Con Law Test 2

Michael M. v. Superior Court (1981)

Brief Fact Summary. California's statutory rape law holds only males, not females, criminally liable for having sexual intercourse with females under the age of 18. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A statute's gender-based classification is constitutionally permissible if the classification bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. Facts. The Petitioner, Michael M. (Petitioner), a seventeen and a half year-old male, sought to have California's statutory rape law declared unconstitutional, on state and federal grounds, because the law defines statutory rape as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years," and thus, unlawfully discriminates on the basis of gender. The California trial and appellate courts denied the Petitioner's request for relief. The Supreme Court of California upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The ruling of the Supreme Court of California was affirmed. Issue. Whether California's "statutory rape" law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because it only holds males criminally liable for sexual intercourse as defined under the statute. Held. (J. Rehnquist) No. The California's statutory rape law bears a substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, and thus, the statute passes constitutional muster. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed. The California statute withstands a constitutional challenge because it supports the state's effort to prevent illegitimate pregnancies, to prevent "significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, to prevent abortions, and to prevent children born, as a result of illegitimate pregnancies, to become wards of the State." The California statute protects young women from sexual intercourse that can cause consequences that are "profound[ly] physical, emotional, and psychological." Because only women can become pregnant, "the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male." Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows: Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) California has not proven its burden that "there are fewer teenage pregnancies under its gender-based statutory rape law than there would be if the law were gender neutral . . . ." Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) California's statute should apply to males as well as females because sexual intercourse between a male and a female constitutes "two guilty wrongdoers" not just one. According to the Constitution, state laws must "govern impartially." Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows: Justice Potter Steward (J. Stewart). Despite recognizing the significance of the physiological differences between men and women - the fact that only women can become pregnant - the Supreme Court of the United States' ruling does not use these differences as merely a "pretext for invidious discrimination," but instead looks to the overriding state interest to protect young women who, because of their physiological differences, are not similarly situated as men and thus, are faced with "substantial physical risks" that are not shared by men. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). The California statute is constitutional because it helps to curtail the problem of teenage pregnancy and supports a substantial relationship to an important governmental objective. Discussion. When men and women are situated differently, a statute creating gender-based classifications can withstand a constitutional challenge if the purpose of the statute can pass the intermediate level of scrutiny.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982)

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Joe Hogan (Respondent), challenged the woman's only admission policy after being denied admission into a nursing program solely on the basis of gender. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A women's only admission's policy is constitutional when it is supported by a significant government interests and is substantially related to the governmental objective. Facts. From its inception, the Petitioner, the Mississippi University for Women (Petitioner), has limited its enrollment to only women. The Petitioner includes a School of Nursing, which maintains its own admission policy. The Respondent is a registered nurse who was denied admission to the Petitioner's School of Nursing on the basis of gender. The Respondent sought to have the School of Nursing admission policy declared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. However, the District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief for the Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court ruling that "because the admissions policy discriminates on the basis of gender, the District Court improperly used a 'rational relationship' test to judge the constitutionality of the policy . . . . " The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Issue. Whether a state statute that excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Held. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor) Yes. The State failed to show that the admission policy "serve[d] 'important governmental objectives and that discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives'." The Petitioner provides no basis for gender-based classifications in its admission's policy. There is "no showing that women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such opportunities." The Petitioner's policy, also, "is not substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory objective. MUW's policy of allowing men to attend classes as auditors and to participate in continuing education courses with female students undermines its claim that women are adversely affected by the presence of men." Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows: Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger). The Supreme Court of the United States' holding is limited to professional nursing schools. "Since the Court's opinion relies heavily on its finding that women have traditionally dominated the nursing profession, it suggests that a State might well be justified in maintaining, for example, the option of an all-women's business school or liberal arts program." Justice Harry (J. Blackmun). If the Supreme Court continues to be rigid in its application of sex discrimination rules, it will increase the risk of States losing its ability to offer its citizens with choices in their educational endeavors while "not depriving others of an alternate choice . . . ." Justice Lewis Powel (J. Powell). The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not apply to this case because the Respondent is only arguing that "he has the right to attend a college in his home community." Discussion. If a state's expressed governmental interest is inconsistent with the expressed governmental objective, the classified-gender discrimination cannot be upheld under constitutional standards.

United States v. Virginia (1996)

Brief Fact Summary. Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-sexed school in Virginia. VMI used a highly adversarial method to train (male) leaders of the future. There was no equal educational opportunity to that of VMI in the State for women. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications of the government can be defended only by exceedingly persuasive justifications. The State must show that its classification serves important governmental objectives and that the means employed are substantially related to those objectives. The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the differences between males and females. Facts. VMI was the sole single-sexed school among Virginia's 15 public institutions. VMI's mission is to produce "citizen soldiers", (male) leaders of the future. VMI achieves its mission through its "adversative method", which is characterized by physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, etc. At trial, the District Court acknowledged that women were missing out on a unique educational opportunity, but upheld the school's policy on the rationale that admitting women could not be done without compromising the school's adversative method. Pursuant to a decision by the Court of Appeals, the State established the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) for women. VWIL offered fewer courses than VMI and was run without the adversative method. Issue. Did VMI represent a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Held. Yes. The Fourth Circuit's initial judgment is affirmed. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that Virginia has shown no "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding all women. "Benign" justifications offered in defense of absolute exclusions will not be accepted automatically. The notion that admitting women would downgrade VMI's stature and destroy the school's adversity system was hardly proved. Generalizations about the way women are or what is appropriate for them will no longer serve to justify denying opportunity to those whose talents and capabilities make them exceptions to the average description. Moreover, VWIL does not qualify as VMI's substitute. VWI's student body, faculty, course offerings and facilities do not match VMI's. Dissent. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) said the virtue of a democratic system is that it enables people over time to be persuaded that the things they took for granted are not so and to change their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed if such types of decisions are removed from the democratic process and written into our United States Constitution (Constitution). Concurrence. Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) argued that while he agreed with the Supreme Court's conclusion, he disagreed with its analysis. The Supreme Court says here for the first time the state must show an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for gender-based classifications, thereby introducing uncertainty regarding the appropriate test. In addition, VWIL only fails as a remedy because it is of inferior quality to VMI. Discussion. This case calls into question what differences between men and women are real, i.e., legitimate basis upon which to draw distinctions, for constitutional purposes.

