HYPOS

Al says to Betty, "I convey to you my land, but only if you use it as a school. If you use it for anything else, I get to come on the land and take it back."

- Betty has a fee simple subject to condition subsequent - Al has a right of re-entry

Charlene says to Doug, "I give you my land for as long as you never tear down the old church on that land."

- Doug has a fee simple determinable - Charlene has a possibility of reverter

B designates his subsurface land as a "nature preserve," noting that it is a pristine natural area akin to a wilderness. Two years later, C injects salt water two miles underneath her land in order to create subsurface pressure that enhances production from oil wells, a common procedure in oil fields. Some of the salt water migrates laterally underneath B's land, destroying an indigenous species of bacteria. Has a trespass occurred?

- Some actual damage, though only to bacteria, so seems pretty trivial - Use is 10k feet down, a lot deeper than Chance. - Designation of "nature preserve" would simply reinforce common law rule that Chance rejected—need to adapt doctrine for modern world.

C enters lease for retail store in D's shopping center, opens Christian book store (which D knows upon lease execution). Two days later, D rents adjacent store to E for use as a pornographic bookstore. C's business suffers, some customers complain about E's adjacent store. D refuses to do anything.

- Wrongful conduct by L? Nothing breached in lease, and no nuisance-level interference with C's bookstore. - Substantial interference with T? No evidence proves C's weak business due to E's store presence. Better or worse if D had rented to another Christian bookstore owner? - Likely no breach of CQE.

O conveys "to A for life, then to B and heirs, but if A is survived at his death by any children, then to such surviving children and their heirs". At the time of the conveyance, A is alive and has two children, C and D. What are the various interests in the property?

--A = life estate; --B = vested remainder subject to total divestment; --C & D = shifting executory interests --Unborn children = shifting executory interests

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 25. B has three children 24, 23, and 22. And B is now 64 years old and has no plans for future children.

--Apply the RAP B cannot validate; an afterborn child could reach vesting more than 21 years after B's death Q: what of the possibility of the CR simply failing? Q: what of B's being past childbearing age? --Implication Strike the invalid contingent remainder; "O to A for life"

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 25. B is alive and she has one child who is 17.

--Apply the RAP Could the contingent remainder conceivably vest more than 21 years after B's death? You bet. B could die with only a two-year-old child, and that child could then reach 25 more than 21 years after B's death. The CR need not vest within 21 years of any life in being at the time of the transfer; it is thus invalid. --Implications. Strike the invalid contingent remainder. Result: "O to A for life".

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 25. B has three children 24, 23, and 22. And B is now 64 years old and has no plans for future children. What is the best measuring life?

--B's present kids don't work; they could die and B could have an long-afterborn child. --B is a better choice; B has most control over the contingent remainder's vesting

O to A for life, then to B's first child + heirs. B has no children at the time of conveyance.

--Does the RAP apply here? O has a reversion, while A has LE; neither are subject to RAP. However, "B's first child" has a contingent remainder. The RAP applies to that interest. When will the contingent remainder vest? When B's first child is born. What is the best measuring life? --B, because B has control over whether there will be children.

O to A + heirs as long as the property is used as a school; otherwise to C + heirs.

--Does the RAP apply? A has a FSSEL, but C has a shifting executory interest, to which the RAP does indeed apply. --When does C's interest vest? When the property is used other than for a school. --What is best measuring life? A, who has control.

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 25. B has three children 24, 23, and 22. And B is now 64 years old and has no plans for future children.

--Does the RAP apply? Not to A's life estate, but possibly to the contingent remainder to "B's first child." --When does the CR vest? When B has a child who reaches the age of 25.

A and B own Blackacre as joint tenants. A takes loan from C and puts up his joint interest in Blackacre as collateral. Five years later, A dies, devising all his property to D.

--Does the mortgage sever the joint tenancy? --Most courts hold no (lien theory, TX) --Some courts hold yes (title theory) --Does C's security interest survive A's death? --Nope; with what policy implications?

C is 10 in 2010. D enters C's land adversely that year. C dies in 2013, and all his property goes to heir H, who has been mentally incompetent since 2012. The jurisdictional AP period is ten years, or five years after cure, whichever is longer. When will C take title?

2020. While C's disability was cured in 2013, that would have resulted in an AP period ending in 2018. 2020 is the longer period so it is the applicable one.

O owns a 100-acre parcel but does not live there. A sells B a flawed deed purporting to give B ownership of 60 acres of the parcel. B enters the parcel and occupies only 10 of those acres for the relevant adverse possession period. What does B own?

60 acres

O conveys "to A for life, then to such of A's children as survive him, but if none of A's children survive him, to B and heirs". At the time of the conveyance, A is alive and has two children, C and D. What are the interests in the property?

A = life estate; A's children = contingent remainder; B = contingent remainder

O conveys "to A for life, then to A's children and their heirs, but if at the time of death he is not survived by any children, to B and her heirs". Two years after the conveyance, twins C and D are born to A. Following their birth, what are the various interests in the property?

A = life estate; C & D = vested remainder subject to open and to total divestment; Unborn children = shifting executory interest B = shifting executory interest

O conveys "to A for life, then to A's children and their heirs, but if at the time of death he is not survived by any children, to B and her heirs". At the time of the conveyance, A is alive and has no children. What are the various interests in the property?

A = life estate; A unborn kids = contingent remainder; B = contingent remainder

A trespasses on B's land, and finds a lost watch. A then loses the watch and C finds it. Whose rights in the watch are superior between:

A and B? - B > A because law wants to discourage trespass A and C? - Arg for A: maximizes prior owner recovery - Arg for C: A was not a prior valid possessor B and C? - Hard call. Does C's finding merit title?

A and B own Blackacre as joint tenants. A lives in a house located on the land. During 2018, he rented a bedroom in the house to C for $1000/month. Recently, A noticed that the roof was leaky, so he fixed it at a cost of $2000. He also thought the house could benefit from a new coat of paint, so he painted the house at a cost of $500. A also paid the property taxes owed on Blackacre during 2015, which cost $3000. B lives out of state and did not set foot on Blackacre during 2018. Nevertheless, B recently wrote to A demanding half of the rent C paid during that year. A responded that since A found C as a tenant, he was entitled to the rent, and that if anything, B owed A for A's work on the house and the property taxes. What result?

A currently owes B nothing for living in the house This may change upon sale, A very likely owes B $6000 for half of C's rental cost B currently owes A nothing for the improvements, necessary or otherwise Though costs of fixing roof would be reflected upon partition by sale, or based on improvement value upon any sale B likely owes A $1500 for property taxes Unless minority rule applies and A must pay all b/c he is in possession Likely outcome: A currently owes B $4500, perhaps as much as $6000 Upon sale, though, B will owe A credits for improvements and fixes

O gives her land "To A and his heirs."

A has a fee simple absolute Heirs have nothing

O owns in 1984 and A enters adversely on 5/1/84. Age of majority is 18. AP term is longer of 21 years from adverse entry or 10 from removal/cure of disability. O is fine in 1984. O dies intestate in 2002. H is 2 years old in 2002.

A owned as of 2005. There is no qualifying disability.

O owns in 1984 and A enters adversely on 5/1/84. Age of majority is 18. AP term is longer of 21 years from adverse entry or 10 from removal/cure of disability. O is 5 in 1984. In 1994, O becomes mentally ill, and dies intestate in 2009. H is under no disability.

A owned as of 2007. Cure of minority happens in 1997, so cure + 10 = 2007 (which is, obviously, longer than 2005). Cannot tack successive disabilities.

A and B own Blackacre as joint tenants. One day, A murders B in order to get all of Blackacre for himself. Who owns Blackacre?

