The Divine Command Theory
The difference between the divine command theory and the ethical omniscience theory is similar to the difference between the following claims:
Joe pushed Bob. Bob pushed Joe.
"Is God good because he is loving, generous, just, faithful, kind, and so forth? Or are these attributes good-making because God has them? On the first alternative, moral goodness supervenes directly on these marvelous traits of character.
Anyone who possesses sufficiently many of them to a sufficiently high degree is morally good, and—let it be noted—this will be so whether or not there is a God ..."
Arguments for the Divine Command Theory
Argument #1: It is not vulnerable to the objections to which moral relativism is vulnerable. Argument #2: It supports the view that God is sovereign.
Replies to Objection #4
First reply: God would not command rape, murder, or genocide because he has commanded previously that we not engage in these activities (see, for example, Exodus 20:13—"Thou shalt not kill"). Objection: God has commanded lots of things that we do not think apply any more, so why think his previous commands regarding killing, etc. apply now? Second reply: God would not command rape, murder, or genocide because he is perfectly morally good. Objection #1: In the context of the divine command theory, to say that God is perfectly morally good seems to mean that God perfectly obeys all of his own commands. And this meaning renders God's perfect moral goodness hollow. Objection #2: If, instead, what is meant is that God perfectly exemplifies all those traits that make for a perfectly morally good being—such as love, generosity, justice, faithfulness, and kindness—then a related problem arises. Third reply: God would not command rape, murder, or genocide because rape, murder, and genocide are morally wrong. Objection: This is to abandon the divine command theory in favor of another moral theory, one according to which the moral rightness and wrongness of acts exist independently of God's commands.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
Is an act morally right because God commands that we perform it, or does God command an act because it is morally right?
Objections to the Divine Command Theory
Objection #1: It entails that the moral wrongness of an act is simply a matter of God's command that we refrain from engaging in the act and not a matter of the effect of the act on those who have been wronged by it. Objection #2: It entails that activities such as rape, murder, and genocide were morally neutral prior to God's commands that we refrain from engaging in them. Objection #3: It entails that, had God not commanded that we refrain from engaging in rape, murder, and genocide, these activities would not be morally wrong. Objection #4: It entails that God could issue a command with regard to any activity whatsoever and, in so doing, make it morally right or morally wrong. Example: God could command rape, murder, and genocide and thereby make them morally right.
Summing up:
There is no moral reason for God not to command rape, murder, and genocide, and this is objectionable.
Three Ways in Which Morality Allegedly Depends on Religion
Way #1: Without religion, we would lack the motivation to do that which is morally right and to refrain from doing that which is morally wrong. Objection: There seem to be plenty of nonreligious motivations for doing that which is morally right and refraining from doing that which is morally wrong. Way #2: Without religion, we would not know which acts are morally right and which acts are morally wrong. Objection: Logically and arguably historically, morality preceded religion. Way #3: Without religion—specifically without God—no act would be morally right or morally wrong. Rather, all acts would be morally neutral. This brings us to Plato's Euthyphro and, with it, the divine command theory.
"Even if there were no perfect being, love and justice and the rest could still be constitutive of the moral ideal, and it could still be the case that persons
are morally good to the degree to which they realize that ideal in their lives. On a view like this, the existence of God plays no role at all in the ontology of moral value ... "
The Ethical Omniscience Theory
the view that God commands that we perform an act because it is morally right, and that God commands that we refrain from performing an act because it is morally wrong.
The Divine Command Theory
the view that an act is morally right because God commands that we perform it, and that an act is morally wrong because God commands that we refrain from performing it. This is just one of many ways in which morality allegedly depends on religion. The divine command theory sounds like—but is significantly different from—the ethical omniscience theory.
"So what about the other alternative? ... This alternative seems incredible to me. It implies that if there were no God who perfectly exemplified [these good-making properties]
then these properties would count for nothing. A person could be as fair-minded and loving and generous and faithful as you please and still fail to be morally better than a cruel and malicious person." (Wes Morriston)
