PSC 319 Midterm (Cases)

Lemon test

- *establishment cases* -secular purpose? -primarily promoting or inhibiting religion? -excessive government entanglement?

O'Brien Test

-*freedom of expression* -within the constitutional power -furthers substantial government interest -interest unrelated to suppression of expression -least restrictive means (not being extra)

Marbury v. Madison

--Facts: Marbury was midnight appointment. President Adams and the Federalist-controlled congress created new circuit and district courts and then tried to staff them. Several of the commissions were not delivered by secretary of the state john marshall-including the appointment for william marbury. When jefferson came into office he told james madison (the new secretary of state) not to deliver these commissions. As a result, marbury appealed directly to the US supreme court asking the justices for a writ of mandamus telling madison to deliver commissions. -issue: does the Supreme court have the power to issue a writ of mandamus in order for an appointed judge to secure his commission? -Rule: there is no specific authority in the Constitution giving the supreme court the power of judicial review -original jurisdiction is set by the constitution (and only the constitution) -Analysis: -Marbury has the right to his commission because the only requirement is the presidential seal. Because President Adams affixed his seal to Marbury's appointment he is entitled to it. For the current administration to deny the commission would violate his rights -Marbury brought this case to the court under its original jurisdiction, citing section 13 of the judiciary act of 1789 which added writs of mandamus to the court's original jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction, however, is set by article 3 of the constitution and it does not include writs of mandamus. Any law contrary to the constitution is void and because this act is contrary to article 3 it is void and unconstitutional -court claims a power by striking down a power -strike down judicial act so they can hear all cases -first time the court struck down a law because it was unconstitutional

United States v carolene products

-Facts: 1923 Congress passed an act banning interstate shipment of "filled milk" Carolene Products was a milk producing company. Indicted under this act. Trial court dismissed indictment Appealed to the federal government Carolene Products argued law did not have a rational basis and oleomargarine was not regulated in interstate commerce -Issue: Does the law violate the Commerce Power granted to Congress in Article Section 8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? -Rule: "The Court would assume a special responsibility for protecting civil rights and civil liberties and be particularly vigilant in guarding the rights of minorities and the politically unpopular" (Epstein and Walker, p. 194) -Analysis: "Congress may restrict shipments of certain milk substitutes without also restricting butter" (oyez.org) "Congress had held many hearings prior to passing this law" (oyez.com), Congress thought it was for the good of the people Carolene Products didn't prove that a rational basis didn't exist for the Act. -Conclusion: The Court upheld the Act.

Sherbert v. Verner

-Facts: Adell sherbert=spool tender in a Spartanburg, South Carolina textile mill Option of working Saturdays but chose not to Member of 7th day Adventist church=no work could be performed between sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday (Saturday was her church's sabbath) June 5 1959 employer informed her starting the next day work on saturdays would no longer be voluntary Sherbert did not work six successive saturdays, fired on July 27 Sherbert field for state unemployment benefits A claimant who is eligible must be able to work and available for work. Ineligible if they have failed without good cause to accept available suitable work when offered Sherbert was turned down on the ground that she failed without good cause to accept suitable work when offered (religious preference was insufficient justification) Filed suit in South Carolina state court, ruled in favor of employment office, state Supreme Court affirmed, asked US Supreme Court to review -Issue: Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? -Rule: The door of the free exercise clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such-cantwell v. Connecticut Even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions it is not totally free from legislative restrictions-braunfeld v. Brown The conduct of actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order- Reynolds v United States, prince v. Massachusetts -Analysis: Whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion-we think it is clear that it does Law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect-braunfeld v. Brown Same kind of burden upon the free exercise as would a fine imposed against appellant No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case (only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation) Appellees suggest no more than a possibility Incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing 1st amendment rights No such justifications underlie the determination of the state court that appellants religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits -Conclusion: the judgement of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed and case is remanded. -Justice Douglass concurring: the interference here is as plain as it is in soviet Russia where a church goer is given a 2nd class citizenship resulting in harm though perhaps not in measurable damages. The harm is the interference with the individuals scruples or conscience-and important area of privacy which the 1st amendment fenced off from government. -Justice Stewart concurring: Cannot agree today's decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld v. Brown Impact is considerably less onerous (in the sherbert case) We deal not with a criminal statute At the worst could be denied a max of 22 wks of compensation payment Think the braunfeld case was wrongly decided and should be overruled Justice Harlan and justice white dissenting: Constitutionally compelling states to carve out an exception and to provide benefits for those whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions The decision necessarily overruled braunfeld v brown Secular purpose of the statute even clearer than that involved in braunfeld Indirect financial burden of the present law is far less than that involved in braunfeld Dealing only with temp benefits State must furnish unemployment benefits to one who is unavailable for work is the unavailability stems from the exercise of religious convictions Even tho it denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior is not religiously motivated Particularly inappropriate in light of the indirect remote and insubstantial effect of the decision below on the exercise of appellants religion be in light of the direct financial assistance to religion that today's decision requires

