china foreign policy

CHINA'S INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ( third world leader)

A poor country during the cold war period. Communist China was a weak power on international scene, but played a leading role in Bandung conference in 1955. It became the leading country in 3rd world. It gave its backing for decolonization process & wanted lead an independent path bet the 2 superpowers. But China's annexation of Tibet in 1959 caused border tensions w/ India & prevented existence of an effective non-aligned bloc. China had tested its own atomic bomb in 1964 but not strong enough to play a major role in cold war in the 60s + it was weakened by cultural revolution in 1966: Purges took pace to eliminate all opposition to Mao. China came out of its isolation during the 70s 1971: relations improved w/ the USA & accelerated negotiations which ended Vietnam war in 1973. In Oct 1971: entered UN & international recognition led to visits by both Nixon & Ford to China. But wasn't a superpower bc of the weakening caused by cultural revolution: bet 10 & 20 million deaths, country disorganized. 4) China, a leader for the third world? a) A stuggle for leadership in the communist world • Under Lenin and Stalin, communism was monocentric -Moscow's rule prevailed-. • After 1953, Beijing claimed that communism had become polycentric: there were more than one road to communism. The dispute between the USSR and China raised Q: which nation was the real leader of Communism. • When Mao described the USSR's leaders as the corrupters of true Communism, he called on Communists in all other countries to reject the USSR's leadership and develop their own form of true Marxism along Chinese lines. → Who would win the leadership, China or the USSR? The ambiguities of Soviet support to decolonisation • Before 1945, ideological limitations on Soviet influence in the decolonising world such as India. (during WW2 Indian communists were for ex instructed to support the British decision on India's entry into the war) and in the post -war era, Moscow remained relatively indifferent to colonial nationalism and Communist parties received little or no support. •Following Stalin's death (1953) but particularly after the Aborted Anglo-French Suez invasion of 1956 Khrushchev brought a new Soviet policy to the decolonising world. Communist parties were nom encouraged to form alliances with the "national bourgeoisie" in the common struggle for the "national democratic revolution" as the 1srt stage in proletarian revolution. But this soon accounted to " too little too late" to have a direct bearing on decolonisation, since the key decisions to transfer power, in the British and French empires at least has already been taken. China, a model for decolonising countries The Chinese leaders had been claiming since 1949 that China's peasant-based "continuing" revolution offered an inspiring model for any oppressed people. For them revolutions that regarded themselves complete or confined to individual countries would cease to be revolutions and would fall prey to reaction. Alliances with "the national bourgeoisie" or peaceful coexistence were a betrayal of world revolution. Genuine coexistence could exist only bet equal nations = after the world revolution, when any form of subjection to the capitalist power would be destroyed. → 1956 Mao in an interview by an American journalist describes the American imperialism as "a paper tiger"= in appearance very powerful but in reality nothing to be afraid of it : made of paper unable to withstand wind & rain. China argued the proletarian world revolution was achievable only though armed struggle and the PRC was not afraid of a nuclear war. b) China and the Third World at the Bundung Conference • China played an important role in BC/ Asian- African Conference in April 1955 in Indonesia. The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation to oppose colonialism or neo-colonialism by either the USA or the Soviet Union in the Cold War or by any other imperialistic nations. → it led to the Non-Aligned Movement, regarded by Beijing as an opportunity to become the leader of the newly independent of underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. At Bandung, Zhou Enlai displayed a moderate & conciliatory attitude: the ideological altruism of supporting socialism and anti imperialistic revolutions everywhere combined with the national interest of expanding China's own power. • The Chinese model of development turned out to have considerable relevance for Third World countries. It was a form of labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive development and thus addressed the hope of most Third World nations that someday might break their dependency on foreign investment. c) Achievements and limits of China's involvement in the Third World. Thus from 1963 to late 1965, China devoted much policy attention to the Third World. But how successfully? Superficially much progress was seen. Ex: Zhou Enlai toured Asia in the 1956-57 and again in 1960 then Africa from late 1963 to early 1964 and again in mid 1965. China began a foreign aid program centered on Africa, sent out military supplies and trained insurgent leaders. Particular attention was devoted to preparations for a "2nd Bandung meeting" in Algeria mid 1965 from which the Soviets would be excluded. BUT the Chinese approach also encountered obstacles. First, it was clearly manipulative, being often more interested in beating the Russians than in assisting the economic development of the former colonies + Beijing's ambitions stepped too far ahead of its ability to project sufficient power far from its border and its programmes lacked effectiveness. In 1962, the Sino-India war seriously damaged the position of China as a potential leader for decolonized countries. Communist China was weak both economically & internationally, but its isolation was relative: as China got progressively out of the Soviet sphere of influence in the 1950s-60s, the context of the Cold War would give the Chinese a new role on the international stage: a possible leader for the emerging Third World (but the Sino War destroyed the idea of non aligned bloc) and even a partner for the American superpower.

