the ideal code for that society. Ideal Moral Code Theory (Officially Stated): an action is permissible iff it does not violate any correct rule for the agent's society.an action is obligatory iff it is required by a correct rule for the agent's society.

CH6 Specifically, Virtues are Intermediate States or Means:

We must now describe the sort of moral state that virtue is. (He has identified the genus (state) virtue belongs to in Ch5, he now seeks to discover what differentiates it from other states. A virtue puts that which has it in good condition and makes the work of that thing be done well: For an eye, virtues contribute positively to the eyes' health and to its functionality as an eye. For a horse, virtues contribute positively to the horse's health and to its functionality as a horse. So likewise, a virtue for a human being will be a state that makes humans better and contributes to their being able to perform their distinctive function well. But can we say more about the nature of virtues? Yes. A virtue is a mean: an optimal balance between two extremes. It is not necessarily equidistant between the two extremes, in the way that 6 is the (arithmetical) mean between 2 & 10. As with a successful work of art, where we say that we cannot take away or add anything to it, the mean contains just the right balance between the two extremes. So virtues typically are a mean between two extremes. The two extremes are vices: a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. But a deficiency and excess of what? A deficiency or excess with respect to passion (i.e. feeling\emotion\attitude) or action. So, moral virtues aim at the mean in emotional responses and in actions To hit the mean in emotion is to feel anger, fear, pride, desire, pity, pleasure, pain, in the right amounts, at the right times, for the right objects, towards the right people, for the right motives, and in the right manner. Plainly it is easier to miss the mark than to hit it, since there are many ways to go wrong, but few that hit the mean. Virtue is an attribute involving choice, consisting in observing the mean, based on the reasons that a person of practical wisdom would use in choosing the mean.

Three Challenges for Virtue Ethics:

1) Consider a virtue like honesty. Suppose lying offers Smith some advantage at the moment, and we ask why Smith shouldn't lie? It seems the answer that "an honest person wouldn't do it" is not enough, for that does not seem to really tell us why Smith shouldn't—it just says roughly that someone who is generally strongly motivated to not lieand generally does not lie(i.e. honest) would not lie. 2) Doesn't it seem that honesty is a moral virtue because of something bad about acts of lying— that the ultimate explanation must rest on features of the act type, lying, not the virtue of honesty? 3) Suppose the two moral virtues of kindness and honesty are in conflict in a given situation (telling the truth will cause harm). Saying "Do what the virtuous person would do" seems to not help much, since the virtuous person will be both kind and honest. We might add that the fully virtuous person would be wise, and know which virtue wins out in the situation, but that begins to sound like "Do what a person would do who can tell what the right or best act is in the situation, taking us back to the moral status of actions as primary again.

The Above Objections to CAU Generalized & Summed Up: We can provide a single summary objection to CAU, as follows: Generalized Moral Irrelevance Objection (cf. Ross):

1) If CAU is true then the only morally relevant consideration for determining the normative statuses of actions is the comparative value of their consequences. 2) It is not the case that the only morally relevant consideration for determining the normative statuses of actions is the comparative value of their consequences.---------- 3) So, CAU is false. R(1): By Definition of CAU, . . . R(2): ... <You need to carefully describe one of the prior OutstandingObjections here, thereby showing that other things clearly are relevant.> 3The Most Pressing Substantive Problem for Classical CAU: According to CAU, all that matters to morality is that we get the greatest sum of consequential value available. CAU places no constraints at all on how we get it or who gets sacrificed in the process. It is a justice-insensitive theory. But justice is probably the most central and important concept of morality (and politics). So, if CAU conflicts with deeply held judgments about the center of morality, then this counts heavily against CAU. [See the variant of our earlier Rareblood case at the end to illustrate.]

Beneficence Component of Kant's CI2:

"treating people as ends"--Treating people to enhance their autonomy; facilitate their ability and freedom to govern their lives by reason and to pursue their own rationally self-appointed goals.

Injustice Component of Kant's CI2:

"treating people solely as means"--Treating them using maxims they could not freely consent to if fully informed. (Cf. contractarianism and the importance of consent for legitimating moral or political principles.)

Two Main Ways Those Sympathetic to CAU Have Modified It in the 20th Century:

1. Act Consequentialism 2. Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism

An Example of a Non-Universalizable Maxim:

1st Maxim: If I am alive, I will not provide for myself and live off others who do. Is this universalizable?What is the generalized form of this maxim? If anyone is alive, she will not provide for herself and live off others who do. Could this be a law of nature governing people's behavior for all time? -No, it is internally inconsistent. (It requires a world where no one provides for herself, but some provide for themselves and others.)

BRANDT'S IDEAL MORAL CODE THEORY (IMCT):

A Rule can be construed as an "if-then" sentence that commands or prohibits the performance of acts of a given type for situations of a given type. FORM: If a person is in a situation of type S then perform [or don't perform] an act of type A. (Cf. The Generalized form of a maxim in Kant.) EXS: If one has made a promise, then keep it. " ", then don't keep it. " ", then do whatever you feel like doing. " " and no one else will be hurt by keeping it, then keep it. If one has made a promise to a Tibetan on a Tuesday, then keep it.

