ALA Civ Pro & Con Law

D is correct. The court is likely to find that there are potential conflicts between those who never were hired, but now might be, and those who were hired. There is a high likelihood of conflicts of interest that would defeat any other commonalities. A is incorrect. Although 500 plaintiffs would make joinder impracticable, the size of the class is not dispositive when there are conflict-of-interest concerns. B is incorrect. There are common questions, including whether the company had policies and practices of discriminating against Latinos. However, having common questions of law will not overcome the potential conflicts of interest between the sub-groups of class members. C is incorrect. The numerosity requirement would be more likely to support class certification, not deny it. However, it is the potential for conflicts of interest that will likely prevent the court from certifying.

A Latino accountant, currently employed by a corporation, initiated a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of a class of current Latino employees and previous job applicants who were not hired, totaling 500 class members. The accountant claimed that the employees and applicants had been victimized by discriminatory policies and practices of the corporation, in both hiring and promotion. On her own behalf and on behalf of the proposed class, the accountant sought backpay, money damages, and injunctive relief prohibiting the corporation from continuing its discriminatory ways and requiring affirmative steps to remedy past discrimination. The potential class amounted to 500 people. The accountant moved the court to certify the class. Is the court likely to grant the motion to certify the class? A: Yes, because the class is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. B: Yes, because there are questions of law or fact common to the class members. C: No, because the class is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. D: No, because potential conflicts of interest among the class members could undermine the adequacy of the representation by the named member.

D is correct. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the court should consider the motion and weigh all the factors when deciding whether to grant the motion to transfer venue. A is incorrect. The federal transfer statute, which gives federal courts discretionary power to grant transfer motions, is applicable in diversity actions. B is incorrect. There is no federal law giving automatic effect to forum selection clauses. It is up to the court's discretion to decide whether to transfer the case to the jurisdiction designated by the forum-selection clause. C is incorrect. The disputed provision is a forum selection clause, not a choice-of-law provision because it indicates where the lawsuit should be filed, not which state's substantive law applies.

A calligrapher properly brought a diversity action against an illustrator in federal court in State A. The calligrapher's single-count complaint sought damages for breach of contract. The contract at issue has a clause providing that "any lawsuits concerning this contract shall be brought in State C." State A law provides that forum selection clauses are unenforceable. The illustrator then filed a motion to transfer the action to State C. How should the court rule on the illustrator's motion to transfer venue? A: Deny the motion, because this is a diversity action and State A law provides that forum selection clauses are unenforceable. B: Grant the motion, because federal law provides that forum selection clauses are enforceable. C: Grant the motion, because State A law is inapplicable given that the contract has a choice-of-law provision, not a forum selection clause. D: Consider the motion, because the court should weigh all factors, including the presence of a forum selection clause, to decide whether to grant the transfer

D is correct. The manufacturer's third-party complaint failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of FRCP 14(a), which states that an original defendant (third-party plaintiff) may only implead a third-party by alleging derivative liability, not by simply claiming the plaintiff sued the wrong defendant. A is incorrect. Third-party impleader falls within the court's supplemental jurisdiction, so it is permissible that the manufacturer and the designer are not diverse parties because the claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative facts." B is incorrect. The manufacturer was not required to obtain the court's leave to file a third-party complaint because it was contained in the answer. C is incorrect. A motion to dismiss may not resolve factual allegations, but rather, addresses whether the facts, taken as true, are sufficient to state a legal claim for relief.

A consumer from State A filed a $100,000 products liability action in federal court against a manufacturer incorporated and with its principal place of business in State B. The consumer claimed that a flaw in the manufacturer's product had resulted in severe injuries to the consumer. In its answer, the manufacturer asserted a third-party complaint against the product designer, also incorporated and with its principal place of business in State B. Believing that the consumer had sued the wrong defendant, the manufacturer claimed both that the designer was solely responsible for the flaw that had led to the consumer's injuries and that the manufacturer was not at fault. The designer is aware that the manufacturer did not follow all of the designer's specifications when making the product. Which of the following arguments is most likely to achieve the designer's goal of dismissal of the third-party complaint? A: The court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the third-party complaint, because both the manufacturer and the designer are citizens of State B. B: The manufacturer failed to obtain the court's leave to file the third-party complaint. C: The manufacturer's failure to follow the designer's specifications caused the flaw that resulted in the consumer's injuries. D: The manufacturer's third-party complaint failed to state a proper third-party claim.

C is correct. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4(c) authorizes any person who is at least 18 years-old and not a party to the action to serve the summons and complaint. Here, there is no indication that service of process was insufficient. Both the summons and complaint were served by someone over 18 years of age. FRCP 12(a) requires the mechanic, as the defendant, to answer the complaint within 21 days because service was proper. A is incorrect. The mechanic has 21 days, not 14 days, to file the answer. B is incorrect. There is no indication that service of process was insufficient because a 23-year-old law student, a nonparty, served the complaint. D is incorrect. As stated above, service was proper here, so there is no basis for this affirmative defense.

A driver filed a diversity action against a mechanic in federal court in State A. The mechanic was served with a complaint and summons by a 23-year-old law student. The student is unknown to both the driver and the mechanic and is working during the summer to pay for tuition. What is the mechanic's best response to the driver's complaint? A: Answer the complaint within 14 days, and should not include an affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. B: File a motion to dismiss, based on insufficient service of process. C: Answer the complaint within 21 days, and should not include an affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. D: Answer the complaint, and include an affirmative defense of insufficient service of process.

C is correct. This is a diversity case with a specific federal procedural rule on point that authorizes the court to order the examination. A is incorrect. This is a procedural issue, not a substantive one. Because there is a federal procedural rule allowing for the examination, the motion should be granted. B is incorrect. Although this is a diversity case, federal procedural rules govern this issue, not state law. D is incorrect. The truck driver's motion presents a procedural question, not a substantive one.

A garbage worker, a citizen of State A, sued a truck driver, a citizen of State B, in federal court in State B. The garbage worker is seeking $125,000 as compensation for injuries he suffered in a car accident that occurred in State A. State B law does not permit a court to order plaintiffs to submit to an examination by physicians, but State A law does. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to order a physical examination by a licensed examiner. The truck driver filed a motion challenging the alleged injuries and requested that the court order the garbage worker to submit to an examination by a licensed physician. Should the court grant the truck driver's motion? A: No, because this is a substantive issue and State B law applies. B: No, because this is a diversity case and State B law applies. C: Yes, because federal procedural rules apply. D: Yes, because this is a substantive issue and State A applies.

C is correct. Because State A's long-arm statute would not grant a state court personal jurisdiction over the homeowner, under FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court of State A would be subject to the same extent of the long-arm statute and would not have jurisdiction. A is incorrect. On the contrary, State A's long-arm statute is dispositive because if it would not grant a state court personal jurisdiction over the homeowner, it would not grant jurisdiction to a federal court either. B is incorrect. The "100-mile bulge" rule only applies to service of process when there is a party joined under FRCP 14 or FRCP 19, which is not the case here. D is incorrect. This is not an Erie problem because there is a controlling federal procedural rule—FRCP 4(k)(1)(A), which directs the federal court to apply the personal jurisdiction standard of the state in which it sits.

A gardener, a citizen of State A, sued a homeowner, a citizen of State B, in a State A federal court for breach of contract. The State A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction without violating the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, State A's long-arm statute would not grant a state court in State A personal jurisdiction over the homeowner. May the State A federal court exert personal jurisdiction over the homeowner? A: Yes, because State A's long-arm statute is irrelevant given that the gardener's lawsuit was filed in federal court. B: Yes, because no facts indicate that the homeowner was served more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued. C: No, because under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, State A's long-arm statute is applicable in federal court to the same extent as in state court. D: No, because State A's long-arm statute is applicable under the constitutional analysis established by the Erie decision.

D is correct. The State A law allowing for a new trial or remittitur on the ground that the damages were excessive applies because this is a diversity case and the court is required to apply the state substantive law standard. A is incorrect. As a federal court sitting in diversity, the correct remittitur standard is State A's "excessiveness" rather than the federal "shocks the conscience." B is incorrect. As stated above, the appropriate remittitur standard is "excessive" rather than "shocks the conscience," although the farmer should, in fact, include a motion for new trial in the alternative. C is incorrect. Although the court should apply the "excessiveness" standard, the Seventh Amendment requires that the judge also offer a choice between remittitur and a new trial.

A geologist properly filed a diversity action against a farmer in federal court in State A. The geologist is seeking recovery for the damage to her expensive sports car and the broken arm that she suffered as a result of a car crash with the farmer. At trial, after two days of testimony, the jury returned a verdict for the geologist and awarded her $800,000 in compensatory damages. Under federal law, a judge who believes compensatory damages are so excessive as to "shock the conscience" may offer the plaintiff the choice between a new trial or remittitur of the excessive damages. Under State A law, the court may reduce a jury's awards by way of remittitur if it thinks damages are "excessive." Which motion should the farmer file to challenge the damages award? A: Motion for remittitur, on the ground that the jury's damage award "shocks the conscience." B: Motion for remittitur and, in the alternative, for a new trial, on the ground that the jury's damage award "shocks the conscience." C: Motion for remittitur, on the ground that the jury's damage award was "excessive." D: Motion for remittitur and, in the alternative, for a new trial, on the ground that the jury's damage award was "excessive."

C is correct. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, even when the requirements for diversity of citizenship are satisfied, federal courts will not exercise jurisdiction over domestic relations or probate proceedings. Furthermore, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time and may not be waived. A is incorrect. Some grounds for dismissal, including a claim that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, may be raised at any time. Therefore, this would not be a basis to deny the wife's motion to dismiss. B is incorrect. Subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal. The wife's failure to raise a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in her answer thus does not bar her from properly raising it now. D is incorrect. This answer choice states the correct conclusion with the incorrect legal reasoning. It does appear from the facts that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the wife originally, but she submitted herself to personal jurisdiction in State A by answering the husband's complaint. Had the wife wanted to move for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, she would have had to do so before her responsive pleading or within the answer. By failing to bring a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(2) motion or raise it in her answer, the wife waived this defense.

A husband from State A filed a divorce action against his wife, a citizen of State B, in State A federal court. The husband asked the court to divide the marital estate valued at $2,755,000. The couple lived in State B at all times during the marriage. The wife had never been to State A before the lawsuit was filed. The wife answered the husband's complaint without asserting any affirmative defenses or filing any additional motions. Two years into the lawsuit, after discovery had been completed and four days before trial, the wife filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the husband's claims. Should the court grant the wife's motion to dismiss? A: No, because her motion to dismiss was not timely. B: No, because she waived any affirmative defenses when she filed her answer. C: Yes, because the federal court in State A lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. D: Yes, because the district court in State A lacks personal jurisdiction.

In order to combat terrorism, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the President to construct surveillance facilities on privately owned property if the President determines that the construction of such facilities is "necessary to safeguard the security of the United States." The statute provides no compensation for the owner of the land on which such facilities are constructed and provides that the surveillance facilities are to be owned and operated by the United States government. Pursuant to this statute, the President has determined that the construction of a surveillance facility on a very small, unused portion of an owner's large tract of land is necessary to safeguard the security of the United States. The construction and operation of the facility will not affect any of the uses that the owner is currently making of the entire tract of land. The owner has filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the construction of a surveillance facility on the portion of land at issue without compensation. How should the court rule? A: The construction of the facility would be a taking of the owner's property for which the owner must be compensated. B: The construction of the facility would single out the owner for adverse treatment in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. C: The construction and operation of the facility would not interfere with any use the owner is currently making of the entire tract of land, and therefore the owner would not be entitled to any compensation. D: The construction of the facility would be valid without any compensation, because it has been determined to be necessary to protect a compelling government interest in national security

A is correct. Any permanent physical occupation by the government of private property is a "taking" for which just compensation to the property owner is required. It is irrelevant that in this case, the portion of the owner's tract of land to be occupied by the government is unused and very small. The permanent physical occupation by the government of the owner's land is sufficient by itself to constitute a taking. C is incorrect. As stated above, any permanent physical occupation by the government of private property is a taking for which just compensation to the property owner is required. It is irrelevant that in this case the construction and operation of the facility will not affect any of the uses that the owner is currently making of the entire tract of land. B is incorrect. Constructing and operating the facility on the owner's land would not violate equal protection because the decision to do so was rationally related to the protection of national security, which is a legitimate government interest. Because construction and operation of the facility constitutes a permanent physical occupation by the government of the owner's land, the government would have to compensate the owner for taking his property. D is incorrect. The Takings Clause does not exempt takings that are necessary to protect a compelling government interest from the obligation to provide just compensation to the property owner. Therefore, in this case, the taking would be invalid without just compensation even if the government could show that the construction of the facility on the owner's land is necessary to protect a compelling government interest in national security

A group of students at a state university's law school wished to debate the future of affirmative action in that state and at that law school. For this debate, they requested the use of a meeting room in the law school that is available on a first-come, first-served basis for extracurricular student use. Speakers presenting all sides of the issue were scheduled to participate. The law school administration denied the use of its meeting room for this purpose solely because it believed that "such a debate, even if balanced, would have a negative effect on the morale of the law school community and might cause friction among the students that would disrupt the institution's educational mission." Is the law school's denial of the use of its meeting room for this purpose constitutional? A: No, because the law school cannot demonstrate that its action was necessary to serve a compelling state interest. B: No, because the law school cannot demonstrate that its action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. C: Yes, because the law school's only concern was the adverse effect of such a discussion of affirmative action on the immediate audience and the mission of the institution. D: Yes, because the law students do not have a right to use a state-owned law school facility for a meeting that is not organized and sponsored by the law school itself.

A is correct. As a threshold determination, the law school's regulation is content-based because it is aimed at the communicative impact of the speech. This means it must pass strict scrutiny and will be presumptively unconstitutional. The law school would need to prove that its denial was necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest, which it could not achieve here because its goal was merely to avoid "friction" and disrupting the mission. B is incorrect. As stated above, because the denial of the use of the room was content-based, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Satisfying rational basis scrutiny, as stated in this choice, would be insufficient to justify the school's regulation. C is incorrect. This concern by the law school regarding the effect of the debate on the audience and mission is not, in fact, a sufficient basis for upholding the regulation. Rather, it is not a compelling interest that would withstand the applicable standard of strict scrutiny, as stated above. D is incorrect. This choice references the analysis of whether the law school facility is a limited public forum, which is not necessary to determine and is also a misstatement of the law. A limited public forum may, in fact, be government property that is opened up for a designated purpose, even if organized by an outside, non-government entity. Nevertheless, this analysis is unnecessary because, as explained above, the restriction is content-based, triggering strict scrutiny.

The owner of a milk container manufacturing firm sought to focus public attention on the milk packaging law of a certain state in order to have it repealed. On a weekday at 12:00 noon, he delivered an excited, animated, and loud harangue on the steps of the State Capitol in front of the main entryway. An audience of 200 onlookers, who gathered on the steps, heckled him and laughed as he delivered his tirade. The owner of the manufacturing firm repeatedly stated, gesturing expressively and making faces that, "the g-ddamned milk packaging law is stupid," and that, "I will strangle every one of those g-ddamned legislators I can get hold of because this law they created proves they are all too dumb to live." After about fifteen minutes the owner of the milk container manufacturing firm stopped speaking, and the amused crowd dispersed. There is one relevant statute of the state which prohibits, "all speech making, picketing, and public gatherings of every sort on the Capitol steps in front of the main entryway between 7:45 a.m.-8:15 a.m., 11:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m., 12:45 p.m.-1:15 p.m., and 4:45 p.m.-5:15 p.m. on Capitol working days." The "Capitol Steps" statute is probably A: constitutional both on its face and as applied to the owner of the milk container manufacturing firm. B: constitutional on its face, but unconstitutional as applied to the owner of the milk container manufacturing firm. C: unconstitutional on its face, because it applied to all working days. D: unconstitutional on its face, because it concerns the State Capitol.

A is correct. Generally, the content-based regulation of speech is subject to strict scrutiny. However, where a statute regulates conduct incidental to speech, the Court has allowed the government to adopt content-neutral, time, place, and manner regulations. If the regulation involves a public forum, it will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to achieve an important government interest. Here, the statute is a content-neutral time and place regulation involving a public forum. The important government interest being advanced by the statute is the ability of workers at the State Capitol to be able to access the main entrance during business hours. The statute is also narrowly tailored to only affect the main entrance and to only restrict speech during times when there is likely to be traffic in and out of the building. Therefore, the statute is narrowly tailored to an important government interest and is constitutional both on its face and as applied to the owner of the manufacturing firm. B is incorrect. As applied to the owner of the manufacturing firm, the statute still satisfies the test for a content-neutral, time, place, or manner regulation of a public forum. C is incorrect. The statute's application to all working days is necessary to advance the important government interest of allowing workers access to the State Capitol building. D is incorrect. The fact that the statute concerns the State Capitol only means that it must be narrowly tailored to achieve an important government interest.

In the wake of massive terrorist attacks carried out inside the United States by foreign citizens, Congress declared war on the terrorists' nation of origin. It also passed a statute requiring every alien who is a citizen of the enemy nation to either immediately leave the United States voluntarily or be subject to deportation. An inseverable provision of the new statute provides that the United States Supreme Court will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought to challenge the validity of the statute. Is the new statute constitutional? A: No, because the statute does not fall within the categories of cases specified in Article III as those over which the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. B: No, because the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. C: Yes, because among the powers of Congress enumerated in Article I, Section 8, is the power to enact laws governing immigration and naturalization. D: Yes, because Article III specifically provides that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make.

