Civ Pro 1-Devlin

International Shoe, the Supreme Court: A. Rejected prior analyses of IPJ based on the traditional bases of physical presence, domicile, voluntary appearance; or consent, and instead created an entirely new analysis based on "minimum contacts" and "reasonableness." B. Retained prior analyses of IPJ based on the traditional bases of physical presence, domicile, voluntary appearance; or consent, but added a new analysis applicable to cases where a non-consenting, out-of state defendant has "contacts" with the form state. C. Derived the "contacts" portion of its new analysis by re-examining and re-classifying prior cases, and constructing a new theory that would account for the results in those cases. D. Derived the "reasonableness" part of its analysis from the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment, and cases interpreting that Amendment. (E.g., Milliken). E. Two of answers a-d. F. Three of .answers a-d G.All of answers a-d

F. Three of answers A-D

Taken together, Pennoyer v. Neff and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A), establish the basic rules for a federal court's power to assert personal jurisdiction over persons within the United States. Together, these sources of law establish that: a. Federal courts, like state courts, are only permitted to assert jurisdiction over persons or things that are found within or who has otherwise associated herself with - i.e, by citizenship, voluntary appearance or consent - the state in which the particular federal court sits b. Federal courts can assert power over any person who can be found anywhere within the United States. c. Federal courts must seek approval from state courts to assert power over persons or things within a particular state d. None of the above.

A. Federal courts, like state courts, are only permitted to assert jurisdiction over persons or things that are found within or who has otherwise associated herself with - i.e, by citizenship, voluntary appearance or consent - the state in which the particular federal court sits

Oscar sues the Dunder Mifflin Company for bad faith discharge, a state tort claim that allows damages if the defendant discharges an employee for reasons that violate certain public policies. Oscar claims that Dunder Mifflin fired him because he refused to engage in accounting practices that violate federal statutory accounting requirements for government contractors. Oscar brought suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and Dunder Mifflin moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. What is the result? A. Grant the motion, because Pennsylvania employment law, not federal law, creates the claim that plaintiff asserts. B. Grant the motion, because the federal law does not enter the case as part of plaintiff's complaint, as required by Mottley. C. Grant the motion, because this case would be better handled in state court where the fact finder better understand the public policies. D. Grant the motion because the federal law is not even an "ingredient" of the case, and therefore the case does not "arise under" federal law, as interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.

A. Grant the motion, because Pennsylvania employment law, not federal law, creates the claim that plaintiff asserts.

Paula, a citizen of Louisiana brings an action against Darlene, also a citizen of Louisiana, alleging a claim "arising out of" Darlene's alleged violation of federal statutes prohibiting race discrimination in employment. Paula can bring that action: Assume that Paula (rightly or wrongly) filed suit in state trial court. The state judge dismissed Paula's claim. Paula is convinced that the trial court ruled as it did because of its fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning and application of the relevant federal statutes. She wants to appeal. She should file that appeal: A. In the appropriate Louisiana Circuit Court of Appeals, because that is the court that has supervisory authority over a Louisiana trial Court B. In the federal 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, because federal courts are the ultimate authority over the meaning and application of federal law. C. In the United States Supreme Court, because that Court is the ultimate authority over the meaning and application of federal law. D. In either the appropriate Louisiana Circuit Court of Appeals or the federal 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, at Paula's option.

A. In the appropriate Louisiana Circuit Court of Appeals, because that is the court has supervisory authority over a LA. trial court.

Aaron B. (New York), shoots and kills Eliza H.'s husband in a duel. At the time of the duel, both were officers in the U.S. Army. Eliza (New York) wants to bring an action against Aaron for wrongful death and loss of consortium. Both causes of action are state law torts. She seeks a total of $1 million from Aaron As part of her allegation that the death was indeed "wrongful" Eliza's complaint cites to Art. 114 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 United States Code 914, which defines dueling as an offense punishable by court martial, and sentence for a term of years to a military brig). Eliza comes to you for advice about where to file her claim. You should tell her: A. She can file the action only in state court, because only a state court would have general subject matter jurisdiction over claims of this sort. B. She can choose to file either in state court or federal court becuase her claim clearly meets the required threshold for the "amount in controversy." C. She can choose to to file either in state court or federal court because she cites ti federal law in her complaint, thus satisfying Mottley. D. She can choose to file either in state court or federal court, because her claim "arises under" the anti- dueling statute, 10 U.S.C. §914. E. She can only file in federal court, because only federal tribunals have authority to try claims against U.S. military officers.

A. She can file the action only in state court, because only a state court would have general subject matter jurisdiction over claims of this sort.

Alternate, alternate universe. Based on the same accident described in question 3, Healy files suit against Austin in Minnesota. Assuming appropriate statutory authorization, would a Minnesota court be allowed to assert personal jurisdiction over Austin? a. Yes, because this claim arose out of Austin's activities in Minnesota. b. Yes, because Austin regularly visits Minnesota. c. Yes, if but only if Austin is served with process while physically present in Minnesota. d. Yes because, by driving in Minnesota, Austin has "impliedly consented" to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action arising out of that driving.

A. Yes, because this claim arose out of Austin's activities in Minnesota.

To say that a particular court can assert "general IPJ" over a particular out-of-state business entity means that: A. the court's power is "dispute blind" in the sense that it the court's power does not depend on what the dispute is about, or where that dispute arose. B. the court's power could potentially extend to any dispute that is in any way connected to the forum state. C. the defendant's contacts with the forum state must be equivalent to those that a citizen or resident of that state would have. D. the court's authority can be asserted regardless of whether there is statutory or common-law authority for the court to do so.

A. the court's power is "dispute blind" in the sense that it the court's power does not depend on what the dispute is about, or where that dispute arose.

Gaston (a citizen of Belgium) wants to join with Levasseur (a citizen of Louisiana), as plaintiffs, to bring a tort suit against McFee Manufacturing Co. (a corporation organized under the laws of the U.K. with its principal place of business in Glasgow, Scotland). They seek $200,000 in damages against the defendants, jointly and severally. Gaston and Levasseur would like to bring this action in federal court. There is also a second potential defendant - one Austin, a citizen of Texas - against whom Gaston and Levasseur have a good faith claim arising out of the same transaction and who could be joined as a second defendant in the same suit. They come to you for advice regarding how the joinder of Austin (or failure to join Austin) would affect the diversity subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. A. A federal court likely would have diversity subject matter jurisdiction over this suit regardless of whether Austin is joined as a defendant. B. A federal court likely would have diversity subject matter jurisdiction if Austin is joined as a defendant, but would not have SMJ if Austin is not joined. C. A federal court likely would not have diversity subject matter jurisdiction if Austin is joined as a defendant, but would have SMJ if Austin is not joined. D. A federal court likely would not have diversity subject matter jurisdiction over this suit regardless of whether Austin is joined as a defendant.