CHINA'S OPENING UP TO THE WORLD FROM 1978

1980s & 1990s China's economic policies After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping launched China's modernization programme (agriculture, industry, research, defence) to remove effects of cultural revolution & speed up China's dev. It adopted + socialist policies & eco became + market orientated w/ private enterprise & country opened to foreign investments. When Hong Kong was handed back to China in 1997, Xiaoping justified the existence of a liberal democracy there by the expression: "one state, 2 systems". A major economic influence China became the world's second economic power. High annual eco growth & fast rising share of world trade → world's major exporting country & leading role in credit facilities. 2001: China entered World Trade organization & ↗ its investments in Africa & Latin America. But, some limitations • Although member of UN security council, not a decisive role in international crises. • China is seen in Asia as a threat: its support for N. Korea, suspicion vs Japan, border pb w/ Vietnam & India = atmosphere of mistrust. • China remains a dictatorship: censorship, control of interne, imprisonment...

USA and China

After 20 y of hostility: China tried a rapprochement w/ USA Reasons for rapprochement: • Strengthen their position vs USSR, main threat for Chinese security • Its geographical position was such that their security interests could not be adequately protected if still hostility to the US at the same time relations w/ USSR deteriorating to such dangerous levels. Ideology & domestic political factors also central to the changing attitudes towards USSR& USA: • Mao saw USSR as developing into a reactionary & conservative society where a new privileged bureaucratic class became entrenched in power. • Mao's cultural revolution (1966) = attempt to prevent this from happening in China • USSR labeled the enemy = "social imperialism" • Foreign & domestic policy aimed to strengthen Mao's position as leader of China & the movement's for world revolution. • Revisionism seen as greater threat than the US (regarded as declining power) Hostile to one another since the Korean war & the situation seemed likely to continue as long as the Americans backed Chiang Kaishek (nationalist) & when Mao won after the civil war, Chiang fled to Taiwan. Mao backed by the USSR. During the Vietnam war, both Russians & Chinese backed Ho chi Minh (communist). They both put pressure on USA to bring about a peace settlement in 1973 with the Paris agreements. China & the USSR were worried about their isolation during the cold war period, both countries had split in 1960 and consequently, both were interested in improving their relations with the USA. There was a dramatic improvement in US/Chinese relations during the 1970s. American tennis table team invited to China + UN = Nixon and Ford's visits. Chiang died in 1975: relations improved even more, even though Chiang supporters were still in Taiwan. Climax of Detente in China came when Carter gave formal recognition of the people's republic of China and ambassadors were exchanged. The Chinese wanted Detente to continue, the American and Chinese signed an agreement in 1985 on nuclear cooperation. However, relations suddenly worsened in June 1991 when the Chinese gov used troops to disperse a sudden demonstration in Beijing. The gov was afraid that it might turn into a revolution which would overthrow Chinese communism. At least 1 thousand students were killed & many executions which brought worldwide condemnation. There were also tensions during the 1990s, particularly in 1996 when there were democratic elections in Taiwan & the USA held naval exercises, sent warships off the coast of Taiwan. a) Changes in the PRC 1969 Mao decided that the Cultural Revolution had reached its objectives & declared the movement over + official announcement of Lin Biao's death (compiler of the Little Red book, creator of Mao's cult of personality as "Great Helmsman", minister of defence "dead saving Mao from USSR's attempt to kill Mao. Very likely that he had been killed by Mao. Csq were: - the return of Zhou Enlai, whose position in the party + gov were enhanced in 1971. - the