A is correct. Granting the U.S. Supreme Court original jurisdiction over actions brought under the statute, which involves deportation of foreign citizens, is not permitted because those issues do not fall within any of the designated categories under Article III establishing the Court's original jurisdiction. B is incorrect. The statute is unconstitutional because it gives improper jurisdiction to the Court over issues not authorized by Article III. However, it is also a misstatement of the law that the statute violates the equal protection of the Fifth Amendment because classifications based on alienage are constitutional as long as they are not arbitrary and unreasonable, and the deportation is rationally related to protecting national security interests. C is incorrect. While Congress does have broad power to regulate matters involving naturalization, this statute nevertheless violates Article III because it grants original jurisdiction to the Court on matters not enumerated in Article III, and Congress may not expand the Court's jurisdiction outside of those categories, as explained above. D is incorrect. This provision of Article III allows for exceptions and regulations regarding the Court's appellate jurisdiction. By contrast, the Court has held that Congress may not expand its original jurisdiction outside of those enumerated categories of Article III.

A state statute prohibits any retailer of books, magazines, pictures, or posters from "publicly displaying or selling to any person any material that may be harmful to minors because of the violent or sexually explicit nature of its pictorial content." Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor. A corner store displays publicly and sells magazines containing violent and sexually explicit pictures. The owner of this store is prosecuted under the above statute for these actions. In defending against this prosecution in a state trial court, the argument that would be the best defense for the corner store is that the statute violates the A: First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute is excessively vague and overbroad. B: First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because a state may not prohibit the sale of violent or sexually explicit material in the absence of proof that the material is utterly without any redeeming value in the marketplace of ideas. C: equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally treats violent and sexually explicit material that is pictorial differently from such material that is composed wholly of printed words. D: equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally distinguishes between violent and sexually explicit pictorial material that may harm minors and such material that may harm only adults.

A is correct. The best defense for the corner store is that the statute is excessively vague and overbroad. It is vague because the terms "harmful" and "violent or sexually explicit nature" are not concrete enough to allow most people to understand what is prohibited. The statute is overbroad because it may prohibit material that is not shown to harm minors, but would not prohibit written material describing violent and sexually explicit acts, which would be harmful to minors. B is incorrect. The state may regulate the sale of violent or sexually explicit material, particularly to minors. The material need not be devoid of any redeeming value. C is incorrect. A classification between pictures and written words need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and this probably satisfies that standard because pictures can have an impact that the written words do not. D is incorrect. A classification based on age would be subject to rational basis review, and it is difficult to conceive of a material that would harm adults but not minors.

As part of a comprehensive federal aid-to-education program, Congress included the following provisions as conditions for state receipt of federal funds: (1) Whenever textbooks are provided to students without charge, they must include no religious instruction and must be made available on the same terms to students in all public and private schools accredited by the state educational authority. (2) Salary supplements can be paid to teachers in public and private schools, up to ten percent of existing salary schedules, where present compensation is less than the average salary for persons of comparable training and experience, provided that no such supplement is paid to any teacher who instructs in religious subjects. (3) Construction grants can be made toward the cost of physical plant at private colleges and universities, provided that no part of the grant is used for buildings in which instruction in religious subject matters is offered. A federal taxpayer challenges the construction grants to church-operated private colleges and universities. The most likely result is that the construction grants will be A: sustained, because aid to one aspect of an institution of higher education not shown to be pervasively sectarian does not necessarily free it to spend its other resources for religious purposes. B: sustained, because bricks and mortar do not aid religion in a way forbidden by the establishment clause of the First Amendment. C: held unconstitutional, because any financial aid to a church-operated school strengthens the religious purposes of the institution. D: held unconstitutional, because the grants involve or cause an excessive entanglement with religion.

A is correct. The construction grants are specifically restricted from being used for buildings where religious instruction is offered. The argument that this would free up funds to spend on religious objectives is not enough to violate the Establishment Clause because any advancement of religion would only be a side effect of the grant. Therefore, the construction grants are constitutional. B is incorrect. If the construction grants are used for building a religious place of worship, then the primary effect of the grant would be an advancement of religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause. C is incorrect. When government aid is provided to a private, religiously-affiliated college, it will be found constitutional as long as it is explicitly reserved for non-religious purposes, and the recipient agrees in good faith to use the funds in that way, it does not violate the Establishment Clause. D is incorrect. The grants do not need the kind of supervision that would cause excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

An independent municipal water-supply district was incorporated under the applicable laws of a particular state. The district was created solely to supply water to an entirely new community in a recently developed area of the state. That new community is racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse, and the community has never engaged in any discrimination against members of minority groups. The five-member, elected governing board of the newly created district contains two persons who are members of racial minority groups. At its first meeting, the governing board of the district adopted a rule unqualifiedly setting aside 25% of all positions on the staff of the district and 25% of all contracts to be awarded by the district to members of racial minority groups. The purpose of the rule was "to help redress the historical discrimination against these groups in this country and to help them achieve economic parity with other groups in our society." Assume that no federal statute applies. A suit by appropriate parties challenges the constitutionality of these set-asides. In this suit, the most appropriate ruling on the basis of applicable United States Supreme Court precedent would be that the set-asides are A: unconstitutional, because they would deny other potential employees or potential contractors the equal protection of the laws. B: unconstitutional, because they would impermissibly impair the right to contract of other potential employees or potential contractors. C: constitutional, because they would assure members of racial minority groups the equal protection of the laws. D: constitutional, because the function and activities of the district are of a proprietary nature rather than a governmental nature and, therefore, are not subject to the usual requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A is correct. The set-asides are a suspect classification based on race, which must satisfy strict scrutiny. This requires that the racial classification serve a compelling government interest. The purpose of the set-asides is to redress historical discrimination generally, not to remedy prior discrimination by this particular district. This does not constitute a compelling interest required to satisfy strict scrutiny. The set-asides are therefore unconstitutional discrimination against other racial groups under equal protection. B is incorrect. The right to contract protects parties' rights from being destroyed under existing contracts and is not impaired by limiting the number of contracts available to future employees or contractors. C is incorrect. The racial minorities here are not being denied equal protection under the law. There is no history of discrimination or evidence of current discrimination. As stated above, remedying general societal discrimination does not amount to a compelling interest, which is necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny. D is incorrect. The government is not treated differently for equal protection purposes when it engages in commercial or proprietary ventures.

An ordinance of a particular city requires that its mayor have continuously been a resident of the city for at least five years at the time he or she takes office. A candidate, who is thinking about running for mayor in an election that will take place next year, will have been a resident of the city for only four and one-half years at the time the mayor elected then takes office. Before he decides whether to run for the position of mayor, the candidate wants to know whether he could lawfully assume that position if he were elected. As a result, the candidate files suit in the local federal district court for a declaratory judgment that the city's five-year-residence requirement is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to a place on his political party's primary election ballot for mayor. He names the chairman of his political party as the sole defendant but does not join any election official. The chairman responds by joining the candidate in requesting the court to declare the city's residence requirement invalid. In this case, the court should A: refuse to determine the merits of this suit, because there is no case or controversy. B: refuse to issue such a declaratory judgment, because an issue of this kind involving only a local election does not present a substantial federal constitutional question. C: issue the declaratory judgment, because a residency requirement of this type is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. D: issue the declaratory judgment, because the candidate will have substantially complied with the residency requirement.

A is correct. There is no case or controversy here because the candidate lacks standing. One reason he lacks standing is that the issue is not yet ripe for review. The issue is not ripe because the candidate will not suffer an injury until he is barred from running for office or until he has won the election. At that point, an injury will either have occurred or will be so certain to occur as to confer standing. The second reason the candidate lacks standing is that the candidate has not joined the correct party to provide him the relief that will redress the injury. The chairman of his local political party would be the correct party to sue if the political party refuses to put him on the ballot due to the residency requirement. However, the candidate seems to be challenging the qualifications with the assumption that he will not be allowed to take office. The correct defendant would be whichever official enforces those qualifications and determines whether elected officials take office, presumably election officials. Finally, the mere agreement by the parties that the court should consider the issue is irrelevant; standing cannot be created by agreement. B is incorrect. The qualifications of an elected official, even for a local election, do present a substantial federal constitutional question. C is incorrect. The court may not reach the merits of the case if the candidate lacks standing. Moreover, it is not clear that this residency requirement would deny candidates equal protection of the law. D is incorrect. The federal courts may not modify the state law by finding substantial compliance enough if the state law is otherwise constitutional.

Under the authority of a federal voting rights statute, some states drew congressional districts in a manner calculated to increase the likelihood that members of historically disadvantaged minority racial groups would be elected. The U.S. Supreme Court declared these districts to be unconstitutional, as improper racial gerrymanders. In response to this ruling, Congress passed a new statute that explicitly denies the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all future cases challenging the constitutionality of action taken under the authority of the federal voting rights statute. Which of the following is the most persuasive argument for the constitutionality of the new statute restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction? A: Article III of the Constitution explicitly states that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make. B: The constitutional principle of separation of powers authorizes Congress to pass statutes calculated to reduce the effects of Supreme Court decisions that interfere with the exercise of powers that have been delegated to the legislative branch. C: The establishment and apportionment of congressional districts directly affect interstate commerce, and the Constitution authorizes Congress to use its plenary authority over such commerce for any purpose it believes will promote the general welfare. D: The Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the amendment's voting rights provisions by appropriate legislation, and Congress could reasonably determine that this restriction on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is an appropriate means to that end.

A is correct. This is the most persuasive argument because Congress has the authority to regulate and limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article III and Ex parte McCardle. B is incorrect. The separation of powers prevents the branches of government from overstepping and interfering with one another. It prohibits the legislature from interfering with the courts' final judgments, it does not authorize Congress to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction. C is incorrect. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. The apportionment of congressional districts does not directly affect interstate commerce. Therefore, this Clause does not apply. D is incorrect. The Fifteenth Amendment relates to denying citizens the right to vote based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude, which is not applicable here.

A state law provides that a person who has been divorced may not marry again unless he or she is current on all child-support payments. A woman who was refused a marriage license pursuant to this law sued the appropriate state officials. What standard should the court apply in reviewing the constitutionality of this law? A: The state must show that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. B: The state must show that the law is substantially related to an important government interest. C: The woman must show that the law serves no important public purpose. D: The woman must show that the legislature did not have a rational basis for enacting the law.

A is correct. U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that an individual's decision to marry is a fundamental right, and therefore, laws that unduly burden a decision to marry trigger strict judicial scrutiny. This strict scrutiny standard obligates the state to prove that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. Here, the law burdens the right to marry by requiring that a person who has been divorced may not remarry unless he or she is current on all child support payments. Because this law burdens the fundamental right to marry, the court will apply the strict scrutiny standard and require the state to prove that the law is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. B is incorrect. This answer states the wrong standard of review. The strict scrutiny standard places a burden on the state that is greater than showing that the law is substantially related to an important government interest. As stated above, it obligates the state to prove that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. C is incorrect. First, it improperly allocates the burden of proof to the woman instead of the state. As explained above, when a law interferes with a fundamental right such as marriage, the court will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review. Second, the standard of review articulated in the question is incorrect. The court will determine whether the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest, not whether the law serves an important public interest. D is incorrect. This answer improperly allocates the burden of proof to the woman and not the state. This strict scrutiny standard places the burden of proof on the state, not on the woman, and obligates the state to prove that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.

B is correct. As a federal procedural issue, this complaint is governed by FRCP notice pleading requirements. By merely stating that the designer drove negligently, the jeweler's complaint does not satisfy the requirement that pleadings must contain enough facts to show that the claim is plausible, not merely possible. A is incorrect. It is not State A's pleading requirements that apply, but federal notice pleading requirements. The complaint is insufficient under these federal rules, while State A's rules are irrelevant. C is incorrect. Although it is true that federal rules apply, this complaint does not satisfy the notice pleading requirement that the complaint must contain more than legal conclusions, but facts that make a claim plausible. D is incorrect. As stated above, federal pleading requirements, not State B pleading requirements, apply to diversity cases.

A jeweler, a citizen of State A, sued a designer, a citizen of State B, in federal court in State B. The jeweler is seeking $100,000 in compensation for tortious injuries suffered in a car accident in State A. The only allegation of the designer's misconduct in the jeweler's short complaint is that the designer "drove his car negligently." State B is a notice pleading state, whereas State A is not. Is the court likely to find the jeweler's complaint sufficient? A: No, because it does not satisfy State A's pleading requirements. B: No, because it does not satisfy federal pleading requirements. C: Yes, because it satisfies federal pleading requirements. D: Yes, because it satisfies State B's notice pleading requirements.

B is correct. Based on the pleadings alone, the man is entitled to judgment because there is a valid contract between the parties and the woman did not assert a valid defense for breaching the contract. A is incorrect. Final judgment here is not dependent on facts in the record, but solely on the pleadings. C is incorrect. A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A defendant may move to dismiss a cause of action if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As the plaintiff, the man would not file this type of motion. D is incorrect. A judgment as a matter of law is a motion made by a party, during trial, claiming the opposing party has insufficient evidence to reasonably support its case or a specific issue. Here, the trial hasn't begun.

A man filed a diversity action against a woman in federal district court in State A. The man's complaint alleged that the woman failed to pay an unconditional debt due on a valid contract she had with him. The woman's answer did not contest the contract's validity, but stated that the woman did not pay the debt because she had to pay her son's college tuition. Which motion should the man's attorney file in response to the answer? A: Motion for summary judgment. B: Motion for judgment on the pleadings. C: Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. D: Motion for judgment as a matter of law.

C is correct. The crossclaim should be dismissed because it does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the man's claim against the two brokers. A is incorrect. The $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement is not relevant because there is no deficiency in the crossclaim's subject-matter jurisdiction. B is incorrect. The court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the crossclaim is not enough to adjudicate the crossclaim. It does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim, which is required for the court to hear it. D is incorrect. A lack of complete diversity is irrelevant here because a federal question exists, but the crossclaim is still improper based on the fact that it does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying claim.

A man from State A sued two mortgage brokers, both citizens of State A, in federal district court in State A. The man's complaint alleged that the brokers failed to make disclosures required by an applicable federal lending law. The first broker filed an answer and a crossclaim against the second broker. The crossclaim alleged that the second broker underpaid him in violation of federal labor laws. The first broker is seeking $150,000 in damages. The second broker filed a motion to dismiss the first broker's crossclaim. Should the court grant the second broker's motion to dismiss the crossclaim? A: No, because the crossclaim satisfies the amount in controversy requirement. B: No, because the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the crossclaim. C: Yes, because the crossclaim does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original action. D: Yes, because all parties are citizens of State A, which means there is no diversity jurisdiction.

C is correct. Service of process was insufficient because the journalist was not served a summons as is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP Rule 4). Here, the journalist may either include in his answer the defense of insufficient service of process or make a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b). A is incorrect. The journalist was not served a summons, so service of process was not proper. B is incorrect. This choice implies that the journalist must file the answer to raise the defense of insufficient process, but the journalist has the option of either including the defense in the answer or filing a pre-answer motion to dismiss. D is incorrect. Insufficient service of process is a FRCP 12(b) defense that may either be the basis of a motion to dismiss or included as a defense in the answer.

A novelist filed a diversity action against a journalist in federal district court in State A. The novelist then served the journalist with the complaint only, without a summons. Which motion or pleading should the journalist's attorney file? A: An answer, because service of process was proper. B: An answer, which is necessary to raise the affirmative defense of insufficient service of process to avoid waiving the defense. C: A motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, or an answer that raises an affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. D: A motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process or risk waiving the defense.

B is correct. Because the painter's attorney is seeking sanctions for violations of discovery rules, not pleadings filed with the court, it would be improper to grant the FRCP 11 motion for sanctions. A is incorrect. Rule 26(g) authorizes the imposition of sanctions for improper certification of a discovery request. It does not apply to a refusal to answer questions at a deposition. C is incorrect. FRCP 11 sanctions do not apply to discovery requests or motions. D is incorrect. Nothing in the FRCP authorizes the conversion of a Rule 11 motion to a Rule 37(b) motion. Thus, this is an incorrect conclusion as the court is not authorized to do such under the FRCP.

A painter sued a driver in federal court. The driver's attorney directed the driver not to answer certain deposition questions during discovery even though the questions did not call for answers that would have invaded any privilege, nor was there any court-ordered limitation on discovery. The driver's attorney did not present a motion to terminate or limit the scope of the deposition. After the painter unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the dispute with the driver's attorney over whether the driver was required to answer the deposition questions, the painter made a motion to compel answers to the deposition questions that had gone unanswered. The court granted the motion. When the driver's attorney continued instructing his client not to answer, and his client continued to refuse to answer for several months, the painter moved for Rule 11 sanctions. Should the court grant the painter's motion for sanctions? A: No, because the sanctions motion should have been brought under Rule 26(g), not Rule 11. B: No, because Rule 11 does not apply to discovery requests, responses, or motions, only pleadings. C: Yes, because the court has a duty to prevent the driver from benefitting from his improper refusal to answer the deposition questions. D: Yes, because the court may convert a Rule 11 motion into a Rule 37(b) motion for sanctions.

A is correct. The defendants properly removed the case. The later-served defendant, the researcher, initiated removal, which the other defendants joined within 30 days, satisfying the consent requirement. Moreover, the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on federal question. B is incorrect. The court should deny the park ranger's motion to remand, but not because the researcher's notice of removal was sufficient to cover all defendants. The reason is that the other defendants joined the researcher's timely removal and subject-matter jurisdiction exists, as stated above. C is incorrect. There is no rule requiring multiple defendants to simultaneously join in a single, timely, notice of removal. D is incorrect. The rancher's letter of consent was sufficient to join in the removal. He did not have to file a separate notice of removal.