Veil of Ignorance (VIG):

A hypothetical situation where: a) Everyone is momentarily unaware of their position in life (i.e. their social status, their economic status, their health, their talents, their age, their gender, their race, their sexual preferences, their religious affiliations if any, etc.). b) Secondly, they are also unaware of their particular conception of what counts as a good life (e.g. hedonism, Christian ideals). c) However, all do know general facts about human nature, the world, history, etc., including that primary social goods (above) are a means to a good life on most any conception of such a life they might later discover they have. Note that, among the general facts they know are that people often have irreconcilably different conceptions of what counts as a good life, and they often try to impose their conception of a good life on others who do not share it. It is also stipulated that each person will temporarily function as a rational but exclusively self-interested individual while behind the veil. (They function as rational egoists temporarily while behind the Veil.) 2Finally, they are not subject to any envy in their choices.

Simple Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism (SHAU):

A is morally permissible iff (i) the total utility of A is at least as large as that of any other action open to that agent & (ii) A itself is open to the agent of A. Note: As our excerpt indicates, Bentham thought all decision-making (esp. policy decisions) should (ideally) be conducted in terms of utility. As with John Stuart Mill, he also uses mixed language that makes it less than clear whether he thinks concrete actions need to be evaluated directly in terms of the utility of their consequences, or indirectly (e.g. in terms of rules or act types, which are in turn directly evaluated in terms of their utility). A is Morally Obligatory iff (i) the total utility of A is larger than that of any other action open to that agent & (ii) A itself is open to the agent of A.

Two Components of Kant's CI2

A) Injustice Component B) Beneficence Component

The General (negative) Form of Kant's Applications of CI: Abbreviations:

A: Any concrete action (performed by Jane Doe) MAX(A): The Maxim of A GEN-MAX(A): The Generalized form of the Maxim of A Each Application of CI Schematically Laid Out: 1) A is permissible only if MAX(A) is universalizable. [

Animals:

Animals seem to be left out. Their welfare makes no direct moral claim on us, since they don't act on maxims, so lack autonomy in Kant's sense, and in principle we could all consent to do as we please to them w/o any contradiction. For Kant our only obligations against gratuitous harm to animals is that it will lead to us being more likely to harm people, and that is the only reason we are obliged to avoid it.

Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism:

Acts are assessed via rules; only rule sets (not acts) are directly assessed via the total utility they would yield.1In either approach, the idea is to escape many of the stronger objections to CAU.

3The Most Pressing Substantive Problem for Classical CAU:

According to CAU, all that matters to morality is that we get the greatest sum of consequential value available. CAU places no constraints at all on how we get it or who gets sacrificed in the process. It is a justice-insensitive theory. But justice is probably the most central and important concept of morality (and politics). So, if CAU conflicts with deeply held judgments about the center of morality, then this counts heavily against CAU. [See the variant of our earlier Rareblood case at the end to illustrate.]

Mill on Determining the Quality of Types of Pleasure - Mill's Quality Ranking Criterion:

According to Mill, how do we determine if one quality of pleasure is superior to another, and by how much? -Pleasures of type A are qualitatively preferable to pleasures of type B iff most people who have experienced pleasures of both types prefer those of type A to those of type B (all other things being equal).

Some Challenges for Mill's Ranking Criterion - 2) Ranking is Sensitive to Context:

After reading Blake all day, I might prefer a dip in the Jacuzzi to Blake. Does that mean it is qualitatively better? How do we rule out contextual affects?

Rationale for the Original Position:

All could consent to any principles endorsed under these conditions, since all are impartially chosen from a position of full equality. Upshot: The Original Position forces a fair bargain for all. A Basic Principle of Justice: Any principle that would be unanimously approved from the original position. Institution or Practice is Just: It does not violate any basic principles of justice.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 1 (CI1 Defined):

An action is permissible (under a given maxim) iff the action's maxim is universalizable. CI1 w\o Abbreviation: An action is permissible iff the agent could consistently will that the generalized form of her maxim functioned like a natural law. -Positive Case (permissible): Me having a bite to eat under the maxim: If I'm hungry, I will eat. -Negative Cases: My living off someone else... | My killing someone ... (see the maxims above)

What does "treat people as ends" mean? Ans: What does "ends" mean in CI2?

Answer: Beings that are intrinsically (by nature) worthy of respect and deserve to be treated with basic dignity because they are capable of reason-backed choice and action. Autonomy: Our capacity to deliberate and govern our choices and actions by reason.

CH5 Virtues are States:

Aristotle is here establishing what general class of thing (genus) a virtue or vice is. He concludes that virtues\vices are states of character. It is because of these states that we are either ill or well disposed in our emotions and actions.

Rationale for VIG:

Behind the VIG, all information that could be used to unjustly promote one's own advantage at the expense of others has been temporarily eliminated. The ignorance guarantees impartiality, by essentially forcing one to consider all positions that one might occupy in a society equally. So each person represents all persons. (Compare our playing with your cards face down) The Importance of Not Knowing What Your Vision of a Good or Happy Life is: Since rational people can have different conceptions of what counts as a good or happy life, any particular vision of a good life is unavailable to those behind the Veil. This means that views like utilitarianism, which depend on a particular vision (e.g. hedonism) of a good life are left out. (Rawls argues that fact, coupled with the general knowledge that people have different conceptions of a good life, and are prone, if unchecked, to impose theirs on others, this will lead those in the assembly to place a premium on freedom from such oppression and interference of alternative conceptions of a good life.)

