Statutory interpretation

LNER v Berriman 1946

A railway worker was killed while doing maintenance work, oiling points along a railway line. His widow tried to claim compensation because there had not been a look-out provided by the railway company in accordance with a regulation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 which stated that a look-out should be provided for men working on or near the railway line 'for the purposes of relaying or repairing it' The court took the words 'relaying' and 'repairing' in their literal meaning and said that oiling points was maintaining the line and not relaying or repairing so that meant that Mr Berriman's claim failed. Mr Berriman had been on the railway lines as part of his work and his safety should have been ensured. Literally he was not 'replaying or repairing' but applying the words literally had led to an unjust decision.

The literal rule

A rule of statutory interpretation. This means that it is used by judges to work out exactly what the law is. It is usually the first rule of statutory interpretation applied by a judge. However, not all judges use it for statutory interpretation, as it can lead to some unusual results.

Eastbourne BC v Stirling 2000

A taxi driver was charged with 'plying for hire in any street' without a licence to do so under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 His vehicle was parked in a taxi rank on the station forecourt, not on a street. He was found guilty as, although the taxi was on private land, he was likely to get customers from the street. The court referred to Smith v Hughes and said it was the same point.

Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd 1970

A workman injured his eye when brickwork that he was removing splintered. He claimed compensation under the Construction (General Provision) Regulations 1961. These regulations made it a duty for employers to provide goggles for workmen when 'breaking, cutting, dressing or carving of stone, concrete, slag, or similar material'. The specific words were 'stone, concrete, slag' and the general word 'or similar material'. The court held that brick did not come within the term 'similar material'. Brick was not Ejusdem generis with stone, concrete, slag. The reason for all the other materials were hard, so that bits would fly off them when struck with a tool, whereas brick was a soft material. This ruling meant that the workman's claim for compensation failed.

When does the mischief rule apply in limited circumstances

According to Lord Diplock in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980]: It must be possible to determine from the Act the precise mischief that the Act was to remedy; It must have been an accident that the mischief had not been resolved by the Act's literal meaning [i.e. the fact that the new law did not deal with the mischief in the case was accidental rather than deliberate]; and It must be possible to say with certainty what additional words would have been inserted by draftsmen and approved by Parliament, assuming that this type of case had been envisaged (foreseen).

The statute includes words that are too ambiguous

An example of this was seen in the case of R v Allen (1872). The defendant was a man who, while already married, had married another woman. This would apparently have contravened section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 - the offence of 'bigamy'. The offence was committed by any married person who "shall marry" a second person. It was seemingly obvious, but the defendant argued that the statute should not be applied to him, since the words "shall marry" had two meanings. One of those meanings was "to become legally married". Since the second marriage - which was the offending action - could not have been legally effective (since the defendant was not already married)... the defendant said that he should not be found guilty of the offence. The prosecution, meanwhile, maintained that the meaning of "shall marry" ought to be read as "to go through the process of a wedding".

European laws

Are made by a combination of European law-making institutions. These are not subject to the same process of statutory interpretation, because they are interpreted by the European Courts. However, the style of interpretation used by the European courts has had an impact on our own process of statutory interpretation. This is because many of our laws are based on European laws. Because of this, our courts need to adopt a similar style of statutory interpretation when looking at English laws that are derived from (based upon) European laws.

Case law

Cases from any branch of law (and from non-English jurisdictions) can be used to aid interpretation of a statute. Re A Children 2004 - in criminal manslaughter, the courts used the civil case of Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 to assist in deciding the scope of negligence.

Preamble

Contained mainly in 19th century statutes. This provides a general introduction to the purposes and background as to why the Act was passed.

The statute includes a drafting error made by Parliament.

In some ways, Brock v DPP (1999) is an example of this. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1993 was hurried through Parliament because of a series of high profile cases. As a result, it was not subjected to the kind of in-depth scrutiny that might have picked up some of the problematic errors that arose in Brock v DPP.

