Meno

False Dichotomy in Meno's paradox

False dichotomy in Paradox - either someone has complete knowledge or zero knowledge - doesn't account for those in between - "we can have a partial grasp of something"

81a-82a Socrates' response to Meno's paradox

IMMORTALITY OF SOUL + TOR Soc begins with a strange reference to "priests and priestesses," "wise men and women [who] talk about divine matters." These people, Socrates says, claim that the soul is immortal: at one time comes to an end, which is called dying, and at another is born again, but never perishes. In other words it is not destroyed with the death of the human body. Men must live all their lives in the utmost holiness."For from whomsoever Persephone shall accept requital for ancient wrong, the souls of these she restores in the ninth year to the upper sun again; from them arise" "glorious kings and men of splendid might and surpassing wisdom, and for all remaining time are they called holy heroes amongst mankind." Pind. Fr. 133 Thus, since the soul has been born often and has seen all things in both the upper world and lower world, it has acquired knowledge of everything. Learning, then, is really a process of recollection in which the soul comes to recollect what it already knew before its current human life span. On this model, seeking what one does not know is not a paradox because one is simply trying to remember the truth. 'there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing—an act which men call learning—discover everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search' Meno asks Socrates to teach him what he means when he says that "learning is recollection" Soc replies: there is no teaching but only recollection Socrates gets him to call one of his slaves --------------- This claim that the soul is immortal and therefore already knows everything is one of Plato's most important ideas, and it is probably introduced for the first time here. It will play a major role in later dialogues, particularly the Phaedo and the Phaedrus. Having put this theory on the table, Socrates proposes to move on with the pursuit of the definition of virtue.

flawed argument that teachers who aren't sure about whether sthg can be taught can't teach it

Just because someone can't make his mind up he might still be a good teacher - maybe it just makes him modest or insecure.

99b-100c thoughts: What role does divine inspiration play in the closing passages of Meno? What's going on at the end of the dialogue? Notice that Socrates and Meno never concern themselves with the second hypothesis?

So, returning to the question that opened the dialogue, how do men become virtuous? THE ANSWER COMES HERE: DRUM ROLL...... DIVINE INSPO Socrates: And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion. [99c] This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states, and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners; for these people utter many a true thing when inspired, but have no knowledge of anything they say. Meno: I daresay that is so. Socrates: And may we, Meno, rightly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a great deed and word? LIKE IN APOLOGY, notion of diviners as men who succeed in speaking many great things, while knowing nothing of what they say. Plato (through Socrates) is content to leave this a mystery of sorts for now, concluding only that virtuous statesmen are only so through a sort of divine inspiration, like "soothsayers and prophets. They too say many true things when inspired, but they have no knowledge of what they are saying" Virtue is left as "a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding." 'virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it.' .... unless there should be somebody among the statesmen capable of making a statesman of another. And if there should be any such, he might fairly be said to be among the living what Homer says Teiresias was among the dead—"He alone has comprehension; the rest are flitting shades."31 In the same way he on earth, in respect of virtue, will be a real substance among shadows. [100b] The point being that such a person who can make another man a statesman is rare ---------------------------- Though this deep uncertainty may not seem like much of an end to the dialogue, the apparent emptiness of Socrates' conclusion is mitigated by the importance of the lack of knowledge in and of itself. Socrates has succeeded in convincing two prominent citizens and men of politics not only that they have no understanding of virtue, but also that no one does. This state of uncertainty, or aporia, the state of knowing that one does not know, is a major Platonic theme, and clears the ground for the pursuit of a kind of truth far more exacting and rigorous than had been previously sought. The Meno ends as Socrates bids his interlocutors farewell, reminding them once more that they must seek to know what virtue is (and, according to him, they'd be the first to truly know) before finding out how it comes to be in men. Departing, Socrates tells Meno to teach Anytus what he has learned today.

Socrates' moral psychology

Socrates' moral psychology - knowledge in the soul - also in the soul are "non-rational affective states such as daring"

82b-86c geometry

The questioning that follows provides a concise model of the Socratic elenchus, in which continuous questioning leads Socrates' subject into a state of total uncertainty (aporia) about what they thought they knew. ELENCHUS-STYLE GEOMETRY LESSON WITH THE SLAVE the slave is a Greek, born in Meno's house Socrates Now observe closely whether he strikes you as recollecting or as learning from me. Socrates draws a square figure in the sand and divides it into four equal sections. Asking questions of the slave (and never teaching him anything directly), Socrates and the slave first establish that the area of a square with two-feet long sides must be four feet (since 2x2). SOCRATES WANTS TO KNOW WHAT LENGTH THE SIZE OF A SQUARE MUST BE TO YIELD HIM AN EIGHT-FOOT AREA He then asks the slave to determine the length of the side of a square that is double the area (i.e., eight feet in area). The slave mistakenly says that such a side would be four feet, double the length of the original square, but as Socrates shows him a four foot side, of course, would yield a sixteen-foot square. The slave, realising that the length he is after must be somewhere between two feet (the length of the original square) and four feet (his wrong answer), now answers that three feet must be the correct length (wrong again--that length would give a nine-foot square). Socrates points out this mistake as well, and makes a point of showing Meno that the slave is now in a state of aporia--he knows that he does not know the correct length. This state, Socrates argues, is better than the slave's original (false) claim to know the answer. Referring to Meno's earlier complaints about being "numbed" by Socrates' questions, Socrates says that "now, as [the slave] does not know, he would be glad to find out, whereas before he thought he could make many fine speeches to large audiences about the square of double size." The slave, like the ungrateful Meno, "has benefited from being numbed." (Soc has given him 'the torpedo's shock', sthg which will benefit him more than harm him). This will push him towards finding out the truth of the matter He would not have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity of realizing that he did not know 'as a result of this perplexity, he will go on and discover something by joint inquiry with me, while I merely ask questions [84d] and do not teach him' FOUR SQUARES LIKE THE ORIGINAL-SIZED SQUARE, CUT THROUGH THEIR DIAGONALS TO FORM ONE LARGE SQUARE IN THE MIDDLE. THE DIAGONAL IS THE LENGTH THE SLAVE HAS BEEN SEEKING - IT IS THE BASE FOR A SQUARE DOUBLE THE AREA OF THE ORIGINAL. Socrates continues his examination. To the original square of four feet in area, Socrates adds three more, thus creating a square four feet on each side (and so four times the area of the original square--it may help to draw this out yourself). Drawing diagonal lines that link the centres of each side of this larger square, he asks the slave if these diagonals cut each of the original-sized squares in half. They do, of course, though it's worth pointing out that Socrates has strayed somewhat here from his policy of not teaching anything but only asking the slave's opinion. Socrates' geometrical point here is that the diagonal of a square is the length the slave has been seeking--it can be used as the base for a square double the area of the original. The slave is made to realize this only through answering Socrates' questions, not through any direct teaching (though we have noted that at least one of his questions is more of a statement). Socrates presents this process to Meno as strong evidence that learning is a recollection: if the slave wasn't being taught, how did he come to know the relationship between the diagonal of a square and a square double the area? The knowledge must already have been in him, waiting to be "stirred up like a dream" by Socrates' questions. Socrates Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. [85e] Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your house. Meno Well, I know that no one has ever taught him. Socrates So if in both of these periods—when he was and was not a human being—he has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge, his soul must have had this cognizance throughout all time? For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being. RECOLLECTION OF KNOWLEDGE = TRUE OPINIONS IN ONE'S SOUL BEING AWAKENED BY QUESTIONING Socrates And so it does to me, Meno. Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I can confidently assert; but that the belief in the duty of inquiring after what we do not know will make us better and braver and less helpless than the notion that there is not even a possibility of discovering what we do not know, [86c] nor any duty of inquiring after it—this is a point for which I am determined to do battle, so far as I am able, both in word and deed. The meaning of this is that Even if he has the idea of the soul's immortality and recollection slightly wrong, says Socrates, the demonstration with Meno's slave has shown that "we will be better men...if we believe that one must search for the things one does not know, rather than think there is no chance of finding it out. 'we are of one mind as to the duty of inquiring into what one does not know'

the 4 principal developments in Plato's doctrines in the Meno

There are four principal developments in Plato's doctrines in the Meno. 1) the doctrine of reincarnation Belief in some form of existence after death was not uncommon in fifth century Athens. There was a tradition, associated with Pythagoras and his followers and some at least of the writings ascribed to the mythical poet Orpheus. According to this the human soul was in its origin divine and was imprisoned in an earthly body as a punishment for some wrong and went through a cycle of reincarnations, being rewarded or punished for its behaviour in each life. The hope was to gain eventual release from the cycle of reincarnations altogether. It is this doctrine that Plato introduces as the first stage of his answer to Meno's paradox. In the Meno itself, however, the main point of the doctrine of reincarnation is to explain how it can be possible for learning to be recollection, of truths known before our birth. 2) the theory of recollection The doctrine of reincarnation makes it possible for learning to be recollection of truths known before this life. Plato makes Socrates claim to show that learning is indeed recollection by a practical experiment he sets one of Meno's slaves. Socrates claims that he is not instructing the slave, only asking questions. The questions, one might say, come from Socrates, but the answers are the slave's. Plato's experiment does not prove that the soul exists before birth. At most, it might show that certain types of mathematical knowledge are built into the structure of our minds at birth. Part of what Plato has seized on is the a priori nature of mathematical truths. Vlastos: 'the knowledge is "in" the slave because what is involved is the working out of the implications of concepts already possessed'. Plato asserts that all knowledge is akin, so that the soul that has learned one thing will remember everything 3) the hypothetical method The theory of knowledge as recollection is one of the innovations that enables Plato in the Meno to overcome the impasse of the early aporetic dialogues. Socrates makes the point that one must consider the nature of excellence before considering whether it is teachable... but, under pressure from Meno, he grants that one can proceed by means of a 'hypothesis' or assumption. In other words, even if one does not know what excellence is, one can still assert that if it knowledge, then it is teachable. HYPOTHESIS = IF IT KNOWLEDGE, THEN IT IS TEACHABLE. The method is clearly shown to derive from geometry by the citation of an obscure geometrical example. The hypothesis however serves as a device to enable Socrates to get back to the question he readily wants to discuss, the nature of excellence; that excellence is teachable if knowledge is already agreed - too readily for it depends on what ones means by 'teachable' and Socrates proceeds to urge that excellence is indeed knowledge. In the Phaedo and Republic Plato sets out a whole programme of philosophical inquiry which involves making certain initial assumptions or hypotheses, and then finding further 'higher' hypotheses which validate these... The notion of a series of hypotheses and the testing are in fact present in the Meno. For "virtue is good", from which "virtue is knowledge" is deduced, is itself described as hypothesis, and, after arguing that excellence is knowledge and things teachable, Socrates doubles back on his tracks and argues that excellence cannot in fact be knowledge after all, for it is not in fact teachable - if it was, there would be teachers of it. Plato, however, may in fact be hinting that the real reason why excellence is not in fact taught is, not that it is not knowledge, but rather that no-one currently sets about 'teaching' it - that is, encouraging recollection of it - in the current Socratic or Platonic way. 4) Knowledge and true opinion Soc argues that was at fault in the argument concluding that excellence is not knowledge, was the failure to recognise that success can be achieved not only by having knowledge but also by having right opinion. What matters for success is not whether I know that something is the case, but only whether I am right in my belief about what is the case. True belief is more hit-and-miss Many contemporary politicians of Soc who are successful and who cannot impart to others their knowledge, are successful as the result of some divine dispensation (this is not intended as a compliment to them by Plato). These men have true opinion. Earlier in the dialogue, at the conclusion of the experiment with the slave, Socrates had stated that the slave, having solved the problem once, as yet possessed only true opinion, but repeated examination of the problem would convert this into knowledge. In Theatetus, conception of knowledge as justified true belief (true judgment with an account). In the Meno, both true belief and knowledge are equally good guides to action, PROVIDED THAT THE TRUE BELIEF IS INDEED TRUE.

diff between knowledge and true belief

True belief = grasping that something is the case Knowledge = understanding why it is so

What is a genus?

a class of things that have common characteristics and that can be divided into subordinate kinds.

After the anytus bit

conversation with meno After the theognis bit in which they see that many are unsure as to whether virtue is teachable, Socrates then says: good men must be beneficial. He shows him using the road to Larissa that a good man can be beneficial and give correct guidance without knowledge but with true belief. Road to Larissa Why true belief is less valued than knowledge? Daedalus' statues, recollection explained

the rival of innatism is

empiricism the theory that all knowledge is based on experience derived from the senses.

for Socrates - virtue

moral virtue is a part of human arete

Socrates' second def of shape:

that in which the solid meets its limit.. shape is the limit of a solid

the Aleuadae

the ruling family of Larisa in Thessaly

stability

true belief is unstable, with regard to knowledge

How do Socrates and Meno differ with regard to their opinion of whether men desire good things?

Def3 = Meno thinks that some people desire good things, others bad things, whereas socrates thinks that everyone desires the good but not everyone recognises it to be good. Knowledge is therefore another important quality of virtue

The different types of true belief

Different types of true belief - some come by recollection like slave boy's - incomplete but nonetheless sequential recollection - others come from perception/hearsay/divine dispensation

Elenchus (Socratic Method)

ELENCHUS - Socrates rejects Meno's proposals through his typical elenctic arguments: a) Socrates' interlocutor proposes a thesis; b) in his attempt to test this thesis Socrates secures his interlocutor's agreement to further premises; c) Socrates then shows that the initial thesis leads to INCONSISTENCIES when combined with some other premises agreed upon. If no inconsistency is revealed in the last step, the initial thesis has passed the first test. Elenchus is most often taken to mean 'refutation', but the word also has the broader meaning of 'test' or 'cross examination.' Elenchus has indirect positive contributions insofar as (a) it shows us that we don't know, (b) it shows us how far we are from knowing and how much we thought we knew, (c) it draws out the cluster of inconsistent beliefs that we have, (d) it assists the process of self-knowledge by revealing how little we know, and also, by making us aware of previously unexamined assumptions embedded in our beliefs, it reveals to us that knowledge differs from mere opinion.

Meno in Xenophon's Anabasis

External 'evidence' in Xenophon's Anabasis M is Greek commander of mercenary army that went to Persia - M treacherous, greedy, unscrupulous, tortured and killed

how do we have knowledge?

For knowledge we need to grasp interrelations - involves a sequence of reasoning 'chain' tying down - "one will have a great commitment to holding a proposition if one understands how it connects with a number of others" - isolated true beliefs easy to give up during argument/persuasion VALUE OF STABILITY IN KNOWLEDGE

86d-89a the hypotheses one

Having resolved MENO'S PARADOX (THROUGH IMMORTALITY OF SOUL, TOR AND ELENCHUS WITH SLAVE) of whether it's really even possible to seek the definition of virtue (i.e. THEY RESOLVED that ONE CAN inquire into what one does not know) , Socrates and Meno try a new approach. Meno suggests that they return to the original question/ hypotheses of WHETHER VIRTUE IS TAUGHT, INBORN (INHERENT TO MEN BY NATURE) OR COMES IN SOME OTHER WAY. Socrates, though he protests again that they should first try to discover what virtue is (rather than how it comes to people), agrees to tackle Meno's question (considering what sort of thing is something which they do not yet know what it is). They should do this, he suggests, by means of a hypothesis. This is a second way around the problem of seeking what one does not yet know; by proposing a possible answer to a problem ("the way geometers often carry on their investigations"), one can approach the true answer without yet knowing it (as the slave did in Socrates' examination). Socrates makes the following reasoning: 1) the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge 2) for virtue to be teachable it must be sthg similar to/ or a knowledge HYPOTHESIS 1 = VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE 1) And therefore proposes the following hypothesis: if virtue is a kind of knowledge, then it can be taught (and if it is not, it cannot). The next point to consider, then, is whether or not virtue is a kind of knowledge. HYPOTHESIS 2 = VIRTUE IS A GOOD THING Socrates' reasoning: 1) virtue is a good thing 2) if there is SOME good apart and separable from knowledge, it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge 3) if EVERYTHING good is encompassed by knowledge, then virtue is a kind of knowledge To this end, Socrates makes a second hypothesis: if there is anything good that is not knowledge, then it is possible that virtue is not a kind of knowledge (and conversely, "if there is nothing good that knowledge does not encompass," then virtue is a kind of knowledge). Thus, Socrates says, virtue, if it is good must also be profitable; for all good things are profitable However, Socrates gives another version of his earlier point concerning the possibility of good, profitable things (like strength, and beauty, and wealth) being used badly. Good things are at one time profitable and at another time harmful. Socrates then considers the goods of the soul: temperance (sophrosyne), justice, courage, intelligence, memory, magnanimity (munificence). These things are only profitable when accompanied by wisdom--"without understanding, they are harmful." 'in brief, all the undertakings and endurances of the soul, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, but when folly guides, in the opposite' 'The guidance of wisdom makes profitable the properties of the soul, while that of folly makes them harmful' This means, in effect, that virtue is only virtue when it has its context in wisdom/ when WISDOM IS THE GUIDING CONDITION. Socrates 'Then may we assert this as a universal rule, that in man all other things depend upon the soul, while the things of the soul herself depend upon wisdom, [89a] if they are to be good; and so by this account the profitable will be wisdom, and virtue, we say, is profitable?'

Elenchus vs hypothetical method (4)

Hypothesis puts out an IDEA for you to discuss. Elenchus puts out an answer from the start. - The elenchus can have a more personal feel (since it is limited to two people, as opposed to the hypothetical method in which Anytus also engages). It's more interactive. Therefore, for some, the hypothetical method is more scientific. The elenctic method can be antagonistic - since it's primary goal is reducing the interlocutor to aporia, or rather, making them understand their ignorance. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, as Socrates says at various points in the dialogue, this may have the positive effect of instilling one to research what they do not know. The elenchus involves a broader examination of a definition/ subject, since the subject can be refuted on many different levels, as opposed to being limited by conditions, as is the case in the hypothesis. ,

WHAT COMES AFTER THE TWO HYPOTHESES

IF VIRTUE IS A GOOD THING, THEN IT MUST BE PROFITABLE/ BENEFICIAL THINGS ARE ONLY PROFITABLE + BENEFICIAL WHEN THEY ARE GUIDED BY WISDOM. For example, self-control and justice... Then, in short, 'all the undertakings and endurances of the soul end in happiness if they are guided by wisdom....' Therefore Def5: virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom!!!!!!

How are men successful?

If not by knowledge, it must be by true opinion that they have excellence. This comes to them by divine dispensation.

