Phil 366

The regress problem

1. a belief can only be justified by another justified belief 2. If all beliefs are inferentially justified (being justified by other beliefs), then either we have an infinite number of beliefs, or circular reasoning is good reasoning 3. but that not true 4. so no beliefs are justified

Justified True Belief (JBT)

JBT= knowledge

Underdetermination

Meaning: P is evidentially underdetermined iff one's evidence does not support P over some competitor, Q.

Reliabilism

a belief is justified to the degree that the process that is responsible for it is reliable. Reliabilism is a form of -Externalism -Non-evidentialism -Non-traditional foundationalism MORE FROM NOTES

An illusion

a non-veridical experience subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience

non-inferentially justified beliefs aka basic beliefs

these are not based on other beliefs- they are reasonable beliefs that are rational

Radical interpretation

to determine both the meanings and beliefs of a being who uses a different language, based solely on the basis of what they assent to.

rule circularity

uses a rule to conclude that they very rule is reliable

Exotic skepticism

-Challenges our epistemic principles. -Thus, in responding to it we cannot appeal to the principles being challenged. -a kind of skeptic who argued that we should not trust inference to the best explanation

The coherence theory of justification

-Davidson accepts this theory

Domestic skepticism

-Does not challenge our epistemic principles. It uses those very principles to argue for skepticism. -Thus, in responding to it we can appeal to our principles. -he deceiver argument is supposed to support domestic

Davidson accept?

-It is not possible that most of one's beliefs are false. -Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. -Sensations or experiences do not justify beliefs - Davidson seems to accept some kind of internalist view of justification.

Isomorphic skeptical hypothesis

-The world is NOT as it appears. -The senses are unreliable and provide an inaccurate picture of reality. -And this is because there is some complex system with the same structure as the world according to RWH that causes us to be systematically deceived.

Egocentric spatial content

-You don't merely see the tree -- you also see it in relation to you - You see how the tree is "epistemically accessible" to you. - Thus it is accessible why you are right. (Brewer holds that the content of experience involves Egocentric spatial content)

The real world hypothesis

-the world is as it appears -the senses are reliable and provide an accurate picture of reality

Coherentism

-they hold there are no basic beliefs or non-inferentially -all beliefs are justified by their relations to other beliefs -All justification is inferential -Experiences do not justify beliefs. -coherentist holds that circularity is not always a bad thing

Mentalism

1st form of internalism (not access) -justifiers = mental states

Gettiers addition to JTB

4. Gettier Condition: needed to turn justified true belief into knowledge

Classical foundationalism and the instrumental model of perceptual knowledge

????? Perception generates knowledge because one's experiences are mental states that are given to one, and one (somehow) knows these states are reliable indicators of the state of the world.

objection to internalism that Vahid discusses?

A. On an internalist view, animals and children could not have knowledge. B. Internalism generates a vicious regress. C. What makes one's reasons good, or bad, is not internal to one's perspective.

ultima facie justification

ALL things considered justified (given everything they have to consider ex. she seeing a bird maybe she took a pill that makes her see a bird-still have prima facia but not ultima

Brewer

Brewer says our basic beliefs are justified by reasons or evidence -we are directly aware of the world, NOT merely our mental representations of it

According to BonJour, how does the coherentist respond to the regress argument?

Chains of justification somehow form a circle.

what will the coherentist say about the role that experiences play in the structure of knowledge? (And by "experiences" here we mean, non-doxastic mental states.)

Experiences merely cause some of our beliefs. That is, they cause but do not justify our beliefs.

What ultimately is Vogel's response to the deceiver argument?

Explanatory considerations give us reason to think that we are not a brain in a vat.

T/F: non-doxastic awareness involves belief

FALSE

True or false: Davidson would accept that some beliefs are non-inferentially justified, or basic

FALSE

True or false: according to the traditional foundationalist, basic or non-inferentially justified beliefs do not need to be supported by evidence

False- they do. they don't need to be supported by other beliefs

Principle of charity

It is a necessary principle that allows us to decide between competing interpretations -Radical interpretation relies on the principle of charity

Why does Vogel reject the Isomoprhic Skeptical Hypothesis (ISH) in favor of the Real World Hypothesis (RWH)?