Whiteley v Chappell 1868

In this case the defendant was charged under the LR 4 QB 147 statute which made it an offence to impersonate 'any person entitled to vote' The defendant had pretended to be a person whose name was on the voters' list, but who had died. The court held that the defendant was not guilty since a dead person is not, in the literal meaning of the words 'entitled to vote'. Using the literal rule in this case resulted in an absurd decision. The law was aimed at preventing impersonating someone in order to vote which you are not entitled to.

Re Sigsworth 1935

In this case the son had murdered his mother His mother had not made a will, so normally her estate would have been inherited by her next of kin according to the rules set out in the Administration of Justice Act 1925 This meant that the murderer son would have inherited as her next of kin or 'issue'. There was no ambiguity in the words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let a murderer benefit from his crime. It was held that the literal rule should not apply in this circumstance; the golden rule would be used to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. Although the meaning of 'issue' was clear, the court was giving a meaning that the 'issue' of a dead person would not be entitled to inherit where he had killed the person he would be inheriting from.

Royal College of Nursing v DHSS 1981

In this case the wording of the Abortion Act 1967, which provided that a pregnancy should be terminated by a registered medical practitioner' was an issue. The procedure to carry out an abortion in 1967 was such that only a doctor could do it. From 1972 onwards, improvements in medical techniques meant that normal method of terminating pregnancy was to induce premature labour with drugs. The first part of the procedure was carried out by a doctor, but the second part was performed by nurses without a doctor present. The court had to decide if this procedure was lawful under the Abortion Act. The case went to the House of Lords where the majority (three) of the judges held that it was lawful, while the other two said it was unlawful. The three judges in the majority based their decision on the mischief rule - they pointed out that the mischief the Parliament was trying to remedy was the unsatisfactory state of the law before 1967 and the number of illegal abortions which put the lives of women at risk. They also said that the policy of the Act was to broaden the grounds for abortion and ensure that they were carried out with proper skill in hospital. The decision was a majority one and the other two judges took the literal view. They said that the words of the Act were clear and that terminations could only be carried out by a registered medical practitioner. They said that the other judges were not interpreting the Act but 'redrafting it with a vengeance'

Disadvantages of the golden rule

It can also be argued that it is not always possible to define what is 'absurd'. This is a subjective decision and the use of the rule might give a judge too much discretion. This is a disadvantage because judges shouldn't have so much power in deciding what the interpretation of the word is as it determines whether or not it would consider the statute to apply to the specific situation. Another problem is that it is not always possible to predict when the courts will use the golden rule. Michael Zander was described it as a 'feeble parachute'. In other words it is an escape route but it cannot do very much. The main disadvantage is that it is very limited in its own use. It is only used on rare occasions so it isn't very effective and therefore cannot be relied upon.

Common law

Law made by the judges - it has evolved over time. This is not subject to statutory interpretation. The judges make this law, they do not have to work out what anyone else meant.

Statutes

Laws made by Parliament, or under powers granted by Parliament. These are the laws which we use 'statutory interpretation' for. This includes all delegated legislation - e.g. bylaws, orders-in-council and (most importantly) statutory instruments.

Smith v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 2006

Mr Smith was self-employed in the car-hire business. In 2001 he made a taxable profit of £169,000. However, this figure was reduced by capital allowances of £148,000 on cars acquired for the business to £21,000. He would therefore only have to pay income tax on £21,000. He was divorced and his wife had custody of their three children. She applied for child support maintenance (i.e. money from him). The relevant legislation stated that the amount of maintenance was dependant on the payer's 'total taxable profits' i.e. his income before tax. The question was whether Parliament intended that capital allowances should be left out of account. The relevant act which included the words "total taxable profits" was the Child Support (Maintenance Assessments and Special Cases) Regulations 1992. The court decided that the capital allowances should not reduce the amount which he had to pay in child support to his wife. It was clearly not Parliament's intention to allow a spouse to reduce their maintenance payments by using capital allowances. The purposive approach allowed the court to look in detail at what Parliament had intended.

Changes in technology may make an old statute out-of-date (and therefore meaningless or ineffective).