return of Deng Xiaoping, who had fallen from power in 1967 "Enlai's protégé". + Strange announcement: 1972 China would host the American President Richard Nixon. b) The Détente and its impacts on the relations bet China and the US • From 1950 the PRC had mounted a continuous propaganda attack on "American imperialism" which included the ritual daily chanting by Chinese schoolchildren "death to the American imperialists and all their running dogs". Campaign intensified during the Cultural revolution. But sudden softening: The Chinese viewed the Soviet politicies of détente and coexistence as an attempt to draw closer to the Western powers in order to leave China internationnaly isolatated. → seemed that Beijing tried to outplay the USSR at its own game. A "rapprochement" with the US and the acceptance of the principle of co-existence with the US would mean a major redistribution of global power against the Soviets + at the same time the PRC established diplomatic relations with Franco's gov, military junta's gov in Greece and Pinochet. • Given the Cold War tensions, the US was equally eager to exploit the mutual fears of the 2 communists powers. - Nixon knew that Moscow feared friendship bet Beijing and Washington. He also hoped to improve relations & trade with China + reach an agreement with the USSR about arms reduction. + domestic political concerns : a successful courting of China could help him greatly in the 1972 Am presidential elections. ≠ tensions bet China & USSR over Hanoi. Until 1965 the Chinese= main supporters of Hanoi. But after the overthrown of Khrushchev the new Kremlin leadership attempted to reclaim from the PRC the mantle of revolutionary militancy in the third world and had increased its aid to North Vietnam. In turn, Beijing tried to provide greater assistance than the USSR but by the late 1960s Hanoi's relations were better with USSR than with the PRC (partly because of the Cult Revol, of the age old suspicions that China sought domination over Vietnam and Moscow could supply the sophisticated weaponry North Vietnam had come to rely on for its air defence). • 1971: the US decided to reverse their position (Kissinger) on Chinese representation in the United Nations and eventually supported Resolution 2758 that recognised the PRC as "the only legitimate representative in April 1971 of China to the UN Chiang's ROC lost its Security Council seat + any representation to the UN. A very important diplomatic gesture that encouraged the PRC to allow talks to begin → invited the US table -tennis team, then touring in Japan to play in China. April 1971 the athletes became the 1st officially to visit China since the communist revolution in 1949. Negotiations that followed this invitation were given the name of the "Ping-Pong diplomacy". Initial diplomacy conducted by Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's special adviser on foreign affairs. Early July 1971 Kissinger secretly went to Beijing and on 15 June 1971 President Nixon revealed that he accepted an invitation to visit the PRC → was from the 21th to 28th Febr 1972. At the conclusion of the trip, the US & the PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In it both nations expressed the hope that there would be continuing Sino-American contacts, the desirability of commercial, cultural and educational exchanges and their joint agreement to give further consideration to the Taiwan issue before intractable.By then, Mao = old, in poor health and ceased to be active the Gov + the party's everyday affairs. Relations suddenly worsened in June 1989, when the Chinese government used troops to disperse student demonstration in Tian An Men. The Chinese government was afraid that it might turn in a revolution which could overthrow Chinese communism. At least 1000 students were killed, and many were later executed. This brought worldwide condemnation of China. There were also tensions with the USA during the 1990s, owing to Chinese naval exercises, close to the island of Taiwan. In protest against the Taiwanese democratic elections. - March 1979 USA and PRC formerly establish embassies in Beijing and Washington - After 9/11 attack PRC offered to support USA in the war against terrorism