After def5

If virtue is wisdom (fronhsis), then good men cannot be good by nature. For if they were those who recognised which of the young were good by nature, would take them and guard them in the acropolis. VIRTUE IS NOT INNATE Since good men are not good by nature, what about through learning? Since excellence is knowledge, virtue must be teachable... 90-95 ANYTUS during which Soc shows that it is not teachable... so virtue is neither INBORN NOR TAUGHT

The contrast between knowledge and opinion/ belief meno vs republic

In the Meno it is apparently implied that knowledge and opinion can be two different states relating to the same object; the slave's opinion about the geometrical problem will be converted into knowledge by further consideration, and the person who has actually travelled along the road to Larisa has knowledge of it where others may have, at best, true belief. Several scholars have seen the middle-period Theory of Forms as already implied in the Meno. In the Republic, by contrast, it is emphatically denied that knowledge and belief can relate to the same objects; knowledge is of Forms, belief or opinion relates to sensible particulars.

'Wicked people want to hurt others; hurting others is bad; therefore wicked people want bad things.' INITIAL THOUGHTS

Initial thoughts: Wicked people = defined as evil or morally wrong 'Wicked people want to hurt others - - assumption that as a result of being evil, they want to hurt others, perhaps they just want to hurt themselves. - They may be intrinsincally evil and not act on their morally wrongness hurting others is bad; - Who says that it is bad to hurt others?? therefore wicked people want bad things.' - Assumption that from hurting others, they want bad things in general - a huge leap - They may want to acquire bad things for themselves Meno quotes a poet (perhaps Simonides), stating that virtue is,"to rejoice in things honorable and be able for them" and therefore that it is "to desire what is honorable and be able to procure it". 1) do they desire the evil thinking that it is good or recognizing it to be evil and still desiring it? AWARENESS OF GOOD/ EVIL 2) does the man think that the evil benefits him the man who acquires it, or is he is ignorant of the fact that it harms the man who possesses it? AWARENESS OF HARM/ BENEFIT They agree no one desires the evil, for noone wants to be miserable and ill-starred. Meno section summed up: Meno proposes that virtue is the desire for good things and the power to get them. Socrates points out that this raises a second problem—many people do not recognize evil.[6] The discussion then turns to the question of accounting for the fact that so many people are mistaken about good and evil and take one for the other. Socrates asks Meno to consider whether good things must be acquired virtuously in order to be really good By defining virtue partly in terms of desire, Meno allows Socrates to lead him into the terrain ofmoral psychology, and so to touch on issues treated at more length in famouspassages of theProtagoras,GorgiasandRepublic. PSYCHOLOGICAL EUDAIMONISM 1. The Principle of Rational Eudaimonism claims that there is a single, decisive rational consideration for all of a person's actions and choices - that is, the person's (greatest) happiness. Indeed, we have found good evidence from the early dialogues that Socrates holds a stronger form of rational eudaimonism such that one's own happiness is the only rational consideration. There are people who desire what they think is bad for them overall, and Socrates cannot just argue them out of existence by assuming psychological eudaimonism. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics can each be understood as claiming that all human beings desire to live well, and that this desire, when accompanied by correct beliefs about the role of virtue in living well, moves people to be virtuous. Call this claim 'psychological eudaimonism' ('PE'). THE OBJECTION TO PE IS ACRASIA The objector's stock in trade hereis the phenomenon of weakness of the will or acrasia. To most people,it is simply obvious that we sometimes act against our better judgement,and of course such action presupposes that we desire things that conflictwith what we know to be best for us. But the counter-intuitiveness of hisposition does not stop with the denial of acrasia. For if he were right, wewould not even be able to desire something that we knew to be bad andstill resist that desire - the phenomenon that Aristotle was to callencrateia,or 'continence'. Such thoughts lead to the standard criticism of Socrates,that he considers human nature to be rational to a degree that it is not -that he is an 'intellectualist' These dialogues will also allow us to explore the connections between eudaimonism and Socrates' views about akrasia and the claim that no one does wrong willingly. The final dialogue I shall consider in this section is the Protagoras, in which Socrates famously denies the possibility of akrasia. At the beginning of this discussion, Socrates, on behalf of himself and Protagoras, endorses the following claim: Knowledge is a fine thing, capable of ruling a person, and if someone were to know what is good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge commands. ... ( Prt . 352C3-6) According to one line of criticism, Socrates ignores or overlooks - or at least vastly underestimates the importance of - the emotional, desiderative, and volitional sides of human nature, being too preoccupied with the intellect.

"Meno's Paradox" at 80d

Meno asks Socrates: "And how will you inquire into a thing when you are wholly ignorant of what it is? Even if you happen to bump right into it, how will you know it is the thing you didn't know?"[9] Socrates rephrases the question, which has come to be the canonical statement of the paradox: "[A] man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know[.] He cannot search for what he knows--since he knows it, there is no need to search--nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for."[10] Dominic Scott S1 If you know the object already you cannot genuinely inquire into it. S2 If you do not know it you cannot inquire, because you do not even know what you are inquiring into. [Implicit premise: S3 Either you know something or you do not know.] S4 Therefore you cannot inquire into any object (Scott 2006: 78).

Gorgias

Meno is a student of Gorgias, a prominent sophist whose views on virtue clearly influence Meno's.

Anytus

Meno now beseeches Socrates to return to the original question, how virtue is acquired, and in particular, whether or not it is acquired by teaching or through life experience. Socrates proceeds on the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, and it is quickly agreed that, if this is true, virtue is teachable. They turn to the question of whether virtue is indeed knowledge. Socrates is hesitant, because, if virtue were knowledge, there should be teachers and learners of it, but there are none. Coincidentally Anytus appears, whom Socrates praises as the son of Anthemion, who earned his fortune with intelligence and hard work. He says that Anthemion had his son well-educated and so Anytus is well-suited to join the investigation. Socrates suggests that the sophists are teachers of virtue. Anytus is horrified, saying that he neither knows any, nor cares to know any. Socrates then questions why it is that men do not always produce sons of the same virtue as themselves. He alludes to other notable male figures, such as Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides, and casts doubt on whether these men produced sons as capable of virtue as themselves. Anytus becomes offended and accuses Socrates of slander, warning him to be careful expressing such opinions. (The historical Anytus was one of Socrates' accusers in his trial.) Socrates suggests that Anytus does not realize what slander is, and continues his dialogue with Meno as to the definition of virtue.

Meno is intellectually lazy?

Meno's "intellectual laziness" - "has no inclination to engage in active inquiry" M "grabs at another tailor-made conception of virtue" - no attempt to learn from the lessons of the dialogue Meno brings in Meno's paradox: Interestingly it is M who volunteers temperance as a virtue, not S (74a5) "Meno is using the argument [Meno paradox] to avoid having to change his underlying ethos"

How is Meno's paradox best answered?

Meno's paradox is best answered by the argument that although one may not know x, one may have true beliefs on x. Using one's true beliefs, one can enquire into x. One can also achieve knowledge of x, since according to the theory of recollection: recollection of knowledge is true beliefs + causal reasoning.

78c Meno's fourth definition (Phrased by Soc) - 80c

Meno's most recent definition, then, amounts to virtue as "the ability to procure good things." ELEMENT OF WHETHER IT'S DONE JUSTLY IS NECESSARY - justice is a necessary component to virtue Even this is not enough for Socrates, however, who points out that the acquisition of good things is only good if it is done "justly and piously" (otherwise such acquisition is "wickedness"). For example, procuring gold and silver unjustly is not a virtue but a vice. A DEFINITION CANNOT CONTAIN THE TERM TO BE DEFINED But now Socrates and Meno are back to square one, having stumbled into another error with regard to the nature of a definition. If virtue is to acquire good things justly, and if justice is a kind of virtue, Meno has simply repeated his earlier mistake of using kinds of virtue to define virtue itself. Socrates: And here you are, Meno, making fun of me? Meno: How so, Socrates? Socrates: Because after my begging you not to break up virtue into small change, and giving you a pattern on which you should answer, you have ignored all this, and now tell me that virtue is the ability to procure good things with justice; and this, you tell me, is a part of virtue? This mistake, however, is slightly different from the earlier mistake in which Meno defined the thing simply by listing its instances. Here, Plato is also showing us that a definition cannot contain the term to be defined--one cannot give a definition of virtue as "virtue" or as "that which is a part of virtue." MENO REDUCED TO APORIA CALLS SOC A TORPEDO FISH Meno, at the end of his rope, calls Socrates a torpedo fish (a fish that numbs whatever touches it). "Both my mind and my tongue are numb," he says. Though he has "made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions...now [he] cannot even say what it is." This state of coming to know that one does not know is typical of Socrates' method in Plato's dialogues, and is known as aporia.

if we accept virtue must contain knowledge, is this sufficient?

NO - Is knowledge sufficient for virtue? Whilst Socrates is saying that knowledge is needed, it does not follow from this that it is sufficient... - The package of knowledge + willpower + other etc. you ought to be saying that virtue is a compound. For what if someone has the knowledge but lacks the willpower and the guts. You may know it is bad, but lack the willpower to do it. WEAKNESS OF WILL. The soldier who knows he must go into battle but lacks the guts - Such a person is surely not virtuous - KNOWLEDGE MAY BE NECESSARY, BUT IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT. - The argument falls short. For whilst Socrates recognises that knowledge is necessary, we are missing a component. - What leads you to act well or badly? Desires! - SOCRATIC VIEW: When you realise sthg is bad for you, your desire just evaporates - Knowledge that something is bad will cause the bad desire to evaporate.

Do we end with a satisfactory definition of virtue?

No However based on the 5 failed definitions we have learnt of some important conditions for a Socratic definition of virtue. Def 1 = there must not be enumeration/ instances of x, a definition must reveal its essence (ousia) Def 2 = a definition must be universally applicable - it must not be too narrow. The ability to rule over people is far too narrow Def 3 = a definition must not contain a superfluous condition - Socrates believes all men desire good things - PE - (whether or not they have the knowledge to recognise the good and the ability to attain them) Def 4 = a definition should not contain the definiendum - virtue is doing sthg with virtue Def 5 = a Socratic definition requires Socratic conceptions. Soc. refutes that virtue is either wholly or partly knowledge, since there are no teachers of it, but I do not interpret this prima facie. By this, I believe Socrates to mean that virtue is not teachable by Socrates' conception of teaching i.e. transmission of knowledge.

Is Socrates' theory of recollection necessarily committed to the pre-existence of the soul?

No. The pre-existence of the soul is not essential. A requisite in solving Meno's paradox is the existence of true beliefs and this distinction between knowledge and true belief. Whether or not the knowledge is a priori is not important.

WHY DOES SOC INTRODUCE THE TOR IF IT IS NOT NECESSARY?

PROVIDES QUITE A MORALIZED VIEW OF THE SOUL AND DEATH S - reincarnation gives us the opportunity to redeem ourselves S - immortality = duty to live piously Immortality = duty to recollect Living piously and recollecting equated??? Recollection allows us to escape cycle of incarnation and achieve the rewards "That piety might require recollection could be grounded in the thesis that virtue is knowledge" Piety a form of knowledge, recollection a way of recovering knowledge Recollection has a religious dimension - Phaedrus - soul like winged charioteer in discarnate state - without adequate view of Forms it loses its wings and falls into human body - many incarnations - returns to discarnate state by living philosophically/engaging in recollection Recollection enables the wings to grow Similar interconnections of themes - "Socrates' purposes in introducing the theory of recollection in the Meno are multi-layered" = lures M back to inquiry, important religiously - injunction to piety, solving M's challenge

Phaedo

Phaedo = in the Phaedo which is on the immortality of the soul, the TOR is explained through the Theory of Forms.

Persephone accepts the requital for her ancient Grief, in the ninth year she restores their soul back again to the sun above, and from these grow lordly kings and men who are swift in strength and great in wisdom; and for the rest of time ppl call them holy heroes

Pindar

What does Plato mean when he says that all knowledge is akin?

Plato asserts that all knowledge is akin, so that the soul that has learned one thing will remember everything

Theatetus (369 BC)

Plato returns to the question of the nature of knowledge

Anytus - characterisation

Plato soon shows him to be a narrow-minded and unimaginative bigot, ready in one and the same breath to condemn the teaching of the Sophists and to say that he knows nothing about it.

When does the Larisa example come (the distinction between knowledge and true belief)

QUITE LATE 97a

agathos vs kalos

S substitutes 'agathos' (good) for 'kalos' (fine/noble/beautiful) immediately - M accepts the substitution without complaint - agathon associated with beneficial/useful, kalos with beauty/nobility

SOCRATES' IDEA OF CIRCULARITY IS FLAWED - scott

S's charge against M of circularity (79b-e) - is Socrates undermining definition by recasting M's statement e.g. defining bachelor as an unmarried man recast as 'bachelor is a man with the same marital status as a bachelor' - "thus any definition can be made to look circular"

should we take Socrates' disavowal of knowledge as true?

S's disavowal of knowledge - claims not to know virtue and thus teachability of virtue - should we take this at face value? IS THIS MODESTY? IS THIS BECAUSE HE WANTS MENO TO TEACH HIM WHAT IT IS - IN PART IRONY.

What is the main question Socrates wants to know in the elenchus with the slave?

SOCRATES WANTS TO KNOW WHAT LENGTH THE SIZE OF A SQUARE MUST BE TO YIELD HIM AN EIGHT-FOOT AREA (DOUBLE THE AREA - TWOFOLD AREA)

Critique of Meno's paradox according to Scott

Scott thinks that the problem of inquiry M1 is not worth serious consideration. "The weakness of M1 is clear (2006: 76)", he says, the impossibility of beginning inquiry is easily solved by means of distinguishing true belief from knowledge, because (as he adds the implicit premise S3 and as I agree) the dilemma is relying on the false dichotomy of all-or-nothing knowledge (1995: 30; 2006:79)

def 3 def 4

Since def3 contained a superfluous condition, it is amended to... Def4: virtue is the ability to get good things Soc: should we not add justice, self-control or piety?? HOWEVER, AS THEY SAID BEFORE, THESE THINGS ARE A PART OF VIRTUE, OR IN OTHER WORDS VIRTUES THEMSELVES AND SO MENO IS DOING THE SAME THING OF BREAKING UP VIRTUE AND CUTTING IT INTO PIECES

Why can the slave inquire?

Slave lacks knowledge but can inquire because he has: 1) true beliefs 2) the capacity for rational reflection and revision of his beliefs

Doctrines Soc is not committed to

Soc is not committed to the TOR he says that the process of enquiry will make men braver

Soc says regarding the slave's true beliefs

Soc says that the slave in both periods—when he was and was not a human being— has had true opinions in him which have only to be awakened by questioning to become knowledge and that his soul must have had this cognizance throughout all time. For clearly he has always either been or not been a human being.

What comes before the Larisa example

Soc: Hence virtue cannot be taught? [96d] we absurdly failed to note that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good; and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive by what means good men can be produced. Soc is alluding to the fact that good men must be useful i.e. give right guidance I will tell you [what i mean]. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?

At the start what is Socrates' response to Meno as to how virtue comes to men?

Socrates answers Meno's question of how virtue is acquired (nature, taught, practise) by reminding Meno that Meno's own countrymen, the Thessalians, have recently gained a reputation for wisdom, due chiefly to the rising fame of Gorgias (a Sophist teacher).

90a-95a ANYTUS

Socrates asks for help from Anytus, who is sitting by them: 1) firstly as he is the son of a wise and wealthy father, Anthemion, who became rich not by a fluke or a gift—like that man the other day, Ismenias23 the Theban, who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates24—but as the product of his own skill and industry. IN OTHER WORDS HE HAS A VIRTUOUS FATHER 2) secondly, he has the name of being in general a well-conducted, mannerly person, not insolent towards his fellow-citizens or arrogant and annoying; HE IS VIRTUOUS HIMSELF 3) thirdly, he gave his son a good upbringing and education, as the Athenian people think, for they choose him for the highest offices. HE HAS A VIRTUOUS SON he thus serves as a perfect foil for Socrates' questions about public virtue and whether it can be taught Socrates first questions Anytus about the standard model for teaching--there are experts in each craft (medicine, shoemaking, etc.), and they are paid to teach these crafts to others. SOC: Consider it thus: if we wanted Meno here to be a good doctor, [90c] to whom should we send him for instruction? Would it not be to the doctors? ANYTUS: Certainly. ETC Socrates then suggests (facetiously, we must assume) that the equivalent expert teachers for virtue are the Sophists, who "profess to be teachers of virtue and have shown themselves to be available to any Greek who wishes to learn, and for this fix a fee and exact it." Socrates continues his analogy: And the same would hold in the case of flute-playing, and so on with the rest? What folly, when we wanted to make someone a flute-player, [90e] to refuse to send him to the professed teachers of the art, who charge a regular fee, and to bother with requests for instruction other people who neither set up to be teachers nor have a single pupil in that sort of study which we expect him, when sent, to pursue! Do you not consider this would be grossly unreasonable? Socrates then asks Anytus to whom ought he to send Meno to gain lessons in virtue and 'have that wisdom and virtue whereby men keep their house or their city in good order, and honor their parents, and know when to welcome and when to speed citizens and strangers as befits a good man'.... OR, Soc says, is it clear that Meno ought to go to these men who 1) profess to be teachers of virtue 2) advertise themselves as the common teachers of the Greeks 3) are ready to instruct anyone who chooses in return for fees charged on a fixed scale SOC: they are the men whom people call SOPHISTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!! :OOOOOOO ANYTUS HATES THE SOPHISTS, HE VIEWS THEM AS BRINGERS OF PLAGUE AND CORRUPTION Anytus: For heaven's sake hold your tongue, Socrates! May no kinsman or friend of mine, whether of this city or another, be seized with such madness as to let himself be infected with the company of those men; for they are a manifest plague and corruption to those who frequent them.26 (This opinion of the Sophists was widely held at the time, though they were well-respected enough as teachers of rhetoric to keep them employed and even to give them some degree of fame. Socrates' own eventual execution was due in part to a perceived similarity to the Sophists, though he argued against them his whole life.) Socrates pretends to be amazed at Anytus' disapproval, in order to point out that Sophists like Protagoras have gained fame and been well-respected (and well-paid) for over forty years. Protagoras amassed more money by his craft than Pheidias—so famous for the noble works he produced—or any ten other sculptors. Moreover, Protagoras' corrupting his classes and charging them went undetected, Soc says. The same could never happen with teachers of common crafts (e.g. menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes returning the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them) so how could it be so with regard to professed teachers of virtue? Anytus says the mad ones are: 1) the young men who pay them money 2) still more the relations who let the young men have their way 3) most of all the cities that allow them to enter, and do not expel them, whether such attempt be made by stranger or citizen. Soc asks Anytus which of the sophists has wronged him, but A. replies that neither he nor any of his people have ever had any dealings with them. At this, Socrates asks him how he can tell whether a thing has any good or evil in it, if he hasn't experienced it - is he a wizard? In any case, says Socrates, the question is who can teach us virtue, not who can't--"let them be the Sophists if you like." Soc. asks Anytus to tell him to whom of the Athenians Meno is to go, which are the teachers of virtue? Anytus suggests that one need only to talk to any Athenian gentleman on the streets of Athens to see true virtue, but Socrates redirects his answer to his and Meno's original question about whether virtue can be taught: "have [these gentlemen] been good teachers of their own virtue?" In other words, Soc isn't just looking for virtuous men, but men who have transferred their virtue to others since their discussion is about whether virtue is teachable. Therefore, this is the question they are pondering: 'Did the good men of our own and of former times know how to transmit to another man the virtue in respect of which they were good, or is it something not to be transmitted or taken over from one human being to another?' Soc says Themistocles was a good man and teacher of virtue - Anytus agrees. However, although Themistocles taught his son Cleophantus to do many things: e.g. be a good horseman, hurl the javelin while so standing, and perform many other wonderful feats in which his father had had him trained, Cleophantus nonetheless did not have the same goodness and accomplishments as his father, though there were never complaints about him. Socrates gives this question some more weight for the prominent Anytus by citing examples of virtuous, well-respected men whose sons have turned out less than perfect: Themistocles and his son Cleophantus, Aristeides and his son Lysimachus, Pericles and his sons Paralus and Xanthippus, 'who taught them to be the foremost horsemen of Athens, and trained them to excel in music and gymnastics and all else that comes under the head of the arts; and with all that, had he no desire to make them good men? He wished to, I imagine, but presumably it is not a thing one can be taught.' and Thucydides and his sons Melesias and Stephanus who 'besides giving them a good general education he made them the best wrestlers in Athens: one he placed with Xanthias, and the other with Eudorus'. In each case, Socrates argues, the fathers taught their sons to the utmost of their abilities (since they were virtuous men), and certainly "would have found the man who could make [their sons] good men." Thucydides, for example, had much influence, so that if virtue were to be taught he would have found out the man who was likely to make his sons good. If virtue could be taught at all, it would have been in these cases. Yet this apparently did not happen. Anytus gets angry at hearing all of these honourable personages slandered and warns Socrates to be careful. Anytus: Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one; [95a] I think you know that yourself. Soc: Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what "speaking ill" means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know.

what was soc accused of? (3)

Socrates' official charges (3) = 1) refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state, 2) importing strange divinities of his own; 3) corrupting the young

teachability of knowledge

Socratic conception of teaching is 'maieutic' (extracting knowledge from within) S claims role of a midwife in Theaetetus

diff between Sophistic learning and socratic learning

Socratic teaching comes from within Meno perceives teaching as something from without

Having resolved the question of whether it's really even possible to seek the definition of virtue - solving Meno's paradox, Socrates and Meno try a new approach.... WHAT COMES NEXT?

