FINAL QUIZ- MASS INCARCERATION

2019—Felony Disenfranchisement Restrictions—for AR:

Prison, Parole, and Probation.

The two processes of destabilization?

-Removing people by sending them to prison -Re-entry back into community

Coercive mobility

-crime can increase as a result of people removed from communities -diminishes collective efficacy The removal of large populations from poor neighborhoods and incarcerating them A distinct form of residential mobility created by the cycling of people into and out of prison

If the crime-control impact is small, the community-level impact is not. The expanding prison system has contributed to each of the following:******

1) intergenerational criminality; 2) broken families; 3) problems in school; 4) STDs; 5) teenage births; 6) anticonventional attitudes; 7) depleted labor markets; 8) racial inequality; 9) crime.

Argue that at least 4 general conclusions can be drawn:

1) the incarceration rate has been demonstrated to be perhaps surprisingly disconnected from the crime rate; 2) prison expansion has not met its own goals, either manifest or latent; 3) mass incarceration exacerbated, rather than improved, many of the social problems that we remained concerned about at the end of the 20th cent.; 4) mass incarceration has been perhaps one of the best examples of how tightly entwined politics and punishment can become.

2 daunting problems to the "iron law" idea:

1) the political and tactical foundation for reducing either of these 2 #s (flow & LOS) is dormant. 2) arises from the first—many of the most popular prison-cost proposals do not have much capacity to control costs. There is a softer, programmatic means to confront prison costs based on the idea that "rehab programs" will reduce recidivism rates.

To have significant impact on prison pops., the main culprits behind the growth of incarceration in the U.S. must be confronted head-on. 3:

3 deserve to be esp. heightened bc they will be central to any meaningful strategy to reduce mass incarceration & overcome the worst excesses of the P.I.: 1) repealing mandatory penalties; 2) reducing length of stay; 3) reducing rates of recidivism

Each state represents a diff statutory challenge in speeding up parole, but most states have been reluctant to release ppl at their first parole eligibility.

A state that routinely denies parole at the initial hearing for nearly all cases & sets a new hearing a yr later would reduce LOS for parole-eligible cases by at least a yr, overall, if it eliminated this practice. (resulting in an immediate/permanent sizeable reduction in the prison pop.) (THIS is the method being used by states when they focus on improved prisoner re-entry, & it pays dividends, over time, when system-wide improvements take place.

Prison, Parole, Probation, & Post-Sentence (Some or all) (11)—

Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Virg., Wyoming

Prison, Parole, & Probation Restriction (18)—

Alaska, AR, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New J., New M., North Carol., Oklahoma, South Carol., TX, Washington, West Virg., Wisconsin

Prison & Parole Restriction (3)—

California, Connecticut, & NY

Prison restriction (17)—

Colorado, Dist. of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hamp., North D., Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode I., Utah

What does coercive mobility do?

Destabilizes communities by increasing levels of disorganization

Felony disenfranchisement & the 14th Amend.

Even if the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment seemingly accepted felony disenfranchisement, our interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause today should allow for the ways in which our concept of equality may have evolved since 1868. Richardson v. Ramirez 418 U.S. 24 (1974)-- Under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state cannot restrict voting rights unless it shows a compelling state interest. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld California's felony disenfranchisement policies as constitutional, finding that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows the denial of voting rights "for participation in rebellion, or other crime." In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist found that Section 2 - which was arguably intended to protect the voting rights of freed slaves by sanctioning states that disenfranchised them - exempts from sanction disenfranchisement based on a felony conviction.

We can draw 2 conclusions:

First—is obvious—the tide has turned, & the energy for penal reform is on the side of something new; the P.I. is no longer the driving force for all correctional policy talk. Second—much more subtle—a great deal of this current reform effort is unlikely to have much effect on prison pops.

Impact of incarceration on communities have taken 2 main approaches:

First—looks at the effect of aggregation of indiv.- & family-level effects that may produce community-level correlations. Second- proposes that there are separate effects that operate at the community-level & that these may in turn influence indiv.-level behavior.

The P.I. has contributed little to reductions in fear of crime-

For most of the period when incarceration rates rose, fear of crime remained high, regardless of fluctuations in crime. It's found that crime has dropped from its place high on the list of public concerns, replaced by economic concerns & international terrorism. It appears that fear of crime tracks more closely to factors having little to do with punishment rates.

original HEA of 1965 has been modified in ways that initially limited/have since completely eliminated prisoner access to the funding for higher education-- due to (drugs):

Frequently the target of punitive legislation, incarcerated drug offenders were first class of offenders restricted from access to Pell Grant—denied thru the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1988 (during Drug War). Shortly thereafter, during the 1992 HEA reauthorization—lifers/death sentence-ers were denied access to Pell Grants. Also, 1994 Clinton's Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) completely eliminated prisoner access to Pell Grants while an offender was incarcerated. · Along with targeting those incarcerated, during the HEA 1998 reauthorization, was amended to include a provision suspending the eligibility for federal grants, loans, & work assistance programs for those convicted of drug-related offenses (The Free Application for Federal Student Aid—FAFSA—included question specifically about drug offenses- given either an affirmative response/no response can trigger ineligibility). · Under 1998 HEA Amendment (P.L. 105-244), the period of ineligibility following drug conviction depends in part upon type of conviction offense (possession or sale) & offense history (with more substantial periods of ineligibility for 2nd & subsequent offenses). A 2nd offense for sale of controlled substances / 3rd offense for possession results in indefinite suspension of eligibility. Such suspension (education assistance) can only be lifted upon proof of rehabilitation / if conviction is ultimately overturned/set aside. · States are not permitted to opt out of/modify the ban on federal student assistance & states have denied state aid on the basis of federal criteria set out in 1998 HEA Amendment

Felony disenfranchisement laws

Individuals who commit felonies lose the right to vote either temporarily or permanently. Rights restoration practices vary widely across states and are subject to the turns of political climate and leadership, which has led some states to vacillate between reform and regression. · Denying the right to vote to an entire class of citizens is deeply problematic to a democratic society and counterproductive to effective reentry. Fortunately, many states are reconsidering their out-of-date disenfranchisement policies, with 24 states enacting reforms since 1997, but there is still much to be done before the United States will resemble comparable nations in allowing the full democratic participation of its citizens.

No restriction (2)—

Maine & Vermont

With 1996/1998 housing policy acts, Congress also introduced stricter mandates strengthening ability of Public Housing Authorities (PHAs)--

Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) to deny admission to public housing to those with criminal histories—under this legislation, local PHAs can require criminal history checks for new applicants/can deny access to public housing to those who've engaged in criminal activity in the past—creating PROFOUND impacts on those attempting to re-integrate "w/o access to decent, stable, & affordable housing, the likelihood of an ex-offender being able to obtain/retain employment and remain drug/crime free is significantly diminished"

The collateral consequences that've attached to felony convictions have foreseeable disparate effects from the troubling Clinton-era:

The collateral consequences that've attached to felony convictions have foreseeable disparate effects from the troubling Clinton-era policies in the areas of education, housing, public assistance, and parental rights

Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965

The federal law that governs the administration of federal student aid programs. (educational grant opportunity program—also known as Pell Grant)—more than 40 yrs old, this program still represents single biggest investment in higher education that the federal gov't has ever made. Designed to open door to higher education for those who otherwise couldn't afford it thru providing federal funding to low-income individuals—btwn 1970s-mid 1980s, Pell Grants served as major funding stream for prison-based education bc prisoners tended to come from precisely the pop. Pell Grant targeted (those w the most financial need)

Collateral consequences / "barriers of reintegration"

The sanctions and prohibitions that are placed on persons convicted of criminal offenses (and their families), particularly those offenders who have been incarcerated. · Laws enacted across most states in mid/late 1990s have restricted ex-offender access to benefits in areas of: housing, education, employment, & welfare assistance (basically—across all areas identified as crucial to prisoner re-entry) · These restrictions—known as "collateral consequences" & "barriers to re-integration"—typically attach upon felony conviction & impact ability of returners to successfully make transition into communities.

Incarceration also affects adult partners of inmates & other family mems.---

These indiv.-level effects can add up to a prevailing aggregate effect- bc deficits resulting from incarceration are so widely spread in communities where incarceration is concentrated. Parental incarceration is a prime risk factor in delinquency, so it's no surprise that these neighborhoods sustain multigenerational patterns of CJ involvement.

