Terrorism Final v.2

What evidences were presented by Richardson to support her contention that "there is nothing fundamentally different about suicide terrorism"? (p. 106). Describe how the tactic developed historically, especially when used by the Tamil Tigers, the world's most extensive practitioner of the tactic (pp. 107-114).

"there is nothing fundamentally different about suicide terrorism" i. Simply the tactic of choice among many terrorist groups ii. Has grown in popularity because it has proven to be an effective means of: 1. Revenge 2. Renown 3. Reaction iii. In willingly taking their own lives, stake a claim to moral superiority that is incompatible with notion of moral depravity b. Historical development of the tactic i. 1980 a young boy charged enemy tank and blew himself up, family has a shrine in their home for him; reject the term 'suicide' because they argue he understood his actions, suicide implies desperation ii. Tamil Tigers 1. Used extensively to murder government officials, politicians, ministers 2. How can we explain the growing use of female suicide bombers? Is there support for Richardson's contention that "suicide terrorism is very effective for the weaker side in a conflict"? (pp. 120-135) a. Use of female suicide bombers i. Trend in suicide terrorism ii. Pioneered by Tamils and Kurds iii. Female suicide bombers 1. Significantly older than male attackersàpossibly in an effort to avoid family humiliation from few marriage prospects 2. More likely to have experienced death in their family 3. More likely to be single (less than 10% were married) b. Other trends: i. Increasing geographic spread of tactic 1. Now used in Argentina, Panama, Pakistan, Croatia 2. Use of tactic of 'suicide truck convoys' ii. Inclusion of chemical materials into the explosive device (Hamas) c. Tactical advantages i. Difficult to defend against ii. Eliminates the need for an escape plan iii. Cost effective (cost-per-casualty ratio) iv. Very likely to attract media attentionàadvertises use of tactic by group v. Most effective 'commitment device' d. Strategic logic i. Usual goal 1. Used mostly by groups with nationalist aspirations against foreigners occupying territory a. Especially if differing religions b. Therefore, not a fourth wave phenomenon c. Religious interpretation is just one interpretation of Islam (many interpretations of all religions) ii. Usual targets (regime or government type) 1. Democracies most commonly targeted because the media has the ability to sensationalize a. Less likely for government to use force to respondà people may demand a reaction, this may be what terrorist groups want if using provocation iii. Usual action resisted 1. Occupation a. Issue of defining foreign occupation b. Recent research indicates may be other variables, but for the most part, still legitimate argument

Networked Structures

AQ, Networked structures favor decentralized coordination and dissemination of communications, direction, and intelligence. They are characterized by loose affiliations between groups from a variety of locations. They are generally favored by religious of single issue groups. General Goals and Targets are agreed upon and left up to the individuals and cells to use flexibility and initiative to execute. Networks can be "virulent", infecting seemingly disconnected actors and spurring them to action through the infectiousness of their ideology and enabling them through dissemination of general directives and published know-how. Strengths: Hard to penetrate, strong operational security, resilient to decapitation, reach beyond the immediate, enabled by continuing advances in instantaneous and networked communications, Weaknesses: Inefficient communications, decentralization increases difficulty in effecting coordinated attacks, large-scale actions generally impossible

IS Leadership Roles

Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi i. Network grew and quickly developed ii. Clearly defined structure with Zarqawi and Shura council as leaders iii. Later created second-in-command post out of necessity to maintain integrity of organization 1. Same power as Zarqawi; access to everything pertaining to organization's operations iv. Zarqawi handled communication with volunteer fighters from outside Iraq; al-Iraqi handed communication with Iraqis within organization v. Military forces divided into battalions, companies, squads b. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi i. Devised basic structure ii. Declared second government with different formation iii. Used 'ministries' c. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi i. Blended structures of traditional Islamic movements ii. Theories of imperial jurisprudence established framework for theological state based on power and authority iii. Incorporated modern organizational structures (military-security, ideological, bureaucratic apparatus) iv. Further developed basic structure on basis of allegiance and obedienceàsolidifying organization's centralized nature and caliph's control of its every aspect v. Pyramid has caliph at apex, direct authority over 'councils' 1. 'Councils' are alternative term for 'ministries' a. IS's central leadership pillars b. Shura council primarily advisory role c. Replaced war ministry with military council vi. Strong Iraqi presence vii. Confined Arab and foreign members to support functions viii. al-Baghdadi retained semi-absoluter authority in war and hostilities ix. Under this control, organization entered phase of extreme secrecy/paranoia

Cell

At the Tactical level, the basic organizational unit of any TO is the cell. Cells are generally unaware of the activities or existence of other cells and thus enhance operational security. Cells are generally organized based on interpersonal relationships (family, come from same mosque), geography, or operational functions (reconnaissance cell, martyr cell, assassination specialists, money laundering cell, etc).