A should not profit from his wrongdoing. Cf. wills context. So what outcome? Typically, B's estate owns half, A's heirs or devisees own the other half; A few states go ahead and allow B's estate to own it all!

O owns a pearl ring. She leaves it at the house of her daughter, A, when visiting. A calls O to tell her she left the ring there. O says "Keep it; I want you to have it." What if O calls A the next day and says she's changed her mind and wants the ring back?

A still owns, assuming it was a valid gift, because validly made gifts are irrevocable.

A and B own Blackacre as tenants in common. One day, A and B are simultaneously killed in a car accident. Who owns Blackacre?

A's and B's estates, each 50% tenants in common What if A and B had owned as joint tenants? A's and B's estates, each as tenants in common—death here effects severance of the joint tenancy

A finds the ring O left at A's house, as above. However, assume that A does not mention the find, but rather surprises O at a dinner by producing the ring. O takes the ring back, then says "No, I want you to have it" and gives it back to A. Then it doesn't fit A's finger, and O again takes it back for resizing. O then leaves the dinner with the ring and is eaten by a tiger escaped from the zoo. Who has superior title in the ring, O's estate or A?

A. O's statement at dinner plus delivery creates a valid gift. A's giving to O for resizing does not (why?), so the ring was A's regardless of the intervening events.

O to A so long as A does not die without having borne a daughter. At the time of conveyance, A has never borne a daughter.

A: --Fee simple determinable (possible counterinterpretations?) O: --Possibility of reverter (or right of re-entry?)

O to A for life, then to B if B reaches the age of 80, and if B does not reach the age of 80, then to C.

A: --Life estate B: --Contingent remainder C: --Contingent remainder O: --Reversion

O to A for life, then to B's devisees (what's that?). At the time of conveyance, A and B are both living, but B has no will.

A: Life estate B: Nothing B's devisees: Contingent remainder O: Reversion

Lease reads, "L leases to T for as long as Sen. Jacobs is in office." Sen. Jacobs is a currently sitting U.S. Senator with a job approval rating of 16%, who is up for re-election in 2020. How long is the lease term? (A) Until 2020, when Jacobs is kicked out of office; (B) Until whenever Jacobs is kicked out of office; (C) Until L or T decides to properly end the lease; (D) Until T decides to properly end the lease.

A: (C). Lease term is unenforceable, making it a tenancy at will, mutually terminable upon notice. Effel.

A landlord runs an ad that reads, "One room in owner-occupied duplex for rent. Only people speaking English need apply."

Ad would be impermissible under FHA, but individual rooms are not regarded as "dwellings," Roommate.com (9th Cir. 2012). CRA unlikely to apply unless you can convince a court that this is a proxy for race discrimination (and that is a plausible argument).

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. L demolishes the elaborate mansion on Blackacre and sells its parts for L's own profit.

Affirmative Waste

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. Blackacre consists of untouched forestland; L aggressively deforests the land throughout his life tenancy, leaving R with a barren wasteland.

Affirmative waste

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. There is no open mine on Blackacre at the time of the conveyance. L discovers gold on the land, creates a mine and removes ore throughout the time of his conveyance.

Affirmative waste—open mines rule

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. L demolishes a dilapidated shack on Blackacre that was considered a depressing, costly eyesore.

Ameliorative waste—thus likely not waste

J, a Hispanic male in good financial standing, applies to rent a one-bedroom unit in a 200-unit apartment tower owned by K. K refuses to rent to J, giving no reason. The unit is still vacant. Illegal?

Appears to be PF case for discrimination under FHA. Burden on K to assert valid reason for denying J the rental—no such reason is apparent.

O to A for life, then to A's widow for life, then to A's children living at the time of the widow's death. At time of conveyance, A is married to C.

Apply RAP --First CR validated by A's life --Second CR not validated by A's life or anyone else's Implication --Second CR invalid

O sells a retail store in Blackacre shopping center to A, the sale to become effective upon completion of the shopping center.

Apply RAP --The shopping center could easily be completed in 200 years, well more than 21 years after the end of any measuring life Implication --Immediate forced sale.

O to A + heirs as long as the property is used as a school; otherwise to C + heirs.

Apply RAP. Could C's executory interest vest more than 21 years after A's death? Yes. After O's or C's death? Also yes. The executory interest is invalid. Implication Strike executory interest. "O to A + heirs so long as the property is used as a school". A has FSD; O has possibility of reverter.

O to A for life, then to B's first child + heirs. B has no children at the time of conveyance.

Apply the RAP Does vesting condition have to occur within 21 years of B's death? Yes: B cannot have a kid more than 9 months after he dies, so the interest cannot VEST more than 21 years after B's death. Result The contingent remainder survives the RAP because it is validated by measuring life (and validating life) B.

A dies, devising "75% of my property to B, and 25% to C." A's estate includes Blackacre. C moves in, whereupon B tells him "You can only be on one-quarter of this land, because I am the majority owner." Is B right? What limits on C's use and enjoyment of Blackacre are imposed by his minority-owner status?

B is mistaken; C has full access to all of the land. C, however, has only a 25% contribution obligation to taxes and upkeep, and will get only 25% of the profit when the land is sold.

A and B own property as joint tenants. A dies, willing his property to C.

B owns an undivided interest

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 25. B is alive and she has one child, who is 17. --What is the best measuring life?

B's living child does not work because the contingent remainder could vest remotely; if the child dies tomorrow, B could have a child thirty years later. B, however, is a more plausible measuring life because B has control over vesting.

A steals B's watch. C, knowing that A stole the watch, steals it from A. A asks for the watch's return. Will A prevail?

Blackletter law answer: Yes. Most courts hold that a wrongful owner still has enforceable interests versus a subsequent wrongful owner.

O conveys her property to A for life. After the estate is conveyed, A sells her interest to Buyer. What happens if Buyer dies before A?

Buyer's estate gets the land until A's death

A and B own property as joint tenants. A sells his property to C. B dies, leaving all her property to D.

C and D own equally as tenants in common

O conveys Blackacre to A, B, and C as joint tenants. A conveys his interest to D. B dies, leaving all his property to H.

C owns 2/3 and D owns 1/3, each as tenants in common

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 18. B is alive has one child who is 10 at the time of the conveyance.

Can B have a child who turns 18 more than 21 years after B's death? Not possible. The contingent remainder survives the RAP because it is validated by B's life.

C is erecting a high-rise office building on land next to D's house. Temporary construction scaffolding on the 20th floor of C's building intrudes 3 feet into the airspace above D's land. D sues C for trespass.

Causby addresses this: "The law gives a remedy in case overhanging structures are constructed on adjoining land." Hard to see what damages would be, though.

A held title to a 200-acre tract of remote and unimproved desert land, which she never visited. Driving past the land one day, B noticed that rare and valuable cacti grew there; B spent 20 minutes digging out four small cacti, which he later sold. Over the next 10 years, he visited the property on five more occasions, each time removing a few cacti. B claims title to the tract. Does B have a valid claim?

Claim seems weak. Possibly actual but unlikely continuous, also possibly not open and notorious. Cf. Zambrotto.

Post pursues and stuns a deer. Pierson captures the deer while it remains stunned. Post arrives on the scene to find Pierson with the deer, which is still stunned. Whose rights in the deer are superior?

Close case, but probably Post because he had deprived the animal of its natural liberty during the time of Pierson's capture. We may need to have a clearer notion of what "stunned" means.

A enters into a ten year lease in B's commercial office building in Arizona, where A plans to open an accounting firm. Lease promises that B will "provide a/c", but does not specify temperature. A learns that B's building policy is to keep premises at 78 degrees, in interest of conservation. A's employees hate this and are 4% less productive than they would be at room temp. B refuses to change when asked. Breach of CQE?