In places where there are high incarceration rates what do you see with family members and residents

They move, many families experience economic hardship, many children get moved to new caregivers, and sometimes there is intentional movement so that the prisoner is not in the same environment

Do crime victims benefit from increased severity of punishment? What is the "zero sum" problem?

Unlike prisoners' movements in other Western countries at the time, the movement in the United States was closely associated with broader issues involving race, class, and various struggles around injustice. As a consequence, criminal activity became associated in the public mind with controversial issues relating to race and rebellion, which fostered zero-sum politics that reduced public sympathy for people charged with crimes and thus was conducive to the promotion of harsher penal policies

Going to prison has a host of negative impacts on the ex-prisoner—

a criminal record operates as a stigma (reducing job prospects) & for black males the interaction of race & criminal record substantially reduces employers' willingness to hire. It reduces post-prison lifetime earnings, reducing wages by 30-40%. Men who go to prison are ab as likely to cohabit after release as those who've not been incarcerated, but they're ½ as likely to marry, even when a child's involved.

When improved parole practices include education & training of parole board members,

a greater variety of community-based options for their consideration on a case-by-case basis but uniformly available across the state (particularly in urban areas), & a collaborative effort by the agency that supervises parole to improve transition planning before release/case management afterwards, parole approval rates will go up. When the rates go up, more prisoners are released—with improved transition plans/supervision techniques, more former prisoners will succeed with fewer returns for new crimes/technical violations.

Within high incarceration neighborhoods you have people who

are constantly in flux

Across-the-board policies do better—

both operationally & politically. For ex., a new good-time provision that adds a day a week of earned credit off the max term will result in systemic earlier releases—If everyone earned all that additional good time, & nothing else changed, the prison pop. would reach a new stability at about 85% of its earlier level. · Bc of this, several states have experimented with across-the-board LOS strategies to reduced prison pops.—one mechanism being to increase the amount of "good-time" (or earned release time) a person can earn—this can be a promising (& low-profile) strategy.

Also, in mid/late 1990s, federal gov't made access to public housing all the more difficult for ex-offenders, even with knowledge that most come from lowest socioeconomic classes—

by passing series of increasingly restrictive housing policy initiatives explicitly designed to exclude ex-offenders from public housing. · As in the context of Pell Grant eligibility, the move to exclude ex-offenders began with ADAA of 1988—with federal gov't tightening noose on drug offenders—requiring local public housing authorities include clauses in their public housing leases prohibiting tenants from engaging in drug-related criminal activity on/near public housing premises. And, after then, law amended to read that "any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, or any drug-related criminal activity" could result in eviction. Extended further to include members of tenant's household/guests/etc. & applying the behavior not just in/near public housing but also "on or off such premises". During height of crack epidemic drug-related criminal activity was known as "the scourge of public housing" · As a result, entire families have had their housing leases terminated on the basis of actions of one household member, a visiting relative, or even just a guest. Even further continued in the exclusion of conviction offenders from public housing, was Congress passage of the Housing Opportunity Responsibility Act (HOPE) in 1996—Clinton administration used to strengthen force of public housing provisions—targeting gang members/drug dealers & a one-strike provision on those who commit crime/peddle drugs. (evidence of engagement is enough to trigger eviction)

A cost-benefit analysis of Cali's Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA—Proposition 36)

demonstrated that SACPA saved Cali. $2.50 for every $1 spent and resulted in net savings of more than $173 mill. in its first yr alone. In the yrs since, states across the country have begun decriminalizing drug possession—most often thru voter-approved ballot initiatives.

Among the probs associated with children during parent's incarceration are:

depression, hyperactivity, aggression, withdrawal, regression, clinging behavior, sleep probs, eating probs, running away, absence/poor school grades.

A final area of reforms that would substantially reduce recidivism rates:

eliminating collateral consequences of conviction & incarceration. · Those ppl convicted of felony offenses, esp. those returning from prison, face a stunning variety of civil/legal obstacles to return to full citizenship—very few of these have substantive connection to legitimate correctional objectives beyond being punitive. In stirring up the punitive pressure, many of these restrictions are counterproductive to public safety/others are simply irrelevant. To the extent that a given collateral consequence of a felony conviction has no demonstrable relationship to public safety, it should be eliminated.

List of 3 priorities offered in order of expected effect size:

eliminating mandatory penalties will reduce the # of ppl who go to prison, offering an immediate reduction in imprisonment; reducing LOS will result in an additional, gradual reduction in prison numbers; & in the long term, reduced rates of recidivism will in turn affect the prison cycling rates.

Support for repeals of mandatory sentences has also been in place. Mandatory minimum sentences—

enacted to serve as deterrents, produce equality in sentencing, evade discretion, & reduce disparity, have been attacked as failing on each of these grounds.

There have historically been 2 notable surges in the use of imprisonment, that both disproportionately affect blacks:

first- a rapid growth in the use of imprisonment across the South, followed the emancipation of slaves in the 1860s, & the second- followed the civil rights movement of the 1960s.

P.I. results caused changes both bold & refined—

for ex., community supervision policies that increased the pressure on probationers & parolees, thru regular drug testing, the escalation of technical conditions, & an emphasis on tough enforcement had the surface effect of increasing the rate at which ppl who were released from prison would go back, whether or not they were arrest for a new crime. But it also had the more subtle effect of distorting the role of the probation/parole officer.

Otherwise stable relationships are often dissolved by the non-prison partner once the prison sentence begins—

for those released, chances of separation post-release are increased, even when there's a minor child present in the home. It's been estimated that btwn ¼ & ½ of all prisoners disrupt a family when removed for incarceration, & this helps explain why counties with high incarceration rates have higher-than-expected rates of single-parent families.

Research suggests that the stigma of prison is not somewhat reduced as more and more people experience prison—

formerly incarcerated people are even more stigmatized in neighborhoods where prison experience is relatively common.

Black-white disparities in incarceration have grown steadily btwn 1880-2000—

from 3:1 shortly following emancipation to almost 8:1 in the year 2000.

Despite their popularity, there's widespread agreement around the negative consequences of mandatory sentencing—

growing prison pops., the transfer of discretion from judges to politicians, increased disparity, & compromised proportionality in sentencing. While all 4 of these consequences call into question the utility of these provisions in their effects, the last 3 additionally raise fundamental questions for justice.

Racial/economic segregation in cities concentrates incarceration in the poorest black neighborhoods—

in some urban areas, more than 1/6 black adult males of the ages 20-44 are in prison, & in sections of Brooklyn, 1/7 youth 18-24 enters prison/jail each yr.

Because of the "Iron Law of Prison Pops."—

it holds that prison pops. are entirely produced by just 2 statistics: flow, how many ppl go to prison, & LOS, their length of stay. The corollary, then, is that to reduce prison pops. one must reduce either the # of ppl who go to prison, how long they stay, or (for maximum effect) both.

The P.I., dominant for more than a generation, has now run its course—

it will be bc an uncoordinated set of forces distributed around the country has reached an unofficial conclusion that the time has come to deescalate the penal system.

Troubling results-

many of ppl retained on probation served jail sentences locally instead of going to state prison, & when cost of subsidy was factored in, neither savings nor reduced incarceration were realized. Yet, ¾ of states have some sort of fiscal arrangement to promote this form of community-based corrections

In high-incarceration places, imprisonment—esp. of men in the prime parenting age groups—

penetrates the context, influencing institutional aspects of community life (labor markets & housing), & interpersonal aspects (family functioning & parenting).

Just as mass incarceration has engaged politics in problematic ways, politics has engaged the public in even more disturbing ways—

politicians tended to play on the public's greatest fears to make the case for greater punishment. · he Reagan administration gave us federal sentencing guidelines & the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; the first Bush administration gave us mandatory sentencing for drug offenders; the Clinton administration offered the 85%-time served truth-in-sentencing requirements for violent offenders. · Ironically, the 2nd Bush administration in some ways led to the de-escalation, offering re-entry programs as part of its Second Chance Act & promoting faith-based rehab programs as well. · The overall pattern, however, under the Punishment Imperative (P.I.) was that reforms generated by the politics of penalty created the fuel for the system to grow. · Voters in Cali. decided twice- first 1994 & then 2004- that 3rd-time serious/violent felons should face sentences of 25 yrs-life. Cali voters cast their votes with little understanding of the law, how it would work, or the consequences it'd have for corrections/budgets/justice.