Fisher v. University of Texas I (2013)

Brief Fact Summary. Fisher (Plaintiff) was a white applicant to the University of Texas (Defendant). When he was denied admission he sued, claiming that admission policies that used race as a factor violated the Equal Protection Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Courts should review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard. Facts. Defendant used race as a factor in its admissions policies in order to increase the enrollment of racial minorities and create greater diversity in the student body. Additionally, Texas enacted a Top Ten Percent Law granted automatic admission to any public state college, including Defendant, to all students who finished in the top ten percent of their class in Texas high schools that met certain requirements. This law as also intended to increase diversity at Defendant university. Plaintiff, a white applicant to Defendant who was denied admission, sued Defendant. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant's admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court of appeals found for Defendant and upheld the policies. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue. Should courts review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard? Held. (Kennedy, J.) Yes. Courts should review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard. Under this standard, the state must show that the policy is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest. Diversity is such a compelling state interest, but Defendant must show that the admissions process evaluates each applicant as an individual and without treating an applicant's race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic. To be narrowly tailored, the policy must be necessary to achieve the compelling interest of diversity and there must be no race-neutral alternative that would produce the same benefit. The appellate court below did not apply the appropriate standard of review, but instead deferred to Defendant on the matter of whether the policy was narrowly tailored and whether race-neutral alternatives existed. Reversed and remanded. Dissent. (Ginsburg, J.) Defendant's purpose is supported by the holding in Grutter. In achieving this legitimate purpose, the school followed the model approved in that case. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, race-neutral policies combined with the Top Ten Percent Law are not enough to achieve diversity. The proposed race-neutral policies are not really race unconscious. If universities cannot explicitly make race a factor, many may resort to pretense to maintain their minority enrollments. It is better to have the schools honestly reveal their policies. This case should be affirmed. Concurrence. (Scalia, J.) Defendant did not ask this Court to overrule the holding in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) which found diversity to be a compelling state interest. Notwithstanding this precedent, governmental discrimination based on race is a violation of the Constitution. (Thomas, J.) Grutter should be overruled entirely. A state's use of race in admissions decisions is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Segregationists used to argue that segregation provided educational benefits. The arguments advanced by Defendant are the same as the segregationists' were. Racial discrimination, no matter the form, is never benign. The fact that Defendant's intentions are good does not excuse racial discrimination any more than the good intentions of the segregationists did. Those denied entry under a race-based admission system are harmed, but those admitted are harmed even more since they are less prepared for higher education than the students who would have otherwise been admitted. Discussion. Justice Thomas's view of affirmative action is that the program acts as a boost for minority students who would otherwise not be qualified for admission, and therefore might not perform as well as their classmates. Others view affirmative action as an anti-discrimination effort to include minorities in preferred positions in society from which they have historically been excluded, despite being qualified to fill them. Justice Thomas's view seems to stereotype African American students at top universities as unqualified, regardless of their actual qualifications and merit.

Fisher v. University of Texas II (2016)

Brief Fact Summary. Fisher (Plaintiff) was a white applicant to the University of Texas (Defendant). When he was denied admission he sued, claiming that admission policies that used race as a factor violated the Equal Protection Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Courts should review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard. Facts. Defendant used race as a factor in its admissions policies in order to increase the enrollment of racial minorities and create greater diversity in the student body. Additionally, Texas enacted a Top Ten Percent Law granted automatic admission to any public state college, including Defendant, to all students who finished in the top ten percent of their class in Texas high schools that met certain requirements. This law as also intended to increase diversity at Defendant university. Plaintiff, a white applicant to Defendant who was denied admission, sued Defendant. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant's admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court of appeals found for Defendant and upheld the policies. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue. Should courts review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard? Held. (Kennedy, J.) Yes. Courts should review state university admissions policies that use race as a factor under the strict scrutiny standard. Under this standard, the state must show that the policy is narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest. Diversity is such a compelling state interest, but Defendant must show that the admissions process evaluates each applicant as an individual and without treating an applicant's race or ethnicity as the defining characteristic. To be narrowly tailored, the policy must be necessary to achieve the compelling interest of diversity and there must be no race-neutral alternative that would produce the same benefit. The appellate court below did not apply the appropriate standard of review, but instead deferred to Defendant on the matter of whether the policy was narrowly tailored and whether race-neutral alternatives existed. Reversed and remanded. Dissent. (Ginsburg, J.) Defendant's purpose is supported by the holding in Grutter. In achieving this legitimate purpose, the school followed the model approved in that case. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, race-neutral policies combined with the Top Ten Percent Law are not enough to achieve diversity. The proposed race-neutral policies are not really race unconscious. If universities cannot explicitly make race a factor, many may resort to pretense to maintain their minority enrollments. It is better to have the schools honestly reveal their policies. This case should be affirmed. Concurrence. (Scalia, J.) Defendant did not ask this Court to overrule the holding in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) which found diversity to be a compelling state interest. Notwithstanding this precedent, governmental discrimination based on race is a violation of the Constitution. (Thomas, J.) Grutter should be overruled entirely. A state's use of race in admissions decisions is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Segregationists used to argue that segregation provided educational benefits. The arguments advanced by Defendant are the same as the segregationists' were. Racial discrimination, no matter the form, is never benign. The fact that Defendant's intentions are good does not excuse racial discrimination any more than the good intentions of the segregationists did. Those denied entry under a race-based admission system are harmed, but those admitted are harmed even more since they are less prepared for higher education than the students who would have otherwise been admitted. Discussion. Justice Thomas's view of affirmative action is that the program acts as a boost for minority students who would otherwise not be qualified for admission, and therefore might not perform as well as their classmates. Others view affirmative action as an anti-discrimination effort to include minorities in preferred positions in society from which they have historically been excluded, despite being qualified to fill them. Justice Thomas's view seems to stereotype African American students at top universities as unqualified, regardless of their actual qualifications and merit.

Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1970)

Brief Fact Summary. Griggs (Plaintiff) was an African American employee of Duke Power Co. (Defendant) who challenged Defendant's job requirements as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because they disparately impacted African American applicants and were not tied to job performance. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When employment requirements have a disparate impact on minorities and are not related to successful job performance, they violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even when there is no discriminatory intent. Facts. Defendant had a policy requiring that applicants for certain jobs have a high school diploma and a certain score on an intelligence test. These requirements disparately impacted African American applicants. Plaintiff was an African American employee of Defendant. He sued, claiming that the policy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the requirements were not related to job performance and had a discriminatory impact. Evidence was introduced that showed employees hired into these positions before the requirements were enacted who did not possess high school diplomas or the requisite intelligence score performed the job satisfactorily and progressed in their departments. The trial court and court of appeals found no discriminatory intent behind the policy and held that Title VII had not been violated. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue. When employment requirements have a disparate impact on minorities, but no discriminatory intent, can those requirements violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Held. (Burger, C.J.) Yes. When employment requirements have a disparate impact on minorities and are not related to successful job performance, they violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even when there is no discriminatory intent. The Civil Rights Act dictates that arbitrary and unnecessary obstacles that result in employment discrimination based on race be eliminated. Where an employment practice that is not related to job performance works to keep African Americans out of certain jobs, it is prohibited even if the employer does not intend to discriminate. Not everyone is guaranteed a job regardless of qualifications, but when the qualifications work to discriminate and are not related to an ability to perform the job, they are prohibited. The evidence here showed that employees who did not have these qualifications performed satisfactorily and progressed in their departments. Therefore, the requirements for a high school diploma and intelligence score have not been shown to bear a reasonable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which they were required. These requirements violate Title VII even without evidence of a discriminatory intent. Reversed. Discussion. In other portions of the opinion, the Court in Griggs, held that the burden of establishing an employment requirement's relationship to the performance of a job lies on the employer. Before Griggs, the employee or applicant had the burden of establishing a discriminatory intent behind an employment requirement. Following this decision, plaintiffs had only to prove discriminatory impact from hiring or advancement standards to succeed. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified this standard.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Brief Fact Summary. When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School (Defendant), she sued the latter in federal district court, alleging racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of the law school's (Defendant) direct consideration of race as a factor in the admissions process Synopsis of Rule of Law. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan Law School (Defendant) receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of 350 students. The Law School's (Defendant) admissions committee tried to achieve diversity in the student body by requiring admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, a student's essay, GPA score, LSAT score, as well as so-called "soft variables." Plus, the admissions policy specifically stressed the Law School's (Defendant) longstanding commitment to racial and ethical diversity. In this regard, the official admission policy noted that by enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, Defendant sought "to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School." When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, applied for admission but was denied, she sued the Law School (Defendant) in federal district court, claiming racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a 15-day bench trial, the district court upheld Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals reversed. Plaintiff appealed Issue. Is diversity a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission? Held. (O'Connor, J.) Yes. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. In this case, the Law School's (Defendant) admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. Truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admission tracks. Universities also cannot insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. However, as was done here, universities can consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant. The Law School's (Defendant) goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. The evidence indicated that the Defendant engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a "diverse educational environment." In addition, evidence showed that the Defendant gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race by frequently accepting nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants. There was no Law School (Defendant) policy, either de facto or de jure, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single "soft" variable. Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. It also does not require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. Affirmed Dissent. (Rehnquist, C.J.) The Law School's (Defendant) means are not narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts. Stripped of its "critical mass" veil, the program is revealed as an obvious effort to achieve racial balancing. As the numbers demonstrate, the Defendant plainly employs racial preferences in extending offers of admission. It engages in precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls "patently unconstitutional." (Kennedy, J.) The Law School (Defendant) has not demonstrated how individual consideration is, or can be, preserved at this stage of the application process given the instruction to attain what it calls critical mass. (Scalia, J.) Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are not permitted, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding, today's decision seems willfully designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race and state-provided education is no exception. (Thomas, J.) I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators. The majority upholds the Law School's (Defendant) racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti. Concurrence. (Ginsburg, J.) From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not know for sure, that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action Discussion. As shown in Grutter and predecessor Supreme Court decisions, not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and "strict scrutiny" is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in any given context.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985)

Brief Fact Summary. A Texas city denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals found that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Denial of a permit for the operation of homes for the mentally retarded violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution where such denial is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Facts. A zoning ordinance for the City of Cleburne (the City) permitted a wide variety of uses on a proposed cite of land, including for hospitals, for sanitariums and for homes for the aged, but excluded the operation of homes for the insane or feebleminded. The City, acting pursuant to the ordinance, denied an applicant a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. The Court of Appeals held that the ordinance and the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Issue. Did the denial of a permit for the operation of homes for the mentally retarded violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution? Did the lower court err in treating the mentally retarded as a "quasi-suspect class" and therefore subjecting the law to "middle level scrutiny?" Held. Yes and Yes. The Court of Appeals is affirmed in its judgment. Justice Byron White (J. White) stated that to withstand Equal Protection review, legislation that distinguishes between mentally retarded persons and others must be rationally related to further a legitimate governmental interest. The ordinance fails on both scores. The governmental interests, e.g., the avoidance of apprehensiveness of mentally retarded persons, are not legitimate. Moreover, the means the government employs are not rationally related to the achievement of its stated interests. Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) stated that the City's ordinance clearly would have been valid under the traditional rational basis test. If the ordinance is to be invalidated, it must be done so pursuant to a standard more rigorous than the minimal rational basis test. Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) stated that the record demonstrates that the permit was denied because of the irrational fears of the neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally retarded persons who would have lived in the home. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) stated that although he disagreed with the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) applied, he shared in the Supreme Court's judgment that the ordinance is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Discussion. One thing to consider is whether the Supreme Court in fact applied an intermediate standard of review in this case instead of the rational basis standard the Court asserted it was using. Given that the mentally retarded suffer from an immutable characteristic, should the courts accord discriminations against them with a heightened scrutiny standard of review?

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections (1966)

Brief Fact Summary. A Virginia law mandated the payment of a poll tax, not to exceed $1.50, in order for citizens to be eligible to vote. The constitutionality of the law was brought into question. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) by making the affluence of the voter or the payment of a fee an electoral standard. Facts. A Virginia law mandated the payment of a poll tax, not to exceed $1.50, in order for citizens to be eligible to vote. The constitutionality of the law was brought into question. Issue. May a State, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, precondition the right to vote in an election on the payment of a poll tax? Held. No. The judgment of the lower court is reversed. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) argued that once the franchise is granted, lines concerning it may not be drawn that are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The interests a State may pursue (i.e., the legitimate ends) in the context of voting are of setting voter qualifications. There is no relationship between ones wealth or the payment of a fee and ones ability to vote intelligently (i.e., the means to ends relationship is lacking). Moreover, the right to vote is too fundamental to be so burdened. Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) said state poll taxes can reasonably and without invidious purposes, be found to rest on a number of legitimate state interests such as the State's desire to collect revenue. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) stated there is a rational argument for requiring a poll tax, weeding out those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 for the right to vote. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States' (Supreme Court) primary concern in this case was a distinction made as to which citizens were entitled to a fundamental right - the right to vote. One wonders if the Supreme Court was not also concerned about the statute because it involved a "wealth distinction." Should ones wealth, as ones race or gender, be regarded as a suspect classification?

