civ pro

personal jurisdiction

-In Personam Jx: Court has power over the D himself; involves Specific Jx v. General Jx -Specific Jx—P's claim arises out of the particular act performed by the D in the forum state (if I commit a crime in Alaska but I live in ca I can be sued in Alaska) -General jx—Power of the Court over ALL acclaims whether related to D's activities within the forum state or not (if I commit a crime in Alaska but I live in ca, I can be used in either) -In Rem: Court has power over D's property -Quasi-In-Rem Jx: Court has power over D by exercising authority over D's property within the forum state

Tag Jurisdiction - Brennan, Scalia, calder

"Tag" Jurisdiction—Burnham a. NJ resident served in CA for CA lawsuit🡪suit is a claim raised outside of CA (NJ) b. The presence in the forum you were served (traditional basis from Pennoyer or is it replaced by I. Shoe); is it enough to give general jx in the absence of minimum contact analysis? 🡪 4/4 split c. Unanimous decision that CA has general jx but couldn't agree WHY Scalia: presence in the forum while served w/ process does give in personam jx & general jx, and you do not need to go through minimum contacts analysis at all b/c of historical tradition Brennan (concurring): I. Shoe is used ONLY if the traditional bases do not work; traditional basis by itself is good enough to establish personal jx 1. D has purposefully availed himself to CA by voluntarily being present in CA 2. Ex: NJ resident in CA for 3 days benefitted in CA so he purposefully availed himself voluntarily to such a degree to hold him to jx🡪too abstract: how much time is enough? Unpredictable standard d. Must be voluntary availment into the forum state (e.g. bought nonstop flight but due to plane problems, stopped somewhere & served there🡪probably no PJ b/c not voluntary) i. Justice Stevens: both are right and didn't take position e. Calder "Effects" Test: activities in one state that targets another state & causes an effect in that state🡪results in purposeful availment=minimum contacts=PJ i. D must know that their conduct causes an effect in that state shaffer v. Heitner—Seizing property before case is not enough; MUST ALSO have D meet I. Shoe test (that D had minimum contacts so that jx is fair) All assertions of PJ meet I. Shoe Attachment statute: Attached property, bring it before the court's jx, that a non-resident D owns or claims to own

Burnham: general

D (NY citizen) was served by ex-wife in CA when he was temporarily visiting CA The Supreme Court unanimously voted for jurisdiction, but was split on the reasoning. Justice Scalia: believed jurisdiction applied because it has been a practice that was historically permitted, as in Pennoyer (in-hand, in-state) Justice Brennan: believed jurisdiction was applicable, not because of history, but because of the I-Shoe standard being satisfied by Shaffeur's holding. Brennan believed that without transient jurisdiction, the transient would have all the benefits while retaining immunity from the forum State's authority. Justice White agrees with Scalia as long as it is intentional that the Defendant was there. No hardcore rule because no majority.

Supplemental j continued 1367 (c)

§ 1367(c)—courts have jurisdictional discretion; once the federal anchor has been dismissed, the court has discretion over hearing state claims (could dismiss them also if they want) Exxon Mobile—if there are two Ps & one of them satisfies $75,000, but the other doesn't, supplemental jx may still allow other co-P to be part of case (diversity jx exception) Supplemental Ancillary Jx: Allows federal courts to assert jx over claims brought by a D to arise from the same case or controversy as an action w/ court's SMJ Pre-1990: proper for a party acting in a defense posture (even if they are a P) to have supplemental jx Supplemental Pendent (ancillary)Jx: Allows P who has a well-pleaded federal question claim to join, in the original complaint, related claims that otherwise would not have Smj

venue: fallback venue and residency

§ 1391(b)(3)—Fallback Venue: Any judicial district w/ PJ if there is no other district for claim to be brought in (aka doesn't satisfy the previous venue rules) § 1391(c)—Residency (different from citizenship in SMJ) A natural person is deemed to reside in a judicial district of which they are domiciled An entity (whether incorporated or not) is deemed to reside in a judicial district if it is their PPB (as P) or where the court has PJ (as D) Definitions: Transferor court: the original court from which we are transferring from Transferee court: the court we are transferring to

removal 1441 c

§ 1441(c)—Exception to "Rule of Unanimity": If a civil action includes both a federal question & a claim that does not arise w/ supplemental jx🡪 entire action may be removed if action is removable & if the action would be removable w/o the inclusion of the later claim District court then must sever all state law claims Essentially allows a single D to remove if a federal question claim has been asserted against him; allows district court to remand non-removable claims & retain removable claims Federal & state law claims must be separate & independent claims for § 1441(c) to apply federal court and nonfederal claim 1. that does not meet supplemental j 2. not apart of same case and controversy 3. separate and independent claims then the court can a. remand or b. keep

federal question

1331: the district courts shall have original jx of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the US motley: "Well-pleaded complaint" rule: in order for federal question jurisdiction to be granted, a plaintiff's statement must show that her original cause of action arises under the Constitution or a federal law. 1.federal statute claim holmes : -fed statue gives private cause of action = right. and remedy American well works, arising under: D harasses P's clients that they will sue b/c they hold a patent in pumps & P is allegedly infringing their patent. P files suit under state trade libel law. Rule: A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action, whether the law that creates the right & remedy is federal Holding: No federal SMJ b/c the law that creates the right & remedy is not federal law Creates problem🡪 this case was about patent law, which if D filed in federal court, it would have satisfied the federal "arising under" question due to federal court's exclusive jx over patent law Doesn't make much sense since this concerned subject matter that federal courts would have had jx over anyways—why do we need to come up w/ a test?

change of venue - proper venue to proper venue: horizontal choice of law

1404(a) Transfer: Transferor court is a proper venue & may transfer to another district based upon 3 factors in the statute: (1) Convenience of the parties, (2) Convenience of witnesses, & (3) interest of justice In addition, judges have great discretion in ruling on § 1404(a) transfer by considering public interest factors & private interest factors Private interest factors: relative ease of access to sources to proof, availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of viewing premises in question Public interest factors: administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home, the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home w/ the law that must govern the action, the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or the application of foreign law, & the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum w/ jury duty Transferee court must be a proper venue AND must have PJ over the D, which must be true w/o waiver by the D Hoffman v. Blaski—cases can be transferred only to a district in which venue & PJ would be proper; irrelevant on whether D consents to litigation in new court Congress amended § 1404(a) to reverse partially Hoffman by providing that a case may be transferred "to any district or division to which all parties have consented" for the convenience of parties & witnesses & interest of justice But court must still determine that transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a). Absent consent, Hoffman applies

multidistrict litigation

1407 - Permits all federal cases relating to mass torts to be transferred to one district & consolidated for pretrial proceedings Following the completion of pretrial proceedings, cases shall be remanded to district from which they came from (unpopular practice) Transfer does not need to meet other venue requirements (decided by judicial panel on multidistrict litigation) Cases consolidated for pretrial purposes under § 1407 remain separate actions that do not merge into a single litigative unit

removal from state court a&b

1441(a) Any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the US have original jx may be removed by the D to a district court where the action is pending Remove to federal district that embraces geographically the state court where the case is filed § 1441(b)—In-State Defendant Rule: A civil action is not removable if any of the parties in interest are properly joined & served as Ds is a citizen of the state in which such an action is brought. -a case with original jurisdiction solely based on DIVERSITY jx cannot be removed if filed in d's state Jx split over situation of in-state D wanting to remove to federal court but hasn't been served yet—"snap removal" Literal reading of § 1441(b)(2)🡪 no explicit rule stating that D cannot remove if D has not been served yet Policy argument against literal reading of § 1441(b)(2): would be unfair for P if D is able to remove b/c policy behind § 1441(b) was probably meant to not allow Ds to remove until some general requirements are met

procedure after removal of civil actions (motion for remand)-when p thinks removal is improper

1447: a. A district court may issue all necessary orders & process to bring before it all proper parties. b. The removing may be required to file w/ its clerk copies of all copies of all records w/ federal court. c. Motion to remand case must be made within 30 days for other reasons than lack of SMJ. It at any time there does not seem to be SMJ, the court must remand the case back to the state court. d. The court may permit joinder & remand, or deny, if joinder destroys SMJ Challenging federal subject matter jurisdiction Move to dismiss under 12 (b)(6)n -in a case removed from state court the plaintiff will challenge subject matter jurisdiction by making a motion to remand to state court under 1447 (c)

continuing questions 2-4

2. Was the issue determined essential to the judgement? a. Findings not essential to a court's judgment do not invoke issue preclusion b. Courts are split over whether alternative findings would invoke issue preclusion c. Rios v. Davis—truck driver, appellee motorist, & appellant injured party were involved in car accident; motorist joined injured party as TPD & sought recovery against him for damages to motorist's truck. Motorist pled res judicata & collateral estoppel based on prior action that found injured party negligent, but resolved the case in motorist's favor Rule: A finding of a particular fact is not res judicata in a subsequent action, where the finding not only is not essential to support the judgment, but is found in favor of the party against whom the judgment is rendered, & if allowed to control, leads to a result different from that which actually has been reached 3. Was there a valid final judgment on the merits? Preclusion of either type (issue or claim) flows only from a valid, final judgment on the merits 4. Against whom can issue preclusion be asserted? a. Issue preclusion can be asserted only against parties that were in a prior action being brought for a subsequent action about the same issue b. Due process requires that issue preclusion can be asserted only against one who was a party to the first case c. e.g. asbestos cases