ARISTOTLE'S NICHOMACHEAN: ETHICS: Book II CH1 Virtues of Character are Acquired by Habit: Intellectual Virtues Moral\Ethical Virtues | | the outcome of teaching the outcome of habit require experience & time acquired by practicing them

Book II CH1 Virtues of Character are Acquired by Habit: Intellectual Virtues Moral\Ethical Virtues | | the outcome of teaching the outcome of habit require experience & time acquired by practicing them Habituation: We become good dancers or athletes by repeatedly (intentionally) performing the relevant acts because they are strategic or appropriate as well as we can at the time. Similarly, by repeatedly performing just acts because they are just, we become just people--people who are, by character, just. Similarly, it is by our reactions to particular dangers that we become cowardly or courageous. Just as cooks will become good cooks or bad cooks by consistently cooking well or consistently cooking badly, people become courageous or cowardly by consistently behaving in a courageous or cowardly way. Virtues and vices are acquired and become part of our character--part of who we are--as a result of deliberately and repeatedly making choices of the sort that one possessing the characteristic would make automatically as a result of habit. So the training of our children and our own individual choices each day are all important determinants of the kind of people we become.

CH4 Virtuous Actions versus Acting Virtuously:

But someone might object to my view as follows: "How can people become just by doing just things when a person can't do just things in the first place unless they are already just?" Answer: Acts in accordance with virtue are not justly performed simply because the acts are just. The agent (the doer of the act) must meet certain conditions for the act to be not only just but justly performed: 1) she must know what she is doing, 2) she must choose to do the just thing for its own sake, and 3) she must do it out of her firm and immutable character. ARE THESE ALL NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ACTING IN A JUST MANNER? No, 3) Seems wrong. Distinguish three things: a) Doing an act which is just b) Doing it because it is just c) Doing it as a manifestation of your being a just person generally For a), which conditions of 1-3 are required? For b), " " For c) which conditions are required? Why is the possibility of b) without 3) actually crucial to Aristotle? Because it is by repeatedly doing just acts because they are just that the virtue of being a just person is acquired--becomes firmly rooted in our character. So we need b) to pass to c), since no one is born with all the virtues. They must be acquired. Just or courageous acts are the sort of acts that a just or courageous person would do. But they are done justly and courageously (done in a just or courageous manner) when they are done because they are just-- when they are done in the spirit of justice and bravery. So although, to become just, one must repeatedly do the just thing for the right reasons, it takes time before it becomes habitual and deep- seated.

Objections to Kant: Morally Irrelevant Cases:

Consider these maxims and their generalizations: 1) When I'm in a situation where the Stock market reaches 1000, I'll withdraw my savings. 1ʹ) When anyone is in a situation where the Stock market reaches 1000, she'll withdraw her savings. 2) If I am on my way to work, then I will enter Ham Smith 249F 2ʹ) If anyone is on their way to work, then they will enter Ham Smith 249F 3) If I''d rather not have to make each and every little sacrifices involved in becoming a doctor, I won't become one (while I rationally endorse policies promoting that doctors be plentiful). 3ʹ) If anyone would rather not..., they won't become a doctor. Upshot: There are many morally irrelevant reasons why a given maxim might not be universalizable in Kant's sense. This seems a serious defect. It classifies clearly morally permissible actions as impermissible.

The Problems of AU in the Light of IMCT:

Death Bed Promise Special Obligations Punishing the Innocent Conflates Prudence with Morality Slavery Conflicts with Supererogation Also Note: The Ideal Code for One Society may not be the ideal one for another. Variability is allowed, and without relativism. (Cf. Rules for water use on Dune vs. Oceanus) This seems a vast improvement, but there are challenges remaining for this version.

Foreground:

Elizabeth Anscombe: "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958). She argues: 1) that Modern Moral Philosophy is bankrupt because it rests on a bad legalistic analogy: without a Divinity, the notion of a "Moral Law" makes no sense. 2) That the ancient notion of an ethics of character traits (and motives, etc.) has been neglected and still makes good sense. We need to return and develop this approach. Virtue Ethics: makes character traits the central notion in morality. Virtue Ethicists either a) agree with Anscombe's 1) and give up on the Fundamental Modern Project and its concepts of permissibility, impermissibility and obligatoriness (minority position), or b) they subordinate the Fundamental Project by making the evaluations of actions secondary and derivative (majority position). Ex of b): What should I do? Answer: Be brave / Do what a brave person would do? A Virtue: a trait of character, manifested in habitual action, that is good for a person to have (either for that person's sake, or for humanity's sake).

FEMINIST ETHICS

Feminism is primarily a cultural and political movement predicated on two central and compelling tenets: 1) there is a long, deep, institutionalized world history of oppression, devaluation, subordination, and degradation of women, including pervasive exclusion of women from valuable enterprises and positions of power reserved for men. 2) that is morally unjustifiable and must be corrected. Feminist Ethics is then concerned with a number of related issues as they impact ethical theorizing, including: a) Identifying and criticizing explicit statements of devaluation of women by traditional ethical theorists (e.g. Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant). b) Exploring the possibility and extent to which various traditional ethical theories might be themselves prejudicial against women in subtle ways, for example by neglecting women's interests and experience (e.g. connected with reproduction: women's role in birthing, child-rearing, etc.) c) Exploring the possibility and extent to which ethical theories may favor the public sphere (civil society) that has been dominated by men, while at the same time downgrading and ignoring the private sphere (family) which is traditionally the "women's domain". d) Exploring the possibility that in traditional ethical theory women are devalued by devaluing characteristics traditionally associated with women (e.g. emotions, and then "being emotional" as yielding irrationality)? d) Exploring the possibility that by devaluing traditional "feminine virtues", traditional ethical theories left out important conceptual resources (e.g. the importance of care or trust) that might be of use in building better theories.