Palko v. Connecticut

-Facts: Argued November 12, 1937. Decided December 6, 1937. Frank Palka robbed a store, then shot and killed two police officers. He confessed to the killings. A Connecticut judge refused to admit the confession. Palka was found guilty of second degree murder which meand a mandatory life sentence. State prosecutors appealed to Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors which reversed the trial judge's exclusion of Palka's confession and ordered that there be a new trial. Palka's attorney argued that the Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy, but Palko was still tried and convicted again. This time he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. When an appeal to the Connecticut high court failed, Palko turned to the Supreme Court -Issue: does the 5th amendment's protection against double jeopardy apply to the states through the guarantee of due process? -Rule: to be incorporated rights must be "fundamental and inalienable"-twinning -Analysis: there is no general rule that whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights is now equally unlawful by force of the 14th amendment if done by a state. Fundamental to concept of due process is a fair trial and includes all proper facts. Does it violate "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions? The answer must be no" -Conclusion: protection against double jeopardy is not incorporated

Barron v Baltimore

-Facts: Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down.Barron wanted the city to pay for the dredging of the Baltimore harbor due to an accumulation of sand and silt from construction but it did not do so. Barron alleged that the accumulation ruined his business since the harbor became too shallow for ships to come into port. Barron sued city asking for compensation for the taking of his private property -Issue: does the takings clause of the 5th Amendment apply to the states? -Rule: plain meaning of the constitution is key -Analysis: the constitution was ordained and established by the people of the US for themselves for their own gvt. The pwrs of the gvt and the limits on it are naturally applicable to the gvt. 5th amendment must be understood as restraining the pwrs of the general gvt not applicable to the state -Conclusion: 5th amendment only applicable to the general government. States never applied limits themselves

Duncan v. Louisiana

-Facts: Gary Duncan sees his two younger cousins with four white youths. Duncan pulls over. A dispute occurs. The white youths say Duncan slapped Herman M. Landry Jr. Duncan claims he only "touched" Landry. PE Lanthum witnesses the altercation and calls the police, alleging Duncan hit Landry. The police question Duncan and let him go. A few days later they arrested him on the charge of cruelty to juveniles. Duncan's lawyer asserted that Louisiana law permitted "cruelty to juveniles" only against an individual having supervision over the juveniles. Landry's mother asked police to rearrest Duncan with charges of simple battery which could result in a maximum sentence of two years in jail and a three hundred dollar fine. Duncan's attorney requested that Duncan be tried by jury, but this request was refused. The judge cited Louisiana Constitutional law which grants jury trials only in cases involving punishments of hard labor or death. Duncan was then tried without a jury and found guilty. He was sentenced with sixty days in jail and a fine of one hundred and fifty dollars. Duncan filed an unsuccessful appeal to the state supreme court. He then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court -Issue: is the right to a jury trial in the 6th amendment for non capital cases incorporated to the states via the 14th amendment? -Rule: fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil... The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees a right of trial by jury in all criminal cases. The right to a trial by jury in criminal cases can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The Declaration of Independence objects to "depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury". The sixth amendment provides for a trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. Constitutions of many states protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases. Maxwell v. Dow and Palko v. Connecticut dealt with similar issues but none dealt with a state which had dispensed entirely with a jury trial in serious criminal cases. -Analysis: The Constitution was violated when Duncan's demand for jury trial was refused. Trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to American scheme of justice. Right of trial by jury in serious criminal cases qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Juries do understand evidence and come to sound conclusions in most cases presented to them. -Conclusion: Reversed and remanded, in favor of Duncan.