B. A federal court likely would have diversity subject matter jurisdiction if Austin is joined as a defendant, but would not have SMJ if Austin is not joined.

Alternate universe. Based on the same accident described in question 3, Healy brings suit against Austin in a South Dakota state court. (Healy chose this court because South Dakota juries have a reputation for awarding unusually large damage awards.) Assuming appropriate statutory authorization, would a South Dakota court be allowed to assert personal jurisdiction over Austin? a. No, because Austin does not have any contacts with South Dakota. b. No, because this claim did not arise out of Austin's contacts with South Dakota. c. Yes, because Austin has "minium contacts" with South Dakota. d. Yes. because Austin has "continuous and systematic" contacts with South Dakota.

B. No, because this claim did not arise out of Austin's contacts with South Dakota.

The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") is a federal administrative agency created Congress. It is authorized to, and does issue regulations which have the force of law. One of the most important of these is SEC "Rule 10(b)(5)," which prohibits fraud in the purchase and sale of stocks and bonds. A Nevada statute provides hat that it shall be a violation of Nevada law for any person in Nevada to engage in "any violation of SEC Rule 10(b)(5) involving short selling of securities," and provides that any person injured by such a short sale by a person in Nevada can assert a claim for damages against that person. Priscilla brings an action against Dennis, who "short sold" stocks to Priscilla in Nevada in a manner that she alleges violates SEC Rule 10(b)(5). She alleges that this sale therefore violated the Nevada statute and seeks the damages provided for by the Nevada statute. Priscilla brings the action in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Dennis moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The federal judge should: A. Deny the motion because federal law creates plaintiff's cause of action. B. Deny the motion because plaintiff's claim will rise or fall depending on whether federal law (here Rule 10(b)(5) is construed to prohibit or not prohibit Dennis' actions. C. Grant the motion because Priscilla's claim is created by Nevada state law. D. Grant the motion because Priscilla's claim fails Mottley's "well pleaded complaint" rule.

B. Deny the motion because plaintiff's claim will rise or fall depending on whether federal law (here Rule 10(b)(5) is construed to prohibit or not prohibit Dennis' actions.

"Targaryen Associates" is a partnership organized under the laws of New York. It is in the business of providing management services for commercial real estate (mostly large apartment buildings) throughout the northeastern parts of the United States. Targaryen's headquarters is, and its officers are, all located in New York City. Targaryen operates in and has individual partners who are are citizens of the following states: New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut and Massachusetts. "Lannister Holdings, LLC," is a limited liability company organized according to the laws of Delaware, with its headquarters in Los Angeles, California. Lannister own commercial buildings located throughout the United States. Its sole managing partner, Cersei Lannister, is also domiciled in Los Angeles, California. Lannister Holdings has limited partners (who act solely as passive investors) located in California, Washington State, Arizona and Texas,. Some years ago, Targaryen entered into a contract to manage the Westeros Arms, a building owned by Lannister in Boston, Mass. A dispute has developed betwen Lannister and Targaryen: Targaryen accuses Lannister of failing to pay their debts (i.e., to pay what was owed under the contract) and Lannister accuses Targaryen of failure to properly manage the Westeros Arms. Targaryen Associates brings suit against Lannister in federal court, seeking $100,000 in damages for breach of the parties' contract. Lannister Holdings moves to dismiss for lack of federal SMJ.. As judge, you should: A. Deny the motion to dismiss, because the parties are completely diverse. Targaryen is considered a citizen of New York (where it was created, and where its headquarters are located). Lannister is a citizen of Delaware (by the laws of which it was created) and California, where its corporate headquarters is located. Hertz v. Friend. B. Deny the motion to dismiss, because the parties are completely diverse Because Targaryen is a partnership, it is treated as a citizen of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut and Massachusetts (i.e., all of the states in which its partners are domiciled). Though an LLC, Lannister is also treated as if it were a partnership, with its citizenship defined by the domiciles of its partners - here, California, Washington State, Arizona and Texas. Carden v. Arkoma Associates. C. Grant the motion to dismiss, because the parties are not completely diverse. Targaryen is deemed a citizen of Massachusetts because it has a partner domiciled there. Lannister is also deemed a citizen of Massachusetts aa substantial asset (the Westeros Arms) in Massachusetts. Carden v. Arkoma Associates. D. Grant the motion to dismiss, because the parties are not completely diverse. As a partnership, Targaryen is considered a citizen of Delaware (among other states) because it has partners domiciled in that state. Lannister, an LLC, is also deemed a citizen of Delaware becuase that is the state according to whose laws it was created. 28 USC §1332(c)(1).

B. Deny the motion to dismiss, because the parties are completely diverse Because Targaryen is a partnership, it is treated as a citizen of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut and Massachusetts (i.e., all of the states in which its partners are domiciled). Though an LLC, Lannister is also treated as if it were a partnership, with its citizenship defined by the domiciles of its partners - here, California, Washington State, Arizona and Texas. Carden v. Arkoma Associates.

Same facts as question 8. Assume that Lewis never appears at all in the Mississippi action and that a default judgment is rendered against him. Faulkner then attempts to enforce the Mississippi judgment in ohio against Lewis and his assets. Lewis opposes those efforts, asserting that the Mississippi court lacked IPJ over him. The Ohio court should: A. Enforce the Mississippi judgment even if it doubts the correctness of the Mississippi court's ruling on this issue. Because this issue was fully litigated in Mississippi, the Ohio court must give "full faith and credit" to the Mississippi court's ruling that it had IPJ over Lewis. B. Enforce the Mississippi judgment if but only if it agrees that the Mississippi court had IPJ over Lewis. Full faith and credit does not require a court to enforce a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment. C. Decline to enforce the Mississippi judgment unless the law of Ohio would allow an Ohio court to assert IPJ over a non-resident in a similar case. D. Decline to enforce the judgment. Judgments rendered on default, in the absence of one of the parties, are inherently in violation of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

B. Enforce the Mississippi judgment if but only if it agrees that the Mississippi court had IPJ over Lewis. Full faith and credit does not require a court to enforce a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment.

