Philosophy 101 Exam 2

Problems with agent causation

1.How is it possible that we as selves are like nothing else in the world? 2.Does it even make sense to say that selves themselves can initiate actions out of the blue? 3.Agent causation seems to require substance dualism. We need a self that can bring about changes in the physical world without being itself caused to act by physical causes. If this is what we need, an immaterial self, then libertarianism inherits Descartes's problem.

Modified consequence argument

1.If we have no control over the causes of an effect, then we have no control over that effect. [obvious fact] 2.If causal determinism is true, then our actions are consequences of our conscious thoughts and feelings. [This is a consequence of causal determinism.] 3.Our conscious thoughts and feelings are things we have no control over. [questionable claim] 4.If causal determinism is true, then our actions are the consequence of things we don't have control over. [deductively follows from 2 and 3] 5.If causal determinism is true, then we do not have control over our actions. [deductively follows from 1 and 4] 6.If we have no control over our actions, we lack free will. 7.If causal determinism is true, we lack free will. [deductively follows from 5 and 6 by hypothetical syllogism]

Zombie Argument

1.It is conceivable that there be zombies. 2.If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies. 3.If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is nonphysical. 4.Consciousness is nonphysical.

The interaction argument for materialism

1.Minds and bodies fully interact. 2.If minds and bodies fully interact, then materialism is true. 3.Materialism is true. Everything hangs on premise 2 here. The idea is that materialism is the only view on which genuine mind-brain interaction is possible. The idealist and epiphenomenalist deny it. The substance dualist claims to offer it on his view, but as we saw in Descartes's big problem, it seems impossible for an immaterial mind (not located in space) to interact with a material brain (located in space).

The mind-body problem

1.The human body is a material thing. 2.The human mind is a spiritual thing. 3.Mind and body interact. 4.Spirit and matter do not interact.

Strong AI

A view related to functionalism, though distinct It is the view that, in John Searle's words, "the appropriately programmed digital computer does not just simulate having a mind; it literally has a mind

Example of a hared determinist

Baron d'Holdbach

Libet Studies

Benjamin Libet did studies in a lab that seemed to show that subjects became "aware of their intention to act about 350 to 400 milliseconds after the brain activity that initiated the muscle movement has already happened

Which say we have free will

Compatibilism and Libertarianism

Compatibilist definition of free will

Compatibilists say that free actions are still completely determined to happen by prior causes. What makes an action free is that it has the right kind of prior causes, namely psychological states.

Who offers the zombie argument which is somewhat similar to the conceivability argument that we have from Descartes

David Chalmers

This person thinks that mind and body can interact even though they are metaphysically distinct substances.

Descartes

The mindbody problem

From (1), (2), and (3) we can derive the following. 5.Spirit and matter interact. (4) and (5) contradict each other. So, to avoid having inconsistent beliefs, we must reject (1), (2), (3) or (4). Rejecting (1) leaves us with idealism, the view that everything is spirit or non-matter.

Versions of Incompatibilist

Hard determinism and libertarians

Syntax vs. Semantics

Having the symbols by themselves--just having the syntax—is not sufficient for having the semantics. Merely manipulating symbols is not enough to guarantee knowledge of what they mean" Reply 1: The room as a whole understands Chinese. Reply 2: If the room interacted with the world properly, it could understand Chinese.

Hard Determinism (Incompatibilism)

Implies that free will is not possible as our behaviour is always caused by internal or external events beyond our control.

divisibility argument

Minds have the property of being indivisible. Bodies have the property of being divisible. If x=y, then x and y share all the same properties. [Indiscernibility of identicals] Minds and bodies don't share all the same properties. [from 1 and 2] So, minds and bodies are not identical. [from 3 and 4] Descartes

Path to Libertarianism: Why simple indeterminism fails

It is not enough just to reject causal determinism. The basic reason for this is that we lose control and our actions appear to be random.

Mind and free will

It seems that the views of mind match up with the views of free will. -Substance dualism seems to fit with libertarianism. -Materialism with compatibilism -Epiphenomenalism with hard determinism. Both the mind-body problem and the problem of free will and determinism are difficult. Perhaps getting insight into one can provide insight into the other.