Adarand Construction Inc v. Pena (1995)

Brief Fact Summary. A federal policy offered contractors working for the government extra compensation for hiring minority businesses. A construction company awarded a subcontract to a minority owned business, despite the fact that a non-minority owned business offered to do the work for less money. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal racial classifications must serve a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Facts. The United States Department of Transportation awarded a prime contract to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain Gravel). Mountain Gravel then solicited bids from subcontractors for the guardrail portion of the prime contract. The Petitioner, Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Petitioner) submitted the low bid. But, Gonzalez Construction Company (Gonzalez) was awarded the subcontract. Mount Gravel's prime contract provided that Mount Gravel would receive extra compensation if it hired subcontractors qualified as small "socially and economically disadvantaged" businesses. Federal law presumed that Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans and Asian Pacific Americans ran socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. Gonzalez had qualified as a small socially and economically disadvantaged business. The Petitioner had not. Issue. What standard of review applies to the federal program, to the extent that it defined disadvantage by race? Did the presumption defining disadvantage partly by race violate the Fifth Amendment constitutional obligation not to deny anyone the equal protection of the laws?

Washington v. Davis (1976)

Brief Fact Summary. A higher percentage of black applicants than white applicants failed a qualifying test administered by the District of Columbia Police Department. Some of the unsuccessful black applicants claimed these effects constituted unconstitutional discrimination against them. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Proof of a disproportionate impact is not enough, standing alone, to ground a finding that a law amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Facts. The District of Columbia Police Department administered a test to applicants for positions as police officers. The test measured verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading comprehension. A higher percentage of the black applicants than the white applicants failed the test. Respondents, unsuccessful black applicants, claimed the test constituted a violation of equal protection, because it had the effect of disproportionately disqualifying blacks for police service. Respondents did not allege discriminatory purpose on the part of the government. The District Court ruled against the Respondents. Issue. Was proof of the disproportionate effects of the qualifying exam sufficient to ground a finding that the exam unconstitutionally discriminated against the respondents? Held. No. The Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, is reversed. Justice Byron White (J. White) said our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law can be a violation of equal protection on the basis of its effect, without regard for governmental intent. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it alone does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review. The police force's efforts to recruit black police officers are evidence that the police department did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. The exam is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of ensuring that police officers have acquired a particular level of verbal skill. Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Steven) said that frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be a showing of what actually happened. A Constitutional issue does not arise, however, every time some disproportionate impact is shown. Discussion. After this case, a court confronted with a law that has a disproportionate effect on a racial minority, must first determine if the law is race specific. If it is, either because the law is facially discriminatory or because the law was motivated by a racial discriminatory purpose, the law will probably be invalidated under the strict scrutiny standard of review. If the law is non-race specific, the court will apply the rational basis standard of review, regardless of the law's impact on racial minorities.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Brief Fact Summary. A white medical student was denied admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis due to the implementation of a special admissions program designed to assure the admission of a specified number of minority students, thereby limiting the number of white students. Strict scrutiny was used to invalidate the medical school's admission policy. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, as here, it must be regarded as suspect. When a state's distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on the person's color of skin or ancestry, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. Merely filling a racial quota is not a substantial state interest and thus, is per se unconstitutional. Facts. Respondent, Mr. Bakke, challenged a special admissions policy implemented by the Petitioner, Medical School of the University of California at Davis, claiming that he was unconstitutionally denied admission based on this policy. The policy was designed to assure the admission of a specified number of minority groups. The State Supreme Court of California held the special admissions program unlawful, enjoined Petitioner from considering the race of any applicant and ordered Respondent's admission. Issue. Whether strict scrutiny should be the level of judicial scrutiny applied to the special admissions program. Whether the purpose of "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical profession is constitutionally permissible as to satisfy strict scrutiny. Whether the purpose of countering the effects of societal discrimination is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny. Whether the purpose of increasing the number of doctors in underserved communities is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny. Whether the purpose of creating a diverse student population is constitutionally permissible to satisfy strict scrutiny. Held. Yes. Judgment of the State of California Supreme Court affirmed. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background (as here), it must be regarded as suspect. Since a suspect class is being discriminated against, strict scrutiny must be applied to the special admissions program. No. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake and is forbidden by the United States Constitution. If Petitioner's purpose is to ensure a certain percentage of a particular group based on its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose is invalid. No. The state has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating or eliminating the disabling effects of social discrimination. The government has no greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from another. Therefore, the purpose in helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Petitioner perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons such as Respondent. No. There is virtually no evidence indicating that Petitioner's special admissions policy is either needed or geared to promote that goal. Yes. Diversity is clearly a constitutionally permissible interest for an institution of higher education, as the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admission program. The question remains, however, whether the program's racial classification is necessary to promote this interest. Here, Petitioner's special admissions program focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of overall diversity. Therefore, the special admissions program is unconstitutional. Dissent. Since whites are not a minority, only intermediate review should be used. Therefore, the affirmative admissions program is entirely constitutional. Concurrence. The question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case and discussion of that issue is inappropriate. Discussion. This highly divided case applies strict scrutiny to a higher education admissions policy rendering the policy invalid because the policy was based, in part, on a quota system.

Graham v. Richardson (1971)

Brief Fact Summary. Aliens challenge state statutes that restrict and prevent their access to welfare benefits offered to citizens. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state cannot restrict or prevent aliens from receiving benefits offered to state citizens. Facts. Aliens who were denied welfare benefits challenged an Arizona law allows welfare benefits to citizens, but imposes a residency requirement on aliens wanting to also receive welfare benefits. Aliens must reside in the state for 15 years before they can receive welfare benefits. The Aliens also challenge a Pennsylvania law that excludes aliens from certain state funded welfare benefits. The District Court ruled that both statutes violated equal protection. Issue. Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prevents a State from requiring a residency requirement to qualify for welfare benefits and from granting welfare benefits only to citizens of the state and not to aliens. Held. Yes. A state's intention to maintain welfare benefits for its own citizens is not a sufficient justification for restricting and preventing aliens access welfare benefits offered to the state's citizens. Placing restrictions on aliens has historically been a power under the federal government, not state governments. Therefore, "making noncitizens ineligible for public assistance, and . . . restricting benefits to citizens and longtime resident aliens, violates the Equal Protection Clause." The judgment is affirmed. Discussion. "State law that restricts the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with [ ] overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government . . . ."