A park ranger filed suit in state court against a scout, a rancher, and a researcher, asserting claims under federal law. The scout was properly served with the summons and complaint on February 1, 2021. The rancher was properly served with the summons and complaint on March 5, 2021. The researcher was properly served with the summons and complaint on April 7, 2021. On April 17, 2021, the researcher filed a timely notice of removal with the proper federal district court. Immediately thereafter, the scout filed his own notice of removal. Two weeks after April 17, 2021, the rancher then filed with the court a letter stating his consent to the removal of the case. The park ranger then moved for remand to state court. Should the court grant the park ranger's motion to remand? A: No, because removal was proper and the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. B: No, because the researcher filed a timely notice of removal, which applied to all defendants. C: Yes, because the scout, rancher, and researcher were all required to simultaneously join in a single, timely, notice of removal. D: Yes, because the rancher's filing a letter of consent with the federal court to remove the case was improper.

C is correct. Subject-matter jurisdiction may be based on diversity (as opposed to federal question) where the parties are completely diverse (i.e., no plaintiff is from the same state as any defendant) and the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. Here, the patient (plaintiff) and nurse (co-defendant) are both from State A, which destroys diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This prohibits the court from having diversity jurisdiction over the patient's claims against the dentist and the nurse. A is incorrect. This is an incorrect statement of law. Supplemental jurisdiction may sometimes give a court jurisdiction over an action that shares a common nucleus of operative facts with an underlying claim that has proper federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This case does not fall within supplemental jurisdiction because there is no underlying claim with proper subject-matter jurisdiction, for the reasons stated above. B is incorrect. An interest in judicial economy is not a basis to cure a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, the court should grant the nurse's motion because there is not complete diversity among the parties. D is incorrect. Although the court should grant the nurse's motion, it is not because the claims do not arise from the same case or controversy. The patient's suit is based on a root canal procedure performed by both defendants, which means the claims do arise out of the same controversy. However, because the patient and nurse are both from State A, the court lacks diversity jurisdiction.

A patient brought a negligence action in federal district court in State A against a dentist and a nurse following a root canal procedure they performed together. The patient is seeking more than $75,000 in compensatory damages. The patient is a citizen of State A, the dentist is a citizen of State B, and the nurse is a citizen of State A. The nurse moved to dismiss the case for lack of complete diversity between the parties. In response, the patient argued that the court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over her claim against the nurse. Should the district court grant the nurse's motion to dismiss? A: No, because the patient's claim against the nurse falls under supplemental jurisdiction as part of the same case or controversy as the claim against the dentist. B: No, because judicial economy would be served by litigating the patient's claims against the dentist and the nurse together. C: Yes, because there is a lack of complete diversity between the parties, which means the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. D: Yes, because the claim against the nurse does not arise from the same case or controversy as the claim against the dentist.

A is correct. Guaranty Trust v. York requires that State A laws, not the FRCP, apply to this diversity case. State A's statute of limitations began running on January 5, 2015 and did not toll until January 15, 2018, when the defendant was serviced. This is more than three years, and the patient's claim is therefore time-barred. B is incorrect. On the contrary, the FRCP do apply in diversity cases, but to procedural issues. This case presents substantive issues that require the federal court to apply State A substantive laws governing tolling of the Statute of Limitations. C is incorrect. Although FRCP 3 provides that an action "commences" upon the filing the complaint, this Rule is inapplicable here, where State A laws govern the time period. Because more than three years have passed since the action arose, the complaint is time-barred. D is incorrect. As stated above, the FRCP do not apply here. State A substantive law applies to the issue of whether the complaint is time-barred.

A patient from State A sued a cardiologist from State B on a tort claim, based on diversity, in a federal court in State A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." State A does not have the same provision. Tort claims have a three-year statute of limitations under State A law, and a State A statute provides that statutes of limitations are tolled when service of process is made on the defendant. The patient's tort claim arose on January 5, 2015. The patient filed his lawsuit with the court on January 4, 2018, but the cardiologist was not served until January 15, 2018. Is the court likely to find that the patient's claim is time-barred? A: Yes, because the patient's claim did not comply with State A's statute of limitations. B: Yes, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable in diversity actions. C: No, because the action was properly "commenced" on January 4, 2018. D: No, because the patient's lawsuit is timely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B is correct. Because the suit was originally filed in the state court that geographically sits in the Eastern District of State A, the federal court in the Eastern District of State A is a proper venue for removal. A is incorrect. Although it is correct that complete diversity supports subject-matter jurisdiction in this case, this is not the correct basis for removal. Removal is proper because the federal court in the Eastern District of State A is the appropriate venue, not because diversity jurisdiction exists. C is incorrect. The motorcyclist's residence is not dispositive, as venue may often be proper in multiple federal districts. The issue is whether removal from state court in the Eastern District of State A to federal court in the same location is proper, as stated above. D is incorrect. This choice implies application of the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which only applies to cases originally filed in federal court, not actions being removed from state to federal court.

A pedestrian from State A sued a motorcyclist from State B. The pedestrian properly filed suit in a state court located in the Eastern District of State A and sought $100,000 in damages for the tortious injuries caused by the motorcyclist's allegedly negligent acts in the Western District of State A. The motorcyclist filed a notice of removal in the federal court for the Eastern District of State A, which geographically embraces the location of where the action was originally filed. Is removal proper? A: Yes, because the requirements of complete diversity are satisfied. B: Yes, because the lawsuit was filed in state court in the Eastern District of State A. C: No, because the motorcyclist is a citizen of State B. D: No, because the accident occurred in the Western District of State A

For a federal court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a party, that party must have had "minimum contacts" with the forum. This is often defined as taking actions that purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing business within the state. A key determination here is whether it was foreseeable, based on the party's actions, that he may be subject to litigation in the state. B is correct. The court should not grant the actor's motion to dismiss because, by contracting with the personal assistant for services performed in State B, even if only for one day, the actor purposefully availed himself of the forum. This is despite the fact that most of the services performed between the parties occurred in State A, where the actor resides. By hiring the personal assistant and receiving services in State B, the actor should have foreseen that he could be subject to litigation in that forum. A is incorrect. Although the court should not grant the actor's motion to dismiss, it is not because the challenge was improperly raised. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(2) allows for a pre-answer motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court should still not grant the motion, however, because the actor had sufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. C is incorrect. This is a misapplication of the law to the facts. By employing the personal assistant to work for him while on location in State B, even if just for a single day, the actor purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that forum. It is a red herring that most of the previous work between the parties happened in State A because the contract dispute here is based on events in State B, even if only during a one-day shoot. It would have been foreseeable that receiving such services could have caused the actor to be called into court in State B. D is incorrect. As explained above, the actor's motion to dismiss alleging lack of personal jurisdiction was properly filed. Moreover, this choice contains a misstatement of the law; it is subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction, that may not be waived under FRCP 12(h). Although personal jurisdiction may be waived, it was not waived here. Nevertheless, the court should not grant the motion, for the reasons explained above.

A personal assistant from State B sued an actor from State A in federal district court in State B, alleging a breach of contract. The alleged breach occurred while the personal assistant was working for the actor on a one-day shoot in State B. Aside from the one-day shoot, the actor has had no other contacts with State B. The personal assistant had worked for the actor for over five years, with all prior services performed in State A. The personal assistant is seeking $125,000 in damages. In response to the complaint, the actor filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Should the court grant the actor's motion to dismiss? A: No, because the actor's challenge to personal jurisdiction was improperly asserted in a motion to dismiss. B: No, because the actor's presence in State B for the one-day shoot was sufficient to establish minimum contacts with State B. C: Yes, because the actor did not have sufficient minimum contacts with State B to establish personal jurisdiction. D: Yes, because personal jurisdiction may not be waived, even though the motion to dismiss was improperly filed.

D is correct. The court should not grant the motion because both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction are satisfied. The facts support diversity jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the parties and amount in controversy. Furthermore, under Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if she is present in the forum state when personally served with process. This occurred here, when the librarian was in State A on vacation and personally served with the complaint and summons in accordance with State A law. A is incorrect. Federal courts do have diversity jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different states and an amount in controversy over $75,000, but state courts may also have jurisdiction in such circumstances. Federal and state courts frequently have concurrent jurisdiction, meaning the lawsuit may be properly filed in either court. B is incorrect. Although a showing of minimum contacts is one way to establish personal jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that personal jurisdiction may also be established over a non-forum defendant who is personally served with process while physically present in the forum. Here, the librarian was present in State A when she was personally served with process. The length of time she was present when served and the fact that she had never been to State A will not prevent the court from exercising personal jurisdiction. C is incorrect. The court should not grant the motion, but not because personal jurisdiction only applies in federal courts. Limitations on personal jurisdiction, rooted in Due Process Clause protections, apply to both federal and state courts. Each state is free to enact its own statutory bases for personal jurisdiction; however, the exercise of jurisdiction must always satisfy minimum constitutional requirements.

A pilot from State A sued a librarian from State B in a federal district court in State A. The librarian sold the pilot an expensive collectible watch through a website that generated a valid sales contract. The pilot's complaint alleged that the librarian breached the contract's terms because the librarian sold the pilot a watch that materially varied from the description the librarian had provided. The pilot is seeking $175,000 in damages. Shortly after selling the watch, the librarian went to State A on vacation with her family. This was the librarian's first time ever in State A. While visiting State A, the librarian was served with the pilot's complaint and a summons in accordance with State A law. The librarian filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Should the court grant the librarian's motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because only federal courts have jurisdiction to hear disputes between citizens of different states with an amount in controversy over $75,000. B: Yes, because the librarian does not have sufficient minimum contacts with State A to establish personal jurisdiction. C: No, because personal jurisdiction requirements only apply to federal courts, not state courts. D: No, because the librarian's physical presence in State A when she was served is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.

B is correct. The State B court should grant the motion to dismiss because federal common law applies to the earlier judgment, a dismissal with prejudice, which has a preclusive effect in State B court. A is incorrect. It is federal common law that determines the preclusive effect of the earlier judgment, not substantive State A law, even though federal common law incorporates State A law. C is incorrect. There is no such constitutional limitation that would prevent the court from giving prejudicial effect to the earlier dismissal. D is incorrect. It is State A's law that determines the preclusive effect of the State A federal court's diversity judgment, not State B law.

A plaintiff filed a diversity action against a defendant in federal court in State A, alleging business tort claims. The State A federal court dismissed the plaintiff's action "on the merits and with prejudice," in accordance with State A law because all claims fell outside State A's two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff refiled the same action against the same defendant in state court in State B. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, citing to the State A federal court's judgment. Should the State B court grant the defendant's motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because the preclusive effect of the State A judgment is substantive and governed by State A state law. B: Yes, because the preclusive effect of the State A judgment is governed by federal common law, which incorporates State A law. C: No, because giving any prejudicial effect to the dismissal on a statute of limitations grounds would violate the U.S. Constitution. D: No, because the preclusive effect of the State A judgment is determined by State B law in this diversity action.

D is correct. The retailer's only option is to file a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is inadequate because "additur" is not allowed in federal court as it has been held unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. A is incorrect. The retailer's new trial motion must be based on the State A standard that the damages are "inadequate," not the federal "shocks the conscience" standard. "Additur" is not permitted in federal cases. B is incorrect. The retailer should file a motion for a new trial on this basis, but additur is not permitted in federal courts. C is incorrect. "Remittitur" is a way of decreasing damages, not increasing them, so it does not apply here, where the retailer is seeking an increase in a low damages award.

A retailer from State A filed a diversity action against a manufacturer from State B in federal court in State A, alleging a breach of contract and seeking $195,000 in damages. The case went to trial and after four days of testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the retailer but awarded only $2.25 in compensatory damages. Under federal law, a judge who believes compensatory damages are so excessive as to "shock the conscience" may offer plaintiffs the choice between a new trial or remittitur of the excessive damages. Under State A law, a judge who believes damages are "excessive" may offer plaintiffs the choice between a new trial or remittitur, and if the court believes the damages are "inadequate," it may offer defendants a choice between a new trial or additur. Which motion should the retailer file to challenge the jury's damages award? A: Motion for a new trial or additur, on the ground that the jury's damage award shocks the conscience. B: Motion for a new trial or additur, on the ground that the jury's damage award is inadequate. C: Motion for remittitur, on the ground that the jury's damage award shocks the conscience. D: Motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict is inadequate.

D is correct. The court should not grant the motion to dismiss because diversity jurisdiction does exist. In class action suits, diversity of citizenship is based on whether the named parties are diverse from one another (i.e., the named plaintiff and defendants are completely diverse), not the unnamed members of the class. Here, the runner is from State A and is therefore diverse from the manufacturer (from States B and C) and the retailers (from States D and E). The citizenship of the other members of the class is not relevant to whether diversity jurisdiction exists. A is incorrect. This choice implies that all members of the class must be diverse from the defendants, which is an incorrect statement of the law. In class action suits, diversity jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the named plaintiff(s) and named defendant(s), not the unnamed class members. Here, the runner, from State A, is the only named plaintiff for the class action. Because neither the manufacturer nor the retailers are also from State A, complete diversity exists between the parties. B is incorrect. This choice implies that all members of the class must be diverse from the named plaintiff, which is also an incorrect statement of the law. Complete diversity in class actions is based on the citizenship between named parties only, as stated above. The lack of diversity between the unnamed class members and the runner does not destroy diversity jurisdiction. C is incorrect. The court should not grant the motion to dismiss, but not because only federal courts may hear class action suits. On the contrary, class actions are not limited only to federal courts. Nevertheless, the court should deny the motion because diversity jurisdiction exists, as explained above.

A runner who took a prescribed medication for shin splints was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. After his diagnosis, the runner sued the manufacturer and several drug store retailers who sold the medication in federal court in State A. The runner sued on behalf of a class who had also been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer after taking the medication. The runner is a citizen of State A, and the other members of the class are citizens of States A, B, C, D, and E. The runner is the only named member of the class bringing the suit. The manufacturer is a citizen of State B and State C. The retailers are citizens of State D and State E. The runner and the alleged class members are seeking more than $75,000 from the manufacturer and the retailers. The manufacturer and the retailers moved to dismiss all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity. Should the court grant the defendants' motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because the class members are from the same states as the manufacturer and retailers. B: Yes, because the class members are from the same state as the runner. C: No, because only federal courts may hear class action suits. D: No, because the runner is from a different state than the manufacturer and the retailers.

C is correct. If the senator's proposed legislation were to pass, it would allow a plaintiff to bring suit and avoid the diversity requirement, which would be unconstitutional. A is incorrect. The power of Congress to extend federal court jurisdiction to federal questions or issues involving the Constitution is not dispositive here, where the proposed legislation would extend federal court jurisdiction to state laws without diverse parties. B is incorrect. Passing legislation that would extend federal jurisdiction to state claims without requiring diversity among the parties would exceed the scope of Article III. D is incorrect. A statute such as this proposed legislation is not unconstitutional simply for failing to extend federal jurisdiction to defendants who invoke state products liability as a defense. The well-pleaded complaint rule, applicable in federal question cases, does not authorize jurisdiction based only on defenses arising under federal law.

A senator from State A became upset when he learned that residents of State A are not permitted to bring state law products liability suits against State A companies in State A federal courts, but that residents of State B may do so. The senator plans to introduce legislation that states: "Federal courts shall have jurisdiction when the plaintiff's cause of action shows that it is based upon a state products liability law." Is the proposed legislation constitutional? A: Yes, because Congress has plenary power to extend federal jurisdiction to any questions arising under federal law or the U.S. Constitution. B: Yes, because Congress has plenary power to create federal courts and determine their jurisdiction. C: No, because it would extend federal jurisdiction to state law claims without requiring diversity of citizenship among the parties. D: No, because it would not extend federal jurisdiction to defendants who invoked state products liability as a defense

B is correct. The distributor and the wholesaler are not diverse and the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. However, the claim can still be added through supplemental jurisdiction because the claim arises from the same common nucleus of operative fact as the underlying lawsuit, thus establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. A is incorrect. Although the wholesaler's and the distributor's principal places of business are diverse, they are both incorporated in the same state and are not completely diverse. C is incorrect. The claim can be brought under supplemental jurisdiction because it arises out of the same common nucleus of operative fact. D is incorrect. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the use of supplemental jurisdiction to join parties when a case is solely based on diversity jurisdiction. However, these rules apply to plaintiffs, not defendants.

A shop owner domiciled in State A sued a distributor in a federal district court in State A for breach of a contract. The shop owner sought $100,000 in damages for allegedly defective goods that the distributor had provided under the contract. The distributor is incorporated in State B, with its principal place of business in State C. The distributor brought in as a third-party defendant the wholesaler that had provided the goods to the distributor, alleging that the wholesaler had a duty to indemnify the distributor for any damages recovered by the shop owner. The wholesaler is incorporated in State B, with its principal place of business in State A. The wholesaler has asserted a $60,000 counterclaim against the distributor for payment for the goods at issue, and the distributor has moved to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Should the motion to dismiss be granted? A: No, because the wholesaler's and the distributor's principal places of business are diverse. B: No, because there is supplemental jurisdiction over the wholesaler's counterclaim. C: Yes, because there is no diversity of citizenship between the distributor and the wholesaler. D: Yes, because there is no diversity of citizenship between the shop owner and the wholesaler.