THE ONE WITH THE HYPOTHESES

THE UNITARIAN ASSUMPTION Is Socrates right to look for a unified definition of virtue?

THE UNITARIAN ASSUMPTION THAT THERE MUST BE A SINGLE DEF WHICH ENCOMPASSES EVERYTHING (Scott talks about the UA) S says virtue is a unitary property - temperance and piety are a necessary condition of virtue and it is beneficial - must know some things about it - SOCRATES' ATTACHMENT TO A UNIVOCITY ASSUMPTION. Hardy: 'a univocal definition of virtue, like a univocal definition of shape will specify that property instantiated by all and only instances of virtue'. There is a multivocity in virtue he is wrong, je pense.. S - justice and temperance needed to manage state well - all of us need these virtues to be good/virtuous - in the same way/by participation in the same virtues - unity assumption/'sameness of virtue'

interpretation of what purpose the elenctic method and hypothetical method serve in the dialogue

The Meno is often interpreted as an illustration of Plato's decision to replace elenchus with recollection and the method of hypothesis........ far from replacing elenchus, the method of hypothesis incorporates and uses elenctic arguments in order to test and build its own steps

Tripartite Soul (Plato) - Republic

The belief that a person's soul has three basic parts: appetite, spirit, and reason (asr)

Plato's Geometric Hypothesis: Meno 86e-87b

The geometrical hypothesis in the Meno occupies a crucial place in the dialogue, linking the preceding discussion of geometry with the subsequent discussion of the teachability of virtue. Yet attempts to understand the hypothesis itself have generally been regarded as pointless and future. Guthrie reassures us that 'it is not necessary to understand the example in order to grasp the' point

what are the themes anticipated in the beginning? BASICALLY MENO'S CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD PROCESS OF TRANSMISSION - SCOTT

Themes anticipated in the opening - e.g. Meno's tyrannical attitude (later even goes onto define virtue as power over others) M's attitude towards teaching and learning - "expects to receive an answer that will quickly made him an authority on the topic, able to teach others in turn" - typical of Thessalians/instilled by Gorgias M has memorised G's speeches - "I have not a good memory Meno" - contrast between M and S - foreshadows Socratic irony and highlights the theme of remembering (recollection)/mocks M for his memorisation of speeches and lack of understanding without him understanding that he is being mocked either - just as he doesn't understand G's speeches - thinks he has gained knowledge but just repeating G - Aristotle rebukes G for giving his students speeches to learn in lieu of teaching them To Meno "education is a straightforward process of transmission" - misunderstands learning and teaching

If virtue is good...

Then it must be profitable. For all good things are profitable

Does the TOR solve Meno's paradox?

Theory of Recollection cannot solve paradox as it still entails that we either know explicitly/have recalled something or do not and have not - need to be able to recollect partial knowledge - which is only possible when true belief/knowledge distinction is taken into account - which would already solve the paradox on its own without need for Theory of Recollection S not even that confident on theory of Recollection (imo) S ignores epistemological problems with paradox and focuses on why M raised it M paradox part 2 suggests that if we make assumptions and then use them to form a specification for something - but will never know if these assumptions and thus our specification are correct called 'The Problem of Discovery' THE TOR IS UNNECESSARY - THE ONLY THING NECESSARY IS THE EXISTENCE OF SOME FORM OF PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH MAY SERVE AS A STARTING POINT.

Why is virtue a form of knowledge ? Main argument for this

Things like beauty, strength, and health benefit human beings, but can also harm them if they are not accompanied by knowledge or wisdom. If virtue is to be beneficial it must be knowledge, since all the qualities of the soul are in themselves neither beneficial not harmful, but are only beneficial when accompanied by wisdom and harmful when accompanied by folly

Gobbet 2 - Meno 99d-100c (divine dispensation)

This is the concluding passage of the Meno dialogue. In the preceding chapters, Socrates returns to the question with which the discussion begins on how virtue is acquired. In the discussion with Meno and Anytus, he argues that virtue is neither teachable nor innate, therefore disproving the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge. Then, having shed light on views central to his theory of the recollection of knowledge, namely, the distinction between knowledge and belief, Socrates returns to the issue of how men become virtuous. Given that throughout the dialogue, Socrates has refuted the three proposed options as to how men acquire virtue, namely, teaching, practise or nature, he must now introduce a new argument. In this extract, Socrates makes the following claims: (1) there are virtuous statesmen who guide the city's affairs well, (2) they are virtuous as the result of divine dispensation, (3) they have been given (and have) true beliefs, as opposed to a real knowledge. According to Meno, this is an argument at which Anytus might take offence. Meno is likely to have made this reference due to the fact that, in a previous discussion, Anytus accuses Socrates of slander when he suggests that many notable virtuous men of Athenian society have not produced virtuous sons, therefore proving that virtue is not teachable. Socrates then provides us with an important distinction between this type of virtuous statesman man (a) and the type of virtuous man who is able to make another man virtuous (b), i.e., to teach virtue. The man (a) has only true beliefs, given to him by the divine and is unable to teach virtue since he lacks knowledge, whereas the latter man (b) has knowledge and not just true beliefs, meaning that he is able to teach virtue - that is, 'teach' used in the Socratic sense of guiding one to recollect knowledge. Such a man (b), he argues, would be the equivalent of Teiresias in earth. Socrates draws attention to how remarkable such a man would be with metaphorical language: with regard to virtue he would be the real thing in comparison with shadows (99e4-100a7). Therefore, it makes sense to apply the argument of virtue being true beliefs to the Athenian statesmen of type (a), considering it to be an ad hominem argument. Indeed, a common interpretation of Socrates' argument that virtuous Athenians have been divinely possessed is that it is ironic. This view is plausible since it is evident from a previous section of the dialogue that Socrates does not believe that these prominent men, though admitting they are virtuous, are able to teach virtue. For, when Anytus claims that they are virtuous men and therefore teachers of virtue, Socrates points out that the sons of these men are in no way virtuous, therefore proving that these eminent Athenians are not teachers of virtue. Similarly, the argument that Socrates is being ironic, is certainly likely for a Socratic dialogue. It keeps with Socrates' irony in his earlier exchange with Anytus on whether sophists are teachers of virtue. Indeed, in this passage too, reference to Anytus' anger is made, thus reinforcing the correspondence between the two sections. Others have preferred to interpret this passage as being a literal statement of how Socrates believes that virtue comes to men. They, however are soon faced with the fact that the conclusion of the Meno dialogue is at odds with the famous Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. For, in this section of the dialogue, Socrates is essentially claiming that virtue is true belief, rather than knowledge and that this true belief is not teachable, but comes through divine dispensation. Such an interpretation requires reading this passage in isolation to the rest of the dialogue. Understanding the conclusion in a way that it does not contradict Socrates' thesis of 'virtue is knowledge' is dependent on an understanding of key concepts expressed in the dialogue. The first is the distinction between knowledge and true belief. Knowledge is conceived by Socrates in absolute terms, as understanding fully a quality's essence and explanatory properties. True belief, on the other hand, consists of having a grasp of something. According to Socrates' theory of recollection, true beliefs can become knowledge when they are tethered by reasoned explanations. Secondly, the distinction between Socrates' conception of teaching as guiding one in the process of recollection, in comparison to the sophists' conception of teaching as transmission of information, is also an important one. Nice ideas but this not a gobbet CCA Context This is the concluding passage of the Meno dialogue. In the preceding chapters, Socrates returns to the question with which the discussion begins on how virtue is acquired. Given that throughout the dialogue, Socrates has refuted the three proposed options as to how men acquire virtue, namely, teaching, practise or nature, he must now introduce a new argument. Content In this extract, Socrates makes the following claims: (1) there are virtuous statesmen who guide the city's affairs well, (2) they are virtuous as the result of divine dispensation, (3) they have been given (and have) true beliefs, as opposed to a real knowledge. Socrates then provides us with an important distinction between this type of virtuous statesman man (a) and the type of virtuous man who is able to make another man virtuous (b), i.e., to teach virtue. The man (a) has only true beliefs, given to him by the divine and is unable to teach virtue since he lacks knowledge, whereas the latter man (b) has knowledge and not just true beliefs, meaning that he is able to teach virtue - that is, 'teach' used in the Socratic sense of guiding one to recollect knowledge. Such a man (b), he argues, would be the equivalent of Teiresias in earth. Socrates draws attention to how remarkable such a man would be with metaphorical language: with regard to virtue he would be the real thing in comparison with shadows (99e4-100a7). Therefore, it makes sense to apply the argument of virtue being true beliefs to the Athenian statesmen of type (a), considering it to be an ad hominem argument. Aside from the literal interpretation of this passage, a common interpretation of Socrates' argument that virtuous Athenians have been divinely possessed is that it is ironic. This view is plausible since it is evident from a previous section of the dialogue that Socrates does not believe that these prominent men, though admitting they are virtuous, are able to teach virtue. For, when Anytus claims that they are virtuous men and therefore teachers of virtue, Socrates points out that the sons of these men are in no way virtuous, therefore proving that these eminent Athenians are not teachers of virtue. Similarly, the argument that Socrates is being ironic, is certainly likely for a Socratic dialogue. It keeps with Socrates' irony in his earlier exchange with Anytus on whether sophists are teachers of virtue. Indeed, in this passage too, reference to Anytus' anger is made, thus reinforcing the correspondence between the two sections. Assessment In support of the above interpretation is that a literal interpretation of the conclusion of the Meno dialogue is at odds with the famous Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. For, in this section of the dialogue, Socrates is essentially claiming that virtue is true belief, rather than knowledge and that this true belief is not teachable, but comes through divine dispensation. Such an interpretation requires reading this passage in isolation to the rest of the dialogue. Understanding the conclusion in a way that it does not contradict Socrates' thesis of 'virtue is knowledge' is dependent on an understanding of key concepts expressed in the dialogue. The first is the distinction between knowledge and true belief. Knowledge is conceived by Socrates in absolute terms, as understanding fully a quality's essence and explanatory properties. True belief, on the other hand, consists of having a grasp of something. According to Socrates' theory of recollection, true beliefs can become knowledge when they are tethered by reasoned explanations. Secondly, the distinction between Socrates' conception of teaching as guiding one in the process of recollection, in comparison to the sophists' conception of teaching as transmission of information, is also an important one. Maybe some more on wider picture

Karasmanis' ti and hopoion argument

Ti' and 'hopoion' statements - "if i do not know what (ti) a thing is, how should I know what sort (hopoion) of thing it is?" - distinguishes between properties of virtue and its essence

Does the Meno give good reason for thinking that knowledge is not necessary for virtue? ESSAY

