Con Law (Civil Rights) Exam 3

Voting Rights Act of 1965

Congress acted against states that used various tests and devices to prevent blacks from registering and voting

Concurrence in Bradwell v. State

The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life (p. 867)

19th Amendment

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.

Dissent in Rostker v. Goldberg

violation of equal protection, categorically exclude women from a fundamental civil obligation

Dissent in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections

Black's Dissent: Some discriminatory voting qualifications can be imposed without violating the Equal Protection Clause and this should be passed on to Congress (judicial restraint) (p. 1011)

Dissent in Mobile v. Bolden

Brennan's Dissent: proof of discriminatory impact is sufficient in these cases White's Dissent: In White v. Regester, the Court unanimously held that the use of multimember districts for the election of state legislators in two counties in Texas violated the Equal Protection clause because they were found to exclude Blacks and Mexican-Americans from effective participation in the political processes in the counties. Court need to question the vitality of White v. Regester Marshall's Dissent: It is beyond dispute that a standard based solely upon the motives of official decision makers creates significant problems of proof for plaintiffs and forces the inquiring court to undertake an unguided, tortuous look into the minds of officials in the hope of guessing why certain policies were adopted and others rejected....and approach based on motivation creates the risk that officials will be able to adopt policies that are the products of discriminatory intent so long as they sufficiently mask their motives through the use of subtlety and illusion

Brennan's dissent in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez

Disagreement with the Court's rather distressing assertion that a right may be deemed "fundamental" for the purpose of equal protection analysis only if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" There can be no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. This being so, any classification affecting education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny (p. 912)

Dissent in Michael M. v. Sonoma County

Dissent: 37 other states have gender-neutral statutory rape laws, gender-neutral laws are a greater deterrent for more people

Shapiro v. Thompson

Facts: A number of states, citing budgetary reasons, established a one-year waiting period before residents could qualify for welfare assistance In this dispute, Vivian Marie Thompson moved from Massachusetts to Connecticut and applied for welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent children (AFDC) program Denied assistance, she sued the Commissioner of Welfare, Bernard Shapiro This case, implicating the constitutional right to travel, also involved residency requirements in Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia A three-judge district court held that residency requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (covering the states) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (covering D.C.) Issue: Do residency requirement for welfare assistance violate the Equal Protection clause (fourteenth amendment) and the due process clause (fifth amendment) Holdings: Residency requirements for welfare assistance violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause The right to travel is a fundamental interest/right. Reasonings: We do not doubt that the one-year waiting period device is well suited to discourage the influx of poor families in need of assistance. An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his first year of residence The Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. Appellants must do more than show that denying welfare benefits to new residents saves money. The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification (does not satisfy strict scrutiny)

Miller v. Johnson

Facts: After the 1990 census increased the number of congressional seats in Georgia from ten to eleven, the state legislature prepared a districting plan that provided for two majority-black districts The Justice Department refused to clear this plan, and the legislature eventually redrew the lines to provide for three black seats Plaintiffs Davida Johnson and others brought this action against Governor Zell Miller Issue: Does racial gerrymandering in congressional redistricting violate the Equal Protection Clause? Holdings: Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional violating the Equal Protection Clause Reasonings: Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines. The logical implication, as courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that parties may rely on evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process One of the two Department of Justice line attorneys overseeing that Georgia preclearance process himself disclosed that "'what we did and what I did specifically was to take a map of the State of Georgia shaded for race, shaded by minority concentration, and overlay the districts that were drawn by the State of Georgia and see how well those lines adequately reflected black voting strength'"

Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Facts: Paul E. Johnson, a male employee, was passed over for promotion to the position of road dispatcher Instead, the Transportation Agency selected a female employee, Diane Joyce. Both were rated as well qualified for the job, but Joyce was picked in part because the Agency took into account her gender as a factor Johnson filed suit, claiming that the Agency had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The district court agreed; the Ninth Circuit reversed Issue: Does the county's affirmative action plan which takes into account the gender of a person violate title 7 of the civil rights act of 1964? Holding: Employers are allowed to consider sex as a factor of qualified employees and the plan does not violate title 7 of the civil rights act of 1964 Reasonings: It was plainly not unreasonable for the Agency to determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision The promotion of Joyce thus satisfies the first requirement enunciated in Steelworkers v. Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate Agency work force imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories The Plan sets aside no positions for women The sex of Joyce was but one of numerous factors he took into account in arriving at his decision Plan is moderate and flexibility to gradually improve minorities and women in that workforce