Outstanding Objections to Classical Act Utilitarianism. Classical Act Utilitarianism (CAU):

For our purposes, the thesis that either SHAU or QHAU is true (i.e. Bentham's or Mill's act-based version of Utilitarianism, is true). 1( We concentrate below on SHAU, but all the objections can be adapted to cover QHAU as well.) BACKGROUND: Forward-Looking Character of Utilitarianism: Only the consequences of actions matter. But consequences always come after an action. So only the future matters for assessing actions. For Ex: Consider CAU's Rationale for Punishment: Either 1) Rehabilitation, 2) Prevention, and/or (3) Vengeance Value (the people get from knowing of or witnessing punishment). (Similarly, since it is only future pleasure and pain that matter, nothing beyond that, for example, that an act is now a violation of a person's rights, is relevant.)

2nd Maxim:

If I would gain by killing someone, I will. Is this universalizable? What is the generalized form of this maxim? If any person would gain by killing someone, s/he will kill that person. Could this be a law of nature governing people's behavior for all time? Yes. No internal contradiction: it could hold in Hobbes' State of Nature. Nonetheless, any fully rational agent would endorse general policies preventing acts of killing for profit. So it is externally inconsistent.

KANT'S INSIGHTS - Moral Judgments are Universalizable in the General Sense:

If it is wrong (right) for you in your circumstances then it is wrong (right) for anyone else in comparable circumstances.

Rule Worship:

If the rationale for rules is their producing maximal utility, and I know that by violating a rule in the ideal code I can produce more utility than by obeying it, why should I be a slave to the rule rather than let the rational of maximizing utility guide me?

Both the injustice and beneficence components together yield the following reinterpretation of CI2 by O'Neil: (CI2*) 2nd Formulation of CI--The Formula of Human Dignity:

In your actions, 1) never treat people using maxims they could not reasonably consent to if fully informed and 2) treat people (yourself included) in ways that enhance their autonomy provided that you do not thereby violate clause 1). Note: This re-formulation of CI2 seems to get around the first problem with Kant's CI2 (with the newspaper & the assassin cases). Why? ... However, with the collateral damage case, the result might be too strong.

What is Attractive about Classical Act Utilitarianism (CAU)?

It analyzes morality via a set of seemingly objective notions: the causal consequences of action, the pain and/or pleasure experienced by individuals, and arithmetical notions of summing and comparison: +, -, >, and =. Its main ideas have a very plausible ring: "You ought to do the best you can all things considered. In figuring out what's morally best, everyone counts equally"

Hedonistic Measurement:

It is assumed that in principle (i.e. from a God's eye point of view) there are two universal scales by which we could numerically measure the amount of pleasure and measure the amount of displeasure in any situation for any given individual. Each scale (for pleasure or displeasure) looks like this:

Two Ways a Maxim Can Be Non-Universalizable:

Kant divided non-universalizable maxim cases into two classes--two ways that an agent might have a maxim that was not consistently will-able. The generalized form of the agent's maxim is: (a) internally inconsistent (it is logically incoherent that it be a law of nature governing all people's behavior--in situations where there are people). or b) externally inconsistent (it is inconsistent with the general policies that any rational agent would endorse for all such agents).

KANT'S INSIGHTS - A Contractualism Based on Respect not Power:

Kant gives the notion of respect a central place in ethics and politics. We should govern ourselves via norms that all could accept simply as rationale agents (not because one is in great power and another is in little power)1 "General law" is here used in the ordinary legal sense (not "natural law" as in CI1). "Solely as a rational agent implies all rational agents would choose likewise, since it is only because of this common trait that you choose the laws. ...We will return to CI3 when we read John Rawls and Jean Hampton

Objections to Kant: Kant's Rigidity of Moral Rules:

Kant infamously argues that it would be wrong to lie to a would-be murderer to save an innocent friend. He seems to think that we can never have any excuse for getting dirty hands (as it were), not even when resisting evil. But then Kant would also disallow telling a lie to a parent when recovering from a heart attack, even though the truth or a non-answer would likely upset them and perhaps cause their death. Kant's reasoning in support of this seems clearly fallacious. Arguing (correctly) that obligations are not conditional on our inclinations and preferences, does not warrant concluding that they are therefore never defeasible by anything, not even other morally relevant considerations, things that have nothing to do with the agent's personal inclinations and preferences. Surely, weaker moral obligations can be defeated by more stringent moral obligations. So the rule "don't lie" is independent of an agent's inclinations, but when following it would involve violating a more stringent moral obligation, like "don't contribute to the death of an innocent person", it should be violated, and for moral reasons.

EX 2: A: My borrowing money on the false pretense of repaying.

MAX(A): If I ever want money, and can get it only if I promise to repay knowing I can't, then I will (try to) borrow it, promising to repay anyway. GEN-MAX(A): If anyone ... then she ... "... this maxim can never rank as a universal law of nature and be self-consistent, For,...it would make promising,...itself impossible, since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams." R(2): The GEN-MAX(A) is internally inconsistent: it couldn't be a law in a system of nature, since if everyone always lied under such circumstances, the practice of promising-making and borrowing couldn't exist.

EX 3: A: I let my talents rust.