Same facts as question 8. Assume the MS court conducted a hearing on Lewis' motion to dismiss, but concluded that it had IPJ over him. Lewis is convinced that the Mississippi court is wrong on this point, and decides not to appear to defend the action on the merits. A default judgment is entered in favor of Faulkner against Lewis. Faulkner then attempts to enforce the Mississippi judgment in ohio against Lewis and his assets. Lewis opposes those efforts, asserting that the Mississippi court lacked IPJ over him. The Ohio court should: A. Enforce the Mississippi judgment even if it doubts the correctness of the Mississippi court's ruling on this issue. Because this issue was fully litigated in Mississippi, the Ohio court must give "full faith and credit" to the Mississippi court's ruling that it had IPJ over Lewis. B. Enforce the Mississippi judgment if but only if it agrees that the Mississippi court had IPJ over Lewis. Full faith and credit does not require a court to enforce a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment. C. Decline to enforce the Mississippi judgment unless the law of Ohio would allow an Ohio court to assert IPJ over a non-resident in a similar case. D. Decline to enforce the judgment. Judgments rendered on default, in the absence of one of the parties, are inherently in violation of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

B. Enforce the Mississippi judgment if but only if it agrees that the Mississippi court had IPJ over Lewis. Full faith and credit does not require a court to enforce a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment.

Cora Crawley was born and raised in the District of Columbia. At the age of 20 she married Hugh Grantham, a British citizen residing in Hampshire, in the southern part of England. Though the couple established their domicile in Hampshire, Cora retained her American citizenship. Edwardian Gowns, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in D.C. Recently, Edwardian Gowns, Inc. brought an action against Cora in a United States District Court, alleging that she owed the company $80,000 for fancy dresses which she had purchased but not paid for. Cora makes a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. You are the judge. You should: A. Grant the motion, because citizens of D.C. are not citizens of any "State." B. Grant the motion because Cora is not a citizen of any state of the United States, nor is she a citizen or subject of any foreign state. C. Deny the motion, because §1332(a)(2) authorizes federal courts to hear claims between citizens of the United States and citizens or subjects of foreign states, and because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. D. Deny the motion because 1) the amount on controversy requirement is met; and 2) the parties are diverse. A human being retains one's former state citizenship until one establishes citizenship in a different state. Thus defendant Cora thus retains her D.C. citizenship and plaintiff Edwardian Gowns, Inc.'s Delaware citizenship makes it diverse from plaintiff.

B. Grant the motion because Cora is not a citizen of any state of the U.S. nor is she a citizen or subject of any foreign state

Petunia, a citizen of Louisiana, was out walking. She was hit by a car driven by Desdemona, a citizen of Texas. Later, on the way to the hospital, one of the EMTs, Douglas, also a citizen of Texas, negligently gave Petunia a transfusion using the wrong type of blood, causing further injuries to Petunia. Petunia thereafter brought a single action in a federal court against both Desdemona and Douglas (as co-defendants). Petunia's claim against Desdemona lists the following items of damage: 1) $25,000 for medical expenses resulting from the initial accident and $30,000 for her "pain and suffering." Petunia's claim against Douglas lists the following items of damages:3) $20,000 for additional medical expenses because of the improper transfusion and $20,000 for the additional "pain and suffering caused thereby. Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. You are the judge. How would you rule? A. Grant the motion because a plaintiff may not sue more than one defendant in a single action. B. Grant the motion because Petunia's claims do not "exceed the sum or value of $75,000," as required by §1332. C. Deny the motion because the parties are diverse and the claims for damages may be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount. D. Deny the motion for now, but grant it if the amounts awarded by the jury fail to add to more than $75,000.

B. Grant the motion because Petunia's claims do not "exceed the sum or value of $75,000," as required by §1332.

28 U.S.C. §1338 provides that federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging violation of the federal patent and copyright laws, (Note, this is one of the rare cases for which state courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over claims "arising under" federal law.) Acme Corp. (incorporated in Delaware, with its PPB in New York) manufactures and sells ceiling fans. Widgets, Inc. (incorporated in Delaware with its PPB in Ohio) also manufactures and sells ceiling fans. Acme believed that Widgets' products improperly copied Acme's patented "force multiplier" design for the blades of its ceiling fans - a patented design for the shape of the blades which increased the amount of air in circulation and the cooling effect of Acme's fans. Acme wrote letters to Widgets, to Widgets' customers (mostly large retail outlets) and to the newspapers, all accusing Widgets of "stealing" Acme's intellectual property. In response, Widgets brought a defamation action against Acme in state court. Acme responded to Widget's complaint by filing an answer and counterclaim alleging that Widgets had "infringed" Acme's patent rights (a claim that "arises under" federal patent law, and thus falls within §1331 and also under §1338's definition of exclusive federal SMJ over patent claims). Acme then "removed" that case to the appropriate federal court. Widgets made a timely motion to "remand" the whole case (including both its original claim and Acme's counterclaim) back to state court, on the ground that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. The federal judge should : A. grant the motion to remand the case to state court, on the ground that neither Widgets' original claim nor Acme's counterclaim falls within the subject matter of the federal courts. B. grant the motion to remand, on the ground that Widget's original claim does not fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court. C. deny the motion to remand, on the ground that Acme's counterclaim falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court (indeed, can only be heard in federal court). D. Deny the motion to dismiss, on the ground that both Widgets' claim for defamation and Acme's claim for patent infringement fall within the federal court's original subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Grant the motion to remand, on the ground that Widget's original claim does not fall within the SMJ of the federal court

The "vesting" clause of Article III, §1 A. Mandates the existence of federal appellate courts and a federal Supreme Court, in order to provide a mechanism for resolving disputes about the meaning and application of federal law B. Mandates the existence of a federal Supreme Court, but gives Congress the option of deciding whether to create other federal courts and tribunals C. Gives Congress the option of deciding whether to create any federal courts or tribunals D. Sets out what sorts of cases federal courts will hear E. Sets forth the "outer boundaries" regarding what sorts of cases Congress may authorize federal courts to hear.

B. Mandates the existence of a federal Supreme Court, but gives Congress the option of deciding whether to create other federal courts and tribunals

Would the outcome of Hess v. Pawloski be different if it had been decided after International Shoe was decided? a. No, because defendant was properly served with process in Pennsylvania b. No, because the facts that defendant was voluntarily driving in Massachusetts, and that the accident arose out of that driving, creates the requisite "minimum contacts between defendant and the state of Massachusetts. c. Yes, because International Shoe directs courts to dispense with "legal fictions" like the fiction of "implied consent" that was relied on in Hess d.. Yes, because merely passing through Massachusetts is not a sufficient "contact" to give rise to personal jurisdiction

B. No, because the facts that defendant was voluntarily driving in Massachusetts, and that the accident arose out of that driving, creates the requisite "minimum contacts between defendant and the state of Massachusetts.