U SAY THAT THE MENO GIVES GOOD REASON FOR THINKING THAT KNOWLEDGE ISSSSSS NECESSARY FOR VIRTUE. CONVERSELY, ONE COULD ARGUE THAT TRUE BELIEF IS NECESSARY FOR VIRTUE, NOT KNOWLEDGE (AS RAY ARGUES) I argue that the Meno gives good reason for suggesting that knowledge is necessary for virtue. Only a literal interpretation of the text suggests the opposite and Socrates, as we observe in his frequent use of irony, is not one to be taken literally at all times. Indeed, Socrates' argument that virtue cannot be taught, which is stated in the Meno, is at odds with his famous thesis that virtue is identical with a kind of knowledge . The pair are incompatible since the latter Socratic thesis presupposes the following: if virtue is knowledge, due to the fact that knowledge is everything which is taught to men (87c), virtue must therefore be taught. In the Meno, Socrates begins his argument as to why knowledge is not necessary for virtue by refuting the following hypothesis: If virtue is a kind of knowledge, then it must be taught, if not, then it cannot be taught. Socrates argues that if we accept that virtue is a knowledge and therefore its teachability, then the logical consequence of this is that there are teachers and learners of virtue. Conversely, if there prove to be none of the sort, then neither the argument that virtue is taught can be accepted nor can the argument that virtue is a kind of knowledge. Socrates first reasons that since there are expert teachers for a number of spheres (e.g. medicine), then there must be expert teachers of virtue. Using Anytus as foil for his questions, he sets out to find out who such men are. They both are certain that the sophists are not such men (Socrates expresses his distaste for them in his characteristic ironic, pseudo-naïve way). Anytus instead proposes that one could find worthy men on the street who are teachers of virtue (type 1). However, Socrates points out, citing examples, that many of these virtuous, respected men have unworthy sons, therefore proving that being a virtuous father who is thus a teacher of virtue to his son does not lead to having a virtuous son who is a good pupil of virtue. Socrates then states that even the distinguished men like the poet Theognis who are unsure of whether virtue is teachable or not (type 2) cannot possibly be effective teachers of virtue. Thus, for these reasons, Socrates concludes that knowledge is not a necessary condition of virtue, since if it were, virtue would be teachable. THIS CAN BE INTERPRETED IS ANOTHER WAY SO AS NOT TO CONFLICT WITH THE WELL-KNOWN SOCRATIC DOCTRINE OF 'VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE'. Devereux suggests that Socrates' argument can be understood in a certain way so as not to conflict with the Socratic doctrine of 'virtue is knowledge'. He suggests that the two men have distinct conceptions of teaching . Socrates' conception is brought to light through the earlier mentioned Theory of Recollection in which learning is conceived as a process of retrieving one's own innate knowledge using (true) beliefs and inquiry. Teaching is therefore regarded as the act of guiding one in such a way so as to enable them to retrieve their innate knowledge. The demonstration with the slave-boy is proof of this, revealing, as Socrates goes on to state in 87 b-c, that the terms "teachable" and "recollectable", διδακτόν and αναμνηστόν are conceived as interchangeable, both consisting of the learning of innate knowledge. Meno, on the other hand, conceives of teaching as the transmission of knowledge. He asks Socrates whether virtue is taught, learned through practice, or inherent in some people's nature - three possible distinct answers which reveal that he is only able to conceive of 'mutually exclusive ways of coming to possess virtue' . Therefore, on Meno's view, it is hard to accept the Socratic suggestion that a knowledge which is innate (even though dormant) can be teachable. Devereux argues that Socrates' conclusion that virtue cannot be taught should therefore be applied to Meno's and the sophists' narrow conception of teaching . Socrates is expressing the view that virtue cannot be taught in the sense of transmission of knowledge. Indeed, he expresses a similar view earlier on in in the narrative when Meno asks him to teach him that the theory of recollection is true. Socrates states: 'there is no teaching, but only recollection' (81e-82a) and instead proposes to prove to him his theory using a demonstration with a slave-boy, as he goes on to do. - SOCRATES ONLY ARGUES THAT ARETE CANNOT BE TAUGHT IN THE CONVENTIONAL SENSE OF 'teaching as transmission of knowledge from one individual to another [which] is associated with the sophists in other dialogues.' This is how Meno conceives of teaching, so he says that ἀρετή cannot be taught, not because ἀρετή cannot be taught at all - it can, but in an unconventional manner as I shall explain - but so as not to confuse Meno. This is part of the reason why Meno's misconception of ἀρετή is so fundamental, as he seems to understand it as a form of knowledge to be transmitted. Indeed, Socrates considers earlier on in the dialogue whether virtue is indeed a kind of knowledge. After the first hypothesis, he proposes a second: (2) If there is anything good that is distinct from knowledge, then perhaps virtue is not a kind of knowledge, but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not encompass, then virtue is a kind of knowledge. Socrates forms the conclusion that virtue is not innate and therefore can be taught. He reasons that all things, including the soul's virtues (e.g. justice, temperance, courage) are beneficial only when they are accompanied by wisdom, their 'guiding condition'. The argument that everything in the soul depends on wisdom yields the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom. Indeed, such a conception of virtue is expressed in the Protagoras dialogue, since vice is viewed as a lack of knowledge of what is good and the capacity to distinguish between the pair. However, in the Meno dialogue, this relation between virtue and wisdom brings about the suggestion that 'good men cannot be good by nature' (89a) and therefore that virtue is not innate to men. As proof of this claim, Socrates explains that if virtue was innate, we would be able to discern which of the young are innately good and set them apart, protecting them from destructive influences, so that they would grow up to be men useful to their society. I believe that we can read this argument on the innateness of virtue in the same way as we read the argument that virtue cannot be taught . The view that virtue is not innate is at odds with Socrates' view according to the theory of recollection: that all knowledge is buried within us and requires some degree of teaching - that is, 'teaching' in the aforementioned Socratic sense of being guided by another, in order for us to recollect it. Therefore, the argument that virtue is not innate is in line with Meno's thinking. Meno would most likely regard the innateness of a characteristic and wisdom in mutually exclusive terms, conceiving the 'innate' and the 'teachable' as two very distinct things. Socrates and Meno's aforementioned distinct conception of teaching sheds light on their different views on innateness: following the theory of recollection, according to Socrates, what is taught comes from within, whereas according to Meno's conception, what is taught comes from outside . I am inclined to accept the argument proposed by Devereux, since it seems highly unlikely that Socrates is contradicting himself by making arguments at odds with frequently mentioned and known views of his. In the Protagoras dialogue, Socrates makes the conclusion that all virtue is knowledge and therefore must be taught. Socrates suggests that he who harms himself, desiring what is not good, in fact lacks knowledge, meaning he misjudges the bad as good. The suggestion that humans desire the good is also in line with Socrates' view in the theory of recollection that knowledge is innate, since both imply that humans may lack the ability to carry something out but nonetheless possess, deep in their subconscious, knowledge of the 'correct' desires. Secondly, I also find this reading of this section of Meno convincing because Socrates' method keeps with Socrates' elenctic method of irony and questioning in order to expose the ignorance of his interlocutor. By persuading Meno that virtue cannot be taught, Meno will hopefully recognise the perceived unreasonableness behind his sophistical conception of teaching and reject it. Just as after an elenchus, the aim is that he will consequently attempt to inquire into the matter, using true beliefs gained from the discussion. Moreover, we must remind ourselves that at this point of the dialogue, Socrates must feel complete exasperation; he has already stated his views on the theory of recollection, proved them using a demonstration and yet Meno has still failed to understand and continues to think within the narrow bounds of what Wilkes refers to as 'orthodox teaching and learning'. Therefore, it is no wonder that Socrates adopts such a method. In conclusion, on the basis of Socrates' theory of recollection, the demonstration with the slave, Socrates' conventional views on the subject of knowledge i.e. the doctrine 'virtue is knowledge', its innateness, Socrates' own methods of elenchus, in particular the importance of irony to encourage inquiry and lastly Meno's inability to grasp Socrates' point, I argue that this section of the Meno takes such a form. Indeed, for these reasons I believe that the Meno gives very good reason for thinking that knowledge is necessary for virtue. --------- RAY ESSAY - paras u like The Meno does not give us reason to think that knowledge is not necessary for virtue. I believe that it is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one; that is, one must possess knowledge to be virtuous (or, at least, aim to possess it), but it is not enough simply to be knowledgeable. It seems to me that the main issue is that two ideas in the dialogue, that knowledge is virtue and that knowledge is not teachable, are apparently irreconcilable, given that the general assumption is that knowledge is teachable. However, as I shall explain, this is largely because of terminology and the way in which Meno understands concepts such as teaching, learning, and ἀρετή itself. One thing that the ancient Greeks believed, and an idea that has hopefully survived into the present day, is that ἀρετή is good2. A related idea is that it should guide us towards good actions, so we should aim for it (while the very notion of 'good actions' is a matter of intense debate, it is not necessarily the issue at hand). There are two things which can guide a man: knowledge itself, but also true belief. Socrates proves this point to Meno3, who is doubtful, by saying that a man who has not been to Larisa and does not know the route for sure can still direct someone else to Larisa and be correct about the route. And so ἀρετή could be either one of these things but, Socrates argues, since there are no teachers or learners of ἀρετή, it must be true belief, which does not need to be taught. But I will not rest on this conclusion since I agree with Wilkes, who deems it unlikely that Socrates or Plato would 'degrade [ἀρετή] to the status of true belief'4. By the end of his conversation with Socrates, the slave has not gained knowledge, just true beliefs8, but should he continue with this style of teaching - dialectical questioning - he would end up with knowledge9. And so it can be seen that true beliefs do not have to be an end in themselves, but can be developed into knowledge. This is done by providing the belief with an αιτίας λογισμός (an 'explanatory account'). Socrates uses the image of Daedalus' statues10: true beliefs are unstable until they are tied down by explanatory accounts. The more time one spends studying a concept, the stronger the hold on each true belief until it is thoroughly 'tied down' and can be called knowledge. Therefore, Wilkes argues, the only difference between knowledge and a true belief is the presence of an explanatory account. By the end, Meno has attained true beliefs of what ἀρετή is but, just like his slave, he does not possess knowledge. Socrates shows us this by presenting Meno with an earlier argument, that ἀρετή does not have teachers or learners, so it surely cannot be taught. The argument is weak and irrelevant, given that we have already dispelled the conception of teaching as the transmission of knowledge. But Meno allows this dubious premise, showing that he does not have knowledge. For if he had knowledge, he would not have allowed Socrates to refute his own belief in this way. If Meno had an explanatory account, and therefore a true understanding, he would have understood why Socrates' refutation had no validity and he would not have given in to it. Socrates uses a similar tactic in the Laches12, where Nicias adopts Socrates' view, knowing that it was his opinion, so as not to be humiliated in front of his friend Laches, so Socrates refutes Nicias' view13; both of these cases are practical demonstrations of the difference between knowledge and true beliefs, and why explanatory accounts are needed. In conclusion, I do think that knowledge is an essential part of ἀρετή. This is because I understand ἀρετή to be the constant scrutinisation of one's beliefs in order to reach better ones, in an endeavour to build knowledge. However, this should not be misunderstood as simply the aspiration for knowledge, as I do not believe that knowledge is the end goal. Instead of the things which one recollects, ἀρετή is the actual state of being determined to recollect. And so it makes sense that the dialogue is aporetic: 'Meno is more likely to learn αρετή if he is left with an unsatisfactory false belief than if he were left with a true belief that he mistakes for knowledge.'17

Doctrines Soc is committed to

Unitarian Assumption Priority of definition

Fifth account of virtue 89a-89c

Upon investigation of the qualities of the soul... SOC AND MENO REACH THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION V5: virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom This means that they must reject one of the hypotheses proposed by Meno (that some can obtain virtue by nature or in other words good men can be good by nature). VIRTUE IS NOT INBORN Therefore, they conclude, on their hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, that it must be taught. VIRTUE IS TEACHABLE

Justice Objection

Utilitarianism sometimes recommends actions that are morally wrong, since they involve injustice, unfairness, or a violation of rights

Def5

Virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom!!!!!!

What virtuous conducts does Meno lists? (6 ppl)

Virtuous conduct of MEN, WOMEN and says that he can say the same things about old people, children, freemen and slaves. (6)

priority of def = scott

WE NEED A DEFINITION TO DETERMINE THE PARTICULARS.

Geometry with the slave

What would the length of the side a square be with an area of 8 - double the area of the original square? The slave mistakenly says that such a side would be four feet, double the length of the original square (which had a length of 2 x 2 = thus an area of 4), but as Socrates shows him a four foot side, of course, would yield a sixteen-foot square (4 x 4 length = 16 area). Then 3x3 = 9 Then Soc takes the diagonal line of each of the 4 original squares which are put together and thus forming one big square. Each of the inside lines has cut off half of each of the four areas. Therefore the relation of 4 to 2 is double (2). There are 4 squares = 2x4 = 8 SO AN 8 FOOT AREA (DOUBLE THE AREA OF THE ORIGINAL SQUARE) IS PRODUCED FROM A SQUARE WHICH IS MADE BY PLACING FOUR ORIGINAL-SIZED SQUARES TOGETHER TO FORM ONE SQUARE AND DRAWING DIAGONALS THROUGH EACH OF THE FOUR SQUARES IN ORDER TO FORM ONE SQUARE (WHICH APPEARS SLANTED).

the distinction between true belief and knowledge

With the distinction between knowledge and belief you have different components - Seeing for yourself - Stability - Requirement of explanation

Is Socrates right to look for a unified definition of virtue?

Yes

Does Soc give good reason for thinking knowledge is necessary for virtue?

Yes for true virtue knowledge is necessary. Type B man. Knowledge cannot be passed on/ taught, whereas true beliefs are. The sophists have these true beliefs. True virtue depends on the sort of moral knowledge that can only be taught by "facilitating" its recollection, recollection of knowledge - eternal truths, as opposed to popular virtue which consists of transmission of these true beliefs. (Sharples) Having said that, though believing it to be inferior to knowledge, he acknowledges the merits of true belief. - It can produce successful men - It is just as good a guide as knowledge

the euthyphro and meno

both contain Soc's accusers Anytus and Meletus

the boy and his relationship to true beliefs

he always had these true beliefs but he did not know of them these true beliefs were stirred up in him like a dream TRUE BELIEFS CAN BE AWAKENED BY QUESTIONING

Meno's low point in the dialogue

his second def: virtue is the power to rule men he forgets two things 1) Meno has forgotten that virtue must apply to everyone - the reason his first definition failed 2) - Meno agreed before his second definition that a necessary condition of virtue is being just. In his second definition he forgets this.

socrates is interested in explanation

in explaining - aitias logismos. Explaining a through b and b through c. because these facts are connected, your beliefs about them are much more stable. If you have been told something by a teacher or politician, giving up that belief is of little cost to you. But if you have anchored that belief, giving up that belief is difficult as it has explanations. By having an interconnected support, you have rallied support for every belief. STABILITY AND EXPLANATION GO HAND IN HAND.

Soc, after refuting def2, says shouldn't Socrates have added

justly and unjustly Socrates takes that statement as an opportunity to make a further point about definitions: does Meno mean that justice is virtue or that it is a virtue?

Does Soc address the 'practice' element?

no not directly however one could argue that the TOR reveals that there is an element of practising involved in successful recollection of knowledge. DEFINITION OF PRACTISE = perform (an activity) or exercise (a skill) repeatedly or regularly in order to acquire, improve or maintain proficiency in it.

Each of Meno's definitions is from another

o First def = Gorgias, second def = sounds like what one of the immoralists would say in the Gorgias, third def = meno quotes a poet o IN EACH CASE MENO DOESN'T THINK FOR HIMSELF, HE QUOTES SOMEONE ELSE.

Virtue is knowledge - how successful is Soc..

o Virtue is advantageous § Lists first non-psychological qualities: these tend to be called external goods e.g. health, wealth, good looks. But none of these things are in themselves good, it depends what you do with them. Being very wealthy might harm you. Soc - all these you intuitively think as good are in themselves neither good nor bad, it depends how you use them. This is very radical a claim. Socrates - 'privilege could harm you'.. he's almost saying there is no such thing as privilege. Yes, you have fortune, but whether it is good or bad depends on you. § INTERNAL ASSETS TOO. Then psychological qualities - he suggests these are neutral as well. Someone might have such great will-power that they don't drink water for many days - isn't is better for them if they didn't have it. Would it not have been better if stalin didn't have self-discipline. Self-discipline can be highly destructive. § KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO USE THEM, DETERMINES WHETHER THEY ARE GOOD AND BAD. § Knowledge is one thing that will always bring advantage. (Soc)

Practice

practice is not treated separately in Plato's subsequent discussion; it is perhaps subsumed under teaching, since practice involves following precepts.

ἐγκωμιάζω

praise

to desire fine things and hvae the power to get them - which poet

simonides probs said this

Socrates' first def of shape: that which accompanies colour

that which accompanies colour

For the things of the soul to be good and profitable

they must be guided by wisdom

the sophists

they were professional teachers of arete in the context of the Athenian democracy the ability to speak in public was an essential ingredient for success; and rhetorical technique was in fact the central part of the teaching of the sophists, though individual rhetoric led to a stressing not of what was actually true, but of what people could be persuaded to believe.

86a8-9 - 'won't his soul for the whole of time be in a state of having learned'

this is fallacious. Firstly the mere fact that the soul has knowledge both in this life and for some time before does not even show that it is always in a state of having learned as long as it exists. There may be a time before it is in the body when it has already learned and another earlier time when it is in a state of ignorance. Even if the soul has knowledge as long as it exists, however it still does not follow that it has knowledge for the whole of time.

Is Meno's paradox easier to solve with regard to inquiry about mathematics than inquiry about ethics?

yes. Mathematics/ geometry is a closed system of a priori truths (those derived from theoretical deduction). This kind of methodology is therefore not applicable to morality. WHAT PLATO DOES PROVE THROUGH THE GEOMETRY ELENCHUS IS THE A PRIORI NATURE OF MATHEMATIC TRUTHS AHA

hypothesis

"A hypothesis is something entertained tentatively, not something of which we have knowledge" "Overtly, Socrates introduces the method as a second best" + does he only introduce it due to M's impatience? If this were true, why would Plato keep refining the method in later works?

in modern day...

"In the modern theory of sets, it is permissible to define a set either by listing all its elements or by stating their common property" - according to this M's definition is satisfactory

redefining

"Meno accepts the theory of recollection, but to accept it means that one accepts also a redefinition of 'knowledge' as 'recollection', or 'teaching' as 'reminding' - wilkes

Socrates' moral views are provocative

"Socrates seems to ignore differences in natural ability" - "boy will have as good an understanding of geometry as anyone" e.g. in Republic people divided according to their natural ability Point is provocative - boy not inferior to his master nor to Anytus - egalitarian?

the foreknowledge principle

"The Foreknowledge Principle" - "the assumption that knowledge must derive from pre-existent knowledge" - S believes this; proved by his assumption that if the boy can recollect, he always had the knowledge - "has now" (present tense - boy always had knowledge) - pre-exists the present time - "Socrates takes it for granted that knowledge must derive from pre-existent knowledge"

Why does Meno care so much about arete?

"What Meno has in mind when he uses the term [arete] is very much a political concept" - set of qualities for good leader - yet he accepts slaves can be virtuous - inconsistent/confused about virtue - virtue has many different connotations, only one of which is as a genus encompassing species justice, courage, etc. Meno perfect interlocutor - "almost personifies the confusions inherent in popular thought" Context - transition to democracy in Athens - "increased social mobility" - "a question naturally arose about the respective roles of nature and nurture in developing the qualities necessary for political success" - hence sophists/orators came forwards. Protagoras "unashamedly claimed to teach virtue" M's question is a natural one for any ambitious young man - obvious vested interest

virtue is intellectualist

'intellectualist' account of virtue attributed to historical Socrates = knowledge sufficient for virtue because if we know that x leads to overall happiness and y leads to unhappiness, we will always choose x and have no desire for y (imo humans not as rational as this - and just because we know something leads to happiness does not mean we will be able to gain it even if we strive for it - and knowledge does not even mean that we WOULD necessarily strive for it) - courage is actually just knowing that it is better to stand firm in the battlefield according to the theory What if you had knowledge but lacked daring? Would run away in battle - cowardice incompatible with virtue - paradoxical - soul could be given training like in the Republic - dialectic helps us learn qualities like patience and staying power and mildness (extolled by s) - if someone did not have these qualities they would never have obtained knowledge in the first place

73d Meno's second account of virtue

(what Gorgias said and Meno agrees with) virtue is the power of governing mankind A person is virtuous if they have the ability to rule over people. (73d)

the theory of innatism

- E.g. geometry: THE THEORY OF INNATISM - WE ARE BORN WITH KNOWLEDGE when you are doing mathematics you appear to be coming with

SCOTT SAYS A DEF OF VIRTUE MUST CONTAIN THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE AFFECTIVE

- First part of the meno: intellectualist - Second part of the meno: need for both: intellectual and affective. If is unfortunate that he says that virtue is knowledge because he is also talking about desires. A need for both. There is a departure in the second part of the meno. Plato establishes this in the Republic - tripartite soul (rational, affective, spirit)

is the justice objection important to Soc?

- Justice objection = an issue fundamental to ethics and politics. The place of justice in the good life is a big concern of Plato's. the value of justice. E.g. Gorgias. Why should you be just??? You need temperance - as otherwise excess takes place, courage to see things through and obviously wisdom, to make the right decisions - self-interest o But what about justice? Some Greeks said that justice is someone else's good. Some people thought justice was a waste of time - unless you are scared of social functions. BUT PLATO SAYS THAT WE CANNOT THRIVE UNLESS WE ARE JUST - you cannot enjoy friendship or community if you are unjust. Justice is very important for Socrates. Immoralists think justice is a waste of time. § Meno is somewhere in the middle. He has a superficial commitment to justice.

this is political...

- Plato's issue in philosophy is highly political - the question what is arete is a question of what quality a political leader should have. Arete - makes you useful to ur city. If arete is knowledge then our leaders should be experts.

After the health and strength point, Socrates says that virtues are common to all people, provided that they have these two virtues:

- Self-control - justice

why does Meno's third def fail?

- Socrates has an argument that everyone desires good things. It is thus pointless to thus mention it in a definition for virtue. Instead we are left with virtue is the ability to procure them - Justice objection = Meno forgets justice yet again! - Unity objection (THE UNITY OF VIRTUE) + justice objection

Anytus bit:

- Standard model for teaching: experts - Sophists. Soc mentions Protagoras - accomplished athenian gentlemen and their sons

Sting ray/ torpedo

1) S numbs victims into intellectual inactivity - cognitive death 2) S has eradicated M's good perspective on virtue 3) S's motives - stingray is predator/harmful, furthering own interests i.e. intellectual self promotion Suggestion that S is intellectually manipulative in magician simile and reference to his arrest ΒΟΤΗ GOOD AND BAD: stingray both numbs and shocks into action - and S is trying to do the latter but must first do the former the boy is given the stingray's shock too and it has done him good - allows him to highlight the importance of inquiry to a complacent Meno - suggestion that the boy would have previously prided himself on his ability to talk about geometry parallels M's 'expertise' on virtue

what is the TOR according to Scott?

1) What the theory is = it is a theory of innate knowledge - that at birth you are born with the knowledge. This knowledge comes from previous life since the soul has been incarnated several times. Most philosophers, even those who agree with innatism, have not agreed with the reincarnation aspect. Some try to downplay reincarnation and say that all Socrates is saying is that knowledge is innate and is not committed to it being their before birth - DOM SAYS THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO REINCARNATION + THE KNOWLEDGE BEING THERE BEFORE BIRTH

Problem of Discovery is routed in two assumptions

1) priority of def 2) the foreknowledge principle PRIORITY OF DEFINITION PRINCIPLE + FOREKNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE = EXPLODES INTO MENO'S PARADOX - According to foreknowledge principle, you have to have rock solid knowledge. Whereas according to priority of definition you canot have rock-solid knowledge. You cannot know whether virtue is teachable, since you have to find out what it is. - The problem is that if you don't have a definition there is nothing certain that you can know about virtue, and so you are relying on assumptions (which even though they may be true, they are only true beliefs). - This is the problem of discovery. - At a deeper level, Plato in worrying about these principles (FP, PODP). He has a serious epistemological question which he wants to solve.

