Philosophy Chapter 2 Dualism, Functionalism, Behaviorism)

To explain why mental states seem to interact with psychical states, two theories are put forward

Occasionalism Pre-Established Harmony

Two differnt types of Parallelism

Occasionalism Pre-Established Haromy

Problems with Epiphenomenalism

Our conscious thoughts have no effect on what we do, which is counterintuitive. We cannot explain why consciousness evolved on this theory, as it is a by-product.

Main problems with Cartesian Dualism

Problem of Interaction: How can something without matter, taking up no space, affect matter? Problem of other minds: if our mind has no physical properties we cannot use physical instruments to detect them. Thus, there is no absolute way to show that anyone other than yourself has a mind

Double Aspect Theory

Spinoza believed that there is one kind of substance in the universe, but it was neither physical nor mental. The physical and mental properties we see in the world are just two aspects of the way this substance appears to us. If we view the substane within ourselves, we have mental properties. If we view the same substance outside ourselves we have physical properties.

Logical Behaviorism is a better theory than Certesian Dualism in the sense that it is simpler, it postulates fewer entities in the world, it has also been more fruitful and more conservative than Cartesian Dualism. ((It solves the problem of of their minds, allows predictions and fits with existing scientific theories))

TRUE

You can think of our mind as the "software" and the brain as the "hardware" if you are a

functionalist

Functioanlism

has problems because it seems as if we could give the "right" output to a given set of "inputs" and not have a mind ((Chinese Room example))

Descartes - The Divisbility Argument

if minds are identical to bodies then whatever is true of minds is true of bodies (and vice versa) Minds are indivisble and bodies and divisible Therefore, minds are not identical to bodies.

Logical Behaviorism

is counterintuitive because it seems that we can be in pain even when we don't behave as such, and we could ac like we are in pain even when we are not.

Some people think that the best way to define the _ is not by referring to what it is made of (the brain) but rather by referring to what it does.

mind

Believing empiricism was true, many early psychologists argued that the only way to conduct a science of the mind was through _ _

observable behavior (sine other people's thoughts and beliefs are not observable)

Because property dualists believe mental states are not redicuble to some physical state, they believe mental properties are

primitive (mental states cannot be explained in terms of anything more fundamental ... like heat can be explained in terms of molecular motion)

Eliminative Materialism

seems mistaken because the first person stuff we know (Qualia, or how something feels) is not something we can know just by knowing all the physical stuff about the brain.

Identity Theory

seems wrong because we think it is possible for something to have a mind even if it did not have a human-like brain

Eliminative materialism

the doctrine that there are no mental states ((Chuchlands, D. Lewis))

Absent Qualia Objection

the objection to functionalism based on the belief that a functional state could have all the functional properties of a mental state without having any of its qualitative content Most common Objection to functionalism.

Eliminative materialism believes that...

the talk of beliefs, desires, and feelings is just like the talk of demons and spirits of past centuries.

idealism

theory that all that exists are mind and the contents of minds

Dualism

theory that both minds and material objects exist

Parallelism...

uses God to explain the interaction between mind and body. However, in comparison with the competing theories, this one loses out in fruitfulness, scope and simplicty

Epiphenomenalism...

has no interaction between the mind and the body.

Dualist Theories

Cartesian Dualism Parallelism Epiphenomenalism

Mental States were nothing but our physical behavior reasoning

1) Something is not a real idea unless it is derived from sense experience 2) A sentence is meaninful only if it contains ideas which were derived from sense experience (logical empircism) So if we cannot tell whether a sentence is true by looking to the sensible world, then it is meaningless. 3) Because of this, Theorists believed that the meaning of a sentence just is its method of verification For example, to understand what the sentence "The cat is on the mat" means just is to understand how to verify it ((VErifiability Theory of Meaning)) 4) Consider how one determines whether another person is thirsty, in pain, or in love. What you do is look at their behavior. Sicne the method of verification is an examination of external behavior, it follows that all we mean by "Thirst" "pain" or "love" is the external behavior, period.

If property dualism is true, we need to explain two things

1) Why do these mental states exist? Assuming evolution is true, there must be some survival advantage to having mental states, otherwise it would not be around now. 2) How is it possible for mental states to emerge from the brain and yet the mind can cause changes to the body ((Downwards causation)) The idea that mental states may cause changes to the physical parts of one's body is one of the hottest ideas in current research.

Serle's Claim

A computer will never have semantics just syntax. Thus, a comp will never have intelligence. "Chinese Room"

Alan Turing and the Turing Test

A test thought to indicate whether a computer, or anything else, is intelligent.

Descartes Conceivability Argument

An attribute is essential to something if and only if it's inconceivable that the thing exist without it It is not inconceivable for me to exist and not have a body Therefore, my body is not essential to me (to what "I" am) It is inconceivable for me to exist and not have a mind Therefore, my mind is essential to me (fpr me to exist)

The most famous psychological behaviorist

B.F Skinner (Who felt that if there were mental states they would have no effect on behavior .)