1950-1953

Korean War Collaboration over all major decisions. During the Vietnam war, both Russians & Chinese backed Ho chi Minh (communist). Both the Russians & the Chinese wanted to bring the Vietnam war to an end & both played a role in putting pressure on the USA in order to bring about a peace settlement in 1973 with the Paris agreements. Eg: whether to cross the 38th parallel in Jan 1951, whether to start negotiations in May-June 1951. BUT inequality in their relationship: China provided troops & bore the blunt (portait le poids) of causalities while USSR provided a division of MIG-15 fighters & military advisers. The views of Soviet officers about strategies always prevailed: Stalin played the decisive role bringing China into war, Mao was originally reluctant. Mao started to think that Stalin's actions were driven by self-interest rather than proletarian internationalism. He resented the Soviet demand that China should pay for the military support she received. The seeds of the split were sown during the Korean War. Stalin did have an interest in the Korea war especially if China joined: • He had been convinced by Kim that NK was capable of sustaining a major war effort against the Americans: if the North Koreans could bring the whole Korea under Communist control, the benefits for the USSR would be considerable. • He anticipated that the US would be sucked in a conflict in Asia that it could not win and would be humiliated. (did not attend purposely the vital meeting of the US council in June 1950 not to prevent the US from interfering). • He knew that a war in Korea entailed no risk to the USSR since Soviet forces would not be directly involved. • He would press Mao to enter the war: if China & the US fought each other it would strengthen the Kremlin's position in relation to both of them, since both would be weakened by the conflict and the PRC would rely more on Soviet financial and material aid. As a result the Soviet Union would acquire a powerful position in the Far East at very little cost for itself. Meanwhile China was at first hesitant to commit China formally to the Korean struggle. The CCP's leading military commanders, including Lio Biao, argued that the PRC's primary task was to crush its internal enemies and that it did not have the resources to fight in Korea. BUT Korea was too close geographically for China to do nothing + A US intervention itself seemed a real possibility to Beijing + according to Chinese historians it seems that Mao viewed the war in Korea, one of its "Former Tribute State" as an opportunity for China to re-establish its prestige and status on the world stage after a century of foreign domination, exploitation and humiliation. But even before they declared the war on the US PLA soldiers (People's Liberation Army) were already fighting alongside the North Koreans as "volunteers". By the end 1950 250 000 troops under had moved into Korea. Despite China's claim that the men were all volunteers it was a conscript army that fought in Korea; July 1953 lost nearly 1 million men. The War did have some positive results for China: • The Gov's call for national unity to enable the PRC to surmount its first great crisis helped the CCP to consolidate its hold over the country by crushing the remnants of the GMD. • Although Stalin had encouraged the war, the USSR played no direct military part and Mao could claim that it was the Chinese comrades who had shed their blood for inter Communism • The PRC could also claim that for 3 years it had matched the USA in combat and remained undefeated. BUT there were many damaging outcomes for the PRC: • There were no prospect of a Communist takeover of SK = a major political failure. • The NK attack led Washington to view SK & Japan as one wing of a general Asian front against coordinated Soviet-Chinese aggression, with French Indochina the other wing and Taiwan located in the centre. → Japanese prime Minister Yoshida described the Korean War as "gift of the gods" as the US started supporting Japan & helped restore their power = to have a strong ally in Asia. → USA pledged itself to the defence of Taiwan and to the continued support of Nationalist China's membership of the UN. This ruled out any possibility of the PRC's reclaiming Taiwan by force. • The Korean War was a huge drain on the young PRC's economy: industrial resources that could have been used for domestic growth had to be diverted into the war effort, then into military aid + material damage and lives lost.

later tensions

Later tensions during Vietnam war (Chinese much closer to Cambodia, Vietnam removed the Khmer rouge from power ) , tensions bet both countries and their allies. During detente: both were trying to get the support of the USA. Both wanted to play a role as a leader in the communism world. At the end of the 70s, there was even more tensions bet the 2 when in Feb 79 there was a brief war bet China & North Vietnam which was in retaliation for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. (Cambodia = ally of China). Struggle inside the communist world. That brief war only lasted a few weeks. During 1980s, the Chinese still had a lot of grievances vs the USSR, the presence of soviet troops in Afghanistan, the Soviet support for the Vietnamese troops that were present in Cambodia. And bc of the presence of soviet troops along the Chinese borders with the USSR. BUT big improvement in their relations with the arrival of Gorbachev. He set up agreements on trade and eco cooperation & in May 1989, Gorbachev visited Beijing and formal reconciliation bet the 2 countries. At the same time in 1989, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia.