Fully re-integrated ex-offender=

remain crime-free, secure/maintain housing & employment, re-establish positive ties to community, & successfully re-connect with family/friends after an often-extended period of separation. · Since only a small (tho growing) portion of prison pop. has been sentenced to LWOP, the vast majority will end up experiencing the re-entry process (vast majority eventually released/returned to communities). Although most will re-enter, just a few will be able to successfully re-integrate (become fully functioning member of community eventually afforded most/all rights/responsibilities of those never being incarcerated)

When prisoners are released it contributes to

residential instability, many enter local shelters

Shaw & McKay—

social processes such as mobility can affect a place's proneness for crime; characteristics of communities have effects that are separate from the simple aggregate of the characteristics of the indivs. who live there. Contextual poverty, unemployment, & demographic characteristics are often correlated with the level of crime. (all derived from the social fact that incarceration concentrates in communities having characteristics associated with social disadvantage)

When looked at in the broadest sense, the P.I. had this main result:

the CMJS now operates as a self-sustaining cycle of gathering increasing #s of poor ppl, mostly black men, into its clutches, profoundly damaging their life chances, & returning them to communities lacking the ability to adapt to them. It has been politically cancerous, responding to/privileging public emotions to base legislative response upon instead of encouraging sound policymaking/strategic thinking. It has been a vast fiscal dark hole—guaranteeing that for generations public money must be moved from public goods such as schools, health care, & infrastructure to instead support/maintain a quasi-permanent, separate community of the incarcerated/controlled. Empirically wrong—doing shockingly little about the crime prob it was originally designed to address.

According to the more critical view, controlling the dangerous was a latent goal of the P.I.— (pattern of collateral consequences)

the P.I. was designed to make sure that the class of ppl who most make us worry about our safety are under surveillance/control. It has not turned out well—though control happened, the probs have all been collateral consequences of "controlling the dangerous". · This pattern of collateral consequences has helped to solidify the disadvantage of ppl who live in high-incarceration neighborhoods, creating/expanding a quasi-permanent class of ppl who occupy the status of "dangerous"

Conclusion:

the continuation of mass incarceration could remain stable/never change, or the old regime of the past (the P.I.) has run its course—never completely gone, however, but the last 40 yrs have diminished in CMJS & a new agenda is on the rise.

Voter dissatisfaction with the punitive drug laws led to:

the passage of Proposition 200 in Arizona in 1996 & of Proposition 36 in Cali. in 2000. The voter-initiated drug-law reforms in Cali. & Arizona each resulted in the diversion of non-violent drug offenders from prison & represented 2 early exs. of measures the public was willing to take to reduce the pressure that correctional expenditures were exerting on state budgets in the late 1990s.

Ex-offenders aspects of struggle in realm of employment:

the stigma of having a criminal conviction can have a demonstrable impact on a person's ability to secure employment—however, the conviction isn't the only reason why ex-offenders have a hard time securing employment—those released from prison have notable deficits in the area of educational attainment that increasingly go unaddressed in the prison setting, which then impact the ability of ex-offenders to secure/maintain employment post-release --this reality of education deficits limiting job opportunities for ex-offenders & it being conducive to future criminal behavior is the reason why educational programs have been the most common/popular forms of prison programming, funded through federal finance—yet, such programs have all but disappeared from prisons in recent yrs.

A focus on reducing failure rates of ppl poses a prob--

there is a ceiling on how much the incarceration rate can be affected by reductions in recidivism (such as in high-incarceration neighborhoods, as well as considering the overall realistic costs/savings

In recent years, heightened public awareness of felony disenfranchisement has resulted in successful state-level reform efforts, from legislative changes expanding voting rights to grassroots voter registration initiatives targeting individuals with felony convictions. Since 1997, 24 states have modified felony disenfranchisement provisions to expand voter eligibility and/or inform persons with felony convictions of their voting rights either through legislative or executive action. Among those-----

§ Ten states either repealed or amended lifetime disenfranchisement laws § Seven states expanded voting rights to some or all persons on probation and/or parole § Twelve states eased the restoration process for persons seeking to have their right to vote restored after the completion of their sentence § Three states improved data and information sharing As a result of successful reform efforts from 1997 to 2016, an estimated 840,000 citizens have regained the right to vote.

The not-so-subtle undertones of some of the particularly punitive legislation:

· (ex. crack/cocaine distinction) that imposes penalties 100x greater in magnitude for the possession of crack cocaine than for the possession of powder cocaine. The evidence for discrimination as a causal determinant of the relationship btwn race & imprisonment is at best mixed- whether intentional/not- the rising levels of black incarceration did not just happen.. they were foreseeable effects of deliberate policies. · Shows that the consequences of incarceration have been felt disproportionately by black men, further alienating them from the labor market, making stable family formation more problematic, and ultimately increasing the economic gap btwn whites & blacks.

· Research on relationship btwn incarceration & crime:

· -longer prison sentences do not deter ppl who receive them from crime; there's almost no relationship btwn the length of a prison stay & the likelihood of recidivism. · -going to prison does not deter; ppl who receive probation are no more likely (& may be slightly less likely) to recividate. · -incapacitation effects of prison are small primarily due to replacement. · -rehab programs offered in prison are less effective than when they are offered in the community. · -the deterrent power of the increased risk of imprisonment is undermined by the delay btwn arrest & sentencing & by a process than many ppl think is unfair.

Softer approach of "rehab programs" to reduce recidivism rates-- · Exceedingly unlikely that this strategy will work/have much impact on prison costs for 2 reasons:

· 1) rehab programs reside around the theme that many of them do not work. Those that do succeed (follow certain criteria for "what works") can be expected to attain recidivism reduction rates upwards of 20-30%. Yet, this result comes ab for a relatively small subset of all ppl who go thru the corrections system—those who're at high risk & have a "criminogenic need" (need that can be changed thru treatment program & where a treatment program is available to them). A large # of ppl do not fit either category. · Under current programmatic levels, only ab 10% of those who need treatment can receive it (unless there is a wholesale expansion of treatment programs—say on the order of a 5-10 fold increase—the prospects for reducing imprisonment thru treatment are dim). · 2) even if we could expect more from proven treatment programs (bring them to scale & if there were an appropriate treatment program for every client of the corrections system) the basic math does not suggest that this approach has much promise. To the extent that some programs are weak, the effect on entry rates is diminished. To the extent that many parole failures serve short terms, the effect on stock pops. is further diminished, etc. So by the time all of the "in practice" conditions are added to the situation, what starts out as a best-case 5% annual reduction in prison intake turns out to be a mere fraction of that effect—(small enough effect that it could be easily overwhelmed by other factors having to do with changes in sentencing laws/practices or crime rates). (THIS is why program-based prison-reduction strategy would take very long time to work).

The Punishment Imperative dominated penal reform for almost 4 decades, with shifting focus of concern but fairly uniform results.

· 1970s—structural sentencing changes led to increases in the likelihood of imprisonment across the board. 1980s—mandatory sentencing reform limited availability of probation for ppl convicted of drug and other serious felonies, increasing further the #s of ppl going into prisons. 1990s- sentencing reforms lengthened the terms ppl served once in prison—throughout decade, tougher policies regarding community supervision increased rate of technical revocations that would lead to return to prison. Over last 20 yrs—new laws have been passed that restrict the avenues by which ppl in re-entry can succeed by limiting housing, employment, & welfare options & thru restricting support for education.

· AGENDA 2- REDUCE LENGTH OF STAY (LOS): 2 kinds of strategies focused length of stay:

· 2 kinds of strategies focused length of stay: programs that release prisoners before their maximum length of stay & sentencing changes that reduce sentences across the board.

· AGENDA 1- REPEAL MANDATORY SENTENCES (ESP. FOR DRUGS)

· A central engine for incarceration growth has been mandatory sentencing, esp. for drug-related crime—if we're to make headway in reducing mass incarceration, mandatory sentencing must be eliminated (esp. for drug crimes).

· REINVESTING IN GOV'T:

· A central prob with current justice reinvestment strategies is that they've often resulted in redirecting gov't funds from corrections to other gov't-based social services. Rationale being that thru these services, failure rates reduced/costs averted. The main problem with this is that it goes against the original rationale for justice reinvestment—that of a community-development agenda.

