HIST 2162 - Soviet History - Quotes List With Questions

The Breakneck Speed of Industrialization - Stalin - 1931: "To slacken the tempo [of industrialization] would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want to get beaten... One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans... by the Turkish beys... by the Swedish feudal lords... by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry... by the British and French capitalists... by the Japanese barons. All beat her—for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity... Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism... That is why we must no longer lag behind... Now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in the hands of the working class, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence... If you do not want [a loss of independence] you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said during the October Revolution: 'Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.' We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us." Why does Stalin claim that the Soviet Union will "'Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries?" What are the implications of his ultimatum that "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good the distance in ten years" on the tempo of Soviet industrialization? How do these assertions provide context for--an in effect--rationalize Stalin's breakneck industrial revolution?

Calling upon a protracted history of Russia being defeated by its enemies--whether Turkey, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, the Mongols, Britain, France, or Japan--Stalin claims that the Soviet Union will "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries" because if it fails to industrialize in time, Russia will be beaten "because to do so [is] profitable and [can] be done with impunity" under "the jungle law of capitalism." Preserving the long-standing rhetoric of "capitalist encirclement"--and building upon the Marxist-Leninist idea that socialism can only succeed by raising a country's economic output--Stalin argues that if the Soviet Union does not strengthen itself, its capitalist neighbors--already opposed to the USSR on principle--will invade it and cause it to collapse. Due to this legitimate concern--as evidenced by Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1939--Stalin was unwilling to compromise on the "tempo [of industrialization]." Even if investing more than 25% of the Soviet Union's GDP into heavy industry was degrading the proletariat's material welfare, even if real wages were decreasing in factories, even if labor discipline was causing worker disaffection with the Soviet regime, and even if collectivization resulted in famine, rapid industrialization was justified. In Stalin's mind, industrialization would occur at all costs. To mount a successful socialist offensive--and to secure the USSR from its neighbors--Stalin was willing to do whatever it took to industrialize the Soviet Union.

Lenin - The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism - November 1921: "What is new for our revolution at the present time is the need for a 'reformist,' gradual, cautious and roundabout approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of economic development... Restore large-scale industry, organize the direct exchange of its goods for the produce of small-peasant farming, and thus assist the socialization of the latter. For the purpose of restoring large-scale industry, borrow from the peasants a certain quantity of foodstuffs and raw materials by requisitioning—this was the plan... that we followed for more than three years, up to the spring of 1921. This was a revolutionary approach to the problem—to break up the old social-economic system completely at one stroke and to substitute a new order for it. Since the spring of 1921, instead of this approach... we have been adopting... a totally different method, a reformist type of method: not to break up the old social-economic system—trade, petty production, petty proprietorship, capitalism—but to revive trade, pretty proprietorship, capitalism, while cautiously and gradually getting the upper hand over them, or making it possible to subject them to state regulation only to the extent that they revive... The question that arises is this. If, after trying revolutionary methods, you find they have failed and adopt reformist methods, does it prove that you are declaring the revolution to have been a mistake in general? Does it not prove that you should not have started with the revolution but should have started with the reforms and confined yourself to them?... The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed... True revolutionaries will perish... only if they abandon their sober outlook and take it into their heads that the "great, victorious, world" revolution can and must solve all problems in a revolutionary manner under all circumstances and in all spheres of action. If they do this, their doom is certain... Every step onward and upward that we take in developing our productive forces and our culture must be accompanied by the work of improving and altering our Soviet system—we are still low in the scale of economics and culture... Communism and trade?! It sounds strange. The two seem to be unconnected, incongruous, poles apart. But if we study it from the point of view of economics, we shall find that the one is no more remote from the other than communism is from small-peasant, patriarchal farming... Trade is the only possible economic link between the scores of millions of small farmers and large-scale industry if... if there is not alongside these farmers an excellently equipped large-scale machine industry whose technical equipment, organizational 'superstructures' and other features are sufficient to enable it to supply the farmers with the best goods in larger quantities, more quickly and more cheaply than before... But the country formerly one of the most backward capitalist countries, which tried alone directly and at one stroke to create, to put into use, to organize practically the new links between industry and agriculture, failed to achieve this task by "direct assault," and must now try to achieve it by a number of slow, gradual, and cautious 'siege' operations... We can use, and, since it is necessary, we must learn to use, all transitional economic forms for the purpose of strengthening the link between the peasantry and the proletariat, for the purpose of immediately reviving the economy of our ruined and tormented country, of improving industry, and facilitating such future, more extensive and more deep-going, measures such as electrification... After the victory of the proletariat, if only in one country, something new enters into the relation between reforms and revolution... Before the victory of the proletariat, reforms are a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle. After the victory... they are, in addition, for the country in which victory has been achieved, a necessary and legitimate breathing space when, after the utmost exertion of effort, it becomes obvious that sufficient strength is lacking for the revolutionary accomplishment of some transition or another. Victory creates such a 'reserve of strength' that it is possible to hold out even in a forced retreat... Holding out morally means now allowing one to become demoralized and disorganized, keeping a sober view of the situation, preserving vigour and firmness of spirit, even retreating a long way, but not too far, and in such a way as to stop the retreat in time and revert to the offensive. We are now retreating to state capitalism, but we did not retreat too far. We are now retreating to the state regulation of trade, but we shall not retreat too far. There are visible signs that the retreat is coming to an end; there are signs that we shall be able to stop this retreat in the not too distant future. The more conscious, the more unanimous, the more free from prejudice we are in carrying out this necessary retreat, the sooner we shall be able to stop it, and the more lasting, speedy and extensive will be our subsequent victorious advance." How does Lenin justify the New Economic Policy? Why does he believe that the restoration of private trade and petty capitalism is the only way to ensure an effective transition to socialism particularly when considering the following quote? "Trade is the only possible economic link between the scores of millions of small farmers and large-scale industry if... if there is not alongside these farmers an excellently equipped large-scale machine industry whose technical equipment, organizational 'superstructures' and other features are sufficient to enable it to supply the farmers with the best goods in larger quantities, more quickly and more cheaply than before... But the country formerly one of the most backward capitalist countries, which tried alone directly and at one stroke to create, to put into use, to organize practically the new links between industry and agriculture, failed to achieve this task by "direct assault," and must now try to achieve it by a number of slow, gradual, and cautious 'siege' operations." According to Lenin, what changes about the relationship between revolution and reforms after "the victory of proletariat." Why were reforms unacceptable under a "bourgeois regime," but now, under a proletarian dictatorship, they are "a necessary and legitimate breathing space?" Based on Lenin's characterization of the NEP, is this "retreat... to state capitalism" a permanent measure, and if it is only temporary, what are the implications of this statement?

1. In a similar manner to his speech accompanying the initial introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin justifies the NEP by citing Russian backwardness and the need to develop Russia's productive capacity in order to make an effective transition to socialism. In Lenin's mind, if the socialist revolution occurred in a developed, Western nation, one where there is already "an excellently equipped large-scale machine industry whose technical equipment, organizational 'superstructures' and other features are sufficient to enable it to supply the farmers with the best goods in larger quantities, more quickly and more cheaply than before," then War Communism's revolutionary approach would have been successful and the NEP would have been unnecessary. However, since Russia remains "one of the most backward capitalist countries," being a nation characterized by small peasant landholdings, a "direct assault" is impossible--as evidenced by the popular resistance accompanying the end of the civil war--so Russia "must now try to achieve [socialism] by a number of slow, gradual, and cautious 'siege' operations." It must institute a tax-in-kind, allow for trade in surplus grain between peasants and the cities, and thereby enable Russia to steadily build its manufacturing capacity. In turn, once Russia's economy reaches the level of industrial development that characterizes the West, it can return to a "victorious advance" toward socialism. It can return to revolutionary measures to establish a revolutionary utopia. In Lenin's mind, once a proletarian revolution occurs, reforms are no longer unacceptable compromises with the "ruling bourgeois class." Since revolutionary victory "creates... a 'reserve of strength'"--one established by the transfer of political power to the proletariat, by Russia's withdrawal from World War I, and by the Bolsheviks' victory in the civil war--it is possible to take a "step backward"--to take a step toward reform--yet still remain on what the Bolsheviks interpret as the right side of history. Less theoretically and more concretely, since "after the utmost exertion of effort, it [became] obvious that sufficient strength [was] lacking for the" implementation of War Communism, the Bolsheviks were justified in implementing a gradualist, NEP approach. Since a continuation of War Communism would have resulted in ruin--in an internal coup or depredation and foreign intervention--the Bolsheviks were wise in implementing the NEP. In Lenin's mind, it was worth sacrificing some economic principles--worth retreating to state capitalism--in order to consolidate the Communist Party's unprecedented political gains. To ensure the survival of the world's first socialist state--and to ensure that Russia would develop the economic capacity necessary for a transition to socialism--Lenin was willing to resort to the New Economic Policy, and thereby prevent all of the revolution's gains from fading away. To Lenin, the NEP was clearly a temporary measure, which inspired fierce debate throughout the 1920s. After Lenin's death, the Communist Party split between those believing that the interim, capitalist period was coming to an end and those who believed that the NEP should operate for decades. These debates culminated in the Left Opposition, with Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev being ousted from the party, and then the Right Opposition, with Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov being sidelined. In turn, Lenin's statement about the temporary nature of NEP helped contribute to Stalin's rise as the dictator of the Soviet Union.

Lenin, The State and Revolution, Summer 1917: "The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e. of the state in general, is impossible except through the process of 'withering away.' ... Only the proletariat—by virtue of the economic role in plays in large-scale production—is capable of being the leader of all the toiling and exploited masses, whom the bourgeoisie exploits, oppresses and crushes often not less, but more, than it does the proletarians, but who are incapable of waging an independent struggle for their emancipation... The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming transformed into the ruling class, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organizing all the toiling and exploited masses for the new economic order... The proletariat needs state power, the centralized organization of force, the organization of violence, both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass of the population... in the work of organizing socialist economy. By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and of leading the whole people to Socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie... Only in communist society, when the resistance of the capitalists has been completely crushed, when the capitalists have disappeared, when there are no classes... only then 'the state... ceases to exist,' and it 'becomes possible to speak of freedom.'... And only then will democracy begin to wither away... Accounting and control—that is the main thing required for "arranging" the smooth working, the correct functioning of the first phase of communist society. All citizens are transformed here into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers... When the majority of the people begin independently and everywhere to keep accounts and maintain such control over the capitalists... and over the intellectual gentry who preserve their capitalist habits, this control will really become universal, general, popular; and there will be no getting away from it, there will be 'nowhere to go.'... From the moment all members of society... have learned to administer the state themselves... from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment approaches when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic the 'state' which consists of the armed workers, and which is 'no longer a state in the proper sense of the word,' the more rapidly does every form of state begin to wither away... And then the door will be wide open for the transition from the first phase of communist society to its higher phase, and with it to the complete withering away of the state." Questions: What is the importance of Lenin's statements that "The overthrow of the bourgeoisie can be achieved only by the proletariat becoming transformed into the ruling class, capable of crushing the inevitable and desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie, and of organizing all the toiling and exploited masses for the new economic order" and that "By educating the workers' party, Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat which is capable of assuming power and of leading the whole people to Socialism, of directing and organizing the new order, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie?" What impact do these statements have on the general form of Bolshevik leadership in post-revolutionary Russia? Why is Lenin's argument that "From the moment all members of society... have learned to administer the state themselves... from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment approaches when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic the 'state' which consists of the armed workers, and which is 'no longer a state in the proper sense of the word,' the more rapidly does every form of state begin to wither away" significant? What is the supposed nature of Lenin's proletarian dictatorship? Is the Bolsheviks' behavior after seizing power consistent with this vision?