Wisconsin v Yoder

-Facts: Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs Wisconsin Supreme Court holding that respondents' convictions of violating the State's compulsory school attendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment fined the sum of $5 each -Issue: Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons? -Rule: Pierce v. Society of Sisters: "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. (Pierce) Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education in church-operated schools A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, -Analysis: individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion, an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious concepts. Exposes to things like competition which goes against religious values but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different. There is nothing in the record or in the ordinary course of human experience to suggest that non-Amish parents generally consult with children of ages 14-16 if they are placed in a church school of the parents' faith -Conclusion: affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr Justice Stewart whom mr justice Brennan joins concurring: the Court today rightly holds that Wisconsin cannot constitutionally do so. (Brand parents criminals for following religious beliefs) there is no suggestion whatever in the record that the religious beliefs of the children here concerned differ in any way from those of their parents MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring cannot say that the State's interest in requiring two more years of compulsory education in the ninth and tenth grades outweighs the importance of the concededly sincere Amish religious practice to the survival of that sect. I am unable to say that the State has demonstrated that Amish children who leave school in the eighth grade will be intellectually stultified or unable to acquire new academic skills later MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissenting in part. disagree with the Court's conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone. the parents are seeking to vindicate not only their own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age children As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation that his rights should be considered I must dissent, therefore, as to respondents Adin Yutzy and Wallace Miller, as their motion to dismiss also raised the question of their children's religious liberty. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, we dealt with 13-year-old, 15-year-old, and 16-year-old students who wore armbands to public schools and were disciplined for doing so. We gave them relief, saying that their First Amendment rights had been abridged. In Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, we held that school children whose religious beliefs collided with a school rule requiring them to salute the flag could not be required to do so. It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision A significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

-Facts: The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message. -issue: does the 1st amendment right to association allow the Boy Scouts of America to forbid membership to homosexuals? -rule: organizations have a right to associate with individuals that they wish to associate with (Hurley) -analysis: we must first determine if the group engages in expressive association, then whether the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect BSA's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. group does not have to associate with the purpose of disseminating a certain message to be entitled to 1st amendment protection. does not require every member of a group to agree on every issue to engage in expressive association. -conclusion: 1st Amendment right to association allows BSA to forbid membership to homosexuals

Agostini v Felton

-Facts: This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. -Issue: Is the Establishment Clause violated when public school teachers instruct in parochial schools? -Rule: Angular v. Felton -Analysis: The New York program under which public school teachers were sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive, financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause. As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion. -Conclusion: No. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-sponsored religion. -public teachers to outside of parochial schools and provide services=not excessive entanglement

Brandenburg

-Imminent Lawless action -can't kill everyone not of your faith and claim free exercise

Cohen v. California

-facts: A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "**** THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail. -issue:Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "**** the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).

Edwards v. Aguillard

-facts: A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well -issue:Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science" along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.

Everton v. Board of Education (1947)

-facts: A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds. -issue:Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school. Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissented

Braunfeld v. Brown

-facts: Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law. -issue: Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs? -Analysis/Conclusion:In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council

-facts: Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review. -issue:Is a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices by licensed pharmacists a violation of "commercial speech" under the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.

Branzburg v. Hayes

-facts: After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. -issue: Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment? -Analysis/Conclusion: No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

United States v Miller

-facts: An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. -issue:Does the Second Amendment protect an individual's right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds reasoned that because possessing a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.

Morse v. Frederick

-facts: At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful .-issue:1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at school-supervised events? 2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised event? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote, ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. The majority held that Frederick's message, though "cryptic," was reasonably interpreted as promoting marijuana use - equivalent to "[Take] bong hits" or "bong hits [are a good thing]." In ruling for Morse, the Court affirmed that the speech rights of public school students are not as extensive as those adults normally enjoy, and that the highly protective standard set by Tinker would not always be applied. In concurring opinions, Justice Thomas expressed his view that the right to free speech does not apply to students and his wish to see Tinker overturned altogether, while Justice Alito stressed that the decision applied only to pro-drug messages and not to broader political speech. The dissent conceded that the principal should have had immunity from the lawsuit, but argued that the majority opinion was "[...] deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate, even among high-school students [...]."

Lemon v. Kurtzman

-facts: Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island's statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers' annual salaries. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials' motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment. -issue:Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to "an intimate and continuing relationship" between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.