B is correct. The grocer waived the defense of improper venue by not raising it in the pre-answer motion, but the court should hear the failure to join a required party defense, as it may be raised after the first responsive pleading. A is incorrect. The opposite is true: The court should only hear the defense of failure to join a required party, not the defense of improper venue, which has been waived. C is incorrect. The defense of failure to join a party is not a defense that must be raised in the first motion and therefore may be considered by the court in a later motion. D is incorrect. The defense of improper venue should not be considered by the court because it was waived, but other defenses, including the failure to join a required party defense, has not been waived.

A shopper sued a grocer in federal court for violation of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act. In its pre-answer motion, the grocer raised the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion. Thereafter, the grocer realized that it arguably had available to it the defenses of improper venue and failure to join a required party. The grocer then filed an answer to the shopper's complaint raising these two additional defenses for the first time. Is the court likely to consider the grocer's defenses? A: Yes, but only the improper venue defense, not the defense of failure to join a required party, because it is waived. B: Yes, but only the defense of failure to join a required party, not the defense of improper venue, because it is waived. C: No, neither the defense for improper venue nor the failure to join a required party, because they have both been waived. D: No, neither the defense for improper venue nor the failure to join a required party, because the grocer's pre-answer motion waived all other 12(b) defenses.

D is correct. When a case is originally filed in a proper venue, the court has the discretion to transfer the case if allowed under the rules governing both jurisdiction and venue. Venue was proper in State A, so a motion to transfer is the airline's only option. A is incorrect. The plane crash, which gave rise to the claim, occurred in State A. Venue will be proper here because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred there. B is incorrect. There are not enough facts to know the extent of the federal court's personal jurisdiction here without knowing the reach of State A's long-arm statute. C is incorrect. A motion to transfer venue is more likely to be granted than a dismissal for forum non conveniens because a transfer is more appropriate than dismissal, except in extraordinary circumstances.

A small commercial airplane crashed in State A. The passengers and pilot, all citizens of State B, were killed in the crash. The airline that owned and operated the airplane is incorporated and has its maintenance facilities and principal place of business in State C. One day before the statute of limitations on their claims would have run, the estates of the pilot and each of the passengers filed a wrongful death action against the airline in federal court in State A. The airline was served one week later and wants to prevent the State A federal court from hearing the action. Which of the following motions is most likely to accomplish the airline's goal? A: A motion to dismiss the action for improper venue. B: A motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. C: A motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. D: A motion to transfer the action to a federal court in State C.

A is correct. Determining the relevance of evidence is within the trial court's discretion because it requires an understanding of the entire case and the factual context in which the evidence is being offered. Therefore, this argument will be reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard. B is incorrect. An appellate court applies the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing findings of fact made by the trial court in a bench trial. Therefore, the standard does not apply to judicial rulings on the admissibility of evidence in a jury trial. C is incorrect. Because an evidentiary ruling involves the application of legal standards to facts—i.e., relevance and prejudice as related to the facts in the case—it is not a ruling on a pure issue of law and therefore not subject to de novo review. D is incorrect. "Harmless error" is a conclusion an appellate court reaches after reviewing and determining the impact of an erroneous evidentiary ruling, not the standard of review that the court applies to determine whether it was erroneous to admit the evidence in the first instance.

A student at a private university sued the university in federal court for negligence after he fell from scaffolding in a university-owned theater building. At trial, after briefing from both parties, the court permitted the jury to hear testimony that there had been several previous accidents in the same building. The jury found for the student, and the university appealed. One of the university's arguments on appeal is that the testimony about the previous accidents should have been excluded as irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Which standard of review applies to this argument? A: Abuse of discretion. B: Clearly erroneous. C: De novo. D: Harmless error

C is correct. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP 4(c)(1)) states that a summons must be served with a copy of the complaint. Thus, the federal Rules specifically require that defendants be served with both a summons and complaint. Here, the facts indicate that the defendant had only been served with a summons but not a complaint. Therefore, the janitor should file a motion to dismiss for insufficient process. A is incorrect. The federal district court in State B would have personal jurisdiction over a State B citizen. B is incorrect. It would be far more efficient for the janitor to file only a motion for insufficient process than for him to file an answer, in which he would have to respond to all of the complaint's allegations. D is incorrect. There is nothing in the facts to suggest that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

A teacher from State A filed a diversity action against a janitor from State B in State B federal court. The janitor was served with a summons from the court, but not a copy of the complaint. Which motion or pleading should the janitor's attorney file? A: An answer, including an affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. B: An answer, including an affirmative defense of insufficient service of process. C: A motion to dismiss for insufficient process. D: A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

C is correct. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), an amendment that changes the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original complaint. It does so when the amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the conduct set out in the original complaint and, within the period provided for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Here, all the requirements for relation back are met. Among other things, the twin sister received notice of the lawsuit within the period provided for serving the summons and complaint as evidenced by the attempted service on her. Thus, she will not be prejudiced in her defense and should have known that but for the traveler's confusion of the bus driver and her twin sister, the action would have been brought against the twin sister. The twin sister had knowledge of the lawsuit because service of the complaint was attempted on the twin sister instead of the bus driver. A is incorrect. Under the FRCP, an amendment that changes the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original complaint. The amendment must assert a claim that arose out of the conduct set out in the original complaint and, within the period provided for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Here, all requirements for relation back are met, as stated above. B is incorrect. The statute of limitations is not a defense if the complaint relates back to the date the original complaint was filed. The complaint does relate back in this case, for the reasons set forth above. D is incorrect. The name change was not simply a misnomer permitted as a matter of course. A misnomer is where the defendant is merely referred to by an erroneous name (e.g., Gloria rather than Lori). Here, the traveler is seeking to sue someone other than the person that he initially sued.

A traveler filed a negligence suit in federal court against a bus driver for injuries he sustained from an accident with the driver. In actuality, the person driving the bus when the accident occurred was the driver's twin sister. Service of the complaint naming the driver as the defendant was timely made on the twin sister, who forwarded the complaint to the driver's liability insurer. The insurer provided verification to the traveler's attorney that the named defendant, the driver, was in another state at the time of the accident, and the bus was being driven by the twin sister. Thereafter, the statute of limitations on the traveler's claim expired. The court granted the traveler leave to amend his complaint to change the named defendant to the twin sister, who moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations having expired. Should the court grant the twin sister's motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because the court improperly granted leave to amend the original complaint after the statute of limitations had run. B: Yes, because there the statute of limitations is a defense that is apparent based on the face of the complaint. C: No, because the amended complaint relates back to the date the original complaint was filed. D: No, because the original defendant's name was a misnomer, and changing it was permitted as a matter of course.

C is correct. In deciding whether to dismiss an action for forum non conveniens, a court must weigh the private and public interests in keeping the action or dismissing it so that it can be brought in the foreign country. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Here, the conduct underlying the wrongful discharge claim took place in the foreign country, and the plaintiff is a citizen of that country, giving that country an interest in the resolution of the dispute. Additionally, all the evidence and witnesses, including the plaintiff and the retired manager, are located in the foreign country, making it the most convenient place to try the action. A is incorrect. Forum non conveniens is not one of the defenses listed in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)-(5) that are waived if they are omitted from an earlier pretrial motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). In particular, the employer's motion is not a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) because the motion presumes that venue is proper but argues that there is a much more convenient foreign forum in which the action should be tried. Thus, no waiver occurred. B is incorrect. The Supreme Court has held that when deciding a forum non conveniens motion, a court may consider the fact that the alternative forum is in a foreign country whose law is not as favorable to the plaintiff as the law where the action was filed. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). However, that fact alone is not determinative and must be weighed against other factors suggesting why dismissal might or might not be appropriate. D is incorrect. The Supreme Court has held that the typical deference given to the plaintiff's forum choice is not present when the plaintiff is a foreign citizen. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). However, that fact alone does not determine whether dismissal is warranted. Rather, the court must weigh the convenience of the parties and witnesses, as well as the public interest in maintaining the action in the selected forum, before deciding whether to dismiss an action for forum non conveniens.

A woman domiciled in a foreign country brought a wrongful discharge action in federal court in State A against her former employer. The employer is incorporated in State A and headquartered in State B. The woman had worked at the employer's office in the foreign country. Her on-site manager, who had sole discretion over personnel matters, had made the decision to discharge her. The manager has now retired and continues to live in the foreign country. Under the employment laws of the foreign country, if the woman succeeds in her action, her damages would be limited to two years' salary. If the woman succeeds in her action under State A employment law, her damages could be much greater and could include emotional distress and punitive damage. The employer filed a motion to dismiss the action for insufficient service of process, which the court denied. The employer then moved to dismiss the action for forum non conveniens. Is the court likely to dismiss the action for forum non conveniens? A: No, because the employer waived its right to challenge the forum by failing to include that challenge in its first motion to dismiss. B: No, because the remedies available to the woman under the foreign country's laws are less favorable than those available under State A law. C: Yes, because the foreign country is the more appropriate forum given that the discharge occurred there and the evidence is located there. D: Yes, because the woman is a foreign citizen and therefore her choice of forum is not entitled to deference.

A is the correct answer. A defendant can remove an action that could have originally been brought by the plaintiff in the federal courts. Only defendants can exercise the right of removal. In this case, the woman is the plaintiff. Therefore, her attorney may not file for removal. The case should be remanded for a defect in the removal. B is incorrect. A federal court may remand state claims back to state court when removal was properly made. However, in this case, there was a defect in the removal and the entire case should be remanded. C is incorrect. This would not be a sufficient reason for the federal court to keep the case. Additionally, removal was improperly made. The plaintiff may have filed a motion to substitute the judge if she truly believed there was a chance of bias in the case. D is incorrect. Even though the plaintiff alleges federal claims, a plaintiff may not file for removal. Because the plaintiff is the party who originally brings the case and chooses the jurisdiction and venue, only the defendant may exercise the right of removal.

A woman sued her former employer in state court, asserting age and sex discrimination claims under both state and federal law. The woman's attorney had recently been embarrassed in court by the judge to whom the case was assigned. Wishing to avoid difficulties with the judge, the woman's attorney promptly removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. The employer's attorney has timely moved to remand. How is the federal court likely to proceed? A: Remand the entire case. B: Remand the state claims but keep the federal claims. C: Retain the case to avoid the risk of bias and impropriety in having it proceed before a judge who has shown clear hostility toward the woman's attorney. D: Retain the case, because it was timely removed and the woman alleges federal claims.

C is correct. The court should not grant the talk show host's motion because it may assert supplemental jurisdiction over the limo driver's claim. If the federal court has diversity jurisdiction over the claim of one plaintiff, it will have supplemental jurisdiction over another plaintiff's claim IF: (i) it is so related to the first plaintiff's claim that it forms part of the same case or controversy; AND (ii) the additional plaintiff is not a citizen of the state of any of the defendants. Here, there is a common nucleus of operative fact between the actor's claim and the limo driver's claim. They claimed that the host breached a contract that caused damages to both the actor and the limo driver. Although the damage amounts are different, both arise from the same breach. Therefore, because both claims arose out of the same contract, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the limo driver's claim and should not grant the motion. A is incorrect. Complete diversity requires that no plaintiff be a co-citizen with any defendant. It does not require coplaintiffs to be diverse from one another. Therefore, two plaintiffs from the same state may still establish complete diversity. B is incorrect. Although the court does not have diversity jurisdiction solely over the limo driver because that claim is under the $75,000 threshold requirement, the court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over the limo driver's claim because the actor's claim does satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. D is incorrect. This answer choice states the correct conclusion with the incorrect legal reasoning. The court should not grant the motion, but not because the limo driver consented to personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction does not turn on the establishment of personal jurisdiction. Regardless of whether the limo driver waived any defect in personal jurisdiction by filing the claim in State B, the court may exert subject-matter jurisdiction over the limo driver's claim through supplemental jurisdiction because the court has diversity jurisdiction over the actor's claims.

An actor and a limo driver are both citizens of State A. Together, they sued a talk show host, a citizen of State B, in federal district court in State B. The complaint alleged that the talk show host breached a contract in which the actor was to be a regular correspondent on the talk show and the limo driver was to provide transportation for the actor to and from the studio. The actor's alleged damages totaled $186,000 and the limo driver's alleged damages totaled $57,000. The talk show host's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the limo driver's claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Should the court grant the talk show host's motion? A: Yes, because the limo driver and the actor are both from State A. B: Yes, because the limo driver's claim does not meet the amount in controversy requirement. C: No, because the court can exert supplemental jurisdiction over the limo driver's claim. D: No, because the limo driver consented to the personal jurisdiction by filing the lawsuit in State B.

C is correct. A party (or the court, on its own initiative) may move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 11 following an alleged violation of the Rule 11 requirements. Under FRCP 11(c)(2), the party seeking sanctions must serve a separate motion on the other party, but may not file the motion if the challenged paper, claim, or defense is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after the service (called the "safe harbor" period). In this case, there has been no such opportunity for the woman's attorney to withdraw or correct the complaint, nor was the sanctions motion filed separately from the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the motion for sanctions should be denied. A is incorrect. A party is not required to affirmatively "make it clear" on the face of its filed complaint that its legal contention is supported by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for expanding the law. Moreover, here, it was unclear under the law whether the woman's claim was valid (that a property owner's "premises" extended to land that the landowner did not own, but frequently used as a waiting area for his invitees). B is incorrect. This is a misstatement of the facts. It is unclear whether the woman has a claim under existing law, as is explicitly stated. D is incorrect. The court should not grant the sanctions motion, but not because the landlord failed to allege that the woman's complaint contained inaccurate factual allegations. The motion should be denied because it was not filed separately, and the woman's attorney was not given the opportunity to withdraw or correct it. Whether the complaint contained inaccurate factual allegations is not dispositive at this stage in deciding the motion.

An attorney filed a complaint based on negligence and failure to warn of dangers on behalf of his client, a woman. The allegations were predicated on the theory that the woman, an invitee to a landowner's premises, was on a portion of the landowner's premises that the landowner did not own, but to which the landowner had directed the woman onto, where she was attacked by third parties. When the complaint was filed, it was unclear under the law whether a property owner's "premises" extended to land that the landowner did not own, but frequently used as a waiting area for his invitees, as in the woman's claim. The landowner moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, claiming the area in question was not the landowner's "premises" and that it owed no duty to the woman. Along with the motion to dismiss, the landowner moved for sanctions on the ground that the claim was not warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for establishing new law. Should the court grant the landowner's motion for sanctions? A: Yes, because the woman's complaint did not make it clear that the claim was supported by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for expanding the law. B: Yes, because the woman had no good faith claim under any existing law. C: No, because the motion was not made separately, nor did the woman's attorney have the opportunity to withdraw or correct the complaint. D: No, because the landlord has not alleged that the factual allegations of the complaint are inaccurate.

C is correct. The corporation's permissive counterclaim, not based on the same transaction as the original claim, lacks an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction because it does not raise a federal question (State A law claim) and does not meet the jurisdictional amount for diversity ($2,500 in damages). A is incorrect. Supplemental jurisdiction does not apply to this permissive counterclaim because it does not arise out of the same "nucleus of operative fact" as the original claim, which is necessary for the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. B is incorrect. Although it is true that the FRCP permit permissive counterclaims, there must still be an independent jurisdictional basis, which does not exist here. D is incorrect. This choice refers to the standard for compulsory counterclaims, not permissive counterclaims, which are at issue here. The court should still grant the dismissal of the counterclaim, but because the court lacks jurisdiction, as explained above

An employee, a citizen of State A, sued his employer, a corporation from State B, in federal district court in State B. The employee works in the corporation's factory located in State B. His complaint is seeking $125,000 in damages for the corporation's alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, a federal law that requires higher wages to be paid for overtime work. The corporation filed an answer with a single counterclaim, alleging that the employee took $2,500 worth of the corporation's tools in violation of State A's wrongful conversion statute. The employee then filed a motion to dismiss the corporation's counterclaim. Should the court grant the employee's motion to dismiss the counterclaim? A: No, because the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim. B: No, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for permissive counterclaims. C: Yes, because the court does not have jurisdiction over the counterclaim. D: Yes, because the counterclaim does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence as the original claim.

A is correct. The claim asserts federal trademark infringement, and therefore it arises under federal law. Subjectmatter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a general federal-question action. That statute requires no minimum amount in controversy, so the amount the company seeks is irrelevant. B is incorrect. Under Federal Rule 12(h)(3), subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and the court can determine at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the fact that the entrepreneur delayed six months before raising the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is immaterial, and the court will not deny his motion on that basis. C is incorrect. There is no amount-in-controversy requirement for actions that arise under federal law. D is incorrect. Although diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000, when diverse parties are litigating a federal claim, the action is treated for jurisdictional purposes as a federal-question action, not a diversity action. The claim here asserts federal trademark infringement, and therefore it arises under federal law. The fact that the action does not meet all the requirements for diversity jurisdiction is irrelevant.

An entrepreneur from State A decided to sell hot sauce to the public, labeling it "Best Hot Sauce." A company incorporated in State B and headquartered in State C sued the entrepreneur in federal court in State C. The complaint sought $50,000 in damages and alleged that the entrepreneur's use of the name "Best Hot Sauce" infringed the company's federal trademark. The entrepreneur filed an answer denying the allegations, and the parties began discovery. Six months later, the entrepreneur moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Should the court grant the entrepreneur's motion? A: No, because the company's claim arises under federal law. B: No, because the entrepreneur waived the right to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction by not raising the issue initially by motion or in the answer. C: Yes, because although the claim arises under federal law, the amount in controversy is not satisfied. D: Yes, because although there is diversity, the amount in controversy is not satisfied.