As you may know, the Wal-Mart retail giant (a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Arkansas) owns many stores and employs many hundreds of people in every state. Assume that a dispute arose between Wal-Mart and a large number of its employees at its stores in Texas. Those Texas employees alleged that Wal-Mart wrongly interfered with the employees' efforts to organize a union, in vilation of the federal Labor laws. Those employees are concerned that the federal 5th Circuit is hostile toward enforcement of federal labor laws, so they instead file the suit in California. Under the line of cases typified by the Louisiana decision in Aguilera de Reyes v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd.: A. Suit could be brought in a federal court in California because Wal-Mart has "continuous and systematic" contacts in that state. B. Suit in a federal court in California might be possible, based on the defendant's continuous and systematic contacts in that state, but the ultimate result would depend on whether the court considered bring suit in that location "fair" and "reasonable." C. Suit in a federal court in California would be possible because any federal court can assert IPJ over any defendant located within the United States. D. Suit could not be brought in California, as the defendant lacks sufficient contacts in that state.

B. Suit in a federal court in California might be possible, based on the defendant's continuous and systematic contacts in that state, but the ultimate result would depend on whether the court considered bring suit in that location "fair" and "reasonable."

Chaplin Motors, Inc. manufactures stunt cars for use in movie and television . Paramount Pictures, a company headquartered in Hollywood, California, is a regular customer of Chaplin. Paramount ordered 10 cars from Chaplin. Chaplin shipped the cars to Paramount, which promptly paid for them. Paramount sent one of Chaplin's cars to Arizona, for use in a desert chase scene. The cars malfunctioned while being used in Arizona, causing injuries to its occupants and delaying completion of the movie - a delay which cost Paramount a significant amount of money. Paramount sued Chaplin in California court, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty and negligence. Defendant Chaplin moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Note: Although we know that California has a "California-type" long arm statute (i.e., one like La. 3201.B that goes to the limits of the Constitution ) for purposes of this question pretend that it has a long arm statute like Louisiana's §3201.A.) If so, you would expect the judge hearing that motion to: Same facts as question 5., but with the following changes: a] Chaplin's car malfunctioned while being used on set in California, rather than Arizona; b] Investigation showed that the problem might have been caused by potentially defective brakes; which were manufactured by Gleason Brakes, Corp., a Delaware company located in Flint, Michigan; and c] Paramount brought suit against Paramount and gleason in a court in California. Both Chaplin and Gleason move to dismiss the claims against them for lack of in personam jurisdiction. (Remember: California has a long arm statute like Louisiana's §3201.B - i.e., that instructs the state court to assert IPJ to the limits of the Constitution.) How would you expect a California court to rule? A. That it may assert IPJ over both Chaplin and Gleason. B. That it may assert jurisdiction over Chaplin but not over Gleason C. That it may assert jurisdiction over Gleason but not Chaplin D. That it may not assert jurisdiction over either defendant.

B. That it may assert jurisdiction over Chaplin but not over Gleason

Which of the following statements most accurately states the degree of deference that federal courts of appeals usually use when reviewing the decisions of U.S. trial courts? A. The appellate court usually gives deference both to the trial court's findings of fact and to the trial court's conclusions of law. The trial court saw the witnesses and knows the local customs and laws of her state better than an appellate court, and its decisions should be respected. B. The appellate court usually gives deference to the trial court's findings of fact, but little deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. The trial court's finding of fact should be left undisturbed (unless they are clearly erroneous) because the trial court was able to see the witnesses' testimony, while the appellate court sees only a written transcript. In contrast, the appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law "de novo" (i.e., by making its own independent decision, not limited by any deference to the trial court). Panels of appellate judges are more reliable interpreters of law than a single trial judge, acting alone. C. The appellate court usually gives deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, particularly in diversity cases. A federal trial judge sitting in Mississippi will be more familiar with Mississippi law that will be a 5th Circuit judge who may be from Texas, and who sits in New Orleans. In contrast, the appellate court should give little deference to the trial court's findings of fact. The trial transcript contains all of the information presented at trial, and appellate judges are usually more experienced in interpreting that evidence. D. The appellate court should determine all issues for itself, without deferring to the trial court's decision. The whole reason that appellate courts exist is to correct the errors of trial courts.

B. The appellate court usually gives deference to the trial court's findings of fact, but little deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. The trial court's finding of fact should be left undisturbed (unless they are clearly erroneous) because the trial court was able to see the witnesses' testimony, while the appellate court sees only a written transcript. In contrast, the appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law "de novo" (i.e., by making its own independent decision, not limited by any deference to the trial court). Panels of appellate judges are more reliable interpreters of law than a single trial judge, acting alone.

Suppose that the Mottleys' case arose after Grable was decided. Once again they sue in federal court for their passes, and allege that the railroad will likely rely on the federal anti-Trust statute as its reason for refusing to renew the passes. The Mottley's complaint goes on to assert that this defense is insufficient: 1) because the statute does not apply to passes granted before its enactment; and if it the statute were so interpreted, the statute would violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. How would the result in the Mottley case differ if it were brought today? A. The result would be the same, because the Fifth Amendment is federal law and is a "necessary ingredient" of the Mottley's complaint. B. The result would be the same, because the federal statute and Constitutional provision cited do not form any necessary element of the Mottley's claim and therefore their claim does not "arise out of" federal law. C. The result would differ, and the case would not be dismissed, because the claim raises substantial, important disputed issues of federal law D. The result would differ, and the case would not be dismissed, because by rewording their complaint, the federal statute is now a necessary ingredient of the Mottley's claim

B. The result would be the same, because the federal statute and Constitutional provision cited do not form any necessary element of the Mottley's claim and therefore their claim does not "arise out of" federal law.

Walter White (cit. of Arizona) hired lawyer Saul Goodman (cit. of New Mexico) to sue Jesse Pinkman (cit. of New Mexico) for breach of contract. Both the hiring of Goodman and the work on the suit took place in New Mexico. Walter agreed to pay Saul $1000 for his services. Saul did the work, but Walter returned to Arizona without paying Saul's fee. Saul sues Walter for his fee in a New Mexico state court. Walter is served with process in New Mexico while Walter was visiting there on unrelated business. Walter promptly departed once more for Arizona and has not returned to the state since. According to Pennoyer, the New Mexico court: a. Would have personal jurisdiction over Walter because the event giving rise to the action took place in New Mexico; b. Would have personal jurisdiction over Walter because he was served in New Mexico; c. Would not have personal jurisdiction over Walter, because he was served while he was there for a purpose unrelated to the fees claim; d. Would not have jurisdiction over Walter, because at the time the action was heard he is no longer physically present in New Mexico e. Would have jurisdiction over Walter for the fees claim, but would not have jurisdiction over him if Saul had sued him for a claim that arose in another state.