P.I. & social problems:

· A third clear conclusion that can be drawn from our grand penal experiment is that it's done nothing to alleviate related social problems. There's actually been evidence of the Imperative exacerbating the very social problems that we were justifiably concerned about for the latter half of 20th cent. · Social inequality, race inequality, and fiscal responsibility—all pressing concerns of the late 20th cent.—were each exacerbated by an over-reliance on incarceration as a solution to the crime problem. The cost of the Punishment Imperative—both socially/fiscally—have been very high.

What are the three main strategies, or agendas, they propose, and what are some examples of each.

· AGENDA 1- REPEAL MANDATORY SENTENCES (ESP. FOR DRUGS) (FAMM; structured sentencing) · AGENDA 2- REDUCE LENGTH OF STAY (LOS): (Parole & Special Early Release; Sentencing change strategies) AGENDA 3: REDUCE RECIDIVISM (HOPE; Justice Reinvestment)

Closely related to the move to exclude ex-offenders (mainly ex-drug offenders) from public housing is the move to permanently restrict their eligibility for public assistance.

· Along with policies increasing restriction in areas of higher education & public housing, the move to deny welfare benefits to drug offenders occurred in mid 1990s. · Clinton followed thru on campaign promise with signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996—with this, the welfare system in U.S. underwent its largest overhaul since its establishment in 1930s—the traditional welfare entitlement program of the AFDC was eliminated and replaced by block-grant program known as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). PRWORA signaled the end of entitlement (TANF requires work & often referred to as a "welfare to work" program) & limited TANF assistance to 5 years

Victim profiles & publicized crime--

· An energetic victims' movement remains a significant aspect of penal code reform, esp. as signified by "name" laws that, as a consequence of highly publicized crimes, codify restrictions on the convicted, their sentencing, or their parole eligibility. (Matters WHO is the victim on the offender's punishment). · Victim participation at various stages of the CMJS is now standard practice—while there's no question that victims routinely feel mistreated in the justice system, it is equally apparent that victims have a much higher profile today than they did 40 yrs ago.

Crime as a problem/American elasticity

· Argue that any decline in public fear of crime has been less about punishment increasing than it has been about crime decreasing. Although crime hasn't dropped completely off the public radar, it is no longer one of the issues that Americans identify as a "most important problem". · Ironically, even as crime reached its lowest point in more than 35 yrs, and although Americans no longer identify crime as a top spending priority, more than 60% of Americans still reported that too little was being spent on "halting the rising crime rate". Perhaps, then, another less of the grand penal experiment was that the Punishment Imperative meant there was an enormous elasticity in what Americans were willing to pay for punishment.

· THE PROBLEM OF INCENTIVES:

· As a result of growing public scrutiny/declining public revenues, CJ is under increasing pressure to become more efficient—coming from various sources—non-justice service providers who see their budgets diminishing as CJ agencies eat up a growing part of the diminishing pie; citizen groups who're dissatisfied with recurring probs in correctional services; & political leaders whose hands are increasingly tied by growing justice demand.

Felony disenfranchisement statistics:

· As of 2016, 6.1 million Americans were prohibited from voting due to laws that disenfranchise citizens convicted of felony offenses. Felony disenfranchisement rates vary by state, as states institute a wide range of disenfranchisement policies. · Persons currently in prison or jail represent a minority of the total disenfranchised population. In fact, 77 percent of disenfranchised voters live in their communities, either under probation or parole supervision or having completed their sentence. An estimated 3.1 million people are disenfranchised due to state laws that restrict voting rights even after completion of sentences. · Public opinion surveys report that eight in ten U.S. residents support voting rights for citizens who have completed their sentence, and nearly two-thirds support voting rights for those on probation or parole.

Disenfranchisement / imprisonment rate

· As states began expanding voting rights in the civil rights era, the disenfranchisement rate dropped between 1960 and 1976. Although reform efforts have been substantial in recent years, the overall disenfranchisement rate has increased dramatically in conjunction with the growing U.S. prison population, rising from 1.17 million in 1976 to 6.1 million by 2016. · The dramatic growth of the U.S. prison population in the last 40 years has led to record levels of disenfranchisement, with an estimated 6.1 million voters banned from the polls today. Disenfranchisement policies vary widely by state, ranging from no restrictions on voting to a lifetime ban upon conviction. Felony disenfranchisement has potentially affected the outcomes of U.S. elections, particularly as disenfranchisement policies disproportionately impact people of color. (Disenfranchisement policies likely affected the results of 7 U.S. Senate races from 1970 to 1998 as well as the 2000 Bush-Gore presidential election.) Nationwide, as of 2016 one in every 13 black adults could not vote as the result of a felony conviction, and in four states - Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia - more than one in five black adults was disenfranchised.

· REORIENTING INCENTIVES:

· Attempts to create new systems of financial incentives for using non-prison penalties have a bit of memory in CJ—most widely known strategy= Cali Probation Subsidy Program, which reimbursed Cali counties for using probation instead of prison, & had the express purposes of reducing incarceration rates/saving money.

Mid-1970s-1980/90s- / by 2002-

· Mid-1970s-1980/90s- emerged mandatory sentencing provisions among the most popular of the sentencing reforms. By 2002, all 50 states & fed. gov't had enacted mandatory sentencing provisions for one/more offenses. These provisions typically attach to violent, sexual, drug, & weapons offenses, & to habitual offending.

Black adolescents / broken families & the CMJS:

· Black boys today have a nearly 1/3 chance of ending up in prison by the time they become men. Black children are increasingly being raised in families with regular personal connections to the U.S. prison system. Economic inequality in these disadvantaged communities (namely—the urban poor) has been exacerbated by the growing penal system/its disproportionate affects. · Among the myriad social probs that've been demonstrated to arise from the prison system expansion are broken families, weakened parental relationships with children, loss of earnings, economic damage to communities, reduced personal health, shorter life expectancies for youth, & teenage births. To top it off, the concentrated growth of incarceration has contributed to higher crime rates in neighborhoods that send so many ppl to prison, only to receive them back a short time later.

Community / ecological effects:

· Community / ecological effects occur when concentrated incarceration changes the social environment of a community for everyone, not just those who're directly touched by the incarceration cycle. · Ecological effects stem from the way incarceration alters the role young men play in ecological-level dynamics (such as labor markets) & promotes juvenile delinquency.

Crime no longer had the salience as a top-2 public worry:

· Crime no longer had the salience as a top-2 public worry; the economy, health care, and education were dominating contemporary public concerns—but the money available for these priorities was becoming seriously strained by the revenue requirements of the penal system.

· METHOD NO. 2—SPECIAL EARLY RELEASE:

· Early release programs used as temporary measures to ease correctional pop. pressures can't make any long-term reductions in prison costs. Prison pops. are produced by a set of decision dynamics external to the prison system. If a unit is released on avg. 3 months early, the pop. returns to what it would've been in about 3 months. These types of policies, however, are eschewed by politicians & are often controversial, if not devastating.

· Sentencing Change Strategies: METHOD NO. 1—TARGETED SENTENCE REDUCTION

· Evidence from the states suggest that the impact of truth-in-sentencing laws (those than constituted one of the main engines of prison pop. growth enacted by Clinton administration to control rising serious/violent crime rates) can be vast. By redefining what constitutes the label "serious & violent", states can realize substantial potential reductions in LOS for large #s of ppl.

Felony Disenfranchisement and Race

· Felony disenfranchisement policies have a disproportionate impact on communities of color. Black Americans of voting age are more than four times more likely to lose their voting rights than the rest of the adult population, with one of every 13 black adults disenfranchised nationally. As of 2016, in four states - Florida (21 percent), Kentucky (26 percent), Tennessee (21 percent), and Virginia (22 percent) - more than one in five black adults was disenfranchised. In total, 2.2 million black citizens are banned from voting.

· Release strategies: METHOD NO. 1- PAROLE:

· For states w indeterminate sentencing structures where parole boards make the release decisions, rates of parole release represent one of the most rapid levers that can be used to reduce LOS.

Given U.S. SC 2002 definitive ruling,

· Given U.S. SC 2002 definitive ruling, public housing evictions for criminal activity are constitutionally permissible & can be initiated at the discretion of housing authorities.