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections

Facts: Annie E. Harper and other residents of Virginia brought this action to have Virginia's poll tax declared unconstitutional A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint While the right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Article 1 section 2 of the Constitution the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned Issues: Does state poll taxes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: The state poll taxes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Reasonings: Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax Our cases demonstrate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the states from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate The principle that denies the State the right to dilute a citizen's vote on account of his economic status or other factors by analogy bars a system which excludes those unable to pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined For to repeat, wealth or free paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned

Shaw v. Reno

Facts: As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina increased its number of seats in congress from eleven to twelve The Justice Department rejected an initial state plan that provided for only one majority black congressional district (the state was about 20 percent black) The Justice Department approved a subsequent plan that provided for two majority black districts Five white voters sued North Carolina lawmakers and the Justice Department, claiming that the state's racial separation of voters violated their constitutional right to participate in "color-blind" elections Ruth O. Shaw, one of the plaintiffs, sued Attorney general Janet Reno and state officials Issue: Do people have a right to sue based on racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause? Holdings: People may challenge redistricting plans that are designed to separate voters by race under the Equal Protection Clause Reasonings: We believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy A plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may stat a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification Racial gerrymandering is not automatically acceptable because it favors the minority Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire

South Carolina v. Katzenbach

Facts: By passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress acted against states that used various tests and devices to prevent blacks from registering and voting The statute authorized federal examiners to qualify applicants for registration, entitling them to vote in elections South Carolina filed suit to have the Act declared unconstitutional as an encroachment on states' rights and a violation of due process protections The case was one of original jurisdiction, with South Carolina supported by Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, while the states supported Attorney General Katzenbach included California, Illinois, and Massachusetts, joined by Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin Issue: Do the sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 encroach on the powers of the state? Did Congress have the power to remedy racial discrimination in state's voting practices? Holdings: By the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to remedy violations of that Amendment The suspension of literacy tests is constitutional (as outlined in the Voting Rights Act of 1965) Reasonings: Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment expressly declares that "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." By adding this authorization, the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in Section 1. Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment The Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting

Baker v. Carr

Facts: Charles W. Baker and other residents of Tennessee brought this suit against Joe C. Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee They alleged that a state statute passed in 1901 arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned the seats in the General Assembly among the state's 95 counties and the state failed to reapportion the seats notwithstanding substantial growth and redistribution of the state's population Issue: Is apportionment a political question? Holdings: Apportionment is not a political question. Plaintiffs in apportionment cases can seek relief in the courts under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Plaintiffs in Tennessee had standing to sue Reasonings: We have no question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm.

Facts: Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a same-sex couple from Colorado, planned to marry in Massachusetts in 2012 (where same-sex marriage was legal), but planned to hold a reception with family in their home state of Colorado (where such marriages were not yet legal) They approached Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Colorado bakery, to ask about having a cake made for their wedding reception Phillips informed them that his Christian religious beliefs against same-sex marriage would keep him from making a wedding cake celebrating their marriage, but that he would sell them other baked goods including birthday cakes, cookies, or brownies. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) prohibited discrimination in "a place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services" to the public Craig and Mullins filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, claiming that Phillips' refusal to provide them with a wedding cake constituted a violation of CADA Following the process outlined in the law, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first made a finding that there was probable cause to believe a violation had occurred The Commission referred the case to an administrative law judge (ALJ) who found that a violation had occurred, applying the Supreme Court precedent established in Employment Division v. Smith that religious believers are not exempt from generally applicable laws such as the CADA Phillips appealed that decision to the Commission and to the Colorado Court of Appeals. Both affirmed the ALJ and ruled in favor of Craig and Mullins Issue: Did the application of CADA Colorado's public accommodation law violate the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment? Did the civil rights commission act without religious neutrality thereby violating the free exercise clause? Holdings: The civil rights commission acted without neutrality and therefore violated the free exercise clause The application of CADA violated the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment Reasonings: The reason and motive for the baker's refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires Kennedy argues that Phillips' conflict "was particularly understandable" given that at the time Colorado did not permit gay marriage and the Court had not decided either the Windsor or Obergefell cases State law allowed businesses to decline to create specific messages The Civil Rights Commission's treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection To describe a man's faith as "one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use" is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado's anti-discrimination law—a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation The Commission's hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment's guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion

U.S. v. Windsor

Facts: Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, just as some states were beginning to consider permitting same-sex marriage, but before any state had done so. Section 3 provided that "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife" Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, residents of New York, were legally married in Canada in 2007 and their marriage was recognized as legimitate by the state of New York. Spyer died in 2009, leaving her estate to Windsor Because of Section 3 of DOMA Windsor was barred from claiming the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses She paid the taxes but filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the provision on Equal Protection grounds She won in the US District Court and the Court of Appeals The Obama administration refused to defend the Act but continued to enforce it A Bipartisan legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the statute Issues: Does the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) deprive same-sex couples Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and thus the constitutional principles of equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment? Does the United States Supreme Court have jurisdiction? Holdings: DOMA denies same sex couples due process (fifth amendment) and equal protection principles (fourteenth amendment) who were legally married under state law Reasonings: The states, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce and the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and divorce DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage New York's actions were without doubt a proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our federal system, all in the way that the Framers of the Constitution intended. The dynamics of state government in the federal system are to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other For same-sex couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status It reflects both the community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects Under DOMA, same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and public ways Use precedent of bolling v sharpe, loving v virginia, and Lawrence v texas

Frontiero v. Richardson

Facts: Reed v. Reed (1971): Idaho law that preferred men over women, used rational basis, Idaho's probate law based solely on discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, sought increased allowances for quarters and housing and medical benefits for her husband on the ground that he was her "dependent" The law provided that wives of servicemen automatically were treated as dependents, but husbands of servicewomen were not dependents unless they depended on their wives for more than one-half their support Issues: Does the federal statute that permits servicemen to claim their wives as dependents but not servicewomen unless she can prove he relies on her for 50% of his support violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? What standard of review should be used for gender discrimination? Holdings: The federal statute violates the due process clause insofar as the requirement of a female to prove the dependency of her husband Reasonings: In Reed v. Reed, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that, when two individuals are otherwise equally entitled to appointment as administrator of an estate, the male applicant must be preferred to the female. The Court found this preference unconstitutional and held that "to give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution" Our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes And although blacks guarantee the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and political rights"—until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration

Craig v. Boren

Facts: Curtis Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, together with a licensed vendor of 3.2 percent beer, brought an action in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief against an Oklahoma law. The law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 A three-judge court held that the state's statistical evidence regarding young males' drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads David Boren was governor of Oklahoma Issue: Does Oklahoma's 3.2% beer gender-based differential statute deny males equal protection under Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: You cannot invidiously discriminate against gender classes Oklahoma's 3.2 beer gender-based differential statute invidiously discriminates against 18-20-year-old males and denies them equal protection Intermediate scrutiny is established and should be used for gender discrimination Reasonings: While such disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous "fit" Indeed, prior cases have consistently rejected the use of sex as a decision making factor even though the statuses in question certainly rested on far more predictive empirical relationships than this Setting aside the obvious methodological problems, the surveys do not adequately justify the salient features of Oklahoma's gender-based traffic-safety law. None of the purports to measure the use and dangerousness of 3.2% beer as opposed to alcohol generally Moreover, many of the studies, while graphically documenting the unfortunate increase in driving while under the influence of alcohol, make no effort to relate their findings to age-sex differentials as involved here Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez

Facts: Elementary and secondary schools in Texas are financed by state and local contributions In the case, almost half of the revenues came from the state in order to provide a basic minimum for schools Supplemental funds were derived from a property tax adopted by each school district A class action was brought on behalf of schoolchildren from members of poor families, who claimed that the Texas system of relying on local property taxes favored the more affluent neighborhoods and violated the Equal Protection Clause A federal district court relied on strict judicial scrutiny to conclude that Texas needed to show a compelling state interest to justify the financing system Demetrio Rodriguez and other Mexican-American parents brought this suit Issue: Issues: Does the Texas system of relying on local property taxes to fund school districts violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Is the Texas dual system of financing education subject to strict scrutiny? Holdings: Strict scrutiny is not required for non-suspect classifications (poor) With respect to wealth, the Equal Protection clause does not require absolute equality of precisely equal advantages Reasonings: At least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages In view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process can any system assure equal quality of education except in the most relative sense Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected The undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation In addition to matters of fiscal policy this case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgements made at the state and local levels The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various states, and we do not violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand (judicial restraint) Use rational basis instead of strict scrutiny