Close case. - L act or omission? - No explicit breach of lease (what would be?). - What outside sources would help? OSHA: 68-76 degrees for worker health Environmentalists recommend 78+ to save energy - Is this a "substantial interference"? Only 4% reduction in productivity, but Employees are miserable, and Custom is freezing buildings (esp in AZ).

A landlord runs an ad that reads, "Two-room unit in duplex to rent. Owner/landlord occupies other unit in duplex. Only white people need apply." A qualified Malaysian couple comes to look at the unit, and is rejected by landlord for racial reasons.

Conduct is invalid under CRA but permissible under FHA (resident owner exception); advertisement is invalid under FHA (race discrimination expressed in housing ad).

A uses the apartment for his noisy, smelly cement-mixing business. B complains that he cannot sleep or eat in the apartment, and A says "You're always welcome here, co-owner. I even got you a gas mask to cut the impact of the fumes!"

Constructive ouster. Unreasonable interference with B's reasonable use & occupancy.

"O to A for life, and then to B if the Dodgers win the 2020 World Series." Vested or contingent?

Contingent

O to G for life, then if M marries, to M and her heirs.

Contingent

O conveys "to A for life, then to A's children and their heirs, but if at the time of death he is not survived by any children, to B and her heirs". Suppose that C dies during A's lifetime, and that A is survived by B and D. What are the various interests following A's death?

D and C's estate each own in fee simple absolute as co-owners

Pierson captures and kills a fox of which Post was in hot pursuit (but had not wounded), except that this time, all relevant events—Post's finding and pursuing the fox as well as Pierson's interception of it—take place on Post's own land, which was the fox's natural habitat and also where its den was located. Pierson was an invited guest of Post's at the time of the event (though he probably won't be invited back). Whose rights in the fox are superior?

Depends on applicability of ratione soli. Early English cases held that owners of real property own animals that reside on their property by constructive possession (ratione soli). Many American courts (especially in the western U.S.) courts have disagreed, holding that wild animals on an owner's land are not the owner's unless she does something to reduce them to her possession. But if ratione soli applied, easy case for Post.

Would your answer be the same if A had left the shipwreck site only to secure extraction equipment, which took him a week, after which time he returned to find that B had excavated the shipwreck herself?

Different result may obtain, cf. Haslem v. Lockwood (investment of effort in labor creates finder status not diminished by reasonable delay in securing property).

A landlord refuses to rent to man with severe Tourette's syndrome. The landlord's stated rationale is that the man will scare and threaten other tenants with unpredictable verbal outbursts.

Disability discrimination not permitted; rationale may be pretextual. Does reasonability of L's asserted rationale matter? Would we accept this in the context of race, for example?

O to A for life, then to A's widow for life, then to A's children living at the time of the widow's death. At time of conveyance, A is married to C.

Does RAP apply? --Yes, also to both contingent remainders. What is measuring life? --A for both contingent remainders What is vesting/failing condition? --First: A dies with wife --Second: A has living children at time of A's widow's death

O to A for life then to B + heirs, but if B does not ever get married, the property should go to C + heirs.

Does RAP apply? --Yes, applies to C's shifting executory interest. What is best measuring life? --B, who has most control over marrying What is vesting/failing condition? --B marries, or dies without having married Apply RAP --Must B get married (or not) within 21 years of B's death? Yes, absolutely. Implication: executory interest survives RAP because validated by B's life

O to A for life, then to A's children who reach the age of 30. A is alive has two children at the time of conveyance: B, who is 23, and C, who is 4.

Does RAP apply? --Yes, to all contingent remainders (B, C, and unborns) What is best measuring life? --Clearly A, who has control over future births. When does gift vest? --When any child of A turns 30. Apply RAP --B's CR cannot vest too remotely; neither can C's; but unborns can. But rule of convenience closes class upon A's death, therefore A's life validates all then-living children. Implication: Have to wait and see. Whichever of these or future kids who reach 30 by A's death vest, others out of luck.

O sells a retail store in Blackacre shopping center to A, the sale to become effective upon completion of the shopping center.

Does RAP apply? --Yes: this is a springing executory interest because it is a conditional sale. What is the best measuring life? --Either O or A produce the same result. What will cause the interest to vest? --Completion of the shopping center.

O to A, but if anyone ever smokes on the premises, then to United Catholic Charities.

Does RAP apply?--Yes, to executory interest in UCC. What is the best measuring life? --O, A or anyone are all equally good. When does the interest vest or fail? --When someone smokes on premises Apply RAP --Could clearly happen more than 21 years after the death of any life in being Implications --Charitable exception does not apply; result is "O to A".

O to A for life, then to A's widow for life, then to B if B is alive at the time of A's widow's death. At time of conveyance, A is married to C.

Does RAP apply? --Yes, applies to both contingent remainders What is best measuring life for each? --A for the contingent remainder to "A's widow" --Why not C? --Why not "A's widow"? --B for the contingent remainder to B

O conveys to A for life, then to B's children to reach 25. At conveyance, A is alive; B is alive and has 2 children: C, who is 23, and D, who is 27.

Does the RAP apply? --Yes, to both the VRSO in D and the executory interests in C and unborns What is the best measuring life? --B, who has control over births. What is vesting/failing condition? --Additional children of B reaching 25 Apply RAP --C's interest not invalid; must vest or fail within 2 years. Unborns certainly invalid (afterborn child of B). Implications --Initially appears invalid for some members of class, so invalid for all. But wait!! --Rule of convenience to the rescue! When does class close if B outlives A? When A dies. Meaning that A validates the existing vested interests of all children of B upon his death. --So: A validates all relevant future interests. Who will vest? D for sure, as well as possibly C or any unborns who are alive upon A's death.

O to A for life, then to B's first child to reach 18. B is alive has one child who is 10 at the time of the conveyance.

Does the RAP apply? O has reversion and B has life estate; RAP is irrelevant to them. But "B's first child to reach 18" has a contingent remainder to which the RAP applies. When does the contingent remainder vest? When B has a child who reaches the age of 18. What is the best measuring life? B's 10-year-old child cannot be a validating life; he could die, and B could then have a kid 30 years after his death. B is a better measuring life because B has control over the contingent remainder's vesting.

T's will reads, "T bequeaths Blackacre to A for life, then to B's children who reach the age of 30." Upon T's death, A has already died, and B is alive and has two children: C, who is 32, and D, who is 27.

Does the RAP apply? Yes, to D's and unborn children's executory interests, and possibly also to C's VRSO. What is a good measuring life? B's because B is alive and has control over the outcome. When will the interests vest? Upon D or any other child of B reaching 30. Apply RAP D's interest could not vest or fail too remotely, but unborns' could. Invalid for one, invalid for all—except for rule of convenience, which regards this class gift as closed upon conveyance. 5. Implication: gift is valid to C and D (but may not vest in D); invalid to unborns. So that means it is vested in C; D has a shot to vest; but future unborns are out of luck.

A is poisoned and rushed to the hospital, where doctors give him only three hours to live. He gathers his family and says, "I give my beloved sports car to my son B." B whoops and celebrates, and then A says "You know what, B is a jerk. I want my daughter C to have the car." Just then, a doctor enters the room holding a vial containing an antidote that (unbeknownst to A) will cure him entirely. But as the doctor moves to administer the antidote, A dies of a completely unforeseen heart attack. A's will does not specify who gets his car but the residuary clause benefits his wife. What if the doctor had cured A using the antidote, and then immediately after, A died of a heart attack?

Easier case. Wife would likely prevail pursuant to the will's residuary clause. When the condition causing A's imminent expectation of death was cured, the gift was constructively revoked.

A landlord refuses to rent other than to married couples with children. Rationale is to stop damage and noise from parties that the landlord has experienced when renting the house to university students in the past.