Growth in incarceration spending:

· Growth in incarceration spending (202%) over the past 2 decades outpaced growth in spending on education (55%), higher education (3%), and public assistance (which actually decreased by 60%). Until very recently, the prison system stood first in line for its budget, and everything else followed.

Children / race affects from parents incarceration:

· In 2007- at least 1.7 million children under 18 had a parent in prison. Although not all incarcerated parents had physical custody of their children in period leading up to current incarceration, women in prison were more than likely than (64% vs. 44%) to report having lived w their children prior to incarceration. · For the more than 170,000 children probably living in foster homes while parent is incarcerated, with the passage of AFSA, the involuntary/permanent termination of parental rights has become a real possibility. · Given the racial disproportionality in prison admissions, it should not be surprising that at least 70% of children with a parent in prison are minority children—women disproportionately affected by drug laws (women of color bearing brunt of impact)

In Mississippi, for ex., a change in release eligibility

· In Mississippi, for ex., a change in release eligibility for a large # of nonviolent offenders from 85% of max term to ab 25% resulted in substantial cost savings to the state (with no increase in recidivism)—suggesting that even incremental changes in these laws can have significant impact on the size of prison pops.

Social/personal disruption

· In high-incarceration places, the social/personal relationships are altered in important ways—the absence of young men due to incarceration can also alter social networks that already tend to be thin, with far more strong ties than weak ones, increasing community reliance on the state for social support. · Incarceration also disrupts patterns of sexual conduct, esp. for girls, in ways that explain the higher-than-expected rate of STDs & teenage births in high-incarceration communities. Mass incarceration has significantly increased the rate of poverty for those not incarcerated as well. · Highly concentrated incarceration- negatively impacts public safety in places. Social disorganization show how high levels of incarceration, concentrated in poor places, would be expected to produce a "tipping point" at which incarceration would cause crime to go up rather than down.

Expansions of services upon release:

· Obtaining housing, finding good work, & advancing one's education are important potential pathways out of the prison cycle. Services for ppl who're under correctional supervision (prison/community wise), fall sorely short of need—estimated btwn 10-15% of those who go thru system have their most pressing needs met by current programs-- & expanding those services are of high priority.

One of main arguments to repeal mandatory minimums--

· One of main arguments to repeal mandatory minimums is on the basis that they frustrate the careful measurements of sentences, from one end of the spectrum to the other, which the sentencing guidelines were intended to accomplish.

"Average" LOS meaning:

· In the case of prison pops., "average" lengths of stay are misleading. In fact, most prison pops. are comprised of a sizeable # of relatively short stays & a smaller (but quite important) # of longer stays. (meaning, there are 2 kinds of "averages" of interest—arithmetic avgs. & medians) · The presence of large #s of ppl serving ultra-long sentences makes calculating medians/means for time served problematic. Longer-stay prisoners also create a prob for length-of-stay reductions strategies when they're a main source of growth (as they are in most state prison pops.) This can be illustrated by reference to the most extreme long-termers: those who've received a sentence of LWOP. · A single LWOP sentence for a 25 yr old (who'll live to 65) turns out to be a 40-yr. length of stay. That person represents the equivalent of a 2 yr time-served sentence every other yr for 2 decades. Those 2-yr sentences can be altered at the margin w/o affecting the avg. pop very much over the 40-yr period. If one more LWOP sentence is added to the mix, it makes the adjustments in the shorter sentences all the less meaningful. (Long sentences create a permanent prison pop. base that becomes increasingly impenetrable to changes in the short-termers.

P.I. & "window of opportunity"

· In the most recent 2012 election cycle, voters in both Colorado & Washington chose to legalize the use of marijuana. Although Americans had been willing to pay for prison expansion for more than 3 decades, it seems that the cost of the Punishment Imperative--& the constraints it place on spending in other areas—ultimately provided the "window of opportunity" necessary for the policy change that we have begun to see occurring across the country.

Direct/Indirect effects on social inequality-- race:

· Incarceration has both direct & indirect effects on social inequality—inequality gaps in U.S. continue to grow-- & nowhere is this effect more pronounced than with regard to young men of color. · According to the most recent figures, at year-end 2010, close to 40% of U.S.'s 1.5 million prisoners were black and more than 20% were Hispanic (more than 60% of prison pops. were racial/ethnic minorities). Just under 1 mill. blacks/Hispanics were serving sentencing of more than 1 year, & more than 7% of the black male pop. btwn ages 30-34 was currently incarcerated. The imprisonment rate for black men was 7x higher than that for white men.

· A consequence of this situation is that justice officials/community leaders alike seek greater efficiency from CJ policy—the inherent prob for CJ leadership is that the search for greater efficiency implies a capacity for risk taking that has structural limitations for CJ/the community alike. The fact is that CJ incentives do not promote efficient decisions, such as:

· Judges have no financial incentive to keep convicted felons locally—yet have political incentives to transfer convictions to state level · High-incarceration communities have little financial/developmental incentive to maintain convicted felons locally (absorbing the costs they impose) · Politicians have very limited political incentive to support alts. to prison.

· There's also ways in which the incentive structure actually restricts innovation/sensible risk taking, by imposing costs on risk takers w/o allowing them to benefit from the savings of their decisions, at the same time failing to discipline those anti-risk by imposing costs for inefficiency:

· Judges who retain convicted felons in the community bc they predict they'll do well there receive no fiscal/programmatic benefits from taking this risk, though they're well aware they'll experience the costs if prediction turns out to be wrong · Judges who send convicted felons to the state prison system, at a cost 10x higher to taxpayers, feel no fiscal consequences for this decision, regardless of ultimate outcomes · Prosecutors who're elected on the basis of their "toughness" on crime face potentially powerful political costs should they support reduced reliance on imprisonment · Prosecutors who send large #s of ppl to prison face no direct budgetary consequences for these costs- they're borne by others · Citizen groups who create strong local programs to serve as sentencing alts. save money for taxpayers who live elsewhere, but absorb all the public-safety/program-effectiveness risks of "doing the right thing" w fellow citizens of neighborhood · Citizen groups who oppose strong local alts. for ppl who've been convicted of crimes transfer both the risks & costs of those ppl to the other places where they go (prisons/neighborhoods) · Probation/parole officers who're quick to revoke a parolee on basis of slightest misstep save themselves from the risk of greater failure · Probation/parole officers who treat return to prison as a last resort do not see any of the savings they generate in taxpayer costs, but embrace a considerable professional risk in doing so

· METHOD NO. 2—OFFENSE-SPECIFIC STATUTORY CHANGES

· Legislatures almost never alter sentencing in the way of granting across-the-board reductions in prison LOS, instead, specific offense groups are targeted. The impact being proportional to the size of the offense group in the prison pop. Ex., with avg. LOS of 30 mos. For the prison system, the avg. will drop to 29.8 most (or something similar)- a drop almost unnoticeable in the face of the existing prison pop. hydraulics.

Mandatory sentencing- disparity:

· Mandatory sentences result in disparate punishment (has increase disparity rather than eliminated it) bc prosecutors, judges, or juries perceive them to be unjust & evade them. While much of disparity associated with mandatory minimums comes from various methods of evading the laws, in some cases disparities are written right into the law (despite recent legislative revisions—the distinction in mandatory minimum penalties for possession of crack vs. powder cocaine has been among the most criticized of sentencing policies).

Mandatory sentencing- equality

· Mandatory sentencing laws leave no room for either an assessment of indiv. culpability beyond prior offense history or for the tailoring of a sentence to fit that culpability—so, while these laws achieve equality in one sense (offense-based), they violate the equality principle in another (offender-based).

Mid / Late 1990s

· Mid 1990s, when crime= heightened issue/punishment imperative in full force, Congress enacted series of legislative initiatives that'd ultimately hinder (instead of help) ex-offenders as they negotiate the re-entry process. · Late 1990s saw many challenges to prisoner re-entry—increasing #s of offenders returning to communities from prison & received little program/service help while serving time. · Most counterproductive policies were enacted in mid/late 1990s under Clinton administration (shortly after crime rates were at all time high/just before they begin on a steady/substantial decline).