1. Lenin's claim that "the overthrow of the bourgeoisie" can only come through a proletarian revolution in which the toiling masses seize political power helped the Bolsheviks gain support in the buildup to the October Revolution. Furthermore, Lenin's argument that the "vanguard of the proletariat... is capable of ... leading the whole people to Socialism" is indicative of how the Bolsheviks conceptualized their revolutionary role. As the vanguard of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks would not only spark a proletarian revolution, especially since the proletariat masses possessed reformist tendencies, but would also assume leadership over the dictatorship of the proletariat. This statement, then, hints at how, after seizing power, the Bolsheviks' dictatorship of the proletariat would more closely appropriate a dictatorship of the vanguard--or party--over the proletariat. 2. Lenin's vision of the state "withering away"--or the state entirely disappearing due to mass worker participation in the state apparatus and the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie and other class distinctions--is significant because it converted many people to Bolshevism in the buildup to the October Revolution. Visualizing a state in which all members of the proletariat would participate--and in which the sheer extent of the state would no longer make it a "state in its proper form"--before eventually disappearing in favor of a "higher phase" of communism, many workers, peasants, soldiers, and wavering intelligentsia committed themselves to the Bolshevik cause over the course of 1917. In practice, though, the Bolshevik government was much more authoritarian and centralized, as evidenced by War Communism, a steadily shrinking political sphere--one that shrank to the point where intraparty democracy was suppressed--and Josef Stalin's ultimate, intensely top-down police state. Clearly, Lenin's On the State and Revolution was a powerful theoretical document, but in reality, the Bolsheviks preferred a strong, pervasive, elitist, and far-from-withering state.

Lenin on Economic Expediency (April 1918): "Only if the proletariat and the poor peasantry display sufficient class consciousness, devotion to principles, self-sacrifice and perseverance will the victory of the socialist revolution be assured. By creating a new, Soviet type of state, which gives the opportunity to the toiling and oppressed masses to take an active part in the independent building of a new society, we solved only a small part of this difficult problem. The principal difficulty lies in the economic sphere... Without the guidance of specialists in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to Socialism will be impossible, because Socialism calls for a conscious mass advance to greater productivity of labour compared with capitalism, and on the basis achieved by capitalism... Had our proletariat, after capturing power, quickly solved the problem of accounting, control and organization on a national scale... then we, after breaking the sabotage, would have completely subordinated these bourgeois specialists to ourselves by means of universal accounting and control. Now we have to resort to the old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a very high price for the 'services' of the biggest bourgeois specialists... Clearly, such a measure is a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune and of every proletarian power, which call for the reduction of all salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker... It becomes immediately clear that while it is possible to capture the central government in a few days... the capital solution of the problem of raising the productivity of labour requires, at all events... several years... The possibility of building Socialism is conditioned precisely upon our success in combining the Soviet power and the Soviet organization of administration with the up-to-date achievements of capitalism... It would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is possible without coercion and without dictatorship... There is absolutely no contradiction in principles between Soviet... democracy and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals... it must be said that large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of Socialism—calls for absolute and strict unity of will which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people... Given ideal class consciousness and discipline on the part of those taking part in the common work, this subordination would rather remind one of the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra. It may assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship if ideal discipline and class consciousness are lacking... The revolution has only just smashed the oldest, strongest and heaviest fetters to which the masses submitted under duress. That was yesterday. But today the same revolution demands—precisely in the interests of its development and consolidation, precisely in the interests of Socialism—that the masses unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the labour process." Questions: Why is Lenin's argument that "Without the guidance of specialists in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to Socialism will be impossible, because Socialism calls for a conscious mass advance to greater productivity of labour compared with capitalism, and on the basis achieved by capitalism..." controversial? Why does he feel compelled to claim that such a measure is a compromise... and that "It becomes immediately clear that while it is possible to capture the central government in a few days... the capital solution of the problem of raising the productivity of labour requires, at all events... several years?" What is the significance of Lenin's statement that "It would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is possible without coercion and without dictatorship... There is absolutely no contradiction in principles between Soviet... democracy and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals?" What does it indicate about War Communism, and what does Lenin's insistence that "the masses unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the labor process" mean for his initial promise of workers' control?

1. Lenin's decision to rely on bourgeois specialists-- economists, engineers, officers, and technicians under the tsarist regime--represents a clear departure from Marx's--and even his earlier--theory of a proletarian dictatorship. In turn, Lenin feels compelled to justify this policy by claiming that in order for socialism to succeed, Russia must first surpass the industrial capacity of the Western, developed nations. Due to Russia's backwardness, due to the lack of sufficient class consciousness among the workers and peasantry, and due to Russia's abysmal economic state, it must compromise its principles to survive. It must rely on--yet simultaneously reign in--the bourgeoisie to ensure effective economic growth which will provide the basis for a transition to socialism. This article, then, reveals an important truth about Lenin's approach to communism; he was practical, willing to concede principles, and situationally malleable. This mindset, then, allowed Lenin to transition from a proletarian dictatorship to a vanguardist dictatorship, from a workers'-run economy to one dominated by bourgeois specialists, and from War Communism to the NEP. Lenin was willing to compromise to secure the survival of the world's first socialist state. 2. Lenin's claim that "it would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to socialism is possible without coercion and dictatorship" signals the Bolsheviks' shift from October Revolution rhetoric to War Communism reality. In the buildup to the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks had made grandiose claims such as "all power to the soviets," workers' control over factories, or the democratic election of officers, but with the civil war impending--and with, perhaps more cynically, the Bolsheviks assuming power--these promises began to erode. Bourgeois specialists, one-man management, and compulsory labor dominated the shop floor; Red Army-appointed officers, many of whom were formerly in the tsar's army, replaced elected leaders; grain requisitioning governed the countryside; and political power increasingly concentrated in Bolshevik hands. Lenin's statement, then, that "there is absolutely no contradiction between Soviet democracy and the exercise of individual will" is indicative of the Bolsheviks' approach to War Communism. To secure the regime's survival--and launch an effective march into socialism--Lenin was willing to renege on former promises. He was willing to abandon his idea of a decentralized, anti-authoritarian workers' state in favor of one with strict discipline, an iron hand, and a system in which "the masses unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the labor process."

The Socialist Drive - Stalin - December 1929: "The past year witnessed a great change on all fronts of socialist construction. The change expressed itself, and is still expressing itself, in a determined offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and country. The characteristic feature of this offensive is that it has already brought us a number of decisive successes, in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction of our national economy... As a result we have a tremendous achievement on the labor front in the form of labor enthusiasm and emulation among the millions of the working class in all parts of our vast country. The significance of this achievement is truly inestimable, for only the labor enthusiasm and zeal of the millions can guarantee the progressive increase of labor productivity without which the final victory of socialism over capitalism is inconceivable... The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and more important. It is more difficult because it demands colossal investments of capital, and, as the history of industrially backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot be developed without extensive long-term loans. It is more important because, unless we develop heavy industry, we can build no industry whatever, we cannot carry out any industrialization. And as we have never received, nor are we receiving, either long-term loans or credits for any lengthy period, the acuteness of the problem becomes more than obvious. It is precisely for this reason that the capitalists of all countries refuse us loans and credits; they believe that, left to our own resources, we cannot cope with the problem of accumulation, that we are bound to fail in the task of reconstructing our heavy industry, and will at last be compelled to come to them cap in hand and sell ourselves into bondage... The past year has shown that in spite of the open and covert financial blockade of the USSR we did not sell ourselves into bondage to the capitalists; that, with our own resources, we successfully solved the problem of accumulation and laid the foundation for heavy industry. Even the most inveterate enemies of the working class cannot deny it now... Is it surprising... that the estimates of the Five-Year Plan were exceeded during the past year, and that the optimum variant of the Five-Year Plan, which the bourgeois scribes regarded as 'wild fantasy,' and which horrified our Right opportunists has actually turned out to be a minimum variant?... The assertions of the Right opportunists to the effect (a) that the peasants would not join the collective farms; (b) that the speedy development of collective farming would only arouse mass discontent and drive a wedge between the peasantry and the working class; (c) that the high-road of socialist development in the rural districts is not the collective farms, but the cooperative societies; and (d) that the development of collective farming and the offensive against the capitalist elements in the rural districts may in the end deprive the country of grain altogether—all these assertions have also collapsed and crumbled to dust... Firstly, the peasants have joined the collective farms; they have joined in whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts. Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement is not weakening the bond but, on the contrary, is strengthening it by putting it on a new, production basis... Moreover, it can now be confidently asserted that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if the development of the collective farms and state farms is accelerated, there is not the slightest ground for doubt that in about three years' time our country will be one of the largest grain countries in the world, if not the largest grain country in the world... The new and decisive feature of the present collective-farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, as was formerly the case, but in whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts, and even whole areas. And what does that mean? It means that the middle peasant has joined the collective farm movement. This is the basis of that radical change in the development of agriculture which represents the most important achievement of the Soviet government during the past year... We are advancing full steam along the path of industrialization—to socialism, leaving behind the age-long 'Russian' backwardness. We are becoming a country of metal, a country of automobiles, a country of tractors. And when we have put the USSR on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the esteemed capitalists, who boast so loudly of their 'civilization,' try to overtake us!... Can we advance our socialized industry at an accelerated rate while having to rely on an agricultural base, such as it is provided by small peasant farming, which is incapable of expanded reproduction, and which, in addition, is the predominant force in our national economy? No, we cannot. Can the Soviet government and the work of socialist construction be, for any length of time, based on two different foundations: on the foundation of the most large-scale and concentrated socialist industry and on the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small-commodity peasant farming? No, they cannot. Sooner or later this would be bound to end in the complete collapse of the whole national economy. What, then, is the solution? The solution lies in enlarging the agricultural units, in making agriculture capable of accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus changing the agricultural base of our national economy... There are two ways of doing this. There is the capitalist way, which is to enlarge the agricultural units by introducing capitalism in agriculture... We reject this way as incompatible with the Soviet economic system. There is a second way: the socialist way, which is to set up collective farms and state farms, the way which leads to the amalgamation of the small peasant farms into large collective farms, technically and scientifically equipped, and to the squeezing out of the capitalist elements from agriculture. We are in favor of this second way. And so, the question stands as follows: either one way or the other, either back—to capitalism, or forward—to socialism. There is no third way, nor can there be... Now... we have the material base which enables us to substitute for kulak output the output of the collective farms and state farms. That is why our offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success... That is why we have recently passed from the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class... Now we are able to carry on a determined offensive against the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class and substitute for their output the output of the collective farms and state farms... Now, the expropriation of the kulaks is an integral part of the formation and the development of the collective farms. That is why it is ridiculous and fatuous to expatiate today on the expropriation of the kulaks. You do not lament the loss of the hair of the one who has been beheaded." 1. What is Stalin's main argument about the "problem of heavy industry?" Why can't the USSR receive "long-term loans or credits," and how does this justify Stalin's policies of grain requisitioning and collectivization in the countryside? 2. What characterizes Stalin's remarks about "the Right opportunists' [Bukharin's]" arguments against collectivization. How does he respond to each of the Right Opposition's claims, particularly their arguments about peasant motivation, the worker-peasant alliance, and economic viability? According to Stalin, why has collectivization been successful? To what extent do these arguments reflect reality? 3. What does Stalin mean when he claims that "the question stands as follows, either one way or the other, either back--to capitalism, or forward--to socialism?" What evidence does he provide to support this claim? Does it shine any light on Stalin and other Bolsheviks' economic mentality? 4. Why is the Soviet government justified in passing from "the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class?" What does Stalin's attitude toward the kulaks reveal about his stance toward mass violence, and about finding scapegoats to preserve his power?