Excluding unmarried people does not violate "family status" provisions—narrowly defined to refer only to parents with minor children. Might be a concern to the extent that this would exclude single parents with kids. CRA does not apply.

O to A, but if A divorces, then to B.

Executory interest is vulnerable A validates; must vest or fail (i.e., he must divorce or not) within his natural life Implication: executory interest to B survives the RAP because it is validated by A's life. No change.

A farmer hires two boys to clean out his barn. Under the chicken coop, they find a can full of silver dollars that has been hidden there since before the farmer bought his farm in 1957. Whose rights in the silver dollar are superior?

Farmer. The boys are acting as his employee/agents, so their find is attributed to him. See South Staffordshire.

O gives her land "To A".

Fee Simple Absolute

O gives her land "To A for as long as A uses it as a restaurant."

Fee Simple Determinable

O gives her land "To A, so long as A uses it to operate a grocery store."

Fee Simple Determinable

O gives her land "To A, but only for use as a liquor store. If A ever stops running the liquor store, I reserve the right to return to the land and take it back."

Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent

O gives her land "To A, unless A ever travels to Cuba."

Fee Simple Subject to Condition Subsequent

O gives her land to "A, but to C if A ever serves liquor on the premises."

Fee Simple Subject to Executory Limitation

O gives her land "To A on the condition that A never sell it."

Fee simple absolute; invalid restraint against alienation

O gives her land to "To A, preferably for use as a tavern."

Fee simple absolute; precatory language insufficient to create FSD

O gives her land "To A for use as a tavern; but if A fails to use it as a tavern, then B gets it."

Fee simple subject to executory limitation

A hires a company to spray a chemical into the clouds 1000 feet over B's land in order to prevent the clouds from producing rain when they float over A's land, because this would harm A's mature wheat crop. B, whose young crops need water, argues that the spraying violated his airspace rights because he lost the rain those clouds would have produced over his land.

First, is this even B's airspace? - Likely not. Causby is pretty clear that above the "immediate reaches above the land," it's the public domain. Second, is it a taking? - In theory you could imagine use of public airspace harming land enough to be a taking - But here, there's no repeated use by A so no easement, and there is a one-time harm, not elimination of all effective use as in Causby.

A landlord rents to married couple and then afterward pressures the wife for sexual favors as a condition of continued residence. When she refuses, he threatens her husband with violence and refuses to provide basic upkeep for their residence. Does this amount to an FHA violation?

Group-based harassment of tenants by landlords, esp linked to provision of services, violates FHA. Grieger (N.D. Ill. 1988).

A steals B's watch. A then loses it, and C finds the watch. A demands that C return it. Will A prevail?

Hard case. Consider these policies: - Avoiding chaos - Returning object to prior valid possessors - Moral hazard and wrongful conduct

Same facts as #9, except that A's death by heart attack was directly caused by stress associated with the poisoning. Now whose title in the car is superior?

Hard case. C would argue that the causation is still the poisoning, so he should get it. Wife would argue that strict application of Brind rule suggests otherwise.

City builds and operates a subway tunnel that runs 300 feet below A's house. There is no vibration or other physical indication of the subway's presence that can be detected by anyone on the land surface. A has no plans to use his subsurface land. Has a trespass occurred?

Harder case than Chance, why? - Much nearer the surface. - Mostly on point with Chance otherwise. Why? - No actual damage suffered—nothing detectable from use on surface A has no plans to use the subsurface, so nothing "reasonable and foreseeable" to A at least

"O to G and heirs so long as land is used as a hospital, and then to M and heirs."

Has O granted a potentially infinite interest to G? Yes, if the land is used as a hospital G keeps it. So, could G's fee interest end due to the occurrence of some event other than sale? Yes, failure to us the land as a hospital would terminate G's fee interest. So, is there a future interest in the grantor? Nope, the future interest is in M and heirs. You've got a fee simple subject to executory limitation there, pardner!!

A housing developer in a racially diverse area distributes marketing materials that show only white people out of hundreds who are depicted living in the future development. When the development is full, there are no non-white people living there, despite the racially diverse local demographics.

How does this one come out after Tex DHCA? Clear statistical evidence of DI, but is there: Causation? Less discriminatory alternative?

A landlord runs an ad that reads, "Two-room unit in duplex to rent. Owner/landlord occupies other unit in duplex. Only people speaking Tagalog need apply."

Impermissible ad. This is also national origin discrimination, using language as a proxy. No opportunity to prove valid reason. CRA does not apply to ads.

Taking 200 shares of Google stock certificates from his safe and handing them to P, O declares, "I want you to have all of these when I die. Keep them safe."

Invalid gift—future intent is not sufficient. Must be present donative intent.

To A for life, then to B's children. B has one child, C

Is the class gift open or closed? Open, for now When does the class close? Upon B's death or, failing that, A's death. How does this affect future interests? C's interest will remain vested Any future born children of B may vest, but none will vest after A's death—even if B is still alive then

A home developer who creates gated communities lives in part of the U.S. with a large Aussie ex-pat population. He wants to avoid Australians buying his places because he feels that they are too rowdy and will upset other residents. Research shows that that Australians strongly prefer housing developments with swimming pools. The developer thus builds developments that lack pools. As a result, no Aussies buy any of the developer's homes.

Is there a decent case for disparate impact? Is there causation? Is there a less discriminatory alternative? If so, can the developer show a legitimate business justification?

O to A for as long as A lives.

Is this alternative any different? Nope Why isn't this FSD? It's got durational words! Not a fee simple—not potentially infinite

O to United Catholic Charities for life of A, then to B, but to LiveStrong if anyone ever smokes on the premises.

Label the interests O has nothing; UCC has a life estate pur autre vie; B has a vested remainder subject to total divestment; and LiveStrong has a shifting executory interest. Only the last of these is RAP-vulnerable. Choose a measuring life Difficult because who has control in this situation? A or B are equally plausible. 3. When would LS's executory interest vest? When someone smokes on the premises. 4. Could the vesting condition occur >21yrs after the measuring life ends? Yes, regardless of the chosen measuring life 5. Implications LS executory interest would normally be invalid and struck from conveyance. But charities exception applies because both possessory and RAP-vulnerable interests are charities

Fan buys ticket to baseball game, enters stadium, takes seat.

License: privilege to use land of another for specific purpose

O gives her land "To A for as long as A shall live."

Life Estate

O gives her land "To A for the life of B."

Life Estate Pur Autre Vie

O gives her land "To A until Jimmy Carter dies."

Life estate pur autre vie

The painted walls within E's duplex unit are cracked and scratched, and some of the lead paint is falling off.

Likely IWH violation. Lead is a serious health threat, especially to children. See Elliott (Mass. App. 2002) (finding IWH violation due to peeling lead paint).

Same facts as #1, except that as the whaling ship Artemis pursues the whale, the anti-whaling ship Minerva follows close behind, and whenever the Artemis gets within range of the whale to harpoon it, Minerva emits a sonic blast that causes the whale to swim away quickly. Assuming U.S. law applies, can Artemis successfully sue Minerva for depriving her of her property?

Likely not But cf. Keeble v. Hickeringhill (Q.B. 1707) (firing gun to scare away ducks in decoy pond was tortious interference with plaintiff's property)

Landlord refuses to rent to schizophrenic. Rationale: applicant has pet for medical reasons and apartment has strict no-pet policy.

Likely violates FHA; FHA entitles disabled people to reasonable policy exemptions.

"O to G for life, then to M and heirs if the land is still being used as a hospital."

M has a contingent remainder

"O to G and heirs so long as land is used as a hospital, and then to M and heirs."

M has an executory interest

A and B own a 1000-square-foot apartment as tenants in common. Fearing crime, A changes the locks, and sends B a key in the mail. As a result, B is locked out for the duration of a weekend.