Asahi: specific

D is Japanese co. & sold valves to Taiwan corp.; ended up in defective tires in CA rule: Stream of commerce Brennan: D put product in stream of commerce & reasonably anticipates that product will end up in forum state (minimum contact & purposeful availment satisfied) O'Connor: Brennan's theory + intent to serve forum state's market

federal question state claims smith-grable test

2. smith test (state created right of action but federal jx; case was about stocks, which means case should have been filed in federal court)—as long as the case turns on the interpretation of federal law, the court has SMJ under federal question Moore case—involves state law claim, but state law incorporates federal law; seems to parallel facts of Smith🡪 still want the expertise of federal court judges to rule if no important federal policy is implicated Merrell Dow—state tort claim implicating federal labeling statute did not confer federal question jx b/c federal interest at stake was not substantial enough🡪 implies that no private right of action means no federal question jx Grable—P brought quiet title action in state court, claiming that D needed to have given personal notice to P, not by certified mail. Rule: state law must raise a federal issue, disputed & substantial, & exercising federal jx would not upset BALANCE OF FEDERALISM (kaleidoscopic test) A federal right of action is NOT always required in order to have federal question jx (Merrell Dow did not overrule Smith) factors: 1. federal issue actually disputed land substantial 2. federal interest in case being in federal forum 3. impact on federal docket 4. necessarily. raised federal issue 5. congresss intent to allow such claim 3-part standard for determining if state law claim has a federal question: 1. Necessarily raise a stated federal issue (from Smith) 2. That is actually disputed & substantial & 3. The federal forum can entertain w/o disturbing congressionally approved balance of state/fed judicial responsibilities

work product

26(B)(3): Any work performed by any attorney in preparation of litigation the is generally not subject to discovery - work product can be overcome upon a sufficient showing of need or substantial hardship from not having access to particular work product hickman v. taylor: a party may not discover documents an tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of trial from a Verde party's council, unless the showing of such information is necessary for litigant or the denial such production would unduly prejudice the preparation pf a party's case or cause ether party hardship or injustice 2 types of work product: lawyer mental impressions, legal conclusions, and legal authorities are not discoverable and work prepared in anticipation of trial note: lawyers scan only work while engaging in work product, if we all bare wp, then liberal discovery goes away remember: IF YOU ARE ABLE TO REMOVE IMPRESSIONS THEN OK

scope of discovery

26(b)(1): (1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. relevant- evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to th determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence proportional to needs of the case- permits resounding pay to discover requests (or move for a protective order) - e.g. requests were unreasonably cumulative or burdensome; creates special issues concerns discovery of ESI privilege- only privileged communication is protected, NOT the underlying FACTS

statuary basis for pj

4(k)(1)(a)- statutory babis for pj step 1: long-arm statue -is there a stautory basis for personal j ? yess, determine if pj is constitutional; no, no pj -requires federal district courts to look at state's long-arm states to establish pj -when federal courts borrows the state long-arm statue of the lsat that the federal court assists in, the federal courts long-arm state will be ass long as the states own arms -out of legislative intent, federal courts arms are limited to state courts arms due to the due process clause in the 14th amendment -also policy consideration of avoiding forum shopping

Pleading: name the rule

8(a)(2) - short and plain statement - must be a plausible claim/cannot be conclusory - how to know a claim is plausible: 1. court must exclude all legal conclusions and accept all actual allegations as true the facts must support a plausible claim to determine plausibility, the judge uses their own experience and common sense- very subjective time to presiding judges own experience and interpretation of twiqbal refer to the thread of cases: dioguardi, Twombly, Erickson, Iqbal, swanson, leatherman

BK: specific

Franchise agreement w/ forum-selection clause; sustained dealings between P & D in forum (FL) rule: 's choice of law clause can create a minimum contact. Contacts & fairness are 2 different parts; contacts must be established first before determining fairness. Burden of proving fairness is on D, who needs to show that having to litigate in forum state is so gravely inconvenient, you're at a severe disadvantage in the case

Problems of Federalism- Preclusion rule application in one jx to another

Always start w/ Full Faith & Credit Clause 1.State-to-state🡪 apply Full Faith & Credit Clause a. All states must give full faith & credit to a valid judgment of a court of another state b. State A needs to have had PJ over D to have valid judgment If State A did have PJ🡪 judgment entitled to full faith & credit in State B (even if judgment is wrong on the merits of the dispute) If State A did not have PJ🡪 judgment is void & unenforceable 2. State-to-federal🡪 § 1738 requires federal court in State B to give full faith & credit to valid judgment of State A Functionally equivalent to "state-to-state" fact pattern § 1738: requires second court "to give to the state judgment the same effect that the judgment-rendering court would give it" Some commentators think courts are free to divulge 3. Federal-to-state🡪 federal common law Federal court will apply state preclusion rules of whatever state the federal court sits in Semtek—C1 filed in CA federal court under diversity jx. C2 filed in MD state court. SCOTUS held that MD needed to have known what CA's preclusion rules were and to apply those to C2🡪 Federal law applies b/c C1 was decided in federal court, but b/c this was a diversity case, you apply the preclusion laws of the state where the district court in C1 sat in. Federal-to-federal Probably Semtek applies, but we don't know for sure If the firsts case was in federal court based upon federal question j, the courts assume that federal common law governs the preclusion question But if the federal courts jurisdiction in the firsts case was based upon diversity of citizen jurisdiction it would = erie ? (federal court to apply state substantive law in diversity cases)

bms

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California (2017) - Justice Alito Fact Pattern: BMS is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. It maintains substantial operations in both New York and New Jersey. Over 50% of BMS's workforce is in the U.S. and is employed in those two states. BMS also engages in business activities in other jurisdictions, including CA. 5 of the company's research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of 160 employees are located in CA. BMS also employs about 250 sales representatives in CA and maintains a small state-government advocacy office in Sacramento. BMS did not develop Plavix in CA, did not create marketing strategy in CA, and did not manufacture, package, label, or work on the regulatory approval of the product in CA. BMS does SELL Plavix in CA though. A group of plaintiffs - consisting of 86 CA residents and 592 non-residents, filed a claim alleging products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and misleading advertising claims under CA law. The nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix through California physicians or from any other California source; nor did they claim that they were injured by Plavix or were treated for their injuries in California. Big Takeaway: This case identifies the Specific Jurisdiction reach in the era of Limited General Jurisdiction. The CA Supreme Court held that specific jurisdiction was possible under the sliding scale approach: the more wide ranging the defendant's forum contacts, the more readily a connection is shown between the forum contacts and the claim. a claim must derive from in-forum activity while the general rule is that a third party conduct is not attributable to a defendant, it is if the d directs the activity

last question 5- By whom can issue preclusion be asserted?

By whom can issue preclusion be asserted? a. Traditionally, courts invoked principle of mutuality of estoppel—issue preclusion can be used only by someone who was a party (or in privity w/ a party) to the first case Mutuality doctrine eroded now due to 2 main exceptions: Vicarious liability in employee-employer relationships—patron sues employee🡪 employee loses. Patron sues employer via 1.vicarious liability🡪 mutuality would force employer to proceed w/ litigation b/c they were not party in first action 2. Indemnification in employee-employer relationship—patron sues employer🡪 employer wins. Patron sues employee🡪 employee cannot assert issue preclusion against patron. If employee loses case, then no indemnity is available b. Mutuality based on basic fairness rationale—someone who cannot be hurt by a prior judgment should not be entitled to take advantage of it NOT rooted in due process🡪 not required c.Now, non-mutual parties can invoke issue preclusion: defensive non-mutual issue preclusion v. offensive non-mutual issue preclusion

continued final and valid judgment on the merits

C2 must have been brought by the same claimant against the same D Taylor v. Sturgell (Identity of Parties That Can Be Bound)—case about one guy (Herrick) asking Fairchild Engine & Airplane Administration for copies of technical documents to a vintage airplane he wanted to restore🡪 loses & then his friend sues for the same documents. Rule: A person may not relitigate a claim which he was considered to be in privity w/ a party of a prior suit. A party may be found in privity, the substantial legal relationship whereby parties are bound by actions of others, if: Agreement to be bound Pre-existing substantive legal relationships Adequate representation by party w/ same interests (in limited areas) Assumed control over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered Litigation through a proxy—case did not establish whether Herrick was acting as proxy for P Special statutory schemes foreclosing successive litigation Final & Valid Judgment on the Merits: Valid: A judgment by a court having both forms of jx is valid, even though it may have been wrong on the merits Final: Individual rulings during the course of a litigation are not entitled to preclusive effect; anything that can be revisited by the judge before a decision on the case as a final matter is considered not final On the Merits: A case whose decision rests upon the law as it applied to the particular evidence & facts presented in the case; Virtually any judgment in favor of the claimant is considered on the merits

continuing- forum selection clause & horizontal choice of law

Choice of Law: Each state has its own choice of law doctrine or rules to decide which state's law to apply -Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp.—example of state utilizing choice of law analysis; parties were NY citizens, but accident happened in MA. Case was filed in NY; P wanted NY law to apply, but D wanted MA law to apply. Holding: MA has a greater interest in this litigation than NY, so MA law was properly applied litigation in state court🡪 forum applies its own choice of law Litigation in federal court🡪 rules established by 3 cases -Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.—SCOTUS held that a federal court should apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits in diversity cases -Van Dusen v. Barrack—SCOTUS held that if D seeks § 1404(a) transfer, that it is simply a change of courtrooms & should not change the law that is applied; transferor court's choice of law rules apply -Ferens v. John Deere Co.—applies Van Dusen to Ps applying for § 1404(a) transfer

daimler: general

Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) - Justice Ginsburg Fact Pattern: Ps sued American subsidiary of foreign D in CA Big Takeaway: While Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business, the reading that a corporation would be subject to jurisdiction in every state in which it engages in substantial, continuous, and systematic courser of businesses was too broad. Even if a corporation conducts billions of dollars' worth of business in the forum, that does not necessarily render the corporation "at home" in that state. Exception: Footnote 19 @ pp.99: in Perkins, a corporation's operations in a forum other than its form place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in the state.

