quiz 6 study

What does Aristotle say about the relationship between the "life of active virtue" and pleasure?

Actions of virtue are pleasant to the virtuous person.

In explaining the doctrine of the "golden mean," Aristotle acknowledges that some action-types and emotion-types do not have any golden mean. (Nicomachean Ethics II, ch. 6, textbook page 323). Which of the following actions and/or emotions, according to Aristotle, do not have any "golden mean"? Check all that apply.

Adultery. Murder. Malice. Shamelessness.

In Nicomachean Ethics I, ch. 6, (textbook, p. 317-318), Aristotle gives a famous argument that philosophers have named the "Function Argument." The argument is for a certain view of what the "human function" really is. What is the correct answer, according to this argument?

An activity of the soul in accordance with reason, i.e. in accordance with virtue, namely the best and most complete virtue, over the course of a lifetime.

How does Aristotle use the idea of the "golden mean" or the "golden middle" to define virtue?

Virtuous actions are the actions that aim for the middle, with respect to a particular emotion or action type: not too much, and not too little.

Why does Aristotle think that virtue has something to do with pleasure and pain? Give the best answer.

Because progress in virtue is learning to have the right pleasures and pains; in short, to have an appropriate relationship to pleasure and pain.

Why is the art of Politics better than art which is directed to the flourishing of a single individual?

Because to secure the flourishing of a whole nation or city-state is much nobler than to secure the flourishing of a single individual only.

Aristotle gives a list of different types of feelings, which provide the subject-matter for different virtues. If we identify the particular sphere of 'feelings of fear and confidence,' then we can say that 'bravery'/'courage' is the relevant virtue in that sphere, compared with which 'cowardice' and 'overconfidence' are vicious. (Nicomachean Ethics II, ch. 8, textbook, p. 324.) What is the logical implication for the nature of bravery/courage?

Bravery/Courage consists in being disposed to feel just the right amount of fear and confidence, neither too much nor too little, in all situations in which fear or confidence might arise.

Aristotle's theory of morality is an example of "virtue ethics." Which of the following terms, according to Bernard Mayo, is the kind that is especially important in Aristotle's theory?

Courageous.

What is Aristotle's distinction between 'virtues of thought' (i.e. intellectual virtues) and 'virtues of character' (i.e., moral virtues)?

Virtues of thought arise by instruction/teaching; virtues of character arise by habituation/practice.

How does Aristotle argue that "happiness" is the supreme good? (cf. Nicomachean Ethics, I, ch. 5, textbook p. 316). -- Pick the answer that is closest to Aristotle's own answer.

Happiness is the only thing that we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of achieving something else.

In Nicomachean Ethics I, ch. 5, Aristotle gives a schematic description of the "[human] good": whatever it is, it would have to be "self-sufficient" and "desired for its own sake." What fits this description?

Happiness.

What does Aristotle identify as the proper object or "aim" of the supreme art or science, i.e. of political science?

Happiness.

How does Aristotle define "happiness," i.e. "eudaimonia"?

It is an activity of the soul, in accordance with complete virtue; over the course of a lifetime.

Compare two situations: (1) someone does the type of action that a courageous person would do, but the action is not caused by the virtue of courage. (2) Someone does a courageous action that is actually prompted by the virtue of courage. Which is better, according to Aristotle's evaluation?

It's better to do a courageous action, prompted by the virtue of courage.

What does Aristotle identify as "the most authoritative science", for the sake of which we pursue all other human sciences?

Political science

Aristotle makes a distinction between morally appropriate action that stems from virtuous character, and morally appropriate action that doesn't stem from virtuous character. (Nicomachean Ethics II, ch. 3; textbook, p. 321.). What is that distinction?

The performance of individual virtuous actions (e.g., just actions) is valuable, but it is even more valuable when it is prompted by a stable character trait of that virtue, when it is done for its own sake, and when it is done from knowledge.

What is the logical consequence of supposing that "we do EVERYTHING that we do, for the sake of something else"?

Then there would be an infinite regress of things that we desire for the sake of other things, and then all desire would be futile and vain.

What is the consequence of presupposing that some single thing is the "end" for the sake of which we do everything else?

This one thing will be the supreme good.

In Nicomachean Ethics II, ch. 4-6, (textbook, pp. 321-324), Aristotle gives a complete definition of 'virtue of character' by identifying its broad category, or 'genus,' then giving its 'specific difference' that sets it apart from other things in that same genus. The broad category is 'state' and the specific difference is 'causing proper function'. Which of the following statements, is the fullest statement of Aristotle's complete definition of virtues of character?

Virtue is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.

Suppose for the sake of argument that Aristotle's definition of 'happiness' is true. Then what conclusion logically follows from that, concerning the logical relationship between virtue and happiness? (How does Aristotle connect virtue and happiness?)

Virtue is needed for happiness.

The next thing is to determine, in what does 'happiness' consist? Aristotle eliminates several candidates for this role. How does Aristotle eliminate "honor" and "pleasure" as candidates for "happiness"?

We desire these things partly for their own sakes but partly because we think they will prove instrumental in achieving true happiness; so they can't be equivalent with true happiness.

How would Aristotle rule out the possibility that true "happiness" might consist in the possession of wealth?

We do not desire wealth for its own sake, but only because of what we can use it to achieve.

Aristotle defines 'virtues of character' with reference to a 'golden mean' -- i.e., a virtue in this sense is a character trait that aims at some 'intermediate' between too much and too little of a certain emotion, or a certain pleasure, or a certain type of action. (So, for example, to have the virtue of 'moderation' or 'temperance' entails being disposed to eat *just* the right amount of food -- neither too much, nor too little.) At line 1106b5 (i.e. Nicomachean Ethics II, ch. 5, textbook p. 322), he explains what it means to say that the 'mean' is "relative to us." What does this mean, for Aristotle?

What is truly intermediate between excess and deficiency, differs from individual to individual, based on their different conditions. None of the above.