The founder of the mind-body problem?

Keith Campbell

A general problem for materialism

Many of the problems posed for materialism in the history of philosophy appeal to the intuition that mental states do not seem to be material states of the brain

In Descartes's system, there are two distinct types of substances

Mental and Physical

Descartes's big problem

Perhaps the conceivability argument from the book is sound, even if the divisibility argument is not. Or maybe the divisibility argument can be fixed. In either case, Descartes still has problems, for he believes that material bodies interact with immaterial minds.

Hard Determinism

Position of last resort The view that the will of an individual is not free and is instead determined by factors beyond his of her control and/or responsibility and free will is just an illusion.

Objections for divisibility argument

Reject premise 1. Multiple personality disorder or dissociative identity disorder is a condition that suggest that minds can be divisible. Also, split-brain patients (patients who have had their corpus callosum severed) cause problems for premise 1. Descartes's motivates this premise by asking us to introspect, but the cases mentioned suggest that introspection is fallible for some areas of inquiry into the mind.

The Mind:body problem

Rejecting (2) leaves us with materialism, the view that everything is matter

The mind/body problem

Rejecting (3) leaves us with epiphenomenalism, the view that conscious states are non-physical and causally inert.

The mind--body problem

Rejecting (4) leaves us with substance dualism

This is the option that Descartes, a 17th century French philosopher, pursues.

Rejecting premise 4. Subject dualism

who says understanding is necessary for thought

Searle

Compatibilism

The belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.

Responses to the consequence argument

The compatibilist could say that the argument commits the straw man fallacy. It is not that our actions find there immediate causes in the remote past. The immediate causes are conscious psychological states. Free actions are still completely determined but they have the right kind of causes, namely conscious thoughts or states.

free will

The idea that human beings are free to make their own choices

What was the conclusion that Libet drew as a result of his experiments

The intention to perform an action came after the brain unconsciously initiated the action

Substance Dualism

The notion that mind and body consist of two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances. selves are spirits; bodies are material

A reply to the argument interaction argument for materialism

The substance dualist must say something to show that mind-brain interaction is possible even if the mind is immaterial and the brain is material. One idea is that there is a faulty assumption in the mix. It is assumed by many that there must be some sort of causal contact in physical space for the soul to interact with the brain. On this assumption, inter-realm interaction is impossible. However, once we reject this assumption and see that the causation between soul and brain is direct and immediate, then some say that the mystery begins to dissolve.

Knowledge arguments

There is a famous version of this argument for called the Knowledge Argument. Nagel also gives us a version. Here is the form. 1.If materialism is true, then all facts are physical facts. 2.Not all facts are physical facts. 3.So, materialism is not true. In the case of the Knowledge Argument, the thing not known is what it is like to see color. In Nagel's version, the thing not known is what it is like to be a bat.

libet studies.

These studies seem to support the idea of hard determinism and epiphenomenalism. It seems that our unconscious brain causes us to act and gives rise to consciousness, but the consciousness is not really doing anything. This is just what the two views say.

What do the compatibilist and hard determinist agree about

They agree that determinism is true

Mental substances and Physical substances

They each have definitional properties that the other substance cannot possess. Minds are mental substances that have the property of being conscious. No physical body can have this property. Bodies are physical substance that have the property of being extended. No mind or mental substance can have this property.

The Chinese Room

Thought experiment by John Searle which he claimed showed that symbolic computation cannot provide intelligence, because it does not understand Searle asks us to imagine a room in which one has a rulebook for how to manipulate symbols so that you are able to answer questions in Chinese. You can use the rulebook to pass the Turing Test. And you would be instantiating a program. But, Searle thinks that you would not understand Chinese. You would not be thinking in Chinese, so passing the Turing Test is not sufficient for thought, and Strong AI is false.

Control and libertarianism

What if we ourselves, as agents independent of our psychological states, cause our actions? The idea is that our psychological states influence us to do things, but ultimately we as agents or selves are the sole causes of our actions. That's a kind of complete and total control and it makes for a robust notion of free will. It also means that causal determinism is false, because not all events are caused by prior events. Some—namely free actions—are caused by agents and not events.