How did Al-Qaeda develop, organizationally, from the beginning to its current form?

Began as hierarchical structure b. Problems of communication forced group to move away from hierarchical structure i. After fall to US forces in 2002, Al Qaeda destroyed as hierarchical organization and developed into more decentralized network structure: composed of core and affiliates c. Social ties and groupings formed primary structures of this network d. Removing central individuals would begin to sever key relationships that held the network together/break down communication between groups b. Describe the differences between the Al Qaeda Core, Affiliates, and Adherents according to the Obama Administration. Why does Stenersen prefer the concept "Associates"? a. Al Qaeda Core i. Group led directly by the Al Qaeda emir, based in Pakistan b. Affiliates (Obama Administration definition) i. Groups that have aligned with Al Qaeda, including associated forces, as defined by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), and groups and individuals not covered by the 2001 AUMF c. Adherents i. Individuals who collaborate with or take directions from Al Qaeda, or are inspired to act to further Al Qaeda'a goals, both the organization and its ideology, through violence targeting the United States, American citizens, or American interests d. Associates i. Groups that are ideologically and/or functionally aligned with network but have not been publicly identified as Al Qaeda ii. Affiliates have developed similar relationships with local groups iii. Activities of these groups generally support and strengthen the network overall iv. This is a more 'all-encompassing' term v. The determinate for whether a group operates within Al Qaeda network is whether is possesses same qualities as an affiliate

2nd Tier Structures

Chain: Each cell is linked to the next enabling horizontal communication. Commonly used in smuggling and money-laundering operations. Star: Communication between cells via a central element that is not necessarily the C2. Financial Networks Hub: Similar to star but possesses a wheel design that allows a cell to communicate with two to three others. All-Channel: all cells are connected to each other, flat design allows power to be shared by all cells. This structure is communication intensive and thus lacks strong safeguards to mitigate the risk or effectiveness of penetration. Generally used by a small network.

Describe some of the evidences presented by Pape to support his contention that "suicide terrorism works" (pp. 62-66), especially the Israeli withdrawal in Gaza (1994) and West Bank (1995).

Chosen tactic because it is strategically effective i. Suicide attacks and policy change: 6/11 were successes, 5/11 were failuresàover 50% success rate ii. Other studies show success rate to only be 24% iii. Much higher probability of death because attacker can blend in with civilians b. Israeli withdrawal in Gaza i. Hamas launched two suicide attacks within a week, killed many Israeli citizens ii. Israel voted to withdraw, accepting Palestinian positions on disputed issues; disagreement over issues had initially caused tensions iii. Attacks were not intentionally meant to cause complete withdrawal c. Israeli withdrawal in West Bank i. Israel continued to miss key deadlines for Oslo Accordsà these cannot explain the withdrawal ii. Only way to respond was to accelerate negotiationsà forced Israel out, not the Oslo Accords

Leadership Decapitation

Decapitation Strikes refer to the process of fixing, finding, and locating enemy leadership elements and the prosecution of lethal strikes against said elements. The goal is to remove the "head" of a terrorist organization. A successful example was the assassination of Pablo Escobar by Delta Force and the Colombian Special Forces. The assassination of UBL by the CIA and Navy SEALs was operationally successful but may have been strategically irrelevant. Decapitation works best against Hierarchical Organizations but, in practice, have mostly targeted Networked Organizations. Killing the leadership elements of Hierarchical Organizations results in the lessened likelihood of an organization remaining operationally viable. However, arresting the leadership elements is more effective. Example: Arresting Abumael Guzman (Shining Path, Peru) Religious Groups suffer the least from Decapitation because the organization is based on a religious ideology rather than a cult of personality.

Describe the differences in the motivation as to why governments and terrorist groups negotiate? How do negotiations end terrorism?