New technology may mean that an old Act of Parliament does not apparently cover present day situations. This is seen in the case of Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981) where medical science and the methods had changed since the passing of the Abortion Act of 1967.

Previous Acts

Often, Acts of Parliament have been altered by the new statute, so the old statute may provide some guidance as to what the new one was meant to achieve. Heydon's case 1584 - the case stated that previous laws would have to be examined in order to establish the problem which the statute was intending to deal with.

Advantages of the golden rule

One of the main advantages of the golden rule is that it respects the will of Parliament. Only very occasionally will the golden rule be used. And even then, this will only be as an 'escape route' whereby it would avoid an absurd outcome. It is superior to the literal rule in some cases and would have led to less distasteful decisions being taken in cases like LNER v Berriman. Most importantly though, it respects what Parliament has said by refusing to change the wording used by Parliament. This is important to preserve Parliamentary supremacy, which is a key value of our system of law-making. It allows the judge to choose the most sensible meaning where there is more than one meaning to the words in the Act. It avoids absurd outcomes. It would clearly have been unjust to follow the son in Re Sigsworth to benefit from his crime. In this case the use of the golden rule led to a just decision Effectively, it avoids the worst problems of the literal rule

Advantages of the literal rule

One of the main advantages of the literal rule is that it falls into line with the doctrines of parliamentary supremacy and separation of powers. Parliament's role is to make the law, while the role of the judges is to interpret and enforce the law. So when the judges apply literally what Parliament has said in a specific statute, then this is doing exactly what the constitution says should happen. If the judges start to deviate from what Parliament has said, then the judges are becoming 'law makers'. The judges are not there to make up the law, the judges should simply apply what Parliament has said. This makes the literal rule effective in implementing the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy and the separation of powers. Another advantage is that using the literal rule should make the law more certain, as the law will be interpreted exactly as it is written. This makes it easier for lawyers to know what the law is and how judges apply it.

Advantages of the mischief rule

One of the main advantages of the mischief rule is that it allows the judge to look at the previous law before deciding what the current law means. This is a valuable and powerful tool because many statutes are passed with a specific problem or issue in mind. This tends to lead to better results because it it more likely to give effect to what Parliament was trying to achieve. A good example of this was seen in the case of Smith v Hughes (1960), where it was clear that the statute was trying to deal with the situation of having too many prostitutes on the streets. By interpreting the statute consistent with Parliament's original purpose, the court was able to reach a result which Parliament would have approved of. This contrasts with the literal rule, which often leads to somewhat ridiculous results - such as that in LNER v Berriman. The unjust result in that case would have likely been avoided if the court had applied the mischief rule. Another advantage is that this approach is more likely to produce a 'just' result. It also means that judges try to interpret the law in a way that Parliament meant it to work. The Law Commission prefers the mischief rule and, as long ago as 1969, recommended that it should be the only rule used in statutory interpretation

Advantages of the purposive approach

One of the main advantages of the purposive approach is that it gives a certain flexibility to the law. Rather than the law simply being an impression of what Parliament was considering at one specific point in time, the law can adapt to fit changing circumstances and trends. This is especially useful in the scientific field, where the advance of technology could in theory leave many laws out-of-date. However, with the application of the purposive approach, the law can be reinterpreted to fit with the Parliamentary intention of the time. This was demonstrated in ex parte Quintaville, where the court determined that embryos created by a new type of process could be considered "embryos" within the meaning of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. This meant that Parliament did not have to create a new law to cover the change in technology. Instead, the courts were able to reinterpret the old law in a way which made sense in the scientific sense, but was still consistent with Parliamentary intention. It also gives judges more discretion than using the literal meanings of words. This allows judges to avoid the literal meaning where it would create an absurd situation. If the purposive approach had been used in Whiteley v Chappell then it is probable that the judges would have decided that Parliament's intention was to prevent people voting in another person's name and found the defendant guilty. The main advantage of the purposive approach is that it leads to justice in individual cases. It is a broad approach which allows the law to cover more situations than applying words literally.