Libetarianism

lib-agents cause events c.d.-only events cause events no agent is an event so, lib rejects c.d.

Which theory appeals to the notion of agent causation?

libertarianism

appeals to agent causation

libertarians

Materialism.

a view that rejects premise 2. the identity theory is a common version of materialism. It says that conscious states are nothing over and above brain states. The two things (what we experience and the material states of our brains) are really one and the same.

Richard Taylor on the insufficiency of compatibilism

agent causation

what are the causes for our actions according to libertarians

agents

Libertarians

agents/selves/persons/are the sole causes of free actions

Consequence argument

an argument against compatibilism and an argument for incompatibilism if causal determinism is true, then the causes of our actions are things outside of our control. If that's true, then we lack control over our actions. If we lack control, we lack free will.

Searle says understanding is

attaching meaning to symbols

Agent causation

beings that are sometimes the causes of their own behavior. In the case of an action that is free, it must not only be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but also such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for his performing just that action. In the case of an action that is both free and rational, it must be such that the agent who performed it did so for some reason, but this reason cannot have been the cause of it

The turing test

can you distinguish between a person and a computer pretending to be a person passing is sufficient for thought

compatibilists are always

causal determinists

Chalmers says that zombies are

conceivable

Problem with compatibilism

lose control over our psychological states if c.d. is true

epiphenominism

consciousness doesn't cause behavior/consciousness distinct from brain

Who argues that it is conceivable and therefore logically possible for the mind to exist without the body

descartes

Who endorses the conceivability argument

descartes

Which of the following claims does the libertarian reject

determinism, the view that all events are determined by prior causes and the laws of nature

which of the following do the libet studies support

epiphenominalism and hard determinism

what do compatibilist and hard determinalist agree on

event causation

Materialism

everything is at bottom material, including consciousness

Knowledge arguments are arguments that support the identity theory.

false

Libertarians accept determinism

false

Psychological states cause actions for libertarianism

false

True or false libertarians is caused by psychological states

false

Richard Taylor says

for agent causation; agents or people originate them, initiate them, or simply that they perform them

what do compatibilist and libertarians agree on

free will in some sense

Which theory appeals to multiple realizability as a core doctrine

functionalism

issues with strong ai

hard to mimic human thoughts bc of emotions ai is giving computers common sense

Causal determinism

has the consequence that we are not responsible for our actions because they are caused by events outside of our control. every event, including, human actions, are determined by prior causes and the laws of nature

J.J.C. Smart endorses which view of the mind

identity theory

The theory that says mental states are nothing but brain states is known as

identity theory

Hypothetical syllogism

if p then q if q then r therefore if p then r

Descartes' big problem

immaterial minds and material minds interact

Searle says that syntax is

not sufficient for semantics

what are the causes of our actions according to compatibilist

psychological states

free actions for a compatibilist

psychological states and not agents themselves

compatibilism

psychological states are both causes and reasons

Libertarianism

psychological states are reasons and persons are causes, we get complete control and no random actions. actions are done for reasons by people

2 types of materialism

reductive and non-reductive

According the Searle, what is needed for understanding

sematics

The view that we consist of two distinct substances (body and mind) and that these two interact is known as

substance dualism

d'Holbach suggest

that man is a merely physical entity.

Functionalism

the mind's essence is not to be found in the kind of stuff that makes it up. The essence of mental states is found by looking at the function they perform for the organism. In the functionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of (living cells, mental or spiritual energy) but on how the stuff is put together

Responding to knowledge arguments

they target a version of materialism that holds that all facts are ultimately physical facts or reducible to physical facts.

Baron d'Holbach is a hard determinist.

true

Hard determinists are incompatibilists

true

Some philosophers argue against the identity theory using conceivability arguments

true

Substance dualism disagrees with identity theory

true

litbet

unconscious brain state

The consequence argument is offered by

van Inwagen

What do hard determinists and libertarians agree on

we cant have both(compatibilism fails)

problem with hard determinism

we have to give up free will and all that comes with that