Identity Theory

Because of the Phineas Gage case (a change in the brain led to a change in one's personality) people started to believe that there was a very close link between the physiology of the brain and the mind, or our mental states. The doctrine that our mental states just are brain states is known as the identity theory. Identity theory does not assume the existance of any mental stuff, like logical behaviorism it seems to fit well with existing scientific theory and to be able to explain many things which Cartesian dualists cannot.

The 4 different Materialistic theories

Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Eliminative Materialism, property Dualism

Empiricsts

Believed that all knoweldge ultimately comes from experience. The main proponents of this theory were Locke and Hume. They believed everything in our minds came from the senses and that if something was not derived from the senses, it could not be a real idea. This is what lead Hume to conclude things like "liberty" and "self" were not really ideas, but meaningless words we throw around.

the most common form of Idealism is that of __

Berkely

The first conceivability argument

Descartes believed that the mind and body were completely different things and he had to arguments to establish this point

Eliminative Materialism's thoughts on folk psychology

Folk psychology does not explain anything and mental states are just as mysterious as they have ever been when we speak of beliefs, desires, feelings. We cannot explain memory, intelligence, or mental illness with folk psychology.

Inverted Spectrum Problem

Hillary Putnam : someone who sees colors just as we do one day changes and begins to see colors in a diff way (inverted) Red things look blue, but you can still learn to change your behavior so that when you see a stop sign (which now looks blue) you call it red. Mental states are not meerly functional states

`Identity THeory Objections

If true, then whatever is true of mental states is true of brain states. Each will not necessarily share the same subjective properties but they must share all objective properties. (EX. You may not believe Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn, but you do believe that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn. The fact that the two do not share the same subjective properties does not mean thye are not identical ( they are) To be identical they must share all objective properties (size, location, color) Since there is some objective property of brain sthats that mental states do not have ("being known through empirical invesitgation) the identitty theory has a problem ((Nagel and his bat)) If the identity theory were true, it would be impossible for creatures without a brain to have mental states. This does seem logically possible, maybe even physically possible.

The 3 versions of Dualism

Interactionism Epiphenomenalism Parallelism

Materialist theories

Logical behaviorism Identity theory Eliminative materialism

Frank Jackson's version of Absent Qualia Objection

Mary the scientist would know all the physical stuff there is to know about the world and not know what it is like to see red. knowing what it is like to see/smell/hear/taste/feel anything is not to be in possession of any information....Rather it is to be in possession of certain abilities. This is the distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how". No one could know how to tell an object is red without knowing what it is like to see red.

Descartes was a _. This means that he believed some knoweldge ultimately comes from reason, pure thought, Recall that he believed all knowledge was based on the basic idea that God is not a deceive,r and thus whatever he believes "clearly and distinctly" must be true.

Rationalist

Parallelism is

The theory that mind and body both exist, but do not interact with one another.

Epiphenomenalism

The theory that the mind is a by-product of the physical processes of the brain and cannot affect the activity of the brain

Occasionalism

Theory that God is constantly coordinating our physical and mental states so that it seems as if they are in sinc

Pre-Established Harmony

Theory that God only intervened once to put mental and physical activities into "harmony" and ever since God has just left the world run on its own.

Materialism

Theory that all that exists are material objects

Objections :::

This Theory is false if it is possible for a person to be in pain and not exhibit external behaviors conssitent with being in pain. The theory is false if it is possible for a person to exhibit the behavior of being in pain without being in pain. The verificability theory of meaning is flawed. The easiest way to see this is to ask "How can we verify if the verifiability theory of meaning is true" There is no way, hence by the theory itself, it is meaningless.

Turing Test

Three people, a man, woman, and interrogator. Interrogator stays in one room while other 2 go into diff room. The object is for the interrogator to correctly identify which is the woman and which is the man by asking them several questions. He knows them as X and Y and when the game is over, he claims X is the woman or Y is the woman. The goal of the woman is to be truthful and to help the interrogator, while the goal of the man is to lie and fool the interrogator. (There is a game show like this, "to tell the truth"). Turing supposed that if a computer could fool the interrogator as often as a real person could, then the computer is intelligent.

Function

What an object does.

Response:

You could respond by saying: (a) although these objections seem conceivable, they are not logically possible. (b) the subjective experience of how something "looks" is irrelevant. So long as we all agree to call "these" objects "red", it doesn't matter how it looks to you.

Cartesian Dualism

cannot explain how or why the mind can and does interact with the body. There does not seem to be any possible way to explain the interaction, because any explanation presupposes we can experience the mind

Consiousness is not a property of neurons or of the parts of the brain, but when the parts of the brain are put together in a complex enough way, consciousness _

emerges. (Just as being wet is a property that emerges when water molecules interact with objects at room temperature. Or just like being nontoxic is a property that emerges from the combination of sodium and chlorine, two toxic elemenets. Consciousness is a non-physical property which emerges from some physical objects.)