Disadvantages of the literal rule

One of the main disadvantages of the literal rule is that it assumes every Act is perfectly drafted. In fact it is not always possible to word an Act so that it covers every situation Parliament meant. This was seen in the case of Whiteley v Chappell (1868) where the defendant was not guilty voting under another person's name. Another problem is that words may have more than one meaning, so the Act is unclear. Often in dictionaries words are defined with several different meanings. In section 18.1 there was a difficulty in interpreting the word 'type' in the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

Disadvantages of the mischief rule

One of the main disadvantages of the mischief rule is that there is the risk of judicial law making. This can be seen by the words of Lord Parker in Smith v Hughes when it could be said that it was his view of how Parliament was trying to deal with mischief. The case of Royal College of Nursing v DHSS, where there was a majority of 3-2 decision, shows that judges do not always agree on when to use the mischief rule in the law. It is impossible to when the judges will use the rule and also what result might lead to. This makes it difficult for lawyers to advise clients on the law and the result of their case. The mischief rule is not as wide as the purposive approach as it is limited to looking back at the gap in the old law. It cannot be used for a more general consideration of the purpose of the law. Can lead to uncertainty in the law. Impossible to know when judges will use the rule and the result it might lead to. Difficult to advise clients on the law and the verdict that might be reached.

Disadvantages of the purposive approach

One of the main disadvantages of the purposive rule is that it may mean that the judges refuse to follow the clear words of Parliament. How do the judges know what Parliament's intentions were? Opponents of the purposive approach say that it is impossible to discover Parliament's intentions; only the words of the statute can show what Parliament wanted. So using the purposive approach allows unelected judges to 'make' law as they are deciding what they think the law should rather than using the words that Parliament enacted. Adding on, it's difficult to discover the intention of Parliament. There are reports of debates in Parliament in Hansard (book that records everything that is said in Parliament through speeches) , but these give every detail of debates including those MPs who did not agree with the law that was under discussion. The final version of what Parliament agreed is the actual words used in the Act. It also leads to uncertainty in the law. It is impossible to know when the judges will use this approach or what result it might lead to. This makes it difficult for lawyers to advise clients on the law.

International laws

Sometimes international laws are the basis for new English statutes. Fothergill v Monarch Airlines 1980 - Mr Fothergill, in March 1975 arrived at Luton airport the contents of his luggage was missing, he did not complain within the required 7 days. The question concerned the meaning of the word 'loss' in the Warsaw Convention (which had been incorporated into UK law by a UK statute). The court referred to the foreign language versions in order to better understand the English language version.

Other enacting words

Sometimes, other words within the statute can help to give us some idea of what the specific words in question mean. Such other sections of the statute may give an indication of what Parliament was considering when it passed the Act.

R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Quintaville 2003

The House of Lords had to decide whether organisms created by cell nuclear replacement (CNR) came within the definition of 'embryo' in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 Section 1(1) (a) of this Act states that 'embryo means a live human embryo where fertilisation is complete'. When the Act was passed in 1990 there was only one way of creating an embryo outside the human body - the IVF process - this was by taking an egg from a woman and sperm from a man and fertilising the egg with the sperm. The fertilised egg could then be placed in a woman's uterus and, if it is established itself, she would be pregnant. This is the normal method of helping those unable to conceive naturally to have children. However, by 2003 another method of producing an embryo had become possible. This was through CNR. Fertilisation is not used in CNR. Instead the nucleus from one cell of an unfertilised egg is removed. It is then replaced by a nucleus of an adult cell and if the cell divides, it is possible to produce an embryo. This technique is known as cloning. Using the purposive approach, the House of Lords decided that embryos produced through CNR were covered by the 1990 Act. In his judgement of the case Lord Bingham said: 'The court's task, within permissible bounds of interpretation is to give effect to Parliament's purpose.. Parliament could not have intended to distinguish between embryos produced by, or without fertilisation since it was unaware of the latter possibility'.