Project HOPE (Hawaii)

· One of most prominent current models is project HOPE (Hawaii)—imposes routine drug testing carried out thru randomly scheduled office visits as a condition of probation—enforcing it using short-term jail stays when ppl fail to make appts/produce negative tests—an impact that's brought attention to a possibility of achieving less crime & less punishment

· METHOD NO. 3—RECIDIVISM STATUTES

· One significant source of much recent prison growth has been the pre-dominance of recidivism statues. Though there's variation from state to state, the general scenario is that a person who's convicted of a 2nd serious felony w/in a particular window of time will have an automatic sentence enhancement of a particular level. · The effect of eliminating these enhancements is straightforward: people's sentences return to the base for the original crime.

Policies have had particularly disparate impact

· Policies have had particularly disparate impact (little to no effect on financially stable convicted offenders but PROFOUND effects on those in lowest socioeconomic classes). Due to structural inequalities in American society, policies designed to target the most dis-advantaged felony offenders will also inevitably have disparate impact on minorities

"Time out" for minority communities:

· Ppl who go to prison for the most part come out, & while they're locked up others take their role in crimes in the community. Many engage in a lifetime of cycling in & out of the prison system. Instead of standing rate of incapacitation, prison represents a standing "time out" for a large amount of poor/mostly minority communities. These places consist of large #s of men (& many women) being locked up on any given day, but who exactly is behind bars changes from day to day.

· To be viable- (outline of an IDEAL "justice reinvestment" model):

· Principle 1: no benefits follow when decision leads to more crime—paramount concern that drives prison-dependent policies is to avoid crime. Alternative funding mechanisms, to be viable, mustn't result in more crime, & so the rewards for risk taking must be structured in such a way that they disappear when they lead to more crime. · Principle 2: the crime victim gets a voice. A 2nd driver for prison reliance is concern ab the victim. This concern has to be addressed, either in direct victim consultation/symbolic consultation thru participation of victims groups in an advisory capacity · Principle 3: new strategies must be truly cost efficient - the amount of $ transferred to the risk taker must be related to the amount of $ truly "saved". Social control nets mustn't be widened. · Principle 4: nothing happens w/o both system & community oversight. Victims aren't the only important constituent group- both the justice system & community must have confidence in new strategies. · Principle 5: taxpayers get a cut of the action—some of $ saved by new structures must go back into the general cash box. For general public, this can't be a zero-sum game, & public risks must be compensated by public benefits. · Principle 6: a dollar must recycle itself in target communities. Central prob is that ppl who receive pa for being involved in community-change efforts spend their $ outside of community, so total local wealth created is small. Money that changes hands several times w/in community represents magnified wealth for that community. · Principle 7: program providers must be accountable for their results—new strategies evaluated, & strategic justice reinvestment work must be evidence-based.

Prison cycling & the phenomenon of crime:

· Prison cycling—the removal of people for incarceration & their eventual return—on those places, with a specific focus on the relationship btwn incarceration & crime. (rooted in the view that crime is not only an indiv.-level phenomenon but also an ecological one)

Prosecutors & the P.I.

· Prosecutors, who gained so much in the way of discretion as a result of Punishment Imperative initiatives, had to overturn the law to avoid what they recognized as profoundly unjust outcomes-- & when the law was not overturned, 3rd-time offenders convicted of relatively minor crimes were serving sentences that were not only exceptionally long (relative to other similarly situated offenders w/o the strikes) but were also inversely proportional. · Across the country throughout the 1980/90s, voters endorsed punitive initiatives that met the objectives of the P.I. but that were often perceived as too rigid by those responsible for meting out justice & were routinely overturned.

Result= by 2010-

· Result= by 2010- U.S. had created largest/most imposing penal system in world—we chose the scope of this penal system- created thru policy—working on every legislative/policy front, targeting every component of system (from probation to prisoner re-entry)- we made this penal system harder, bigger, tougher, and sterner. This was the Punishment Imperative: no matter what the problem, the punishment had to grow.

Risk of re-offense periods

· Risk of re-offense is heightened in period immediately following release (greatest challenges)—but also important re-entry initiatives focus not only on point of release but also on period of time leading up to release—when re-establishing familial/community ties—and months/years following release. · *re-entry is a PROCESS, not a moment*

· AGENDA 3: REDUCE RECIDIVISM

· Sentencing reform is a difficult implementation—as a alt., many policymakers have tried to mount new efforts to reduce recidivism (esp. tech. revocation). Approaches that promise to reduce recidivism rates are politically unattractive, bc reduce risk rather than increase it- also avoid prob of "early" prison releases.

Structured sentencing-

· Structured sentencing, usually achieved thru the enactment of guidelines, is now widely viewed as a preferred approach for dealing w issues of discretion, disparity, & proportionality. In contrast to mandatory sentencing provisions, structured sentencing systems guide, but don't eliminate, judicial discretion.

Punishment imperative (P.I.) method:

· The Punishment Imperative was a method to manage the economic probs that have arisen as labor market shifts decreased jobs for the low/unskilled. Finding no place in the legitimate market, they live in weak inner cities & by their existence threaten the existing order. · There are real problems of crime, but the methods undertaken in the Punishment Imperative are designed to control people, not to prevent crime—what is essential is to have a penal system capable of managing large #s of ppl, esp. men, thru their most economically viable yrs, keeping them out of job market & isolated from the economic world · The Punishment Imperative sought certain societal goals as a matter of formal policy—as designed, it couldn't help but promote certain social outcomes as a matter of practical reality—one reason it had such dominance was that it combined a compelling public discourse with a powerful sociopolitical utility.

The country's most vulnerable citizens & the punitive system:

· The concentration of the grand penal experiment among poor males, esp. minority-group members, means that the collateral consequences they suffer from the expanded justice system are a main product of the generation-long changes in the system (bottom line=== the country's most vulnerable citizen's (this poor/minority group), suffer the consequences of both crime itself & the social responses to crime.

Mandatory sentencing- deterrent effect

· The deterrent effect of mandatory sentencing is minimized bc the laws themselves tend to be seen as too harsh by many of the central actors of CMJS who're responsible for enforcing them, & they (police, prosecutors, judges) often go out of their way to evade the laws & avoid imposing the mandatory penalty.

A final policy initiative associated with Clinton administration that can have damaging effect on re-entry process/goal of full re-integration - relates to family reunification.

· The importance of maintaining (or if necessary, re-establishing) family ties upon release has been shown to increase the likelihood of successful re-entry. · The Adoption of Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 authorized termination of parental rights for children who'd been in state custody for 15 of the most recent 22 months—although ASFA didn't specifically reference children in state custody because of parental imprisonment, the policy clearly has the potential to affect parents (particularly women) who face periods of incarceration greater than 15 months.

The incentive structure in CMJS:

· The incentive structure in CMJS doesn't link risk taking & rewards, nor does it link risk-transfer decisions to the costs of these decisions—it is inherently conservative, stifling innovation by punishing efficient decisions when they're risky while rewarding expensive decisions in which decision-makers pass their costs on to others.

The most serious consequences of the P.I.:

· The most serious consequences of the P.I. have been the way it exacerbated racial inequalities/fueled racial injustice. · The 5-fold increase in the size of the penal system, esp. the # of colored ppl behind bars, has been an intervention into racial stratification of enormous magnitude.

Prison cycling & race/legislation

· The probability of African Americans experiencing prison is elevated, along with the stigma associated with prison being amplified for African Americans—due to link of images of race with images of crime. · The landscape of prisoner re-entry has undergone a somewhat substantial shift over past several decades—some changes making it more difficult to navigate re-entry into the community, & these difficulties have been compounded by legislation that's erected more and more barriers to full integration.

The promise of justice reinvestment is at its most profound when:

· The promise of justice reinvestment is at its most profound when it contains the core idea that money now spent incarcerating ppl will instead be used to develop the social stability of the very communities from which these ppl came (a very tall order). (a model of a diff kind of justice reinvestment—one that has its direct target the infrastructure of troubled communities; organizing private/narrow forms of social control, not public control; most of all- places heavy reliance on the private/semiprivate sectors for their involvement in community life)

Stigma of felony convictions + policy initiatives- reintegration

· The stigma of felony conviction has always meant that offenders exiting prison would come up against challenges when trying to re-integrate, but the erection of further barriers thru the series of policy initiatives in the areas of education, housing, welfare, & child custody has only served to make that transition from prison to community all the more difficult.