Plyer v. Doe

Facts: In 1975 Texas revised its education laws to withhold state education funds from children who were not "legally admitted" to the United States It authorized school districts to deny admission or charge tuition to students who could not prove their legal status This suit was brought on behalf of children, contending that the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment The federal district court of appeals agreed and ruled against the state James Plyler was the Superintendent of Tyler Independent School District and its Board of Trustees Issue: Does the Texas state law withholding state funds from educating children of illegal immigrants violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: The Texas law withholding state funds from educating children of illegal immigrants violates the Equal Protection Clause Illegal aliens and their children are afforded the same constitutional protections of the Fourteenth Amendment as citizens Reasonings: There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that "due process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal protection," and therefore available to a larger class of persons. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice But the Texas law is directed against children and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control. It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their presence within the United States In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests Use strict scrutiny: Texas fails to find substantial state interest

Rostker v. Goldberg

Facts: In 1980, Congress reactivated the registration process for military service but denied President Carter the authority he requested to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men After President Carter ordered the registration of specified groups of young men, several men, including Robert L. Goldberg, brought a lawsuit challenging the statute's constitutionality A three-judge district court held that the statute's gender-based discrimination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and enjoined registration under the statute Bernard Rostker, Director of Selective Service, brought this appeal to the Supreme Court Issues: Does the US Military Selective Service Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for males? Can Congress authorize men and not women to register under the Selective Service Act? Holdings: The male only registration for Selective Service does not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Congress is well within its authority to authorize such registration Reasonings: Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statutory The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them Court deferring to Congress about defense

Citizens United v. FEC

Facts: In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documentary film critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a presidential candidate. With plans to make the movie available on cable television within 30 days of the primary, Citizens United produced TV ads to run on broadcast and cable TV Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating federal election law, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the law was unconstitutional A district court denied the preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission summary judgment Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an electioneering communication or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate 2 U.S.C. section 441b (Federal Election Campaign Act) Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n The holding in McConnell rested to a large extent on an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce Austin had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity 30 days before primary and 60 days before election Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) Issues: Should Austin (and parts of McConnell) be reconsidered? Can corporate political speech be banned? Does section 441b (FECA) and section 203 of BCRA violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Holdings: Austin and parts of McConnell are overruled. Congress may not ban political speech based on speaker's corporate identity (violates the First Amendment free speech) Section 441b and section 203 are valid and do not violate the Free speech clause of the First Amendment Corporations are people Reasonings: The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions The option to from a PAC does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with section 441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The court has recognized that First Amendment protections extends to corporations. This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations It is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason that vague laws chill speech: People of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the law's meaning and differ as to its application These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship

Buckley v. Valeo

Facts: In response to the scandals uncovered by the Watergate affair, Congress rewrote campaign finance laws to impose stricter limits on contributions and expenditures The Federal Election Campaign Act amendments of 1974 also created a Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the statute James L. Buckley, U.S. Senator, was the lead plaintiff in filing this case against Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate Issue: Are the FEC limits on campaign contributions and expenditures constitutional? Holdings: The limitation on contributions is constitutional The limitation on campaign expenditures violates the First Amendment free speech rights and is therefore unconstitutional Reasonings: A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose —to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined The use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution limitations are directed

Automobile Auto Workers v. Johnson

Facts: Johnson Controls, a manufacturer of batteries, prohibited fertile women from working in jobs that would expose them to lead and possible health hazards to the fetus a woman might conceive Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Johnson Controls did not employ any woman in a battery-manufacturing job. In June 1977, however, it announced its first official policy concerning its employment of women in lead exposure work Johnson Controls at first emphasized that a woman who expected to have a child should not choose a job in which she would have such exposure to lead. The company also required a woman who wished to be considered for employment to sign a statement that she had been advised of the risk of having a child while she was exposed to lead Five years later, in 1982, Johnson Controls shifted form a policy of warning to a policy of exclusion of pregnant women or women capable of bearing children Petitioners included a woman who had chosen to be sterilized in order to avoid losing her job, a woman who had suffered a loss in compensation when she was transferred out of a job where she was exposed to lead, and a man who had been denied a request for a leave of absence for the purpose of lowering his lead level because he intended to become a father Issue: Is Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy a BFOQ (bona fide occupational qualification) exception allowed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Does the employers gender based fetal protection policy violate Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978? Holdings: Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy is not a BFOQ exception allowed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Johnson's policy is sex discrimination and violates Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 Reasonings: Despite evidence in the record about the debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system, Johnson Controls is concerned only with the harms that may befall the unborn offspring of tis female employees Johnson Controls' policy is facially discriminatory because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she is not capable of reproducing Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex Johnson Controls' professed moral and ethical concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of female sterility Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire those parents