May be actual ouster, but trivial so no damages. Court may find so trivial that it's not even ouster.

O gives her land "To A and the heirs of his body."

Modern: fee simple absolute Historical: fee tail

O lends a book to his neighbor P, who takes it home. Several days later, O finds that he has a second copy of the book. O calls P and declares: "Keep that book I lent you. It's yours." Whose title in the book is superior, O or P?

Much as example from previous page, likely a valid gift. No reported cases; delivery seems sufficient.

A and B are deeded their father's old rocking chair as joint tenants. A wants to partition it in kind; B wants partition by sale. What result?

Neither result seems to fulfill the parties' intent. Partition seems worse than sale, though (why?). Court may impose a sharing arrangement.

O devises his property to "A and her heirs." Harry is the sole child of A. At the time of the conveyance, Suppose that A wants to sell the property and spend all the proceeds on a trip around the world. Can Harry stop her?

No

A landlord runs an ad that reads, "Two-room unit in duplex to rent. Owner/landlord occupies other unit in duplex. All welcome to apply." Landlord systematically rejects all white applicants for racial reasons.

No FHA violation. Ad not facially discriminatory, and discriminatory acts permitted under resident owner exception. FHA does apply to "reverse discrimination," see Simpson (S.D. Ind. 2003). Probably but not certainly illegal under CRA.

The dishwasher inside D's rented house is broken. D's landlord has tried to fix it, but is unable to do so because the needed part is no longer sold.

No IWH violation. Inconvenience does not threaten safety or health of Ts, and dishwashers are not required by housing codes.

O owns a 100-acre parcel of farmland, but has not visited it or cultivated it since 1990. One day A shows up in his office and says, "Surprise, your land is mine by adverse possession! Since 1995, I've been going there several times every month and hiking around to get exercise. Since the jurisdictional adverse possession period is 10 years, the land is mine." Why is A's argument a loser?

No actual possession. A few monthly hikes do not amount to the kind of use that would be adverse to farmland.

A lives in the apartment, and B wants to operate a home design business there, using her bedroom as a studio and the common areas as client meeting space. B is irritated that A is watching TV in the living room and occasionally having guests to visit. B argues that she has been constructively ousted because she can't operate her design business in light of A's uses of the apartment.

No constructive ouster. A's conduct is not unreasonable, but B's expectations probably are.

A tells O, "Surprise—your suburban McMansion is mine by adverse possession! You thought it was vacant since 1990, but I actually snuck in and lived there from 1990-1995, then again from 2000-2003, and now again from 2007-present. The statutory period is 10 years, so I win!" O has not set foot on the property since 1989. Why is A's argument a loser?

No continuous possession.

O has owned a vacant lot since 1990, but has not laid eyes on it since 1991. One day he receives a call from A, who says, "Surprise, your land is mine by adverse possession! I turned it into a public park back in 1992, and now people come and go freely all over the land whenever they want to. Since the jurisdictional adverse possession period is fifteen years, it's mine." Why is A's argument a loser?

No exclusive possession by A so title cannot vest in A.

A landlord runs an ad reading, "2BR apt for rent. No more than four occupants, please." Five-person family applies and is rejected.

No family status violation—neutral rule would rebut PF case if family asserted FHA violation. CRA irrelevant.

Landlord refuses to rent to a single black woman. He claims it is only because she is a lawyer, and he is concerned she will be a troublesome tenant.

No federal cause of action (if truthful); might be under local NYC law

O states, "P, I want you to have my Van Gogh. It's in my office in Rome, Italy. Pick it up whenever you want." Has O made a valid gift to P?

No gift—no valid delivery. Symbolic/constructive may be permitted (why?) but no attempt to do any of them.

L owns a condo that he rents to T. One day, instead of sending in the rent, T sends L a note that reads, "Surprise, your condo is mine by adverse possession! I've lived here since 1999, and since the statutory adverse possession period is 10 years, that means I own the place." Why is T's argument a loser?

No hostility. He could have either put out signs saying this is my property or stopped paying rent.

G, a confirmed vegetarian, applies to rent a studio apartment in a 5-unit complex owned by H. H refuses to rent to G because she is a vegetarian.

No violation on any theory or statute.

A landlord will rent only to married, different-sex couples. She will not rent to unmarried different-sex couples or to married or unmarried same-sex couples. Does this conduct violate the law?

No violation; nontraditional couples not included in FHA "family status" category. CRA irrelevant. State statutes might come into play.

O goes on an extended vacation that lasts two months. When she comes back, A is living in her house and has posted signs all over the premises that say "A's place—keep out!" O confronts A, who responds, "Surprise, your house is mine by adverse possession! I snuck in the second you left for your vacation, and have been here ever since." Why is A's argument a loser?

No way this could be sufficient duration; no statutory adverse possession period is this short.

The whaling ship Artemis has identified a whale using sonar, and has pursued it for several hours. The anti-whaling ship Minerva then intercepts Artemis' radio broadcasts, and races to the whale's location. When Artemis finally approaches the whale, it sees that Minerva has deployed a series of buoys and nets that surround the whale, effectively but temporarily preventing its escape, and making harpooning impossible. Artemis asserts that Minerva is wrongfully interfering with Artemis' valid rights in the whale. Assuming U.S. law applies, is Artemis right? Q: on these facts, does Artemis have enforceable rights in the whale under Pierson v. Post?

No. Artemis never acquired any rights in the whale. It was merely in hot pursuit at the time of Minerva's capture.

T leases fancy apartment that includes doorman, swimming pool, gym. Then one day ownership changes, these amenities fall into disrepair, and new L refuses to fix. IWH issue?

No. IWH does not entitle Ts to luxuries, only minimum habitability.

L puts sign in window of T's unit. The sign is 2 feet tall and 3 feet wide; it reads "For Rent. Call 851-0341." No one comes to look at T's unit.

No. Sommer requires "personally or through an agency, offering or showing the apartment to any prospective tenants, or advertising it in local newspapers." Plus, this sign is on the fourth floor window and not visible.

O to A for life then to B + heirs. Does RAP apply?

No. The RAP does not apply here because there are no contingent remainders or executory interests (or related vested remainders subject to open). A has a present possessory interest, and B has a vested remainder.

A occupies O's land for 6 years. A then tells his friend B: "You can be here if you want, but I'm leaving." B occupies the house for five more years. Is tacking allowed?

Nope - lack of privity.

O has owned a vacant lot in a residential area since 1995, hoping one day that property values will increase so that he can sell it for a profit. One day A shows up in O's office and says, "Surprise, your lot is mine by adverse possession. Little did you—or anyone—know that since 1997, I've been sneaking onto your lot in the dead of night and camping there a couple times every week, leaving every morning before dawn so no one sees me. Since the adverse possession in this jurisdiction is 10 years, the land is mine." Why is A's argument a loser?

Not open and notorious.

L is a Christian fundamentalist organization and T1 is an abortion counseling center.

Not reasonable b/c not commercial, see American Book Co. (N.Y. 1969)

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. There is an open mine on Blackacre at the time of the conveyance. L continues to work the mine at a standard rate during his life tenancy, after which no ore is left.

Not waste

O conveys Blackacre "to A for life, then to B if B gives A a proper funeral".

O has a reversion following the life estate to A; B has a springing executory interest; A has a life estate.

Same facts as #4, except that at dinner, when O takes the ring back from A, she says instead, "A, I promise to give this ring to you when I die". Shortly after dinner, O is eaten by another tiger escaped from the zoo. The ring is on O's person when she dies. Upon O's untimely death, who has superior title in the ring?

O's estate. O's statement did not effect a gift, since there was a lack of present donative intent. Likely unenforceable as a will either, fwiw.

O to A when A has a daughter. At time of conveyance, A has a son but no daughter.