There have been successes in the fight against mandatory sentencing— (smart sentencing reforms)

· There have been successes in the fight against mandatory sentencing—some particularly active advocacy groups like FAMM have commissioned reports to document the failures of mandatory sentencing & the successes in the fight for smart sentencing reform*** · Facing budget shortfalls & prison crises of varying magnitudes, state legislatures have begun to rethink their mandatory sentencing policies—a # of states have scaled back/eliminated mandatory sentencing provisions—in 2001, legislatures in Indiana, Connecticut, & Louisiana passed legislation that removed/reduced mandatory penalties for drug offending.

· JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: Focusing on Incentives-

· There is-today-an increasingly popular strategy for putting those policies into place/taking advantage of the savings they produce=== justice reinvestment · This is an alternative to broad-based sentencing reform & the recent emphasis on revocation—the goal being to redirect some portion of the $54 billion America now spends on prisons to rebuilding the human resources & physical infrastructure (schools, healthcare facilities, parks, & public spaces) of neighborhoods devastated by high levels of incarceration. Theoretical foundation being: community development.

Distorted role of probation/parole officer- P.I.:

· These roles had been invented as ways of making reintegration into the community easier, of providing official support for the social adjustment of ppl who had criminal histories. Early theories of probation/parole supervision actually saw these roles as community advocates for those under correctional supervision—the get-tough movement changed that profoundly- these days, ppl in these jobs mostly function as community surveillance workers.

Mandatory sentencing- discretion:

· They've neither reduced discretion—instead simply transferred discretion from judges, who once determined appropriate punishment, to the legislature, which enacts these penalties (often in conflict with state sentencing commission recommendations), and most importantly to the prosecutors, who have complete/unchecked discretion in the charging of offenses/plea-bargaining of cases.

3-strikes & P.I.:

· Under 3-strikes type laws, those who've committed the least serious crimes as their "3rd-strike" offense experience the most dramatic escalation in punishment. A 3rd-strike offender convicted of aggravated homicide would've probably received a penalty of LWOP (or death sentence) even w/o 3-strike provision, but a person convicted of aggravated assault sentenced to 25-to-life under 3-strikes laws probably experiences an increase in punishment that is at least 2-3x what he would've received.

· INCENTIVES AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR:

· What's needed is a new set of financial incentives that'd create reasons for communities to welcome felons to be kept locally, reinforce (& support) local service capacities, & provide a mechanism for community infrastructure development—2 main obstacles to changing such incentive structure: 1) there is no obvious/proven system for initiatives trying to address the probs of incentives- changing the incentives structure requires new ideas be developed that create arrangements particular to the jurisdiction in question. 2) following, ppl lack experience in how such alternative system of arrangements would work.

Experiment = P.I.

· When an experiment is introduced into a set of social relations, these are modified, and modifications persist after the experiment has been withdrawn. (aka—the cumulative effect of close to 40 yrs of punitive sentencing policy change cannot simply be undone with the declaration that the experiment has ended). · It is certainly the case that the social experiment in mass incarceration was driven by increasingly punitive criminal justice policies that ensured that there would be prisoners to fill newly constructed prison cells.

Crime & imprisonment relationship

· When we lock up more ppl, crime does not necessarily go down. Yet, as crime may decline- it does not seem to translate into decreasing prison use. While imprisonment increased in every yr btwn 1973-2009, over that same period crime invariably increased, decreased, or stabilized (disconnect between crime & imprisonment/punishment). · Most empirical research on the relationship btwn crime & imprisonment suggests that crime (particularly violent) can explain some, but certainly nothing like all, of the variation in growth in imprisonment over time/across places (basically—while crime & imprisonment are clearly not completely disconnected, there's plenty of "unexplained variance." · Though we're in the midst of the longest/most significant crime decline since WWII, we've not yet seen an equivalent decline in the rates of imprisonment.

MPRI-- prisoner re-entry plan ex.:

· Where there are practical operational exs. of this in many states—there's never been a collaborative effort to determine which of the many aspects of improved prisoner re-entry are more/less responsible for the improved outcomes (FOR EX.- Michigan's Prisoner Reentry Initiative—MPRI—in 2000 only 9,133 prisoners were released- so if that year was used as the baseline the changes would be even more dramatic) · The parole rate/parole pop. increased, the # of tech. violations decreased, & rate of parolees convicted of new crimes/sentenced to prison stayed about the same—end result= after working with over 22,000 prisoners- the MPRI achieved a 33% improvement in parole success in the community, as evidenced by fewer revocations back to prison

With this came intro of the so-called welfare ban that restricted access to public assistance for convicted drug offenders—

· With this came intro of the so-called welfare ban that restricted access to public assistance for convicted drug offenders—this eligibility ban imposed on drug offenders as part of PWORA as a provision allowing states to impose a lifetime ban on public assistance for those convicted of felony drug offenses. · Under federal leg., states were permitted to completely opt out of the ban- but only 12 did so. 21 enforced the ban w some modifications, but fully 17 states enforce ban in full—permanently denying public assistance to those convicted of drug offenses, so any other conviction outside of drug offense has no bearing on access to public assistance/food stamps. · Similar to public housing ban, this collateral consequence affects only ex-drug offenders of limited means who need public assistance—HOWEVER, unlike public housing ban- it is in theory limited-- & public assistance can be permanent.

P.I. laws as a foundation in disadvantaged:

· Yet- these laws laid the foundation that lead to a cycle of penal growth—new laws increase the policing of our poorest neighborhoods, & more young men are caught up in penal system as a consequence. The large volume of young black men in the system's clutches serves to reinforce the idea that safety is a prob of race, enabling legislatures to propose ever more drastic measures that're racially disproportionate in their consequences. · The neighborhoods where these young men reside become places with large #s of missing men, men behind bars, & even larger #s of men who've cycled thru the justice system—these men arrive home from prison w reduced prospects for earnings/family participation, & with increased chances of crime. Their children, too, have increased chances of criminal involvement as a consequence of parental incarceration.

Consensus agreed that the most important/pressing needs of prisoners returning to community were in the areas of:

· education, employment, housing, health care, & substance abuse treatment. Since the chances of success were expected to be slim upon an offender's re-entry if the needs in any of these areas weren't addressed/couldn't be met. · For ex., a returning offender who was unable to secure proper employment post-release may be expected to quickly resort to criminal activity in order to make ends meet. Likewise, a prisoner's inability to secure housing post-release could result in ex-prisoner's homelessness (which could come with increased risk for re-offense)

Bc of community's high incarceration rates, a range of public probs flourished—

· from HIV-related health probs to teenage births. Labor markets weakened, & social networks damaged. Each of these effects of high incarceration has the tendency to increase crime rates. Higher crime rates lead to more policing/arrests. The system feeds upon itself & its impacts are not minor. P.I. will have lasting consequences for individuals, for communities, and for crime in those communities. · The movement of ppl going into/coming back from prison is thought to put strains on a neighborhood/its residents in the way it affects networks, families, & children. This process is not evenly distributed across places—but instead, highly concentrated- creating specific areas where there are continuously relatively large #s of ppl being removed to prison & then later returned.

Although most of these "smart on crime" choices have been incremental,

· in 2003, Michigan repealed almost all of its mandatory sentences for drug offenses, replacing those sentences with structured sentencing under guidelines. More recently, btwn 2009 & 2010, NY, RI, & SC repealed most of their mandatory minimum drug sentences & MA relaxed parole eligibility restrictions for drug offenders. · Seems that state legislatures are beginning to recognize that the concerns that mandatory sentencing provisions were intended to address (disparity, abuse of discretion, etc.) can be achieved thru other, less problematic/severe sentencing initiatives.

Argued that high rates of incarceration, concentrated in impoverished places, have had a range of negative impacts on those places- including:

· including increased rates of STDs, increased rates of teenage births, & increased rates of serious juvenile delinquency—imprisonment as a system "that fed upon itself"- exacerbating the very social problems that led to the increases in crime that enabled policy shifts towards more reliance on imprisonment in the first place.

The problem of Prison Cycling—

· prisoner re-entry/reintegration have always been challenging bc ex-offenders are among the most stigmatized and least sympathetic of all marginalized groups. · By virtue of their criminal convictions, ex-offenders are deemed less trustworthy, honest, & among the least deserving—the stigma associated with having served time in prison remains long after release & can affect an ex-offender's life chances well into future ; can affect across multiple domains of life: housing more difficult to secure, jobs more difficult to come by, and relationships are more difficult to mend.