Law reform bodies' work

The Law Commission may investigate a specific area of the law and produce proposals for changes in the law. These proposals are often the basis for new statutes. Black Clawson 1974 - Law reform bodies had contributed to the passing of a certain Act of Parliament which was being questioned. Consequently, it was appropriate to refer to this work.

Mesure v Mesure 1960

The Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 allowed a divorce where one spouse had received 5 or more years of "continuous treatment" for mental illness. Mrs Mesure was in a mental hospital from 1952 to 1959 except for 11 weeks at a sanatorium getting treatment for tuberculosis in 1956. Mr Mesure wanted a divorce. Mr Mesure was unable to obtain a divorce, as the treatment was not "continuous". A literal interpretation of the word "continuous" was used, meaning that the treatment had to be without any interruptions at all. Since the treatment for mental illness had been suspended while the wife was being treated for tuberculosis, the requirement for "continuous treatment" was not met.

Adler v George 1964

The Official Secrets Act 1920 made it an offence to obstruct Her Majesty's Forces 'in the vicinity' of a prohibited place. The defendant had caused an obstruction in the prohibited place. It was argued that he was not guilty in the literal wording of the Act as it did not apply to anyone in the prohibited place - only those 'in the vicinity' - outside but close to it. Using the golden rule, the Divisional Court found the defendant guilty as it would be absurd if those causing an obstruction outside the prohibited place were guilty, but those inside were not The words should be read as being 'in or in the vicinity of' the prohibited place.

Aids to interpretation

The aids to interpretation are used by the courts to work out what statutes mean. They work together with the four rules of interpretation. However, they are only really used alongside the mischief rule and the purposive approach. It will be clearer as to why this is the case we read through the different aids.

Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere 1965

The case involved interpreting a section which set out the rules for 'interest, annuities or other annual interest'. The first use of the word 'interest' on its own could have meant any interest paid, whether daily, monthly or annually. Because of the words 'other annual interest' in the section, the court decided that 'interest' only meant annual interest.

Smith v Hughes 1960

The court considered appeals against the conviction under the section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which said 'it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution' of 6 different women. In each case, the women had not been in a 'street or public place'. One had been on the first floor balcony of a house and the others had been at the windows of ground floor rooms, with the window either half open or closed. The women were attracting the attention of men by calling or tapping on the window It was argued for them that they were not guilty since they were not literally in a street or public place. The court decided that they were guilty, with Lord Parker saying: 'For my part I approach the matter by considering what is mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act to clear up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed from this way it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in the doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open'. It can be seen that the judge was not looking at the exact meaning of the words 'in a street or public place' but was looking at the mischief or problem that Parliament were attempting to deal with when passing the Act.

R v Registrar-General, ex parte Smith 1990

The court had to consider s51 of the Adoption Act 1976 which stated:(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (6), the Registrar General shall on an application made in the prescribed manner by an adopted person a record of whose birth is kept by the Registrar-General and who has attained the age of 18 years supply to that person... such information as is necessary to enable that person to obtain a certified copy of the record of his birth Subsection 4 said that before supplying that information the Registrar-General had to inform the applicant about counselling services available Subsection 6 stated that if the adoption was before 1975, the Registrar General could not give the information unless the applicant had attended an interview with a counsellor An application was made by Charles Smith for information to enable him to obtain his birth certificate. Mr Smith had made his application in the correct manner and was prepared to see a counsellor. On a literal view of the Act, the Registrar General had to supply him with the information, since the Act uses the phrases 'shall.....supply' The problem was that Mr Smith had been convicted of two murders and was detained in Broadmoor as he suffered from recurring bouts of psychotic illness. A psychiatrist thought that it was possible he might be hostile towards his natural mother This posed a difficulty for the court , should they apply the clear meaning of the words in this situation? The judges in the Court of Appeal decided that the case for the purposive approach. They said despite the plain language in the Act, Parliament could not have intended to promote serious crime. So, in view of the risk to the applicant's natural mother if he discovered her identity, they ruled that the Registrar-General did not have to apply any information

Tempest v Kilner 1846

The court had to consider whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 (which required a contact for the sale of 'goods, wares and merchandise' of more than £10 to be evidenced in writing) applied to a contract for the sales of stocks and shares. The list 'goods, wares and merchandise' was not followed by any general words, so the court held that only contracts for those three types of things were affected by the statute; because stocks and shares were not mentioned or caught by the statute.

