Ethics Exam 2
An action done because of intellectual fear is . . . a. less voluntary, and possibly even involuntary b. fully voluntary
"A" because you did not choose the difficult circumstances (which reduces voluntariness), and you might or might not be blameworthy for how you responded to those circumstances (depending on whether you chose to respond to them reasonably)
Why is Exaggeration worse - is it worse in itself, or worse relative to most people, or both, according to Aristotle?
worse in itself. It does not really even look like the right amount of talking about oneself, in other words, in Aristotle's view.
Based ultimately on the way human nature is built, money CAN help us to live more excellently by fulfilling three functions that are not as easily fulfilled in a barter economy. What THREE functions does money naturally and legitimately serve, according to Aristotle? Name and explain them.
(1) Money can make it easier to ensure that corrective justice is fulfilled in an exchange. EXPLANATION: Money provides a quick numerical method of comparing the values of very different things like shoes, houses, and loaves of bread. (2) Money can encourage exchanges (and exchanges are often beneficial to people). EXPLANATION: Suppose a shoemaker needs a house. The housebuilder would probably not want to trade a house for 10,000 pairs of shoes from the shoemaker, but he might be willing to trade a house for $150,000 from the shoemaker (since $150,000 can be spent to acquire something that the housebuilder really DOES need or want - unlike 10,000 pairs of shoes!). (3) Money can store value in a more permanent way than other items that might be traded. EXPLANATION: Money does not rot as fast as food, for example.
What is brutishness?
: An unnatural desire taking over the soul (not merely an ordinary, natural desire taking over the soul, which would be bad enough). Examples: Instead of merely wanting too much ordinary food in general like an ordinary glutton (as in the vice of gluttony), a brutish person might want to rip babies out of pregnant women's bodies and eat them (to use one of Aristotle's examples). Or instead of a man seducing an adult woman outside of marriage (as in one example of the vice known as lack of self-control, which would be bad enough), a child molester might show his brutishness by going after toddlers. As you can see, brutishness tends to involve wanting something that it never makes sense to want in any way and for any reason, whereas mere vice tends to involve wanting something which could be legitimate in other circumstances, but wanting it too much (or too little) or in the wrong way or under the wrong circumstances.
Why would a virtue be a "state," in his view?
: because we consider a person to be an excellent person overall when his character is a certain way, not merely because once one day he had a warm, fuzzy feeling or once one day he did a nice action. A moral virtue is an excellence in a PERSON, not merely in a feeling or in an action. It has to do with a disposition or habit for how you regularly DEAL WITH AND GOVERN your feelings and actions!
A person who DID have a reasonable way to know the truth of what he is in fact doing, but who decided not to look as hard as a reasonable person would to ascertain the truth, is in a condition of . . . a. vincible ignorance b. invincible ignorance
A
An action done because of antecedent passion is . . . a. less voluntary than one done without passion, and possibly even involuntary b. fully voluntary
A
MULTIPLE CHOICE: Which of the following names the virtue of having the right amount of boldness? a. courage b. perfected self-mastery c. insensibility d. rashness e. none of the above
A
Suppose I suspect that there is a law against the type of stock transaction that I am about to perform. A legal dictionary is next to me, and I open to the page marked "insider trading." As I start to read the relevant pages, I see the beginning of an argument that is probably (but not certainly) going to end by condemning the type of trade that I am about to perform. Therefore, I quickly close the book, so that if I am arrested, I can honestly say that I "didn't know for sure that what I did was wrong." What exactly is this type of ignorance called? a. affected vincible ignorance b. crass vincible ignorance c. practical vincible ignorance d. lazy vincible ignorance e. absolute vincible ignorance
A
What's unique about the relationship of the vice of being "Over-Reserved" with the opposite vice of being an Exaggerator when it comes to communicating thoughts about yourself?