Whitney v California

-facts: Charlotte Anita Whitney, a founding member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for helping to organize a group that sought to effect economic and political change through the unlawful use of violence. Whitney argued that she had not intended the organization to act this way and did not plan to aid it in those objectives. She claimed the California law violated the First Amendment. -issue:Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court held that the state, in exercise of its police power, can punish those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other words, words with a "bad tendency" can be punished.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC

-facts: Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her. Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply. -issue:Does the ministerial exception, which prohibits most employment-related lawsuits against religious organizations by employees performing religious functions, apply to a teacher at a religious elementary school who teaches the full secular curriculum, but also teaches daily religion classes, is a commissioned minister, and regularly leads students in prayer and worship? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act's ministerial exception, dismissing Perich's suit and her claims for damages. Chief Justice Roberts described the history of the "ministerial exception", established by courts to prevent state interference with the governance of churches, a violation of the First Amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. He rejected the EEOC and Perich's argument that these clauses of the First Amendment are irrelevant to Hosanna-Tabor's right to choose its ministers. Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Perich indeed functioned as a minister in her role at Hosanna-Tabor, in part because Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister with a role distinct from that of its lay teachers. He also noted that Perich held herself to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Perich performed secular duties in her position and that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as Perich, but reasoned that Perich's status as a commissioned minister outweighed these secular aspects of her job. He also rejected the EEOC and Perich's suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor's religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual, explaining that the purpose of the ministerial exception is not limited to hiring and firing decisions made for religious reasons.

United States v Obrien

-facts: David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. -issue:Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."

Schenck v. United States

-facts: During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment. -issue:Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress' wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the "clear and present danger test," Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.

Ramos v. Louisiana

-facts: Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana's non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Ramos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. -issue:Does the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict against the states? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:

Walz v. Tax Commission

-facts: Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches -issue:Did the property tax exemptions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."

Goldman v. Weinberger

-facts: Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties." -issue:Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.

West Virginia v. Barnette

-facts: In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency. -issue:Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity.

Texas v. Johnson

-facts: In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. -issue:Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Hurley v Irish American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group of Boston

-facts: In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech. -issue:Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? -rule: -analysis: conclusion:Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech subordinate to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

McCullen v. Coakley

-facts: In 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in "pro-life counseling" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics. -issue:1. Did the First Circuit err in upholding the Massachusetts law under the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. If the Supreme Court's ruling in Hill v. Colorado applies, should that ruling be limited or overruled? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

-facts: In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA. The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling. -issue:Does the application of Colorado's public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about same-sex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.

Near v. Minnesota

-facts: In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court. -issue:Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.

Lee v. Weisman

-facts: In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari -issue:Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona

-facts: In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees. -issue: may lawyers constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed? -rule: commercial is not pure speech, but it is given broad protection -analysis: postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of professionalism is severely strained, other professionals advertise. not persuaded that advertising will be misleading. -conclusion: lawyers may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed -dissent: Rehnquist: 1st Amendment speech provision demeaned by invocation to protect advertisements of goods and services

New York Times v. US

-facts: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. -issue:Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn

-facts: Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims. -issue:Did the Georgia law violate the freedom of the press as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

-facts: Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. -issue:Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice."

United States v Alvarez

-facts: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal. -issue:Does 18 U.S.C. 704(b), the Stolen Valor Act, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper

Wisconsin v. Mitchell

-facts: On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. -issue:Did the increase in Mitchell's sentence based on his bigoted motives violate his First Amendment rights? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

-facts: On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "a ********ed racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague.-issue:Did Chaplinsky's conviction violate the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinsky's conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." He found that Chaplinsky's insults were "fighting words" since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.

Espinoza v Montana Department of Revenue

-facts: Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule ("Rule 1") prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits "direct or indirect" public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs. Espinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court -issue:Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:

Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe

-facts: Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech. -issue:Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