MAX(A): If I am in comfortable circumstances, and I don't feel like making any effort to develop [any of] my talents, then I won't. GEN-MAX(A): If anyone ... then she ... "A system of nature could indeed subsist under such a universal law ... (South Sea Islanders) ... Only he cannot possibly will [it] ...For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his powers should be developed, since they serve him, and are given him, for all sorts of possible ends." R(2): Although GEN-MAX(A) is internally consistent, it is not externally consistent: it conflicts with the policy that people make the efforts needed to develop their talents, a policy any fully rational agent would endorse.

EX 4: A: I don't help others in desperate need.

MAX(A): If I can help desperate others at no great cost to myself, but with no gain to myself, then I will not help. GEN-MAX(A): If anyone ... then she ... "Now admittedly if such a maxim were a universal law of nature, mankind could get on perfectly well..., yet it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold... For a will which decided this way would be in conflict with itself, since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself." R(2): Although GEN-MAX(A) is internally consistent, it is externally inconsistent: the GEN-MAX(A) conflicts with a general policy all rational agents would endorse: that people receive aid from others when desperate if the cost to the giver is low.

EX 1: A: I commit suicide.

MAX(A): If the remainder of my life is ever going to be bad on balance, then I will commit sui cide out of self-love. GEN-MAX(A): If the remainder of anyone's life is ever going to be bad on balance, then s/hewill commit suicide out of self-love. "...a system of nature by whose law the very same feeling [self-love] whose function is to stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy life would contradict itself." R(2): The GEN-MAX(A) is internally inconsistent: it couldn't be a law in any system of nature, since committing suicide out of self-love is contrary to the function of self-love, which includes self-preservation.

Conflicting Rules:

Might not the ideal code be one where rules can conflict? How then do we resolve the conflict?

Some Challenges for Mill's Ranking Criterion - 3) Cardinal Ordering vs. Ordinal Ordering:

Mill's criterion only tells us when one pleasure has a better quality than another; it does not tell us how to assign a numerical value to the two qualities, onethat would allow us to measure the extent to which the one is better than the other. Secondly, does it make sense to say "As have TWICE THE QUALITY of pleasure of Bs "-- even if it does make sense to say that pleasure of type A is qualitatively better than that of type B? [This is a very serious objection about any possible calculating.]

CI3) 3rd Formulation of CI-- The Formula of Autonomous Legislation in a Kingdom of Ends:

Never act in such a way that your action under your maxim would violate some general law that you solely as a rational agent could\would endorse for all rational agents to live under in an ideal political community.1

Autonomy:

Our capacity to deliberate and govern our choices and actions by reason.

Rawls' Three Principles

P1: The Principle of Maximal Equal Liberty: Each citizen should be given the most extensive basic liberties compatible with comparable liberties for all.[i. e. Among schemes equally distributing liberties among citizens, that scheme will be chosen that awards the most extensive basic liberties to each citizen.] P2: The Principle of Exceptions to Social and Economic Equality (P2): Arrangements allowing for social and economic inequalities are to be permitted only if (a) there is good reason to believe they will be to the advantage of all (thus even those worst off in them are better off than they would otherwise be) and (b) the social positions of the better off are open to all (equal opportunity). [i. e. All inequalities are to be ruled out that are either (i) at the expense of some or (ii) are associated with positions that are arbitrarily closed off for some (i.e. there must be equal opportunity for all positions of favor). This implies that inequalities are justified only if they benefit even the most disadvantaged citizens. P3: Priority: P1 takes priority over P2 if they conflict,

Virtue Ethics II Background: Two Traditional Questions:

Philosophy of Moral Principles: "What should I do? [Modern European] Philosophy of Moral Character: "How should I be? [Ancient Greek]("What sort of person should I be?") Middle Ages in Europe: Morality consists of Divine Commands: Laws by Decree of a Supreme Authority. Renaissance into Modern: Morality Begins to be Secularized: Divine Laws of Morality now Become Moral Laws of Reason (cf. Hobbes and Kant)

The Original Position:

Refers to the hypothetical assembly above, with all operating temporarily as non-envious, rational egoists while behind the veil of ignorance.

J u s t i c e/ / \ \ 4 Key Notions:

Rationality, Non-Envy, Self-Interest, Impartiality We will rely on our intuitive sense of rationality and envy. We rely on no particular conception of what makes up a good life (such as Hedonism). We will assume we all benefit from certain abstract goods, "social goods", even with different conceptions of what counts as a good life: Primary Social Goods: food, clothing, shelter, security, liberties and rights (e.g. to vote), etc. This will allow us to factor in self-interest from a more neutral perspective. The Main Task Then: How to assure "impartiality" for generating only just principles?

Rawl's general conception of justice:

Rawls' argues this "general conception" of justice would be endorsed in the Original Position: General Conception: All primary social goods are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution is to benefit everyone (and thus benefit the worst off too). He next makes this conception more specific, but first, he distinguishes a sub-class of social goods: Basic Liberties: political ones (freedom of speech & assembly, the right to vote, hold office, etc.); personal ones (freedom to live as you choose, hold property, etc.); legal ones (freedom from arbitrary arrest, seizure, etc., right to a defense, etc.) He then argues for a more specific conception, one that differentiates the status of basic liberties from the status of other primary social goods, giving priority to liberty:

UTILITARIANISM VIA HEDONISTIC VALUE THEORY:

Say that "an action is OPEN to an agent" when the agent is able to perform it. We can now evaluate the actions open to a given agent (his\her options) hedonistically by considering the balance of pleasure over displeasure that they would cause for any selected individual (or set of individuals) we choose. This is called the "Utility" of the action. Officially: The Utility of an Action (A) for a Person: the amount of pleasure that said person would experience as a result of that action minus the amount of displeasure that she would experience as a result of that action.