A person who is EXTREMELY Over-Reserved (too little talking about oneself) actually ends up drawing attention to himself and thus ends up becoming an Exaggerator in that way. (For instance, extreme over-reservedness can be like saying, "Hey, everyone, look at how humble I am, look at how I don't answer your reasonable questions about my achievements, in order to make you ask about them more")
Which is easier to reform - a person with a vice, or a person with Imperfect Self-Control, according to Aristotle, and why?
A person with Imperfect Self-Control because at least that person still himself recognizes that he ought to change his behavior. The person with a vice refuses even to agree with the statement "I ought to change my behavior" because his enslaved reasoning part (enslaved to the lower parts of his soul) actually justifies his depraved conduct with rationalizations (bad arguments that his lower parts want to be true so that they can get what they want). That person might even be proud of his conduct!
How many of those features must be present in order for an action to be morally EXCELLENT/VIRTUOUS?
ALL FOUR!
Look at the list of features that you provided in answer to the last question. According to Aristotle, which of those must be present in order for an action to be morally permissible (that is, "okay")?
At the very least, the first condition: the action must be of the right type (that is, in the relative mean). Without that, you have a downright BAD action, objectively.
A person who DID TECHNICALLY have a way to know the truth of what he is in fact doing, but who couldn't REASONABLY be expected to have been able to have found out the truth, is in a condition of . . . a. vincible ignorance b. invincible ignorance
B
An action done because of consequent passion is . . . a. less voluntary than one done without passion, and possibly even involuntary b. fully voluntary
B
If an action is an action of the right kind (like "eating a reasonable amount of dessert") and the action fulfills ALL BUT ONE of the other 3 conditions laid out by Aristotle for a "virtuous action," then Aristotle would say that the action is . . . a. morally bad (wrong) b. morally okay, but neither excellent nor virtuous c. still morally excellent, though technically not morally "virtuous"
B
If an action is an action of the right kind (like "eating a reasonable amount of dessert") but the action does not fulfill ANY of the other 3 conditions laid out by Aristotle for a "virtuous action," then Aristotle would say that the action is . . . a. morally bad (wrong) b. morally okay, but neither excellent nor virtuous c. still morally excellent, though technically not morally "virtuous"
B
Suppose I do not try to find out the truth at all about some aspect of what I am doing, even though a reasonable person in my situation would. In that case, I am in a condition of . . . a. affected vincible ignorance b. crass vincible ignorance c. practical vincible ignorance d. lazy vincible ignorance e. absolute vincible ignorance
B
Which of the following is the name of the vice of too much with respect to boldness? a. cowardice b. rashness c. courage d. vulgar profusion e. lack of self-control."
B
Is excessive anger worse in itself, or worse relative to most people (meaning it is more tempting to most people), or both, according to Aristotle?
BOTH
Why is there two vices for every virtue?
Because there is a vice of habitually aiming at not enough of something and there is a vice of habitually aiming at too much of that same thing. The virtue is between these two extremes.
Which deals more with regulating our Spirited Part and its handling of pain - Courage or Perfected Self-Mastery?
Courage
Suppose I try to find out the truth, but do not try as hard as a reasonable person would. In that case, I am in a condition of . . . a. affected vincible ignorance b. crass vincible ignorance c. practical vincible ignorance d. lazy vincible ignorance e. absolute vincible ignorance
D
(a) What does money naturally measure, according to Aristotle's analysis? (That is, in other words, when money fulfills the purposes that human nature needs it for, what is it treated as measuring?) Why?
Demand Because, as we've seen. human nature needs money in order to help facilitate trade - yet trade itself would not occur in the first place if people did not want what each other have. So the way money (when used rightly) can facilitate trade is by measuring how much people want things so as to be able to make sure trades are fair.
MULTIPLE CHOICE: Which of the following names the vice of not having sufficient boldness in the face of danger? a. courage b. perfected self-mastery c. insensibility d. rashness e. none of the above
E
TRUE or FALSE: The person with a vice still has an active conscience (reasoning part) and thus realizes deep down that he is doing something bad.
FALSE
TRUE or FALSE: The person with a virtue still has not tamed his/her desiring and spirited part and thus has an internal struggle before doing what is right.