O: --Fee simple subject to executory limitation A: --Springing executory interest

O owns a pearl ring. She leaves it at the house of her daughter, A, when visiting. A calls O to tell her she left the ring there. O says "Keep it; I want you to have it." Whose title in the ring is superior?

One commentator: valid gift; why force a meaningless delivery ceremony?

A discovers a shipwreck beneath Mississippi River, attaches floating buoys to the wreck and blazes trees along the adjacent riverbank to mark the spot, but never actually excavates it. Eight months later, B comes to the site and excavates the shipwreck. Whose rights are superior, A's or B's?

One court held B. Eads v. Brazelton (Ark. 1861).

D, a mother with four minor children, applies to rent a two-bedroom apartment in a large complex. E, the building manager, tells her: "You have too many children for an apartment that small."

PF case for family status discrimination.

L leases to T "renewing seasonally."

Periodic tenancy

T and L agree to lease agreement stating only "$12k per year, payable $1k per month."

Periodic tenancy. "Per year" indicates intention for lease to persist over time on a yearly basis.

L fails to trim back vegetation near large back yard wooden deck. Unknown to L, the vegetation grows below the deck floor and causes the wood to decay. When L dies, R discovers the decay and needs to re-do the deck at a cost of $10,000.

Permissive waste: L's failure to take due care led to damage.

Environmentalist Post nets a wild rabbit, paints "Property of Post" on it, and lets it run wild and free again. Pierson shoots and kills the rabbit. Putting aside for a moment whether painting a rabbit is either logistically feasible or the kind of thing a committed environmentalist should do, whose rights in the rabbit are superior?

Pierson's. Merely declaring ownership by words is insufficient. By letting the rabbit go with no intention to have it return, Post returned it to the wild and lost any claim to it.

C's unit is on the fifth floor of an apartment building. One of the tenants on the fourth floor regularly smokes cigarettes inside his unit. C smells this smoke every day, thanks to building ventilation. It's strong about 7 days per month.

Possible IWH violation. Secondhand smoke increasingly known to be serious health hazard. Cf. Poyck (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006) (finding issue of fact whether secondhand smoke violated IWH in rental setting where it was constantly present, and T was both extremely allergic to smoke and recovering from second cancer surgery).

O owns a 100-acre rectangular parcel, where he occupies only the eastern 10 acres. A sells B a flawed deed purporting to give B ownership of all 100 acres of the parcel. B enters the parcel but occupies only the western 10 acres for the relevant adverse possession period. What does B own?

Possible options: 10 acres, 90 acres, 100 acres. Which is better? Deputron (U.S. 1890) held that on these facts, B would own 10 acres.

Post's domestic cow wanders off Post's land and onto unowned land, where Pierson captures the cow and brings it onto his own land, claiming ownership of it. Whose rights in the cow are superior?

Post's. A domestic cow that happens to wander onto unowned land, unlike a wild animal returning to the wild, remains the property of its owner (animus revertendi).

Post's dogs chase a fox into a shallow cave. Pierson finds the fox there and kills it. Post arrives moments later to find Pierson with the fox. Whose rights in the fox are superior?

Probably Post's. Getting the fox into a "shallow" cave is much like trapping it because its liberty is deprived since it's in a small, contained space. Might depend on how "shallow" the cave is.

B's ground-floor apartment is located in a high-crime area. No deadbolt on front door, no bars on windows. Four of the 52 units in the complex have been robbed over the last year.

Probably no IWH violation. IWH requires only "bare living conditions," not guarantee of safety from all negative social conditions. No requirement to provide total safety (e.g., deadbolt instead of regular bolt).

B's ground-floor apartment is located in a high-crime area. No deadbolt on front door, no bars on windows. Four of the 52 units in the complex have been robbed over the last year.

Probably no IWH violation. IWH requires only "bare living conditions," not guarantee of safety from all negative social conditions. No requirement to provide total safety (e.g., deadbolt instead of regular bolt). Cf. Brichacek (Iowa 1987).

A lives in the apartment with his girlfriend C, who shares A's bedroom. B is offended by their pre-marital cohabitation and refuses to set foot in the apartment until C moves out.

Probably not constructive ouster. A's use was probably not objectively unreasonable, regardless of B's subjective reactions. Imagine that B's objection was that the apartment had become so cramped he could not live there. Different outcome? Possibly—would likely need to look at B's specific objections; A's and C's conduct; and occupancy standards for apartments of that size.

Assume T enters two year lease with L for a studio apartment on the fourth floor of L's 20-unit complex, agreeing to pay rent of $1k/month. One year later, T abandons. Under the Sommer standard, has L sufficiently mitigated damages if: L places ad in local paper for apt., and when U visits in response to ad, L shows U all vacant units, always leaving T's apt. until last?

Probably not. Sommer requires that L treat T's unit "as if it were one of his vacant stock," Sommer. Must show same diligence to all apartments.

A landlord rejects application from otherwise qualified single mother with three young kids to rent 2BR apartment. Landlord shows that he ended up renting to family consisting of two parents and two children.

Probably violates "family status" provisions in absence of some highly compelling justification. CRA moot (why?).

L hires a broker to find tenants for all vacant apts., including T's. Broker finds potential tenant V, who wants to rent T's apt but offers $900. L refuses.

Probably, if $1000 is fair market value or if 10% reduction "substantially" alters lease terms. L has attempted to rent via reasonable means. DtM does not require L to accept below-market offers such as this one. See Foggia.

L's sanitation workers are part of a city-wide strike. The in-building incinerators fail to work, and L gives Ts bags to take trash to the curb instead. Because of strike, no one gets this trash and it piles up outside, creating odor and pest problems. IWH issue?

Probably. IWH is a minimum standard that has been violated here because of health risks & possible code violation. L could have paid for private trash removal. Park West Mgmt. (N.Y. 1979).

"O to A's first grandchild."

RAP-invalid. Rule of convenience does not apply. Why? This is not a class gift.

"O to A's grandchildren." A is living and has some children but no grandchildren.

RAP-invalid. Rule of convenience does not save this executory interest. Why? No members of class yet.

"O to A's grandchildren." A has three grandchildren at time of conveyance.

RAP-valid: vested. Rule of convenience applies. Class closed in three children.

T1 wants to take assignment to operate a business that will compete with one of L's in the area.

Reasonable, L may withhold consent, see Carr-Gottstein (Alaska 2004)

O to A for life, then to D's children who reach 25. At conveyance, D has two children, E (20 years old) and F (30 years old).

RoC means A validates this interest. Whose interests are preserved? F certainly; E if E vests; ditto for any children born during A's life.

"O to A for life, then to A's grandchildren." A living at conveyance & has two grandchildren.

Rule of Convenience makes A a validating life. When will the class close? When all of A's children die (natural closure), or When A dies (RoC closure)

F, seeking a roommate for her apartment, places this ad in the local newspaper: "Female roommate wanted to share 2-bedroom unit close to university."

Seems to violate FHA bc ad reflecting gender discrimination. But Roommate.com (9th Cir. 2012) held room is not a "dwelling," so ads to share living units not covered by FHA. CRA inapplicable (why?).

A landlord refuses to rent a to gay couple. His stated rationale is a fear that he will contract AIDS due to interacting with them.

Sexual orientation discrimination not precluded by FHA; but discrimination on basis of disability is. Likely prima facie case shifting burden onto L to show nondiscriminatory reason. See Niethamer (D.D.C. 1999)

College student accepts admission, moves into dorm.

Some courts say license, see Cook (Ill. 1981); others tenancy of years, see Burch (Kan. 1988)

T devises $10k "to my cousin, Don Little, if and when he survives his wife". What does Don Little have? Why would T make such a devise?