THE REVOLUTION OF MARKET ORIENTED ECONOMY UNDER XIAOPING

Privatization of eco: ensure the eco dev of China to become a superpower. Priority sector= agriculture as 70% of the pop lives in countryside, underdeveloped: low productivity bc of collectivization under Mao, plentiful workforce, low qualified. →not enough supplying to cities, rationing. Decollectivization of agriculture from 1979 to 1984: Peasants can sell their surplus freely on the markets. → ↗ agricultural production. Since 1979: SEZs for foreign enterprise dedicated to exportations. 70 000 enterprises created, seaboard=most dynamic region of China & = 70% of all China's production. This succeed is mainly due to Chinese diaspora responsible for ¾ of foreign investments. Thanks to these enterprises, China multiplied by 7 its exportations from 1979-1995. (textile, oil, toys..). It developed commercial relations w/ Japan, USA, UE & the way of living of new generations got more occidental. Weaknesses of this new economy • Overheating of the eco, causing inflation • Brutal social changes w/ new capitalist class in coastal cities & poverty in countryside • Massive rural exodus • Unemployment • Pb of housing & cost of living • Rigidity of the political system: repression of demonstrations of Tiananmen Square, where Mao's portrait still is.

1960s

Sino-soviet split • Mao objected to many aspects of Khrushchev's leadership including the reconciliation w/ Yugoslavia (ideological revisionism), & improved relations w/ west (Peaceful coexistence & 1959 visit to the US) • Sino- soviet relations deteriorated after Stalin's death. Mao objected to N. Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress of Feb 1956: Many of Mao's policies were based on Stalin's & he was offended by destalinization. Khrushchev denounced Stalin's cult of personality & Mao created one of enormous proportions. + NK made this speech without informing China = treated as subordinate. • NK criticized the Great Leap forward in 1958 & massive industrialization in the countryside, especially its plan for building furnaces (fours) in rural areas. It was an ideological challenge to the USSR which had been moving towards communism ever since 1917 without reaching the goal. • Nov 1960: meeting in Moscow of 81 communist parties→ China charged USSR w/ revisionism & NK denounced the Chinese as left adventurists = NK attacked China in a full gathering of the world's communist parties & China defied authority of Soviet party. • Arguments over USSR's refusal to reduce its ties to Mongolia, considered by China as within own sphere of influence. • They shared a border of 2,738 miles w/ same ethnic groups (Kazakhs & Mongols) on both sides → regular border disputes: most serious at Damansky Island on the Ussuri River in March 1969: deaths on both sides. Aug 1969, Xinjiang: serious clash → USSR eliminated an entire Chinese brigade. 1967: USSR had 15 army divisions along mutual border. By 1970, doubled. China's foreign policy needed to be reevaluated. • 1968: Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to bring a + independent communist gov back into line w/ Moscow's direction→ real fear of invasion in China. • Eco relationship bet USSR & China after the 1950 treaty = old style eco imperialism: USSR exported manufactured goods & expertise, in return: raw materials & food. → China's resentment • USSR suspended its aid to China & repatriated its experts and technicians. • In the 1960s, the growing divide became an open Sino-Soviet split → ex Khrushchev recalled all Soviet and East Europeans scientists and technicians who were working in China, with the blue paints, leaving many projects unfinished. In retaliation for what Mao saw as an attempt to undermine China's standing among the Communist nations the PRC gave support to those countries which defied the USSR. For eg Albania's leaders had been opposing Moscow since 1958 on issues of peaceful coexistence, destalinization and Yugoslavia's "separate road to socialism". When the USSR responded by withdrawing its financial aid in Febr 1961, the PRC immediately stepped in to supply Albania with money and tech assistance. + Oct 1961 at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev abused Albania for its backward Stalinist ways and it was interpreted by Zhou Enlai as a deliberately offensive attack on themselves → the Chinese delegation walked out of the conference. • In 1964, Mao asserted that a counter-revolution in the USSR had re-established capitalism there. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party broke off ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (until the mid 80s) → The Sino Soviet break was complete. Not until 1989 was a Soviet leader welcomed in China. Main reasons: Chinese's will to lead + strong desire to achieve self-reliance and independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing received as Moscow's junior partner. • Regarding economic development: Chinese leaders were wary of becoming too dependent on Soviet expertise and technology + the Soviet model of dev gave priority to industry over agriculture when the principal base of Mao's support was to be found in the countryside. • Regarding international relations: the Chinese attacked all talk of "Peaceful coexistence" because they had little to gain from it + early 70s continued to regard the Americans as an imminent threat to the survival of the PRC + late 1950s concrete evidence that the Soviets were prepared to sacrifice Chinese interests for their own purposes. Ex: USSR provided little or no diplomatic support for the PRC in times of crisis like the 1st & 2nd Taiwan Strait Crisis= 2 short armed conflicts that took place bet the PRC and Chiang Kai-shek republic of China (ROC) in 1954-55 and 1958 or again in 1969 with the Tibetan uprising and 1962 with the Sino- Indian War (Moscow proving weapons on both sides). • Regarding defence: Since the 1950s, Mao Zedong had been unhappy with the Soviet attitude towards the military question. Moscow's position was that if China wanted assistance in its defence programme it had to give the USSR a controlling hand in the PRC's defence policy. •Regarding the nuclear issue: Mao decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the 1st Taiwan Strait crisis to increase China's diplomatic credibility over the world. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese Program and at one point seemed to even have promised a "prototype bomb"≠ 1959-1960 all Soviet assistance was abruptly stopped. The Soviet interest was to contain the arms race because the USSR still lacked money and resources to keep up with the USA. + In 1963, Mao dismissed the Test Ban Treaty as another betrayal by the USSR. 1964: China had its own atomic bomb. → The Sino Soviet dispute was also intensified by increasing competition bet Beijing and Moscow for leadership in the international communist movement and influence over the liberation movements world-wide and in the Third World.