District of Columbia v. Heller

-facts: Provisions of the District of Columbia Code made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns, though the chief of police could issue one-year licenses for handguns. The Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered firearms to keep them unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or other similar device unless the firearms were located in a place of business or being used for legal recreational activities. Dick Anthony Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. Heller sued the District of Columbia. He sought an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code and argued that they violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The district court dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and the District of Columbia's requirement that firearms kept in the home be nonfunctional violated that right. -issue:Do the provisions of the District of Columbia Code that restrict the licensing of handguns and require licensed firearms kept in the home to be kept nonfunctional violate the Second Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:The ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violate the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the first clause of the Second Amendment that references a "militia" is a prefatory clause that does not limit the operative clause of the Amendment. Additionally, the term "militia" should not be confined to those serving in the military, because at the time the term referred to all able-bodied men who were capable of being called to such service. To read the Amendment as limiting the right to bear arms only to those in a governed military force would be to create exactly the type of state-sponsored force against which the Amendment was meant to protect people. Because the text of the Amendment should be read in the manner that gives greatest effect to the plain meaning it would have had at the time it was written, the operative clause should be read to "guarantee an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." This reading is also in line with legal writing of the time and subsequent scholarship. Therefore, banning handguns, an entire class of arms that is commonly used for protection purposes, and prohibiting firearms from being kept functional in the home, the area traditionally in need of protection, violates the Second Amendment.

Dennis v United States

-facts: Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board. -issue:Does the indictment charge a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government consistent with 18 U.S.C. 371? 2. Is section 9(h) of the Taft- Hartley Act a bill of attainder in violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution? 3. Did the trial court err in denying the defense's request for access to grand jury testimony of prosecution witnesses or in camera inspection of the testimony? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes, not addressed, and yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 371. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Abe Fortas, argued that the conspiracy of filing the false affidavits was intentional and that the events of filing the affidavits and using the NLRB facilities together were a "concert of action" with the purpose of defrauding the Government. The Court refused to hear the question of the constitutionality of 9(h) as the union officers' attempt was to circumvent the law. The relevant standard, according to Fortas, is that the Court will not hear a constitutionality claim to supplant a "voluntary, deliberate, and calculated course of fraud and deceit," as conspiracy to defraud is not an appropriate way to challenge acts of government. The Court also held that the defense should have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes containing the prosecution witnesses' testimonies with an opportunity to question the witnesses regarding their statements. The majority opinion maintained that the union officers exceeded the particularized need standard that is used to evaluate access to grand jury testimony, and thus access should have been granted to the defense, especially as an evaluation is best made by a defense advocate and not a trial judge during in-camera inspection. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo L. Black joined this part of the majority opinion but dissented from the remainder. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Rosenburger v. University of Virginia

-facts: Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines. -issue:Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

-facts: Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. -issue:Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."

City of Borne v. Flores

-facts: The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari. -issue:Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?-rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah

-facts: The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities. -issue:Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

-facts: The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy. -issue:Did the Act violate the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. The unanimous Court held that "the fundamental liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."

Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission

-facts: The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged. -issue:Do the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations, concerning personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum scarcity made it "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment. With respect to the regulation of personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates, the FCC's requirement that the subject of the attack be provided with a tape, transcript, or broadcast summary, as well as an opportunity to respond without having to prove an inability to pay for the "air-time," insured a balanced and open discussion of contested issues. The requirement that political editorializing be presented for and against both sides of the debated issues also contributed to the balanced discussion of public concerns.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores

-facts: The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. -issue: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? -analysis/conclusion: Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears. In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the requirement violates the RFRA. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Additionally, judicial precedent states that religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties, as the sought-after exemption would do to women seeking contraception in this case. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the majority opinion misconstrued the RFRA as a bold legislative statement with sweeping consequences. Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden the respondents claim is not substantial, and the government has shown a sufficiently compelling interest, Justice Ginsburg argued that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. In their separate dissent, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan wrote that the Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

-facts: The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute. -issue:Does the First Amendment protect the rights of corporations to attempt to influence the outcome of elections in which they have no direct monetary interest? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the right to attempt to influence the outcomes of elections is one of the primary rights the First Amendment was meant to protect. If this form of speech came from a person rather than a corporation, there would be no question about whether it was protected speech. The Court also held that its previous decisions regarding the First Amendment rights of corporations emphasized the role that such speech played in creating public discussion.

Central Hudson v. PSC of New York

-facts: The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals. -issue:does the PSC regulation on ads violate the 1st amendment and 14th amendment bc it completely bans promotional ads by electrical utility? -rule: commercial speech does not equal pure speech but is given broad protection -analysis:energy conservation and that rates be fair and efficient=both are substantial interests. such conditional and remote eventualities put forth by the state simply cannot justify governing appellant's promotional advertising arguments for the interest and do not justify restriction on protected speech -conclusion: ban is unconstitutional

Rumsfeld v. FAIR

-facts: The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds. -issue:Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier

-facts: The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court. -issue:Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Lynch v. Donnelly

-facts: The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket. -issue:Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."