Allen v Emerson 1944

The court had to interpret the phrase 'theatres and other places of amusement' and decide if it applied to a funfair. As there was only one specific word, 'theatres',it was decided that a funfair did come under the general term 'other places of amusement' even though it was not the same kind as theatres.

The 'narrow' version of the golden rule

The court may choose between the possible meanings of a word or phrase, if there is only one meaning then that must be taken. Lord Reid's comments in Jones v DPP (1962) "It is a cardinal principle applicable to all kinds of statutes that you may not for any reason attach to a statutory provision a meaning for which the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between these meanings, but beyond this you cannot go.

Maddox v Storer 1962

The defendant drove a minibus made to carry 11 people at over 30 mph. Under the Road Traffic Act 1960 it was an offence to drive at more than 30 mph in a vehicle 'adapted to carry more than seven passengers'. It was held that 'adapted to' could be taken to mean 'suitable for'. The narrow approach was used.

Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse 1899

The defendant was a bookmaker who made his living in Tattershall's Ring, an outdoor part of the claimant's racecourse. He was charged with a bookmaking offence, which made it an offence to keep "a house, office, room or other place for betting". He was operating a stall like the one below. He was clearly not operating a house/office/room, as his business was outdoors. So the question was whether the general words "other place for betting" applied to his stall. A literal interpretation of "other place for betting" would seem to apply to him, because his stall was somewhere that people could place bets. However, the phrase "other place for betting" had to be interpreted in a way which was consistent with the list of specific words "house, office, room", which appeared next to the words "other place for betting" in the statute. The court said he was not guilty of the offence. Since the examples were all of places which were indoors - the reference to "other place" had to be interpreted in the light of the examples given.

R v Allen 1872

The defendant was a man who, while already married, had married another woman. This would apparently have contravened section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 - the offence of 'bigamy'. The offence was committed by any married person who "shall marry" a second person. It was seemingly obvious, but the defendant argued that the statute should not be applied to him, since the words "shall marry" had two meanings. One of those meanings was "to become legally married". Since the second marriage - which was the offending action - could not have been legally effective (since the defendant was not already married)... the defendant said that he should not be found guilty of the offence. The prosecution, meanwhile, maintained that the meaning of "shall marry" ought to be read as "to go through the process of a wedding". The court applied the narrow version of the golden rule here. The court said that since the word "marry" had two potential meanings, that the court was entitled to choose the meaning which made sense in the circumstances. Given that the prosecution's definition made more sense, the court chose this one. The defendant was found guilty. The court's choice of definition is not hard to reason with. If the court had chosen the defendant's version, then it would have been impossible for anyone to commit the offence of bigamy and s57 of the OAPA 1861 would have been entirely meaningless.

Corkery v Carpenter 1951

The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 made it an offence to be 'drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine'. Held: The Act was to be read purposively. The mischief rule allowed the court to hold that a carriage included a bicycle. Lord Goddard CJ said: 'for this purpose there cannot be any distinction between a section in a highway statute passed for the protection of the public and a section in a licensing statute passed for the same purpose, both of them concerning the conduct of a person on the highway and the preservation of public order.' and 'a bicycle is a carriage . . It is a carriage in my opinion because it carries.'

Fisher v Bell 1960

The defendant, Mr Bell, who was a shopkeeper and in his shop window he had displayed a flick knife priced at 4 shillings. He was prosecuted for offering to sell a flick knife which was a criminal offence under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The court held that in accordance with the general principles of contract law, the display of the knife was not an offer of sale but merely an invitation to treat, and as such the defendant had not offered the knife for sale within the meaning of s1(1) of the Act. It is well established in contract law that the display of an item in a shop window is an invitation to potential customers to treat. The defendant was therefore not guilty of the offence with which he had been charged.