Defensive non-mutual issue preclusion:

Defensive non-mutual issue preclusion: D seeks to prevent a P from asserting a claim the P has previously litigated & lost against another D 1.Blonder-Tongue-- new party in C2 invoked issue preclusion to prevent P from establishing a fact that P had already been unable to establish in C1 Controlling rule for federal question jx cases Rule: Regardless of whether there would be mutuality, a patentee whose patent is held invalid in his suit against one alleged infringer may be precluded, under issue preclusion, from asserting the validity of the patent in a suit against a different alleged infringer 2.Bernhard—elderly rich woman hires Cook to be her caretaker. Cook was allowed to write checks out in her name; withdraws $4,000 & deposits into his own account. After woman dies, her estate rep. thinks money should be returned. Issue to estate rep & bank: whether $4,000 was a gift Rule: Mutuality is not proper if the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted never had their day in court

the thread

Dioguardi v. Durning— A P can satisfy the pleading requirement w/ a "short & plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" pursuant to FRCP. Ps should have their day in court (policy consideration) Twombly—P filed class action against Baby Bell phone companies based on federal antitrust laws. D filed 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state claim. Rule: Pleadings must state enough facts to state a claim to relief that is PLAUSIBLE on its face. Also asks Ps for plausible grounds to infer an argument that raises a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of wrongful conduct. Erickson v. Pardus—P was inmate undergoing treatment for hepatitis C, but later was denied treatment. Rule: A pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. doesn't just apply to antitrust cases Iqbal—P was arrested by FBI agents during investigation of 9/11 terrorist attacks. P claimed that conditions of custody violated 1st & 5th Amendments; complaint accused US gov't for implementing a discriminatory policy of confining individuals in harsh conditions based solely on their "religion, race, and/or national origin." Rule: Under Twombly, a complaint will only survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges non conclusory facts that, taken as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Holding: P did not state enough facts for a plausible claim. Twombly becomes black letter law. Swanson v. Citibank— pleading alleging racial discrimination Rule: A court is not to consider whether a set of facts are probable, but whether a set of facts are possible Holding: P's complaint included claim for relief w/ brevity, conciseness, & clarity to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Court interpreted

forum non conveniens

Equitable doctrine permitting a court to refrain from hearing & determining a case (aka dismiss) when the matter may be more properly & fairly heard in another forum state. Piper v. Reyno—Plane crash in Scotland where people died. Plane was operated & owned by Scottish citizens, but plane was manufactured in US🡪 sued in US Rule: Dismissal may not be barred solely b/c of the possibility of an unfavorable change of law Court used balancing test of private & public interest factors from § 1404; some interest factors that Court defined are: Relative ease of access to sources to proof Availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses Possibility of viewing premises in question After dismissal, P is free to sue in the new jx; new jx must be adequate & available for P to have her day in court Courts often impose a condition on a forum non-conveniens dismissal—D must waive certain defenses in the foreign country jx in exchange for court granting forum non-conveniens dismissal

Erie doctrine-vertical choice of law

Erie Prong—Direct Collision w/o FRCP When a federal judge is faced w/ an issue, can the judge be required to use state law or can they ignore it? Erie Railroad v. Tompkins—P (citizen of PA) Rule: In diversity cases, federal court must apply state substantive law & federal procedural law. There is no federal general common law. Attempted to rewrite § 1652 (Rule of Decision Act; RDA)🡪 Federal courts cannot create their own common law; they must follow state decision of laws Rule of decision can be provided by state statutes & state decisional law (aka state common law) Twin aims of Erie decision as described in Hanna v. Plumer: (1) discourage forum shopping among litigants & (2) avoid inequitable administration of law If no federal provision on point🡪 true Erie question; federal judge must apply state law on matter of substantive law Don't have to apply state law if not substantive issue Substantive law: rules that govern our primary conduct outside of the judicial system

Fairness factors \

Fairness factors: Defendants interest States interest Plaintiffs interest Interstate judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of controversies Shared interest of state furthering substantive social policies Hanson comes back: must purposefully avail; fairness arguments can only come after purposeful availment has been met

§27 collateral esstoppel question: Issue Preclusion—Is C2 bringing an issue that was already actually litigated in C1?

Focus is on whether there would be confidence in original finding that would allow subsequent litigants to be bound Generally, issue preclusion is rejected in default judgments w/o full litigation, you won't have confidence in the first lawsuit resulting in default judgment But, claim preclusion can apply in default judgments Rest. § 26(1)(e)—applies in continuing relationship/obligation Bonds & coupons: coupons are separate obligations—you can sue on each one separately Trespass—X & Y fighting over Property Z🡪 each day of trespass on Z counts as a separate instance of trespass Open account for construction projects: different days you buy different items for construction project, but fail to pay🡪 one transaction 5 questions to assess issue preclusion (1) Was the same issue litigated & determined in the first case? Usually obvious to determine whether the same issue was litigated before O'Connor v. G & R Packing Co.—C1 was about contributory negligence. C2 was about no duty due to minimal duty to a trespasser. 2 different issues🡪 no issue preclusion Cromwell v. County of Sac—C1: issue about fraudulent nature of bonds🡪 D won against Smith. C2: issue about P being bone fide purchaser of coupons different from bonds in C1. Rule: Where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered

forum selection clauses: 1404

Forum Selection Clause: statement in a K that states where parties will litigate if there are any disputes; very persuasive in deciding venue Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc. v. US District Court—offers clarification of forum selection clauses in context of § 1404(a) transfers -A valid forum selection clause does not render venue improper in other districts -A party to a valid forum selection clause may seek enforcement of the provision through a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) -In applying § 1404(a), P's choice of forum & "private interest factors" are irrelevant b/c parties already agreed to litigate in a particular forum in the K; courts may consider only "public interest factors" which will rarely defeat enforcement of forum selection clause Van Dusen does not apply in § 1404(a) transfers to enforce a forum selection clause b/c it would allow the party violating the clause to "capture" favorable law of a district in another state. Transferee court applies choice of law rules of the state in which it sits

summary judgment

Function: Can avoid unnecessary delay and expense in deciding a case if there is no genuine issue of material facts in controversy that requires a trial Granted to the moving party (usually D), who has the burdens of production & persuasion, in showing that there are no genuine dispute on a material fact & that judgment should be entered against the non-moving party as a matter of law—Rule 56(a) Material fact: facts that relate to elements of a party's claim or defense A material fact raises a genuine issue if a reasonable jury could reach different conclusions concerning the fact The moving party must state each claim or defense for which summary judgment ought to be granted The moving party asserting that a fact is not genuinely disputed must support this assertion by citing parts of materials in the record, discovery, affidavits or by showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence of a genuine issue of fact or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact—Rule 56(c)(1) If movant meets their 56(c) burden🡪 BURDEN SHIFTS TO NON-MOVING PARTY

gray: specific

Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (1961) Fact Pattern: Ms.Gray's hot water heater exploded and caused her extensive injuries. She sued Titan Valve Co. alleging that it had negligently constructed a safety valve, and as a result of its negligence, a water heater had exploded. She sued in Illinois, and Titan, an Ohio corporation, challenged personal jurisdiction. Titan had manufactured the value in Ohio, then sold it to a Pennsylvania company which had incorporated it into the water heater. The water heater "in the course of commerce" was sold to the Illinois consumer. There was no evidence in the record that Titan had done any other business in Illinois either directly or indirectly. Big Takeaways: The Illinois Supreme Court gave a creative reading to its long-arm statute: it allowed the assertion of jurisdiction only if facts of the case came within a specific sub-category. The applicable provision stated that an out-of-state defendant was subject to the court's jurisdiction if it committed a tortious act within the State. If a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products. It should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into the State. In order to satisfy that the assertion of jurisdiction complied with due process, the Court used McGee holding → the isolated event was sufficient to establish the minimum contact.

gunn v. minton

Gunn v. Minton—P asserted state-law claim against his lawyers for malpractice in a patent matter. P specifically argued that they were negligent in not asserting the "experimental use" exception to the "on-sale" bar in underlying infringement suit. Rule: Federal jx over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, & (4) capable of resolution in federal court w/o disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Where all 4 requirements are met, jx is proper b/c there is a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum, which can be vindicated w/o disrupting Congress' intended division of labor between state & federal courts. Holding: the federal issue was not substantial in the relevant sense b/c the federal patent issue was posed in a merely hypothetical sense:

hanna prong of Erie

Hanna v. Plumer Prong—Direct Collision w/ FRCP Is there a FRCP on point on that issue that directly conflicts with state law? Hanna v. Plumer—P filed complaint in federal court in MA. P effectuated service by leaving copies of the summons & complaint at D's wife's residence, in accordance w/ Rule 4. D files answer asserting that in-hand service is required in MA state law Rule: To hold that FRCP must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress's attempt to exercise that power in the REA Implies that the federal system has a separate & distinct interest in its own procedural system Chief Justice Warren says that there will be few REA violations b/c FRCP were drafted by SCOTUS, Congress, & Advisory Committee & can only be struck down only if there is a prima facie case that the FRCP are not valid § 2072—Rules Enabling Act defines whether a federal law is valid: (a)SCOTUS, Congress, & Advisory Committee have the power to prescribe general rules of practice & procedure & rules of evidence for cases in the US district court & appeals courts (b)Such rights shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. SCOTUS has never found a FRCP to be invalid; falls in accordance w/ policy to maintain spirit of Rule 1 (discourage satellite litigation🡪 we don't want litigants to challenge the validity of the FRCP)