Hypotheses and philosophical method in the Meno 1) Socratic method/ elenctic method + Socratic irony 2) Hypothetical method

1) Socratic method/ method of Elenchus/ elenctic method/ Socratic debate,: (proceeds by Socrates asking questions) You think you know something ↓ You realize you never actually understood it to begin with The person is left stunned/perplexed The end goal is to realize one's ignorance so that one can start building up one's knowledge in a less confused way The Socratic method is a dialectical method, involving a discussion in which the defense of one point of view is questioned; one participant may lead another to contradict themselves in some way, thus weakening the defender's point. The Socratic method is a method of hypothesis elimination, in that better hypotheses are found by steadily identifying and eliminating those that lead to contradictions. The Socratic method searches for general, commonly held truths that shape beliefs and scrutinizes them to determine their consistency with other beliefs. In Plato's early dialogues, the elenchus is the technique Socrates uses to investigate, for example, the nature or definition of ethical concepts such as justice or virtue. According to Vlastos,[5] it has the following steps: 1) Socrates' interlocutor asserts a thesis, for example "Courage is endurance of the soul". 2) Socrates decides whether the thesis is false and targets for refutation. 3) Socrates secures his interlocutor's agreement to further premises, for example "Courage is a fine thing" and "Ignorant endurance is not a fine thing". 4) Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, these further premises imply the contrary of the original thesis; in this case, it leads to: "courage is not endurance of the soul". 5) Socrates then claims he has shown his interlocutor's thesis is false and its negation is true. Most Socratic inquiries consist of a series of elenchi and typically end in puzzlement known as aporia. the aporetic nature of the early dialogues Guthrie claims that the Socratic method actually aims to demonstrate one's ignorance. Socrates, unlike the Sophists, did believe that knowledge was possible, but believed that the first step to knowledge was recognition of one's ignorance. Guthrie writes, "[Socrates] was accustomed to say that he did not himself know anything, and that the only way in which he was wiser than other men was that he was conscious of his own ignorance, while they were not. The essence of the Socratic method is to convince the interlocutor that whereas he thought he knew something, in fact he does not."{pg 74} SOCRATES CLAIMS HE IS WISER THAN ALL MEN FOR THE REASON THAT HE IS CONSCIOUS OF HIS OWN IGNORANCE, WHEREAS OTHER MEN ARE UNAWARE OF IT. "the only thing i know is that i know nothing" - Socratic ignorance Socratic irony, as demonstrated in the Platonic dialogues, is "the dissimulation of ignorance practised by Socrates as a means of confuting an adversary".[11] Socrates would pretend to be ignorant of the topic under discussion, to draw out the inherent nonsense in the arguments of his interlocutors. The Chambers Dictionary defines it as "a means by which a questioner pretends to know less than a respondent, when actually he knows more". 2) Socrates' use of a hypothesis (a supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation.) HYPOTHESES MADE: btw in an exam, first address/ discuss what hypothesis really means in this context. Socrates proposes a possible answer to a problem - a way of approaching the true answer when you do not know it. 1) Virtue is good 2) Virtue is knowledge diff between hypothesis and elenchus - The hypothetical method can work with more than two people (Anytus comes in), whereas the elenchus only with one. - Hypothesis puts out an idea for you to discuss. Elenchus puts out an answer from the start.

main problems with tor

1) why does the soul have to exist before birth? Plato provides very little argument and tries to show that an act of learning requires something within. 2) - you might say knowledge of mathematics is innate, but what about knowledge of ethics? - This is an act of faith on Socrates' part 3) we may have innate beliefs, but this doesn't mean that they are true. - Why should we have any respect for something just because its innate? what is wrong with the geometry lesson? 1) - 'isn't it?' people say Socrates is asking leading questions and feeding the boy with answers Is the boy saying yes because he gets it and perceive 'a logical relationship' or yes what is okay - THE BASIC IDEA OF IT THAT ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE COMES FROM SENSORY PERCEPTION IS PLAUSIBLE

two halves of the dialogue, according to Karasmanis

2 halves of dialogue - 1st half is seeking a definition of virtue (K thinks it proposes a complete theory of definition), 2nd half focuses on whether or not virtue can be taught

How many definitions come before 80 = meno's paradox

4/5 DEFINITIONS THUS COME BEFORE MENO'S PARADOX definition 5 - virtue is either partly or wholly wisdom comes right after the bit with the 2 hypotheses. More specifically THE BIT THAT FOR GOOD THINGS IN THE SOUL TO BE PROFITABLE, THEY MUST BE GUIDED BY WISDOM.

When does Meno call Socrates an electric ray?

80a-80b When he is reduced to aporia = the state of coming to know that one does not know is typical of Socrates' method in Plato's dialogues, and is known as aporia.

GENUS VS SPECIES GENUS-DIFFERENTIA DEFINITION

A genus is made up of any number of species. GENUS > SPECIES Euthyphro: piety is a species of the genus 'justice' Meno: courage is a species of the genus 'virtue'

Priority of Definition

Appeals to a metaphorical distinction between features that are essential to an object (what x is in itself) and those that are non-essential (what x is like)" "The essence is what explains the non-essential attributes"

the argument that they would have separated young virtuous people at birth...

Argument about young virtuous people being separated at birth - very flawed - no agreement on what virtue is so how do we know who is virtuous - difficult to detect virtue in the young - what if people's virtue comes to the forefront later in life or depletes

Hypothetical Method

By PUTTING OUT AN IDEA/ proposing a possible answer to a problem ("the way geometers often carry on their investigations"), one can approach the true answer without yet knowing it (as the slave did in Socrates' examination). The method of hypothesis suggests a concrete dialectical procedure for positively testing and strengthening our opinions and thereby gradually converting our opinions to knowledge. By reducing Meno's question, whether virtue is teachable, to the preliminary problem of whether virtue is some sort of knowledge, Socrates basically brings Meno closer to the question concerning the nature of virtue. The key elements of the hypothetical procedure: i) that the hypothesis is proposed tentatively and provisionally, ii) that it establishes limiting conditions and then iii) considers whether the limiting conditions announced have been met (BeduAddo 1984, 6, Benson 2003, 107, 112-113).

Socrates' argument that bad things will make us miserable and wretched thus no one desires bad things as no one desires to be wretched or miserable IS

CIRCULAR Scott: "highly counterintuitive, almost absurdly so" (can desire to go to the dentist without desiring the pain this entails) - "would generate a huge range of desires. I have to desire every known consequence of my actual desires" - perfectly possible to desire something even though you know it is bad rather than because it is bad

How to write philosophy gobbets?

CCA designed to test your ability to extract the relevant philosophical content from a short stretch of text. The basic format of a gobbet should be: (i) context, (ii) content, (iii) assessment. (i) Context. You need to identify the argumentative context of the passage. WHERE IS THIS PASSAGE FROM AND V BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS PRECEDED - IS THIS A REPLY TO STHG?. For example, 'THIS PASSAGE OCCURS IN Socrates' response to Thrasymachus' claim that the ruler properly so‐ called is expert in promoting his own advantage; in reply Socrates urges that all expertise aims to promote the advantage of that on which the expertise is exercised, hence the expert ruler must aim to promote, not his own advantage, but that of the subject.' (ii) Content. You need to say what the specific contribution of the passage is to that argumentative context. - Is it a sub‐argument (in which case the steps of the argument should be set out)? - Or does it introduce a distinction (in which case you should clearly state what is being distinguished from what)? - Or does it introduce some key concept (in which case, you should elucidate the concept, and explain its importance for the argument)? If there are differing interpretations of the passage, you should canvas them all - don't just state your preferred one. (iii) Assessment. Once you have elucidated what the content of the passage is, you need to assess that content. BE CRITICAL - If the passage contains an argument, then you should say whether the argument is a good one, and identify its flaw if it is fallacious or unsound. - If the passage introduces some key distinction or concept, you should say why the distinction or concept is important for the surrounding argument. - If the significance of the passage goes beyond the immediate argumentative context (e.g. in introducing a concept which is important for a wider range of contexts) that wider significance should be indicated. - Wider significance may be internal to the work as a whole, or may extend beyond it, for instance by relating to some theme central to the thought of the author (such as Plato's Theory of Forms or Aristotle's Categories) or to some important topic in modern philosophy. (you can make comments on the Greek - if grammar is philosophically relevant, terminology), any mistakes in the argument, anything that seems to contradict to what they say earlier or later on, how does this play a crucial role? HOW IS IT SIGNIFICANT? ---- Your primary focus in philosophy gobbets should be on argumentative and conceptual content. Details of sentence construction, vocabulary etc should be discussed only in so far as they affect that content. The same goes for the identification of persons etc named in the passage; note that where the passage is taken from a Platonic dialogue it will usually be relevant to identify the speaker(s). 22 It is vitally important to observe the time constraints imposed by the number of passages to be translated and commented on. Brevity, relevance and lucidity are crucial. It is especially important not to be carried away in expounding the wider significance of the passage (see above); a gobbet should not expand into an essay on the Theory of Forms, or the problem of universals, or whatever.

Meno's Paradox can also be called

"The Paradox of Inquiry,"

Dialectic technique in the MENO

- Metaphor: 1) Meno's first account of virtue, Socrates says, consists of a swarm of virtues, just as a swarm of bees. 2) Meno likens Socrates to an electric ray as he has the ability to make men numb (the effect of aporia). Similarly, in the geometry elenchus with the slave, Socrates and Meno comment on the slave's being numbed and the torpedo shock. 3) Daedalus' sculptures to explain why knowledge is more prized than true belief - Socratic admission of modesty at the start - he does not know what virtue is, nor has met anyone who does. - Contrast between Socrates and the sophists - this is important as Socrates' own eventual execution was due in part to a perceived similarity to the Sophists, though he argued against them his whole life - Meno turns the tables and asks Socrates to answer his own question and define "shape" and "colour" himself, so that Meno will have an example to follow in defining virtue. This turning of the tables, in which Socrates' interlocutor asks him the questions, gives Plato the opportunity to contrast Socrates' style of definition with that of the Sophists. - Socrates gives Gorgias' definition of colour (which is based on Empedocles' concept of effluvia) = "an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived." The main contrast highlighted here is between Socrates' simple, direct account and the "theatrical" accounts of Gorgias and the Sophists (which are full of high-flown theories and quotations) - Socrates facetiously suggests to Anytus that the sophists are teachers of virtue. Anytus is vehemently against this. - Socrates speaks of the sophist Protagoras, who undetected, went around corrupting his classes and charging, whereas the same could never happen with teachers of common crafts (e.g. menders of old shoes and furbishers of clothes returning the clothes or shoes in worse condition than they received them) so how could it be so with regard to professed teachers of virtue? - Elenchus-style geometry demonstration with the slave - Hypotheses - this is a second way around the problem of seeking what one does not yet know; by proposing a possible answer to a problem ("the way geometers often carry on their investigations"), one can approach the true answer without yet knowing it (as the slave did in Socrates' examination). - Aporia - the desired result of the elenctic method - Meno says he is numb like an electric ray. During Socrates' demonstration with the slave, the slave is also described as having been made numb.

standard model for teaching--there are experts in each craft examples used

- medicine - doctors - shoemaking - cobblers - Flute-playing - flute-players

Other dialogues in which the immortality of the soul is discussed (3)

1) Phaedo 69e-84b DIALOGUE ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL!!! Socrates' arguments for the immortality of the soul: 1) The Cyclical Argument/ Opposites Argument (69e-72d) 2) The Theory of Recollection (72e-77a) = explained through the reintroduction of the Theory of Forms. E.g. Equal objects remind us of the Form of Equality because our soul obtained knowledge of the perfect Forms before our birth. We lose knowledge of these Forms at birth, but through a process of learning that we come to recollect them and know them again. Evidence that the soul coheres after death is the combination of the Opposites Argument (suggests soul came into being from death) + The Theory of Recollection (suggests soul existed before birth). 3) The Affinity Argument (78b - 82a) Plato's conception of the soul in the Phaedo: - The soul is akin to the Forms (as seen in the Affinity Argument). 2) The Republic, which was written a little later, suggests there are three parts of the soul - roughly, desire, emotion, and reason. - Each soul will be reincarnated as befits the way the person behaved in this life. Very moral conception of the soul's reincarnation. 3) Phaedrus 245c-249d The Chariot allegory as proof of the immortality of the soul: - The soul is like "the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer" (246a). - The gods' souls contain only good horses and charioteers - Humans' souls contain a mixture of good + bad horses. The charioteer symbolizes reason/ logical part of the soul, the good horse symbolizes thumos and the bad horse appetite. This recalls the tripartite soul in the Republic. - These two horses must work in harmony or they will lose their wings and fall to earth and take on an earthly body. - Souls which are perfect and fully winged mount up to the top of a hill, beyond heaven, from where they see the Reality of the Forms (universal truths). Reminiscent of the Phaedo (and Meno) - through recollection of the Forms which the soul knows, one learns. - The immortal souls eventually fall to earth. The body they take on depends on how much they have seen.

What two theories does S. employ to solve Meno's paradox?

1) the immortality of the soul 2) the theory of recollection (learning is recollection).

WHY TOR IS NOT NECESSARY? (3) updated

1. There is no need for knowledge to be a priori/ pre-existent or remembered, as the theory of recollection states. True beliefs may have been plausibly gained from perception and hearsay and thus knowledge may be a product of applying reasoning/ logic/ deductions to these true beliefs (this grasp of knowledge). It follows from this that for this reason the theory of recollection does not replace the elenchus - and nor is there any proof that the two are different things. In the elenchus with the slave, one could reasonably argue that this is the logical result of the slave-boy's repeated inferences and deductions. Moreover, Socrates helps him to reach this point: he asks leading questions which encourage him to use reasoning and logic to work them out and at times push him towards the correct answers. Indeed the elenctic method, with its result of aporia - reducing the interlocutors to a state of aporia and (hopefully) instilling in them the desire to investigate further and consequently acquire knowledge on the subject PRODUCES THE SAME RESULT AS THE THEORY OF RECOLLECTION, THEREFORE PROVING RECOLLECTION ITSELF UNNECESSARY 2. the way in which recollection works proves to be INSUFFICIENT. If one were to reject the views on knowledge and true belief and take the notion of recollection in isolation, this would be the proposition: if one recollects, unpacked as now knowing a formerly latent thing explicitly, this means that they recollect everything, knowing everything explicitly. Since inquiry requires some partial knowledge, recollecting (full) knowledge raises issues for proposition (3 - If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x.): how can one inquire into something if by recollecting they gain full knowledge of it? Surely, in this case, inquiry is unnecessary . 3. Similarly, as Fine argues, one's ability to distinguish between or recognise which beliefs are 'true' and which are 'false' is not required. Inquiry may still take place, even if the person possesses a mixture of true and false beliefs.

Why does Socrates set such high standards for understanding a term like virtue? (2)

1. Topical - during the 5th and 4th century BC, Greeks began to be more and more concerned with ethics and moral philosophy (MORAL CONCEPTS), as they began to REJECT the traditional ways of living, believing, and thinking, which sometimes caused political trouble for the philosophers themselves. 2. There were many SOPHISTS - teachers of these qualities. Socrates was keen on showing the superficiality of teaching such things. He is right to do so - aristocratic men were not questioning knowledge they were gaining. They were paying these 'teachers' to give them these values/ skills/ knowledge, in hope of increasing their career prospects - very cynical.

74b-76e Meno and Socrates discuss the concepts of shape and color

74b-76e Meno again professes confusion, and Socrates again resorts to the example of "a shape" versus "shape" in general. He also mentions color in the same regard. Meno, however, simply asks Socrates to answer his own question and define "shape" and "color" himself, so that Meno will have an example to follow in defining virtue. (This turning of the tables, in which Socrates' interlocutor asks him the questions, is a relatively rare occurrence in Plato's dialogues. Here, it serves to give Plato the opportunity to contrast Socrates' style of definition with that of the Sophists.) Socrates, after making sure that Meno knows the geometrical terms "surface" and "solid," defines shape as "that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid." 76c One might tell even blindfolded, Meno, by the way you discuss, that you are handsome and still have lovers. Because you invariably speak in a peremptory tone, after the fashion of spoilt beauties, holding as they do a despotic power so long as their bloom is on them. You have also, I daresay, [76c] made a note of my weakness for handsome people. So I will indulge you, and answer. Then would you like me to answer you in the manner of Gorgias,2 which you would find easiest to follow? Then, after chastising Meno for ordering him around, Socrates proceeds to define color "after the manner of Gorgias" (rather than after his own manner, in which he defined shape). He mentions Empedocles', a Greek pre-Socratic philosopher's concept of effluvia, those elements that travel into us via our sense organs and allow us to sense the external world. *Empedocles taught that material objects are known to us by means of effluences or films given off by them and suited in various ways to our sense-organs* Using this concept, and quoting Pindar along the way, Socrates defines colour as "an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived." The main contrast highlighted here is between Socrates' simple, direct account and the "theatrical" accounts of Gorgias and the Sophists (which are full of high-flown theories and quotations).

When was the Meno composed?

A date in the middle 380's seems most likely

95a-96e After Anytus leaves, Soc and Meno on sophists and whether virtue is teachable

But Socrates blithely continues, asking Meno if he has run across any fellow Thessalians* who claimed to teach virtue ('are there not good and honorable men among your people also?'). *Meno is an ancient Thessalian political figure. Meno replies that his people disagree about whether virtue can be taught at all (perhaps the reason he asked Socrates in the first place). Socrates says such people, as those who cannot agree on whether virtue is teachable, a great question, cannot be called teachers of it in a first place. Socrates than asks Meno again about the Sophists and whether he considers them teachers of virtue. Meno mentions Gorgias whom he particularly respects for his refusal to claim to teach anything other than skill in speaking and ridicules those who claim to teach virtue. Meno says that he is unsure as to whether sophists are indeed teachers of virtue: 'sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not.' Even the poet Theognis, Socrates now recalls, in addition to Meno and other political folk, could not decide (are in two minds as to) whether virtue is teachable or not; Socrates recites two brief passages from him that contradict each other on this issue. In those elegiac lines where he says— "Eat and drink with these men; sit with them, and he pleasing unto them, who wield great power; for from the good wilt thou win thee lessons in the good; but mingle with the bad and thou wilt lose even the sense that thou hast." Theognis 33-36 Bergk Do you observe how in these words he implies that virtue is to be taught? But in some other lines he shifts his ground a little, saying—"Could understanding be created and put into a man (I think it runs thus) many high rewards would they obtain for he would have followed the precepts of wisdom: but not by teaching wilt thou ever make the had man good" Theognis Bergk 434-438. You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point? Socrates then says that thus those who are so confused about a subject cannot be effective teachers of it. Socrates then says that if neither the sophists nor the men who are themselves good and honorable are teachers of the subject, clearly no others can be... This means there are no disciples of it. A thing of which there are no teachers or disciples cannot be taught.