Kahn v. Shevin (1974)

Brief Fact Summary. Kahn (P) was a widower in Florida who sued the state of Florida (D) on the grounds that the statute enabling widows but not widowers to claim a property tax exemption was arbitrary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state tax law cannot be held to be arbitrary if it discriminates in favor of a certain class because of certain differences in the class or the state policy which do not clash with the federal constitution. Facts. Kahn (P) is a widower in Florida, which has a property tax exemption for widows. The application of the statute to widowers was denied by the tax assessor's office. Kahn (P) filed a case against Shevin (D) who is the tax assessor, asking the court to declare the Florida judgment a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the same protections under law to all people in like circumstances. The ground of his objection was the word "widow" in the tax classification, which is purely gender-based. The Florida Supreme Court declared the classification to be a valid one insomuch as the purpose of the statute under which the classification came was to reduce the gulf between a man and a woman in terms of their economic capabilities. Issue. Is a state law arbitrary or unfounded upon fact if it discriminates in favor of a certain class of people in order to underplay a certain difference between them or to promote a certain difference of state policy, as long as such a difference does not clash with their constitutional rights? Held. (Douglas, J.) No. A state law is not arbitrary if it is in favor of a certain class as long as the difference it makes is based upon a reasonable premise or difference in the state policy which is not against the federal constitution. In ths case the tax exemption is founded on a reasonable premise, that the financial impact of losing a spouse is disproportionately higher for the female sex, and that the exemption of this class from tax will reduce the financial burden. The exemption does not infringe upon any federal right other than equal protection, and involves only taxation. In such cases, the states have a lot of freedom to make classifications which would lead to reasonable taxation systems. The court declared in favor of Shevin (D). Dissent. (Brennan, J.) Any system of classification upheld by law which makes distinctions between the beneficiaries solely on the basis of gender, like those based upon race or national origin, needs to be looked into by the court. The object of the legislation could be achieved with other non-discriminatory means or by using a more precise set of parameters. (White, J.) Making a distinction between widows and widowers is a false classification and violates the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause. The basis for making a gender-based classification is not sufficient based on the state's arguments. Aiming at dministrative efficiency alone is not a reason to make a gender-based division. Concurrence. N/A Discussion. The classification of people for benefits on the basis of sex alone is a subject with legal opinion. In 1971, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sought to prevent the discrimination between the sexes in the matter of employment opportunities, unless the occupation is such as to make such a distinction reasonably needful for its normal operation. In 1972, a state law which gave preference to men over women for employment even if their qualifications were equal was declared

Orr v. Orr (1979)

Brief Fact Summary. Laws of the State of Alabama would require men in some cases to pay alimony on divorce, but women were in no case required to pay alimony. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Without an important state interest and substantially related means, the State may not classify on the basis of sex. Facts. This case arises out of a petition for divorce. The Alabama courts would review the financial status of both partners during the proceedings to determine whether or not the husband owed alimony to the wife. The husband in this particular divorce argued that the law denied him equal protection. Issue. May the state restrict alimony payments in a manner that discriminates on sex? Held. No. In the present case, the State of Alabama argues that sex is a proxy for need of financial assistance. As the finances of both parties to the divorce are examined to determine whether a husband owes alimony, this assertion cannot even support a claim of administrative convenience. Because a gender-neutral classification serves the State's purposes just as well as a gender-based classification, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Discussion. Orr v. Orr is a very straightforward decision. The State cannot argue that a classification is a proxy for financial need when financial need is a necessary determination in the particular case to begin. Combined with the intermediate scrutiny afforded gender classification legislation, the statute is clearly unconstitutional.

Massachusetts Retirement Board v. Murgia (1976)

Brief Fact Summary. Massachusetts law requires state police officers to retire upon turning 50 years old. The Respondent, Murgia (Respondent), argues that this compulsory retirement denies him equal protection under the laws. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Age classifications are only subject to rational basis review. Facts. The Respondent was an officer in the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts State Police. Upon his 50th birthday, the Respondent was required to comply with state law and retire, although a physical examination just four months prior had determined the Respondent to be healthy and capable of all his job functions. The Respondent brought suit in United States District Court, alleging that the compulsory retirement law for Massachusetts State Police denied him of equal protection under the law. Issue. May Massachusetts use an age classification to determine compulsory retirement of its police officers? Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed. The Supreme Court of the United State's (Supreme Court) majority states that although there has been age discrimination in the past and at present, it does not represent the same type of "purposeful unequal treatment" that has been shown on the basis of race or national origin. As such, the Supreme Court states that rational basis review is the proper level of scrutiny in the current case. Police work can be physically arduous and the individual officers must be capable of executing their duties fully in the interest of public safety. As individuals grow older, they are no longer as physically able as individuals in their 20's and 30's. Although Massachusetts requires routine physicals annually for all officers over the age of 40, there is no requirement that it base retirement solely on the results of these physicals. There is a rational basis for using a set age as a proxy, and hence, the Supreme Court finds no equal protection violation. Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissents, arguing that the right to work is a fundamental right and hence proper for a heightened level of scrutiny, as well as that the discrimination against the elderly is more widespread and systemic than the Per Curiam opinion admits. Discussion. The central holding of Murgia is that age classifications are subject only to rational basis review. Given the relatively small gain in administrative convenience in the present case (officers approaching 50 are physically examined annually, anyhow), one might argue that the majority is looking at the larger picture of how age classifications are used in this country (for example, driver's licensing, drinking age, voting rights, statutory rape, etc

Craig v. Boren (1976)

Brief Fact Summary. Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of beer to males under age 21 and to females under the age of 18. Synopsis of Rule of Law. To justify a gender-based classification, a state law must be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. Facts. Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of beer to males under age 21 and to females under the age of 18. The Appellee, the government (Appellee), alleged that the purpose of the classification was to enhance traffic safety. In support of its allegation, Appellee introduced statistical surveys showing that .18 % of females and .2% of males between the ages of 18-20 were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Issue. Does the gender based differential constitute an unconstitutional denial of equal protection to males between the ages of 18 to 20? Held. No. Oklahoma's law invidiously discriminates against males 18-20 years old. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) says the difference between males and females with respect to the purchase of beer does not justify the differential treatment they are accorded under Oklahoma law. Appellee's statistics do not support the conclusion that gender-based distinctions closely function to achieve their alleged purpose. Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) argues that the majority opinion is objectionable for two reasons. One, it concludes that in cases of men challenging gender-based discrimination, a more stringent standard of review is called for than is applied in cases involving most other types of classifications. Two, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is enunciating a test, without citation, that classifications based on gender must be substantially related to important interests. Concurrence. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell) said this gender-based classification does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the legislation. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) says there is only one Equal Protection Clause. It does not require the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different one in other cases. Discussion. This case establishes the current standard of review for gender-based classifications. The same standard applies without regard for which gender is being discriminated against.