Hanson: specific

Hanson v. Denckla (1958) Fact Pattern: Mrs. Donner, a wealthy widow living in Pennsylvania, paid a Delaware company to serve as a trustee. She moved to Florida and the trust remained in effect until her death. During the 8 years when she lived in Florida, the trust company maintained its business relationship with her which included managing the trust and sending income checks to her home in Florida. After moving to Florida, Mrs. Donner created a will in which she left the bulk of her estate to two of her three daughters, Katherine Denckla and Dorothy. Upon her death, they would inherit about $500,000 each under the will. The third daughter, Elizabeth Hanson, was named the executor and her two sons would be the beneficiaries of the trust principal, both receiving about $200,000 each. Despite this, Katherine and Dorothy sought to challenge the validity of the trust in Florida proceeding to settle their mother's estate. As residual legatees of Mrs. Donner's will, they would receive the $400,00 trust principal. They sought to name the Delaware company as a defendant in the suit in Florida. Before the court resolved the Florida action, Hanson brought suit in Delaware to have the trust declared valid. The Florida Court ruled for Denckla and Stewart, and the Delaware Court found for Hanson. Big Takeaways: The Supreme Court found that Florida did not have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware Bank. When the trust was created, there was no connection with Florida. Mrs. Donner's move to Florida was not sufficient to create jurisdiction. It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Dissent (Black): FL is convenient place for litigation

supplemental j

Helps non-diverse & non-federal question claims into federal court Does not get a case to get into federal court, but allows Ps to attach state claims to federal claims (the case is already properly in federal court, but a particular claim does not) Every claim must have subject matter jx; if claim has no SMJ, then see if supplemental jx allows it to be brought into the case United Mine Workers v. Gibbs—rival labor unions in dispute over coal mining jobs. P asserts 2 claims against D (both TN citizens); 1 claim is federal labor law question & 2nd questions arises under state law. Rule: A federal court has subject matter jx over the state court claims if the claims of the entire action comprise of one constitutional case & the claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts🡪 later codified in § 1367 w/ a refined definition of "same case or controversy" 2 Step Process to § 1367: Does § 1367(a) grant supplemental jx over this claim—does the claim meet the Gibbs test (always satisfied if claim comes from same case or controversy)? Yes🡪 if trying to assert diversity claim, go to #2; if trying to assert federal question claim, claim is granted supplemental jx No🡪 claim is not granted supplemental jx & cannot be joined w/ case Does § 1367(b) take away supplemental jx for diversity claims? If claim is brought by a PLAINTIFF against parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24; also kills supplemental jx for claims by Rule 19 Ps & claims by Rule 24 intervenor Ps🡪 claim is not granted supplement jx & cannot be joined w/ case UNLESS THE P IS PUT IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION

hess v. palowski specific j

Hess v. Pawloski (1927) - Justice Butler Fact Pattern: Action brought by defendant in error to recover damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff in error negligently and wantonly drove a motor vehicle on a public highway in Massachusetts and that by reason thereof the vehicle struck and injured defendant in error. Plaintiff in error is a resident of Pennsylvania. No personal service was made on him and no property belonging to him was attached. Service of process was made in compliance with General Laws of Massachusetts (statutory law) Big Takeaways Under the statute, the implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on a highway in which the nonresident may be involved. The State may declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served. A defendant impliedly consented to the Court's jurisdiction.

int shoe: specific

International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) - Chief Justice Stone Fact Pattern: -International Shoe, located in Missouri, had a workforce in Washington State. -Its salesman solicited orders from customers there. -- -International Shoe did not allow its salesforce to enter into contracts with sellers in Washington. Instead, employees at the Missouri headquarters decided whether to fill orders. The corporation failed to pay funds into Washington's unemployment compensation fund. Corporation argued against personal jurisdiction because it did not do business-in-state. Big Takeaways: The Court focused on the nature and the quality of the defendant's contacts with the state. When a defendant sought the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state - at least when the claim arose out of or related to the underlying contacts - the defendants had a reciprocal obligation to respond to suit in that forum. Implied consent theory was fiction. Minimum contacts analysis applied to both individuals and corporations. Minimum Contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer (1940). The defendant's contacts with the forum State much be such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" . DOES NOT overrule Pennoyer, but supplements it

interpleader

Interpleader protects persons in possession of property or money (stakeholders) the ownerships of which may be claimed by more than one party; allows stakeholder to force adverse claimants to property to litigate ownership in single proceeding (usually insurance cases) Action brought by stakeholder (P) naming contending claimants to property as Ds. Ds then file crossclaims against each other to figure out who gets the property Dunlevy—New York Life held insurance policy under Joseph Gould, who claimed that it was his. Gould's daughter, Dunlevy, claimed that it was hers b/c Gould had assigned the proceeds to her. Court lacked PJ over Dunlevy but still held that Gould was owner. Dunlevy then sued to recover insurance money & lower courts found for her. SCOTUS affirmed lower courts finding for Dunlevy. Insurance company had to pay twice—reason why interpleader was created (avoid double liability) Rule 22—Rule Based Interpleader: Invokes federal jx through § 1332 diversity of citizenship; complete diversity required (p v d) Allows both Ps & Ds to use interpleader P may file an interpleader action against the claimants & a D may raise interpleader as a counterclaim or crossclaim Cases based on Rule 22 Interpleader are subject to the normal rules of PJ, SMJ, & venue

Issue & Claim Preclusion: Is C2 bringing forward an issue that could have been joined in C1, but is now bringing it forward in C2

Is C2 bringing forward an issue that could have been joined in C1, but is now bringing it forward in C2? you have one shot to litigate your claim Rule 8(c)—A D may assert res judicata (claim preclusion) as an affirmative defense if they prove 3 elements: (1) identity of parties, (2) identity of causes of actions, & (3) final & valid judgment on the merits 2 main tests for claim preclusion to determine scope of a claim (aka what is a cause of action?): "Primary rights" test: We get a different claim for each right invaded (e.g. one claim for personal injury and different claim for property damages) Carter v. Hinkle—. Rule: Damages to the person & to property, though occasioned by the same wrongful act, give rise to different causes of action. Ps can tack on many causes of action🡪 judgment call for the jury Minority approach—CA uses this test "Same transaction" test—Restatement 2d, of Judgements: Considers a claim to encompass all rights to relief "w/ respect to all or part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose" Transaction: "natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts" Modern trend; federal law applies this test Prior litigation bars all possible issues that could have been raised in prior litigation b/c there is a presumption that Ps' counsel has done all legal & factual homework before bringing his claim to court

Macintyre

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (2011) Fact Pattern: The plaintiff Robert Nicastroy seriously injured his hand using a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre, a British Corporation. The plaintiff sued in New Jersey where he worked and was injured. The defendant created a subsidiary, J. McIntyre America, to market its products in the U.S. By the time of trial, the subsidiary was bankrupt. The record included evidence of the sale of only one machine in New Jersey, the defendant hope to sell its machines to anyone in the U.S. The employees attended trade shows in the United States but not in New Jersey. Big Takeaway: Personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign analysis. The facts in the case may reveal an intent to serve in the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey Market. The stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures. Kennedy's strict interpretation of purpose - did not get a majority. You have to be one that creates the relationship -

James-dickens: tag jurisdiction

James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry (1927) Fact Pattern: Addressed the question of whether Tag Jurisdiction works for businesses as it does for human defendants. Addressed jurisdiction based on service on a transient agent. Situation is quite different with service on a corporate agent who is not transient. All states require out-of-state business seeking to transact business within the state to register and to appoint an in-agent for service of process. When a company complies with a registration statute and appoints an agent for service, jurisdiction based upon service on the agent is not rooted in presence or minimum contacts. Rather it is rooted in consent. Big Takeaways: Court rejects the notion that tag jurisdiction works the same way for corporations as individuals. Jurisdiction over a corporation of one State cannot be acquired in another State or district in which it has no place of business and is not found, merely by surviving process upon an executive officer temporarily therein, even if he is there on business of the company.