CI1 viewed as a 5 Step Decision Procedure:

S1: Identify the maxim of the agent's action. S2: Construct the generalized form of that maxim. S3: Imagine a world where the generalized form held like a law of nature. S4: Is such a world possible/coherent? [Test Part A] If so, go to S5.If not, you're done, the act is impermissible. S5: Could the agent consistently (& rationally) will to be in such a world? [Test Part B] If so, you're done, the act is in the clear/permissible.If not, you're done, the act is impermissible.

CH9 Difficulties and Strategies for Hitting the Mean:

Since it is easy to miss the mean, we must develop strategies to get better at hitting it, or to at least come closer to hitting it. The best strategy is to aim at the lesser of two evils, when one vice is worse than another (further from the mean than the other), Also we should compensate for our personal strongest tendencies in one direction or another. (If I am more strongly drawn toward hedonistic excesses (i.e. to my detriment), say, then initially, I should let the pendulum swing past the mean, of moderation and temperance, toward the opposite extreme, of asceticism.) This will perhaps eventually weaken my tendency toward the one extreme, thus putting me closer to the mean.

Objections to Kant: Particularize Your Maxim:

Sometimes a more specific maxim could be universalized, reversing the result: An action that is impermissible under one maxim might have been permissible for the agent is she had chosen it under another maxim: EX: Whenever I don't want to pay basic taxes and I made $733.29 less last year and I just bought a yacht that I would really like to take on vacation, THEN I won't pay my taxes. Generalized: Whenever anyone doesn't want to pay taxes & ..., THEN she won't pay her taxes.

(CI2) 2nd Formulation of CI:

The Formula of Human Dignity: In your actions, always treat people (including yourself) as ends and never solely as means. Ex: Nazi gruesome "scientific" experiments on conscious concentration camp victims, murder for profit, mugging, terrorism, lying, cheating, coercion, etc.

Some Challenges for Mill's Ranking Criterion - 4) What if the Majority is Wrong?:

The fact that the majority exposed to both kinds of pleasure prefer pleasures of type A to those of Type B doesn't guarantee that pleasures of type A are worthy of being preferred to pleasures of type B. If there is a real objective difference in quality, then why can't the majority be wrong? [Cf. The preferences and pleasures of the Roman citizens for the profoundly cruel barbarisms of the Coliseum.] If no objective difference, then why should we allow the majority's preferences about quality to count, and does that mean Mill has abandoned the objectivism of SHAU? [This is also an important objection about the basic idea.]

MILL'S QUALIFIED HEDONISTIC ACT UTILITARIANISM (QHAU):

The overall value of an experience of pleasure is a function of its: a) Intensity b) Duration c) Quality

CH3 The Role of Pleasure and Pain in Moral Education:

The pleasure or pain which accompanies actions may be regarded as a test of a person's moral state--what we take pleasure or pain in is also important to our character. For moral virtue is concerned in part with pleasures and pains. It is pleasure that makes us do what is base, and pain which makes us abstain from doing what is noble. This is why excellence is always concerned with what is harder (but better). Ex. If fully courageous a certain satisfaction will come from doing what you know you should. If a big struggle takes place in order to stand your ground when you know you should, then although this may still be admirable, it reflects the fact that courage is not yet firmly rooted in your character, else there would be no struggle (though there may be fear) since you would not vacillate about doing what you see you ought to do. Hence, the important of early training, and self-habituation, so that we become habituated to take pleasure and pain in the right things; for this is true education. If a person abstains from pleasure (when he recognizes that he should in the circumstances), but does so very reluctantly and indecisively ("painfully"), then, although perhaps admirable, the person is not yet firmly temperate and is still overcoming self-indulgence. When temperance is established (firmly rooted) it is no longer particularly difficult to resist the temptation to pursue pleasures that you recognize you shouldn't pursue in the circumstances. The fully temperate person will in fact get some satisfaction in taking the right course.

Utopianism:

The theory tells us what would be right and wrong in ideal circumstances. But this won't always match what is right or wrong in real (i. e. sub-ideal) circumstances. Can it be adapted?

KANT'S NOTORIOUS FORMULATIONAL PROBLEM:

The upshot is that Kant's main formulation of his main principle, CI1, doesn't have the results he thinks it does when carefully applied. In each case, it seems to fail to give the classification he thinks a correct theory should, although he mistakenly overlooks this fact in each case. So Kant never identified a sense of inconsistencyt hat will do the job he wants his CI to do: to give the ruling he thinks is intuitively correct for his four examples. As we saw, in at least some cases (e.g. perhaps suicide and rusting talents), it may be just as well that his account does not give the definitive results that he finds intuitive, because some of Kant's intuitions are very controversial to begin with. In the case of promise-breaking under the conditions described, his intuition seems right, such an act would be wrong, but CI1 doesn't give that result; s imilarly for his "no charity" case. We also note that Kant appears to think that all four types of action are alwayswrong, and so, wrong under any maxim, and we have seen that this is dubious. Minor changes in a maxim may support a reversal of the act's moral status under CI1 (e.g. as we suggested with rusting talents, and with promise-breaking).