A is correct. The first case was decided in state court in State A. Therefore, the second court, the federal court in State B, must use the issue preclusion rules of State A which decided the first case. State A does not permit nonmutual issue preclusion. Therefore, the university in the second case is precluded from using the first judgment offensively against the company. B is incorrect. When the first case was decided in a state court, the second court, even if a federal court, should apply the preclusion rules of the first court. C is incorrect. In this case, the court must apply the preclusion rules of State A, not the federal rules. D is incorrect. The court hearing the second case must apply State A preclusion rules, which do not allow offensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion

An individual investor purchased stock through a company's stock offering. When the price of the stock plummeted, the investor sued the company in a state court in State A, claiming that the company's offering materials had fraudulently induced him to purchase the stock and seeking $25,000 in damages. A university that had purchased the company's stock through the same offering sued the company in federal court in State B, claiming that the offering materials violated federal securities laws and seeking $1 million in damages. The individual investor's suit proceeded to trial. The state court ruled that the company's offering materials contained false information and awarded the investor a $25,000 judgment. The university immediately moved for partial summary judgment in its federal action against the company, arguing that the state court judgment bound the federal court on the issue of whether the company's offering materials contained false information. Neither State A nor State B permits nonmutual issue preclusion. Should the court grant the university's motion? A: No, because State A does not permit nonmutual issue preclusion. B: No, because the federal court sits in a state that does not permit nonmutual issue preclusion. C: Yes, because federal law permits nonmutual issue preclusion. D: Yes, because the issue of whether the materials contained false information was actually litigated and necessarily decided.

B is correct. The parties are not completely diverse, which means the federal court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. A corporation's domicile may be in its principal place of business and its state of incorporation. Here, the manufacturer's board of directors meets in State A to direct and control its activities, which establishes domicile in State A, in addition to State B, where it is incorporated. The injured man is from State A, which means the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity because the manufacturer is also domiciled in State A. Without complete diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the federal court is likely to grant the motion to remand back to state court. A is incorrect. Although the court should grant the motion to remand, it is not because venue is improper. The motion should be granted because the federal district court does not have the authority to hear the action without subjectmatter jurisdiction, and because the injured man and drug manufacturer are co-citizens of State A, there is not complete diversity among the parties. C is incorrect. Even if the court had subject-matter jurisdiction, which it does not, it would lack authority to remand solely on the basis of conserving its resources for federal question cases. D is incorrect. As stated above, there is no diversity jurisdiction between the parties because both the injured man and the drug manufacturer are co-citizens of State A, which means the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction and should remand.

An injured man from State A brought a products liability action against a manufacturer and a retailer in a state court in State A. The man claimed a drug he purchased from the retailer, created by the manufacturer, caused him to suffer $100,000 in damages. The manufacturer is incorporated in State B, with its sole manufacturing plant in State C, and its board of directors meets in State A to direct and control the corporation's activities. The retailer is a limited liability company with its principal place of business in State A and its owner-members are citizens of State D. The manufacturer and the retailer timely removed the case to the federal district court in State A. The injured man timely moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court is extremely busy with criminal cases and civil cases that arise under federal law. Is the district court likely to grant the man's motion to remand? A: Yes, because either the manufacturer or the retailer, or both, are citizens of the state in which the action was brought, and venue is therefore improper. B: Yes, because the man is not diverse from both the manufacturer and the retailer, and the court lacks any other basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. C: No, because the district court may exercise its discretion to retain the case instead of conserving its resources for actions arising under federal law. D: No, because all of the requirements for removal have been satisfied, including personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and venue.

C is correct. No facts suggest that the administrative assistant was a designated agent of the stockbroker, and the Rules provide no general authority to serve process on third parties at a defendant's place of employment. A is incorrect. FRCP 4(e)(2) allows service to be made at the defendant's "dwelling or usual place of abode," not at the defendant's workplace. B is incorrect. FRCP 12(b) provides that every defense to a claim for relief, including insufficient service of process, must be asserted either in the responsive pleading (answer) or by motion. D is incorrect. FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) makes clear that the process of the federal courts may exceed state boundaries.

An investor from State A filed an action against his State B stockbroker in federal court in State A. The summons and complaint were served at the stockbroker's office in State B, where the process server handed the documents to the stockbroker's administrative assistant. The stockbroker has answered the complaint, asserting the defense of improper service of process. Assume that both states' requirements for service of process are identical to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Is the court likely to dismiss the action for improper service of process? A: No, because service was made on a person of suitable age found at the stockbroker's place of employment. B: No, because the stockbroker waived her claim for improper service of process by asserting it in her answer. C: Yes, because an individual defendant may not be served by delivering process to a third party found at the defendant's place of employment. D: Yes, because the process of State A courts is not effective in State B.

D is correct. The court should not grant the manufacturer's motion because by advertising and selling his goods in State A, the manufacturer targeted citizens of State A, amounting to purposefully availing himself of the benefits of conducting business within State A. Based on this activity, it was foreseeable to the manufacturer that he could be called into court to defend a lawsuit. Because he has established minimum contacts with State A, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer and his motion should be denied. A is incorrect. This choice is a misapplication of the law to the facts. A defendant may demonstrate minimum contacts under due process by conducting business within a state, even if he has never been physically present there. Here, because the manufacturer advertised and sold products within State A, he has the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction. B is incorrect. The issue presented here is not about removal, but about personal jurisdiction. It is true that a defendant may file a notice of removal in the appropriate federal district court, if that court would otherwise have subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the manufacturer has not sought to remove this case, but rather, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. As an aside, a proper notice of removal must be filed in the appropriate federal district court, not state court. C is incorrect. Although the court should not grant the manufacturer's motion, it is not because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Although this is a true statement of law, this answer choice is referring to subject-matter jurisdiction, and the manufacturer's motion to dismiss is a challenge to personal jurisdiction.

An ophthalmologist from State A sued a manufacturer from State B in State A state court. The manufacturer makes widgets in a small factory and sells them throughout the country through his website. The ophthalmologist purchased a widget from the manufacturer through the manufacturer's website after seeing an advertisement for the widget in a State A newspaper. The ophthalmologist was injured when the widget malfunctioned. The ophthalmologist is seeking $85,000 in damages under State A products liability law. State A's long-arm statute authorizes the state to have the full range of constitutionally-valid personal jurisdiction. The manufacturer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because the manufacturer has never been to State A. Should the court grant the manufacturer's motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because the manufacturer does not have minimum contacts with State A. B: Yes, because the manufacturer has the right to remove the case to federal court. C: No, because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. D: No, because the manufacturer has purposely availed himself of State A law.

Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids it in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides "Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it." Snipe traps cost about $15 each. An ardent snipe trapper is a resident of West Hampton. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, the snipe trapper stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after the trapper admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply. The snipe trapper can demonstrate that common carriers are permitted to transport snipe traps as cargo across Midland for delivery to another state and that in practice the Midland statute is enforced only against private individuals transporting those traps in private vehicles. If the trapper challenges the application of the Midland statute to her on the basis only of a denial of equal protection, the application of the statute will probably be found A: constitutional, because the traps constitute contraband in which the snipe trapper could have no protected property interest. B: constitutional, because there is a rational basis for differentiating between the possession of snipe traps as interstate cargo by common carriers and the possession of snipe traps by private individuals. C: unconstitutional, because the state cannot demonstrate a compelling public purpose for making this differentiation between common carriers and such private individuals. D: unconstitutional, because interstate travel is a fundamental right that may not be burdened by state law.

B is correct. Because the statute does not classify on any suspect grounds, rational basis is the test that would apply. It is rational to differentiate between common carriers transporting snipe traps and individuals possessing them, the statute would be constitutional. A is incorrect. The snipe trapper would have a property interest even in contraband. C is incorrect. Under equal protection, the statute need satisfy only rational basis. D is incorrect. The right to travel is not implicated by the statute prohibiting possession of snipe traps.

On the basis of scientific studies showing a causal relationship between the consumption of "red meat" (principally beef ) and certain forms of cancer, a federal statute prohibits all commercial advertising of red meat products. The statute does not, however, restrict the sale of red meat products. Producers of red meat have challenged the statute as a violation of their free speech rights protected by the First Amendment. Is the court likely to find the statute constitutional? A: No, because it does not serve a substantial government interest. B: No, because it is more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest in preventing certain cancers. C: Yes, because it does not affect speech protected by the First Amendment. D: Yes, because it serves a legitimate government interest in protecting public health.

B is correct. Even though the government has a substantial interest in preventing cancer, and it arguably advances that interest to prohibit all commercial advertising for red meat products, this regulation is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. A is incorrect. The goal of preventing cancer is a substantial government interest, however, the ban on advertising is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. C is incorrect. Although limited, the First Amendment does protect commercial speech. D is incorrect. The statute is unconstitutional because it is more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest in protecting public health.

A state accredits both public and private schools, licenses their teachers, and supplies textbooks on secular subjects to all such schools. A private school that offers elementary and secondary education in the state denies admission to all non-Caucasians. In a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional the continued racially exclusionary admissions policy of the school, which of the following is the strongest argument AGAINST the school? A: Because education is a public function, the school may not discriminate on racial grounds. B: The state is so involved in school regulation and support that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the school. C: The state is constitutionally obligated to eliminate segregation in all public and private educational institutions within the state. D: Any school with teachers who are licensed by the state is forbidden to discriminate on racial grounds.

B is correct. The Constitution prohibits the state from encouraging, authorizing, or participating in racial discrimination. However, this prohibition only applies to private parties in specific situations, such as the performance of a traditionally exclusive public function or where there is significant state involvement in the private action. Therefore, if the state was substantially involved in school regulation, the school would be prohibited from racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. A is incorrect. The performance of a public function does not make an institution a state actor unless the action performed has traditionally only been performed by the state. C is incorrect. The states are not constitutionally required to outlaw discrimination, they must only refrain from encouraging or authorizing discrimination. D is incorrect. Licensing alone does not qualify as "significant involvement" by the state.

A state constitution provides that in every criminal trial "the accused shall have the right to confront all witnesses against him face to face." A defendant was convicted in state court of child abuse based on testimony from a six-yearold child. The child testified while she was seated behind one-way glass, which allowed the defendant to see the child but did not allow the child to see the defendant. The defendant appealed to the state's highest court, claiming that the inability of the child to see the defendant while she testified violated both the United States Constitution and the state constitution. Without addressing the federal constitutional issue, the state's highest court reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial. The court held that "the constitution of this state is clear, and it requires that while testifying in a criminal trial, a witness must be able to see the defendant." The state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On which ground should the United States Supreme Court DENY the state's petition? A: A state may not seek appellate review in the United States Supreme Court of the reversal of a criminal conviction by its highest court. B: The decision of the state's highest court was based on an adequate and independent state ground. C: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that a witness against a criminal defendant be able to see the defendant while the witness testifies. D: The decision of the state's highest court requires a new trial, and therefore it is not a final judgment.

B is correct. The Supreme Court may not review a judgment by the highest court of a state if that judgment is supported entirely by state law and is wholly independent of the interpretation and application of federal law. In this case, although the defendant claimed a violation of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the state supreme court based its decision entirely on the state constitution without addressing the federal constitutional issue. A is incorrect. The Supreme Court may review a judgment of the highest court of a state if the state court's decision turns on a question arising under federal law. The reason the Supreme Court will deny the petition for certiorari is that the state supreme court based its decision entirely on state law. C is incorrect. The Supreme Court would not reach the merits of the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. As explained above, the Supreme Court may not review a judgment by the highest court of a state if that judgment is supported entirely by state law and is wholly independent of the interpretation and application of federal law. In this case, although the defendant claimed a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the state supreme court based its decision entirely on the state constitution without addressing the federal constitutional issue. D is incorrect. Although the Supreme Court may only review final judgments and decrees from the highest state courts, this judgment qualifies because it finally settled the confrontation issue. That issue would not arise again on retrial, and thus, the present petition provided the U.S. Supreme Court its only opportunity to review the confrontation issue. The reason the Supreme Court will deny the petition for certiorari is that the state supreme court based its decision entirely on state law.

A plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state tax law, alleging that it violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the state constitution. The state supreme court agreed and held the tax law to be invalid. It said: "We hold that this state tax law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and also the Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution because we interpret that provision of the state constitution to contain exactly the same prohibition against discriminatory legislation as is contained in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The state sought review of this decision in the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the state supreme court's determination of the federal constitutional issue was incorrect. How should the United States Supreme Court dispose of the case if it believes that this interpretation of the federal Constitution by the state supreme court raises an important federal question and is incorrect on the merits? A: Reverse the state supreme court decision, because the Equal Protection Clause of a state constitution must be construed by the state supreme court in a manner that is congruent with the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. B: Reverse the state supreme court decision with respect to the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and remand the case to the state supreme court for further proceedings, because the state and federal constitutional issues are so intertwined that the federal issue must be decided so that this case may be disposed of properly. C: Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because it is based on an adequate and independent ground of state law. D: Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because a state government may not seek review of the decisions of its own courts in the United States Supreme Court.

B is correct. The U.S. Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction over the state supreme court's interpretation of the federal Constitution because it raises an important federal question. When a state court interprets the state constitution and the Constitution co-extensively, as it did here, the Court may find that independent and adequate state grounds did not exist, which allows the Court to review it as to the federal issues. The state court maintains the right to interpret the law under its own constitution. Therefore, the Court should reverse as to the federal question and remand to allow for further adjudication by the state court. A is incorrect. The state maintains the authority to interpret the statute under its own constitution, and is not required to construe the statute in a manner congruent with the U.S. Constitution. The Court's review of the state court judgment is limited to questions of federal law. C is incorrect. The state court found that the statute was unconstitutional based on a co-extensive interpretation of the state and U.S. constitutional provisions, and therefore, there were no independent and adequate state law grounds. Given that the Court found the federal constitutional application to be incorrect, it may properly adjudicate the federal question. However, it must then remand the case for the state court to review the statute's legality under the state constitution. D is incorrect. The state government, like any other party, may seek review of a decision in the Court if it has jurisdiction.

A private university is owned and operated by a religious organization. The university is accredited by the department of education of the state in which it is located. This accreditation certifies that the university meets prescribed educational standards. Because it is accredited, the university qualifies for state funding for certain of its operating expenses. Under this funding program, 25 percent of the university's total operating budget comes from state funds. A professor at the university was a part-time columnist for the local newspaper. In one of her published columns, the professor argued that "religion has become a negative force in society." The university subsequently discharged the professor, giving as its sole reason for the dismissal her authorship and publication of this column. The professor sued the university, claiming only that her discharge violated her constitutional right to freedom of speech. The university moved to dismiss the professor's lawsuit on the ground that the U.S. Constitution does not provide the professor with a cause of action in this case. Should the court grant the university's motion to dismiss? A: Yes, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the university to employ only individuals who share and communicate its views. B: Yes, because the action of the university in discharging the professor is not attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. C: No, because the accreditation and partial funding of the university by the state are sufficient to justify the conclusion that the state was an active participant in the discharge of the professor. D: No, because the U.S. Constitution provides a cause of action against any state-accredited institution that restricts freedom of speech as a condition of employment.

B is correct. The professor's discharge by the private university did not constitute "state action," which is required to trigger Fourteenth Amendment protections. A is incorrect. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not grant a university any right to discharge employees who do not share and communicate the views of the university. However, the motion should be granted because the university's discharge of the professor was not "state action." C is incorrect. U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that the accreditation, regulation, and partial funding of a university by the state does not render the university's conduct state action, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. D is incorrect. The Constitution does not, in fact, contain a provision providing a cause of action against any state accredited institution that restricts freedom of speech as a condition of employment.

Residents of a city complained that brightly colored signs detracted from the character of the city's historic district and distracted motorists trying to navigate its narrow streets. In response, the city council enacted an ordinance requiring any "sign or visual display" visible on the streets of the historic district to be black and white and to be no more than four feet long or wide. A political party wanted to hang a six-foot-long red, white, and blue political banner in front of a building in the historic district. The party filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the sign ordinance as applied to the display of its banner. Which of the following would be the most useful argument for the political party? A: The ordinance is not the least restrictive means of promoting a compelling government interest. B: The ordinance is not narrowly tailored to further an important government interest, nor does it leave open alternative channels of communication. C: The ordinance imposes a prior restraint on political expression. D: The ordinance effectively favors some categories of speech over others.

B is correct. This is the strongest argument because ordinance at issue is not substantially related to an important government interest, nor does it leave open alternative channels of communication. A is incorrect. This suggests a strict scrutiny analysis, but the ordinance does not trigger strict scrutiny because it restricts signs regardless of their content. C is incorrect. Prior restraint is not at issue because the ordinance does not require the permission of a government official before signs may be posted. D is incorrect. The restriction on signs is not based on content. However, even if the ordinance were to favor some categories of speech, this alone does not invalidate the ordinance.