1950

The Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, Alliance & mutual assistance • Mutual military assistance vs aggression by Japan or any states that might collaborate w/ Japan in acts of aggression. • Military aid given to help China develop its air force. • Gave China credit of $300m ( to be repaid over 10 yrs from 1954) for spending on defence industries. • Technical assistance given for large aluminium plant at Henan • Soviet promise to restore China's sovereignty over Manchuria: USSR promised to transfer control over the railways in Manchuria to China. • Mongolia remained a Soviet sphere of influence. • Stalin refused to give aid to conquer Taiwan- feared provoking the US into action. After Stalin's death: a Sino-Soviet "honeymoon"? After the 5 march 1953 relations between Moscow and Beijing would ease and develop to genuine partnership. Seemed to be a Sino-Soviet honey moon bet 1953 and 1956. Examples: • In a series of aid agreements signed in 1953/1954 and 1956 the USSR provided China with further technical assistance. Moscow agreed to assist in the construction of +/- 200 industrial projects. • With the help of the Soviets, the PRC embarked on the Fist Five Year Plan (FFYP) in 1953 and before it was completed the country had recovered from the damages of the wars: full communications had been restored, inflation was under control, the economy much better. • The Chinese enjoyed their 1st international conference in April-July 1954 at Geneva, agreement signed to enforce an cease-fire in Indochina and partition in Vietnam. Thanks to the Soviet support the Americans were forced to sit down at the same negotiating table with the representatives of the PRC. • In Sept-Oct 1954, the first official visit of Soviet Leaders to Beijing took place, headed by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan and the Soviets agreed to return Port Arthur and Dairen to the PRC. • A Soviet delegation led by Mikoyan travelled to Beijing in April 1956 and extended some economic aid to China. • Mao Zedong attended Moscow Conference in Nov 1957= 2nd visit to the USSR. He recognised the USSR's unique place in Communism history, and approved a Sino-Soviet declaration that expressed China's readiness to co-operate. Impressed by the Soviet Sputnik, Mao declared that "East wind will prevail the West wind" and the USSR even agreed to provide the USSR with technical assistance for constructing atomic weapons. • In July 1958, Khrushchev flew to Beijing to meet Mao again.