Describe the differences in the motivation as to why governments and terrorist groups negotiate? How do negotiations end terrorism? Governments negotiate i. Search for a potential exit strategy from the violence ii. Motivations 1. Hold potential for short-term pause in violence, if only because it is harder to carry out effective attacks when efforts are focused elsewhere 2. Making contact with terrorist groups can provide important intelligence, particularly about structure, hierarchy, or connections among members of group 3. Strident demands broadcast in wake of terrorist attacks may bear little relationship to reality—or to what different elements of group actually want/will settle for 4. Talks can divide followers of a cause into factions; may enable state to hive off different parts of movement and to turn against each other Terrorist groups negotiate i. If violence is a part of identity/livelihood of participants themselves, less likely for negotiations to be successful ii. Groups that negotiate have longer life-spans than others, pursue causes related to territory control iii. Members of group may press for more tangible, negotiable expression of aims as movement/members age/acquire assets How do negotiations end terrorism? i. Rarely, and in short-term ii. Thought of as essential elements in broader range of policies to marginalize group/change dynamics of support iii. Exploit differences, enable members to leave/constituencies to turn elsewhere iv. Provide crucial information about how group functions v. Reduce degree/intensity of attacks over time vi. Overall, most effective if they are consciously employed to redirect the contest into a less violent channel as talks proceed and the campaign also winds down for other reasons Counter-terrorist Strategies Defensive Strategy i. A framework of action that emphasizes 'hardening the homeland' against terrorist attacks ii. Introduction of metal detectors in 1973 decreased the likelihood of plane hijackings by 41-50 incidents Diversionary Strategy i. Policy of decreasing one's target proneness by 'giving in' and 'passing off' ii. Al Qaeda affiliates already engaged in fighting with local regimes; do not have energy or resources to fight far enemies like the United States 1. "Others will die so Americans will live." iii. Example: criticize the way repressive regimes have treated their people Diplomatic Strategy i. Framework of action that emphasize employment of pacific mechanism allowed in international law 1. Negotiations 2. Mediation (3rd party, non-binding) 3. Arbitrator (3rd party, choice binding) 4. Adjudication (3rd party, no choice, binding) ii. Arbitration is difficult for states to enter into iii. Why do governments negotiate? 1. Respite in attacks 2. Gain intelligence/knowledge of inter-workings of terrorist groups 3. Potential to shift narratives and change minds of constituents (voters) 4. Positive action 5. Can divide active follower of terrorist group 6. Allows government to identify moderates iv. Why do terrorist groups negotiate? 1. Pause in fighting to allow to rearm, etc. 2. "Exit strategy" if on the verge of defeat 3. Pressure from external sponsors 4. Reorientation of terrorist organization's strategy 5. **Only 17.8% of durable terrorist organizations engaged in negotiations** a. Negotiation extent i. Unstable (terms disregarded or bypassed): 32.1% ii. Resolved conflict (negotiations fully resolved conflict): 29.6% iii. Stable (negotiations stabilized conflict, no fundamental resolution reached): 27.2% iv. Failed (negotiations fully broken down, agreements openly abandoned): 11.1% b. Terrorism is a losing tactic (only 4.4% full achievement level, 87.1% none achievement level) v. When do negotiations succeed (from government's perspective)? 1. Limited goals 2. Trying to buy time/stall 3. Leadership is strong 4. Absence of suicide bombings (from terrorists) 5. Absence of spoilers (from terrorists) 6. 3rd party international support 7. Constituents support (from government) 8. Political statement ('hurting' stalemate) Based on the three cases (Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine process, and LTTE) identify the variables that are associated with negotiation success. Explain how they contribute to the outcome. Case Variables Associated with Negotiation Success Variables Contribution to Outcome Northern Ireland Israel-Palestine Process Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Stalemate i. Negotiations initiated when both sides sense additional violence is counterproductive ii. Occur when group perceives itself to be losing ground in conflict because of other competitors 1. PLO with rise of competitors in intifada iii. Infiltration by government agents 1. Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA) iv. Undercutting of support 1. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or Tamil Tigers (LTTE) after 9/11 v. Backlash by its own constituency Strong leadership i. Change in leadership an increase likelihood of succeeding in negotiations Sponsors i. Role of third-party states is crucial, as are mediators, outside guarantors, and other external actors willing to push along or support negotiations ii. Failure of key Arab states to demonstrate commitment to peace process undermined it iii. Norwegian politicians efforts to assist in LTTE/Sri Lankan peace process by voluntarily inserting himself Suicide campaigns i. Inclusion of suicide attacks in terrorist campaign seems to make resolution through negotiation even more problematic, as it reduces willingness or ability of the factions to live side by side Splintering i. Common effect of political processes is splintering of groups into factions that support the negotiations (or the outcome) and those that do not Spoilers i. Additional terrorist attacks have often been used to derail or destroy peace negotiations, remarkably successful in doing so ii. Hamas role in Israeli-Palestinian peace process iii. Terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland timed to coincide with peace process developments Setting the story i. Important element in determining whether negotiations end terrorist attacks is whether terrorist groups have correctly understood the broader historical context within which they are operating, and have responded correctly to it ii. Changing international context may be necessary but not sufficient condition for negotiations to end terrorism iii. LTTE heavily influenced by post-9/11 environment The Northern Ireland Peace Process i. Early 1990s, both sides of sectarian divide seemed to sense stalemate with danger hat relentless tit-for-tat violence could escalate 1. Good Friday Agreement reached conclusion they were in danger of being marginalized and that, given the British government's position, any realistic political alternatives to the settlement were likely to be worse ii. Increasing sense of investment that all sides had in the process 1. Attempts by splinter factions to undermine peace process treated as attacks on individuals and the peace process itself, which became a means of channeling the outrage iii. Good Friday Agreement was very complex with "deliberate strategic ambiguity" that enabled participants to describe accord in terms that were palatable to their constituents iv. Changing international context within which the negotiations occurred was crucial 1. Economic boom in Irish Republic demonstrated what peace might hold Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process i. Correlation between terrorist attacks and milestones in negotiations ii. Role of spoilers important in case, during mid-1990s; Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad increased in number of attacks at times when believed they could drive two sides in peace process apart iii. Early 1990s Israelis considered Arafat too weak to stop attacks; some believed had ability to stop attacks, but chose not to iv. Terrorism during second intifada does not seem to be directly related to peace process, but instead to internal dynamics among competing Palestinian factions v. Palestinians began to see terrorist attacks as complementary to the peace process instead of at odds with it; believed that negotiations along would never lead to Israel's withdrawal vi. Polls indicate peace process perceived as another dimension for carrying out violence The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) i. Peace process had important short-term salutary effects on country, including increased aid pledges from the international community, small boom in construction in the north of the country, emergence of important additional information about the LTTE ii. Talks helped to undercut unity of Tamil Tigers iii. Government suffered politically from breakdown of talks; unable to transcend ethnic polarization that had helped spark initial conflict iv. Government used cease-fire to recruit, modernize, build up fighting forces v. Failure of talks followed by invigorated Sri Lankan military campaign against the LTTE vi. Reduction in violence and hope of peaceàmany viewed political and military situation as stalemate