B. Would have personal jurisdiction over Walter because he was served in New Mexico

Acme Contractors, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of Texas, with its principal place of business in Marshall, Texas (a city about 40 miles west of Shreveport on I-20). Acme is in the business of doing the construction work necessary to renovate, expand or repair private homes. Until the facts set forth below, all of Acme's customers have been located in Texas. Last spring, Acme entered into a contract with Boudreaux, a lifelong resident of Greenwood, Louisiana. According to that contract, Acme agreed to repair the roof of Boudreaux's home, which have been severely damaged by a tornado. Acme did the work and Boudreaux paid Acme $10,000 for its efforts.. However, it swiftly became apparent that the roof was defective - it leaked badly in every rainstorm. Boudreaux brought suit against Acme in Louisiana state court. Assuming statutory authorization, would a Louisiana court be able hear this claim against Acme? a. Yes, if but only if the contract between Acme and Boudreaux specified that claims arising out of that contract could be heard in a Louisiana court, or if Acme had otherwise expressly or impliedly consented to such an assertion of jurisdiction. b. Yes, because Acme ""purposefully availed" itself of the opportunity to do business in Louisiana c. Yes, because the contract the parties signed had significant contacts in Louisiana d. No, because Acme is a Texas entity and, from the facts given, there is no reason to think that it has consented to submitting itself to the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts, either in the contract or otherwise. e. No, because a single construction project in Louisiana is not enough of a contact to constitute "purposeful availment."

B. Yes, because Acme "purposefully availed" itself of the opportunity to do business in Louisiana

The rule articulated in Louisville & Nashville RR. Co. v. Mottley is sometimes (somewhat misleadingly) referred to as the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. This concept is best understood as: A. requiring that plaintiff's complaint adhere to the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10, which prescribe the required content and form of federal pleadings B. requiring that the federal law relied on for the assertion of U.S. District Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction must make up part of the logic of plaintiff's claim. C. requiring that the plaintiff draft her complaint in proper English. D. requiring that, in order to assert federal question subject matter jurisdiction, there must be a citation to federal Constitutional, statutory or treaty law somewhere within the body of plaintiff's complaint.

B. requiring that the federal law relied on for the assertion of U.S. Dictrict Court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction must make up part of the logic of plaintiff's claim.

Both Art. III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §1332 permit federal trial courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction over suits "between citizens of different states. Which statement correctly describes how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase? A. The phrase has been interpreted to require only "minimal diversity" - i.e., that federal courts may assert diversity SMJ whenever any plaintiff is a citizen of a different state than any defendant. B. The phrase has been interpreted to require "complete diversity" - i.e., that federal courts may assert diversity SMJ only if all defendants are citizens of different states than all defendants. C. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require only minimal diversity, but as used in §1332, the phrase has been interpreted to require complete diversity. D. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require complete diversity, but as used in §1332 the phrase has been interpreted to require only minimal diversity.

C. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require only minimal diversity, but as used in 1332, the phrase has been interpreted to require complete diversity.

Which of the following provides statutory authority for Louisiana courts to assert general IPJ over non- resident business entities that have "continuous and systematic" contacts in Louisiana? A. 13 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 3201.B. B. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Art. 6.B. C. Both answer "A" and answer "B." D. Neither answer "A" nor answer "B"

C. Both answer "A" and answer "B."

Pierre, a citizen of Louisiana, gets into a car accident with Donald, a citizen of Texas. Pierre brings a negligence action against Donald in federal trial court. In the "wherefore" clause of his complaint, Pierre lists the following items of damage: 1) $35,000 for the cost to replace Pierre's car (which was totally destroyed in the wreck); 2) $15,000 for Pierre's medical expenses; and $30,000 for Pierre's "pain and suffering." Donald moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. You are the judge. How would you rule? A. Grant the motion because ordinary tort claims are more properly handled in state court. B. Grant the motion because none of Pierre's claims "exceeds the sum or value of $75,000," as required by §1332. C. Deny the motion because the parties are diverse and the claims for damages may be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount. D. Deny the motion because the plaintiff is "the master of his complaint" and is free to allege whatever amounts of damages he chooses.

C. Deny the motion because the parties are diverse and the claims for damages may be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount.

Allie (a citizen of Louisiana) works at LSU as a professor. Allie believes that LSU is treating her differently and not giving her the same opportunities as other professors of similar accomplishment because she is a woman. (Indeed, she is the only woman in her department.) Allie has heard that federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender. She is also convinced that the university's treatment of her violates the terms of her employment contract. She wants to sue LSU for breach of contract, and to do so in federal court if possible. She comes to you for advice. You would tell her that a federal court would A. Hear the case because federal law does have something to do with the claim she asserts. B. Hear the case because federal law is the primary source of her right to relief. C Dismiss the claim because Allie is relying on state law as the source of her right to relief. D. Dismiss the claim because federal courts can never hear a breach of contract claim since that is exclusively a state claim.

C. Dismiss the claim because Allie is relying on state law as the source of her right to relief

Leni Riefenstahl is a citizen of Germany. However, she is also a permanent resident of the United States with her domicile in California. Kelly Conway is a citizen of the United States, also domiciled in California. James Carville is a U.S. citizen domiciled in Louisiana. Reifnstahl brought a defamation action against Conway and Carville, in U.S. District Court, alleging a good faith claim for more than $75,000 in damages against each. Defendants move to dismiss the action for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. You would expect the judge to: A. Deny the motion, because the plaintiff is completely diverse from both defendants and the amount in controversy requirement is met. B. Deny the motion because this is a suit between a citizen of the United States and a "citizen or subject of a foreign state," as required by 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2). C. Grant the motion because Riefenstahl, as a "permanent resident" is treated as if she were a citizen of the state in which she is domiciled - here, California. Thus she is not diverse from Conway. D. Grant the motion because ordinary state law tort actions should are better dealt with in state court.

C. Grant the motion because Reifenstahl, as a "permanent resident" is treated as if she were a citizen of the state in which she is domiciled-here, California. Thus, she is not diverse from Conway.