1919

communist takeover of China Viewed by USA= another victory for world communism. Mao seen as an instrument of USSR to spread worldwide revolution. US refused to recognize the new China or support admission to UN. China regarded US = enemy & principal imperialist power. China had close links w/ USSR, only power to recognize the communist regime. Alliance w/ USSR = cornerstone of Mao's foreign policy in 1949: Mao believed it was only through assistance of USSR that communist China could receive protection needed vs attack from USA & anti-communists in China + wanted help of Soviet experts to ensure a socialist society was developed in China.

PRC and USSR had strained relationships. WHY?

• Border disputes: the 7,000 km border bet China & Russia had made the 2 neighbours very wary of each other in tsarist times & the Bolshevik Revolution did nothing to alter this. • Ideological differences: Mao's approach was essentially nationalist and based on peasantry → the agrarian peasantry rather than the working class, was the key revolutionary force which could change society and achieve the revolution ≠ Marxist dictating that true proletarian had to be urban based. Mao's Sino centric view of Marxism was bound to cause friction with the Soviet Union, as the country of Lenin regarded itself as the only true interpreter of the Communist doctrine. • Clash of personalities: biographers suggest that the 2 leaders disliked each other. Actually the pb for the Soviet Union in the early 50s was that the PRC had the potential to become a great power and thus would be difficult to control. The Chinese communist had won the civil war by their own and though they needed eco & military assistance from Moscow, Beijing was unwilling to accept fully Soviet political domination. The Soviets never controlled China's gov or economy as they did in Eastern Europe. A growing divide? • In fact, Mao Zedong didn't get any better with Khrushchev than he had with Stalin. Mao regarded himself as the doyen of the Communist world and expected to be consulted in all major issues, when K wanted to demonstrate that the USSR was dominant. • The beginning of destalinisation in 1956 provided the 1st occasion for the public expression of ideological differences bet the 2 leading communist powers: -The Chinese supported the use of troops in Hungary but rejected Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. Although Mao had profound diff with Stalin, he had been profoundly disturbed by the ferocity + denunciation of the cult of personality that he saw as an indented criticism of his own style of leadership in China, at the moment where he was to launch the "Hundred Flowers Camaign" (begun in 1956 officially to lift the restrictions imposed upon Chinese intellectuals and thus grant freedom of thought & speech but for historians, real aim = encourage dissidents to criticize the regime making it easier for the com to identify them and deal with them effectively). As a result the Chinese defended Stalin as a great if sometimes misguided revolutionary leader and argued that the difficulties of communism in Eastern Europe were to be attributed to the pb of Soviet hegemony. -When in 1957 Khrushchev organised a conference of the world Communist parties to repair the differences between the USSR and the other Marxist countries, Mao let it to be known that he regarded Moscow's diplomatic new approach to the West as too accommodating and called on the Soviet Union to abandon "revisionism" (denying what happened/ altering the past) and return to the true Marxist-Leninist path. In late 1957, Mao announced the abandonment of the Second Five Year Plan and presented the Great Leap Forward (GLF)=a scheme to achieve the simultaneous dev of both rural & urban areas at an accelerated pace that thus revised the Soviet model of development in a fundamental way → Moscow feared that the PRC was heading for trouble and began to wonder whether it was worth committing money and tech assistance to Beijing. • Yet Sino-Soviet differences had remained muted as both nations had still much to gain by being allies. But a mutual suspicion increased, relations deteriorated rapidly in 1958-60. • When Khrushchev made an attempt to improve relations with Mao in 1958, Mao deliberately set out to make the Soviet leader uncomfortable. • In June 1959, the USSR decided to cancel its assistance in China's nuclear programme.

1949

• The PRC was officially recognised by Moscow on 2 October 1949, and by other nations of Eastern Europe followed within 2 months. Britain being the 1st one on 6 Jan 1950. • In Dec 1949, Mao embarked in a 2 month visit to the Soviet Union- his 1st trip beyond China's borders. He was besides offended by the superior air adopted by the Soviets and by Stalin's offhand treatment of the Chinese delegation. • The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance & Mutual Assistance was signed on 14 Febr. (1950) It was based on the prior treaty of the same name signed bet the Soviet Union & the Nationalist Gov in 1945. The agreement resulted in some 80, 000 Chinese going to the USSR to study science & tech (1950-1964).