detterence and backlash

Discuss the differences between "deterrence" and "backlash". a. Deterrence and targeted killings i. Disincentive terrorist groups and cause deterrent effect ii. Deprives terrorist group of valued recruits/increases coordination costs iii. Force members to focus on personal security, not attack planning iv. Decreases possibility of level one and two supporters becoming mobilized and active recruits b. Backlash and targeted killings i. Repressive actions in Israel=increase from Palestine (same in Egypt) ii. Killing/arresting leaders, delayed long-term impact iii. Building/house demolitions increase subsequent attacks c. Overall, very mixed data, circumstantial depending on question being tested 2. Describe the procedures undertaken by Gill to measure the impact of drone strikes in Pakistan. a. Data from GTD and Bureau of Investigative Terrorism b. Graphed number of terrorist attacks per month compared to number of drone strikes per month c. Graphed number of terrorist attacks vs. number of fatalities from drone strikes d. Ran regressions regarding three sets of data 3. Identify the three major findings of Gill's study. What are its implications for policy? a. Relationship between proliferation of drone attacks and terrorist attacks in given month; number killed unrelated i. Can say with some confidence, terrorist attacks and fatalities may increase after drone strikes b. No weekly shift in behavior after drone strike i. Particularly deadly drone strike reduces number of attacks on weekly basis c. Daily rate showed no change d. Overall: no definitive conclusion to traditional deterrence vs. backlash argument

Discuss the roles that the media can play in terrorist prevention.