Prentiss, a citizen of New York, sues Dee Foods Corp., a corporation created under the laws of the state of New York, with its principal place of business in Tampa, Florida. Prentiss became sick after drinking a bottle of orange juice bottled by Dee Corp., which turned out to contain botulism toxin. Prentiss brought suit in the US District Court for the Middle District of Florida (which includes Tampa). Prentiss brings suit on two theories. Count I seeks $50,000 from Dee Crp on the theory that the company was negligent in allowing its product to be contaminated by botulism. Count II also seeks to recover $50,000 based on the same events, asserting in the alternative that Dee Corp. is strictly liable under a "products liability" theory. (Note, both theories arise under Florida tort law.) Defendant moves to dismiss.. You are the judge. You would most likely: A. Grant the motion because the parties are not diverse B. Grant the motion because plaintiff does not state claims that "exceed the sum or value of $75,000." C. Grant the motion for both of the reasons set forth in answers "A: and "B" D. Deny the motion because the parties are diverse. Plaintiff is a citizen of New York and Defendant is defined by 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1) to be a citizen of Florida, its principal place of business E. Deny the motion because the two counts can be aggregated to meet the required "amount in controversy." F. Deny the motion for both the reasons set forth in answers "D" and "E"

C. Grant the motion for both of the reasons set forth in answers, "A" and "B."

Lewis publishes books in Ohio. One day he was visited in Ohio by Falkner, a book wholesaler whose head office is in Mississippi. Lewis agrees to sell a thousand copies of Brandywine, Ohio, a novel, to Faulkner. At Faulkner's request Lewis ships the books directly to Faulkner's Louisiana warehouse. Faulkner subsequently discovers that the books have suffered water damage and cannot be sold. Falkner sues Lewis in a state court in Mississippi. Lewis is convinced that he should win on the merits, because he believes the books were damaged while being stored at Faulkner's warehouse in Louisiana. Lewis also doubts that a Mississippi court would have IPJ over him. Lewis makes a special appearance in the Mississippi court to raise the issue of lack of SIPJ. You are the judge. You should: A. Deny the motion. By appearing in a Mississippi court, Lewis conferred IPJ on that court. B. Deny the motion. Entering into a contact with a Mississippi entity (Falkner) is an intentional contact by Lewis with Mississippi, and this case arises out of that contact. C. Grant the motion. Lewis did not engage in any act that would show "purposeful availment" of any opportunity to business in Mississippi. D. Grant the motion. It would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to expect a business in Ohio to travel to defend itself in another state.

C. Grant the motion. Lewis did not engage in any act that would show "purposeful availment" of any opportunity to business in Mississippi.

Same facts as question 6, except assume that Chaplin did not ship directly to Paramount. Rather, Chaplin sells its cars to various distributors of movie equipment and props, including "Indestructible Props, Inc." a company located in Salt Lake City Utah. Paramount is well aware that many, iof Indestructible's clients are in California. Assume that the car that malfunctioned in California was bought by Paramount from Indestructible, rather than directly from Chaplin. Under these facts would a California court would be able to assert specific IPJ over Chaplin in connection with Paramount's claim? A. The California court would be able to assert SIPJ because the California long arm statute directs its courts to go to the limits of the constitution when asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. B. The California court would be able to assert SIPJ. Because Chaplin knew that Indestructible sold its products in California, and Chaplin benefitted from those sales, Indestructible was (in effect) acting as Chaplin's "agent" when selling Chaplin cars in California. Grey v. American Radiator. C. The assertion of SIPJ would be more difficult but not impossible. The court would have to determine whether Chaplin was "targeting" California as a market. J. McIntyre Machinery Ld. v. Nicastro. D. A California court would not be able to assert SIPJ over Chaplin. A manufacturer may only be subjected to SIPJ in the state where it directly sold the product that allegedly caused harm,. Actions by other parties can never create IPJ. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson; McIntyre.

C. The assertion of SIPJ would be more difficult but not impossible. The court would have to determine whether Chaplin was "targeting" California as a market. J. McIntyre Machinery Ld. v. Nicastro.

Which of the following are required in order for a court to successfully assert a court's power over particular persons? a. Statutory authorization for the court to assert that jurisdiction b. That the assertion of jurisdiction fall within the limits imposed by the Constitution. c. That the summons and complaint were properly served d. All of the above e. Two of the above

D. All of the above

Both Art. III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §1331 permit federal trial courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction over claims "arising under" the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Which statement correctly describes how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase? A. The phrase has been interpreted to require only that federal law have something to do with the claims - i.e., that it is sufficient that some point of federal law be relevant to plaintiff's claim, even if that point is not in dispute or only arises as a matter of background law. B. The phrase has been interpreted to require that federal law "create" (or at least be a "necessary element" of) plaintiff's claim. C. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require that federal law "create" (or at least be a "necessary element" of) plaintiff' claims, but as used in §1331 the phrase has been interpreted to require only the federal law have something to do with plaintiff's claim. D. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require only the federal law have something to do with plaintiff's claim, but as used in §1331, the phrase has been interpreted to require that federal law "create" (or at least be a "necessary element" of) plaintiff' claims.

D. As used in Art. III, the phrase has been interpreted to require only the federal law have something to do with plaintiff's claim, but as used in §1331, the phrase has been interpreted to require that federal law "create" (or at least be a "necessary element" of) plaintiff' claims.

Further research has led Allie and her attorney to discover Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides that employers may not discriminate against an employee because of the employee's race, color, national origin, sex or religion. Title VII further provides that any person who believes that he or she has been discriminated against in violation of the Act may bring an action for damages against the employer. Allie now files a complaint against the LSU in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, alleging that the university's treatment of her violated Title VII.. Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of SMJ. You would expect the federal judge to: A. Grant the motion to dismiss because the parties are non-diverse. B. Grant the motion to dismiss because the dispute between the parties is essentially one for breach of contract, and a plaintiff cannot create federal SMJ where it does not exist by "dressing up" the complaint with references to federal law C. Deny the motion because federal law has something to do with plaintiff's claim D. Deny the motion because federal law "creates" Allie's claim. D. Deny the motion because federal law "creates" Allie's claim.

D. Deny the motion because federal law "creates" Allie's claim

P, a citizen of Louisiana, sues D Corp., her employer, for an alleged violation of Louisiana law. D Corp. is a corporation created under Delaware law with its principle place of business in Baton Rouge. Plaintiff seeks exactly $75,000 in damages. Plaintiff brings the suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. You are the judge. You should: A. Deny to motion because the suit is between a citizen of Louisiana and a citizen of Delaware and the requisite amount in controversy has been alleged B. Grant the motion to dismiss because the parties are not diverse. C. Grant the motion because the amount in controversy requirement has not been met. D. Grant the motion for both of the reasons set forth in answers "B" and "C" above.

D. Grant the motion for both of the reasons set forth in answers B and C above.

Tim Cook, holder of a patent on a new cell phone, licenses the idea to Steve Jobs, an entrepreneur. Both Cook and jobs are citizens of California. The contract between Cook and Jobs requires Jobs to pay a license fee to Cook for every phone sold. Jobs sells over one million cell phones, but Tim claims that Steve has only paid him licensing fees for half of those phones. Tim sues Steve in the Central District of California to recover for the difference in amounts paid for the licensing of the patent, and Steve moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. What is the result? A. Deny the motion, because plaintiff's complaint will necessarily have to refer to federal patent law in order to lay out his claim against defendant Jobs, and thus meets the requirement of Mottley. B. Deny the motion, because federal patent law is the ultimate source of the rights that plaintiff seeks to vindicate in this suit. C. Deny the motion, for the claim turns on the question of whether the patent is enforceable under federal law. Smith v. Kansas City Titile & Trust. D. Grant the motion, because the plaintiff's claim does not "arise under" federal law, under either the "creation" or the current understanding of the "necessary ingredient" test. E. Grant the motion, because contact law is state law, and state courts are the best forum in which to resolve disputes over contract claims.