Springing executory interest divesting T's residuary estate; testator must have hated Don's wife

T leases ramshackle hovel for $50 (L wanted $100 but agreed to less). But after living there for a couple weeks, T found various violations of the IWH and said "$50 is actually more than it's worth"—a statement that is objectively true. T then refuses to pay rent. What result?

T has no obligation to pay rent in light of IWH violations. Prior bargain and T notice irrelevant.

L leases to T "for as long as the land is used to grow soybeans."

Tenancy at will

L leases to T for "the duration of the war."

Tenancy at will (see Effel—cannot time lease w event certain to occur but unclear when)

L leases to T for "as many years as T desires."

Tenancy at will under TX law, see Effel -Minority rule: leases can specify sole terminability, see Garner

Squatters occupy city-owned property. City permits them to live there for eight years while they work on urban renewal project.

Tenancy at will, see Utsey (N.Y. 2000) (by implication)

O conveys Blackacre "to A and B jointly". What form of ownership to A and B share?

Tenancy in common. Not clear from grant that they are joint tenants; "joint" alone not clear enough to indicate this form of co-ownership.

A and B hold Blackacre as tenants by the entirety. They divorce. In what form do A and B hold Blackacre?

Tenancy in common—severance of a tenancy by entireties goes back to a tenancy in common, NOT a joint tenancy

A dies, devising Blackacre "to B, C, and D." The will does not specify the form of ownership in which the heirs are to take the land. In what form of ownership do the heirs take the land?

Tenancy in common—the presumptive state of co-ownership

"T gives his land to A for life, then to B's children who survive T."

The conveyance is analyzed at the moment of T's death, but the interests do not change. If T outlives A, the life estate is still considered as one to A for life (even though this may not actually effect any possessory interest in A)

Alice and Bob are neighbors. Alice sees Bob chasing a fox on Bob's own land, though Bob has yet to control the fox in any way. The fox does not natively dwell on Bob's land, but happened to be there when Bob began to chase it. As the fox runs near the border of the neighbors' land, Alice quickly hops the fence into Bob's land, grabs the fox, and returns to her own land. Bob is angry and demands that Alice give him the fox. Whose rights in the fox are superior?

The fox is probably Bob's. Although Alice was first to deprive the fox of its liberty, she did so while trespassing, and so forfeits any rights in it. Law would likely not want to reward Alice's trespass by giving her ownership of the fox.

"O to A for life, then to A's children who reach the age of 30." A has two kids at the time of conveyance, B, who is 33, and C who is 2.

There is a vested interest subject to open in B, and executory interests in C and unborns.

C occupies O's land for 2 years. C then tries to reconvey the land to her sister D, but the deed C uses for this purpose is invalid. D occupies the land for 9 more years. Is tacking allowed?

There is privity so tacking would be allowed.

L leases to T for three years. One year later, T "subleases, transfers, and assigns" the property to T1 for a year. Thereafter, both T and T1 stop paying rent. Against whom can L recover?

This is a sublease, despite language (Ernst). L can thus recover against T on both property and contract theories.

L leases to T for three years, monthly rent of $1000. Two years later, T transfers his lease to T1, leaves the country for a two-year research fellowship in New Zealand. T1 defaults. Against whom can L recover?

This is an assignment. L can thus recover against T on a contract theory and T1 on a property theory.

Carlos lives in an old New England mansion that he and his family have occupied for twenty-five years. Michelle, a houseguest, inadvertently turns over a floorboard and finds a jewel-encrusted ring lying beneath it. The ring is covered with dust and it is clear that the ring has been lying there for at least a century. Whose rights in the ring are superior, Carlos' or Michelle's?

Tough call. Michelle will argue for strict application of the rule that place of find is irrelevant (Hannah, Bridges). Carlos will argue that Hannah is distinguishable because he is a resident owner, and also had constructive possession (did he?)

O gives A a note that says "I hereby give A my wristwatch." The watch remains in a safe deposit box before and after O gives the note to A. Does A have superior title in the ring to O?

Traditional rule: invalid gift (insufficient delivery) Modern rule: harder case, may depend on sufficiency of evidence of intent

M promises to marry W, giving her a ring to memorialize this promise. Then he callously leaves her for another woman. Does W have to return the ring to M?

Traditional: M is at fault, so W can keep ring Modern rule: no fault; W must return ring But cf. Albinger (no conditional gifts, period)

D installs a television cable that passes 50ft below the land surface owned by E and others. E hopes to build a six-story office building on this land. The planned underground parking garage for this building will extend 20ft below the surface. Because the project is still in its preliminary stage, E do not yet know how deep the excavations for the parking garage will be.

Unlike Chance in several respects: - First, very plausible that E will actually need this subsurface, why? His office building may need to be that deep, his plans may change, &c - Second, use is uch shallower than Chance, and much more likely an interference with use—seems like a trespass to me - Maybe think in terms of a subsurface analogy to Causby: owner needs to have reasonable control over area nearby land in order to preserve possible future uses

T is renting from L. T wants to assign to T1. What reasons are 'commercially reasonable' enough to deny assignment? T1 is a tenant in another of L's buildings, and if he takes T's assignment, T1 will leave that lease.

Unreasonable, L may not withhold consent, see Krieger (N.J. 1973).

C owned a home in a rural subdivision. D owned the house next door. All backyards in the subdivision were unfenced and covered by wild grass. Over the next 10 years, D occasionally watered the wild grass behind his house; he also mowed it 3-4 times each summer. D then discovered that part of the land he had been watering and mowing (a strip about 20 feet wide) was actually part of C's original lot. Over the years, C's children had played on 8-9 occasions. D claims title to the strip. Is D's claim valid?

Very likely not. D's occasional but consistent use is probably enough to establish the element of actual possession. But C's children's use of the area as their yard negates his claim.

A tenant in a large apartment building finds a bag full of uncut diamonds on the back of the top shelf in a closet. Whose rights in the diamonds are superior, the tenant or her landlord?

Very tough case. Possibly tenant. If the diamonds are lost/abandoned, then Hannah seems to favor her. If the diamonds are mislaid, then she may be a constructive bailee as the person in the best position to return the diamonds to the prior possessor. Cf. McAvoy. Or would that be owner of building? Does ownership of real property play a role? Cf. Hannah. Be careful! May not be enough facts to state determinate answer.

"O to A for life, then to B." Vested or contingent?

Vested

O to G for ten years, then to M and her heirs.

Vested

O to A's children. A is alive and has one child. Vested or contingent?

Vested in born child; contingent in unborn ones.

O to A for life, then to A's widow for life, then to B if B is alive at the time of A's widow's death. At time of conveyance, A is married to C.

Vesting or failing conditions? --A dies married for CR #1; B outlives A's widow for CR #2 Apply RAP --For A's widow, validated by A; for B, also self-validating Implications --None; gift is valid

Landlord who is concerned about "white flight" in his neighborhood reserves a few apartments out of fifty for white tenants, and actively seeks white tenants for those units. All the other apartments are occupied by non-white tenants.

Violates FHA and probably CRA. Long-term intent may be well-meaning, but statute strictly precludes intentional racial discrimination, regardless of long-term intent or effects.

O conveys Yellowacre to A and the heirs of his body.

What did the parties have at Common Law? A: Fee tail; O: reversion What are the modern statutory responses? Fee simple absolute

O conveys Blackacre to A + heirs, but if alcohol is ever sold on the premises, Blackacre shall go to C + heirs. {NB: we will see later that this conveyance violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.}

What does A have? Fee simple subject to executory limitation What does C have? Shifting executory interest What does O have? Nothing

O conveys Whiteacre by inter vivos deed to A and her heirs, but if Whiteacre ceases to be used as a school during A's lifetime, then to C + heirs.