A generally applicable state statute requires an autopsy by the county coroner in all cases of death that are not obviously of natural causes. The purpose of this law is to ensure the discovery and prosecution of all illegal activity resulting in death. In the 50 years since its enactment, the statute has been consistently enforced. A husband and wife are sincere practicing members of a religion that maintains it is essential for a deceased person's body to be buried promptly and without any invasive procedures, including an autopsy. When the couple's son died of mysterious causes and an autopsy was scheduled, the couple filed an action in state court challenging the constitutionality of the state statute, and seeking an injunction prohibiting the county coroner from performing an autopsy on their son's body. In this action, the couple claimed only that the application of this statute in the circumstances of their son's death would violate their right to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Assume that no federal statutes are applicable. As applied to the couple's case, the court should rule that the state's autopsy statute is A: constitutional, because a dead individual is not a person protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. B: constitutional, because it is a generally applicable statute and is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. C: unconstitutional, because it is not necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. D: unconstitutional, because it is not substantially related to an important state interest.

B is correct. When a neutral law of general applicability impacts a religious practice, the law is subject to rational basis review. There is no inquiry into the extent of the impact or the sincerity of the religious beliefs. The law must merely be rationally related to a conceivable legitimate state interest. A is incorrect. It is not the deceased's rights that are being analyzed; rather, it is the rights of the parents, who are persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. C is incorrect. A neutral law of general applicability does not need to meet strict scrutiny if it affects a religious practice. D is incorrect. The law does not need to meet intermediate scrutiny either, only rational basis.

The United States government demonstrated that terrorist attacks involving commercial airliners were perpetrated exclusively by individuals of one particular race. In response, Congress enacted a statute imposing stringent new airport and airline security measures only on individuals of that race seeking to board airplanes in the United States. Which of the following provides the best ground for challenging the constitutionality of this statute? A: The commerce clause of Article I, Section 8. B: The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. C: The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. D: The privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B is correct. When the federal government takes action that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had it been conducted by a state government, it amounts to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The security measure is a presumptive violation of equal protection because it imposes a discriminatory racial classification on one minority group, which triggers strict scrutiny. It would be virtually impossible for the government to prove that the classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest. A is incorrect. The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power to regulate the safety of air travel because airlines are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. C is incorrect. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is inapplicable because it does not govern the actions of the federal government. Rather, it applies to actions by state governments against citizens of other states. D is incorrect. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has never been applied to actions of the federal government. It only applies to states, prohibiting them from depriving individuals of the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship.

As part of a comprehensive federal aid-to-education program, Congress included the following provisions as conditions for state receipt of federal funds: (1) Whenever textbooks are provided to students without charge, they must include no religious instruction and must be made available on the same terms to students in all public and private schools accredited by the state educational authority. (2) Salary supplements can be paid to teachers in public and private schools, up to ten percent of existing salary schedules, where present compensation is less than the average salary for persons of comparable training and experience, provided that no such supplement is paid to any teacher who instructs in religious subjects. (3) Construction grants can be made toward the cost of physical plant at private colleges and universities, provided that no part of the grant is used for buildings in which instruction in religious subject matters is offered. A federal taxpayer challenges the provision that allows the distribution of free textbooks to students in a private school where religious instruction is included in the curriculum. On the question of the adequacy of the taxpayer's standing to raise the constitutional question, the most likely result is that standing will be A: sustained, because any congressional spending authorization can be challenged by any taxpayer. B: sustained, because the challenge to the exercise of congressional spending power is based on a claimed violation of specific constitutional limitations on the exercise of such power. C: denied, because there is insufficient nexus between the taxpayer and the challenged expenditures. D: denied, because, in the case of private schools, no state action is involved.

B is correct. While taxpayers generally lack standing to challenge general spending statutes, a taxpayer will have standing where the spending violates the Establishment Clause. Because the taxpayer is alleging that the provision is advancing religion, there is a possible violation of a specific limitation on congressional spending and the taxpayer will have standing. A is incorrect. Taxpayers generally do not have standing to challenge governmental expenditures. C is incorrect. In the case of Establishment Clause challenges, the taxpayer does not need to show a special nexus in order to have standing. D is incorrect. The distribution of books paid for by federal funds is state action.

C is correct. Because the buyer's attorney did not effect timely service, the only way to survive the seller's motion to dismiss is for the buyer to demonstrate good cause for failing to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Forgetting to effect service is not good cause, which typically includes something beyond the party's control. A is incorrect. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 states that an action is commenced when a complaint is filed, the Supreme Court has held that state law governs how and when the statute of limitations runs. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 100 S.Ct. 1978 (1980); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Warehouse Co., 69 S.Ct. 1233 (1949). B is incorrect. Informal notice of a possible complaint is insufficient to stop the statute of limitations from running. Although the seller's attorney agreed to accept service, the attorney did not agree to accept untimely service and further was told by the buyer's attorney that the complaint would be filed "that day." That statement would suggest that service would be made promptly, and certainly within the 90-day window authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The fact that the seller's attorney had to ask 120 days later whether the complaint had been filed underscores that the attorney was not aware that the buyer had decided to go forward with the action. D is incorrect. Although it is true that the limitations period expired before the seller's attorney was served, that fact alone would not require dismissal since the complaint was filed before the expiration.

Before filing a federal civil action against a seller, a buyer's attorney unsuccessfully tried to settle with the seller's attorney. Three days before the limitations period on the buyer's claim expired, the buyer's attorney told the seller's attorney that she would file a complaint that day and asked the seller's attorney whether he would accept service of the summons and complaint. The seller's attorney agreed to do so. The buyer's attorney promptly filed the complaint but forgot to serve the seller's attorney. Four months later, the buyer's attorney received a voicemail from the seller's attorney asking whether she had ever filed the buyer's complaint. The buyer's attorney immediately mailed a copy of the complaint to the seller's attorney. The following week, the seller's attorney moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to effect timely service of process. Is the court likely to grant the seller's motion to dismiss? A: No, because under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of the complaint commences an action and the buyer's complaint was timely filed. B: No, because the seller's attorney had notice of the complaint and agreed to accept service. C: Yes, because the buyer's attorney did not show good cause for her failure to effect timely service. D: Yes, because the limitations period expired without timely service.

A student contracted for an expensive cable television service for a period of six months solely to view the televised trial of a defendant, who was on trial for murder in a court of a particular state. In the midst of the trial, the judge prohibited any further televising of the defendant's trial because he concluded that the presence of television cameras was disruptive. The student brought an action in federal district court against the judge in the defendant's case asking only for an injunction that would require the judge to resume the televising of the defendant's trial. The student alleged that the judge's order to stop the televising of the defendant's trial deprived him of property--his investment in cable television service--without due process of law. Before the student's case came to trial, the defendant's criminal trial concluded in a conviction and sentencing. There do not appear to be any obvious errors in the proceeding that led to the result in the defendant's case. After the defendant's conviction and sentencing, the opposing party in the student's case moved to dismiss the suit. The most proper disposition of this motion by the federal court would be to A: defer action on the motion until after any appellate proceedings in the defendant's case have concluded, because the defendant might appeal, his conviction might be set aside, he might be tried again, and television cameras might be barred from the new trial. B: defer action on the motion until after the state Supreme Court expresses a view on its proper disposition, because the state law of mootness governs suits in federal court when the federal case is inexorably intertwined with a state proceeding. C: grant the motion, because the subject matter of the controversy between the student and the defendant has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived. D: deny the motion, because the student has raised an important constitutional question: whether his investment in cable service, solely to view the defendant's trial, is property protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

C is correct. Article III limits the exercise of federal court jurisdiction to cases and controversies, and once the injury that gave rise to the case is incapable of remedy, the case becomes moot and no longer justiciable. Here, once the trial was over, the relief the student sought, (televising the trial), was no longer possible, and his case became moot. Moreover, it is unlikely that the controversy will be revived because the case is not on appeal now, and there were no obvious errors in the proceedings. Therefore, the federal court should grant the motion to dismiss. A is incorrect. The chances that the conviction would be set aside are small enough that it is unlikely the controversy would be revived. Moreover, the court might allow cameras for the second trial if one were granted. B is incorrect. There is no state law of mootness. D is incorrect. A federal question cannot be considered without a case or controversy, and a moot issue is not a case or controversy.

A resident of a state brought suit in federal district court against a corporation in that state. The resident seeks recovery of $12,000 actual and $12,000 punitive damages arising from the corporation's sale to him of a defective automobile. The resident's suit is based only on a common law contract theory. From a constitutional standpoint, should the federal district court hear this suit on its merits? A: Yes, because Article III vests federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving the obligation of contracts. B: Yes, because it is an action affecting interstate commerce. C: No, because this suit is not within the jurisdiction of an Article III court. D: No, because there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.

C is correct. Common law contracts are a matter for state and not federal law. And, because the parties are not diverse, the federal courts would lack jurisdiction over this state law claim. A is incorrect. This case involves a state law contract issue, and not a federal constitutional impairment of contracts issue. B is incorrect. Article III does not provide jurisdiction over every action affecting interstate commerce. D is incorrect. There is a case or controversy since the resident has been injured by an action of the corporation.

Congress recently enacted a statute imposing severe criminal penalties on anyone engaged in trading in the stock market who, in the course of that trading, takes "unfair advantage" of other investors who are also trading in the stock market. The statute does not define the term "unfair advantage." There have been no prosecutions under this new statute. The members of an association of law school professors that is dedicated to increasing the clarity of the language used in criminal statutes believe that this statute is unconstitutionally vague. Neither the association nor any of its members is currently engaged in, or intends in the future to engage in, trading in the stock market. The association and its members bring suit against the Attorney General of the United States in a federal district court, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of this statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. May the federal court determine the merits of this suit? A: Yes, because the suit involves a dispute over the constitutionality of a federal statute. B: Yes, because the plaintiffs seek real relief of a conclusive nature--an injunction against enforcement of this statute. C: No, because the plaintiffs do not have an interest in the invalidation of this statute that is adequate to ensure that the suit presents an Article III controversy. D: No, because a suit for an injunction against enforcement of a criminal statute may not be brought in federal court at any time prior to a bona fide effort to enforce that statute.

C is correct. In order to have standing, a party must have an imminent or actual injury. Here, because the plaintiffs do not trade in the stock market and do not plan to, they have no injury. Accordingly, they lack the standing required to create a case or controversy under Article III. A is incorrect. The presence of a constitutional question cannot make up for a lack of standing. B is incorrect. Although the remedy the plaintiffs seek will redress the injury caused others by this statute, they themselves have no injury, and lack standing. D is incorrect. A suit to enjoin enforcement of a statute can be brought before a bona fide effort to enforce the statute unless it is clear that the executive plans never to enforce it. An imminent injury is present when someone could be subject to prosecution at any time.

Insurance is provided in a particular state only by private companies. Although the state insurance commissioner inspects insurance companies for solvency, the state does not regulate their rates or policies. An insurance company charges higher rates for burglary insurance to residents of one part of a county in the state than to residents of another section of the same county because of the different crime rates in those areas. The plaintiff is a resident of the county who was charged the higher rate by the insurance company because of the location of her residence. The plaintiff sues the insurance company, alleging that the differential in insurance rates unconstitutionally denies her the equal protection of the law. Will the plaintiff's suit succeed? A: Yes, because the higher crime rate in the plaintiff's neighborhood demonstrates that the county police are not giving persons who reside there the equal protection of the laws. B: Yes, because the insurance rate differential is inherently discriminatory. C: No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. D: No, because there is a rational basis for the differential in insurance rates.

C is correct. The Constitution provides for equal protection of the law, which means that it protects individuals from actions by the state (the Fourteenth Amendment) or the federal government (the Fifth Amendment). Equal protection only restricts private action in extremely specific circumstances, none of which are present in this fact pattern. A is incorrect. This choice assumes that the Constitution prohibits differential treatment by private companies. Moreover, the plaintiff is suing the insurance company, not the police, for a violation of equal protection. The equal protection violation here would be caused by the police. B is incorrect. Generally, private discrimination does not violate the Constitution. D is incorrect. The Constitution only restricts private action in extremely specific circumstances, none of which are present in this situation.

A state statute permits a person's name to appear on the general election ballot as a candidate for statewide public office if the person pays a $100 filing fee and provides proof from the State Elections Board that he or she was nominated in the immediately preceding primary election by one of the state's two major political parties. It also permits the name of an independent candidate or a candidate of a smaller party to appear on the general election ballot if that person pays a filing fee of $1,000, and submits petitions signed by at least 3% of the voters who actually cast ballots for the office of governor in the last state election. The state maintains that these filing requirements are necessary to limit the size of the election ballot, to eliminate frivolous candidacies, and to help finance the high cost of elections. Historically, very few of the state's voters who are members of racial minority groups have been members of either of the two major political parties. Recently, a new political party has been formed by some of these voters. Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to the new political party as a basis for attacking the constitutionality of this statute? A: The First Amendment. B: The Thirteenth Amendment. C: The Fourteenth Amendment. D: The Fifteenth Amendment.

C is correct. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from limiting access to the ballot to members of particular political parties unless the prohibition is necessary to further a compelling interest. This is therefore the provision most helpful to the new political party in its efforts to attack the constitutionality of the statute. A is incorrect. The First Amendment does contain a right of association that is injured by this statute, but the First Amendment only applies to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. B is incorrect. The statute classifies on the basis of political party rather than race, and the party members are from several racial minority groups, not just Black people, and therefore the classification may not be a badge and incident of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment works to eradicate. D is incorrect. The classification does not limit the right of voters on the basis of race.

The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, a citizen brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. The citizen has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, "when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government." Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the citizen's suit by the federal court? A: Suit dismissed, because the citizen does not have standing to bring this action. B: Suit dismissed, because there is not diversity between the citizen and the defendants. C: Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjusticiable political question. D: Suit decided on the merits.

C is correct. The federal courts abstain from deciding political questions, which are disputes that present issues committed by the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government. Here, the Constitution vests the power to conduct foreign relations to the President with some powers to Congress. And, therefore, a federal court would dismiss the suit as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. A is incorrect. The citizen would have standing, since he has been injured by the recognition of Ruritania, which terminated his contract. B is incorrect. There need not be diversity since this would raise a federal question if it were justiciable. D is incorrect. For the reasons stated above, the suit would be dismissed.

A man intensely disliked his neighbors. One night, intending to frighten them, he spray-painted their house with racial epithets and threats to kill them. The man was arrested and prosecuted under a state law providing that "any person who threatens violence against another person with the intent to cause that person to fear for his or her life or safety may be imprisoned for up to five years." In defense, the man claimed that he did not intend to kill his neighbors, but only to scare them so that they would move away. Can the man constitutionally be convicted under this law? A: No, because he was only communicating his views and had not commenced any overt action against the neighbors. B: Yes, because he was engaged in trespass when he painted the words on his neighbors' house. C: Yes, because his communication was a threat by which he intended to intimidate his neighbors. D: Yes, because his communication was racially motivated and thus violated the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment.

C is correct. The man communicated a threat with the intent to intimidate the recipient. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this type of threat is not protected free speech under the First Amendment. Because this type of threat is not constitutionally protected, states may outlaw them regardless of whether the speaker acts on the threat. A is incorrect. As explained above, when an individual makes a threat intended to intimidate the recipient, such speech is not protected. It is irrelevant whether the man commenced any overt action against the neighbors because the threat alone may be outlawed as unprotected speech. B is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. Under the First Amendment, the state may not punish an individual for the content of his speech simply because he engages in unlawful conduct. In this case, the man may be convicted because a threat communicated with the intent to intimidate the recipient, like the communication here, is not constitutionally-protected speech. D is incorrect. The Supreme Court has not held racially-motivated threats to violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. The reason the man may be convicted is because a threat communicated with the intent to intimidate the recipient, like the communication here, is not constitutionally-protected speech.

A city owned and operated a municipal bus system. The city sold space on its buses for the posting of placards. Under the relevant city ordinance, the administrator of the bus system had sole discretion to decide which placards could be posted on the buses, and the administrator's decision was final. Although most of the placards that appeared on city buses were commercial advertisements, the administrator had often sold space on the buses for placards promoting various political, charitable, and religious causes. After a circus bought space on the buses for placards advertising its upcoming performances, an animal rights organization asked to buy space for a placard with photographs showing the mistreatment of animals in circus shows. The administrator denied the organization's request, stating that the proposed placard would be offensive to the circus, which had paid a substantial sum to place its placards on the buses, and that a circus employee had told her that none of the photographs on the organization's placard depicted animals belonging to this particular circus. The organization sued the administrator in an appropriate court for a declaration that her denial of the organization's request for placard space for the reasons she gave violated the First Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Is the organization likely to prevail? A: No, because the administrator's denial of space to the organization was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction of speech. B: No, because a public official may not allow the use of public facilities for the propagation of a message that he or she believes may create a false or misleading impression. C: Yes, because a public official may not refuse to permit the dissemination of a message in a public forum solely on the basis of its content unless that denial is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. D: Yes, because a public official may not refuse to allow the use of any public facility to publish a message dealing with an issue of public concern.

C is correct. The space on city buses used for the posting of placards qualifies as a designated public forum because it is public property that the city has decided to open for an expressive use. The decision to create a public forum must be made "by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse." See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U S. 788 (1985). The organization's placard was consistent with the city's designated use of the forum. The city administrator's denial of space to the organization was based on the content of the placard and therefore triggered strict scrutiny, which requires that the denial be necessary to serve a compelling government interest. The reasons cited for the city's denial of the organization's request do not implicate compelling government interests that would justify a content-based speech restriction. A is incorrect. The mere reasonableness of the administrator's denial is insufficient justification to satisfy strict scrutiny. B is incorrect. The false or misleading nature of speech in some instances may deprive it of protection under the First Amendment (e.g., commercial speech). However, there is no general constitutional requirement that a public official deny the use of public facilities for the propagation of a message that he or she believes may create a false or misleading impression. Indeed, in many instances, denial of a public forum on such a basis would constitute a content-based restriction of speech, in violation of the First Amendment. D is incorrect. This choice overstates First Amendment protection of the expressive uses of public property in two respects. First, not all public property qualifies as a public forum, and government custodians have broad discretion to disallow the expressive use of non-forum property. Second, government custodians also have considerable discretion to enforce content-neutral restrictions of the expressive use of property that qualifies as a public forum.