Socrates' objection 73d-74a

But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave? This definition is immediately thrown out, however, as Socrates reminds Meno that ruling over others is not virtuous in slaves or children. THIS DEFINITION OF VIRTUE IS THUS TOO NARROW. In any case, Socrates asks, shouldn't Meno have added "justly and not unjustly" to the phrase "ruling over people?" - FOR THIS REASON THE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE IS TOO WIDE AS IT DOESN'T STIPULATE HOW ONE OUGHT TO RULE OVER MEN (SUGGESTS BOTH JUSTLY AND UNJUSTLY)... Meno agrees, noting that "justice is virtue." Socrates takes that statement as an opportunity to make a further point about definitions: does Meno mean that justice is virtue or that it is a virtue? Meno, however, still fails to grasp this distinction between instances of virtue and the definition of virtue, and Socrates must use another example. Roundness, he notes, is a shape, but is not shape in and of itself. Meno again seems to grasp the difference, and clarifies his statement about justice: it is a virtue, not virtue itself. "There are many other virtues," he says, and he goes on to list some of them ("courage...moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others"). MENO IS MAKING THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN Again, Socrates says that Meno lists many particular virtues without defining a common feature inherent to virtues which makes them thus.

Conditions of a definition of virtue

Conditions of a definition - Def 1 = there must not be enumeration/ instances of x, a definition must reveal its essence (ousia) Similarly, after definition 2, Socrates makes a similar point on the importance between instances of virtue and a definition of virtue when he asks Meno on adding justly to "ruling over ppl": does Meno mean that justice is virtue or that it is a virtue? Justice is a virtue (an instance), instead of virtue (definition), which means that it does not reveal a feature/ eidos inherent to virtues. He makes the same mistake in definition 4. - Def 2 = this definition is good because it displays the unified account that Socrates asked for. However, it receives a DOUBLE CRITICISM 1) a definition must not be too narrow. The ability to rule over people is far too narrow, since it does not apply to children and slaves for whom it would be inappropriate. 2) of being too wide, in that it leaves unspecified what kind of ruling corresponds to virtue, i.e. ruling justly, not unjustly. - Def 3 = a definition must not contain a superfluous condition - Socrates believes all men desire good things - PE - (whether or not they have the knowledge to recognise the good and the ability to attain them) - Def 4 = a definition should not contain the definiendum - virtue is doing sthg with virtue - Def 5 = a correct definition should have evidence (based on real-life) in support of it. Socrates cannot find any teachers of virtue, therefore virtue is not partly or wholly knowledge. - As Socrates shows us at the end of the dialogue, a definition of TRUE VIRTUE requires a Socratic conception of teaching. Socrates suggests that successful statesmen (i.e. the men who are not able to make others virtuous) have true belief, which has come to them by divine dispensation. Whereas men like Teiresias, have knowledge and are thus able to make others virtuous. These men, in Socrates' opinion, have TRUE VIRTUE. Moreover, this true virtue which consists of knowledge is not able to be taught in the way the sophists teach/ statesmen try to educate their sons. Instead TRUE VIRTUE is taught by guiding one to recollect the knowledge hidden in their soul, as opposed to the sophistic transmission of knowledge which Socrates cynically perceives as consisting of no true understanding/ inner processes of self-reflection.

Gobbet 1 - Meno 97a-d Road to Larisa to explain the difference between knowledge and true belief These are long gobbets btw - gobbets don't need to be this long

Context - in exam this will be max 2 sentences This discussion on knowledge and true belief has come about as a result of Socrates revisiting the argument that virtue is knowledge and therefore teachable. Prior to this passage, Socrates has argued that virtue cannot be taught, after gathering evidence in his discussion with Anytus and Meno, that there are no teachers or learners of virtue. In this passage, he will point out the similarities and differences between ὀρθη δόξη (true belief) and ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) and how they relate to ἀρετή (virtue). CONTENT - MAYBE SUMMARISE PASSAGE. The correlation lies in the fact that true belief is just as good a guide for right action as knowledge and therefore is just as useful. Socrates, when making this point, refers to knowledge using the term φρόνησις (prudence, good judgement) and the participial form φρονῶν of its verb. This implies a knowledge which is more practical, as opposed to the more intellectual knowledge implied in ἐπιστήμη and therefore is a fitting lexical choice for a passage considering the knowledge required for ὀρθῶς πράττειν (acting correctly). The difference between the pair is that knowledge is regarded as more valuable. Using the example of the traveller on the road to Larissa, Socrates and Meno establish the exact relationship between the pair. Socrates argues that both the person who has true belief of the way and the person who has knowledge of it will successfully reach Larissa and be able to lead others there too. In other words, true belief, though inferior to knowledge, is a sufficient guide for acting correctly. However, as Meno argues, the man who has knowledge has secured success, whereas for the man with true beliefs, his successfulness is variable. To understand this using the example of the road to Larissa, we could state: the person with knowledge will always be able to travel to Larissa, whereas the person with true belief may either manage to work out the way, or alternatively be unable to do so. THIS IS ALSO CONTENT - AS YOU ARE STATING THE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE PASSAGE TO THE ARGUMENTATIVE CONTEXT. To relate this passage to the rest of the text, the concept of true belief has already been briefly touched upon in chapter 85, after the demonstration with the slave-boy, to explain the theory of recollection. Socrates argues that the slave's true beliefs are being awakened by questioning and become knowledge. These are views on which he will later elaborate. For, having established the distinction between knowledge and true belief in this passage, in the following passage, he will use the metaphor of a man possessing one of Daedalus' valuable statues, to explain exactly how true belief becomes knowledge and the theory of recollection. ASSESSMENT - why this passage is significant - it sheds light on the Socratic conception of knowledge and true belief. Therefore, this passage which sheds light on the Socratic conception of knowledge and true belief plays an important role in the Meno. It is central to the theory of recollection for several reasons. Firstly, this theory is dependent on the Socratic definition of knowledge as knowing a quality's essence and properties in an absolute way: one either has full knowledge of x or no knowledge of x at all. This is evident when Meno suggests that the man who has knowledge, might always hit upon something, whereas for the man with true beliefs, it is not certain. Secondly, this process of recollection is dependent on the notion of true belief as a requisite of knowledge. When one has beliefs on a subject, which in non-Socratic terms can be conceived as partial knowledge or having a sense of something, using these and inquiry, one may undergo recollect knowledge. Once the theory of recollection is understood, Meno's paradox, which suggests that one cannot inquire into the nature of virtue when they do not know what it is, since they will not be able to recognize it, is promptly resolved. For, even if one does not know x (in the Socratic sense of full knowledge), they can inquire into x using their true beliefs. With the help of the theory of recollection and having resolved Meno's paradox, it is possible to work out a definition for virtue. ASSESSMENT - why this passage raises concerns? The relationship between true belief and knowledge, however useful it may be for the arguments in the Meno dialogue, no doubt raises several concerns. Firstly, what of the cases when one lacks the true beliefs, meaning that there exists an absence of any specification of the object of inquiry? For, the belief(s) must be true in order to be of any use to the person in the process of recollecting knowledge. To use the example of the traveller with false beliefs, they will undoubtedly be unable to find the way to Larissa, since they will have nothing to work with or make their enquiry. Secondly, the Socratic notion of knowledge as absolute is problematic. In the case of the traveller, it implies that a traveller who has knowledge of the road to Larissa, knows every possible route, therefore meaning that a traveller who only knows one route, in Socratic terms, does not know the road to Larissa. Similarly, knowledge in the Socratic sense of knowing something's essence and its essential properties, implies that one has experienced something first-hand. Therefore, for one to have knowledge of the road to Larissa, they have to have been. This definition of knowledge is extremely limiting and counter-intuitive, since one can know how to get to a place without knowing all the possible routes and without having been. Review by me: what is this missing? - maybe a bit more of the wider significance - in the text: just before they have discussed with Anytus whether virtue is teachable and thus a kind of knowledge. - more clear set-up. Assessment should begin with 'this is a good argument because...' 'this is problematic because...' - wider significance extending beyond the Meno - the relationship between knowledge and true belief is explored in other Platonic works, such as the Republic and the Theaetetus dialogue. In the Theaetetus dialogue, 201, Plato famously defined knowledge as "justified true belief".

Gorgias 466a-472e

Dialogue is about the definition of rhetoric The pitiful tyrant (466d - 481b)[edit] Socrates then advances that "orators and tyrants have the very least power of any in our cities" (466d). Lumping tyrants and rhetoricians into a single category, Socrates says that both of them, when they kill people or banish them or confiscate their property, think they are doing what is in their own best interest, but are actually pitiable. Socrates maintains that the wicked man is unhappy, but that the unhappiest man of all is the wicked one who does not meet with justice, rebuke, and punishment (472e). Socrates states that it is far worse to inflict evil than to be the innocent victim of it (475e). He gives the example of tyrants being the most wretched people on earth. He adds that poverty is to financial condition as disease is to the body as injustice is to the soul (477b-c). This analogy is used to define the states of corruption in each instance. Money-making, medicine, and justice are the respective cures (478a,b).

'Wicked people want to hurt others; hurting others is bad; therefore wicked people want bad things.' Explain and assess Socrates' response to this kind of argument. Can he show that we don't want to hurt others? ESSAY

ESSAY Using the principles mentioned in the earlier Socratic dialogues, in particular the dialogue with Meno, I will attempt to show that Socrates' refutation of the argument in the title, is well-explained and well-thought out, but ultimately unsatisfactory to modern readers, given the metaethical (Meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.) presuppositions it leans on. Although the Meno dialogue explores desires relating to the agent, that is, the reasons and consequences of wicked men hurting themselves, as opposed to others, it nonetheless offers important Socratic ideas. I will therefore begin by assessing the Meno dialogue. The first important Socratic theory observed in the Meno dialogue is the thesis that no one errs willingly (introduced in Protagoras 345 c 4-e 6 ). In the Meno, Socrates asserts that no one desires the evil for himself. This discussion begins with the third definition of virtue as the desire for good things and the ability to acquire them (77b). Socrates' refutation of Meno's argument takes place in the following order. - Meno first makes the distinction that some men desire the good (1a) and others desire the evil [for themselves] (1b). Socrates points out that this raises a major issue: the recognition of the evil and the recognition of the negative consequences attached to it. - Meno then states the subdivision of the group of men desiring the evil (1b): those who desire the evil thinking it is good (2a) and those who desire the evil, knowing it to be evil (2b). Socrates expresses doubt over the argument that a man recognizes something as evil and still desires it. Recognition, or rather, KNOWLEDGE is therefore what distinguishes these two categories of evil-desiring men. Socrates raises the issue of whether men are aware of what is good and evil or whether they mistake one for the other. - There is a subdivision of the group of men who desire evil, knowing it to be evil (2b): men who know what they desire to be evil, but believe that the evil will benefit them (3a) and the men who know that they desire the evil and also know and believe that it will harm them (3b). Socrates argues that the men in the group 3a, since they believe what they desire will benefit them, are not desiring the evil but in fact desire what is good. Similarly, he argues that the men of 3b, who know and believe that the evil will harm them, do not in fact desire the evil, for it is harmful to them, making them miserable and no one desires to be miserable. The argument that 'no one desires the evil' is therefore an example of the Socratic intellectualist conception that VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD. Socrates argues that when someone desires the evil and acts on it by doing something evil, or in fact, morally wrong, that moral failure takes place as a result of an intellectual error . Not only are those men who desire to do wrong ignorant of the good, they also lack the ability to distinguish between the good and the evil and to procure the good. Therefore, all men are united in their desire for the good, but some men are firstly ignorant of the good, mistaking the evil for the good and secondly are inferior in their ability to acquire it. The second important Socratic theory observed is the principle of PSYCHOLOGICAL EUDAIMONISM, that is, that a man pursues and acts on his own happiness as the 'decisive consideration for all his actions' . The argument that no men desire the evil relies on the logical assumption that no men wish to harm themselves. Socrates makes the following assumptions: 1) evil harms its agent, 2) being harmed makes men miserable 3) no one desires to be miserable and wretched, 4) no one desires things that make him miserable and 5) therefore no one desires the evil. Psychological eudaimonism is thus linked to the concept of knowledge of good, for Socrates believes that men who mistakenly desire the evil, are ignorant of the good, since they cannot logically want to undertake in actions which will harm themselves. Given these two fundamental Socratic principles, (which u can conflate as psychological eudaimonism - 'no one errs willingly') Socrates would approach the argument of the title in the following way. He would firstly re-structure the argument, so that it begins with a general desire, then a more specified desire and then a conclusion. He would perhaps begin with the proposition that wicked people want bad things, modified for consistency purposes as, wicked men desire the evil (part 1). Then, the assertion - wicked men want to hurt others - would follow since it specifies what kind of evil these men want. It can therefore be reframed as wicked men desire the evil for others (2). As the Meno dialogue explored, the evil harms people, whether perpetrators of evil or victims of it. Hurting others, i.e. the act of fulfilling the desire of evil for others, goes against the standard ancient and modern codes of morality, therefore reasonably producing the inference: hurting others is bad (3). wicked men desire the evil (part 1) wicked men desire the evil for others (2) hurting others is bad (3). Socrates would strongly deny the first proposition that wicked men desire the evil with the arguments explored in the Meno on why he believes that nobody willingly chooses to do evil. These are that desiring the evil is ignorance of and inability to acquire the good and that men wish to act in accordance with the principle of psychological eudaimonism. The Protagoras dialogue offers a useful analogy as to why Socrates believes men fall in the trap of desiring and committing evil. Socrates ponders why men harm themselves, by overindulging in various pleasures, such as food. He argues that they do such things which we consider bad (e.g. overeating), or rather, as showing that they desire the evil, because it is enjoyable to them in the short term, regardless of the fact that it is harmful to them in the long term. Socrates explains men's prioritizing of short-term pleasure over long-term pain with the argument that they lack the knowledge to measure the consequences of fulfilling their desires. Therefore, to be overcome by pleasure means to be ignorant of what is good. The argument that desiring evil constitutes a lack of knowledge of the good depends hugely on the assumption that human beings only desire the good. In the case of the wicked tyrant who puts someone to death, Socrates would argue that he does so because he thinks that this will benefit him and his city. Therefore, he is desiring the good for himself and for others. However, this is deeply problematic. 1) Firstly, it assumes that humans have an intrinsic desire for the good and 2) Secondly, it does not consider the following argument: those who desire bad knowing that it is bad, but believing that they will benefit from it. Socrates would object that this exists, for no one who believes that bad things are beneficial can really know that they are bad. He re-describes it as desiring the good. This is because desiring the good depends on what the intended object is, not what the actual desired object is. To explain this, Scott uses the example of a person who wants a glass of water1. If there is a glass in front of them and they believe it contains water, we are justified in saying that they desire water. Even if the glass actually contains petrol, thereby making the petrol the object of desire, water remains the intended object of desire. In the same way, when it comes to whether or not people desire good, we must focus on their intended objects. Therefore, in these two cases, it doesn't actually matter whether or not they desire a bad thing, because they both believe good will come from it, and they therefore desire good. 3) thirdly that this this desire lies behind every single action (whether it be a direct effect or remote consequence of the action). As Segvic puts it: 'Socratic volition is [..] a receptivity of the soul to certain evaluative properties of the object of volition, the properties Socrates designates by the term 'good''. The suggestion that human beings are rational in such a way is incredibly difficult to accept when we observe the large scale of human evil and suffering which often is perpetrated for no specific reason. Moreover, even if we were to accept Socrates' argument that these wicked perpetrators buried deep within their subconscious the belief that their actions, e.g. a mass murder, were of some benefit to themselves or to humanity, it is impossible to provide evidence for it. Indeed, this argument has a far too rigid conception of human nature and desires, suggesting that human nature is rational to a degree that it is not . It does not accept the possibility of akrasia (weakness of will), that one knows that a course of action is better for them, yet does something else which they desire . 4) 'But no one desires to be miserable and wretched.' The assumption is that if x desire p and knows that p leads to q, then x desires q, which is how the first two groups of people fit into Socrates' theory. It means that everyone has to desire every known consequence of every desire. However, it is possible for a desire to have more than one consequence and for someone to desire one consequence yet not another. Scott uses the example of the dentist3: people go to the dentist knowing that there will be pain, but not necessarily desiring the pain even though it is a known consequence of their action. The second proposition that wicked men desire the evil for others, could also be refuted using such arguments. The principle of psychological eudaimonism, that one's primary consideration is his happiness, need not be ascribed only to cases with self-regarding desires. For according to Socrates, in the Gorgias dialogue, men who do evil towards others, harm themselves far more than the person towards whom their evil has been directed. He refers to people who carry out acts of evil as 'unhappy'. This begs the question: why would men desire to commit evil when it makes them so miserable? Socrates would answer by arguing that these men LACK KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD. - In the Gorgias dialogue, Socrates mentions orators and tyrants, arguably the two most powerful groups of 4th century Greek society, and argues that they have the very least power, due to the fact that they act in accordance to what they think is in their best interests as opposed to what they want. This distinction is expressed in such a way: these men do 'what they take to be best' - ἃ δοκει αὐτοις (467a3, 467b8), ἃ¬ δοκει αὐτοις βελτιστα εἰναι (467b 3-4) and not 'what they want' - ἃ βουλονται (467b2, b6, 467a10; cf. 466d8-e1) . These powerful men are thus powerless since they lack the knowledge to understand that they do not truly want to commit the acts which they commit (e.g. killing people, banishing them or confiscating their property). Indeed, the argument that it is difficult for humans to distinguish between what they think is best (doxa - 'opinion') and what they actually want, that is, acting in accordance with their episteme - 'knowledge' , is certainly plausible. For one could argue that a number of men commit evil without being aware of or truly considering whether they desire the negative, unhappy-rendering consequences of their actions. - Segvic explains what she understands to be the difference between what one pleases and what one wants. What one pleases is based on δόξα (one's opinion or judgement of what is best), so what one wants must be based on ἐπιστήμη (what one knows is best). Socrates says that orators and tyrants do not do what they want to do because they do not act in accordance with knowledge, and this is what Segvic terms 'Socratic wanting': to want to do something, knowing that it is good. As Segvic herself puts it5, '[it] does not merely involve a desire to f because f-ing is seen by the agent as having some goodness in it; the agent wants to f only if he desires to f seeing it as the right or correct thing to do.' Having said that, I strongly disagree with the first argument that wicked men are unhappy because their evil actions harm themselves more than they harm others. In the Gorgias dialogue, Socrates mentions three groups of unhappy wicked men: the wicked man who desires evil (1), the punished wicked man (2) and the unpunished wicked man, who he believes to be the unhappiest (3). Socrates believes the latter to be the unhappiest man because the wrong-doing he causes damages his soul and his soul is not realigned by punishment. Whilst I can accept that the unpunished wicked man is unhappy (2), since punishment on a logical level does make one unhappy, the other two examples (1 and 3) are highly counterintuitive. They presuppose views that are not universally accepted, such as the close relation between one's happiness and morality, which is conceived as the relation between mind and soul, i.e. if a man thinks and acts immorally, he is unhappy because his soul is damaged. In conclusion, I do not believe that Socrates can successfully prove that we do not want to hurt others, for both the fundamental principles used, that is, knowledge of the good and psychological eudaimonism, prove to be deeply problematic for the argument of the title. By arguing that wicked men have a lack of knowledge of the good, Socrates completely disregards the multiplicity, insubstantiality, instinctiveness, inexplainability and often conflicting nature of human desires. Similarly, by arguing that men act with primary consideration of their own happiness, Socrates forgets the fact that human beings are not always rational. Also the theory does not account for the existence of evil in reality TWO MAIN PRINCIPLES USED BY SOC IN THIE ARGUMENT: KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EUDAIMONISM

Platonic chronology of dialogues

First Period of Plato's literary activity. 399-390 Laches Protagoras Apology Charmides Hippias Minor Crito Euthyphro Ion Gorgias Lysis Hippias Major Second Period of Plato's literary activity: foundation of the Academy: 388-367 Meno Symposium Phaedrus Cratylus Phaedo Parmenides Euthydemus Republic Theatetus Menexenus The Meno belongs to the middle-period. The developments in the Meno pave the way to the developed middle-period Theory of Forms - the physical world is a reflection of an ideal world of Forms, accessible only to the intellect. Our knowledge of the Forms is the result of our recollection of our souls' experience of them before our souls entered their earthly bodies. A SHARP DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE, CONCERNED WITH THE FORMS, AND OPINION OR BELIEF (DOXA), CONCERNED WITH THE PERCEPTIBLE WORLD. The task of the philosopher is to arrive at a knowledge of the Forms by the method of hypothesis, ascending to knowledge of the Form of the Good...