Long title

The formal title at the top of a statute. This is intended to provide a summary description of the purpose or scope of the Act. Fisher v Brown 1964 - the long title was used to decide that 'debtors' for the purposes of the Act were original debtors. Black Clawson 1975 - Lord Simon stated that 'it became established in the 19th century that the long title could be considered as an aid to interpretation. The long title should be read as part of the context, 'as the plainest of all the guides to the general objectives of a statute'.

Types of rules of language

The general rule The specific rule The context rule

The golden rule

The golden rule is a rule of statutory interpretation. This means that it is used by judges to work out exactly what the law is. It is not usually the first rule of statutory interpretation applied by a judge. However, it can be applied if certain circumstances apply. The golden rule is a modification of the literal rule. It starts by looking at the literal meaning of the words but the court is then allowed to avoid interpretations which would lead to an absurd result.

The wording used in the statute may become out-of-date.

The meaning of words can change over the years. This was one of the problems in the case of Cheeseman v DPP (Director of Public Prosecutions) 1990. Police officers who had witnessed a man masturbating in a public lavatory were not 'passengers' within the meaning of s28 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 when they had been stationed in the lavatory following complaints.

Mischief Rule

The mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation. This means that it is used by judges to work out exactly what the law is. It is not usually the first rule of statutory interpretation applied by a judge. However, it can be applied if certain circumstances apply.

The purposive approach

The purposive approach is a rule of statutory interpretation. This means that it is used by judges to work out exactly what the law is. It is sometimes the first rule of statutory interpretation applied by a judge, particularly in cases where the English law was based on a European law. This is because the purposive approach to interpretation is the main rule of interpretation that the European courts. The purposive approach goes beyond the mischief rule in that the court is not just looking to see what the gap was in the old law. The judges are deciding what they believe Parliament meant to achieve. They are looking to see what the purpose of the Act was.

The rules of language

The rules of language are used by the courts to work out what statutes mean. In that sense, they are very much like the rules we have learned about so far. However, the rules of language apply to specific situations, rather than being general approaches to interpreting words.

The 'wider' version of the golden rule

The words have only one clear meaning, but that meaning would lead to a repugnant situation. This is a situation in which the court feels that using the clear meaning would produce a result which should not be allowed. In such a case, the court will use the golden rule to modify the words of the statute in order to avoid this problem.

The law (the statute) uses terminology that is too broad.

There may be words designed to cover several possibilities. For example in the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 there is a phrase 'any dog of the type known as the pit bull terrier'. This seems a simple phrase but has led to problems. What is meant by 'type'? Does it mean the same as 'breed'? In Brock v DPP (1993) this was the key point in dispute and the Queen's Bench Divisional Court decided that 'type' had a wider meaning than breed. It could cover dogs which were not pedigree pit bull terriers, but had a substantial number of the characteristics of such a dog.

Extrinsic aids

These appear outside the statute.

Intrinsic aids

These appear within the statute itself.

Side notes

These are inserted next to a certain section of the statute. They are inserted by the parliamentary draftsman in order to help explain their thinking. Case law: Pride of Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd v British Celanese Ltd (1953). Case concerned the interpretation of words in the 1901 Derby Corporation Act. Side notes (sometimes referred to as marginal notes) were used to help interpretation of the statute.

Interpretation sections

These are specific sections of the statute which give a definition of specific words used within the statute. Example: Children's Act 1989 - the interpretation section stated that 'this act shall be interpreted so that the best interests of the child are paramount', it serves as a guide as to how to understand the statute.

Explanatory Notes

These are written by the Parliamentary draftsman. They assist with the interpretation of the statute, explaining why the statute has been drafted in the way it has been. R(Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service 2002 - '... Insofar as the Explanatory Notes cast light on the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute, and the mischief at which it is aimed, such materials are therefore always admissible as aids to construction.' R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire ex parte LS and Marper 2004 - Explanatory Notes are not endorsed by Parliament. On the other hand, in so far as they cast light on the statute, and the mischief at which it is aimed, they are admissible in aid of construction of the statute. After all, they may potentially contain much more immediate and valuable material than other aids regularly used by the courts, such as Law Commission Reports, Government Committee Reports, Green Papers and so forth'.