Rostker v. Goldberg (1981)

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff's brought suit, alleging the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The federal government may classify on the basis of race, but only when there is an important government interest and the means are substantially related to the interest. Facts. The MSSA requires all males between the ages 18 to 26 to register with the Selective Service. The purpose of the MSSA is to allow the armed services to select men in the event that a military draft is necessary. Women are not required to register with the Selective Service. Issue. May the federal government require only males to register with the Selective Service? Held. Yes. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) writes for the majority, noting that the primary objective for the MSSA is to provide a supply of combat troops in times when a military draft is necessary, clearly an important government interest. As to the means, J. Rehnquist notes that only men (as a group) are eligible for combat duty. Because of this, registering all women is a substantial administrative inconvenience for a small degree of payoff. Men and women are thus differently situated for purposes of a draft. Furthermore, most non-combat positions are filled by combat-ready troops that are rotated with other troops, further diminishing the payoff from the registration of women. Dissent. Justice Byron White (J. White) dissents, arguing that there are jobs that can be performed by persons ineligible for combat duty. As such, there is no reason that Congress cannot recruit women for these positions. Discussion. Again, J. Rehnquist does not use the intermediate scrutiny terminology, although it may clearly be applied to the case at bar. There is an important government interest (providing for a draft) and a substantially related means to achieve the interest (requiring only men to register, where only men are eligible for combat as a group).

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. (1989)

Brief Fact Summary. Richmond, Virginia created a set-aside program which required that a percentage of subcontracts for construction projects be reserved for minorities. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Affirmative action programs can only be maintained by a showing that the programs aim is to eliminate effects of past discrimination. Facts. In1983, the Richmond City Council, in the state of Virginia, adopted the minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan), which required government supported construction contractors to set-aside 30% of its subcontracts to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). MBEs were defined as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled . . . by minority group members." Under the Plan, "minority group members" were defined as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Black, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." The purpose of the Plan was to "promot[e] wider participation by minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects." The Appellant, J.A. Croson Company (Appellant), challenged the Plan on the grounds that it violated the United States Constitution (Constitution) because there had been no specific finding that the Plan's purpose was supported by past discriminatory practices in the construction indust ry of Richmond, Virginia. The District Court upheld the Plan, but, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding that the set-aside program "violat[ed] both prongs of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . " The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Issue. Whether a state may enact an affirmative action plan without support that the "race-based measure ameliorates the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our society . . . ." Held. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor). No. Without a showing that a race-based initiative was created to remedy past racial discrimination and that it supports a compelling governmental interest, the race-based initiative is unconstitutional and cannot withstand strict-scrutiny. The judgment is affirmed. All classifications based on race must be supported by a compelling government interest and withstand strict-scrutiny. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) finds that the Plan failed to consider race-neutral measures that would encourage more minority participation in the construction program. Also, the 30% quota allowed by the Plan was not "narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing." The race-based measure of Richmond, Virginia's construction set-aside program makes only a "generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in . . . [the construction industry and] provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall). Richmond's Plan would be declared constitutional under the intermediate level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court should have applied the intermediate level rather than the strict scrutiny standard. Preventing initiatives, such as the set-aside program, for lack of a showing of past discrimination in the area only perpetuates racial discrimination because it suggests that racial discrimination no longer exists. Concurrence. The concurring opinions of the Court are as follows: Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). The premise of remedying past wrongs should not be the sole requirement for allowing racial classifications. The judicial system, not the legislative process, is best equipped to identify past discrimination and to create ameliorative remedies. Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Kennedy). "The Fourteenth Amendment ought not be interpreted to reduce a State's authority [eradicate racial discrimination] . . . unless, of course, there is a conflict with federal law or a state remedy is itself a violation of equal protection." Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia). All racial discrimination is unconstitutional. There is only one instance when a State "may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification." Discussion. Regardless of its application to racial minorities or to other racial groups, race-based classifications require the highest level of scrutiny in all cases. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena Search Search Brief Table of Contents Remove from Library Law Dictionary Print Note Pad AA Font size Held. Strict Scrutiny and maybe. The case is remanded to the lower courts for determination of whether the program passes the test of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is necessary because (1) it may not always be clear whether a so-called benign classification is in fact benign; (2) the courts should take a skeptical view of all racial classifications and (3) there should be consistency of treatment regardless of the race of the person burdened or benefited. "Strict in theory" does not necessarily imply "fatal in fact". When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is constitutional when it satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement. Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) states the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) assumes there is no difference between a decision by the majority to impose a burden on the minority and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to the minority notwithstanding the incidental burden certain members of the majority will incur. The Supreme Court would disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that given this Country's racial history and its consequences, Congress should be able to carefully design remedial programs to help us finally realize the "equal protection of the laws" the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) has promised since 1868. Concurrence. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) stated that the government could never have a compelling interest for discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past discrimination. There is no such thing under the Constitution of the United States as a debtor or creditor race. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) stated government programs based on benign racial classifications are just as noxious as those inspired by malicious prejudice. Discussion. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires strict scrutiny of all race-based programs adopted by state or local governments. In this case, the Supreme Court brings the standard of judicial review for state and local governments into harmony with that for the federal government. The Supreme Court says that there should be no different treatment between claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and those brought under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause.

Lalli v. Lalli (1978)

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, Robert Lalli (Appellant), seeking inheritance from his father, challenges the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring him to prove paternity, before the death of his father. Synopsis of Rule of Law. State laws classifying children on legitimacy must be substantially related to the important state interest the statute is intended to promote. Facts. The Appellant claimed to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli who died intestate. The Appellant argued that he was entitled to inherit from father and that the New York statute, requiring him to obtain an order of filiation during his father's lifetime, discriminated against him on the basis of his illegitimate birth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). A New York trial and appellate court ruled against the Appellant. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Issue. Whether the New York law requiring illegitimate children to provide a particular form of proof of paternity, in order to inherit from their fathers, is unconstitutional. Held. No. The New York requirement for illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers is substantially related to the important state interests that the statute intended to promote. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The main goal of the statute "is to provide for just and orderly disposition of property at death." This goal has been recognized as an important state interest. Proof of paternity becomes more difficult after the father's death. Therefore, the state also expressed an important interest in preventing "fraudulent claims of heirship and harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to establish themselves as illegitimate heirs." Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan). The New York statute discriminates against illegitimate children "through means not substantially related to the legitimate interests that the state purports to promote . . . ." Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows: Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart). The ruling of the Supreme Court provides "authoritative guidance to the courts and legislatures of the several States. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), should have been overruled, not distinguished, by this decision. Discussion. The Supreme Court illustrated that paternity suits are now classified among gender discrimination cases and require intermediate scrutiny requiring that the statutory classification be substantially related to an important governmental objective.