Snyder v Phelps

-facts: The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words." -issue:Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Tilton v. Richardson

-facts: The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose. -issue:Did the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.

Town of Greece v. Galloway

-facts: The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers. -issue:Does the invocation of prayer at a legislative session violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment even in the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers and content? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion.

Van Orden v. Perry

-facts: Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. -issue:Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith

-facts: Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture -issue:Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.

Tinker v. Des Moines

-facts: a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest. Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion. -issue:Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students' freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? -rule: -analysis: -conclusion:Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.

Branzburg v. Hayes

Branzburg wrote 2 articles about individuals in the drug trade. 1st focused on 2 individuals who synthesized from marijuana. 2nd contained interviews with drug users in KY. Branzburg subpoenaed by a grand jury to answer questions concerning the identity of the individuals. he refused

Reynolds v. US

Court ruled that one cannot use religion as a defense to the crime of polygamy. Court ruled that religious practices that impair the public interest do not fall under the First Amendment.

freedom of assembly

DeJonge v. Oregon

Abington Township v. Schempp

Facts of the case Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself. The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state. Issue: does the reading of the Bible and the Lord's Prayer public violate the Establishment clause of the 1st Amendment? Rule: Separationist (Engel v. Vitale) Analysis: said neither state nor federal government can set up a church. neither can pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one religion over another, the test is whether there is a secular legislative purpose for a law, and whether the primary effect of the law advances or inhibits religion. Conclusion: reading of Bible and Lord's prayer in public school violates the Establishment clause

Abrams v. United States

Facts: Abrams and others professed revolutionary, anarchist, or socialist political views. they had published and distributed leaflets which criticized President Wilson's sending of troops into Russia and calling for a general strike to end that policy. charged with intent to cripple or hinder the US in the persecution of the war Issue: Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? rule: clear and present danger test (Schenck) Analysis: the avowed purpose of the leaflets was to throw the country into state of revolution and thereby frustrated the military program of the government. men must be held accountable for the effects of their intentions were likely to produce -Conclusion: Abrams right to free speech not violated

Brandenburg v. Ohio

Facts: Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." -issue: Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? -Analysis/ Conclusion: The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Hurtado v California

Facts: Hurtado shot/killed his wife's lover. While defendants often faced a grand jury to determine if there was enough evidence for a trial, California allowed prosecutors to use an information to initiate a trial rather than a grand jury. Method was used to bring Hurtado to trial and he was found guilty of murder Issue: does an individual accused of a capital crime have a right to a grand jury in state court under the 5th amendment? Rule: the P & I clause will not be used to nationalize the bill of rights-Slaughterhouse cases. Plain meaning is key-Barron Analysis: because due process is included in the 5th amendment, it could not be equivalent to the entire bill of rights. Indeed because it is contained in the 5th amendment, it applies only to this amendment. Inclusion of the term due process in the 14th amendment cannot mean that it incorporates all of the bill of rights Conclusion: an individual accused of capital crime doesn't have right to grand jury in state court

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier

Facts: planned to publish articles on teen pregnancy and divorce. principal said readers would be able to identify the students. would not allow publication, student staff challenged as censorship

freedom of speech

Gitlow v. New York

freedom of the press

Near v. Minnesota

Cantwell v. Connecticut

Newton Cantwell and his sons, members of Jehovah's Witnesses Playing records, soliciting contributions, distributing pamphlets to citizens house to house New Haven, Connecticut Area was mostly Catholic 2 passerby took offense and complained Police arrested the Cantwells (the next day) for violating a state law prohibiting individuals from "soliciting money for any cause" without a license Law required solicitors to obtain a "certificate of approval" from the state;s secretary of the Public welfare Council (charged the official with determining if the cause was religious or bona fide object of charity, if neither he could withhold certificate) Unsuccessfully fought charges in lower courts, Cantwells appealed to the US supreme court Issue: Whether the 1st amendment's free exercise clause should be incorporated and made applicable to the states through the 14th amendment If yes, then if the Connecticut solicitation license policy violated the Cantwell's rights Rule: A state may by general and nondiscriminatory legislation regulate the times, places, and manner of soliciting upon its streets .., in other respects safeguard the peace, good order, and comfort of the community without unconstitutionally invading liberties protected by the 14th amendment-snyder v. phelps, mccullen v. coakley The first amendment= congress shall make no law respecting a establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 14th amendment= rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws Analysis: The statute deprives appellants of their liberty without due process of law Constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion: forstalls compulsion by law the acceptance of any creed/practice of any form of worship. Safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion The Amendment embraces 2 concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to act Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society Power to regulate must be so exercised as not unduly to infringe the protected freedom The Act requires an application to the secretary of public welfare council of the state Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by 1st amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the 14th A state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation State is free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience Conclusion: the judgement affirming the convictions is reversed. Reversed and remanded.