Michael M. v. Sonoma County

Facts: Michael M., a 17-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law, which defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years" He sued on the ground that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were criminally liable The Supreme Court of California held that the classification, when subjected to strict scrutiny, was justified by the state's compelling interest to avoid the cost of illegitimate teenage pregnancies, abortions, and teenage childbearing Issues: Does California's "statutory rape" law violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: California's statutory rape law does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasonings: At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies, which have increased dramatically over the last two decades, have significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State (compelling state interest to pass strict scrutiny) Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here protects women form sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are particularly severe Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct A criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly "equalize" the deterrents on the sexes The statute does not rest on the assumption that males are generally the aggressors. It is instead an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is irrelevant since young men are as capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented Use rational basis: rational to have this law to prevent teen pregnancy

Bradwell v. State

Facts: Myra Bradwell, a resident of Illinois, applied to the judges of the Illinois Supreme Court for a license to practice law. It rejected her application She was a married woman She was born in Vermont and then moved to Illinois In taking her case to the US Supreme Court, she asserted that she was entitled to the license by virtue of the privileges and immunities guaranteed to US citizens under Section 2 of Article IV and under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment Issues: Is the right to practice law guaranteed to US citizens under privileges and immunities in Section 2 of Article IV and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: The right to practice law is not a privilege or immunity of natural citizenship nor does her denial violate the privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment Reasonings: There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, in that relation and character, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. But the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. This right in no sense depends on citizenship of the United States Many prominent and distinguished lawyers have been admitted to practice, both in the State and Federal courts, who were not citizens of the United States or of any State The opinion just delivered in the Slaughter-House Cases renders elaborate argument in the present case unnecessary The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license

Bush v. Gore

Facts: The Florida Supreme Court, divided 4 to 3, ordered an immediate manual recount of all ballots where no vote for Al Gore or George W. Bush for President had been recorded by machines On the following day, the US Supreme Court issues a stay on the manual recount Lawyers for Bush claimed that the manual recount violated the constitutional guarantee for equal protection The Gore legal team argued the importance of counting every legal vote Issues: Does the use of standard less manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses? Did the Florida Supreme Court establish new standards for resolving presidential election contests thereby violating article 2 and failing to comply with us code 3 section 5? Holdings: The use of standard less manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses The Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving presidential election contests thereby violating article 2 and failing to comply with 3 u.s.c section 5 Reasonings: The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application. The formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we conclude, necessary When a court orders a statewide remedy there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied

Smith v. Allwright

Facts: The statutes of Texas provided for primary elections for U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, and state officers The Democratic party of Texas, which the Texas Supreme Court called a "voluntary association," adopted in a state convention a resolution permitting only white citizens of the state to participate in the Democratic primary Lonnie Smith, a black voter, sued an election judge, S.E. Allwright In Grovey v. Townsend, the Court decided that the refusal of a county clerk in Texas to give a black an absentee ballot, for reasons only of race, was permissible because the clerk was not a state officer and there was no "state action" Issue: Should Grovey v. Townsend be reconsidered? Can states deny their citizens the right to vote in primaries based on race? Holdings: Grovey v. Townsend is overruled The right to vote in primaries is protected by the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments Reasonings: The recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the State We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow legislative directions an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions (made a mistake on grovey) Privileges and immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment

Personnel Adm. of Mass v. Feeney

Facts: Under a Massachusetts statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveteran The statute made the preference available to "any person, male or female, including a nurse," who was honorably discharged from the United States armed forces after at least 90 days of active service, at least one day of which was during "wartime" Helen B. Feeney, who was not a veteran, passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations but, because of the veteran's preference law, was ranked below male veterans who had lower test scores A three-judge court held that the veterans' preference statute violated the Equal Protection Clause Issues: Does the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute discriminate against women in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasonings: Veteran status is not uniquely male. Although few women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans—male as well as female—are placed at a disadvantage. Too many men are affected by the statute to permit the inference that the statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women The distinction made by the statute is, as it seems to be, quite simply between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women Massachusetts has not offered a preference to veterans for the purpose of discriminating against women It cannot be reconciled with the assumption made by both the appellee and the District Court that a more limited hiring preference for veterans could be sustained Nothing in the record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted because it would accomplish the collateral goals of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service Veterans' preference laws reward veterans for their service