D. Grant the motion, because the plaintiff's claim does not "arise under" federal law, under either the "creation" or the current understanding of the "necessary ingredient" test.

Peter (a citizen of Louisiana) wants to sue David (a citizen of Texas), alleging a claim for breach of contract. He asserts that defendant's breach has cost him (plaintiff) $90,000. Peter can bring that suit: A. Only in state trial court, because the matters involved (tort law and contract law ) are issues of state law. B. In federal district court, regardless of the amount in controversy, because the suit is "between citizens of different states" as required by §1332(a)(1), as interpreted in Strawbridge. C. In federal district court, because his good faith claims aggregate to more than $75,000. D. In either state court or federal district court, at Peter's option.

D. In either state court or federal district court, at Peter's option

Mas v. Perry stands for the principle that: A. The state citizenship of a U.S. citizen is determined by the state in which that citizen is domiciled B. A party's domicile is the place where that party intends to remain indefinitely C. A married couple is presumed to share a common domicile and citizenship, but what that domicile will be must be decided on the totality of the circumstances. D. Two if the above E. All of the above.

D. Two of the above (A+B)

3. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, the Supreme Court held that a federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that the bank's officers and directors had breached their fiduciary duties, even though that claim was "created" by state rather than federal law. It did so because: A. Article III of the Constitution requires only that federal law have something to do with plaintiff's claim, even if that federal law is undisputed or a mere matter of background. B. Plaintiff's claim would necessarily turn on the question of how federal law - here, the federal constitutional limits on Congress' authority to issue bonds - was interpreted. C. The fact that plaintiff's claim would turn on the interpretation of federal law was apparent from the face of the complaint. D. Two of the above. E. All of the above.

D. Two of the above.

Peggy and Donald got into car accident in Georgia. Peggy wants to due Donald, but he left the state before he could be served with process. His present whereabouts is unknown. Peggy's investigator learned that Donald is a citizen of Florida, where his aged mother still lives. Peggy arranged to have her investigator send a Facebook message to Donald stating (untruthfully) that Donald's mother was gravely ill. Not surprisingly, Donald rushed home, where he was met by a process server who served Peggy's summons and complaint on him. Would a Florida court likely assert personal jurisdiction over Donald in this case? a. No, because while this was service on Donald when he was physically present in Florida, courts generally refuse to assert personal jurisdiction, if that jurisdiction was obtained by fraud. b. No, because the accident took place in Georgia. c. Yes, because Donald was served with process while physically present in Florida; the circumstances that led to his presence are irrelevant d. Yes, because Donald is a citizen of Florida e. Yes, for both the reasons given in answer "c" and "d."

D. Yes, because Donald is a citizen of FL.

Ringling Brothers, Inc. is a corporation created under the laws of Wisconsin, with its corporate central offices in New York City. Ringling is in the business of operating a circus. During the months from March through November, the circus travels (primarily by train) to and performs in cities up and down the eastern portion of the United States. The only real property owned by Ringling is near Sarasota, Florida, where the circus maintains its "winter quarters" - i.e., where they store their equipment for the winter, where performers train and where those performers who do not have homes elsewhere can live in barracks-type quarters provided by the company. Investigation has revealed that the particular employee whose negligence caused the lion to escape was Emmett Kelly, a citizen of Florida. A few months ago, Barnum, a citizen of Maine, was injured when a lion escaped from its cage while the circus train was stopped for refueling at the railroad yard in Bangor, Maine. Plaintiff wants to bring suit against Ringling Bros. and Kelly, and would like to get both defendants into the same courtroom. Barnum comes to you for advice. The time is today. You would tell him: A. that he likely could not get IPJ over both defendants in the same court. After Daimler, Ringling Bros. Is subject to suit only in Delaware or New York, and over Kelly only in Florida or Maine. B. that he could likely get IPJ over both defendants only in Maine. C. that he could almost certainly get IPJ over both defendants in either Florida or Maine. D. that he could certainly get IPJ over both defendants in Maine, and may be able to get IPJ over both defendants in Florida as well.

D. that he could certainly get IPJ over both defendants in Maine, and may be able to get IPJ over both defendants in Florida as well.

The function of a trial court-either those within the federal court system or those within the various state court systems- is to: A. Make a determination as to the "facts" of a dispute- who did what, when, where, how and why B. Make a determination as to the "law" regarding a dispute-deciding what legal rules govern the particular dispute and how those legal rules should be interpreted C. Come to a final "judgment" that resolves the dispute, by applying the appropriate legal rules to the facts found D. Two of functions set out in A-C E. All of the functions set out in A-C

E. All of the functions set out in A-C

Which of the following statement or statements contains the core principles of Grable and Sons ? [1] Federal courts may have federal question jurisdiction over claims created by state law, if the meaning or application of some point of federal law is actually disputed, and is a substantial part of litigation [2] Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over a claim if but only if there is a "well pleaded complaint." [3] Federal court has federal question jurisdiction over state law claims as long as the federal court can hear without disrupting the federal-state balance, as set by Congress A. Statement [1] B. Statement [2] C. Statement [3] D. Statements [1] and [2] E. Statements [1] and [3] F. Statements [2] and [3] G. All three Statements

E. Statements [1] and [3]

Peggy Olson (New York citizen) sues Don Draper (New Jersey citizen) in New York state court alleging employee discrimination due to her gender. Under which of the following circumstances would the New York have in personam jurisdiction over Don based on traditional bases? a.. Don was served with process in his New York office b. Don appoints his secretary at his New York office as agent for service of process c. Don makes a special appearance in New York state court to file motion for dismissal d. Peggy proves that Don's has 'minimal contacts' at his office in New York e. Two of the above f. Three of the above. g. All of the above

E. Two of the above

Paula, a citizen of Louisiana brings an action against Darlene, also a citizen of Louisiana, alleging a claim "arising out of" Darlene's alleged violation of federal statutes prohibiting race discrimination in employment. Paula can bring that action: A. Only in state trial court, because the plaintiff and defendant are not diverse from one another. B. Only in federal district court, because only federal courts are authorized to hear claims arising under federal law. C. In federal district court, if but only if Paula can assert a good faith claim for more than $75,000. D. In the United States Circuit Court for the 5th Circuit, which covers the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. E. In either state trial court or federal district court, at Paula's option