1. Stalin's main argument about "the problem of heavy industry" is that its development requires massive capital investment, which in the case of Russia, would come in the form of loans. Since foreign countries are unwilling to provide the Soviet Union with loans--which Stalin claims is due to their desire to erect a "financial blockade of the USSR" in order to secure its collapse but is more directly a result of the Bolsheviks' decision to default on the tsarist government's debt--the USSR must find a way to solve the "problem of accumulation." As emphasized in an earlier speech--and aligning with Preobrazhensky's theory that capitalist economies grew through colonialism or loans--Stalin thereby believed that the Soviet Union must consequently squeeze as much capital as possible out of the peasantry. And since many peasants were unwilling to bring their grain to market during 1927-1928--largely due to low state prices--Stalin believed that industrialization could only occur as a result of grain requisitioning and collectivization. By seizing wealth in the form of grain from the peasantry and selling it on the world market--albeit at relatively low prices--the USSR would receive enough money to fund industrial development. Despite the lack of foreign loans, the Soviet Union would still be able to uphold the First Five Year Plan and rapidly industrialize. 2. Stalin's remarks on collectivization--which contain a mix of half-truths and brazen lies--systematically address the concerns of the Right Opposition and thereby justify his agricultural policy. Even though Bukharin asserted that "the peasants would not join the collective farms," Stalin responds, rather disingenuously, that "whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts" have joined the kolkhozy, conveniently ignoring the fact that collectivization was often forced. Even though the Right Opposition argued that "the speedy development of collective farming would only arouse mass discontent and drive a wedge between the peasantry and the working class"--which it indeed did, Stalin responds that "the mass collective-farm movement... is strengthening" smychka by "putting it on a new, production basis," one where workers and peasants are united in the pursuit of supporting Russia's economic development. And even though Bukharin claimed that "the development of collective farming.... may in the end deprive the country of grain altogether"--which presciently predicted a disgruntled peasantry, the inefficiencies of collective farming, and the consequences of eliminating the countryside's best producers--Stalin argues that "we... have already emerged from the grain crisis," even if this emergence came from excessive requisitioning instead of a tangible increase in output. Furthermore, Stalin asserts that "the middle peasant has joined the collective farm movement," which, although true in some cases, is a gross misrepresentation of the truth. Stalin's support of collectivization, then, is based on a systematic collection of half-truths and lies. In order to guarantee collectivization's success--and force Russia down the path of full-scale socialist industrialization--Stalin was willing to overlook collective farming's problems, find scapegoats in the kulaks, and inflict massive hardship on the countryside. In order to industrialize Russia and augment his power, Stalin was willing to go to great lengths and impose a heavy burden on the Soviet populace. 3. Stalin claims that "the question stands as follows... either back--to capitalism, or forward--to socialism" because he believes that it is impossible for the "work of socialist construction" to rest "on two different foundations: on the foundation of the most large-scale and concentrated socialist industry and on the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small-commodity peasant farming." In Stalin's mind, in order to successfully industrialize, Russia needed sufficient capital, and since the Soviet Union could not turn to the foreign community, it needed to rely on its agricultural surplus to generate wealth. Although Lenin proposed gradually increasing Russia's economic output through restricted free trade and the New Economic Policy, Stalin believed that "the solution [lay] in enlarging the agricultural units, in making agriculture capable of accumulation." But to do this in a traditional manner, the Soviet Union would have had to rely on "the capitalist way," which is clearly inconsistent "with the Soviet economic system." In turn, for dedicated Bolsheviks, there is only one other way: "the socialist way, which is to set up collective farms and state farms... and [squeeze] out... the capitalist elements of agriculture." Although Stalin's reductivist, black-and-white argument is characteristic of his debating style, it also importantly reveals his economic mindset. To Stalin and his followers, Russia's industrial might could only occur through a socialist offensive or full-scale capitalist retreat. The NEP would work too slowly--and gradually--to make a difference by the time the USSR needed to protect itself from its capitalist enemies. Therefore, in Stalin's mind, there was really only one option: "forward--to socialism," at all costs and with all possible speed. 4. According to Stalin, the Soviet Union can now pass "from the policy of restricting the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class" because "we have the material base which enables us to substitute for kulak output the output of the collective farms and state farms." Since collectivization--at least according to Stalin--has been so successful in raising the countryside's agricultural output, Bolshevik officials no longer need to rely on the kulaks for an agricultural surplus. The collective farms are fully capable of replacing the kulaks' economic productivity, which means that the Soviet government can now liquidate this "dangerous" class enemy. Even though most peasants reviled Soviet officials more than their better-off neighbors--and even though kulak was a nebulous, all-encompassing term that caused many poor peasants to be persecuted--Stalin believed that "the expropriation of the kulaks [was] an integral part of the formation and the development of the collective farms." By eliminating this potential source of resistance to Soviet power--and by removing the force most likely to restore capitalism--Stalin could extend the state's power over the countryside. Through the collective farms--and through dekulakization--the peasantry would be subjugated, thereby not only preventing resistance to Stalin's industrialization program, but also shoring up his power. As evidenced by the sheer violence of dekulakization, by Stalin's chilling warning that "you do not lament the loss of the hair of the one who has been beheaded," and later by the Great Purge, Stalin was fully willing to employ mass violence. Inheriting Trotsky's stance toward Red Terror, Stalin believed that terror was a necessary mechanism for achieving his policy goals and preserving his dictatorship over an emergent totalitarian state.

Lenin's Testament - December 24, 1922: "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hand; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand Comrade Trotsky... is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities—personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee—but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs... Postscript, January 4, 1923: Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority—namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc." What is the significance of Lenin's testament? Why is it important that Lenin declared that "Stalin is too rude," which is "insupportable in the office of General Secretary?" How did Stalin still manage to come to power despite this scathing rebuke?

Although some scholars--citing Lenin's relatively incapacitated state--have argued that this document was forged, Lenin's "Testament" is nevertheless significant because it provided a prescient warning against--and a potential deterrent to--Stalin's dictatorship. Although Lenin did not completely state that Stalin would become a dictator, it is clear that Lenin held serious reservations about Stalin becoming General Secretary and "concentrat[ing] enormous power in his hand." Due to his personality, abrasiveness, and influence, Lenin was concerned that Stalin would precipitate a split in the party--or at the very least undermine the impending transition from Leninist, personality-led leadership to longer-term party-led leadership. Since leading political figures throughout the 1920s were attempting to cloak themselves in the mantle of Lenin--to declare that they were the true inheritor of his policies--this document would have been very harmful to Stalin's accumulation of political power. However, Stalin, as General Secretary--and other leaders in the party--decided to prevent this document from public release, which helped Stalin still win the succession struggle despite this harsh rebuke.

The Tasks of the State Cinema in the RSFSR - Anatoli Lunacharsky - Minister of Progress and Enlightenment - 1919: "We must do what nobody else is either able or willing to do. We should remember that a socialist government must imbue even film shows with a socialist spirit... Furthermore, the main task of cinema in both its scientific and feature divisions is that of propaganda... A Communist government has... a life-giving idea and, with the minimum of attention and experience, this idea can be very easily conveyed in the appropriate artistic guise... we must concentrate only on moments that are important for agitation and propaganda... While in no way denying the enormous importance of a broader range of themes, depicting, for instance, the history of science... I think that, with our limited time and resources, we must not hesitate too much and in choosing between two pictures of roughly the same importance and value we must make the one that can speak to the mind and the heart more vividly from the standpoint of revolutionary propaganda." Why does Anatoli Lunacharsky--the Minister of Enlightenment and Progress--assert that "We must do what nobody else is either able or willing to do. We should remember that a socialist government must imbue even film shows with a socialist spirit... Furthermore, the main task of cinema in both its scientific and feature divisions is that of propaganda?" Does this indicate that propaganda is an essential or tangential part of the Bolshevik revolutionary project?

Anatoli Lunacharsky asserts that "we must... imbue even films shows with a socialist spirit" because he believes that "the main task of cinema... is that of propaganda. Film, which is a powerful visual medium, can express Communism's "life-giving idea" and--due to its nature--be very effectively portrayed in a manner that vividly "speaks to the mind and heart." By imbuing films with revolutionary messages--by screening projects such as the Battleship Potemkin, The First Teacher, or The Radiant Path, which glorify revolutionary ideology, history, mobility, and enlightenment--the Soviet regime can construct widespread, popular support among its population. Film, then, is a means of popular education--and alongside schooling, literature, statues, posters and public festivals--is a means of restructuring Soviet society, of ensuring dedication to the socialist project, and of remolding its population into new, idealized Soviet men and women. Therefore, Lunacharsky's statement not only reveals the importance of propaganda to the Bolsheviks, but also illustrates how they viewed propaganda. In contrast to the West, the Soviets viewed propaganda in a positive light, believing--albeit idealistically--that it was a way of educating the masses and replacing false consciousness with proper, soviet beliefs.