[The Agent-Utility of an action:

The utility of that action for the agent of the action (the person performing the action). Since we are not analyzing a hedonistic form of egoism, this available notion is not crucial here.]

CH8 Different Virtues are Differently Related to Their Extremes:

There are then three dispositions, two being vices, namely excess and deficiency, and one being a virtue, namely the mean. The two extremes are mutually opposed, as is the mean from the two extremes, but the two extremes are in greater opposition to one another. Since the mean in virtue is not a mathematical intermediate distance, the mean is sometimes more opposed to the deficiency than to the excess, and vice versa. Thus cowardice, not rashness, is more opposed to courage. Sometimes the vice that is the deficiency is more like the virtue that is the mean than is the vice that is the excess, other times, matters are reversed.

KANT'S INSIGHTS - Immorality Often Involves Inconsistency of a Sort:

There is a sense in which I am inconsistent when I take unfair advantage of a situation. Not taking unfair advantage is a central part of ethics.

Some Challenges for Mill's Ranking Criterion - 1) "All Other Things Being Equal":

To compare the quality of a given pleasure of type A to one of type B, we need to make sure that they are of equal intensity & duration, so that only the quality could effect a difference in our evaluation of them. Secondly, how do we do this-- esp. for intensity?

The General (Rough) Pattern of Rule Utilitarianism:

Utility considerations are directly applied to general rules (e.g. prohibited act types), not to concrete acts. Concrete acts are then directly evaluated via the selected rules, not by the comparative utility that they would cause.Some notion of Total Utility →Correct Rules→ Normative Status of Concrete Acts So the principle of utility only indirectly applies to individual actions, the rules are intermediaries....Next is a particular version of RU that has received a lot of attention.

1Why are virtues important?

Virtues usually make people's live go better, and moral virtues usually make our collective lives go better. Virtue Ethics (or Agent-based Ethics): All moral evaluations of action are derived from independent and non-derivative evaluations of the inner life of the agent (her motives, desires, character traits, or such). An action is impermissible iff and because it one that a good person would rule out. An action is permissible iff and because it is one that a good person would not rule out. An action is obligatory iff and because it is one that a good person would be compelled to do.

Objections to Kant: Is There Always a Maxim?:

We often act without much thought. In such cases, the right hand side of CI automatically fails. For it is trivially false that "our action's maxim is universalizable" if our action has no maxim to begin with. But then it follows at once that we do not act permissibly, that is, we act impermissibly.

Some Remaining Challenges For AU: Membership in 2 Societies:

What if I am a member of two societies? (Cf. NCR) "The" Ideal Code: Why can't there be distinct top ranked codes? If so, which one do we follow when they conflict?

Ideal Moral Code Theory (Officially Stated):

an action is permissible iff it does not violate any correct rule for the agent's society. an action is obligatory iff it is required by a correct rule for the agent's society.

KANT'S INSIGHTS - Moral Rightness and Wrongness is Categorical in the Sense:

if something I do is morally wrong, it is not wrong only if I happen to have a certain inclination or preferences. "You shouldn't murder for profit" vs. "You shouldn't murder for profit, if you don't happen to like hurting people".

An Action's Maxim is Universalizable:

if the agent of the action could consistently will (or accept) that the generalized form of her maxim functioned like a natural law. --So my maxim is universalizable if it would be consistent with my aims that the general form of my maxim apply to the behavior of all rational beings for all time, like a law of physics.

A MORAL CODE:

is a set of rules of this form (though some are surely better than others). We will be interested in the relationships these codes might bear to Societies. One important relationship a society can bear to a code is currency.

The QUALIFIED VALUE of the Pleasure in an Experience:

the intensity of pleasure in the experience times the duration of pleasure in the experience times the quality value of the experience: Qualified Value of e = QUAL(e) x INT(e) x DUR(e).

An Action's Maxim:

the maxim by which the agent of the action chooses the action (Determined by her intention and conception of her circumstances.)(MU) -A maxim is a concise expression of a fundamental moral rule or principle, whether considered as objective or subjective contingent on one's philosophy. -Generally any simple and memorable rule or guide for living; for example, 'neither a borrower nor a lender be'. Tennyson speaks of 'a little hoard of maxims preaching down a daughter's heart (Locksley Hall), and maxims have generally been associated with a 'folksy' or 'copy-book' approach to morality.[1]

FIRST TWENTIETH CENTURY MODEL - I. RULE UTILITARIANISM--A NEO-UTILITARIAN APPROACH to AU

Determines the normative status of particular concrete actions solely on the basis of the comparative utility (total utility) of their consequences. What type of action a particular act is, whether a case of promise-breaking or promise-keeping, punishing the innocent or punishing the guilty, enslaving or emancipating, etc., has no relevance from the standpoint of CAU. And we have seen that it is the de facto relevance of just such features of actions that makes CAU so unacceptable from the common sense perspective on morality. Rule Utilitarians enter here by trying to inherit what is right in both these perspectives w\o inheriting CAU's difficulties. They do this by using the principle of utility to determine which types (or general rules) of actions are acceptable, and then they determine the status of individual concrete actions according to whether their type is acceptable or not. The General (Rough) Pattern of Rule Utilitarianism: Utility considerations are directly applied to general rules (e.g. prohibited act types), not to concrete acts. Concrete acts are then directly evaluated via the selected rules, not by the comparative utility that they would cause. Some notion of Total Utility →Correct Rules→ Normative Status of Concrete Acts So the principle of utility only indirectly applies to individual actions, the rules are intermediaries....Next is a particular version of RU that has received a lot of attention.