McGee: specific

McGee v. International Life Insc. Co. (1957) Fact Pattern: A California Citizen purchased a life insurance policy from an Arizona insurance company. A Texas insurance company later took over the Arizona company. When it took over, the Texas company mailed a reinsurance certificate to the California insured. The insured in turn sent his premiums from CA. The insured died in CA, and the insurance company asserted the policy was void because the insured had committed suicide. The beneficiaries sued the Texas insurance company in CA state court. No evidence that the Defendant (the Texas Company) had ever solicited or done any insurance business in CA apart from this particular policy, the Supreme Court found jurisdiction. Big Takeaways: The Due Process Clause did not preclude the CA court from entering a judgment. It is sufficient for the purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with the State. CA has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. Residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant state in order to hold it accountable. A clear trend towards "expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations" An isolated contact that is so substantial is still sufficient to meet the minimum contacts tests from I-Shoe.

summary judgment - nonmoving parties burden

Non-moving party's burden—Rule 56(e): the non-moving party must "properly support an assertion of fact" by citing parts of materials in the record, discovery, or in any affidavits Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion for summary judgment does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment should be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented (See Adickes v. S. H. Kress) Inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party If X-exam works to survive a motion for summary judgment,

Offensive non-mutual issue preclusion

Offensive non-mutual issue preclusion: P seeks to estop D from relitigating the issue which D previously litigated & lost against another P 1. Problem in mass tort actions: P1 wins against D, so P2-P100 can invoke issue preclusion. But, D cannot assert issue preclusion against all Ps b/c that would deprive their day in court 2. SCOTUS has lukewarm support for offensive issue preclusion b/c it does not promote judicial economy (aka most courts reject non-mutual offensive issue preclusion)🡪 disincentivizes Ps from joining together in the first action 3. Parklane Hosiery v. Shore—C1: SEC successfully brings action against D for making false statements about their proxy statement. C2: same issue litigated by SEC but w/ different Ps against same D. a. Rule: In cases where a P could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons against using offensive nonmutual issue preclusion or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a D, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel b. Controlling rule for federal question jx cases c. Factors for district court judges to consider in permitting non-mutual offensive issue preclusion: Easy joinder in the first case Foreseeability of litigation/incentive to litigation Inconsistent judgments Different procedures

Kenton: specific

P filed in NH federal court in defamation suit to take advantage of NH's statute of limitations laws rule:D is carrying out part of its business in NH & that's sufficient to support jx when cause of action arises out of very activity being conducted (minimum contacts)

pennoyer v. neff traditional basis

Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) - Justice Fields Fact Pattern: -Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon State Court for Neff owing $$$ for legal services. -Mitchell submitted an affidavit asserting Neff owned land in Oregon and Neff was in CA. -Notice of the suit published in the weekly church newspaper. -Neff did not answer or appear in the case, and the Court entered a default judgment. -Land was sold at sheriff's sale and purchased by Mitchell -> transferred title to Pennoyer. -Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court seeking eviction. -Code of Oregon provides such service by publication when an action is brought against a nonresident and absent defendant, who has property within the State. Also provides, where the action is for the recovery of money or damages, for the attachment of the property of the nonresident. Big Takeaways: Mitchell did not begin the suit by proper attachment of the property that would have given the state court in rem jurisdiction. Because Mitchel filed his original action in personam and did not serve Neff in-hand, in-state, the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over Neff. A court lacks in-personam jurisdiction over a non-constening,non-resident defendant unless that defendant was served in-hand, in-state. The 14th amendment prevented Oregon from reaching into California or any other state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant in that other state. → the 14th amendment is a limitation on state power.

rule 26 exceptions to claim preclusion

Rest. § 26(1)—Exceptions to Claim Preclusion Parties have agreed that P may split his claims, or D has acquiesced therein Court in 1st action has expressly reserved P's right to maintain 2nd action P was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy in the first action b/c of limitations on SMJ of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies in a single action, & P desires in 2nd action to rely on that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief Judgment in 1st action was plainly inconsistent w/ fair & equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme, or P should have been permitted to split his claims For reasons of substantive policy in a case involving a continuing or recurrent wrong, P is given an option to sue once for the total harm, both past & prospective, or to sue from time to time for the damages incurred to the date of suit, & chooses to sue from time to time Clearly & convincingly shown that the policies favoring preclusion of a 2nd action are overcome for an extraordinary reason—e.g. apparent invalidity of a continuing restraint or condition having a vital relation to personal liberty or the failure of the prior litigation to yield a coherent disposition of the controversy

counterclaims: A counterclaim is a claim asserted against the opposing party, usually by a D against a P. A counterclaim may seek any kind of relief that the court is competent to give. Counterclaims must meet the pleading requirements under Rule 8.

Rule 13(a)—Compulsory Counterclaims: A claim arising out of the transaction that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, & which does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court does not have jx, must be stated as a counterclaim, even where the counterclaim may not have been triable in the court where the original pleading was filed If not asserted, you waive the claim -Must assess SMJ in counterclaim🡪 if SMJ fails, then supplemental jx may allow it in -Requires assertion of transactionally related counterclaim only if defending party is asserting a pleading—motions are not pleadings (e.g. Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss) -Must attach compulsory counterclaim in the answer Dindo v. Whitney—P drove w/ D in passenger seat when car went off the road & P was severely injured. P sued alleging that cause of accident was D putting his hand through steering wheel to reach for a flashlight. D filed counterclaim. 2 years later P sued D alleging that accident was caused by D & alleged he did not realize he had a claim against D until he spoke to new counsel. Rule: A final judgment is not necessary for the invocation of the Rule 13(a) bar when a party uses the same claim in a new action. Forgave P's failure to file compulsory counterclaim b/c P was alleging ignorance of rule (and not acting in "conscious inaction") Carteret Savings & Loan Assn. v. Jackson Rule: When a D is defaulted for failure to file a pleading, the default applies to whatever the party should have pleaded "Well-pleaded complaint" rule, requisite for invoking federal question jx, prohibits courts from looking at counterclaim for jx basis b/c courts can only look to the face of the complaint

Rule 13(b)—Permissive Counterclaims

Rule 13(b)—Permissive Counterclaims: allows parties to make counterclaims that do not arise from same transaction or occurrence & you may assert it in this case or sue in a separate case Must assess SMJ in counterclaim🡪 if SMJ fails, then supplemental jx may allow it in Different from Rule 18(a) b/c 18(a) is premised on an action that is properly brought; once an action is properly brought, everything else can come in

crossclaims

Rule 13(g) A crossclaim is a claim against a co-party, usually made by D against a co-D A crossclaim must arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying dispute. Crossclaims must meet the pleading requirements under Rule 8 Permissive; never compulsory Must satisfy SMJ or supplemental jx Language does not preclude P from crossclaiming co-P, but Danner v. Anskis interprets Rule 13(g) permitting a P to crossclaim co-P after there is a counterclaim against P

impleader aka 3rd party practice

Rule 14—Third Party Practice: Allows D to join somebody new (TPD) b/c the TPD is or may be liable to the D for all or part of the P's claim Rule 14(a)(1): permits joinder of a party who "is or may be liable" to the defending party for all or part of the P's complaint -Requires derivative liability (e.g. indemnification, respondeat superior, contribution, etc.); not applicable in cases where D blames TPD to being true wrongdoer Add person to shift liability or share costs (either in indemnity/full or partial cost) -Markvicka v. Brodhead-Garrett Co.—action brought on behalf of minor child who suffered severe injuries while using machine manufactured by D. D files Rule 14(a) complaint against School District (TPD) alleging that accident was also partly due to fault from TPD. Rule: Where state law creates a right to contribution or indemnity among tortfeasors, the wrongdoer who has been sued by an injured party may implead his co-wrongdoers before the P successfully obtains a judgment. The fact that contribution may not actually be obtained until the original D has been case in judgment & has paid does not prevent impleader. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger—James Kroger was electrocuted to death & his wife brings wrongful death lawsuit. D filed 3rd party complaint against Owen (TPD) on grounds that TPD owned & operated the steel crane that killed Kroger. During trial, it's discovered that TPD's PPB is actually IA & not NE (destroys diversity). Rule: In an action in which federal jx is based on diversity, the P cannot assert a claim against a TPD when there is no independent basis for federal jx over the claim Rule 14(a)(3)—P can assert claim against TPD if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence

joiners: Real Party in Interest, Capacity, & Standing

Rule 17 Parties of Interest: An action must prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest (RPI). An action is not dismissed for failing to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, reasonable time passes to join into the action. If RPI does not bring lawsuit, you can either file: Motion for substitution of RPI Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of SMJ Minors & incompetent persons may sue w/ a representative or w/o one under a guardian ad litem that is either selected or court-appointed Corporations may be sued as designated by statute. Partnerships & other unincorporated associations w/o capacity may sue in its common name to enforce a substantive right A public officer may sue or be sued in his official capacity rather than by name unless the court orders names of officers to be included Insurance companies own the actions b/c they pay the insured damages but will often sue in the name of the insured out of fear that juries will find them unsympathetic. They do so by either: Treating the insurance payments as a loan use deductible (if not paid yet) as a way to keep insured as RPI

simple joinders

Rule 18—Joinder of Claims: A party can include as many claims against a D as she wants, even if they are totally unrelated. However, a judge may separate claims for trial for reasons of convenience, prejudice, & economy per Rule 42(b), which acts as a remedy Gibbs consequences: -Produces efficiency b/c Ps can attach state claims to federal claims Rule 20—Permissive Joinder of Parties: Parties may be joined if they assert a claim or defense that (1) arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transaction or occurrence & (2) there must be a common question of law or fact Schwartz v. Swan—Ds from 2 separate car crashes were joined in 1 case by P -Rule: Joinder of multiple parties depends broadly upon the assertion of a right to relief, or a liability arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, & the existence of a common question of law or fact. Since it is difficult to discern which D is liable for P's injuries🡪 Ds can be properly brought on Aldinger—P's boss fires P after finding out P was living w/ her bf. P sues boss (D) under federal equal protection claim & joins state law claim against the county -Rule: Pendent party joinder is constitutional as long as the statutory grant did not preclude supplemental jx