"What We Are Fighting For," March 1921: "After carrying out the October Revolution, the working class hoped to achieve emancipation. The result has been to create even greater enslavement of the individual man... The glorious arms of labor's state—the sickle and hammer—have actually been replaced by the Communist authorities with the bayonet and the barred window, for the sake of preserving the calm, carefree life of the new bureaucracy of Communist commissars and officials... With the aid of militarized trade unions they have bound the workers to their benches, and have made labor not into a joy but into a new slavery. To the protests of the peasants... and of the workers... they answer with mass executions and bloodthirstiness, in which they are not surpassed by the tsarist generals... It has been sketched out more and more sharply, and now has become obvious, that the Russian Communist Party is not the defender of the toilers which it represents itself to be; the interests of the working nation are alien to it; having attained power, it is afraid only of losing it, and therefore all means are allowed: slander, violence, deceit, murder, vengeance on the families of rebels... The workers and peasants unreservedly go forward, abandoning behind them the Constituent Assembly with its bourgeois stratum and the dictatorship of the party of the Communists with its Cheka men, its state capitalism, its hangman's noose encircling the neck of the masses and threatening to strangle them for good. The present overturn at last makes it possible for the toilers to have their freely elected soviets, working without any violent party pressure, and remake the state trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants, and the labor intelligentsia." What are the Kronstadt sailors' main problems with Bolshevik rule? Why do they state that "the Russian Communist Party is not the defender of the toilers which it represents itself to be?" Are the Kronstadt sailors reactionary counterrevolutionaries, as they are derided by the Bolsheviks, or do they represent a different view of socialism?

As mentioned above, the Kronstadt sailors primarily believe that "the Russian Communist Party is not the defender of the toilers which it represents itself to be" because of its War Communism policies. Despite promising workers' control, the Bolsheviks have resorted to labor militarization; despite promising land to the peasants, the regime has resorted to grain requisitioning; despite promising a workers'-led democracy, the Bolsheviks have banned opposition parties, condemned other left-wing ideologies, and mobilized the Cheka to retain its grip on power, resulting in a vanguardist, elitist dictatorship over the proletariat. However, it is important to notice that the Kronstadt sailors are not reactionary; indeed, they scorn the Constituent Assembly. Instead, they desire a more participatory form of socialism, one in which the "hangman's noose" no longer "encircles the neck of the masses," one in which democratically elected, more ideologically diverse soviets run the country instead of the Bolshevik Party. Ultimately, the Kronstadt sailors did not inspire a third revolution as they had hoped, and they were crushed by the Bolsheviks. In turn, Lenin was forced to concede the New Economic Policy, but he reaffirmed Bolshevik political control, even cracking down on intraparty democracy through a ban on facitionalism.

The Right Opposition - Bukharin - July 1928: "[Stalin] is an unprincipled intriguer, who subordinates everything to the preservation of his own power. He changes his theory according to whom he needs to get rid of... Now he has made concessions, so that he can cut our throats... Capitalism grew either on account of colonies, or loans, or the exploitation of the workers. We have no colonies, we can get no loans, therefore our basis is tribute from the peasantry. You understand that this is just what Preobrazhensky's theory is... The more socialism grows, the greater will be the resistance... Since tribute is necessary and resistance will grow, we need firm leadership. Self-criticism must not apply to the leadership, but only to those who carry out orders... As a result we are getting a police regime." What is the significance of Bukharin's conversation with Kamenev about Stalin's role as "an unprincipled intriguer?" Why is he concerned about Stalin's assertion that "our basis [of economic growth] is tribute from the peasantry," and why is he concerned about the statement that "the more socialism grows, the greater will be the resistance?"

Bukharin, the primary defender and theorist of the New Economic Policy, calls Stalin "an unprincipled intriguer" because in 1928, Stalin had abandoned the NEP to pursue a radical, fully socialist plan of economic development. Even though Stalin had supported the NEP throughout the 1920s, once the grain crisis of 1927-1928 occurred, Stalin--instead of relying on small reforms within the private market to incentivize grain production--proposed immediate grain requisitioning and forced collectivization. Bukharin, suddenly facing Stalin's wrath--and believing that his claim that "our basis [of economic growth] is tribute from the peasantry" was rash, coercive, and would portend unrest, economic disaster, and potentially the overthrow of the Soviet regime--in turn reached out to Kamenev for help in opposing Stalin. However, by this point, Stalin had overwhelming support in the Central Committee, and Bukharin and his "Right Opposition" were quickly accused of factionalism. Therefore, Bukharin and Kamenev's conversation is significant because it not only encapsulates Stalin's decision to embark on a radical industrialization and collectivization program, but also because it captures the emergence of his "police regime," especially since "self-criticism must not apply to the leadership."

Stalin on the Nationality Question and Self-Determination - January 15, 1918: "The tsarist government realized the importance of the national question and tried to handle the affairs of the nationalities with a rod of iron. It carried out a policy of forcible Russification of the border peoples, and its method of action was the banning of native language groups, pogroms, and other forms of persecution. Kerenesky's coalition government abolished these national disabilities, but, because of its class character, it was incapable of a full solution on the national question... The Soviet Government alone has publicly proclaimed the right of all nations to self-determination, including complete secession from Russia... The speaker cited a number of examples of how the bourgeois nationalist governments, hastily formed in the border regions and composed of representatives of the upper sections of the propertied classes, endeavoured, under the guise of settling their national problems, to carry on a definite struggle against the Soviet and other revolutionary organizations... And if the bourgeois elements of this or that region sought to lend a national colouring to these conflicts, it was only because it was advantageous to them to do so, since it was convenient for them to conceal behind a national cloak the fight against the power of the labouring masses within their region... All this pointed to the necessity of interpreting the principle of self-determination as the right to self-determination not of the bourgeoisie, but of the labouring masses of the given nation. The principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the principles of socialism." Why does Stalin argue that "the principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the principles of socialism?" What implications does Stalin's nationality policy have on the course of many peoples' struggle for national self-determination?

Citing examples of "bourgeois nationalist governments" leveraging "the guise of settling their national problems" to "carry on a definite struggle against the Soviet and other revolutionary organizations"--such as in Ukraine, the Baltic States, Finland, Poland, or to a lesser degree in Transcaucasia--Stalin argues that "self-determination... should be subordinated... to socialism." Essentially, this means that self-determination is reserved for the working classes; if a country is socialist, and specifically adheres to the Bolshevik form of socialism, it will receive the right to self-determination, but otherwise, the Red Army will be compelled to overthrow its "bourgeois nationalists," install a Bolshevik government, and maintain its political subjugation. In practice, this meant that Russia attempted to reassert control over all of its former territories. Often being invited by local Bolshevik sympathizers, the Red Army would wage war on the nationalists and--depending on the outcome of the struggle--either fail or reincorporate that nation into the Soviet Union. In the Baltic States, Finland, and Poland, the nationalists prevailed--often due to the help of foreign intervention--but Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Central Asia re-entered the Soviet Union. Therefore, Stalin's nationality principle subverted Lenin's earlier radical promise for self-determination; despite protecting cultural autonomy and avoiding the harsh Russification policies that characterized the tsarist regime, Bolshevik leaders were willing to walk back earlier promises to preserve Russian territorial integrity and geopolitical power.

A Bolshevik Critique of Stalin's Policies - Trotskyites in 1930: "We also warned against the harmful theory of building a socialist society in one country, a theory which could arise only in the imagination of a bureaucracy believing in the omnipotence of the apparatus, the theory advanced by Stalin-Bukharin after Lenin's death... We have also pointed out that the correct assumptions of principle which were embodied in the decisions of the Sixteenth Party Conference on industrialization and collectivization lead, under conditions of bureaucratic administration, when the class has been replaced by officials who have been transformed into a specialized ruling stratum, not to the development but the disruption of socialist construction. We pointed out that the restoration and strengthening of party and workers' democracy is the primary condition for eliminating the avarice, irresponsibility, stubbornness, and arbitrariness of the apparatus, the reverse side of which is the oppression, humiliation and lack of rights of the toiling masses... Secretaries, chairmen of executive committees, procurement officials, heads of co-operatives, heads of state farms, party and nonparty directors of enterprises, specialists, foremen, who, following the line of least resistance, install in our industry the sweat-shop system and factory despotism—here is the real power in the period of the proletarian dictatorship which we are now experiencing... From the workers state with bureaucratic perversions... we have developed into a bureaucratic state with proletarian-Communist survivals... Before our eyes a great class of rulers has been taking shape and is continuing to develop. It has its own internal subdivisions, and grows by way of calculated co-optation, through the direct or indirect appointment system... The unifying factor of this unique class is that unique form of private property, governmental power." What do the Trotskyites means when they claim that "From the workers state with bureaucratic perversions... we have developed into a bureaucratic state with proletarian-Communist survivals...?" Who comprises this new "class of rulers," what is their relationship with the working masses, and how do the Trotskyites oppose rectifying this issue? What does this article reveal about class relations in Stalinist society?

Citing the increasing bureaucratization of the Bolshevik Party--as evidenced by restrictions on intraparty democracy, Stalin's emergence as an unchallenged dictator, and most officials' appointment-instead-of-election-based status--the Trotskyites argued that a new ruling class had emerged in the Stalinist Soviet Union. Unlike former bourgeoisie ruling classes, which owned private property, this ruling class owned political property, or "government power." Appointed by Stalin--or at a local level by lower-ranking Soviet officials--most Bolshevik Party members owed their status--and privileges--to political appointments. In turn, the Soviet Union had transformed "From the workers state with bureaucratic perversions... [to] a bureaucratic state with proletarian-Communist survivals." The ruling structure was increasingly centralized, with Stalin and his inner-circle setting the direction of the entire country, as evidenced by his policies of collectivization, industrialization, and dekulakization. In turn, the Trotskyites contended that the Stalinist state was increasingly alienated from the peasantry and workers--from the people it claimed to rule in the name of--resulting "in the oppression... of the toiling masses." Certainly, there was still a promise of upward mobility, but the chances of this were slim. Therefore, the Trotskyites are not only important for illustrating how the Communist Party had abandoned a participatory vision of socialism, but also for shining light on Stalinist society's emergent class structure, one with a definitive hierarchy of state official, worker, peasant, and gulag resident.

Lenin - The New Economic Policy - April 1921: "Thus, the first thing required is immediate and serious measures to raise the productive forces of the peasantry. This cannot be done without a serious modification of our food policy. Such a modification was the substitution of the surplus-appropriation [requisitioning] system by the tax in kind, which implies free trade... after the tax has been paid... The tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from that peculiar 'War Communism,' which we were forced to resort to by extreme want, ruin and war, to the proper socialist exchange of products... The essence of this peculiar 'War Communism' was that we actually took from the peasant all the surplus grain—and sometimes even not only surplus grain, but part of the grain the peasant required for food [and to sow the next crop]—to meet the requirements of the army and sustain the workers... 'War Communism'... was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat which is exercising its dictatorship in a small peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for manufactured goods the peasant requires. Only such a food policy corresponds to the tasks of the proletariat; only such a policy can strengthen the foundations of Socialism and lead to its complete victory... Either try to prohibit entirely, to put the lock on, all development of private, nonstate exchange, i.e., trade, i.e., capitalism, which is inevitable amidst millions of small producers. But such a policy would be foolish and suicidal for the party that tried to apply it. It would be foolish because such a policy is economically impossible. It would be suicidal because the party that tried to apply such a policy would meet with inevitable disaster... Or... to try to direct [capitalism] into the channels of state capitalism. This is economically possible, for state capitalism—in one form or another, to some degree or other—exists wherever the elements of free trade and capitalism in general exist. Can the Soviet state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, be combined, united with state capitalism? Are they compatible? Of course they are." What is Lenin's defense of state capitalism and the New Economic Policy? Why does he claim that "'War Communism'... was a temporary measure," and how does he justify shifting from a radical, intensely socialist economic policy to one predicated on "obtain[ing] grain in exchange for manufactured goods the peasant requires?"