Michelle Alexander—recently referred to this as "The New Jim Crow",

· the central claim being "something akin to a racial caste system currently exists in the U.S." in which ppl with criminal records "have scarcely more rights, & arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama under Jim Crow." The substantive analysis she offers—the war on drugs, collateral consequences of conviction, & sociopolitical consequences of the growth of the prison system—has been made. · Michelle has said that police discretion is a significant aspect in applying discriminatory attitudes in the offenders they stop/detain—making racial biases a pristine reference. Also claims that prosecutors are free to "load up" defendants with extra charges, & such decisions cannot be challenged for racial bias. "they will eventually return to prison & then be released again, caught in a closed circuit of perpetual marginality"

One of the more troubling features of the social experiment in mass incarceration is the way in which punishment has engaged politics—

· thru 1980/90s even the slightest indication that a politician might be soft on crime signaled the death knoll for that candidate's election hopes. · Demonstrating that one was appropriately tough on crime required supporting "get-tough" policies regardless of their logic, ability to address the probs they were punitively designed to address, or their cost. Mandatory minimum sentences, habitual offender legislation, & truth-in-sentencing requirements were just a few of the many "get-tough" policies that contributed to the prison buildup.

From the Punishment Imperative- we can see that it did not achieve its own manifest aims—

· —there were, at minimum, 2 main objectives: to reduce crime & to reduce the fear of crime. · The most valid studies of the deterrent effect of incarceration—those that control for simultaneity—suggest that a 10% increase in the imprisonment rate will bring about somewhere in the range of a 2-4% reduction in the crime rate—similarly estimated that the 66% increase in imprisonment btwn 1993-2001 reduced the rate of serious crime by 2-5%. (In grand terms= the social experiment in mass incarceration has not had much impact on crime).

Clear & Frost: PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE

• Rivals New Deal (new New Deal)• Growth of punishment (especially imprisonment) over last 40 years unprecedented• Came about changes (not in rate of crime but in) in our orientation to crime and in policies that were used to deal with crime as a social issue.• When it came to crime, incar. Used as grand social experiment• Grand penal experiment "The punishment imperative"• America's start was a grand social experiment in democracy• Toqueville - American democratic experiment either success nor failure, only time could tell...America worthy of note...American long tradition of social experiments• Grand social experimentation - pursuing expansive social programs - in wholesale fashion - to address a social problem of some import. Comprised of a higher order of policy shifts, historical moments...• The way the problem is socially 'defined' is a logical strategy for attacking the problem.• Three defining characteristics of grand social exp: take place around pressing social problem, galvanizes public attention calling for transformative action (grand problems call for grand solutions).• (2) coalescence of poltical will/ public enthusiasm for a new approach. Public frustration with problem → new possibilities for tackling problem - window of opportunity in policy arena → Status quo seems like failure → called for new strategies → those with political agendas offer new definitions of the underlying nature of the problem → New def promote changes in action (radical change).• (3) Gaining momentum, adoption of new, largely unproven strategy for a high-priority social problem.• GSE gain momentum from 3 facts: 1)immensity of the problem, 2) constituencies that often oppose one another in other political contexts become aligned in this one.• Results are so detached in time/ effort from original social change that the link to the experiment is not obvious and is historically debatable.• GSE are "studied" rather than evaluated• Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal federalization of welfare and Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society War on Poverty programs. (address social problems such as umemployment; new deal and poverty; WonP)• New Deal:• 1930s Roosevelt federal initiatives recovering U.S. economy from 1929 market crash• Through social protest, were able to exert considerable political pressure on govt• 1st new deal: fair competition regulations, series of banking reforms, passage of National Housing Act, Security & Exchange Act• 2nd new deal: more banking initiatives, fair labor practices, 1935 passage of social security act (created federal welfare systems)• SSA - unemployment insurance, income assistance, insurance for the aged, public assistance for the poor through ADC (aid to dependent children) program and AFDC (families w/ dependent children)• Create a seismic shift• America's welfare state was slower to grow and less comprehensive than other countries• Great Society• 1960s war on poverty• Johnson's Great Society Programs• Expand social welfare safety net• Made increasingly salient by the civil and women's right movement• Harsh punishment as an answer to a problem• Public policy didn't come from the need to help poor communities (more likely to suffer from violent crimes), but as platforms for political agenda• During 1970s crime was associated with ecological/ social issues (people committed crime because of poverty, inequality, lack of opportunity, unemployment, etc)• Wilson's - laws that punished firmly and uniformly needed. "Mistaken desire to help people"• This mentality continued past crime stabilization and well past crime rate drop• "Getting tough" coming from south arising against civil rights movement• Nixon - "toward freedom from fear" coming from fear of black folks• By 1980s, no politician can be "soft on crime"• Blacks locked up 6x the rate of whites• Robert Martinson's 1974 article "What works?" argues that rehabilitation is futile• Benn Wattenburg "A thug in prison can't shoot your sister"• Problems with the metaphor - implies intentionality that might've not always been there• Three points about crime politics era (from Goldwater Bush Senior)o Modern punitive movement owes much of its energy to the abiding discomforts Americans have about race. "Get tough" coming from south during CRMo Growth of penal system maps much more successfully onto the dymaics of crime rhetoric than crime itself.o Punishment experiment has had dramatic racial effects: African Americans borne the brunt of the get-tough movement• Great Society Notions stated that individuals problem behaviors came from social problems (economic, social, and racial inequalities). This died as new movement blamed individuals for their wrong doings.• Incarceration rates grew, no matter what was going on in the country, high crime or not, war or not, economic unrest or not...

Clear & Frost: Contours of Mass Incarceration

• Spent more than 68 billion on corrections, $98 billion on policing (1982-2006)• 29,000$/person/year• costs taxpayers 10X more to incarcerate than to have them supervised in the community• People who commit serious, chronic, and violent crimes belong behind bars, but the 100s of thousands of lower-level inmates, incarceration costs taxpayers more than it saves in prevented crime• Prison population trend data says that over half of those incarcerated are violent offenders (but that also includes far less serious offenses such as intimidation, criminal endangerment, etc). So this is an exaggerated statement• When legislators write new laws they are almost always reacting to extreme and highly publicized cases.• Those who commit violent offenses stay in jail longer than those who commit lower-level crimes...• More than 2/3 (over 70%) of those entering prisons each year were convicted of a nonviolent crime• Intermediate Sanctions: More restrictive than parole, but less restrictive than prison. Intended to reduce use of incarceration.• Surveillance worked to increase/ fuel growth in incarceration. Enhanced surveillance = detection of failure, increased chance to incarcerate.• Lowest in maine, highest in Louisiana• States with lowest incarceration, looked more like Western European ways than the complete application of the American way.• Southern states = highest in incarceration• Lowest = primarily northern states + Nebraska• 90% men, nearly 50% AA• Black men born between 1965 & 1999, ½ have been incarcerated• 1/5 Black men incarcerated in their lifetime!!!• Disproportionate offending rates, concentration of policing in inner-city communities, and disparities in criminal justice outcomes across races have had an impact on high black incarceration (as opposed to simplistic answers such as blacks commit more crimes, or ever arguments like justice system is overtly or covertly racist are not adequate).• Stable incarceration since the early 1900s suggests that a society requires a certain amount of punishment to function.• During early phase of the punishment imperative, likelihood of imprisonment for petty crimes increased• All growth in prison population attributed to commitments to prison once convicted and length of stay once admitted.• Only 1% of the growth can be attributed to increased police effectiveness• Crime can be both an input of imprisonment and output; making relationship difficult to model statistically.• Incarceration might actually increase crime by creating conditions post incarceration that leave people in worst conditions than before (removing of governmental help, disenfranchisement ,etc).• Incarceration has actually increased rates of violent crimes• Prison has an impact on the community level, not just the individual.• Reentry cycling: going in and out of prison(prison cycling). Effects of prison cycling: collateral consequences of a crime-control polcy that tends to exacerbate the very social problems that are though to undermine community public safety.• Summary:• Contours of grand penal experiment (37yrs since 972)• Has persisted during good and bad economic times• Calling it incarceration didn't encompass how mass it was• Not only were people more likely to be sent to prison/ jail, but also sent there for longer periods of time• Punishment Imperative• Using the word Imperative to imply a kind of structured intellectual economy in which the idea of punishment (as opposed to other ideas such as reform/ reintegration) becomes so powerful that it drowns out any other voices in the discussion of penal policy