necessary parties

Rule 19(a)—Necessary Parties: An absentee should be joined as a "necessary party" for a just adjudication where: -The P cannot get relief from the named party -Where the absentee may be prejudiced from failing to join -Where the D may be prejudiced by the failure to join an absentee by being left to a substantial risk of incurring double, inconsistent obligations Temple v. Synthes Corp.—P had back surgery involving getting screws implanted, but screws broke off post-surgery. P filed suit against D in federal court on basis of diversity & simultaneously filed suit against the doctor who performed the surgery & the hospital where he got the surgery done for malpractice & negligence. Rule: Joint tortfeasors are simply not Rule 19 necessary parties Rule 19(b)—When Joinder is not Feasible Feasible if PJ, SMJ, & proper venue requirements are all met🡪 party must be joined Not feasible: either PJ is absent or joinder would destroy diversity jx -Decide whether to proceed w/o absentee or dismiss the case -Dismiss the case if absentee can't be added to the case; better to dismiss rather than run the risk of proceeding w/o absentee Courts are unlikely to dismiss unless there is another court for P to go to Reasons why someone would be Rule 19(b) party: Adding them would destroy SMJ Haas v. Jefferson National Bank—failure of the district court to acquire jx over indispensable parties to an action deprives the court of jx to proceed in the matter & render a judgment Venue is improper Not subject to service of process to establish PJ Black and white firefighters example: If black firefighters sue the city & b/c of that new rules are created to impact hiring practices. This in turn affects white firefighters, therefore making them indispensable parties

methods of service 4(e)(2)

Rule 4(e)(2)—Methods of Service personal service: hand d papers; can be done anywhere in forum state substituted serviceL serving substitute instead of d; ok if at d's dwelling house , or usual abode and served someone who is of suitable age and discretion who resides there serve d's agent: agent is appointed by d or by law statutory provision: rule 4(e)(1)- court may use any methods of process allowed by state law ; state law where federal court sits and state where service is effectuated is applicable ssstate law

rule 41(b)

Rule 41(b): All judgments are on the merits unless they are based on jx, venue, or indispensable parties. NOT on the merits: (1) court in C1 said judgment is not on the merits, (2) C1 was decided w/ leave to amend, or w/o prejudice, & (3) some states say that dismissal based on SOL is not on the merits Trial is not required to be "on the merits" Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie—Respondents were two of several private litigants who had brought federal actions against petitioner department store seeking treble damages as a proposed class of retail purchasers. Set 1 Ps appealed to 9th Circuit & Set 2 Ps filed new lawsuits in state court; while those cases were on appeal, SCOTUS held that retail purchasers can show injury required by antitrust laws. 9th Circuit reversed & remanded Set 1 Ps in light of new precedent. Rule: A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. SCOTUS struck down 9th Circuit's reversal. But dismissal based on claimant's failure to prosecute, discovery sanction, or lack of jx or venue are NOT "on the merits" Rest. 2d, Judgments § 20(1)(a): Any judgment against the claimant, except one "for lack of jx, for improper venue, or for nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties" is accorded claim preclusive effect Must show that Case 1 & Case 2 were brought by the same claimant against the same D Case 1 must have ended in a valid final judgement on the merits Both cases must involve the same claim—a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts Privity: a person in privity w/ a party is usually bound to the same extent as the party

consolidation

Rule 42—Consolidation Matters may be consolidated if they present a common question of law or fact in order to avoid unnecessary cost or delay—does not mention "same transactional test" required in Rule 20 Use if same transaction test fails for Rule 20 The court may also separate trials for convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite & economize

service of process and method of service

Rule 4—Service of Process Process consists of 2 documents: (1) Summons, & (2) Copy of the complaint Summons: formal notice from the court that tells D that she has been sued, tells her how long she has to respond, or if she doesn't respond🡪 risk being in default Summons is signed by clerk & a symbol of gov't power over the D In serving process, P may follow either the procedures of the state in which the district court sits, or the procedures of the state in which service is effected, or procedures set forth in Rule 4 Rule 4(e)(1)—Summons must be served w/ complaint within Rule 4(m) period Rule 4(c)(2)—Any person who is at least 18 years old & not a party may serve a summons and complaint Rule 4(m)—Service must be accomplished within 90 days or it is dismissed w/o prejudice unless there is good cause shown to extend time Rule 4(h)—Service on a corporation: Must service an officer or manager or general agent of that corporation. Find someone that has enough responsibility that we will expect him to transmit important papers May incorporate state law in determining service on a corporation—Rule 4(e)(1) Rule 4(k)(1)(a)—Federal court says we can serve process throughout the state where the federal court sits May serve out of state only if state court there could serve

simple joinders continued: aggregation and rule 21

Rules of Aggregation: if you have multiple Ps suing one D, but neither P meets the amount in controversy, you cannot aggregate the two amounts together -Supplemental jx overrides amount in controversy rule & the complete diversity rule b/c it falls within the grant of § 1367(a) & § 1367(b) does not remove grant of supplemental jx Rule 21—Misjoinder & Nonjoinder of Parties: Misjoinder is not grounds for dismissing an action. The court may drop or add any non-necessary party at any stage in the action on any terms as are just, or sever the claim against a party on its own or by motion Severance: two (or more) separate suits, each w/ its own docket number & judgment

Special Appearance: Direct Attack: . Collateral Attack: Risks:

Special Appearance: Allows the defendant to appear in a forum for the sole purpose of contesting in personam jurisdiction. Raising an objection to personal jurisdiction along with a notice to remove the case to federal court does not constitute a general appearance. General Appearance: If a defendant does more than object to the jurisdiction, such as asserting another defense. This would subject them to in-personam jurisdiction. Direct Attack: When the defendant makes an appearance and objects to personal jurisdiction. Risks: Clients will have to find an attorney to appear there on their behalf, can be expensive and must be completed quickly because of time limits imposed for making defensive responses. Client cannot appeal the jurisdiction ruling until after she litigates the entire case on the merits, Should she lose at trial, she can appeal both on jurisdiction and the merits. Collateral Attack: When P ignores and allows the State A court to enter a default judgment, when P attempts to enforce default judgment in State B, client could make a collateral attack where they argue the judgment is not entitled to the full faith and credit clause because State A did not have personal jurisdiction. Risks: P may try to enforce the judgment anywhere where Client has property The collateral attack permits client to raise only the issue of whether State A had jurisdiction, connect contest merits of the claim.

specific v. general j

Specific vs. General J(X) If a corporate D's activities are sufficiently continuous, systematic, and substantial, it may be sued there even on claims unrelated to those activities. 🡪 NO LONGER THE TEST: D must be "at home" (from Daimler) D must be "at home" D as individual🡪domicile D as corporation🡪state of incorporation or principal place of business

telemedicin: internet pj

The express aiming test: In the Internet context, the plaintiff must prove the defendant had constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum and that the defendant's contacts were temporally and substantially related to the lawsuit. Something more is needed: it must relate to the forum state and cannot be satisfied by the plaintiff's mere residence in the forum state. The defendant must have some knowledge that the plaintiff lives or does business in the forum state or acts specifically with the purpose of inflicting harm to the forum. whether minimum contacts are framed, the bottom line question is whether the nature of the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation makes it fair to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. The "injury plus" (and minimum contacts) requirement is not met here, particularly if Calder in fact requires a showing that the defendant intended to reach forum-state readers.

shaffer general

The plaintiff filed a shareholder derivative suit in Delaware state court against the Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary, and 28 of Greyhound's directors and officers. A shareholder's derivative suit is a suit brought by one or more corporate shareholders to enforce the corporation's rights. In Oregon, Officers and directors were accused of breaching duties to the corporation by having the company engage in activities that violated antitrust laws. The suit against 21 of the individual defendans was brought quasi-in-rem by attaching the defendants' shares of Greyhound stock, a procedure known in Delaware as "sequestration" Although the stocks certificates were not physically located in Delaware, a Delaware statute made Delaware the legal location of all stock in Delaware Corporation. The individual defendants challenged Delaware's jurisdiction arguing that they did not have the requisite minimum contacts with delaware to support jurisdiction under International Shoe takeaway The standards that must be set forth to answer the question are the standards in International Shoe (minimum contacts standard).

venue

Venue is a statutory right, not a constitutional right Venue is waived if there no motion under Rule 12(b)(3) § 1390: General definition of venue—geographic specification of the proper court § 1391(b): A civil action may be brought in: § 1391(b)(1)—Residental Venue: A judicial district in which any D resides, if all Ds reside in the district; if all Ds reside in the forum state, you can sue them all in either district in which one of the Ds resides § 1391(b)(2)—Transactional Venue: A judicial district in which a substantial part of events or property give rise to the claim Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc.—D mailed debt collection letter to D's old address. Post office forwarded the letter to P's new address, which was in a different judicial district. Case was dismissed for improper venue. Rule: Personal harm suffices to be a substantial part of the events giving rise to P's claim according to § 1391(b)(2). The court noted the liberalization of venue provisions, to permit multiple venues, & not to require a district court to determine the venue in which the claim arose. Finding a place where a majority of the events took place is no longer relevant.