Forced to cede the New Economic Policy as a result of the Kronstadt sailors rebellion and concurrent Green Army uprisings, this article defends state capitalism by claiming that "War Communism was a temporary measure." Although War Communism--and its grain requisitioning, compulsory labor, trade union militarization, and top-down management--was necessary to ensure that the Red Army prevailed in the civil war, Russia must now shift from a radical push toward socialism to gradual, reformist measures. As evidenced by the state of Russia's economy--and as evidenced by mounting popular resistance--War Communism "would be foolish and suicidal for the party that tried to apply it" during peacetime; it was economically impossible to completely suppress the market, and doing so would prevent Russia's economic progress--which would thwart the nation's ultimate transition into socialism. Until Russia was ready for full-scale socialist policies, then, the Bolsheviks would utilize the New Economic Policy; they would institute a tax-in-kind, exchange surplus grain for manufactured goods, and thereby gradually build up Russia's productive capacity. In Lenin's mind, then, the New Economic Policy was not just a concession caused by popular unrest; it was a tactical retreat, one that would help secure the eventual triumph of socialism.

Lenin Calls For an Uprising September 12-14, 1917: "The Bolsheviks, having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, can and must take state power into their own hands... For the Bolsheviks, by immediately promoting a democratic peace, by immediately giving the land to the peasants and by re-establishing the democratic institutions and liberties which have been distorted and shattered by Kerensky, will form a government which nobody will be able to overthrow... Why must the Bolsheviks assume power at this very moment? Because the imminent surrender of Petrograd will reduce our chances a hundred times... The point is that now, at the Democratic Conference [of all Workers', Solidiers' and Peasants' Soviets] our Party has virtually its own congress, and this congress... will decide the fate of the revolution... History will not forgive us if we do not assume power now... By seizing power both in Moscow and in Petrograd at once... we shall win absolutely and unquestionably." Why does Lenin claim that "history will not forgive us if we do not assume power now?"

Having noted the Russian masses' radicalization over the course of 1917--as evidenced by soldier munities, growing demands for workers' control, and the peasants' seizure of land--Lenin believed that the Bolsheviks possessed enough popular support to launch a coup. Certainly, political parties such as the Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Kadets still collectively held more sway than the Bolsheviks, but the Bolsheviks had enough collective drive and popularity to overthrow the Provisional Government. Additionally, the German Army's steady march toward Petrograd (St. Petersburg/Leningrad) added a sense of urgency since the conservative German forces would be much more willing--and much more able--to crack down on the Bolsheviks. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks needed to seize power now.

The Food Supply Crisis of Fall 1928 - Various Workers: "'The leaders of the Soviet regime don't care about us at all. They say 'we're making everything better, we're building everything'—but they've forgotten to think about us... The yoke that has fallen on us is unbearable, and now there's the yoke of hunger... So what did we fight for?... The leaders should have thought about us. If they aren't going to give us bread, then we bluntly say that we'll idle the mills and we won't work. So as to have some food, we must demand a little more insistently that they stop sending it abroad... 'We lived badly, but it isn't any better now: there are cutbacks everywhere, obligations everywhere, but the salaries paid are very small. It's a disgrace and shame for Soviet power... We fought for something, you know, and there was a revolution for a reason. But in the tenth year, we're sitting without bread.'... 'Obviously, our policy in the village is incorrect. Obviously, the Party organization struck at the peasantry incorrectly... What's happened in the village as a result of the new tax on foodstuffs? Not the kulak, but the middle peasant, for whom we should be working, is suffering." Why do several members of the working class claim that the "leaders of the Soviet regime... forgot... about us?" Why do they believe that the Communist Party failed to live up to the promise of the October Revolution? What does this reveal about most workers' motives for joining the revolutionary movement, and what does it reveal about industrialization's effect on the relationship between the workers and Communist Party leadership?

Most simply, many workers claimed that "the leaders of the Soviet regime... [have] forgotten... about us" because their material needs were not being met. Despite sacrificing during the October Revolution, despite sacrificing during the civil war, despite diminishing trade union autonomy and increasing labor discipline, despite ceding to socialist emulation and shock work, and despite facing longer, more difficult working hours, the workers are still going hungry "in the [revolution's] tenth year." Even though the Communist Party ruled in the working class's name--even though it styled itself as the vanguard of the proletariat--its unrelenting emphasis on increased economic output meant that the workers were arguably worse off under the Soviet regime. As industrialization accelerated throughout the 1930s, conditions only deteriorated, leading to large-scale disaffection with Stalin and the Communist Party. Clearly, workers primarily joined the October Revolution out of a desire to improve their material standing. Although some workers were committed to Marxist ideology--to the idea of upward mobility in the Soviet system--most workers overthrew the Provisional Government in order to secure better lives for themselves and their children. And since under Bolshevik leadership, the working class was forced to continue to make sacrifices--to continue to deny themselves for the promise of a utopian future--the proletariat became increasingly dissatisfied with the Communist Party.

Constitution of the RSFSR July 10, 1918: "In order to secure the supremacy of the laboring masses and to guard against any possibility of the restoration of the power of the exploiters, the Congress decrees the arming of the laboring population, the formation of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and the complete disarmament of the propertied classes... at the decisive moment in the struggle of the proletariat against its exploiters, the latter can have no place in any of the organs of power. Power must appertain completely and exclusively to the laboring masses and their plenipotentiary representatives, the soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies... leaves to the workers and peasants of each nationality the right to make an independent decision, at their own plenipotentiary congress of soviets, whether they desire, and if so upon what basis, to participate in the federal government and in other federal soviet institutions... The principal object of the constitution of the RSFSR, which is adapted to the present transition period, consists in the establishment of the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry, in the form of the strong all-Russian soviet power, with the aim of securing the complete suppression of the bourgeoisie, the abolition of the exploitation of the man by man, and the establishment of socialism, under which there shall be neither class division nor state authority... Guided by the interest of the working class as a whole, the RSFSR deprives individuals or separate groups of any privileges which they may use to the detriment of the socialist revolution... The following persons have neither the right to vote nor the right to be elected, even if they are included within one of the above-mentioned categories: a. Person employing hired labor for the sake of profit... Private business men, trade and commercial agents. d. Monks and clergymen of all religious denominations." Question: What is the "principal object of the constitution of the RSFSR?" How does it go about establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat?

Importantly, the Constitution of the RSFSR establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat by stripping the "bourgeoisie" of their eminence, property, and political rights. In order to secure the rights of the working class, this constitution prevents the so-called "former peoples"--which include capitalists, nobles, clergymen, and non-compliant intelligentsia--from owning weapons, holding office, voting, or otherwise participating in Bolshevik society. Accordingly, this constitution is a direct product of Marxist theory and of Lenin's article On the State and Revolution. The RSFSR is clearly committed to establishing a proletarian dictatorship, even if this dictatorship more strongly appropriated a vanguardist, Bolshevik-led dictatorship in practice.

Riutin Platform 1932 (Limited Excerpt): "Adventurous tempos of industrialization, involving a colossal drop in the wages of workers and employees, unbearable overt and hidden taxes, inflation, price increases, and the fall in the value of the ten-ruble bank note; adventurous collectivization attended by unbelievable violence, terror, and dekulakization—which, in fact, has been directed mainly against the middle and lower masses in the countryside—and finally, the expropriation of the countryside by means of all sorts of requisitions and forcible procurements have lead the whole country to the most profound crisis, the monstrous impoverishment of the masses, and starvation in both the countryside and the city... In concrete terms, the range of measures necessary to get the party and the country out of the crisis and dead end, are essentially the following: Liquidation of the dictatorship of Stalin and his clique. Immediate replacement of all heads of the party apparatus and the calling of new elections to the party organs on the basis of genuine intra-party democracy... An immediate end to the anti-Leninist methods of industrialization and an irresponsible tempo leading to the exploitation of the working class... Immediate disbanding of all collective farms which are created by force and are a sham.... Immediate cessation of requisitioning of grain, livestock, and other produce by the current method of looting the countryside. Ending the export of agricultural produce at negligible prices. Restoration of the old laws and of Leninist policy in the work of the trade unions. Ending immediately the adventurist policy of dekulakization in the countryside, which is in fact directed against all inhabitants of the countryside." What is the significance of the Riutin Platform? What are Riutin's main problems with the Stalin Revolution, and why does Riutin call for the "liquidation of the dictatorship of Stalin and his clique?"

In a similar manner to the Petropavlovsk Resolution, the Riutin Platform represents a broadside against Stalin's industrialization, collectivization, dekulakization, and political policies. Citing "a colossal drop in the wages of workers and employees... inflation... and price increases"--all of which discredit Stalin's industrialization program-"collectivization attended by unbelievable violence, terror, and dekulakization--which, in fact, has been directed mainly against the middle and lower masses in the countryside--...and starvation"--all of which discredit Stalin's agricultural policy--and Stalin's role as a "capricious" "political intriguer"--which discredits Stalin's political legitimacy, the Riutin Platform calls for a wholesale reversal of the Stalin Revolution. Only by "liquidat[ing] the dictatorship of Stalin and his clique," restoring "genuine intra-party democracy," ending the "irresponsible, [inefficient industrial] tempo," disbanding "collective farms," halting grain requisitioning, restoring trade union autonomy, and ceasing dekulakization can the Soviet Union return to a true, more participatory, and less unstable socialist state. The Riutin Platform, then, sought to topple Stalin's leadership and policies, but like the Left Opposition and Right Opposition that came before him, Riutin was unsuccessful. The Riutin Platform only received limited circulation, Stalin cracked down on the opposition, and Riutin was executed in the Great Purge. Overall, the Riutin Platform is significant for illustrating that despite Stalin's growing dictatorship, there was still resistance to his rule, resistance that Stalin believed he could only crush through the Great Terror.

The Monolithic Party: Resolution of the Tenth Party Congress - March 1921: "All class-conscious workers must clearly realize the perniciousness and impermissibility of factionalism of any kind, for no matter how the representatives of individual groups may desire to safeguard Party unity, in practice factionalism inevitably leads to the weakening of team work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the Party... to widen the cleavage and use it for counterrevolutionary purposes... Moreover, everyone who criticizes must see to it that the form of his criticism takes into account the position of the Party, surrounded as it is by a ring of enemies, and that the content of his criticism is such that, by directly participating in soviet and Party work, he can test the rectification of the errors of the Party or of individual party members in practice... The Congress therefore and hereby declares dissolved and orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another. Nonobservance of this decision of the Congress shall involve absolute and immediate expulsion from the Party... the Congress authorizes the Central Committee, in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee to reduce them to the status of alternate members... If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, who by a two-thirds majority, deems it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of an alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately." What is the significance of the Tenth Party Congress's ban on factionalism? Why is it so important that the Central Committee "in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of factionalism, [could] apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee to reduce them to the status of alternate members" by a two-thirds vote?