Discuss the roles that the media can play in terrorist prevention. a. Influence of public officials on news gets in way of most fundamental role assigned to free press in liberal democracies, namely, to serve general welfare by informing people/enabling them to make judgments b. Most newsrooms prioritize interesting/sensational information at expense of important/less sexy/complex public affairs matters that are not high on public relations agenda of public officials 2. Describe the procedures ("operationalization") that Nacos used to test her hypotheses (pp. 5-7). a. Terrorism prevention i. Defined narrowly ii. Prevention of terrorist incidents inside the US and as aviation, maritime, cross-border transportation security iii. Specifically concerns securing vulnerable areas such as airports, airplanes, seaports, wide range of infrastructure, borders iv. Coded network broadcasts of pertinent new segments using the unit message for coding; identified source of prevention messages b. Public opinion i. Retrieved public opinion survey questions about Americans' views on efforts to prevent terrorism and protect homeland from 9/11/2001 through 12/31/2005 ii. Selected polls that revealed public's degree of confidence in government's efforts/ability to prevent terrorist strikes in US, in respondents' own communities, and in particular vulnerable areas c. Used public opinion data to explore relationships between public perceptions about state of homeland security and news coverage of terrorism prevention 3. Identify the four major findings of this research. How can we develop them into specific counter-terrorism proposals? a. Public confidence is directly related to decision as to which aspect of counter-terrorism (threat or prevention measures) is emphasized b. Media has to remain the critical "watchdog" on decisions taken by public officials on how terrorist issues should be framed c. Four key findings i. Government only focuses on threats, public loses faith in ability to protect ii. Public opinion regarding if the government is doing all it can to prevent further terrorist attacks is directly tied to how much attention government media gives it iii. Public opinion of government's ability to prevent terrorism/protect American from further attacks directly tied to volume of messages about prevention results (aviation security, etc.) iv. Public opinion viewed Katrina and response as a national failureà extensive coverage on the storm's damageà government that cannot prevent rupture of levees probably cannot protect from terrorist attacks

Forcible

Forcible measures are broken down into two distinct strategies. These strategies are characterized by how they label terrorists. The Law Enforcement Strategy labels terrorists as criminals. This strategy seeks to arrest terrorist operatives so that they may be prosecuted under a state's legal system; relevant international human rights laws are applied. Extraterritorial law enforcement is possible with state consent. The law enforcement strategy has been used by the U.S. D.E.A. to arrest narco-traffickers associated with terrorist organizations most notably in Afghanistan. The second strategy of forcible counter-terrorism is the Military Strategy colloquially known as the "Global War on Terror" Approach. This strategy uses a framework of action that emphasize pre-emptive CT transnational actions against terrorists. The framework treats non-state actors as states and as such are capable of armed attacks. This approach leverages international law to justify armed attacks against terrorist organizations. Terrorist operatives are treated as enemy combatants or unlawful combatants and are legally subject to targeted killings. Notably, civilians who directly participate in hostilities are coded as combatants. Operational examples of the application of this approach include "Kill-or-Capture" raids such as the 2011 Assault on UBL's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan; lethal drone strikes in the Federally Administrated Tribal Area in NW Pakistan and Yemen;

Group Motivation Counter-Terrorist Strat

Group Motivation Effect on Success of Counter-Terrorist Strategies National-Separatist: seek autonomy from existing government to (1) form independent state (Basque Separatists in Spain), or (2) become part of another state (IRA in Northern Ireland); often claim to represent specific ethnic population Use combination of concessions, legal reform, and restrictions; England and IRA=success, Spain's use of policies not simultaneously against ETA=failure→ became successful when they began to use policies at the same time Revolutionary: third wave; promote Marxist-Leninist ideology (have declined since Cold War) Combination of legal reform and restriction; Italy and Red Brigade=success, Greece and 17 November=failure because counter-terror legislation did not make police reforms Reactionary: right-wing groups (KKK in US); "status quo," form out of reaction to other revolutionary movements Restriction (measures to limit group's activities, such as sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism) works best; South Africa and AWB (pro-apartheid group)=success because police able to penetrate→ disable group; US and Patriot Movement=failure because simultaneous use of legal reform and restriction (regarding firearms) caused membership to grow Religiously motivated: use extreme versions of mainstream religion to justify political violence; want to replace secular governments with more fundamentalist regimes (jihad; Al Qaeda's near enemy) Restriction is necessary, does not work by itself; conciliation and violence not successful because of members' willingness to die for cause (suicide bombers, martyrdom); Egypt and Egyptian Islamic Jihad successful, used restriction and violence; US and Al Qaeda=failure because violence (War on Terror, Afghanistan), legal reform (Patriot Act), restriction (intelligence reforms to increase capabilities) did not succeed, however, too early to draw conclusions

How did Al-Qaeda develop, organizationally, from the beginning to its current form?

Hierarchical i. Re-established Islamic Caliphate ii. Military campaign-cannot fight this with networked structure iii. Areas under control divided into administrative units (wilayat) 1. Senior officials under wali's command called 'emirs' (commanders) who control assigned sector

Primary Organizational Models of Terrorism

Hierarchical and Networked

How does "decapitation" work?