FALSE
Out of all Aristotle's detailed accounts of moral virtues and vices from the second half of Book III to the end of Book V, which virtue is described by Aristotle in the most controversial way, according to what we learned in class?
Great-Mindedness
According to Aristotle, is it easy or hard to be virtuous, and why?
Hard, because you can err by too much or too little, and it's not always easy to find - and want - the relative mean.
What SPECIFIC bad effect does Small-Mindedness have, according to Aristotle?
He claims it deteriorates one's character by tending to result in aiming at less excellent activities than one is really capable of. Thus (in Aristotle's view) the person ends up not practicing and developing and maintaining the great virtues that he actually used to have.
If an action is not an action of the right kind (in other words, not in the relative mean), then can it still be a morally permissible action, according to Aristotle?
NO. Minimally, at the very least, that first feature must belong to the action for it to be at least "okay."
Why did Aristotle add the final clause of his definition of moral virtue - "and as a man of practical wisdom would determine"? Isn't that just redundant with the previous part of the definition ("determined by reason")?
No, it's not redundant. Aristotle is specifying whose Reasoning Part is best suited to determine the relative mean. Not everyone's Reasoning Part is equally expert in every area of life. So the judgment of someone who truly has practical wisdom would be a better standard than the judgment of someone who is clueless about the details of the topic that is being encountered! But without the final part of the definition, we'd have to say that a virtuous child's Reasoning Part is just as competent to decide how bold to be in putting one's fingers into a broken machine (while trying to fix it) as compared with the Reasoning Part of a virtuous adult who has been fixing that type of machine for 32 years. Or we would have to say that a child's Reasoning Part is just as competent as a mature, excellent adult's Reasoning Part at figuring out how much money to spend today at the grocery store. That is absurd.
If someone is bold on behalf of an unreasonable goal, would Aristotle call that courage? Why or why not?
No. because a virtue aims at a relative mean which is DETERMINED BY REASON AND AS A PERSON WITH PRACTICAL WISDOM WOULD DETERMINE. So if the goal is unreasonable, then it is not reasonable to face danger to achieve it! Trying to be bold so as to achieve an unreasonable goal is a case of rashness, by definition. That's why (as we discussed in class) it is pretty clear that Aristotle would not call terrorists "courageous." Instead, they are rash. They are being bold when it does not make sense to be bold - like when facing innocent civilians and being so bold as to cut their throats. That is too much boldness, relative to the situation of "facing a plane full of innocent civilians," as a reasonable assessment of the topic of "whether each person in this random collection of people on this plane has done something to deserve an instant death penalty at my hands right now" easily shows.
Aristotle's account of the various types of justice makes sense to a lot of people. But society still has lots of disputes about justice. What kinds of disputes can arise among people about justice, even when they agree that distributive justice is different from corrective justice?
People still argue over: (1) whether a given situation calls for the application of corrective justice or distributive justice (or a mix of the two), (2) whether the items in a given exchange are in fact equal in value (when trying to APPLY corrective justice), and (3) what standard should be used to decide who gets how much honor, power, wealth, possessions, etc. in a distribution (when trying to APPLY distributive justice).
Which deals more with regulating our Desiring Part and its drive for pleasures - Courage or Perfected Self-Mastery?
Perfected Self-Mastery
Sometimes one vice can be worse for your character than the opposite vice in the same area of life. What two factors can produce this result?
Sometimes one vice is "worse in itself" than the opposite vice, and sometimes one vice is "worse for you personally" than the opposite vice.
TRUE or FALSE: An action done because of affected vincible ignorance is voluntary in one way but more voluntary on another.
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: Aristotle does not say whether he thinks one vice is worse than the opposite extreme in the case of friendliness
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: Courage involves being as bold as a situation reasonably requires, in Aristotle's view. A coward does not act as boldly as reason requires in some situation.
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: If someone does not have ALL the other virtues to a great degree, then Aristotle claims that person cannot have the virtue of Great-Mindedness.