Representing Lenin and the Bolsheviks' response to the Kronstadt sailors political demands, the Tenth Party Congress crucially suppressed "factionalism" or intraparty democracy. Not only would the Bolsheviks refuse to broaden political participation or cede the Communist Party's power to democratically elected soviets, but they would also crack down on ideological nonconformity within the party itself. Groups such as the Workers' Opposition--or in the future the Zinoviev-Kamenev Opposition and Right Opposition--would be crushed and expelled from the party. Although this decision was consistent with Bolsheviks' political siege mentality--and may have helped reign in control in the wake of the civil war--it directly facilitated Stalin's rise to power. As the General Secretary, Stalin could steadily pack the Central Committee and other party organizations with loyal supporters; in turn, when figures such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, or Bukharin contested his growing power, he could use the ban on factionalism to sideline his opponents. Therefore, the Tenth Party Congress is not only significant for mounting a response to the Kronstadt rebellion, but also for paving the path toward Stalin's eventual dictatorship.

Document 61 - Anti-Stakhanovist Leaflets - November 29, 1935: "...condemned the policy of the party and of Soviet power, saying that the party is leading the country to ruin, that the party is not following Lenin's path, that in the Soviet Union socialism is being built on the deprivations and privations... of the workers, that the Stakhanovist movement is a form of exploitation of the working class, etc... YOU CAN'T BUILD SOCIALISM ON THE BONES OF THE PROLETARIAT... And imagine how cleverly this [Stakhanovist policy] has been invented. For every ton of coal that you mine in excess of the set quota, the policy of sliding-scale payment counts as double or triple... It is foolish to think that the Stakhanovist method raises your earnings. For the most part, this is not so... The Stakhanovist earnings concern isolated individuals only... The Central Committee and Stalin are striving to build socialism for future generations at the cost of privations today... Whoever says that reality alone is reflected in the literature of the Soviet Union was profoundly mistaken. Literary themes are dictated by the Central Committee of the party headed by Stalin. The CC of the party harshly punishes those who try to reflect the real situation in the country... It was around 1930 when there was an 'error' in the implementation of the policy of collectivization. They were overzealous, so to speak. Peasants belonging to the poorer strata came under the category of kulaks. Many, though innocent, were deported or simply executed. The peasants, seeing their bread taken from them, were forced to eat oil cakes or bread with nettles. Where in Soviet literature will you find a reflection of these glaring facts? Is this realism?... Eighteen years of privations ought to be compensated for with a new policy directed toward real improvement in the material welfare of the working masses." What are these students' major issues with the Stakhanov Movement and with Stalin's industrialization policies? What does this pamphlet reveal about the regime's relationship with the working class?

Most directly, these Anti-Stakhanovist students contend that "YOU CAN'T BUILD SOCIALISM ON THE BONES OF THE PROLETARIAT." Even though rapid industrialization is designed to secure the Soviet Union's future glory and protect it from its capitalist enemies, these students argue that "the Central Committee and Stalin are striving to build socialism for future generations at the cost of privations today." The Stakhanov Movement, despite containing the promise of increased wages, working class pride, and heightened material rewards, "concern[s] isolated individuals only." Most individual wages were not increasing as a result of the Stakhanov Movement, and due to rapid inflation and a dearth of consumer goods, the workers' material welfare was actually diminishing. Despite purportedly ruling in the express interest of the working class, Stalin and the Soviet government were "exploiting" the proletariat and "not following Lenin's path." In turn, "eighteen years of privations ought to be compensated for with a new policy directed toward real improvement in the material welfare of the working masses." Overall, this anti-Stakhanovist leaflet captures worker discontentment with the Stakhanov Movement and Stalin's government at large. Due to persistent sacrifices and degrading conditions, the Communist Party had alienated its most loyal source of support, which necessarily demanded even harsher measures of repression and mass violence, as evidenced by the Great Terror.

Order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet March 1, 1917: "In all political actions, troop units are subordinate to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and to the committees thereof. The orders of the Military commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed, with the exception of those instances in which they contradict the orders and decrees of the Soviet Workers' and Soviet Soldiers' Deputies." Why is Order No. 1's assertion that "The orders of the Military commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed, with the exception of those instances in which they contradict the orders and decrees of the Soviet Workers' and Soviet Soldiers' Deputies" significant?

Order No. 1 signals the soviets lack of faith in--and ability to undermine--the Provisional Government. Since soldiers--many of whom supported the Soviets--would now follow the orders of the soviets instead of the Provisional Government, a precarious situation of dual power rapidly emerged. Furthermore, Order No. 1 provided the basis for a second revolution in October, particularly as the population radicalized, since most of the military supported the soviets, followed their orders, and could easily topple the regime.

"In our attitude towards the war... not the slightest concession to 'revolutionary defencism' is permissible. The specific features of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry. This transition is characterized... by a maximum of legally recognized rights... and... the unreasoning confidence of the masses in the government of capitalists, the worst enemies of peace and Socialism. This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the special conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life. No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be explained, particularly those relating to the renunciation of annexations... As long as we [the Bolsheviks] are in the minority we carry on the work of criticizing and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes... Confiscation of all landed estates. Nationalization of all lands in the country, the disposal of the land to be put in the charge of the local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies... The immediate amalgamation of all banks in the country into a single national bank." Why are Lenin's April Theses significant? Specifically, why is it important that he claims that "the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat, placed the power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to the second stage, which must place the power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry," and in turn, that "As long as we [the Bolsheviks] are in the minority we carry on the work of criticizing and exposing errors and at the same time we preach the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, so that the masses may by experience overcome their mistakes?"

Prior to Lenin's April Theses, many figures within the Bolshevik Party were happy to cooperate with the Provisional Government. However, after Lenin arrives from Finland and issues this speech, it becomes clear that the Bolsheviks would refuse to cooperate with the Provisional Government and instead consistently expose its errors before eventually launching a second, proletarian revolution. The April Theses are particularly significant since, as other socialist parties entered the Provisional Government and the Provisional Government continued to solve many of Russia's overlapping crises, the Bolsheviks appeared vindicated to many Russians. In turn, the April Theses helped the Bolsheviks benefit from Russia's steady radicalization over the course of 1917, which ultimately culminated in the October Revolution.

Proclamation of Assumption of Power by the Congress of Soviets October 25-26 1917: "The Soviet Government will propose an immediate democratic peace to all the nations and an immediate armistice on all fronts. It will secure the transfer of the land of the landed proprietors, the crown and the monasteries to the peasant committees without compensation; it will protect the rights of the soldiers by introducing complete democracy in the army; it will establish workers' control over production; it will assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the time appointed; it will see to it that bread is supplied to the cities and prime necessities to the villages; it will guarantee all the nations inhabiting Russia the genuine right to self-determination." What is the significance of these proclamations that immediately followed the Bolsheviks seizure of power?

Referred to as a revolution by decree, the Proclamation of Assumption of Power by the Congress of Soviets effectively signaled Lenin and the Bolsheviks' revolutionary program. Containing policies that appealed to all of the Bolsheviks' major constituents, the Proclamation promised an immediate armistice--which mollified the soldiers--approved peasant land seizures--which mollified the countryside--advocated workers' control over production--which mollified the workers--championed self-determination--which mollified Russia's nationalities--and guaranteed bread--which promised a solution to the tsarist and Provisional Government's supply crisis. Essentially, Lenin's revolution by decree signaled the Bolshevik Party's intent to uphold its slogan of "Peace, Land, and Bread," which helped shore up support in preparation for the coming civil war. Ultimately, some of these promises were left unfulfilled, as War Communism instituted compulsory labor, conducted grain seizures, and broadly suppressed nationalist movements, but the document is nevertheless significant for its role in galvanizing popular support.

Petr Nikolaevich Durnovo - 1914 Letter to the Tsar: "More than that, one must foresee that under the exceptional conditions that exist, a general European war is mortally dangerous both for Russia and Germany, no matter who wins. It is our firm conviction, based upon a long and careful study of all contemporary subversive tendencies, that there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution which, by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor. An especially favorable soil for social upheavals is found, of course, in Russia, where the masses undoubtedly profess the principles of an unconscious sort of socialism... a purely political revolution is not possible in Russia, and any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into a socialist movement. The opponents of the government have no support among the common people, who see no difference between a government official and a member of the intelligentsia... The peasant dreams of obtaining free a share of somebody else's land; the workman, of getting hold of the entire capital and products of the manufacturer... In the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable... The legislative institutions and the opposition intelligentsia parties, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless to stem the rising popular tide, which they themselves had aroused, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the outcome of which cannot even be foreseen." Questions: What does Durnovo mean when he suggests that Russia is "an especially favorable soil for social upheavals?" Why is he convinced that war with Germany will result in "a social revolution that by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victor?

Rough Answer: Durnovo, a conservative tsarist official is recognizing the radical nature of Russia's peasantry and working class in addition to their disaffection with the middle-class elite. As a result, a failed war with Germany will spark unrest that will eventually devolve into a radical, socialist revolution. This turns out to be a prescient analysis of the course of World War I and the October Revolution.

"Now the question is: can the Russian obshchina, though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primaeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of Communist common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West? The only answer possible to-day is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development... We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of those means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule... But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labor, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (trade unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the contest breaks out into riots... Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole... Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of the oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence... The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He became a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society... In this sense, the theory of Communist may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property... You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property of the immense majority of society. In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend... The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality. The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word... United action of leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end... The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production... Nevertheless, in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.. 1. Abolition of property in land... A heavy progressive or graduated income tax... Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly... Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state... equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture... When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character... If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Questions: Why did Marx and Engels think Russia, through its "common ownership of [agricultural] land," might provide an exception to their scientific-historical view of development? What is the significance of Marx's statement that "a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands?" Why did the Communist Manifesto have such a strong appeal? Specifically, why did Marx and Engel's assertion that "every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of the oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence... [The bourgeoisie] is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to [the proletariat]... Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society" gain widespread support? What is the significance of Marx and Engel's brief overview of proletarian rule? Specifically, how do the statements, "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in hands of the state... and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible" and "1. Abolition of property in land... A heavy progressive or graduated income tax... Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly... Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state... equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture..." correlate with the RSFSR's initial implementation of socialism?