How does "decapitation" work? a. Arresting a leader damages campaign more than killing him does, especially when jailed leader can be cut off from communicating with his subordinates yet also paraded in humiliation before public b. Decapitation- removal by arrest or assassination of top leaders or operations leaders of a group c. Arrest (Mickey McKevitt and Real Irish Republican Army, Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo, Shining Path and Abimael Guzman, Abdullah Ocalan and Kurdistan Workers' Party) i. Much better alternative (all else equal) so that fate can be demonstrated to public ii. Can result in succession struggle=paralyzes group, stymied by fact that leader is still alive d. Targeted killing/assassination (Philippines' Abu Sayyaf, Russia and Chechen leaders, Israel-Palestine) i. Treads on ambiguous moral territory ii. Forbidden from legal perspective, except in times of waràquestionable iii. Seen as preemptive act—though it is permissible in 'war' to kill enemy commanders iv. Engaging in terror tactics strengthens the perception that states have no more right to a monopoly on the use of force, no more legitimacy in how they employ it, than do international and sub-state enemies v. Reduces operational efficiency in short-termàmay raise stakes/survival need in long term (of group) vi. May increase level of recruitment vii. No one to negotiate with e. Degree to which group depends on leader a huge factor f. Level of popular support for cause also huge factor g. What happens after arrest is crucial 2. Identify some variables that are related to the success of decapitation as a tactic against terrorist organizations. a. Determine if use of violence will alienate supports of terrorism and counterterrorism efforts b. Treatment after arrest may turn him into godlike figure and backfire or public display can be effective in dismantling group c. Degree to which rely on leader d. Level of popular support for cause

How does failure end terrorism? Are there similarities and differences among the variables that strongly relate to implosion and marginalization? Explain.

How does failure end terrorism? i. Claim of legitimacy is a source of strength for organization but also source of vulnerability ii. Governments expected to be hypocritical, terrorist organizations cannot afford it iii. States that fail to publicize and exploit targeting errors by terrorist groups are missing a time-honored opportunity to facilitate end of a campaign iv. Operational errors are the most well-established method of rapid self-defeat v. Failing to excite interest of second or third generation, experiencing burnout, succumbing to individual members' departures or betrayals, and breaking into competing splinters vi. Cannot wait passively for failure Implosion: mistakes, burnout, collapse i. Failed generational transition 1. Growing alienation or moral disengagement ii. Infighting and fractionalization 1. Internal dynamics of group may bring out lust for violence that eventually becomes counterproductive iii. Loss of operational control 1. Security imperative that leads to compartmentalization of information and limiting of communications among cells increases inefficiencies and mistakes iv. Amnesties/accepting an exit 1. Sometimes accept that goals are not being achieved through terrorist violence; amnesty offers cause internal dissension Marginalization: diminution of popular support i. The ideology becomes irrelevant 1. Ideology must have achievable goals to inspire a following ii. Loss of contact with "the people" 1. Especially difficult to remain in touch with following while operating underground iii. Targeting errors and backlash 1. Terrorist group may choose a target that a wide range of its constituents consider illegitimate, undercutting the group and transferring popular support to the government's response

Discuss three important variables that are related to a terrorist organization succeeding in fulfilling its objectives.

If goals are limited and attainableàmore likely to succeed Aligned with international normsàmore likely to succeed Other tactics besides terrorism are usedàmore likely to succeed

Discuss at least three important findings on the motivation and recruitment of female terrorists (pp. 506-507).

Motivations i. Social; gender equality, education/career needs, humiliation and repression, family problems ii. Personal; personal distress, monetary worries, social outsider iii. Idealistic; religion, nationalism, commitment to cause, wish for martyrdom iv. Revenge is the least cited reason; contrary to Richardson's Revenge, Renown, Reputation b. Recruitment i. Voluntary ii. Most cases via peer pressure and group conformity through networks, social media, influence from men they are close to 2. How did the roles of female terrorists change over time and environments? (pp. 507-510) a. Sympathizers- those who perform daily duties in extremist camps b. Spies-those who play more active role as messengers, intelligence gatherers, decoys c. Warriors-fight in battles, equal status as men d. Leaders-dominant forces at top of organization, actively involved in leadership, motivation, strategy of group e. Began in third wave/nationalist groups with increasing participation f. Fourth wave and some third wave use of women in suicide missions g. Environment enables of female participation i. Strategic advantage women have to terrorist attacks/groups 1. Increased access to targets 2. Unlike with security profiles 3. Arise less suspicion ii. Elicit feelings of sympathy for causeà greater media coverage iii. Enlisting women has shown to enhance group stability, increase motivation, provide efficient use of population