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: The person with Imperfect Self-Control still has an active conscience (reasoning part) and thus realizes deep down that he is doing what is bad.
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: The person with Self-Control still has not tamed his/her desiring and spirited part and thus has an internal struggle before doing what is right.
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: The topic of "voluntariness" is the topic of "to what extent the will is engaged in an action."
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: The vices mentioned in part (a) of this question concern such things as how much you talk about yourself (including how much attention your clothing draws to yourself, since clothing talks about yourself in a way).
TRUE
TRUE or FALSE: Truthfulness is Aristotle's name for the virtue of habitually doing the right amount (the relative mean) of talking about oneself.
TRUE
a) TRUE or FALSE: According to Aristotle, a person with Imperfect Self-Control is on the path to vice. (b) Why?
TRUE:
Which sense is Perfected Self-Mastery trying to moderate most of all, according to Aristotle?
Touch
TRUE or FALSE: Even in the case of an activity whose very definition does NOT necessarily imply "too much" or "too little" by its very definition, the right amount of that activity for you personally might still be ZERO for much or even all of your life, according to Aristotle's way of thinking.
True
According to Aristotle, for every virtue there are ____ vices.
Two
Has anyone ever defended the claim that Aristotle's account of Great-Mindedness can be interpreted so as to NOT sound like a "treatise in defense of arrogance"? If so, how, in general?
Yes, for example St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas is a thinker who likes humility and dislikes arrogance, but he claims that although Aristotle did not mention humility as a virtue, there is a way of interpreting his account of Great-Mindedness as at least not endorsing arrogance. (In fact, St. Thomas claims that Aristotle's account can be interpreted such that it would still even be compatible with the virtue of humility, a virtue which Aristotle never mentions.)
Give an example of commutative justice practiced in a voluntary transaction.
You give a soccer store owner $29.95 for a pair of junior soccer cleats which are worth $29.95. Or another student needs an eraser, and you want a pencil, and you both agree that his pencil is worth as much as your eraser, so you trade your eraser for the pencil.
Aristotle gave the example of throwing valuable goods overboard during a storm in order to save a ship from sinking. We went over this example in class. Explain how this situation involves intellectual fear.
You know that if you do not throw the goods overboard, you drown and lose both your life and the goods anyway. So no one can charge you with "voluntarily inflicting a loss of $100,000 on the person expecting the shipment." You voluntarily responded in a reasonable way to a storm, and the storm is really what caused the destruction of the merchandise. You did choose to throw the goods overboard, but you did not choose the circumstances that led to this being a reasonable decision.
Give an example of commutative justice practiced in an involuntary transaction.
You shoplift a pair of soccer shoes from a soccer store. The shoes were worth $29.95, so the government fines you and repays the soccer store owner against your will.
What reason does HE give for this -- because it's more tempting for most people, or because it simply does not resemble the virtue very much, meaning that it is further from the relative mean and thus is "worse in itself"?
because it simply does not resemble the virtue very much, meaning that it is further from the relative mean (i.e., "worse in itself")
What reason does HE give for this -- because it's more tempting for most people (i.e., "worse relative to most people personally"), or because it simply does not resemble the virtue very much, meaning that it is further from the relative mean (i.e., "worse in itself")?
because it's more tempting for most people
Why is that considered so controversial?
because many people have thought that details that Aristotle gives about Great-Mindedness make it sound like a rather unpleasant form of arrogance. He says that the Great-Minded person despises the praise of less virtuous people. He would rather hear of his own good deeds instead of others' good deeds toward him. Aristotle even concedes that people like this are "thought to be supercilious" because nothing is all that important in their eyes. Everything is small, they think, compared to their own great thoughts and virtues. Etc. (as we covered in class from the text).
Why aren't "experience and skill" the same as true courage, in Aristotle's view?
because the person knows he is not REALLY facing as much danger as everyone else thinks, so this situation is not REALLY an adequate test for "excellence" in his character. Maybe if he were in a situation that is TRULY dangerous for someone of his level of training, he would give up and not do what is right.