Rough Answers: 1. They believed that the peasant commune might provide a jump start into socialism; rather than entering a full-scale bourgeois phase, a communist agricultural state could form. This is reflected in the demands of the SRs and in the motives of large-scale peasant rebellions. 2. This statement directly foreshadows the Bolsheviks role in the October Revolution. Visualizing themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat, as the intelligentsia that can awaken class consciousness and ensure revolutionary success, Lenin and other Bolsheviks helped spark the October Revolution. This idea, though, translates into the vanguard or the Communist Party, continuing to retain leadership over post-revolution Russian society. 3. The Communist Manifesto's scientific perception of history--its belief that history was based on class antagonisms and inevitably progressed through stages of slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism--provided a compelling, seemingly objective view of the world and societal progress. Ultimately, its assertions were flawed, especially since Marx neglected the reformist power of capitalism, but it attracted many supporters--particularly among the proletariat and disaffected intelligentsia--since it contained a prescriptive model for history and a prescriptive view of a future, proletarian-governed state. 4. Marx and Engels' brief overview of a proletarian-led state is significant for three reasons. First, its rough contours--especially its demand for proletarian political and economic power in addition to the rapid increase of productive capacity--became a central focus of the Bolsheviks; having seized power, Lenin initially and Stalin especially focused on overcoming Russia's "backwardness" to increase national output. Second, its more specific items--specifically its nationalization of banks, establishment of industrial armies, and abolition of private property in land--became central focuses of War Communism. Finally, since this description was limited and rather nebulous, it provided room for experimentation and debate, which helped facilitate during the Civil War and 1920s the Communist Party's intense conflict over War Communism, the NEP, political participation, factionalism, and nationalism, amongst other items. By the 1930s, though, as Stalin consolidated power, this debate was largely compressed into one, prescriptive view of socialism in one country.

Stalin on Socialism in One Country - December 1924: "According to Lenin, the revolution draws its strength primarily from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary strength can be found only 'in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.' But what if the world revolution is fated to arrive with some delay? Is there any ray of hope for our revolution? Trotsky offers no ray of hope... 'Permanent revolution' is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement. 'Permanent revolution' is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the repudiation of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat... The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin—if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory—only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and in a country little developed in the capitalist sense at that, is excluded as something improbable... Trotsky writes: 'Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant.' It means that the victory of socialism in one country, in this case Russia, is impossible 'without direct state support from the European proletariat' i.e., before the European proletariat has conquered power. What is there in common between this 'theory' and Lenin's thesis on the possibility of the victory of socialism in 'one separate capitalist country'? Clearly, there is nothing in common... It goes without saying that for the complete victory of socialism, for complete security against the restoration of the old order, the united efforts of the proletarians of several countries are necessary... It appears, then, that, twist and turn as you like, we not only have 'not arrived,' but we have 'not even begun to arrive' at the building of socialist society. It appears that... a 'real progress of a socialist economy' will not be possible until the proletariat has been victorious in the 'major European countries.' Well then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only 'choice' that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state... Lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of the Russian proletariat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of 'permanent revolution.' What difference is there between Trotsky's theory and the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism in one country, and in a backward country at that, is impossible without the preliminary victory of the proletariat revolution 'in the principal countries of Western Europe?' As a matter of fact, there is no difference.... Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution' is a variety of Menshevism." What is Stalin's theory of socialism in one country? Why is it important for him to claim that "Lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of the Russian proletariat—that is what lies at the root of the theory of 'permanent revolution,'" from both an international and domestic standpoint? What is the significance of Stalin associating Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' with Menshevism? Why does he state that "The opportunists of all countries assert that the proletarian revolution can begin—if it is to begin anywhere at all, according to their theory—only in industrially developed countries, and that the more highly developed these countries are industrially the more chances there are for the victory of socialism. Moreover, according to them, the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, and in a country little developed in the capitalist sense at that, is excluded as something improbable..." and then "Well then, since there is still no victory in the West, the only 'choice' that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state?" Is Stalin's speech mainly designed to establish a new policy direction or to discredit Trotsky?

Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country"-- which functions as a pointed contrast with Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" and Lenin's earlier emphasis on the importance of Western Europe in ensuring the success of socialism and the Russian Revolution--essentially argues that "the revolution draws its strength... from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself." Marxist and Bolshevik theorists had long assumed that since Russia was a "backward," minor capitalist, primarily agricultural nation, it could not effectively institute socialism without the help of the international proletariat. Yet as the Bolsheviks emerged victorious from the civil war--even at a high cost--and as Western capitalist democracy appeared to stabilize, many members within the Communist Party began to dispute the validity of "permanent revolution." Indeed, since no help seemed forthcoming, "permanent revolution" seemed to indicate that the Bolshevik experiment was bound to fail, which Stalin alludes to by stating that under this theory, "the only 'choice' that remains for the revolution in Russia is: either to rot away or to degenerate into a bourgeois state." Stalin and some other leading Bolsheviks responded to this fear by supporting "socialism in one country." Although Russia, through the Comintern, would unquestionably support the international revolution, it would not depend on it, instead relying of Russian domestic strength to develop Russia's productive capacity and thereby institute socialism. For a proud, often defeated nation--and a dedicated, idealistic intelligentsia--Stalin's theory of socialism in one country was a compelling argument, one that would be pursued during the Stalinist revolution with collectivization, dekulakization, and breakneck industrialization, all of which represented a full steam surge toward socialism. Stalin associates Trotsky with Menshevism, and decries his "permanent revolution" theory, primarily out of a desire to politically sideline him. Certainly, Stalin did believe in the idea of socialism in one country, but in this context, Stalin was more concerned with discrediting Trotsky, who represented the major opposition figure in the Communist Party. By framing Trotsky's idea of "permanent revolution" as one that underestimates "the strength and capabilities of the Russian proletariat," as one that leaves Russia with the only option of "degenerat[ing] into a bourgeois state," Stalin powerfully--and rather effectively--undermines Trotsky. Certainly, Trotsky was far from a Menshevik, as he was one of the more radical figures in the Communist Party, but Stalin's mudslinging tactics--and practical control over appointments within the party apparatus--helped him remove Trotsky from the political picture. One more obstacle to Stalin's unquestioned power was by the wayside, and further attacks would soon follow on Zinoviev, Kamenev, and eventually Bukharin.

Makhno Movement: Documents, 1919-1920 "So we must win—win not so that we may follow the example of past years and hand over our fate to some new master, but to take it in our own hands and conduct our lives according to our own will and our own conception of the truth... The Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine was called into being as a protest against the oppression of workers and peasants by the bourgeois-landlord authorities on one side and the Bolshevik-Communist dictatorship on the other... The land of the gentry, the church and other enemies of the toilers with all its livestock and equipment must be transferred to the peasants, who will live on it only by their own labour... The factories, workshops, mines and other means of production are to become the possession of the working class as a whole, which through its trade unions will take enterprises in its own hands... Representatives of political organizations have no place in workers' and peasants' soviets, for their participation will transform the latter into soviets of patry deputies, which can only bring about the demise of the soviet order... The Makhnovists are those toilers who raised the banner of combat against the rule of Denikin and all other forms of oppression, violence, and lies, whatever their origin... For the true soviet order is not the rule of the Social-Democratic Communist-Bolsheviks which now calls itself soviet power, but a higher form of anti-authoritarian and anti-statist socialism, manifesting itself in the organization of a free, happy and independent structure for the social life of the toilers... Only through the abolition of all rulers, through the destruction of the whole foundation of their lies, in state as well as political and economic affairs, only through the destruction of the state by means of a social revolution can we attain a genuine worker-peasant soviet order and arrive at SOCIALISM." Who are the Makhnovists and what are they fighting for? Specifically, what does their assertion that "The Makhnovists are those toilers who raised the banner of combat against the rule of Denikin and all other forms of oppression, violence, and lies, whatever their origin... For the true soviet order is not the rule of the Social-Democratic Communist-Bolsheviks which now calls itself soviet power, but a higher form of anti-authoritarian and anti-statist socialism, manifesting itself in the organization of a free, happy and independent structure for the social life of the toiler" reveal about peasant rebellions--or Green Army uprisings--that occurred during the civil war?

The Makhnovists--a quasi-anarchist group of Ukrainian toilers--encapsulates the peasantry's conception of socialism and their resistance to the "Social-Democratic Communist-Bolshevik dictatorship." Akin to other peasant uprisings that occurred across the Soviet Union--such as the particularly large rebellion in Tambov Province--the Makhnovists, most simply, wanted to be left alone. They desired an "anti-statist and anti-authoritarian" form of socialism, one in which neither the tsar, White Army, Red Army, or any other arbitrary source of "oppression, violence, and lies" would exert authority over the peasants, seizing their land, taxing them, and requisitioning their grain. The Makhnovists essentially wanted socialism to operate at a local level, on the basis of the peasant commune, and without political oversight; they championed a peasant vision of socialism, a vision that was ultimately suppressed by the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the Makhnovists and other Green Army uprisings are significant because they helped secure the end of War Communism and the beginning of the New Economic Policy.

The Petropavlovsk Resolution, February 1921 - Kronstadt Sailors: "In view of the fact that the present soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants... we resolve... to give freedom of speech and press to workers and peasants, to anarchists, and left socialist parties...to secure freedom of assembly for trade unions and peasant organizations... to abolish all political departments because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive the financial support of the state for such purposes... [officers] are to be appointed in the army from the ranks... to give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to the land... on condition that the peasants manage with their own means... without hiring employed labor." What is the significance of the Petropavlovsk Resolution? What were the Kronstadt Sailors fighting for?

The Petropavlovsk Resolution--formed by disgruntled, radical Red Army sailors stationed on Kronstadt--represented a broadside against War Communism, as its provisions systematically targeted the worst excesses of Bolshevik power during the Russian Civil War. Its desire "to give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to the land" challenged grain requisitioning, its proposal to "secure freedom of assembly for trade unions" opposed labor militarization," its demand that "[officers] are to be appointed in the army from the ranks" challenged the Bolsheviks' reliance on bourgeois military specialists, and its resolution "to give freedom of speech and press to workers and peasants, to anarchists, and left socialist parties" defied the Bolsheviks' monopoly on political power and their increasing restriction of the political sphere. Although many of the Kronstadt sailors' demands--particularly their criticism of grain requisitioning--were fulfilled by the New Economic Policy, their political demands were unjustifiable to Lenin and his regime. In turn, the Kronstadt sailors were crushed, and a third revolution did not occur. Historian's Commentary: "But the resolution's opening declaration—that "the present soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants"—represented a clear challenge to the Bolshevik monopoly of political power... In effect, the Petropavlovsk resolution was an appeal to the Soviet government to live up to its own constitution, a bold statement of those very rights and freedoms which Lenin himself had professed in 1917... But the Bolsheviks saw it in a different light: by rejecting their claims to sole guardianship of the revolution, to exclusive representation of the workers and peasants, it was nothing but a manifesto of counterrevolution and had to be dealt with accordingly."

Proclamation of the First Provisional Government March 1, 1917: "Freedom of speech, press, and assembly and the right to form unions and to strike and the extension of political freedom to persons serving in the armed forces limited only by the demands of military and technical circumstances. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality... Elections to the organs of local self-government are to be held on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage and secret ballot... While preserving strict military discipline on duty and during military service, the soldiers are to be freed from all restrictions in the exercise of those civil rights which all other citizens enjoy. The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention whatsoever of taking advantage of the military situation to delay in any way the carrying through of the reforms and the measures outlined above." What is significant about the promises that the First Provisional Government made to the Russian people? What is important about this Proclamation's statements directed at soliders?