continued: Cases that challenge validity of FRCP

Walker v. Armco— Rule: If claim arises under federal question jx, then it tolls SOL, but if claim arises under diversity jx, it does not toll & state law applies. SCOTUS wanted to avoid REA violation, so SCOTUS stretched Rule 3 meaning; enacting a nationwide SOL would seemingly violate § 2072(b) b/c it'll enlarge state substantive right SOL if Federal Rule would impinge on state SOL rights, then it likely violates § 2072(b) Shady Grove—P wanted NY state law to apply that would preclude class actions seeking penalties/statutory minimum damages b/c it feels like they are entitled to D for a remedy b/c D refused to pay interest. Conflict is over whether NY state law applies or Rule 23 (federal rule on class actions) governs. Rule (Scalia): Give a natural reading to the Rules; if you satisfy § 2072(a), you satisfy § 2072(b). Rule 23 applies. (if a rule is arguably procedural, the courts work is done) Dissent (Ginsburg): disagrees with Scalia: Read it narrowly in light of state substantive policies🡪 would change applicability of the FRCP in whatever state you're in. (to a avoid a conflict with an important substantive policy) Concurrence (Stevens): agrees w/ Scalia on giving natural reading of Rules (Rule 23 applies). But also agrees w/ Ginsburg that there needs to be some consideration for the state's regulations. -recognizes the presumption that. rule enacted under REA does not violate the REA. he leaves open the possibility that a party. might show that the stat rule is bound up within the state substantive right - in effect compliance with 2072 does not end the inquiry because a p may be able to show that the rule modify, enlarges, or abridges a substantive right

wwv : specific

World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980) - Justice White Fact Pattern: In 1976, the Robinsons bought an Audi from a dealer in New York. During their move to Arizona, while in Oklahoma, Kay Robinson and her two children were in the Audi when a drunk driver smashed into the rear of the car. The collision jammed both the doors shut and ruptured the gas tank. The Robinsons brought suit in state court in Oklahoma against Audi (the manufacturer), Volkswagen of America (the importer), World-Wide Volkswagen (the regional distributor) and Seaway Volkswagen (the dealership) Seaway and World-Wide entered special appearances, claiming that the Oklahoma's lack of pj The Robinsons' lawyers filed in state court because juries in the county where the accident occurred were plaintiff-friendly. The Robinsons still retained their New York Citizenship. Oklahoma would have been the only state where the plaintiffs could bring their action against all the defendants in one suit. All the evidence was there and it would be burdensome for them to go all the way to New York to file suit. Big Takeaways: defendants' contacts with the forum state were insufficient. Lacking was any evidence that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Oklahoma. Foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for pj it is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma, but the mere unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. Purposeful availment AND THEN fairness factors

statutory grant of federal jx

american redcross: Ps want to sue for receiving HIV-contaminated blood from the American Red Cross. But, there is no federal statute that has created a right to sue for receiving tainted blood; aka no federal remedy (does not turn on the interpretation of federal law; does not get through Door #1 & #2)🡪 now must look if there is a state tort that would create a right of action for receiving tainted blood Rule: There needs to be specific language in the statutory language that grants a federal entity to be sued or sue in federal court Holding: Federal jx would be satisfied b/c there is specific language in the charter of a federal entity that allows it to be sued or sue in federal court

intervention

an aentee (nonparty) seeks to bring herself into a case. It is up to the absentee to decide which side to come on Two types of intervention: Rule 24(a)(2)—Intervention of Right: Satisfied if you can show that the absentee's interest will be harmed if she is not joined & her interest is not adequately represented now (similar to Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) of necessary parties) Rule 24(b)(2)—Permissive Intervention: Absentee's claim or defense has at least one question in common w/ the pending case

scope of discovery cases

cases: united oil: narrowed the scope of discovery to matters that are relevant to claims and defenses and not to the subject matter of the pleading or dispute seen in the past zubulake: to determine whether costs shifting should occur, the court must apply a 7 factor test considering the following, (treat) 1. (t)he cost of production compared to amount in controversy 2.(r)elative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information .. 3.(e)xtent to which the requests is specifically tailored to discover relevant information 4.(a)vailability of such information from other sources 5.(t)otal cost of production compared to resources available to each party-not included FRCP

defenses an objections to pleadings

d mst serve answer to p's complaint within 21 days off service 12 (b): pre answer motions may be asserted in answer, but also can be asserted before filing an answer as a motion (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. 12(h)(1): must assert defenses in rule 12(b)(2)-(50 I firsts response to pass complaint failure to assert in first response, d waives these defenses rule 12(b)(6) and 12 (b)(7) can be raised for the firsts time after fires response rule 12(h)(3)- rule 12(b)(1) can be raised anytime

notice and opportunity to be heard

due Process: requires D to be given notice & opportunity to be heard Notice to be heard is given by service of process Opportunity to be heard: procedural rules that allow D to respond to P's allegation & allows D to engage in litigation Notice RULE: A state may determine the rights of non-resident beneficiaries in the settlement of claims if the notice provided is constitutionally adequate. Notice must be of such nature as reasonably conveys the required information, & it must afford reasonable time for those interested to make their appearances. (Mullane v. Central Hanover). Under Dusenberry, due process requires a reasonably calculated attempt to give actual notice, but not actual notice itself.

federal statute claim

holmes: federal staute. gives private. cause of action = remedy

change of venue: improper venue to roper venue

horizontal choice of law: A district court, which is an improper venue for a case, shall dismiss the case, or in the interest of justice, transfer to another district in which the case should bave been brought Goldlawr—courts can still transfer to a proper venue even if the originally filed court lacks PJ & venue Does not apply factors, unlike § 1404(a) transfers

rule 11 - signing pleadings: list them all

rule 11(a): requires attorneys to sign all documents except for discovery documents (governed by rule 26(g)) rule 11(b): certifies to the bets of your knowledge and belief, after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, that a. document is not for improper purposes b. legal contentions are warranted by law, or there is at least a non-frivilous argument that the law should change c. factual contention have evidentiary support or are likely to have evidentiary support after further investsigation

sanctions

rule 11(c):if the. opposing party seeks to impose sanctions. they must first serve the violating party with a motion for sanctions. the violating party then has 21 days to withdraw or correct the matter to avoid sanctions (safe harbor) rule 11(c)(2): party musts raise "safe harbor" defense; otherwise, it Is waived if the violating party fails to correct within 21 days, then the opposing party may file the motion fo sanctions with the court. however, the opposing party may not motion fo sanctions with the court if the violating party. timely withdraws or corrects the matter ex of proper procedure: pat v dan. pat files suit for improper purpose. dan serves pat with a motion for sanctions. 21 days pass and pat refuses to withdraw. the suit or correct the matter. dan then files the motion for sanctions with the court.

amended pleadings & relation back of amendments (state of limitations)

rule 15(a): a party may amend its pleading once within 21 days of serving it if there is no right to send, you seek leave of court "freely given when justice so requires" amendments are liberally allowed in the spirit of rule 1 15 (B)- variance: the presentation of evidence on a point not covered in pleadings: guess beyond the scope of what was pleaded -if other side objects to the variance during trail treat evidence as inadmissible -does not bar party seeking leave to amend -if other side does not object to variance during trail treat pleading as though it Is amended to show the new information rule 15 (c)(1)(a)- statute allows claim to relate back

amendments adding a new claim

rule 15(c)(1)(b)- amendment is adding a new claim only if concerns the sam conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original pleadings; or marshes v. coleman: p original pleadings didn't include fraud claim (fraud clip brought up after claims SOL ran court held that the amendment did not relate back b/c fraud claim was not part of Same transaction as original complaints in initial pleading rule 15(c)(1)(c): amendment is adding a new D only if 15(c)(1)(b) satisfied and you sued the wrong person the first time, but the right person knew about it and can be charged w/ knowledge of it and but for a mistake of proper parts identity he would have been charged in the original complaint

sanctions rule 26 and 37

rule 26 (g): equivalent to rule 11 for certifying pleadings docs -purpose: put burden on party being sought after for discovery to percent situations where D. is straying to hide being uncooperative fisons: an attorney is subject tp sanctions if he does not comply wot reasonable discovery requests and misleads opposing counsel rule 37: motion to compel discovery used for response inconsistent with the letter, purpose, and sort of discovery rules (discretionary sanctions) -first file a motion to the court compelling the other side to imply with discovery requests before other party is sanctioned - apples in cases party responding to discovery requests is being clearly uncooperative

discovery: duty to disclose- general provisions governing discovery

rule 26(a)(1)- initial disclosure: both parties must make automatic disclosures to begin discovery -description or copied of any documents that the disclosing party can use to suport its claims or defenses is sufficient (no need to provide a copy of whole document) rule 26(a)(3): required pretrial disclosure: generally at least 30 days before trial, each party must disclose information about witnesses and evidence they intend present at trial -ensures that there are no surpasses at trial -names of witnesses expected to be called at trial (depositions used at trialed)+ a list of documents and exhibits to be offered into evidence

experts

rule 26(b)(4): each party must identify all experts who may testify at trial at least 90 days before trial rule 26(a)(2): expert witnesses identities must be part of initial disclosures ager v. Jane (identify 4 different types of experts: 1. expert witnesses expecting to use at trial - rule 26(a)(2)(b) -initial disclosures, you must 1. identify the experts you play to use at trial, 2. disclose their resumes, 3. share the date they sued, and 4. provide an extra report -may be deposed by other side 2. experts retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial but not expected to be used at trial: rule 26 (b)(4)(d) -not discoverable except on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable of the party to obtain facts or opinions on the sam subject by other means 3. experts informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained (not expected to testify at trial) -not written in FRCP not discoverable 4. Experts whose information was not acquired in prep for trial - 26(b)(1) -treated more like expert #1 open for discovery