According to Miller, what mix of counter-terror strategies and tactics works best against:

Nationalist-Separatists TOs; b. Revolutionary TOs; c. Reactionary TOs; d. Religious TOs. Forcible Counter-Terror Strategy Defensive strategy tactics i. Reactive-stop actions ii. Hardening borders iii. Strengthening law enforcement iv. Focus primarily is on shielding the homeland Diversionary strategy tactics i. Shift blame somewhere else 1. Example: let Russia keep bombing Syria region and the US does not intervene ii. Put the blame on someone else Diplomatic strategy tactics i. Result: grant concessions ii. May work but depends on goal 1. Negotiations 2. Arbitration 3. Mediation iii. Limited vs. expansive Offensive: most government prefer this i. Military strategy ("War on Terror" (WOT)) 1. A framework of action that emphasizes preemptive transnational actions against terrorists a. Treats non-state actors as capable of "armed attacks" b. Treats terrorists as "enemy combatants" or "unlawful combatants" c. Allows extra-judicial murder of "war enemies" (via targeted killings) i. Enemy combatants 1. Laws of War: POWs and injured returned once the conflict endsà but when does terrorism end? d. Treats civilians who "directly participate in hostilities" (DPH) as combatants 2. Law-Enforcement strategy (LES) a. Treatment of terrorists as "criminals" (as in Special Tribunal for Lebanon) b. Prosecution through regular court system c. Application of relevant international human rights laws ii. Leadership Decapitation 1. Does leadership decapitation work? a. Target top echelon results in: i. Lack of direction ii. Credibility iii. Hierarchy structures most vulnerable to thisàit would be detrimental to information flow b. Drones used primarily for network structures i. Hamas: drone strikes caused them to attack more, with less brutality 2. Does killing matter? Or are they better alive? a. Better to arrest than to kill if upper echelon i. Leader: killed=30% collapsed, arrested=21% collapsed ii. Upper echelon: killed=6% collapsed, arrested=15% collapsed 3. What type of terrorist organization is more likely to collapse with decapitation? a. Ideological 4. Impact of typology on organizational fate a. Works best in ideological because kill the charisma and beliefs b. Religions less likely to be based on leadership qualities/charismaà does not work 5. Under what conditions do drone strikes work? a. Young terrorist groups: (1) absence of successors, (2) very little support, (3) give upà more likely to retreat because of cost 6. Probability of organization collapsing after decapitation a. Young, small, ideological more likely to collapse b. Large, old, religious least likely to collapse