The Assembly:

Everyone is assembled together. All are equally free to propose principles, argue for or against them, and vote when a motion is called. For such a principle to pass, a unanimous vote is required.

John Rawls

Foreground: John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), gives an analysis of social\political structural justice. His Main Question: When is the basic structure of a society just? He tries to answer this by arguing that people, placed under certain conditions, would agree to certain principles of justice, principles that apply first and foremost to the basic structure of society. He is thus a contractarian, but a Kantian, not a Hobbesian one. The Basic Idea: Just Principles are those principles that all rational, self-interested, and non-envious people would agree to for their society if they were to choose from an impartial perspective:

Objections to Kant: Is Immorality Intrinsically Irrational:

Kant wants to claim that morality can be deduced from our rationality alone--that our rationality alone imposes morality on us. It seems to follow, and Kant takes it as following, that immorality is then not only immoral (obviously) but irrational. But this is not obvious at all. It does not seem that a hitman is necessarily irrational, just horribly immoral. Killing people for profit is intrinsically immoral, but it is not intrinsically irrational. (Indeed, it can be quite profitable for the minimal time invested, and that is one reason why rational but immoral people choose it as a profession.) Also, if it really was irrational, then you could argue in court from the mere fact that the person was a hitman that he was irrational, and then argue that since he is irrational, he has at best limited responsibility, and this should at least mitigate against strong punishment. Such an argument is surely sophistry. In fact, often the death penalty is allowed only for special cases like that of murder for hire.

Objections to Kant: Don't We Want to Know Simply: Which Actions are Wrong?

Kant's theory is formulated to tell us when an action is wrong-under-a-given-maxim. However, don't we generally want to know whether various actions would be wrong in a given circumstance simpliciter? Kant, in discussing his examples, seems to think that he is showing us that certain types of actions are wrong per se (e. g. lying) by showing us that they are wrong under a certain maxim. But this just doesn't follow.

Act Consequentialism:

Keep "Do the best you can!" for permissibility, but opt for an improved value theory for "best". (Alter the underlying value theory to avoid some of the objections, but keep the analysis of moral statuses in terms of the best consequences—as Mill did to SHAU to get QHAU.)

KANT'S INSIGHTS - Treating People as Things:

That people are rationale deliberators give one reason why it is wrong to treat them certain ways (e. g. as slaves) and to use coercion, deception, etc. (rather than persuasion leading to consent) for achieving our own ends. (But the fact that animals (and infants) can suffer seems like it is also a good reason to not treat them in certain ways even in the absence of rationality or autonomy.)

CH2 The Correct Method of Habituation:

The goal of our inquiry is not purely theoretical, it is not merely to know what virtue is, but to become more virtuous. So, since acts determine character, we must inquire into the right way to perform acts. But we can not expect mathematical precision in ethics. The kind of reasoning demanded in any subject must be such as the subject matter itself allows. In particular cases, there is no getting around the need to exercise judgment. No true general rules will tell us precisely what to do in all cases. In matters of virtue, deficiency and excess are both fatal: Strength is diminished by overtraining and lost by under-training. Health is diminished by under-eating or overeating. Similarly, a person who never faces any perceived threat is a coward; one who faces every perceived threat is foolhardy or rash. So, repeatedly choosing to give way too often or too little when threatened leads to a character defect. On the flip side: by repeatedly opting for pleasure just when we should and standing our ground just when we should we become temperate and courageous, and as these traits become instilled in us more and more, it requires less and less effort to resist the temptation to be intemperate or to be uncourageous--their opposites become habitual.

A MORAL CODE IS CURRENT

in a Society iff the vast majority of people in the society subscribe to each rule in the code, and this fact is a matter of public knowledge. (cf. Anthropologist's notion of a society's moral code.) Currency is not to be confused with strict conformity. Given the above, a code is current in a society only if the majority of people in the society "subscribe" to its rules. Roughly, to subscribe to a rule is to accept it as a sound moral rule. Although there is generally some relationship between a rule subscribed to and a rule conformed to, currency by no means entails conformance (nor vice versa). One can accept a rule as sound w/o always conforming to it. However, if you genuinely subscribe to a rule and on a given occasion you knowingly violate it, then normally, you will feel guilty, and if you know that the rule is part of a code that is current, then you will have a reasonable expectation of chastisement from others for your violation, etc. In contrast, it is logically impossible to knowingly violate a rule to which one strictly conforms.

Utility of A for Jane Doe:

the pleasure A would cause for Doe - the displeasure A would cause for Doe --------------------------------- = the utility of A for Doe (A 's overall value for Doe's welfare) Note: The person in question need not be the agent of the action. For ex., we can talk about the utility for you of my making an easy\hard test, of my giving you all my money, etc. Also, the utility can be zero, of course: most of my actions have no utility for you.

The Total Utility of an Action:

the sum of all the individual utilities the action would yield for all people if it were performed.

HEDONISM:

the view that the only things that have any intrinsic value (value on their own merits, or in their own right, whether positive or negative) are pleasant and unpleasant experiences. -All other things that have value have only extrinsic value (because they merely produce or prevent pleasant or unpleasant experiences). Their value derives only from pleasant/unpleasant experiences.