It is less simple than RWH

The major thesis of Gettier's paper is?

Having a justified true belief is not sufficient for having knowledge

Traditional foundationalism

Hold 1&2 and: 3. We are directly aware of our mental states, and certain truths knowable a priori 4. this direct awareness is non-doxastic (aka. justified by your experience)

the coherence theory of truth

P is true iff P is a member of a maximally coherent set of beliefs

Papineau

Papineau accepts fallibilism does not accept weak access internalism. -Papineau holds that a belief can be justified despite not being based on any evidence

The traditional (or JBT) analysis of knowledge

S knows P iff: 1. S is JUSTIFIED in believing P 2. P is TRUE 3. S BELIEFES P

Gettier counter-examples

Smith is driving through the countryside. He looks out his car window and sees something that looks exactly like a sheep. On the basis of that observation, he concludes that there is a sheep in the field. It turns out that the sheep is in fact a cleverly disguised dog. But there is a sheep in the field, hidden from Smith's view behind a tree.

Externalism

What justifies your belief can be external to your perspective. Consequently, a belief can be justified even if you completely lack any reasons or evidence on its behalf.

Internalism

What makes your belief justified must be things that are internal to your perspective. Specifically, the reasons or evidence that you possess.

According to the foundationalist, the correct solution to the regress problem is that...

Some beliefs are non-inferentially justified or basic

According to Gettier, which of the following is possible?

Someone can fail to know P, and yet justifiably believe P

T/F? Gettier believes one can be justified in believing something false.

TRUE

True or false: according to Brewer a direct perception of the external world might be subjectively indistinguishable from a hallucination.

TRUE

True or false: according to Brewer, what basic beliefs we can have about the world depends upon what concepts we have.

TRUE

True or false: according to Vogel, if theory A involves less empirical regularities than theory B, then he would say that theory A has greater nomological simplicity.

TRUE

True or false: on an internalist view, a belief is justified only if it is supported by reasons or evidence.

TRUE

True or false: the simulation hypothesis can be considered a kind of isomorphic skeptical hypothesis.

TRUE

the minimal skeptical hypothesis

The world is NOT as it appears. The senses are unreliable and provide an inaccurate picture of reality. Embellishment: this deception is caused by something (computer, demon).

Foundationalism proper

This is what all foundationalist accept: 1. Some beliefs are inferentially justified by their relation to other beliefs 2. But some beliefs are non-inferentially justified

Premise circularity

assumes the conclusion as one of its premises

Doxastic conservatism

beliefs are innocent until proven guilty. That is, one's beliefs are presumed true until there is reason to think otherwise.

Inferentially justified beliefs aka non-basic beliefs

beliefs that are inferred- are supported by other beliefs (aka justified by virtue of its relation to other beliefs)

Nomological simplicity/complexity

concerning laws of nature (and the number there of)

Non-doxastic mental states

doesn't involve a state of belief -experiences are non-doxastic mental state ex. a headache

The problem of illusion and the notion of subjective indistinguishability

illusory experiences are in some sense indistinguishable from normal, veridical experience Brewer says in the bad case you are not justified bc you do not have those reasons since you are mistaken

Prima facie

some considersations speak in favor of the beliefs but this may be defended by other considerations ex. jill seeing a bird she is prima facia justified as in things speak in favor of her believing this

weak access internalism

justifiers = accessible facts -one has to have access to good reasons.(appreciate the reason)

Knowledge requires...

knowledge requires belief and must be true

strong access internalism

one has to have access to good reasons, and also to the fact that they are good (appreciate the goodness of the reason)

Epistemic luck

one merely lucks out that ones belief is true -knowledge is incomplete with epistemic luck A Gettier case is a scenario in which someone's belief is true by luck

The deceiver argument

refer to notes, in brief: one cannot know mundane propositions about the external world