Dictionaries

These books have been produced for centuries, and offer some commonsense advice on how certain words meant certain things in the past. Mandla v Dowell Lee 1983 - in this case a boy was excluded from school for wearing a turban. A Question of Law was whether a Sikh fell within the Race Relations 1976. The statute (an intrinsic aid) defined 'race' as including 'ethnicity' - but what does that mean? House of Lords used a dictionary (extrinsic aid) and finally decided 'ethnicity' refers to a long shared history from a particular region.

Headings and sub-headings

These divide the statute into different sections. These titles give some guidance as to what that section of the Act is concerned with. 1971, Chapter 38 - The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs

Green/White Papers

These documents are often issued by the government to put forward law reform proposals to the wider public. W v MPC 2006 - the question was whether the word 'remove' meant a police officer or CSO could use force to take an under 16 year-old home from a 'dispersal area'. In paragraph 31, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) referred to White Paper to assist them decide the scope of the Act.

The point of each of these aids to interpretation

They are used by the judges to find out what specific problem the statute was trying to deal with (in the case of the mischief rule) or to find out what Parliament's intention was in passing the statute (in the case of the purposive approach).

Short title

This appears in a section of the Act. It is a brief description of the Act and can be used as a short term of reference. The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971

Hansard

This book contains a detailed record of everything said in the context of parliamentary debates and business. It can give a clear indication of the 'parliamentary thought process'. Pepper v Hart 1993 - The case concerned the construction of words in the Finance Act. The House of Lords relaxed the old rule that excluded reference to Hansard for the purposes of statutory interpretation; so as to ensure that taxation was not imposed in a way that the Treasury had 'assured' the House of Commons was not intended. Hansard may be considered but only where the words of the Act are ambiguous or obscure or lead to an absurdity. Even then, Hansard should only be used if there was a clear statement by the Minister introducing the legislation, which would resolve the ambiguity or obscurity.

Definition of the mischief rule under Heydon's case 1584

This rule gives the judge more discretion than the other two rules. The definition comes from Heydon's case (1584) where it was said that there were four points the courts should consider: 'What was the common law before the making of the Act?' 'What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?' 'What was the remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?' 'The true reason of the remedy. Then the office of all judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.'

The context rule (Noscitur a sociis)

This rule of language applies to a general or specific word, where the court needs to decide what it means. The court will have a look at surrounding words in similar sections of the statute, to see what else the statute has talked about. In some cases, similar words may be more precisely defined elsewhere. That will lead the court to a conclusion that the words in question should be interpreted in the same manner.

The general rule (Ejusdem generis)

This rule of language applies to a general word, where that general word might describe a number of other things. Clearly, "healthy food" could cover lots of different items - it is a very general term. Equally, the word "fruit" could apply to a number of different, more specific things. Indeed, even "apples" could apply to different things, since there are many varieties of apple. When deciding what the general words mean, the courts will look at the examples which are given within the statute. Sometimes the examples will help the court to decide what exactly the general words mean. So if a statute said that someone had to eat a "healthy item" and then specified "apples, pears and cabbage" as examples, then "healthy items" might be interpreted to refer only to fruit and vegetables (rather than, say, roast chicken). However, this rule can only be applied if there are at least two words in the list of specific words.

The specific rule (Expressio unius exclusio alterius)

This rule of language applies to a list of specific words. If it is claimed that another item, which is not included in the list, is covered by the statute, then any such claim will fail. This is because the list is considered complete. The opposite would apply if there were general words at the end of the list, as in the examples above in the 'general rule' section.

Historical setting

Understanding the historical background to the passing of a law may give a clear insight as to why it was passed. Smith v Hughes - working out why the court passed an act to deal with street prostitution. Spath Holme 2000 - the question was what a 'fair rent' was for a certain property. The judge considered the historical setting of the provision that was being interpreted.