discovery tools (depositions) witnesses

rule 30:a witness (deponent) is placed under oath and response to questions, similar to testifying at trial -deponents respond orally under oath to questions asked why lawyers for the various parties based upon their print recollection -depositions a nonparty witness requires the party seeking discovery to subpoena the witness -effective way to learn what an individual knows about a particular matter'- places a presumptive limit of 10 depot per side, 1 per day for max 7 hours; can be altered by stipulation of parties or by court order rule 31: witnesses can be disposed by having a court officer read questions out loud advantage; lawyers don't need to be present (helps with expenses) disadvantage: no opportunity for follow-up q's based on responses recived

interogatorriess

rule 33: any party may send to any other party written questions that require a written response under oath; cannot be sent to nonparty -effective way to learn detailed , objective information -parties are required to provide facts that are reasonably available to them to help them answer questions -typically drafted by p's lawyer -places presumptive limit of 25 interoggatoriess per party; limit scan be alters by parties or by court order adv: less expensive than depots

production of documents and things

rule 34: permits any party to require another party to produce for inspection, copying, or testing all relevant documents or other tangible things -if document request is overly burdensome,e , party can go to court to have request quashed rule 34(b)(i): party cannot make "document dump"- must turn over docs as they are used in the ordinary course of business -docs requests are the best method for uncovering "smoking gun" docs, which aren't turned over in automatic disclosures

medical examinations

rule 35: requires court order -when the health, physical, or mental condition of a party is sin controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination -nonparty who is in custody or legal control of a party may undergo medical exam narrow standard (employer-employee relationship does not mean legal control in this context) -the party requesting the examination chooses the medical professional who will make the exam and write a report concerning the condition of the person examined -if the opposing party subjects your client to get a medical exam, you ware entitle to a copy of the report, if requested you must receive a copy -once you receive a copy , you waive any privileged related t that report

requests for admission

rule 36: used to determine what issues are and are not in dispute - can make objections -if not admitted, the party must specify why it denied or state in detail why it cannot truthfully admit or deny- rule 36(a)(4)

waiver of service of processs

rule 4(d)- waiver of service of process a. An individual, corporation, or association that is subject to service has a duty to avoid unnecessary expenses of serving the summons b. P may notify D that an action has been commenced & request that the D waive service of a summons. c. Must be done w/ first class mail & D has 30 days to return signed waiver form d. Does not waive PJ or venue e. Not waiving service of process means P needs to have service effective formally (D must pay for service incurred)

answer: name the rule

rule 8(d)(2): you can make as many statements of claims as long as they're plausible

exceptions to general plausibility standards (put other side on notice): what rules?

rule 9(b): circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be pleaded with particularity rule 9 (g): items of special damage must be pleaded with specificity

procedure for removal for civil actions

single defendant: Defendant shall file a notice of removal w/ the federal; does not need to ask for permission or consent removal occurs automatically when d files notice The notice of removal shall be filed within 30 days after service & all properly joined §1446(b)(3): complaint amended? another 30 days exception: if d could have removed pre-amendment they have waived this multiple defendants: removal occurs automatically when d files notice The notice of removal shall be filed within 30 days after service & all properly joined Ds & §1446(b)(2)(a): all d's properly joined and served served must join or consent to the removal; 30 days begins after last D is served even if d1's opportunity to remove passes, D2 can still remove if within their 30 days § 1446(c)(1)-- D cannot remove case more than a year after the case was filed A case may not be removed on the basis of diversity jx more than 1 year after commencement of the action unless the district court finds the P has acted in bad faith

constitutional basis for pj

step 2: traditional basis for pj: 1. presence : was d present in the forum state when he was asserted process, in hand in state over a non-resident a. penner v. neff - pj is not established thru publication of litigation, was served in form, was about power of the court to compel a person hess v. palowski - a state may declare that the use of the highway by a non-resident is the equivalent oath appointment of the register as agent on whom process may be served -d is domiciles in th eforum d consents to pj -if you can't establish pj under traditional bias apply minimum contact test from int. shoe modern approach-int shoe: for an personam jx , a non-resident d must have certain minimum contacts w/the form state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fear play and substantial justice

Diversity Jurisdiction

the district courts have diversity jurisdiction to establish subject matter j if two requirements are met - 1 complete diversity and 2 amount in controversy Complete diversity (from Strawbridge v. Curtis)—Every plaintiff must be a citizen of different state than every D in the action. Complete diversity must exist between Ps & Ds. No P may be a citizen of the same state as any D. Shared citizenship between any two parties across the "v" destroys diversity jx. Citizenship of a human being: A US citizen is a citizen of the US state where she is domiciled Every human has a domicile, & a human only has one domicile at the time. A citizen retains her citizenship where she is born until she affirmatively changes her domicile Physical presence + intent to reside indefinitely = change of domicile (from Mas v. Perry) Subsequent change in domicile is irrelevant; diversity only needs to be satisfied AT THE TIME CASE IS FILED § 1332(a)(2-4)—Alienage Jx: in cases of dual citizenship, only US citizenship is considered, & thus alienage jx cannot be invoked If not state domicile, but US citizenship🡪 no diversity jx under alienage jx 2011 Amendment: permanent resident rule works as a rule of exclusion only when the PRA is domiciled in the same state as the US citizen that is the opposing party Cannot have alien v. alien unless US citizens w/ complete diversity on both sides; if you are not a citizen of the US, but residing in a US state, that residing state becomes domicile (only permanent resident aliens take on the domicile of where they live) CA + UK v. NV + France = ok CA v. NV + UK = ok

subject matter jurisdiction

the power of the court to hear a case General Subject Matter Jx State courts have general SMJ, which means they can hear all cases of all matters Limited Subject Matter Jx Federal courts have limited SMJ, which means they can only hear certain kinds of cases, prescribed by the US Constitution & federal statutes Exclusive Subject Matter Jx Federal courts have exclusive SMJ in certain areas of law, which means they must be filed in federal court. E.g. admiralty proceedings, bankruptcy matters, patent & copyright infringement cases, & federal antitrust & securities cases. Concurrent Subject Matter Concurrent SMJ means that a case can be heard in either state or federal court For federal court jx, you must have Article III power & legislative power Article III power grants more than Congressional grants E.g. Diversity amount in controversy requirement in § 1332 is not part of Article III E.g. Article III "arising under" standard is a very broad principle—Osborn addressed meaning of Article III "arising under" test is there is you need a "federal ingredient" Just b/c Article III gives power to courts, Congress does not have to carry that power over to statutes 2 types of cases that could be heard at federal courts (but don't necessarily have to): Diversity Jx Federal Question

interpleader continued §1335, §2361, and rule 22

§ 1335—Statutory Interpleader: You need one claimant diverse from one other claimant. Do not need complete diversity, but needs minimal diversity More flexible than Rule 22 interpleader as to jx & venue Under § 1335, the federal courts have SMJ over any interpleader case where (a) the stake is worth $500 or more, & (b) at least one claimant is diverse from other claimant (aka minimal diversity). Citizenship of stakeholder is disregarded Under § 1397, venue is proper in a district where any claimant resides Under § 2361, the court has PJ over all claimants. Nationwide service of process; does not need minimum contacts Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere—whether remedy of interpleader is available under either statutory interpleader or Rule 22 Interpleader over accident caused by tractor hitting a school bus Rule: Rule 22 permits interpleader when P may be exposed to multiple liability. Danger doesn't need to be immediate; doesn't matter how remote or improbable the exposure is State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire—Greyhound bus collided w/ pickup truck, killing 1 & injuring many others. Rule: The Interpleader Act should only be used in mass tort situations when the target of the potential claims is a common fund that is of such a small amount as to make the Ps have little interest in the potential aggregate amount of claims. Courts should only control the underlying litigation in very rare circumstances.

continue §1359, 1332

§ 1359—Parties collusively joined or made Cannot use assignment to create or destroy diversity to gain federal jx Cannot tack on nominal non-diverse parties to destroy diversity jx § 1332(c)(1)—Citizenship of a corporation is based on (1) all states of incorporation; and (2) principal place of business ("nerve center") where managers controls, directs & coordinates corporation's activities (from Hertz Corp. v. Friend) Corporation could have more than 1 citizenship Corporations can only have 1 principal place of business Non-incorporated corporations citizenship: use citizenship of all of its members (DO NOT LOOK AT PLACE OF INCORPORATION OR PPB); from Bellville E.g. partnerships, limited liability corporations, labor unions § 1332(c)(2)—Representatives sue on behalf of other people: Suits on behalf of all decedents, minors, & incompetents🡪 look to the represented's citizenship, not representatives Amount in controversy—Total amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 for he district court to have j. Diversity jx is not broken if judgment is ultimately less than the amount Can only aggregate claims to meet amount in controversy requirement if claim is common & indivisible A single P may aggregate all claims against one D to satisfy amount in controversy -1367 allows where there's a p that meets amount but co-p doesn't, co-p can stay. in claim Diversity jx can exist if at least one D is liable for the amount Domestic relations exception: even if § 1332 would apply, the federal courts refuse to hear domestic relations cases, except for cases about divorce, alimony & child custody (upheld in Ankenbrandt)