Frontierio v. Richardson (1973)

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, Sharron Frontiero (Appellant), asserts that a military practice that automatically allowed the wives of male officers to be considered as dependents and thus receive the rights of dependents, but required the female officers, in order to get the benefits for their husbands, to actually prove that their husbands were dependent upon them, is an unconstitutional gender based classification. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Facts. The Appellant, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought housing, medical and dental benefits for her husband. The Appellant did so on the basis that her husband was a dependent based on a statute that states dependents of service personnel are eligible for such benefits. The Appellant's application was denied because she failed to show her husband was dependent on her for more than one-half of his support. The Appellant filed suite arguing that the statute unreasonably discriminated on the basis of gender in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Appellant asserted the discriminatory impact was twofold. First, as a procedural matter, a female member is required to demonstrate her spouse's dependency, while a male member is not required to demonstrate his spouse's dependency. Second, as a substantive matter, a male member who does not provide more than one-half of his wife's support receives be nefits, while a similarly situated female member is denied such benefits. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) concluded that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Issue. Whether the differential treatment of the allocation of allowances and benefits in the uniformed services by allowing servicemen's spouses to claim a dependent without regard to whether they are truly dependent on their spouses, while requiring servicewomen's spouses to show they are actually dependent on their spouses for over one half of his support violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Held. Reversed. The Due Process Clause is violated by this gender classification. Classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Concurrence. Statute mandates invidious discrimination, which violates of the Constitution. The challenged statute constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. However it is unnecessary to characterize sex as a suspect class because if the Equal Rights Amendment is enacted it will resolve the substance of this precise question. Discussion. Classifications based on sex are inherently suspect per the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment and must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny

Mathews v. Diaz (1976)

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellees, Diaz and others (Appellees), were denied enrollment into a federal insurance plan solely on the basis that they were not citizens of the United States. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The federal government may restrict aliens from receiving or qualifying for benefits enjoyed by United States citizens. Facts. The Appellees were denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program and therefore, challenge the constitutionality of this denial. Specifically, the Appellees challenge the requirement that aliens can only qualify for the federal medical insurance program if he or she becomes a permanent resident and resides in the United States for at least five years. The District Court held the eligibility condition to be unconstitutional. The judgment of the court is reversed. Issue. Whether Congress may, under the United States Constitution (Constitution), condition an alien's eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United States for a five-year period and admission for permanent residence. Held. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution protects aliens and citizens. However, this protection does not lead to the conclusion that "all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship . . . ." Also, The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution concerns relationships between aliens and states, not between aliens and the federal government. The judgment is reversed. Discussion. The Constitution allows the federal government more freedom in its exercise of power over aliens then that of the states.

Bernal v. Fainter (1984)

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Efrem Bernal's (Petitioner), application to become a notary public was denied solely on the basis that he was an alien. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State must show that it has a compelling state interest, that is consistent with the principles supported by the United States Constitution (Constitution), when its law supports alien-based classifications. Facts. The Petitioner, an alien living in Texas, has worked as a paralegal and wanted to become a notary public so that he would be able to "administer oaths to [migrant farm] workers and to notarize their statements for use in civil litigation . . . ." The Petitioner's application to become a notary public was denied by the Texas Secretary of State because he was not a citizen of the United States. The Petitioner argued that the Texas law, allowing only United States citizens the right to become notaries, violated the Constitution. The District Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision after its application of the rational basis test. Issue. Whether a statute of the State of Texas violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it denies an alien the opportunity to become a notary public. Held. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall). Yes. An alien-based classification under state law can only be upheld if it withstands the strict scrutiny standard of review. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The State fails to show that aliens cannot become familiar with state law for purposes of carrying out their notary duties nor does the State show that aliens are incapable of being available for purposes of testifying as to work performed as a notary. The requirements to become a notary do not directly support the State's concern that an alien cannot become familiar with state law. The core requirements for becoming an notary only include "fill[ing] out an application that lists one's name and address and that answers four questions pertaining to one's age, citizenship, residency and criminal record . . . " The State fails to show that the possible unavailability of an alien notary for purposes of testimony for litigation is a compelling interest that is consistent with constitutional principles. Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist). J. Rehnquist's dissents for reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973). Discussion. Alien-based classifications, under state law and state action, must pass strict scrutiny.

Palmore v. Sidoti (1984)

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Linda Palmore (Petitioner), brought an action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment challenging a judicial ruling that divested custody of her child solely because of her relationship with a person of another race. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Racial classifications in the determination of custodial arrangements are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and will only be upheld if they are justified by a compelling governmental interest and necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose. Facts. The Petitioner and the Respondent, Anthony Sidoti (Respondent), divorced and the Petitioner was awarded custody of their young daughter. The Respondent later filed a petition to modify custody arrangements after he learned the Petitioner was involved in a relationship with a black man whom she later married. The petitioned court determined that there was no basis to the allegations that the Petitioner had improperly cared for the child. However, the court awarded custody to the Respondent based on the lifestyle choices the Petitioner had made by having a black partner and the social stigmatization that the child would suffer because the Petitioner's relationship with a black man. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's decision was based solely on race and therefore it was subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fou rteenth Amendment. Issue. Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by a judgment that divested a natural mother custody of her child because of her remarriage to a person of a different race? Held. Reversed. Discussion. Classifications based on race invoke the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and will be subject to a strict standard of review, which will only uphold the classification if it is justified by a compelling governmental interest and necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose

Reed v. Reed (1971)

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Ms. Reed the mother of a deceased child (Petitioner), alleges a statute that prefers males over females in the administration of an estate to which they both have equal claims, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. Classifications based on gender must be substantially related to an important government interest in order to be upheld per the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Facts. The Petitioner filed suit alleging a statute that prefers males over females in the administration of an estate that the Petitioner and the Respondent, Mr. Reed (Respondent) have equal claim, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based solely on this statute the Respondent, the father of the deceased child, is declared the administrator of the child's estate. Issue. Whether a statute that includes a gender based provision, preferring males over females to administer an estate, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Held. Reversed. This gender-based classification violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Discussion. Classifications based solely on gender are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause. The standard of review is that the statute must be reasonable and must rest upon some ground having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979)

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Feeney (Respondent), challenges the Petitioner, Personnel Administration of Massachusetts's (Petitioner), rule that provides a hiring preference to military veterans. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A gender neutral statute that adversely impacts one gender does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) if it does not have a discriminatory purpose and it does not actually classify one gender. Facts. Respondent claims that by having a hiring preference for veterans over non- veterans for civil service positions, the Petitioner is discriminating against women. The District Court found that this practice has a severe impact on job opportunities for women, since most of the veterans are men. Issue. Does the hiring practice that favors veterans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution? Held. No. The benefit of this act was offered to any person who was a veteran. The law is a preference for veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. It was not designed to favor men over women. Discussion. This statute was designed to reward and help veterans reenter society after their service. At the time only 1% of the veterans were women. So, it appeared that this legislation was meant for men only. But, in its application and by definition a veteran is gender neutral.