The Provisional Government Proclamation, which functioned as a quasi-constitution, rapidly transformed Russia from one of the most conservative to most liberal states in Europe. Promising universal suffrage, freedom of press, speech, and assembly, and the abolition of class, religion, and national restrictions, the Provisional Government was.a hallmark of what the Bolsheviks would call a "bourgeois liberal constitution." The Provisional Government's attempts to ameliorate soldiers, particularly by stating that "the soldiers are to be freed from all restrictions in the exercise of those civil rights which all other citizens enjoy" already hints at the Provisional Government's precarious position? Already noting the army, workers', and peasants' predilection for the soviets, the Provisional Government felt the need to grant concessions.

Formation of the USSR - Constitution, Signed 1922, Ratified 1924: "It is only in the camp of the soviets; it is only under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat that has grouped around itself the majority of the people, that it has been possible to eliminate the oppression of nationalities, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence and to establish the basis of a fraternal collaboration of peoples... the instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks make inevitable the creation of a united front of the Soviet Republics in the presence of capitalistic surroundings... All these considerations insistently demand the union of the Soviet Republics into one federated State capable of guaranteeing security against the exterior, economic prosperity internally, and the free national development of peoples... this Union is a free federation of peoples equal in rights, that the right to withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic, that access to the union is open to all Republics already existing... that it will serve as a bulwark against the capitalistic world and mark a new decisive step towards the union of workers of all countries in one World-Wide Socialist Soviet Republic." What is the significance of the USSR's Constitution? Was its promise that "this Union is a free federation of people equal in rights, that the right to withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic... and that it will mark a new decisive step towards the union of workers of all countries in one World-Wide Socialist Soviet Republic genuine?

The USSR's Constitution is significant for cementing Stalin's resolution of the nationality question. Citing the international situation--or the Soviet Union's "capitalist encirclement"--the principles of socialist "fraternal collaboration," and the Marxist-Leninist preference for internationalism, this constitution effectively bound Belarus, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia (although it would receive its own republics later) into the Soviet Union. The promise that "the right to withdraw from the Union is assured to each Republic" was rather disingenuous, as was the claim that "this Union is a free federation of people's equal in rights." Despite formally establishing a federal, nationality-based government system, the Soviet Union was, in practice, a unitary, centralized state. Major political decisions ran through Moscow--and through the upper ranks of the Bolshevik Party--not through the local Soviet Socialist Republics. Although the USSR did provide for a degree of cultural autonomy--especially since Bolshevik officials believed that good conduct toward non-Russian nationalities would help secure the spread of communism--this relationship was always tenuous--as evidenced by Stalin's actions in the border states during the Great Purge and World War II. And unquestionably, the RSFSR and its party apparatus held ultimate authority under this constitution.

Zinoviev and Kamenev October 11, 1917 About the Present Uprising: "It is said that: (1) the majority of the people in Russia are already for us and (2) the majority of the international proletariat are for us. Alas! neither one nor the other is untrue, and this is the crux of the matter. A majority of the workers and a significant part of the army in Russia are for us. But all the rest are in question. We are all convinced, for example, that if it now comes to elections to the Constituent Assembly, then the majority of the peasants will vote for the SRs... It is extremely harmful to overstate one's forces... if we now lose the battle, having staked everything, we shall inflict a cruel blow also to the international proletarian revolution... But meanwhile only the growth of revolution in Europe would make it necessary for us, without any vacillations, to take power immediately in our own hands. This is also the only guarantee of the triumph of an uprising of the proletariat in Russia... The strength of the proletarian party, of course, is very considerable, but the decisive question is, is the mood among the workers and soldiers of the capital really such, that they themselves see salvation already only in street fighting and are bursting to go on to the streets. No. This mood does not exist... And there is only one way that [we] can nullify [our] successes in present circumstances, and that is by taking the initiative for an uprising itself and in doing so subjecting the proletariat to the blows of the whole united counter-revolution, supported by petty-bourgeois democracy." Why do Zinoviev and Kamenev oppose Lenin's plan to immediately seize power. What is the significance of their statement that "if we now lose the battle, having staked everything, we shall inflict a cruel blow also to the international proletarian revolution?"

Zinoviev and Kamenev believe that--although the Bolsheviks will eventually launch a proletarian revolution--now is an inopportune time. Although the Bolsheviks had been steadily gaining support, particularly along the battle lines and in the cities, the peasants still overwhelmingly supported the Social Revolutionaries. Launching a coup would not only mean declaring war on the Provisional Government, but also on all other socialist parties, which is a gamble that could end in disaster. Furthermore, as adherents of classic Marxist theory, Zinoviev and Kamenev believed that for the Russian Revolution to be successful, the Bolsheviks must receive aid from the proletariat in the developed, Western countries. Since there were only inklings--not overwhelming indicators--of socialist unrest, a revolution would likely leave Russia alone and forced to vie with the world's capitalist nations. Essentially, Zinoviev and Kamenev believed that by launching a coup, the Bolsheviks would invite the opposition of not only "the forces of reaction" in Russia and abroad, but also that of other socialists. The Bolshevik Party, though strong, would crumble under the weight of this opposition.

Trotsky on Terror - 1920: "The problem of revolution, as of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and accept the conditions of the conqueror... As long as class society, founded on the most deep-rooted antagonisms, continues to exist, repression remains a necessary means of breaking the will of the opposing side... Terror can be very efficient against a reactionary class which does not want to leave the scene of operations. Intimidation is a powerful weapon of policy, both internationally and internally... A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works in the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands... The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. The gendarmerie of Tsarism throttled the workers who were fighting for the Socialist order. Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists, and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order... For us Communists [this distinction] is quite sufficient." Question: What does Trotsky mean when he argues that "the problem of revolution... consists in breaking the will of the foe?" What implication does this have for the Bolsheviks use of terror, both during the Russian Civil War and beyond?

Trotsky, alongside many other Bolsheviks such as Lenin and Stalin, viewed mass violence as a legitimate, effective policy tool. Since terror, which "kills individuals" while "intimidat[ing] thousands" can force a resistant population into submission, it has a clear, prominent role in the Bolsheviks' proletarian dictatorship. Furthermore, since the White Army is concurrently and the tsarist regime was formerly conducting terror, the Bolsheviks are even more justified because their mass violence "oppresses the oppressors" instead of "exploiting the exploited." During the Russian Civil War, then, Red Terror manifested itself in the operations of the Cheka--or the secret police--and the Red Army, and it was an important factor--alongside patriotism, geographic advantage, and dedicated organization--in why the Bolsheviks won the civil war. Following the civil war, Red Terror diminished to an extent, but as Stalin came to power in the late 1920s, mass terror was reinstituted on a wide scale to support his policies of forced collectivization, dekulakization, and later in the Great Purge. Trotsky's statement, then, provides the basis for a legacy of mass violence that persisted throughout the first few decades of Soviet history.

Zinoviev-Kamenev Opposition - December 1925: "I think it is first of all necessary to answer those who are trying to represent the matter as though we have no state capitalism and practically nothing of capitalism in general. I feel that the thing here is really the attempt of certain comrades to declare that the NEP is socialism... Such a point of view, such a position represents the idealization of NEP, the idealization of capitalism... It is indisputable that the NEP is the road to socialism, but the assertion that the NEP is not socialism also seems to me indisputable... this is a unique state capitalism, radically distinguished from the state capitalism of the bourgeois countries in that it is subordinated and limited by the working class, by the proletarian state. But at the same time Vladimir Ilich said that in order for the workers to see that we do have capitalism we must not idealize or gloss over reality... intraparty democracy is essential, its further development is essential... [A repression of intraparty democracy] must be avoided. This can be avoided only if the minority, which is not made up of newcomers, which you know about fully—if this minority is given an opportunity to defend its views in the party, of course with the full responsibility which the party and the dictatorship impose upon us... We are against creating a theory of the 'Chief,' we are against establishing a 'Chief.' We are against the Secretariat, which has in practice combined both policy and organization, standing over the political organ. We are for our upper level being organized in such a fashion that there would be a really all-powerful Politburo, bringing together all our party's policies, and at the same time the Secretariat would be subordinate to it and execute the technical aspects of its decisions... But I must say this out to the end. Precisely because I more than once told Comrade Stalin this, precisely because I more than once told a group of Leninist comrades, I repeat it here at the congress: I have arrived at the conviction that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfill the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff." What is Zinoviev's major issue with the New Economic Policy? Why does he state that "It is indisputable that the NEP is the road to socialism, but the assertion that the NEP is not socialism also seems to me to be indisputable?" What is Kamenev's major issue with Stalin's leadership of the Bolshevik Party? Why does he believe that "[A repression of intraparty democracy] must be avoided. This can be avoided only if the minority, which is not made up of newcomers, which you know about fully—if this minority is given an opportunity to defend its views in the party, of course with the full responsibility which the party and the dictatorship impose upon us?" What were the consequences of him saying that "I have arrived at the conviction that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfill the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff?"

Zinoviev's major issue with the New Economic Policy is that it is, frankly, not socialism. Like other members of the Left Opposition, Zinoviev believes that the New Economic Policy, being characterized by state capitalism, private trade, NEPmen, and re-emergent social differentiation, is not what the Bolsheviks fought for in the October Revolution and through the civil war. Certainly, Zinoviev pays homage to Lenin's position that the "NEP is the road to socialism"--as opposing Lenin was a quick route to losing status in the Bolshevik Party--but he attests that it is time for Russia to return to full-scale socialism. Russia's productive capacity has already sufficiently increased, the retreat has already been successful, so it is time to return to the offensive. Although Stalin, positioning himself as a moderate, repudiated Zinoviev's stance in 1925, interestingly, just a few years later, Stalin would embark on the same--if not an even more radical--program. This, then, demonstrates how Stalin--despite moderately changing his opinions--largely took stances on the issues of the 1920s in order to augment his political power. Kamenev declares that "I have arrived at the conviction that Comrade Stalin cannot fulfill the role of unifier of the Bolshevik staff" because he is concerned about Stalin's repression of "intraparty democracy" and his increasing political power. Even though Zinoviev and Kamenev were all too happy to align with Stalin a few years earlier to outmaneuver Trotsky, now that they are in the minority, they stand against "the Secretariat, which has in practice combined both policy and organization, standing over the political organ." Since Stalin has appointed loyal followers to positions on the Central Committee and throughout the party apparatus--and since he has skillfully harnessed the ban on factionalism to sideline opposition--Kamenev is concerned that Stalin intends to completely eliminate intraparty democracy. After first removing the political power of the bourgeoisie, and then that of other socialist parties, the Communist Party is now preventing discourse among loyal Bolsheviks, instead resorting to an even narrower, more centralized, top-down structure. As a result, Zinoviev and Kamenev propose that the General Secretary be made subordinate to the Politburo and that Stalin be removed from his post, but since Stalin had the support of most of the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev's pleas were overlooked. They were repudiated on charges of factionalism and effectively removed from the political picture. This left only Stalin's former allies, Tomskii, Rkyov, and Bukharin, standing in the way of uncontested political power.