Meno

Handsome 2 references to meno being handsome - 1) handsome and still has lovers because he orders ppl around, 2) handsome being handsome people get fine comparisons, so when he compared Socrates to an electric ray he was doing so in order to get a handsome comparison. Gorgias is his teacher He is from Thessaly He is well-educated, in conventional terms, is somewhat impatient, and eager for information rather than understanding. Meno's character INABILITY TO FOLLOW SOCRATES' ARGUMENTS MENO MAKES THE SAME MISTAKE THREE TIMES Meno's first account of virtue is to explain the virtues of a man, woman, child etc. Here he is listing instances of virtue, as opposed to giving a definition of virtue. In 73d-74a, Meno struggles to understand Socrates' question: is justice virtue or is it a virtue - the distinction between instances of virtue and the definition of virtue. Socrates uses the example of roundness being a shape, as opposed to shape, to clarify this thought. Meno says that it is a virtue, but then states that there are many other virtues and goes on to list some of them. Here, he is shown to be making the same mistake as he made in his first account of virtue and to have failed to grasp the point in Socrates' question: Socrates is after a common feature inherent to virtues, not a list of all examples of virtues. Therefore in 74b-76e, Socrates again resorts to the example of "a shape" versus "shape" in general. He also mentions colour in the same regard. Meno, however, simply asks Socrates to answer his own question and define "shape" and "colour" himself, so that Meno will have an example to follow in defining virtue. In 79, Meno says that virtue is to acquire good things justly, and that justice is a kind of virtue. Here Meno has simply repeated his earlier mistake of using kinds of virtue to define virtue itself. After explaining the theory of recollection, Meno asks Socrates to teach him what he means when he says that "learning is recollection. Soc replies: there is no teaching but only recollection. He is recalcitrant

How does soc reach the argument that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? - 5th account of virtue

He reasons that all things, including the soul's virtues (e.g. justice, temperance, courage) are beneficial only when they are accompanied by wisdom (their guiding condition). Everything in the soul depends on wisdom.

Do we end with some thought as to whether virtue is teachable, innate or acquired through practise?

I interpret Socrates' ending that men in politics have true belief (which is then converted to knowledge) due to divine dispensation as ironic. The real answer to Meno's initial inquiry is therefore that excellence is achieved by a combination of nature and teaching. It is natural not in the sense that some men naturally possess it while others not, but in the sense that all men have within themselves the knowledge which constitutes excellence, possessing it however in a form in which needs to be recollected. And the teaching which leads to excellence, too, is not ordinary teaching but that which facilitates the student's own recollection. So Socrates' remark that virtue is not teachable means that it is not teachable, in the conventional sense/ Sophistic way in which men define teaching, i.e. transmission of knowledge. Instead, virtue is teachable by Socrates' conception of teaching: the theory of recollection - tethering one's true beliefs by causal reasoning. Therefore, virtue is achieved by teaching and all the cognitive processes this involves: attention, seeing someone virtuous, perception, memory, language, learning, self-reflection and higher reasoning.

Meno's three definitions

In reply to Meno, Socrates raises a more fundamental question - 'What is virtue?' - as without knowing the nature of an object, one cannot judge its qualities [71b]. Meno provides three definitions for virtue during the course of the dialogue: (1) He lists instances of virtuous conduct for men, women, children and so on. For example, the virtue of a man is to manage his public affairs. Meno adds that there exists a virtue for every action, age and occasion [71e-72]. (2) The ability to rule over people is the virtue common to all [73d]. (3) Virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them [77b]. DEF 4: the ability to procure good things with justice = 79B - ALL 4 DEFINITIONS THUS COME BEFORE MENO'S PARADOX

Is the theory of recollection needed to solve Meno's paradox?

Is the theory of recollection needed to solve Meno's paradox? Overall, I argue that the theory of recollection (TOR) is not needed to solve the paradox, since, though several concepts used in it are necessary, the process of recollection itself is not. I will first resolve the issues of interpretation of Meno's Paradox and explain Socrates' theory of recollection. Meno's paradox is made up of three questions: 1) How can you inquire if you don't know what something is? 2) Which of the things which you don't know will you select as your object of inquiry? 3) If you stumble across it, how will you recognise it? MENO'S PARADOX can be reformulated as follows: (1) For any x, one either knows, or does not know, x. (2) If one knows x, one does not need to inquire into x. (3) If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x. (4) Therefore, whether or not one knows x, one cannot inquire into x. (Based off Gail Fine, p205-6) One must first make a sound interpretation of propositions (2) and (3). What do the antecedents: if one knows/ if one does not know x, actually mean? Fine argues that if one knows x, one therefore has full knowledge of x and similarly if one does not know x, one lacks full knowledge of x. She interprets in the paradox an all-or-nothing conception of knowledge, based on Socrates' Principle of the Priority of Knowledge What (PKW) . Socrates in the Meno and in other definitional dialogues shows that he equates knowing something about x to knowing its definition, that is, its essence and its explanatory qualities . Therefore, Socrates accords priority to knowledge of a quality's essence, hence the principle named PKW. Using this theory, Fine proposes that if one does not know the definition of x, they therefore lack (what Socrates considers) full knowledge of x. Therefore proposition (3) of Meno's paradox can be reformulated as: If one lacks full knowledge if x, one cannot inquire into x. PKW Socrates' Principle of the Priority of Knowledge What (PKW) = Socrates in the Meno and in other definitional dialogues shows that he equates knowing something about x to knowing its definition, that is, its essence and its explanatory qualities . Therefore, Socrates accords priority to knowledge of a quality's essence If one accepts my interpretation of the paradox, one also accepts that Socrates' theory of recollection (TOR) more or less solves it. The TOR is premised on the following: (1) the soul is immortal, it dies and another is born and this takes place again and again, (2) the soul has seen everything in the worlds above and below and therefore has acquired knowledge of everything, including 'virtue and other things'. Due to these two premises, Socrates argues that learning is just recollection of things previously known by the soul. The process of recollection of knowledge is dependant on inquiry. This inquiry does not require any knowledge whatsoever (the Socratic interpretation of knowledge as knowing everything), but requires beliefs on the subject*. The distinction between (true) belief and knowledge is neatly explained by Socrates as follows: true belief (ὀρθη δόξη) is just as useful a guide for right action as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) (97c), although knowledge is undoubtedly more valuable (98a). When true belief is not allowed to run away from the soul by being fastened up with an explanatory account/ causal reasoning (αἰτίας λογισμος), it becomes knowledge (98a). Therefore, by the process of recollection which requires using one's true beliefs, one is able to work out an explanatory account through questioning and consequently acquire knowledge on a subject. Indeed, Plato attempts to prove the TOR in his demonstration with the slave-boy. Socrates engages in an elenchus with the slave on a geometrical question. The slave's beliefs enable him to respond to Socrates' questions whether with right or wrong answers and thus cause Socrates to refute or approve of his points. Exposing his ignorance, causes in him 'rational self-reflection and revision of his beliefs' . Therefore, in the elenchus with Socrates, the slave, according to Socrates' argument, is able to retrieve from his soul the knowledge he once had on geometry, through the combination of engaging with his beliefs and thus finding explanatory accounts. By the end of the elenchus, the slave still lacks knowledge but he 'has in himself true beliefs about the things he does not know'2 and if anyone asks him the same questions in different forms, he will be able to answer consistently. WHY THE TOR IS NECESSARY/ USEFUL Having stated the paradox, the TOR and the demonstration 'proving' it, I will firstly explain the parts of the paradox for which the TOR is necessary to solve. 1) IT PROVES THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY = In general, the main argument that the TOR proves is the 'problem of discovery' (as Scott calls it). Meno asks Socrates the following in 80d: (1) how can one look for x - their object of inquiry, when they know absolutely nothing about it (i.e. in Socratic terms, one has no knowledge, but has true beliefs on it)? (2) if the person does stumble upon it, how will they recognize it to be x? Socrates' theory of recollection answers the two fundamental issues raised. (1) is solved by the claim that knowledge is not necessary for inquiry, (true) beliefs are. (2) is solved by the argument that knowledge comes from pre-existent knowledge, therefore it is recovered. By using the combination of beliefs, inquiry and explanatory accounts (as required in the process of recollection), the assumption is that one comes to the understanding that they have correctly recovered relevant knowledge on the said subject. More specifically, the TOR is needed to solve propositions 2 and 3 ((2) If one knows x, one does not need to inquire into x, 3) If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x.) because the distinction drawn between knowledge and 'true' belief, implies a differentiation between full knowledge of a subject (knowledge), no knowledge whatsoever of a subject (lack of knowledge) and a partial grasp of it ('true' belief). It is a false dichotomy that one either knows everything or knows nothing of an object. The antecedent of proposition (3) reveals that one has no knowledge of the definition of x. This does not mean that they have no 'beliefs'. Otherwise proposition 3, if interpreted prima facie is unable to be refuted with logical arguments. The antecedent: if one does not know x, implies one lacks total knowledge and this makes inquiry into the subject difficult, for as Meno logically argues, this total ignorance means that the inquirer struggles to even recognise what they are looking for. How can one even begin to inquire in the absence of any specification of the object of inquiry? Similarly, the second proposition of the paradox relies on a Socratic notion of knowledge as absolute: one either knows everything or nothing. As stated, proposition (2) depends on the understanding of 'if one knows x' as 'if one has full knowledge of x'. Without this, one could interpret the antecedent of (2) as having that partial knowledge of x, in which case, the consequent fails and there is certainly a need for them to inquire into x and achieve greater knowledge of it. REASONS WHY TOR IS NOT NECESSARY TO SOLVE MENO'S PARADOX On the other hand, the notion of recollection itself is not necessary to solve Meno's paradox . Firstly, propositions 2 and 3 can be solved purely on the basis of the TOR arguments regarding knowledge and true belief. There is, therefore, no need for the argument that a priori knowledge is remembered. As Scott puts it, recollection is 'an account of where our cognitive states come from and as such is not necessary to the solution', for one could plausibly have gained a grasp of knowledge from other sources, such as perception and hearsay. In the demonstration with the slave-boy we receive no proof of the recollection argument. The fact that the slave-boy eventually discovers the right answer is not proof of his 'recollection', instead, one could reasonably argue that this is the logical result of the slave-boy's repeated inferences and deductions. Socrates helps him to reach this point: he asks leading questions which encourage him to use reasoning and logic to work them out and at times push him towards the correct answers. - - Secondly, the way in which recollection works proves to be insufficient. If one were to reject the views on knowledge and true belief and take the notion of recollection in isolation, this would be the proposition: if one recollects, unpacked as now knowing a formerly latent thing explicitly, this means that they recollect everything, knowing everything explicitly. Since inquiry requires some partial knowledge, recollecting (full) knowledge raises issues for proposition (3 - If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x.): how can one inquire into something if by recollecting they gain full knowledge of it? Surely, in this case, inquiry is unnecessary . Gail Fine argues that the theory of recollection unnecessary, but it does not by itself actually provide a sufficient response to the dilemma. - BAD For if one has pre-existent knowledge of the definition then there is no reason for inquiry. If one once knew but now lacks the ability to inquire, then the prior knowledge is meaningless because it has no function. IT DOES NOT REPLACE ELENCHUS with an alternative route to knowledge - GOOD The only good thing it offers is an explanation for why inquiry in the absence of knowledge is possible and why, in inquiry, we tend toward the truth. Additionally, one could argue that the TOR is unsatisfactory since it depends on Socrates' requirement of the existence of true beliefs in order for inquiry to take place. As Fine argues, one's ability to distinguish between or recognise which beliefs are 'true' and which are 'false' is not required. Inquiry may still take place, even if the person possesses a mixture of true and false beliefs. However, if the person only possesses 'false' beliefs, this means that they even lack partial knowledge on the subject. Therefore, they will evidently be unable to inquire into the subject and discover its explanatory account. Recollection of prior knowledge is therefore the person of proposition (3) who lacks true beliefs. Not only is recollection itself unnecessary and unsatisfactory, indeed the elenctic method, with the aforementioned Socratic ideas of knowledge and true belief, is capable of solving Meno's paradox. Having allowed the interlocutor to have partial knowledge on a subject (true belief), Socrates' claim that inquiry is possible, even when one lacks complete knowledge on an issue, is vindicated . The questioning involved in Socratic method exposes the flaws in the interlocutors' arguments, reducing them to a state of aporia and (hopefully) instilling in them the desire to investigate further and consequently acquire knowledge on the subject. Therefore, one could argue that it is the process of learning as opposed to recollection that leads to the interlocutor's acquirement of knowledge. In conclusion, I have argued that the TOR, in particular the theory of acquiring knowledge by means of recollection, is not needed to solve Meno's paradox. Instead what is needed is: (1) the interpretation of the paradox that knowledge is absolute, one either knows everything or nothing at all; (2) the distinction between knowledge and true belief; (3) the requisite of true beliefs (i.e. partial knowledge of a subject) for (4) the process of inquiry, that is, the process which enables one to acquire knowledge. Ray conclusion: in conclusion, I do not think that the theory of recollection is necessary to the solution of Meno's paradox. It does not solve the dilemma directly - that role is fulfilled by the elenctic demonstration by Socrates and the slave - but it answers the problem of discovery, which I do believe exists in the dialogue and, though not immediately obvious, requires a solution.

Why is virtue knowledge of the good?

It follows from PE (the claim the human beings only desire what makes them happy) that men who act contrary to their eventual happiness are IGNORANT/ LACKING IN KNOWLEDGE. And so virtue is conceived as knowledge of the good.

The Meno dialogue's place in terms of other Socratic dialogues

It marks a traditional stage between the early dialogues, in which the direct influence of Plato's teacher Socrates, is nor clearly apparent and the middle period dialogues - the Phadeo, Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus, in which Plato puts forward his own distinctive doctrines, most notably the Theory of Forms. The Meno can therefore provide important insights into some at least of the lines of thought that led plato to the views of his middle period,. It also displays a considerable range of style and subject matter: the opening section, following the pattern of an early Socratic dialogue, contrasts with the prophetic tone of the passage introducing the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul, and with the precise detail of the discussion of the geometrical problem.

When does justice come into the argument?

JUSTICE 1 After Socrates' refutation of definition 2, Socrates says that they should have added 'justly and not justly' to the phrase 'ruling over people'. Meno agrees, stating that "justice is virtue." Socrates takes that statement as an opportunity to make a further point about definitions: does Meno mean that justice is virtue or that it is a virtue? THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTANCES OF VIRTUE AND THE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE Again, Socrates says that Meno lists many particular virtues without defining a common feature inherent to virtues which makes them thus. JUSTICE 2 We revisit justice in definition 4 virtue as "the ability to procure good things JUSTLY However this is quickly dismissed because as they agreed earlier on, justice is a virtue and so this amounts to saying that virtue is doing something with virtue. The definition cannot contain the definiens. Here Meno has repeated his earlier mistake of using kinds of virtue to define virtue itself.

Meno's paradox 1) as phrased by Meno 2) as reformulated by Fine

Meno's paradox is made up of three questions: 1) How can you inquire if you don't know what something is? 2) Which of the things which you don't know will you select as your object of inquiry? 3) If you stumble across it, how will you recognise it? MENO'S PARADOX can be reformulated as follows: (1) For any x, one either knows, or does not know, x. (2) If one knows x, one does not need to inquire into x. (3) If one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x. (4) Therefore, whether or not one knows x, one cannot inquire into x. (Based off Gail Fine, p205-6)

77b Meno's third account of virtue

Meno: virtue is the desire for good things and the power to get them. A person is virtuous if they desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.

Belief in the duty of inquiring

Mentions several times Like aporia, this has benefits since it will make men braver and more manly, whereas if they believ

Plato's ethics on virtue based on other dialogues

Plato maintains a virtue-based eudaemonistic conception of ethics. That is to say, happiness or well-being (eudaimonia) is the highest aim of moral thought and conduct, and the virtues (aretê: 'excellence') are the requisite skills and dispositions needed to attain it. The Unity of the Virtues is argued in Plato's Protagoras and Laches - In the Protagoras (329b-333b) Socrates argues for the view that all of the virtues—justice, wisdom, courage, piety, and so forth—are one. UNITY OF VIRTUE(S) In different periods of his writing, Plato argues for different conceptions of the unity of the virtues. He always denies that one can possess one virtue without possessing the others. He first supposes that all virtues are one, since they are identical to knowledge. VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE

aporetic dialogues

Plato's earlier dialogues are called aporetic because the dialogues end in perplexity or aporia though there are pretty clear hints, in some cases at least, of directions in which more satisfactory solutions might be found.