What does A have? Fee simple subject to executory limitation What does C have? Shifting executory interest What does O have? Nothing

O to A for life then to B + heirs if B gets married. If B does not get married, the property should go to C + heirs.

What does A have? Life estate What does B have? Contingent remainder What does C have? Contingent remainder What does O have? Reversion

O to A for life then to B + heirs if B is married when A dies. If B is not married when A dies, the property should go to C + heirs.

What does A have? Life estate What does B have? Alternative contingent remainder What does C have? Alternative contingent remainder What does O have? Nothing

O conveys Blackacre by devise to A for twenty years, and then to B's children and their heirs. At the time of the conveyance, B has one child, Connie.

What does A have? Term of years What does B's child Connie have? Vested remainder subject to open What does O have? Nothing What do unborn children have? Shifting executory interests

O conveys Brownacre to A and her heirs provided that the property is used as a school. If Brownacre ceases to be used as a school, then O has the right to re-enter and retake Brownacre.

What interest does A have? Fee simple subject to condition subsequent What interest does O have? Right of re-entry What interest do A's heirs have? Nothing

O conveys to A for life and then to B's first child. B has no children at the time of the conveyance.

What interest does A have? Life estate What interest does B's first child have? Contingent remainder What interest does O have? Reversion What interest does B have? Nothing

O by devise conveys Blackacre to A + heirs while Blackacre is used as a school.

What interest does A have? Fee simple determinable What interest does O have? Possibility of reverter What interest do A's heirs have? Nothing

O: "I convey Blueacre to A for life then to B + heirs; but if B does not get married, Blueacre should go to C + heirs."

What interest does A have? Life estate What interest does B have? Vested remainder subject to total divestment What interest does O have? Nothing What interest does C have? Shifting executory interest

O to A for life.

What interest does A have? Life estate What interest does O have? Reversion

O conveys to A for 10 years and then to B's first child to reach 18. B has one child at the time of the conveyance who is 12 years old.

What interest does A have? Term of years What interest does 'B's first child to reach 18' have? Contingent remainder What interest does B have? Nothing What interest does O have? Reversion

O to Anne for life, then 1 year following Anne's death, to Bob and his heirs.

What interest does Anne have? Life estate What does Bob have? Remainder Contested: alternative = springing executory interest (?) What does O have? Reversion

O conveys Whiteacre by inter vivos deed to Anne for life, then to Bob and his heirs.

What interest does Anne have? Life estate What interest does Bob have? Vested remainder absolute What interest does O have? Nothing

O conveys to Arnold for life, and then to Arnold's widow and her heirs. At the time of conveyance, Arnold is married to Betty.

What interest does Arnold have? Life estate What interest does Arnold's widow have? Contingent remainder What interest does O have? Reversion What interest does Betty have? Nothing!

O to A for life, then to B's children if and when they reach 18. B has two children, Connie who is 20, and David who is 15.

What interest does Connie have? Vested remainder subject to open What interest does David (and unborn children) have? Shifting executory interest

O devises his property to "A and her heirs." Harry is the sole child of A. At the time of the conveyance,

What interest has A acquired? Fee simple absolute What interest has O's estate retained? Nothing What interest does Harry have? Nothing

O to Anne for life. Assume that while Anne was in possession of the life estate, Adverse Possessor entered onto the land and stayed the required statutory period of time. Assume further that all other elements are met for adverse possession.

What interest has Adverse Possessor acquired? Life estate What, if anything, is the effect of Anne's death on the Adverse Possessor's interest? Goes to O's estate via reversion

O conveys her property to A for life. After the estate is conveyed, A sells her interest to Buyer.

What interest has Buyer acquired? Life estate pur autre vie What interest does O have? Reversion What interest does A have? Nothing

H and W are married. H works a full-time job and W stays home with their kids. During 2018, H earned a $100k salary and received a bonus of $5000 to reflect quality job performance. Also during 2018, H received $10k when a long-lost aunt died intestate and H was one of her statutorily defined heirs. Finally during 2018, W convinced her parents to give her $10k as a gift, which she then used as startup capital to create an internet business which in turn netted $5k in profit that year. H and W live in Texas.

What marital property regime prevails? Community property—TX is a CP state Classify H & W's marital assets for 2018: CP or SP? H's salary CP W's gift SP H's bonus CP W's profit CP H's inheritance SP

O leaves a holographic will that says "Upon my death, I want my friend A to have my estate, Blackacre."

While O lives: A has nothing When O dies: A gets FSA (assuming will still in effect)

A is poisoned and rushed to the hospital, where doctors give him only three hours to live. He gathers his family and says, "I give my beloved sports car to my son B." B whoops and celebrates, and then A says "You know what, B is a jerk. I want my daughter C to have the car." Just then, a doctor enters the room holding a vial containing an antidote that (unbeknownst to A) will cure him entirely. But as the doctor moves to administer the antidote, A dies of a completely unforeseen heart attack. A's will does not specify who gets his car but the residuary clause benefits his wife.

Who has superior title to the car? - One option: wife, because A did not die of the specific cause he feared. The other option: C because death occurred while still in peril of death, albeit by a different cause. Which rule is better?

, "O to A for life, then to B's children who reach 30." B is alive and has one child C who is 31 and another D who is 2.

Who is a validating life for the XIs in unborns? B is not. Why? C and D too. Why? A, though, is—thanks to the Rule of Convenience! His life saves the interests of all children born during that life. A thus validates the otherwise invalid future interests created by the class gift. Think of it as, "O to A for life, then to B's children born during A's life who reach 30."

Same facts as #9, but now assume that the doctor comes in with the antidote, and says to A, "you're saved!" A believes him, and is so excited by the news that A suffers a heart attack and dies. What result now?

Wife probably gets the car—A's belief that he will not die of poisoning automatically effects revocation of gift. The peril had passed. Would it change your mind if the doctor was wrong about the antidote? - No change—once subjective expectation of immediate death is gone, gift is revoked.

O owns in 1984 and A enters adversely on 5/1/84. Age of majority is 18. AP term is (1) 21 years from adverse entry or (2) 10 years from removal/cure of disability, whichever longer. O insane in '84 and dies insane and intestate in 2007. H is 6 years old in 2007.

Yes A owned starting 2017: cure + 10. H's minority is not a qualifying disability.

O owns in 1984 and A enters adversely on 5/1/84. Age of majority is 18. AP term is (1) 21 years from adverse entry or (2) 10 years from removal/cure of disability, whichever longer. O insane in '84 and dies uncured and intestate in 2007. O's heir, H, is under no disability in 2007. Does A own?

Yes A owned starting in 2017: cure + 10

A and B own a 1000-square-foot apartment as tenants in common. A puts locks on the door that prevent B from entering. Ouster?

Yes, this is clearly ouster

A posts this notice on a website: "For rent. 1-bedroom apartment in 10-unit building. Prefer tenant who can speak French or German."

Yes, violates FHA because indicates "intention to make a preference" based on national origin. Holmgren (N.D. Ill. 1971). CRA inapplicable (why?).

Dana failed to come to her officemate Chuck's birthday party, as she had promised. The next day, Dana approached Chuck with a fancy pencil holder and said "I am sorry I missed your party. Please accept this gift as a gesture of apology." Chuck ripped the pencil holder away from Dana, saying "I don't accept your apology or anything else," then stalked away. Later that day, Dana noticed when she passed by Chuck's office that he had the pencil holder out on his desk and was using it to store pencils. Is Dana's gift to Chuck legally enforceable?

Yes. Chuck's actions clearly evidence acceptance, despite his (somewhat ambiguous) words to the contrary. Lesson: actions can trump even unambiguous words as evidence of subjective intent.

O grants Blackacre to L for life, remainder to R. Blackacre includes an orange orchard that has been used for profit for years; L picks and sells a moderate amount of oranges throughout his tenancy.

not waste