A baseball fan has a fierce temper and an extremely loud voice. Attending a baseball game in which a number of calls went against the home team, the fan repeatedly stood up, brandished his fist, and angrily shouted, "Kill the umpires." The fourth time he engaged in this conduct, many other spectators followed the fan in rising from their seats, brandishing fists, and shouting, "Kill the umpires." The home team lost the game. Although no violence ensued, spectators crowded menacingly around the umpires after the game. As a result, the umpires were able to leave the field and stadium only with the help of a massive police escort. For his conduct, the fan was charged with inciting to riot and was convicted in a jury trial in state court. He appealed. The state supreme court reversed his conviction. In its opinion, the court discussed in detail decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the First Amendment Free Speech Clause as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. At the end of that discussion, however, the court stated that it "need not resolve how, on the basis of these cases," the United States Supreme Court would decide the fan's case. Instead, the court stated, "this court has always given the free-speech guarantee of the state's constitution the broadest possible interpretation. As a result, we hold that in this case, where no riot or other violence actually occurred, the state constitution does not permit this conviction for incitement to riot to stand." The United States Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari to review this decision of the state supreme court. In this case, the United States Supreme Court should A: affirm the state supreme court's decision, because the fan's ballpark shout is commonplace hyperbole that cannot, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished. B: remand the case to the state supreme court with directions that it resolve the First and Fourteenth Amendment free-speech issue that it discussed in such detail. C: dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, because the state supreme court's decision rests on an independent and adequate state law ground. D: reverse the decision of the state supreme court, because incitement to violent action is not speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

C is correct. The state court's decision rested on an independent and adequate state-law ground because it explicitly held that it would not resolve how the Supreme Court would have adjudicated the matter based on federal law, but rather, it would give the state constitutional provision "the broadest possible interpretation" and it "does not permit this conviction for incitement to riot to stand." (emphasis added). The Court should, therefore, dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. A is incorrect. It is possible that the speech would not be protected under the federal Constitution if it was "fighting words" or if it posed a "clear and present danger." Nevertheless, because an independent and adequate state-law ground existed, the Court should dismiss the writ. B is incorrect. As stated above, the state court does not need to resolve the federal issue because its opinion relied upon independent and adequate state grounds. D is incorrect. Because an independent and adequate state-law ground existed, the writ should be dismissed and the analysis should end there. However, the speech might not have been considered an incitement to violent action given that there was some delay between the speech and the menacing of the umpires and no violence broke out.

A state initiated a criminal prosecution against the owner of a video store for selling a video that consisted entirely of pictures of nude sunbathers on a beach in a foreign country where nude public sunbathing is common. The state charged that selling the video violated its anti-obscenity law. The store owner defended on the ground that the prosecution violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Should the store owner prevail in this defense? A: No, because the store owner is engaged in the commercial sale of the video, which is not protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. B: No, because the video consists entirely of portrayals of nudity, appeals to the prurient interest of viewers, and lacks serious social value as a whole. C: Yes, because mere portrayals of nudity are insufficient to justify a finding that the video is obscene as a matter of constitutional law. D: Yes, because the portrayals of nudity occurred outside the United States, and therefore the state lacks a compelling interest in applying its anti-obscenity law to the sale of the video.

C is correct. The video consisted of pictures of nude sunbathers, where nude sunbathing is common. It had no appeal to the prurient interest in sex in that it was mere nudity, nor was it patently offensive. Therefore, the store owner will prevail in this defense. A is incorrect. Commercial speech does, in fact, receive First Amendment protection, even though it is more limited than with non-commercial speech. False or deceptive commercial speech may be properly forbidden by the government, but that is not the case here. B is incorrect. Nudity alone is not considered obscene; to appeal to a prurient interest in sex, it must incite a morbid or shameful interest, not merely a normal interest. D is incorrect. Regardless of where the nude pictures were taken, the sale itself falls under the purview of state regulation if it is otherwise constitutional. The store owner will nevertheless prevail because the video is not obscene and therefore, he has the right to free speech here.

Public schools in a state are financed, in large part, by revenue derived from real estate taxes imposed by each school district on the taxable real property located in that district. Public schools also receive other revenue from private gifts, federal grants, student fees, and local sales taxes. For many years, the state has distributed additional funds, which come from the state treasury, to local school districts in order to equalize the funds available on a perstudent basis for each public school district. These additional funds are distributed on the basis of a state statutory formula that considers only the number of students in each public school district and the real estate tax revenue raised by that district. The formula does not consider other revenue received by a school district from different sources. The school boards of two school districts, together with parents and schoolchildren in those districts, bring suit in federal court to enjoin the state from allocating the additional funds from the state treasury to this formula. They allege that the failure of the state, in allocating this additional money, to take into account a school district's sources of revenue other than revenue derived from taxes levied on real estate located there violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint does not allege that the allocation of the additional state funds based on the current statutory formula has resulted in a failure to provide minimally adequate education to any child. Which of the following best describes the appropriate standard by which the court should review the constitutionality of the state statutory funding formula? A: Because classifications based on wealth are inherently suspect, the state must demonstrate that the statutory formula is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. B: Because the statutory funding formula burdens the fundamental right to education, the state must demonstrate that the formula is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. C: Because no fundamental right or suspect classification is implicated in this case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the funding allocation formula bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. D: Because the funding formula inevitably leads to disparities among the school districts in their levels of total funding, the plaintiffs must only demonstrate that the funding formula is not substantially related to the furtherance of an important state interest.

C is correct. There is no fundamental right to education, and wealth is not a suspect class. Because there is no fundamental right or suspect class at issue, the court will apply rational basis review, which would require the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the funding allocation formula is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate state interest. A is incorrect. Wealth is not a suspect class. B is incorrect. Education is not a fundamental right. D is incorrect. The regulation only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

A state has enacted a new election code designed to increase voter responsibility in the exercise of the franchise and to enlarge citizen participation in the electoral process. None of its provisions conflicts with federal statutes. Which of the following is the strongest reason for finding unconstitutional a requirement in the state code that each voter must be literate in English? A: The requirement violates Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that representatives to Congress be chosen "by the People of the several States." B: The requirement violates Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to "make or alter" state regulations providing for the "Times" and "Manner" of holding elections for senators and representatives. C: The requirement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. D: The requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

D is correct. Literacy requirements have been used in the past to disenfranchise minority voters as a class. English proficiency is not a perfect proxy for being politically informed, and it is more likely that political minorities will be less proficient in English. Under the Equal Protection Clause, these types of restrictions would be unconstitutional. A is incorrect. The literacy requirement does not impair the choice of representatives by the people of the several states. B is incorrect. The literacy requirement is not a time or manner provision for holding elections. C is incorrect. The literacy requirement is essentially a classification, and so equal protection is the more appropriate analysis. The major factor to consider in deciding whether to apply Equal Protection Clause analysis versus Due Process Clause analysis is whether the law in question creates a classification. If, as in this fact pattern, the law does create a classification, the Equal Protection Clause is more appropriate.

The legislature of a particular state enacted a statute requiring that all law enforcement officers in that state be citizens of the United States. An alien, lawfully admitted to permanent residency five years before the enactment of this statute, sought employment as a forensic pathologist in the state coroner's office. He was denied such a job solely because he was not a citizen. The alien thereupon brought suit in federal district court against appropriate state officials seeking to invalidate this citizenship requirement on federal constitutional grounds. The strongest ground upon which to attack this citizenship requirement is that it A: constitutes an ex post facto law as to previously admitted aliens. B: deprives an alien of a fundamental right to employment without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. C: denies an alien a right to employment in violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. D: denies an alien the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

D is correct. The Equal Protection Clause requires that classifications based on alienage be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. However, strict scrutiny for alienage classifications does not apply where the discrimination against aliens relates to functions that go to the heart of the representative government. This means that individuals who hold state-elected or important non-elected executive positions, and those who are government officers that participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy may be required to be citizens. If the law discriminates against an alien participating in state government, the standard is rational basis review. It has been held that the government may discriminate against aliens with respect to the following positions: state troopers; public school teachers; jurors; and deputy probation officers. In this case, it is unclear which standard the position of forensic pathologist would be evaluated against. However, because this law is treating a group of people differently, the best challenge would be under equal protection. A is incorrect. The law does not criminalize an act after it was committed, nor does it impose a burden on a vested right; therefore it is not an ex post facto law. B is incorrect. Employment is not a fundamental right. C is incorrect. The Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination by states against United States citizens, and an alien is not a United States citizen

In response to the need for additional toxic waste landfills in a state, the state's legislature enacted a law authorizing a state agency to establish five new state-owned and state-operated toxic waste landfills. The law provided that the agency would decide the locations and sizes of the landfills after an investigation of all potential sites and a determination that the particular sites chosen would not endanger public health and would be consistent with the public welfare. A community in the state was scheduled for inspection by the agency as a potential toxic waste landfill site. Because the community's residents obtained most of their drinking water from an aquifer that ran under the entire community, a citizens' group, made up of residents of that community, sued the appropriate officials of the agency in federal court. The group sought a declaratory judgment that selecting their community as the site of a toxic waste landfill would be unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the agency from doing so. The agency officials moved to dismiss. Which of the following is the most appropriate basis for the court to dismiss this suit? A: The case presents a nonjusticiable political question. B: The interest of the state in obtaining suitable sites for toxic waste landfills is sufficiently compelling to justify the selection of the community as a location for such a facility. C: The Eleventh Amendment bars suits of this kind in the federal courts. D: The case is not ripe for a decision on the merits.

D is correct. The case arguably is not ripe for adjudication because the agency's inspection does not itself pose any risk of harm to residents of the community. The residents face a risk of harm only if the agency selects their community as a site for a landfill, but on these facts it is unclear whether or when the community would be selected. A is incorrect. The political question doctrine insulates from judicial review certain constitutional questions that the Constitution has committed either to the legislative branch or to the executive branch of the federal government. No such question is presented on these facts, which concern actions by a state government. B is incorrect. There are no facts to suggest that strict judicial scrutiny of the state's site-selection decision is warranted. Therefore, the state need not show that the selection of the community is necessary to serve a compelling interest. A more appropriate basis for a court dismissing the suit would be that the case is not ripe for adjudication. C is incorrect. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar the suit because it was brought against state officers, not the state itself, and because it seeks only prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, not compensatory monetary relief.

A city enacted an ordinance banning from its public sidewalks all machines dispensing publications consisting wholly of commercial advertisements. The ordinance was enacted because of a concern about the adverse aesthetic effects of litter from publications distributed on the public sidewalks and streets. However, the city continued to allow machines dispensing other types of publications on the public sidewalks. As a result of the city ordinance, 30 of the 300 sidewalk machines that were dispensing publications in the city were removed. Is this city ordinance constitutional? A: Yes, because regulations of commercial speech are subject only to the requirement that they be rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and that requirement is satisfied here. B: Yes, because the city has a compelling interest in protecting the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets, and such a ban is necessary to vindicate this interest. C: No, because it does not constitute the least restrictive means with which to protect the aesthetics of the city's sidewalks and streets. D: No, because there is not a reasonable fit between the legitimate interest of the city in preserving the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets and the means it chose to advance that interest.

D is correct. The city's interest in reducing litter on public sidewalks may constitute a substantial interest, however, removing machines that dispense commercial pamphlets is not a reasonable fit. Only 30 out of 300 of the machines will be removed, thus not significantly reducing the litter, and there is no indication that those 30 machines cause more litter than the remaining 270 machines. A is incorrect. This answer choice states the wrong test; the applicable test is whether the state can show that the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental interest in a way that is reasonably tailored to achieve that objective. B is incorrect. This answer choice also states the wrong test and instead provides the strict scrutiny standard used for content-based restrictions. C is incorrect. The means chosen need not be the least restrictive means, just a reasonable fit.

A federal statute requires the National Bureau of Standards to establish minimum quality standards for all beer sold in the United States. The statute also provides that public hearings must precede adoption of the standards, and that once they are adopted, the standards will be subject to judicial review. While the proposed standards have not yet been announced, several Bureau officials have publicly expressed opinions indicating a belief that pasteurized beer is safer than unpasteurized beer. However, these officials have not stated whether they intend to include a pasteurization requirement in the standards. A brewery that produces unpasteurized beer is concerned that, after the appropriate proceedings, the Bureau may adopt quality standards that will prohibit the sale of unpasteurized beer. The brewery has sued in federal district court to enjoin the Bureau from adopting standards that would prohibit the sale of unpasteurized beer. How should the district court proceed with the suit? A: Determine whether the Bureau could reasonably believe that pasteurization is the safest process by which to brew beer and, if so, refuse to issue the injunction against the Bureau. B: Determine whether the process used by the brewery is as safe as pasteurization and, if so, issue the injunction against the Bureau. C: Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit at this time and stay the action until the Bureau has actually issued beerquality standards. D: Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit and dismiss it, because it does not involve a justiciable case or controversy.

D is correct. The federal courts lack the power to entertain a suit that is not ripe for adjudication because such a suit does not present a "case" or "controversy" within the meaning of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. The district court should dismiss the suit because the Bureau has yet to announce the beer-quality standards, and therefore the case is not ripe. The court may not maintain jurisdiction over the suit by issuing a stay because it lacks the constitutional authority to retain control over the suit. A is incorrect. Because the case does not satisfy the requirements for ripeness under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, it should be dismissed without hearing the merits. B is incorrect. As stated above, the case is not yet ripe because there have been no beer-quality standards announced, and therefore, it should not proceed. C is incorrect. The district court should not stay the action, it should dismiss it because the suit does not present a case or controversy within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.

Members of a religious group calling itself the Friends of Lucifer believe in Lucifer as their Supreme Being. The members of this group meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located in a U.S. National Park, to hold an overnight encampment and a midnight dance around a large campfire. They believe this overnight encampment and all of its rituals are required by Lucifer to be held on top of Mt. Snow. U.S. National Park Service rules that have been consistently enforced prohibit all overnight camping and all campfires on Mt. Snow because of the very great dangers overnight camping and campfires would pose in that particular location. As a result, the park Superintendent denied a request by the Friends of Lucifer for a permit to conduct these activities on top of Mt. Snow. The park Superintendent, who was known to be violently opposed to cults and other unconventional groups had, in the past, issued permits to conventional religious groups to conduct sunrise services in other areas of that U.S. National Park. The Friends of Lucifer brought suit in Federal Court against the U.S. National Park Service and the Superintendent of the park to compel issuance of the requested permit. As a matter of constitutional law, the most appropriate result in this suit would be a decision that denial of the permit was A: invalid, because the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Park Service from knowingly interfering with religious conduct. B: invalid, because these facts demonstrate that the action of the Park Service purposefully and invidiously discriminated against the Friends of Lucifer. C: valid, because the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the holding of religious ceremonies on federal land. D: valid, because religiously motivated conduct may be subjected to nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that advance important public interests.

D is correct. The government may regulate the time, place, and manner of religiously-motivated conduct as long as the regulation is neutral and serves an important public interest. Here, the regulation is neutral on its face and in application, the Superintendent's views notwithstanding. The interest in public safety is important. Therefore, the denial of the permit would be valid. A is incorrect. The permit rules do not target religious practices. B is incorrect. These facts do not demonstrate purposeful and invidious discrimination against the Friends of Lucifer. No group has been allowed to camp all night or to light campfires on Mt. Snow. C is incorrect. The Establishment Clause does not prohibit the holding of religious ceremonies on public land as long as those ceremonies do not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

A city ordinance prohibited individuals from picketing in residential neighborhoods unless the picketing related to the neighborhood zoning requirements. This exception to the ordinance was adopted in response to local citizens' strong views about proposed rezoning of residential neighborhoods. A group that wished to picket in front of a business owner's home because of the business owner's employment practices challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Will the group's challenge likely prevail? A: No, because the ordinance is a content-neutral regulation of speech. B: No, because the ordinance regulates conduct rather than speech. C: Yes, because the ordinance irrationally discriminates between different types of protesters. D: Yes, because the ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech.

D is correct. The ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech because it permits an expressive activity (picketing) on one subject (neighborhood zoning requirements) and prohibits it on all other subjects. Such a restriction on expression presumptively violates the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. To justify a contentbased restriction, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny, proving that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. The city would be unable to meet that burden in this case. A is incorrect. As explained above, the ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech, not a content-neutral regulation of speech. B is incorrect. Although picketing is conduct, it is considered "expressive conduct" because: (i) the picketer intends to communicate a message; and (ii) the audience is likely to understand the message. Expressive conduct is protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. As stated above, the ordinance is a content-based regulation of speech, which must satisfy strict scrutiny, a burden which the city would be unable to meet. C is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. For the reasons explained above, the applicable standard of review is strict scrutiny, and the ordinance would not pass this standard.