89d-89e Socrates' reservations as to whether virtue is knowledge

SOC: VIRTUE MAY WELL BE TAUGHT, BUT IS IT RLLY A KNOWLEDGE Socrates, however, is less sure. The problem is not with the hypotheses (that is, the statement that virtue is taught - he is ok w this), but rather with the assertion that virtue is knowledge (a stronger proposition than the one that virtue is wisdom "as a whole or in part"). Socrates says that his suspicion lies in the following dilemma: if something as important as virtue can be taught, where are the teachers + learners of it? Socrates claims (as he did at the beginning of the dialogue) that he has never yet found any teachers of virtue. If this is truly the case, it would indicate that virtue in fact cannot be taught.

Meno's paradox - according to Scott + Fine

Scott divides this paradox into two parts, M1 and M2 [M] Then, Socrates, how will you inquire into the thing which you do not know at all what it is? [M1] Placing what of the things which you do not know will you inquire into it? [M2] Or, even if you happened to meet it, how could you know that this is what you did not know? Scott: There are three questions in the paradox, the first two questions belong to M1 ; the last question belongs to M2 . ---------------------------------------------------- 1) for any x, one either knows or does not know x 2) if one knows x, one does not need to inquire into x 3) if one does not know x, one cannot inquire into x 4) therefore, whether one knows x or not, one cannot inquire into x

71d-72a Meno's first account of virtue

Socrates - Then let us pass him (Gorgias) over, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven's name, what is your own account of virtue. 71d Meno's first account of virtue (71e-72a) - A man is virtuous if he can manage public affairs in a way that benefits his friends and harms his enemies, but doesn't harm himself. - A woman is virtuous if she can manage the household well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband. - Meno claims to be able to say similar things about the virtues of old people, children, freemen and slaves. 'for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue'

70a-71d

Socrates answers by reminding Meno that Meno's own countrymen, the Thessalians, have recently gained a reputation for wisdom, due chiefly to the rising fame of Gorgias (a Sophist teacher). Gorgias, Socrates says, has taught people "to give a bold and grand answer to any question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do." Athenians, on the other hand, do not claim to be able to answer such questions, says Socrates, noting that he himself is certainly among the ignorant. We should note that Socrates' modesty here is somewhat false, at least in the context of the dialogue that is to follow. For Socrates (and for Plato), it is much better to know that one does not know than "boldly and grandly" to claim knowledge when one is in fact ignorant. Thus, Socrates' modesty simply sets up Meno, the Thessalians, Gorgias, and the Sophists in general for a fall later on in the elenchus. Socrates adds to his admission of ignorance the statement that he has not yet met anyone who knows what virtue is (though he qualifies this statement with regard to Gorgias, claiming not to remember his meeting with him clearly). This claim astonishes Meno, who moves quickly, at Socrates' behest, to give a definition of virtue.

Problems with the elenchus with the slave (2) - one relating to mathematics being applied to morality - tor being unnecessary - working out, trial + error, self-reflection, logic, progress

Socrates argues that in the elenchus with the slave: The slave has no conscious knowledge of geometry and, through Socrates' questioning, he is able to reach the answer to the problem. By the end of the elenchus, the slave still lacks knowledge but he 'has in himself true beliefs about the things he does not know'2 and if anyone asks him the same questions in different forms, he will be able to answer consistently HOWEVER.... - some would argue that geometry is not a relevant example because it is a closed system of a priori truths (those derived from theoretical deduction), and is therefore not applicable to morality. - Progress is achieved by self-reflection: at each stage the slave resolves a conflict in his beliefs by discarding those which seem less reasonable. Moreover, Socrates describes this mathematical inquiry in a scientific way, by trial and error, and does not rely on a priori truths. What evidence is there of a priori truths be awakened in the slave? Is this not a simple case of working something out, using progress, self-reflection, trial and error?

Protagoras dialogue

Socrates asks why is it that men do harm to themselves, by overeating or overindulging in other pleasures, and asks Protagoras whether his view is the standard one, that these men do so because of pleasure. Protagoras agrees, and Socrates continues by saying that what we call bad is not necessarily unpleasant in the short term, but necessarily so in the long term, like certain foods that cause pleasurable sensations but harm the body in the long run. Socrates then concludes that the only reason why people exchange good for bad, like the pleasant taste of food for sickness that comes by eating it, is because they do not know that the first (the pleasure) is short, while the second (the pain) is long. ERROR IN JUDGEMENT IN ESTIMATING THE SIZES OF DIFF OBJECTS. The error they make is just like one in judging the sizes of different objects when are far away, assuming one is smaller because it's further away. So if men were taught the art of calculating these things correctly, have a more exact knowledge that is, they would not act harmfully (357c-358d). To be "overcome by pleasure" then means just this, ignorance. So, in a way, all virtues are essentially knowledge and can be considered one and the same, more like parts of golden objects (as discussed above) rather than the parts of a face. And that's how the issue of courage can finally be addressed after being cut short by Protagoras only a short time before. Because given that courage is good, as both agree, probably together with their entire culture, than the lack of it must necessarily be a lack of knowledge, and so Protagoras was wrong in saying that some courageous men are also ignorant.

What does Soc do in the Protagoras dialogue

Socrates famously denies the possibility of akrasia.

Socrates' conception of life and death and the gods

Socrates has a moralised understanding of life and death - depends on the kind of life you lived.

Socrates' objection 77b-78b

Socrates points out that some men desire evil and do not recognize it to be evil, thinking it to be good (since no one desires what will harm them). The discussion then turns to the question of accounting for the fact that so many people are mistaken about good and evil and take one for the other. SOCRATES REGARDS 'DESIRES GOOD THINGS' AS A SUPERFLUOUS CONDITION SINCE EVERYONE DESIRES THE GOOD (PE) Socrates Well now, I presume those who, as you say, desire the evil, and consider that the evil harms him who gets it, know that they will be harmed by it? Socrates Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred? Meno I do not suppose there is, Socrates. Socrates No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it? [78b] - 3B THE MEN WHO DESIRE EVIL, KNOWING IT TO BE EVIL AND KNOWING THAT IT WILL HARM THEM (INSTEAD OF BENEFIT THEM) CANNOT DESIRE THE EVIL BECAUSE THE EVIL MAKES MEN MISERABLE AND NO MAN DESIRES FOR HIMSELF TO BE MISERABLE

Gorgias dialogue

Socrates says that tyrants are powerless since they lack the knowledge to understand that they do not truly want to commit the acts which they commit (e.g. killing people, banishing them or confiscating their property)

70a - MENO ASKS SOC HOW VIRTUE IS ACQUIRED. 3 THINGS

TAUGHT, PRACTICE, NATURE Three Hypotheses (70a): Virtue can be taught. One can obtain virtue by way of practice (or habituation). Some can obtain virtue by nature (or in some other way). Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way?

WHY IS THE TOR IS NECESSARY

THE TOR IS NECESSARY because it answers the problem of discovery, which I do believe exists in the dialogue and, though not immediately obvious, requires a solution.

The style and subject matter in the Meno

The Meno displays a considerable range of style and subject matter: the opening section, following the pattern of an early Socratic dialogue, contrasts with the prophetic tone of the passage introducing the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul, and with the precise detail of the discussion of the geometrical problem. It was written during a transitional period - whilst resembling the early period dialogues, it also displays greater depth of thought and developed doctrines, e.g. . Additionally some of the ideas mentioned will later be developed in later dialogues. For example, in the Phaedo which is on the immortality of the soul, the TOR is explained through the Theory of Forms.

The conclusion of the Meno

The apparent conclusion of the Meno is that excellence is not in fact knowledge, since it cannot in practice be taught, and that those who are successful are so as the result of right opinion, not knowledge, and possess this as the result of an inexplicable divine dispensation. However, as in other early Platonic dialogues, all may not in fact be as it seems. 1) firstly, it may be doubted whether the rejection of the possibility of excellence being knowledge and being taught is to be taken at face value. The failure of anyone to teach excellence may show, not that excellence is knowledge at all, but that excellence as commonly conceived is not knowledge, and indeed is not real excellence either. There is also pretty clear hint at the end that there might after all be someone able to teach excellence - Soc or Plato 2) the distinction between both interpretations of the conclusion also lies both in distinctions between two senses of "excellence" and one between two senses of 'teaching': true excellence depends on the sort of moral knowledge that can only be taught by "facilitating" its recollection, while excellence, as popularly understood, not involving understanding of eternal truths, is not the sort of thing that could be recollected. Teaching as ordinarily understood, whether by a sophist or a parent, is therefore the only possibility for the transmission of popular excellence; but as experience shows - and this is where the ostensible conclusion of the dialogue comes in - it cannot in fact be taught. The real answer to Meno's initial inquiry is therefore that excellence is achieved by a combination of nature and teaching. It is natural not in the sense that some men naturally possess it while others not, but in the sense that all men have within themselves the knowledge which constitutes excellence, possessing it however in a form in which needs to be recollected. And the teaching which leads to excellence, too, is not ordinary teaching but that which facilitates the student's own recollection.

What is wrong with initial attempts for a definition? What requirements does Socrates in the Meno make of a definition? Are they defensible?

There are two ways definitions can go wrong: problems with form, and problems with content. Conditions for a Correct Definition DEF 1 1) A definition must not consist of instances/ enumeration of x, Soc wants to know the ultimate essence (ousia) of virtue We want to know what unites all instances of virtue as virtues. Meno gives a list of different virtues for men, women, children, slaves etc. This is far too narrow. Socrates compares this to giving different instances of bees. What we want to know to define "beehood" is what they have in common in virtue of all being bees (likewise with health, strength). TOO NARROW DEF 2 2) A definition must be not too narrow in form but also sound in content. definition 2 (The ability to rule over people) hardly seems appropriate for a child or a slave and therefore is not broad enough as a definition. Socrates further objects that this definition is incomplete, as without justice the ability to rule over people could disintegrate into tyranny [73d]. TOO NARROW DEF 3 has two parts - (1) the desire for beautiful things and (2) having the power to acquire them. 3) A def should not contain superfluous material Meno defines virtue as desiring beautiful (good) things and having the power to acquire them. Socrates argues that everyone always desires good things, even if they are mistaken in what things are actually good (the Principle of Psychological Eudamonism). Thus, desiring good things is a superfluous condition. It is true of everything, so it does not contribute anything important to our conditions. 'the extension of the definens is larger than that of the definiendum' Karasmanis 4) the definiens should not contain the definiendum (78c-79c) Meno, at Socrates prompting, defines virtue as the power of securing good things justly and piously. Justice and piety are virtues, so this amounts to saying that an action is a virtue if it is performed with virtue. This is obviously only helpful if we already know what virtue is; i.e. it is unhelpful as a definition. This lends an unacceptable recursive twist to this definition where virtue is defined as an action performed with a virtue.

Why does Socrates request a definition? Plato's early dialogues can be described as definitional

These were key moral concepts at the time, the virtues of piety, wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. Such an examination challenged the implicit moral beliefs of the interlocutors, bringing out inadequacies and inconsistencies in their beliefs, and usually resulting in aporia. In view of such inadequacies, Socrates himself professed his ignorance, but others still claimed to have knowledge. Socrates believed that his awareness of his ignorance made him wiser than those who, though ignorant, still claimed knowledge. While this belief seems paradoxical at first glance, it in fact allowed Socrates to discover his own errors where others might assume they were correct. This claim was based on a reported Delphic oracular pronouncement that no man was wiser than Socrates. as regards the immortality of the soul = Philosophizing is a way to stop people fearing death. Plato's doctrine of the Primacy of Definitions. Every inquiry about X ought to begin with the question "What is X?" Socrates asked a simple kind of question that revolutionized philosophy: "What is it?" Usually raised about significant moral or aesthetic qualities (e.g., justice, courage, wisdom, temperance, beauty).

Socrates' objection 72a-73c.

This, of course, is not a definition but a list of different kinds of virtue. Socrates points this error out with a metaphor about Meno's "swarm" of virtues being like a swarm of bees. The bees differ in size and shape, but "do not differ from one and other in being bees." In other words, Socrates is after the definitive characteristics of virtue in general, the "form" (eidos) of virtue. This idea of forms, which suggests that there is an ideal, non-physical model for each kind of thing, will eventually play a major role in Plato's dialogues. Here, the term is used sparingly, and Plato seems to be thinking of forms as somehow inherent in each physical thing rather than as separated in some mental or divine realm. 'Socrates And if I went on to say: Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike? You could find me an answer, I presume?' Socrates 'And likewise also with the virtues, however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues, and on which one would of course be wise to keep an eye when one is giving a definitive answer to the question of what virtue really is. [72d] You take my meaning, do you not?' Health + strength are the same in all people, then surely virtue is. (Socrates also uses qualities like health and strength to show Meno that he is asking after the single form common to all kinds of virtue (strength in a man, for example, is the same thing as it is in a woman, regardless of how much of it is present).) He leads Meno towards the idea that virtues are common to all people i.e. both women, men, children and old men need the following virtues: - temperance (sophrosunê- exercising self-control) and - justice (dikê, dikaiosunê- refraining from harming other people)

96e-99b

Thus, despite concluding earlier that virtue is at least partly a kind of wisdom (though not necessarily "knowledge" per se), it would now appear that virtue cannot be taught at all, and therefore that it is not knowledge. This is a disturbing picture of things, since it means that "it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that men succeed in their affairs." At 96e, Socrates proposes another path of inquiry into virtue, suggesting that people might be able to obtain it (VIRTUE) without knowledge or wisdom, which implies that the second and third (original) hypotheses might have more going for them than the inquiry has established thus far. Soc: good men must be useful... and they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct. Soc says that their assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge is a mistake. EXAMPLE AS TO WHY ONE DOES NOT NEED KNOWLEDGE TO GIVE RIGHT GUIDANCE: A GUIDE ON THE ROAD TO LARISSA Socrates gives the example of a guide on the road to Larissa. 1) If a man KNEW THE WAY to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance? yes 2) If a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, could he give right guidance? yes THUS.... whether the guide has knowledge of the way or a true opinion about the way, the result is the same (a successful trip to Larissa). The inquiry takes an epistemological turn: Socrates distinguishes correct opinion (or true belief) from knowledge. 'true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue, [97c] when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion.' 'Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge.' The difference is that knowledge is practically more successful than true opinion: 'he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not.' MENO DOESN'T UNDERSTAND WHY KNOWLEDGE IS MORE PRIZED THAN TRUE OPINION Meno says: 'I wonder, Socrates, [97d] this being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, and why they should be two distinct and separate things.' SOCRATES INTRODUCES THE METAPHOR OF DAEDALUS' SCULPTURE TO EXPLAIN WHY KNOWLEDGE IS MORE PRIZED THAN TRUE OPINION Socrates says that Meno is in wonder because he has not seen the statues of Daedalus. He gives the metaphor of a man who possesses a valuable sculpture by Daedalus. If the statue is "tied down," it is of lasting value. If, however, it is not tied down, it won't last long, like a runaway slave and is therefore of less good. Similarly, true opinions which are 'so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession, [98a] and effect all that is good' are the same in that they "are not willing to remain long, and they run away from a man's soul, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by giving "an account of the reason why" the opinion is true/ or ties them down "with causal reasoning". Such an account allows true opinion to become knowledge through the process of "recollection" discussed earlier, and so to become fixed in the mind. This is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion. Nonetheless, at least in terms of directing actions at given times, true opinion serves as well as knowledge. RECOLLECTION OF KNOWLEDGE = TRUE OPINION TIED DOWN BY CAUSAL REASONING K: Knowledge is true opinion (belief) "tied down" by an account of the reason why (the opinion is true). (98a) JTB: S knows that P if S believes that P; P is true; and S is justified in believing that P is true. Socrates and Meno have concluded both that 1) virtue is not innate - both parties agree that neither knowledge nor true opinion can be innate and instead are acquired MEANING GOOD PEOPLE CANNOT BE GOOD BY NATURE 2) virtue is not teachable - if it were a wisdom, it would be teachable, but because there are no teachers of it (which would mean it could be taught), they conclude that it neither is taught nor is a wisdom. 3) virtue is a good. Something which guides rightly is useful and good. And that there are only two things— true opinion and knowledge—that guide rightly and a man guides rightly if he have these. BUT since virtue is not taught, it is NOT knowledge. Statesmen who were virtuous could not use knowledge to make others have their qualities. Therefore the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states is good opinion...

Socrates' definition of colour

a definition should be given in terms that are clearer than X (75d, 76d) Socrates define shape as that which always follows color Meno complains that this is not helpful because color is no more clear than shape Socrates responds in a mocking way by defining color as "an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived," which Meno claims to understand. The point is that his first definition was in fact much clearer, but this clarity condition is somewhat subjective

Prodicus

a sophist specialised in subtle distinctions between the meaning of words

who is Protagoras?

a sophist who according to Socrates for 40 years - amassed much money by corrupting his classes and sending his pupils away in a worse state than when he took charge of them! - this went unnoticed since he was of high repute till the end of his life - Socrates says he lived till about 70

Motives of Plato's earlier dialogues (mostly written in the 390s BC)

as the others who wrote literary works with Soc as the central figure, his motive was to vindicate him against the charge of corrupting the youth on which he had been condemned. Plato also has a clear interest in dramatic portrayal of characters, patterns of argument and a wrestling with the intellectual problems left by Soc. The key to much of Plato's thought is his desire to assert positive moral standards and the conventional ones that had been called into question.

Plato

born in about 427 BC Much of Plato's thinking in the social and political spheres show a desire to refashion politics, the career he might well have followed, in the mould of the philosophy he had adopted.

Socrates

he recalls the Socrates of the earlier dialogues he is genuinely polite to those he encounters - even to Anytus, his eventual accuser - employing the weapon of irony both in self-disparagement and at those with pretensions to knowledge. Authoritative

The ostensible subject of the Meno is

is the question of HOW a person can come to have excellence and in particular of whether this is something that can be acquired by being taught. The question was a topical one in the late 5th and 4th centuries B.C. notably because of the sophistic movement. These are theatrical texts and so need to be treated with caution as evidence for popular attitudes. The Meno is just as much about the real nature of knowledge, and hence of teaching, as it is about the nature of excellence - indeed for Soc and for Plato the two issues are really inseparable.

Does Socrates violate the presuppositions of the Theory of Recollection?

presupposition = assumption 1 presupposition is that Socrates does not teach. no, he does guide the slave very much - by telling him of the diagonals in being necessary to solve the problem of the length of the side of a square double the original square in area. However he does not literally give him the answer or transmit knowledge.

fronhsis vs episteme

φρόνησis implies a knowledge that is more practical than the more intellectual knowledge ἐπιστήμη