Why isn't the "Courage of Citizenship" the same as true courage, in Aristotle's view?
because the reasoning part is not motivating the person, but just rewards or punishments. The resulting conduct when the person faces danger thus might still be okay or even good but not "excellent" (virtuous). To put it another way, the person fulfills condition # 1 for a virtuous action, but not condition # 3.
Why isn't "mere Animal Spirit" the same as true courage, in Aristotle's view?
because the reasoning part of a person is not really what is motivating him, but only a temporary rush of adrenaline. Once that wears off, he will not be as bold as he needs to be (if it is really "mere Animal Spirit" and not "the spirited part working together with the reasoning part" inside him).
Why is being "sanguine and hopeful" not the same as true courage, in Aristotle's view?
because these people might refuse to face the situation if they truly understood how dangerous it is
Why is "ignorance" not the same as true courage, according to Aristotle?
because these people might refuse to face the situation if they truly understood their lack of skills to deal with it.
In the context of false types of courage, what specifically does Aristotle mean by "ignorance" as a false type of courage?
being ignorant of one's own lack of ability, and thus overestimating one's ability to handle a situation. (Here you accurately understand the situation around you, but you do not understand yourself!)
Where does Aristotle think most people are on that graph?
between self-control and imperfect self-control, but NEARER to imperfect self-control than to self-control
What is the "Courage of Citizenship"?
facing danger not because it is so right to do so, but instead primarily because of the promise of honors or the threat of punishments
In the context of false types of courage, what is meant by "experience and skill"?
having specialized abilities so that you know that FOR YOU the situation is nowhere near as dangerous as it looks to the untrained eye.
What is superhuman virtue?
having tamed the lower parts of the soul so much that the person does incredibly good actions. For example, instead of merely exercising "ordinary" liberality with frequent donations to the poor, people like St. Francis of Assisi renounced all their earthly possessions and spent the entire rest of their lives doing good deeds and taking care of poor people, lepers, and others. Wow!
Later philosophers built upon Aristotle's analysis by naming different types of ignorance that he had outlined and by explaining more fully the concept of compulsion. Thus, with the aid of a handout, we studied 5 factors that can affect the voluntariness of an action. You will not be asked to recite the names of these 5 factors from scratch, but if you are given a list of choices, you should be able to recognize which items on the list were factors that we studied and which items were not. For example: MULTIPLE CHOICE: Which of the following is NOT the name that we learned for a factor that we studied that affects voluntariness? historical accident, passion, physical force, habit, ignorance
historical accident
In the text at the very start of Book III, Aristotle explicitly names two sources that can reduce voluntariness in an action. What are they?
ignorance and compulsion
Some examples of states (i.e., habits or conditions, things that have become "second nature") inside a person are a condition whereby the muscles can easily coordinate to hit a baseball with a baseball bat, or a condition whereby the person's finger tends to scratch the head three times instead of two or four when there's an itch, or a condition whereby the person tends to chew food on the left side of the mouth before the right side. But none of these examples would be an example of the kind of state that constitutes a moral virtue. So, by contrast, what exactly does a moral virtue make us apt to do, according to its definition?
it makes you apt to exercise deliberate choice
Not every type of deliberate choice would be a virtuous choice. What must be true of the "amount" of something that is being deliberately chosen, in order for the state of character that aims you at it to be a moral virtue?
it must be in the relative mean
Who are "the sanguine and hopeful" who are listed as people with a false type of courage in Aristotle's list?
people who underestimate the danger of a situation in itself. (Here you are underestimating the situation itself which is around you.)
What is "mere Animal Spirit," according to Aristotle?
the spirited part of a person temporarily becomes very excited (like a "rush of adrenaline"), and then the person faces danger solely because of the adrenaline rush.
Why is buffoonery worse, according to Aristotle - is it worse in itself, or worse relative to most people, or both, according to Aristotle?
worse relative to most people. (That is, most people are more tempted to tell jokes that at times and in ways that are inappropriate, he thinks, than they are to scorn humor that is legitimate.)