As part of a comprehensive federal aid-to-education program, Congress included the following provisions as conditions for state receipt of federal funds: (1) Whenever textbooks are provided to students without charge, they must include no religious instruction and must be made available on the same terms to students in all public and private schools accredited by the state educational authority. (2) Salary supplements can be paid to teachers in public and private schools, up to ten percent of existing salary schedules, where present compensation is less than the average salary for persons of comparable training and experience, provided that no such supplement is paid to any teacher who instructs in religious subjects. (3) Construction grants can be made toward the cost of physical plant at private colleges and universities, provided that no part of the grant is used for buildings in which instruction in religious subject matters is offered. A federal taxpayer challenges the salary supplements for teachers in private schools where religious instruction is included in the curriculum. On the substantive constitutional issue, the most likely result is that the salary supplements will be A: sustained, because the statute provides that no supplements will be made to teachers who are engaged in any religious instruction. B: sustained, because to distinguish between private and public school teachers would violate the religious freedom clause of the First Amendment. C: held unconstitutional, because some religions would benefit disproportionately. D: held unconstitutional, because the policing of the restriction would amount to an excessive entanglement with religion.

D is correct. The salary supplements for teachers in private schools would fail the third prong of the Lemon test, requiring that the funding not amount to an excessive entanglement with religion. A is incorrect. The statute's provision restricting who may receive the supplements must still be enforced, and the enforcement will lead to an excessive entanglement with religion. B is incorrect. The issue here is not the classification of groups of teachers, but whether the statute's provision restricting who may receive the supplements may be enforced without causing excessive entanglement with religion. C is incorrect. There is no indication that any religion is disproportionately benefiting because the supplements do not go to teachers of religious topics.

Congress enacted a statute authorizing the denial of all federal funding to public school districts in which a specified percentage of the students enrolled in the public schools fail to pass a national achievement test. According to the terms of the federal statute, the first national achievement test was scheduled for administration five years from the effective date of the statute. After reviewing then-current levels of public school student performance, the officials of a state became concerned that several of its public school districts would lose their federal funding after the administration of the first national achievement test. Then-current levels of private school student performance were substantially higher. In order to improve the chances of those school districts retaining their federal funding, the state recently enacted a law that requires all children of elementary and secondary school age to attend the schools operated by their respective local public school districts. The law is to take effect at the beginning of the next school year. Parents of children enrolled in private schools within the state have filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of this state law. Should the court uphold the law? A: Yes, because it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. B: Yes, because it is necessary to further a compelling state interest. C: No, because it is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. D: No, because it is not necessary to further a compelling state interest.

D is correct. The state's law requiring kids to attend public schools defies the Court's holding in Pierce that such laws are invalid. Moreover, the law infringes upon parents' fundamental right to raise their children, which triggers strict scrutiny, a level of review that cannot be satisfied here. A is incorrect. Even if this law would satisfy rational basis review, this is not the proper standard because it infringes upon a fundamental right, thus triggering strict scrutiny, as explained above. B is incorrect. Even though this response states the proper standard of review, it misstates the court's likely finding. As explained above, the law is not necessary to further a compelling state interest. C is incorrect. The law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. However, this is the incorrect standard of review. The court would apply strict scrutiny, and the law would not pass this higher standard of review.

A federal statute requires United States civil service employees to retire at age 75. However, that statute also states that civil service employees of the armed forces must retire at age 65. The plaintiff, a 65-year-old service employee of the Department of the Army, seeks a declaratory judgment that would forbid his mandatory retirement until age 75. The strongest argument that the plaintiff can make to invalidate the requirement that he retire at age 65 is that the law A: denies him a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. B: deprives him of a property right without just compensation. C: is not within the scope of any of the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8. D: invidiously discriminates against him on the basis of age in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

D is correct. The statute discriminates on the basis of age in violation of the Fifth Amendment, which contains an implied equal protection provision. While this would only trigger a rational basis review, it is the only argument provided that has a chance of prevailing. A is incorrect. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable to the facts here. This Clause prohibits states from denying citizens rights and immunities of national citizenship (e.g., right to interstate travel; right to vote for federal officials). In the present case, the statute is a federal, not a state statute, to which the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause cannot apply. B is incorrect. The plaintiff's continued employment is not a property right. C is incorrect. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to not only declare war and raise armies, but to also make rules for the regulation of the armed forces.

A city zoning ordinance requires that anyone who proposes to operate a group home obtain a special use permit from the city zoning board. The zoning ordinance defines a group home as a residence in which four or more unrelated adults reside. An individual applied for a special use permit to operate a group home for convicts during their transition from serving prison sentences to their release on parole. Although the proposed group home met all of the requirements for the special use permit, the zoning board denied the individual's application because of the nature of the proposed use. The individual sued the zoning board seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds. Which of the following best states the appropriate burden of persuasion in this action? A: Because housing is a fundamental right, the zoning board must demonstrate that denial of the permit is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. B: Because the zoning board's action has the effect of discriminating against a quasi-suspect class in regard to a basic subsistence right, the zoning board must demonstrate that the denial of the permit is substantially related to an important state interest. C: Because the zoning board's action invidiously discriminates against a suspect class, the zoning board must demonstrate that denial of the permit is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. D: Because the zoning board's action is in the nature of an economic or social welfare regulation, the individual seeking the permit must demonstrate that the denial of the permit is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

D is correct. The zoning board's denial of the permit did not discriminate against a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, nor did it unduly burden the exercise of a fundamental right. The denial therefore triggers rational basis scrutiny. A is incorrect. The Supreme Court has not held that housing is a fundamental right. Therefore, the zoning board's denial of the permit does not trigger strict scrutiny on that basis. B is incorrect. The Court has not held that convicts constitute a quasi-suspect class. Consequently, the zoning board's denial of the permit does not trigger intermediate scrutiny on that basis. C is incorrect. As stated above, the Court has not held that convicts constitute a suspect class. The zoning board's denial of the permit thus does not trigger strict scrutiny on that basis.

A city ordinance requires every operator of a taxicab in the city to have a license and permits revocation of that license only for "good cause." The city taxicab operator's licensing ordinance conditions the issuance of such a license on an agreement by the licensee that the licensee "not display in or on his or her vehicle any bumper sticker or other placard or sign favoring a particular candidate for any elected municipal office." The ordinance also states that it imposes this condition in order to prevent the possible imputation to the city council of the views of its taxicab licensees and that any licensee who violates this condition shall have his or her license revoked. One holder of a city taxicab operator's license decorates his cab with bumper stickers and other signs favoring specified candidates in a forthcoming election for municipal offices. A proceeding is initiated against him to revoke his taxicab operator's license on the sole basis of that admitted conduct. In this proceeding, does this license holder have a meritorious defense based on the United States Constitution? A: No, because he accepted the license with knowledge of the condition and, therefore, has no standing to contest it. B: No, because a taxicab operator's license is a privilege and not a right and, therefore, is not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. C: Yes, because such a proceeding threatens the license holder with a taking of property, his license, without just compensation. D: Yes, because the condition imposed on taxicab operators' licenses restricts political speech based wholly on its content, without any adequate governmental justification.

D is correct. There is a meritorious defense based on the freedom of expression because the licensing restriction is content-based (prohibiting political candidate bumper stickers on private property) and as such, it is subject to strict scrutiny. The city's interest in preventing the possibility of people thinking taxi drivers and councilmembers have the same political views has not been shown to be compelling, nor is prohibiting all bumper stickers narrowly drawn to achieve such an interest. A is incorrect. The government cannot require an individual to give up the fundamental constitutional right to free speech in order to receive a government benefit. Standing exists because the content-based restriction forces the license holder to choose between free speech rights and the ability to make a living with the license. B is incorrect. As stated above, government privileges cannot be conditioned on an agreement to give up a constitutional right. C is incorrect. This is not a "takings" case, as it does not involve the taking of one's land use or the regulation of property in a manner that deprives its owner of all economically viable use. The government may take a person's license, which can be considered property, as long as it affords him due process of the law and is not otherwise violative of any constitutional rights.

The National AIDS Prevention and Control Act is a new, comprehensive federal statute that was enacted to deal with the public health crisis caused by the AIDS virus. Congress and the President were concerned that inconsistent lower court rulings with respect to the constitutionality, interpretation, and application of the statute might adversely affect or delay its enforcement and, thereby, jeopardize the public health. As a result, they included a provision in the statute providing that all legal challenges concerning those matters may be initiated only by filing suit directly in the United States Supreme Court. The provision authorizing direct review of the constitutionality, interpretation, or application of this statute only in the United States Supreme Court is A: constitutional, because it is authorized by the Article I power of Congress to enact all laws that are "necessary and proper" to implement the general welfare. B: constitutional, because Article III provides that the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is subject to such exceptions and such regulations as Congress shall make. C: unconstitutional, because it denies persons who wish to challenge this statute the equal protection of the laws by requiring them to file suit in a court different from that in which persons who wish to challenge other statutes may file. D: unconstitutional, because it is inconsistent with the specification in Article III of the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.

D is correct. This provision is inconsistent with Article III, which states that the Court has original jurisdiction in cases involving ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and cases in which a state is a party. None of these scenarios applies here. A is incorrect. While the statute itself is valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the judicial review provision can only be authorized under Article III. B is incorrect. Congress only has the power to make exceptions and regulations governing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. C is incorrect. The judicial power of the United States is exercised by any Article III court, including the Supreme Court. There is no differential treatment as long as an Article III court has jurisdiction at some point in the process.

A state enacts the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act, which provides that, before any persons less than 30 years of age may be issued a marriage license, they must receive at least five hours of marriage counseling from a statelicensed social worker. This counseling is designed to assure that applicants for marriage licenses know their legal rights and duties in relation to marriage and parenthood, understand the "true nature" of the marriage relationship, and understand the procedures for obtaining divorces. A man, aged 25, contemplated marrying a woman, aged 25. Both are residents of the state. The man has not yet proposed to the woman because he is offended by the counseling requirement. The man sues in court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act is unconstitutional. Which of the following is the clearest ground for dismissal of this action by the court? A: The man and woman are residents of the same state. B: No substantial federal question is presented. C: The suit presents a nonjusticiable political question. D: The suit is unripe.

D is correct. To avoid issuing advisory opinions, federal courts require that a dispute has matured sufficiently to warrant a decision, known as ripeness. When considering a question of ripeness, a federal court considers two main factors: (i) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and (ii) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. The man's issue is not ripe since he has not applied for a marriage license and been required to submit to the counseling. A is incorrect. The residency of the plaintiff and his potential spouse are irrelevant both under the statute and for purposes of jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. B is incorrect. A substantial federal question is always presented when a statute's constitutionality is at issue. C is incorrect. This is not a matter that is clearly delegated to a coordinate branch of government, nor does it lack judicially manageable standards.

A is correct. The instructor's motion to remand to state court should be denied because it is the federal court, not state court, which has proper subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal copyright claim. B is incorrect. Although the court should deny the motion to remand, this is not the correct legal reasoning. The doctrine of "derivative jurisdiction" is inapplicable here, where the federal court may adjudicate the copyright claim based on federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, whether the state court would have jurisdiction to hear the case is not dispositive, as the federal court does have jurisdiction to hear it. C is incorrect. The instructor's motion should be denied because it is the federal court, not state court, with proper jurisdiction over the suit. Derivative jurisdiction is irrelevant here. D is incorrect. There is no need to re-file the action to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction; the case may simply remain in federal court.

In state court, an instructor brought suit against an entertainer alleging that the entertainer infringed on the instructor's copyright. Copyrights are granted by the federal government and federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights. The entertainer removed the copyright action to the local federal court. The instructor then moved to remand the case to state court. Should the court grant the instructor's motion to remand? A: No, because the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit based on federal question. B: No, because the state court would not have jurisdiction to hear the case, even though the federal court lacks "derivative jurisdiction." C: Yes, because the state court did not have jurisdiction over the instructor's claim, so the federal court lacks "derivative jurisdiction." D: Yes, because the remand would allow the instructor to voluntarily dismiss the suit and re-file it in federal court.

C is correct. The court should deny the motion because State A, the original venue, was improper. A court may only transfer from an improper to a venue that would have been proper originally. State B was not a venue where the case could have been properly filed originally, so the court must deny the transfer. A is incorrect. The parties' consent is not a basis for transferring a case from an improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406. B is incorrect. The busy docket in State A's federal court is not a basis for transferring to a State B federal court because the case was initially filed in an improper venue, and State B would not have been a proper venue either, so the court must deny the transfer. D is incorrect. The court should deny the transfer, not because transfer is only permitted from one proper venue to another. When the initial venue is improper, the court may transfer to another venue that would have been proper originally. This is not the case here, however, where neither federal court in State A nor State B was proper.

Just before the statute of limitations ran on his claim, a pilot from State A sued a radiologist from State C in the federal judicial district in State A, an extremely busy court. The radiologist has never been to State A and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim did not occur in State A, but in State C. The radiologist moved to transfer the case to a federal court in State B because he travels to State B often for work. The pilot has family in State B and consented to the transfer. Should the court grant the motion to transfer to a federal court in State B? A: Yes, because both parties have expressed their consent to litigating the case in State B. B: Yes, because of the extremely busy docket of the federal court in State A. C: No, because State B is not a district in which the action could have properly been brought originally. D: No, because transfer is permitted only from one proper venue to another.

D is correct. FRCP 15(d) allows for the comedian to supplement with the intentional tort claim because it occurred after the date of the original complaint and relates to the underlying business tort claim. A is incorrect. There is no statute of limitations problem because the intentional tort claim is a proper supplemental pleading to the original complaint. B is incorrect. The fact that the intentional tort occurred after the lawsuit is the basis for adding it as a supplemental pleading, as stated above. C is incorrect. The relation back doctrine does not apply here. This is a supplemental claim because the event is a related matter and happened after the filing of the original complaint.

On January 1, 2019, a comedian from State A filed a diversity action in State A federal court against an actor from State B. The lawsuit was based on alleged wrongful business torts that occurred on January 15, 2014. The comedian is seeking $80,000 in compensatory damages. State A has a five-year statute of limitations for tort claims. The actor was served with the complaint on January 24, 2019. On January 25, 2019, the actor, upset about the lawsuit, deliberately drove his car into the comedian's car. A week later, the comedian moved to add an intentional tort claim in a supplemental pleading against the actor in the existing lawsuit. Should the court permit the comedian to supplement the pleadings with the additional intentional tort claim? A: No, because the statute of limitations for the business tort claim has already expired. B: No, because the intentional tort occurred after the comedian filed the original lawsuit. C: Yes, because the intentional tort relates back to the business tort claim, filed within the statute of limitations. D: Yes, because the intentional tort in the comedian's supplemental pleading would be a timely amendment to the original complaint.

B is correct. State A's law is silent on notifying companies that they have been sued, which falls short of the due process requirement that reasonable efforts be made to give notice of actions filed against them. A is incorrect. This argument would be unsuccessful because it refers to subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court based on diversity (the amount in controversy requirement), but this case is in state court. C is incorrect. Registering to do business and selling merchandise in State A does amount to minimum contacts because the toy manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of the laws of State A. D is incorrect. This argument is challenging the sufficiency of the complaint, which would be ineffective because the teacher properly included the cause of action, factual basis, and prayer for relief in the pleadings.

State A's statute provides: "To be registered to do business in this state, a company must authorize the Secretary of State to receive service of process on its behalf." However, the statute is silent on whether the Secretary of State must provide notice to companies that they have been served. A toy manufacturer, a State B corporation, is registered to do business in State A, but has sold less than $1,000 of merchandise in State A. A teacher, a citizen of State A, sued the toy manufacturer in State A state court asserting a factual basis for a products liability claim, with $35,000 in damages. The teacher served process on the toy manufacturer by serving process on State A's Secretary of State. The toy manufacturer filed a motion to dismiss. What is the toy manufacturer's strongest argument for dismissing the case? A: State A state court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the teacher's claim does not seek damages in excess of $75,000. B: State A's service requirements are unconstitutional because they failed to provide adequate notice of the suit to the toy manufacturer. C: State A state court does not have personal jurisdiction over the toy manufacturer because it does not have minimum contacts with State A. D: The teacher failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the toy manufacturer's products were safe and therefore, not defective.

B is correct. The mechanic had up to one year to remove this diversity action to federal court, but he waited until over a year had passed, which means it was untimely and the court should remand. A is incorrect. The court should grant the motion to remand because the mechanic's removal was untimely, not because he failed to prove the amount in controversy. C is incorrect. This choice is not supported by the facts, which show that the janitor followed State X's rules by not pleading the damages amount in the initial complaint. After that point, the mechanic had plenty of time to determine the amount in controversy and file a notice of removal. D is incorrect. Even though the mechanic removed the case promptly after ascertaining damages information, this is insufficient because he could have sought that information within the year time limit for removal, and no facts indicate that the janitor acted in bad faith in concealing the information.

State X's rules prohibit personal injury plaintiffs from alleging the damages amount in their complaints. A janitor from State X sued a mechanic from State A for negligence in a State X court. In his complaint, the janitor alleged that, due to the mechanic's negligence, he suffered multiple broken bones that required extensive surgeries and sustained brain damage. The janitor sought compensation for those injuries for pain and suffering and reimbursement of medical expenses. The parties participated in discovery for over a year, at which point the mechanic received timely answers to interrogatories that, for the first time, expressly indicated that the janitor sought $1 million in damages. The mechanic promptly filed a notice of removal with the federal district court, citing that the janitor's interrogatory answer that referenced $1 million in damages. The janitor moved to remand the action. Should the court grant the janitor's motion to remand? A: Yes, because the mechanic failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. B: Yes, because the mechanic's removal to federal court occurred more than one year after the janitor filed the claim. C: No, because the janitor deliberately failed to disclose the amount in controversy to prevent the mechanic from removing the case to federal court. D: No, because the mechanic promptly removed the case after ascertaining from the interrogatory answers that the janitor was seeking $1 million in damages.