E. in either state trial court or federal district court, at Paula's option

The most common form of express consent to personal jurisdiction in the business world is by contract. Both parties may agree to add a forum selection clause identifying a certain forum as the agreed place to litigate should any conflict arise. Generally, courts may a. Enforce such clauses if but only if they were expressly negotiated by the parties b. Enforce such clauses regardless of whether they were expressly negotiated by the parties c. Enforce such clauses if but only if the forum selected has some relation to the events of the dispute d. Enforce such clauses only in the context of contracts among business entities, but not in the context of consumer contracts.

b. Enforce such clauses regardless of whether they were expressly negotiated by the parties

In International Shoe, the Supreme Court ultimately found that the State of Washington and its courts could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the International Shoe Corp. because: a. The company's activities in Washington were sufficient to meet the "solicitation plus" definition of what it means for a corporation to be "doing business" in that state. b. International Shoe had continuous and systematic contacts in the state of Washington and this cause of action arose out of those contacts c. Service of process on International Shoe's sales representative in Washington was sufficient in itself to establish jurisdiction according to Pennoyer - he company's agent was served with process while physically present in the state. d. None of the above

b. International Shoe had continuous and systematic contacts in the state of Washington and this cause of action arose ot of those contacts

Some years ago, Jessica was involved in a car accident. The other party involved brought suit against Jessica in a Maine state court. Process was served on Jessica in New York. Jessica believes that the Maine action should be dismssed for two reasons: 1) because the Maine court lacks personal jurisdiction over her; and 2) because the suit is now barred by the applicable statute of limitations. She makes what she calls a a "special appearance" (allowed by Maine law) and moves to dismiss the case on both of the asserted grounds. Did Jessica's appearance in the Maine Court give that court personal jurisdiction over her? a. Yes. Jessica's presence in the Maine court is sufficient to give them jurisdiction over her. b. Yes. Special appearance protection only applies when the defendant appears solely for the purpose of dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction. Jessica has also pleaded the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, giving Maine jurisdiction over her. c. No. Jessica went to Maine to contest personal jurisdiction which is allowed by special appearance without having to submit yourself to the jurisdiction of Maine. d. No. Jessica's assertion that Maine lacks personal jurisdiction is correct so Maine therefore does not have basis for jurisdiction against her.

b. Yes. Special appearance protection only applies when the defendant appears solely for the purpose of dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction. Jessica has also pleaded the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, giving Maine jurisdiction over her.

Patricia was driving from Arizona to her home in Louisiana. She while in Texas she suffered a flat tire. As the old tire was very worn, Patricia bought a new tire from "Don's Tires," a store located near Houston, Texas. The new tire was installed at Don's, and Patricia paid in cash. Later that day, while Patricia was on the highway between Lake Charles and Lafayette (i.e., in Louisiana) the new tire had a catastrophic blowout. Because of the blowout, Patricia's car skidded off the road, rolled several times and eventually crashed into a tree. The car was destroyed and Patricia was severely injured. She is presently in a hospital in Lafayette, where she will likely remain for some time to come. Patricia brings suit against Don's Tires in a Louisiana state court. Assuming statutory authorization, will a Louisiana state court likely be able to assert personal jurisdiction over Don's Tires? a. Yes, because the tire sold by Don's failed and caused an accident in Louisiana, thus creating a "contact" between Don's and Louisiana out of which this cause of action arose. b. Yes, because it would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" to require Patricia - confined as she is to a hospital in Louisiana - to sue Don's in Texas. c. No, because Don's has not "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of doing business in Louisiana. d. No, because it would be unduly burdensome on Don's to have to defend itself in Louisiana.

c. No, because Don's has not "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of doing business in Louisiana.

Austin, a citizen of North Dakota, is a traveling salesman who sells her goods in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota. While in Minnesota, Austin is involved in a car accident with Healy, a citizen of Minnesota. Austin brings suit against Healy in the U.S. District court for the District of North Dakota, seeking $100,000 in damages for the harms she suffered in the accident. Does the North Dakota federal court have personal jurisdiction over Healy? a. Yes. The parties are of diverse citizenship and the suit seeks more that $75,000 in damages. b. Yes, because plaintiff is a citizen of North Dakota. c. Yeas, because defendant is physically located in Minnesota and, under Pennoyer, courts of the United States potentially could assert personal jurisdiction over any person anywhere in the United States d. No, because defendant has not consented or voluntarily appeared, and has no apparent contacts with the state of North Dakota. e. No, because the accident took place in Minnesota, and therefore no court in any other state would have jurisdiction..

d. No, because defendant has not consented or voluntarily appeared, and has no apparent contacts with the state of North Dakota.

Plaintiff (a Louisiana citizen) sued Defendant (a Texas citizen) in a Louisiana state court. After winning a $100,000 judgment in her favor, Plaintiff sought to enforce that judgment against Defendant's assets in Texas. The Texas state court refused to enforce (i.e., to give full faith and credit to) the Louisiana court judgment, on the ground that it was an unreasonable interpretation of the applicable law. She comes to you for advice: You should tell her: a. To file an appeal in the appropriate federal court in Texas, on the ground that the parties are completely diverse and there is a sufficient amount in controversy. However, the appeal would likely be unsuccessful, as the Texas court may refuse full faith and credit if the prior decision is manifestly erroneous.. b. To file an appeal in the appropriate federal court in Texas, on the ground that the parties are completely diverse and there is a sufficient amount in controversy. However, the appeal would likely be unsuccessful because the defendant is a Texas citizen and Texas courts have authority over persons within their territory, and thus finally say in what judgments can be rendered against their citizens. c. To file an appeal in the appropriate federal court in Texas, on the ground that the parties are completely diverse and that there is a sufficient amount in controversy. The appeal will likely be successful because, under Full Faith and Credit clause, the Texas court is required to enforce valid judgments by a Louisiana regardless of whether the Texas Court agrees with the decision or reasoning. d. To file the appeal in the appropriate Texas state appellate court. The appeal would likely be successful, because the appellate court will likely rule that the Texas courts do not sufficiently understand Louisiana's Civil Law of Obligations, to be able to determine whether the Louisiana judgment was erroneous. e. To file the appeal in the appropriate Texas state appellate court. The appeal will likely be successful because, under Full Faith and Credit clause, the Texas court is required to enforce valid judgments by a Louisiana regardless of whether the Texas Court agrees with the decision or reasoning.

e. To file the appeal in the appropriate Texas state appellate court. The appeal will likely be successful because, under Full Faith and Credit clause, the Texas court is required to enforce valid judgments by a Louisiana regardless of whether the Texas Court agrees with the decision or reasoning.