New York Times case

Pentagon papers. still can't stop the publishing

Gitlow v. New York

Ruled against Gitlow but incorporated free speech 1st meaningful step toward selective incorporation bc the court made specific provisions of the bill of rights applicable to states

Twining v. New Jersey

Some provisions of the bill of rights might be protected from state abridgement through the due process clause of the 14th amendment Liberties included in due process are "fundamental and inalienable" No complete incorporation-the court will only do so selectively. However the right against self incrimination did not need to be protected against state action

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad v. Chicago

Substance, not form, is important when it comes to determining due process If just compensation is essential for due process as ordained by the 14th amendment then a state must abide by the meaning of that amendment. Just compensation is a VITAL PRINCIPLE of republican institutions 1st supreme court case to incorporate an amendment of bill of rights and apply to state/local gvt

Slaughterhouse Cases

The court gutted the privileges or immunities clause The court would NEVER use the privileges/immunities clause to nationalize the bill of rights This led to the dispute in Hurtado v. California (1884)

Maxwell v. Dow (1900)

This case involved whether for a non capital case juries could have fewer than 12 members and not allow the accused to face a grand jury Maxwell wanted both rights incorporated under both the due process and privileges/ immunities clauses of the 14th amendment Also aksed the court to rectify the contradiction from the previous 2 cases The court refused to do so and basically ignored the incorporation issue

courts are loathe to

allow freedom of speech restrictions unless certain things are true

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier

analysis: students cannot be punished for merely expressing their personal views on school premises unless school administrators have reason to believe that the expression will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or infringe on the rights of other students". the articles in question are part of school curriculum and the educators are entitled to exercise greater control over such activities to make sure that students learn the lesson being taught conclusion: educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school publication produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum

Quincy Railways v Chicago

by using the 14th amendment to apply part of the bill of rights to a state action, the court opened the door for similar protection of the other provisions

Miami Herald v. Tornillo

can't mandate responsible journalism (newspapers)

free exercise

cantwell v connecticut

Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC

does the fairness doctrine violate 1st amendment? rule: electronic media is different than print media

Branzburg v. Hayes

does the requiring reporters to appear and testify before grand juries violate their freedom of speech and press? rule: yes if the state interest is compelling

right to jury trial in non petty cases

duncan v Louisiana

no established national religion

everson v board of education

McDonald v Chicago

facts: Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. -issue: Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states? -conclusion: The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.

Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission

facts: when it was created in 1934, the FCC has required that both sides of issues be presented on tv and radio. known as the fairness doctrine. WGCB broadcast "Christian Crusade"-Rev. Billy James Hagis verbally attacked Fred Cook (wrote a critical book of Barry Goldwater). Cook was refused to be let to respond on air. went to FCC which held Red Lion wasnt in compliance with fairness doctrine

Near v. Minnesota

freedom to speak/publish goes beyond like-ability. can't libel, more restricted in time of war

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier

issue: may educators exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school publication produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum? rule: prior restraint requires a compelling need, but student speech is different (Morse v. Frederick)

Carolene Products

loathe to let majority silence minority

zorcher v. stanford daily

press not immune from valid warrants for searches

courts loathe

prior restraint

Slaughterhouse Cases

privileges and immunities clause protected only certain narrow federal rights (such as right to travel, petition congress, vote in national elections), not the protections found in the bill of rights

Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn

states cannot restrict the publication of truthful and public info

Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC

to condition the granting of renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representation community views of controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of provisions forbidding abridgment of freedom of speech and press conclusion: fairness doctrine doesn't violate 1st amendment

Branzburg v. Hayes

we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the 1st amendment protects a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source on the theory it is better to write about crime than to do something about it conclusion: reporter is not shielded. must testify to grand jury