Railway Express Agency v New York (1949)

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States found that a law that forbids general advertising on vehicles where such ads benefit businesses other than that of the vehicle's owner, is a valid social and economic regulation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Unequal treatment on the basis of advertisements of products sold by the owner of the truck and general advertisements is not a violation of equal protection, but rather a valid social and economic regulation. Facts. Section 124 of the New York City Traffic Regulations forbade general advertisements on trucks unless the advertisement belonged to the owner of the truck. Therefore, owners of trucks could not sell advertising space on their trucks to general advertisers. Appellant, Railway Express Agency, is engaged in a nationwide express business and operates about 1,900 trucks in New York City. Appellant was convicted for selling space on the exterior sides of the trucks for advertising pursuant to this law. The state court concluded that the advertising on vehicles constituted a distraction to other drivers and pedestrians and therefore, affects the safety and public use of the streets. Issue. Whether section 124 of the New York City Traffic Regulations violates the Constitution. Held. No. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. The city's interest in traffic safety was served by the regulation banning general advertising on vehicles, but allowing advertising for the company which owned the vehicle. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. Concurrence. It would be constitutional for New York to completely ban advertising if such advertising causes people driving on the highways to be distracted. Discussion. Despite the law's under-inclusiveness, the majority holds that it is a valid regulation and thus does not violate equal protection.

Loving v. Virginia (1967)

Brief Fact Summary. The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person or the reverse. The constitutionality of the statutes was called into question. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Restricting the freedom to marry solely on the basis of race violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Facts. The state of Virginia enacted laws making it a felony for a white person to intermarry with a black person or a black person to intermarry with a white person. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the statutes served the legitimate state purpose of preserving the "racial integrity" of its citizens. The State argued that because its miscegenation statutes punished both white and black participants in an interracial marriage equally, they cannot be said to constitute invidious discrimination based on race and, therefore, the statutes commanded mere rational basis review. Issue. Was rational basis the proper standard of review by which to evaluate the constitutionality of the statutes? Were the Virginia miscegenation statutes constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause? Held. No and No. The mere fact that a statute is one of equal application does not mean that the statute is exempt from strict scrutiny review. The statutes were clearly drawn upon race-based distinctions. The legality of certain behavior turned on the races of the people engaging in it. Equal Protection requires, at least, that classifications based on race be subject to the "most rigid scrutiny." The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution) prohibits classifications drawn by any statute that constitutes arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The fact that Virginia bans only interracial marriages involving whites is proof that the miscegenation statutes exist for no purposes independent of those based on arbitrary and invidious racial discrimination. Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) argued it is not possible for a state law to be valid, which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor. Discussion. The key to this case is articulated in J. Stewart's concurrence. The miscegenation statute was improper because it made the legal consequences of an action turn on the races of the persons participating in it.

Skinner v. Oklahoma (1937)

Brief Fact Summary. Under Oklahoma law, a person convicted a third time of certain specified crimes involving "moral turpitude" received the punishment of sterilization. Persons convicted a third time of other similar crimes were not. The constitutionality of this distinction was brought into question. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When the law concerning those who have committed intrinsically the same type of offense punishes one, but not the other by depriving the one of a fundamental right, an invidious discrimination has been made. Facts. Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act) defined a "habitual criminal" as a person who has been convicted three of more times for crimes involving moral turpitude. Such persons under Oklahoma law were to be rendered sexually sterile. Multiple violations for offenses involving "prohibitory laws" such as revenue acts, embezzlement or political offenses were exempted from punishment under the Act. Petitioner, convicted of stealing chickens for a third offense, was convicted under the Act. The alleged purpose of the law was to prevent the passing on to future generations of criminal traits. Issue. Was the Act, calling for the sterilization of certain multiple offenders but not others, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Skinner v. Oklahoma Search Search Brief Table of Contents Remove from Library Law Dictionary Print Note Pad AA Font size Held. Yes. The judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that the vasectomy be performed is reversed. Justice William Douglas stated sterilization of repeat offenders of grand larceny, with immunity for repeat offenders of embezzlement, is an unmistakable discrimination. Oklahoma has put forward no proof, nor do we have any basis to conclude, that traits for crimes resulting in sterilization are any more inheritable than are traits for crimes exempt from sterilization. The right to procreate is one of the most basic civil rights. Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurred in the result. J. Stone I thought the real question, however, is whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to an invasion of personal liberty without the opportunity to prove he is not of the type the law presumes him to be, is a violation of due process. Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) declares that the right implicated by the distinction here is a fundamental one, thereby subjecting the law to the strict scrutiny standard of review. Arguably, the Supreme Court could have invalidated the Oklahoma law, providing starkly differing treatment as between embezzlers and larceners, on the grounds of the rational basis standard of review.

J.E.B. v. Alabama Rel. T. B. (1994)

Facts of the case Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool. Question Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."

United Steelworkers v. Weber (1979)

Facts of the case The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber. Question Did United and Kaiser Aluminum's training scheme violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race? Conclusion 5-2 DECISION FOR UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions, the University implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A student that is from an underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points towards his or her over all score. The groups of students typically come from African-American, Hispanic, and Native American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary artistic talent only receives 5 points under the admission system. Also every student that is from an underrepresented group, and is otherwise qualified, is typically accepted into the school. A group of white student's, that were determined qualified by the University, where denied admission. Issue. Whether a School's admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points to students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Held. Yes. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or town where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous cases, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant should be individually assessed. Each student's admission should be based on the student's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education. An admission system that grants points for certain characteristics such as race is not an individual assessment. When applicants are being chosen for a program and part of the reasoning is based on race, any discrimination made is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since the White students are being discriminated based on race, they are a suspect class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show the system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not narrowly tailored. Simply Dissent. The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race sole reasons for denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things such residency, grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan design is better fit than other plans to ensure diversity. Discussion. The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with individual assessment will be impractical. However, this court states that just because it will be difficult to achieve such standards, it does not render their actions constitutional.