U.S. v. Virginia

Facts: Virginia Military Institute (VMI) operated as the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning The mission of the school as to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service Only about 15% of VMI cadets entered career military service The United States sued Virginia and VMI on the ground that the school's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause The district court ruled in VMI's favor; the Fourth Circuit reversed. To remedy the constitutional problem, Virginia proposed a parallel program for women: Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts school for women The district court and the Fourth Circuit found that this proposal satisfied the equal protection requirement Issue: Does Virginia's male only policy at VMI violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: Virginia's male only policy at VMI violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasonings: Neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable for women. And the school's impressive record in producing leaders has made admission desirable to some women. Nevertheless, Virginia has elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and opportunities a VMI education affords Virginia has not shown that VMI was established or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying by its categorical exclusion of women, education opportunities within the Commonwealth It is also undisputed, however, that the VMI methodology could be used to educate women and some women, the expert testimony established, are capable of all the individual activities required of VMI cadets VWIL affords women no opportunity to experience the rigorous military training for which VMI is famed Generalizations about "the way women are," estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description. Notably, Virginia never asserted that VMI's method of education suits most men In myriad respects other than military training, VWIL does not qualify as VMI's equal (state many ways they aren't equal) A VWIL graduate cannot assume that the network of business owners, corporations, VMI graduates and nongraduate employers interested in hiring VMI graduates will be equally responsive to her search for employment Intermediate scrutiny is used

Mobile v. Bolden

Facts: Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile Alabama, brought a class action in federal court against the city on behalf of all black citizens of the city They alleged that the practice of electing city commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of blacks in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Although finding that blacks registered and voted "without hindrance," the district court held that the at-large electoral system violated the Fifteenth Amendment and invidiously discriminated against blacks in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Issue: Does Mobile's at-large system of municipal elections violate the rights of Mobile's black voters thereby violating the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965? Must voting practices discriminate purposefully or only in effect to be declared unconstitutional? Holdings: Mobile's at-large system of municipal elections does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments States are prohibited only from purposefully discriminating against voting rights of blacks (voting rights act only prohibits states from purposefully discriminating, intentional not incidental) Reasonings: The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, and neither Smith v. Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any implication to the contrary That Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or previous conditions of servitude" We have recognized, however, that such legislative apportionments could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities To prove such a purpose it is not enough to show that the group allegedly discriminated against has not elected representatives in proportion to its numbers The Court noted that no black had been elected to the Mobile City Commission. However, blacks had the only active "slating" organization in the city. It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation Congress reversed this case

Yick Wo v. Hopkins

Facts: Yick Wo was one of several plaintiffs to challenge a municipal ordinance in California designed to regulate public laundries As implemented by the Board of Supervisors, eighty white owners received licenses to operate but licenses were denied to two hundred Chinese-owned laundries Peter Hopkins was the sheriff of the city and county of San Francisco Issue: Does the unequal enforcement of the San Francisco permit system towards citizens and aliens violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Holdings: The unequal enforcement of the San Francisco permit system towards citizens and aliens violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Reasonings: The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitations of power For the cases present the ordinances in the actual operation, and the facts shows establish an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution

Standards of Review

Rational basis: Legislation is valid if the legislature's purpose is legitimate and the law is "rationally" related to that purpose. Following the post-1937, this standard governs review of economic regulation Intermediate: A position between the customary two-tiered analysis (rational basis and strict scrutiny). Governmental action is valid if it serves an "important" purpose and is "substantially related" to that purpose. Often applied in cases of sex discrimination and commercial speech. Strict Scrutiny: A heightened standard used to review legislation that discriminates against fundamental interests (examples: race, voting, marriage). This category is sometimes called a suspect classification. To satisfy this test, a legislative classification must be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest

14th Amendment`

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article

15th Amendment

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude

26th Amendment

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.

Dissent in Johnson v. Transportation Agency

The Court today completes the process of converting this from a guarantee that race or sex will not be the basis for employment determinations, to a guarantee that it often will