Non Forcible

Non Forcible measures include Defensive, Diversionary, and Diplomatic Strategies. Defensive Strategies focus preventing attacks on the homeland by increasing the costs incurred by terrorist organizations during the execution of attacks. Defensive Tactics include Hardening, bolstering police resources, and intelligence gathering. Diversionary Strategies generally involve the adoption of policies focused on attenuating one's target proneness by "giving in" or "passing off". An example of giving in is the retreat of U.S. forces from Lebanon in wake of the deadly bombing of a Marine barracks that killed 231. Diplomatic Strategies employ a framework of action that emphasize employment of pacific mechanisms in International Law. Nearly all Democratic governments engaged with terrorism have been forced to negotiate Trends Direct correlation between age of groups and probability of talks ⅕ groups enter talks Half of groups that have joined the bargaining table remained violently active during negotiations Groups that negotiate have longer average lifespans and nearly always pursue Territorial Goals Talks tend to drag on with no outright failure or success Examples include Negotiations, Mediation, Arbitration, and Adjudication. When Do Governments Negotiate? Attempt to achieve a respite from attacks To gain intel on structure, hierarchy, and motivation of a TO To establish a narrative to divide TO followers Identify or Develop moderates Why Do TOs Negotiate? Respite Intel Signalling Legitimacy Exit Strategy Strategic Repivot External/International Pressure When Do Negotiations Succeed TO has limited goals Time (?) TO has a Hierarchical structure Absence of Suicide Bombing Presence of International Support Constituent support Political stalemate Ripeness Hurting Stalemate Main issue of TO is aligned with progressive development of International Norms Negotiations have not lead to more attacks (Crenshaw) Negotiation Case Studies North Ireland (rel. successful) Group: IRA- nationalist/separatist Complex web of players Republican and Loyalist Paramilitaries Secret talks began in 1972, 7 through 1994 All Initiated by G.B. involved 3rd party intermediaries Circumstances of Successful Cases Both sides increasingly feared losing ground increasing sense of investment in peace process Ambiguously worded agreements added palatability needed to sell agreements to constituents Changing International Context Economic boon Israel-Palestine Talks Largely thought to be dead intifada gave Palestinians an Identity they have previously lacked Secret meeting with 3rd party Intermediary Norway (Oslo Accords) Religious nature complicates and polarizes Heavy use of spoiling during elections and peace talks Palestinians began to see attacks as complimentary to the peace process pseudo-enforcement mechanism to force Israeli compliance LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)-Sri Lanka Majority (Sinhalese Buddhists) vs. Minority (Tamil Hindus) History of Insurgency and failed talks A fractitious government in Colombo (capitol) exacerbated problems and forced Norway (3rd Party) to pull out of talks Talks had short-term positives Tamil Tigers increasingly used crime to finance activities which hurt popular support Used talks to regroup Negotiation Circumstances "Hurting Stalemate" -William Zartman most promising circumstance Groups will wait to negotiate if they perceive popular support shifting towards their favor Greater asymmetry=less likelihood talks will dictate outcomes Negotiations can occur more easily if group perceives it is losing due to: group competitions (intifada) Infiltration (PIRA) Undercutting of support (LTTE post-9/11) Backlash (Omagh Bombing, PIRA) Intelligent CT will manipulate circumstances prior to, during, and after negotiations Strong Leadership Negotiations require a strong and willing spokesperson or leader groups that persist after leadership changes often emerge as more deadly (AQ→ ISIS; IRA→ PIRA) Sponsors 3rd party moderators/facilitators improve talks Ambiguously worded agreements, help participants "sell" the treaty to constituents Suicide Campaigns involved constituencies are more likely to geographically separate themselves Israeli Wall=manifestation Martyrdom Operations (MOs)=Sacrifice investments that raise the stakes engender and reflect a unique level of ideological commitment MO's force cultural and sociological change in societies that experience them→ inhibits free moving and mingling see Israeli Wall Splintering Splinter groups are often more deadly Spoilers Attacks in association with talks=¼ treaties went into effect W/o Attacks=60% Spoiling attacks that seek to disrupt talks with popular support, 3rd party guarantors, invested parties seem to be good for Talks (Ireland) Miscellaneous Young Ideological and Separatist groups most likely to collapse Structures not fully developed Not enough time for "infection" to occur; little support Large Old Religious groups least likely to collapse

Case Studies

Nonlethal Decapitation Case Studies (Law Enforcement Strategy) Shining Path-Peru Marxist group operationally effective by 1980 Founded by Abumael Guzman a university philosophy teacher Guzman fostered a cult of personality and myth of omnipotence with no viable successor Arrest ruined perception of AG's omnipotence and the group declined into relative obscurity PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)-Turkey Ethnic/Marxist group Founded in 1974 in Ankara by Abdullah Ocallan Affectionately referred to as Apo (Uncle) Ocallan captured in Kenya in 1999 Sentenced to death but spared after popular riots and demonstrations and his request to PKK to renounce violence Became a political party, some resurgence during Iraq war Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)-Ireland Nationalist/Separatist Split in 1997 over IRA Peace talks with Great Britain 1998 Omagh Bombing heavy violence during bombing campaign and children killed at Omagh sparked resentment and loss of popular support Resumed violence a few years karer Arrest of leader Mickey McKevitt lead to group's decline Aum Shinrikyo-Japan Religious-Doomsday Cult founded in 1987 by Asahara Ideology: U.S. would start World War Three with Japan 1995 Tokyo Subway Attack Sarin Gas used in attacks Asahara arrested -> Huge Decline Lethal Decapitation Case Studies (Military Strategy) Abu Sayyaf-Philippines http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/abu-sayyaf-group-asg Founded by Abubakar Janjalani, a Philippino Islamic Mujahedin who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets Killed by Police Son succeeded but was not a strong and viable replacement Presided over groups fall from Islamic ideals to crime Still deadly but Decapitation worked because of weak replacement Chechen Leaders-Chechnya, Russia 2005 Russia kills Aslan Maskhadov, only viable leader to negotiate with Russian Counter-Terror kills every identif iable figurehead incredibly ruthless and efficient Decapitation Campaign (Very Russian) Insurgency was initially confined to Russia then became transnational 2006 kidnapping and killing of 4 Russian Embassy Officials in Iraq Insurgency still ongoing Israel's Assassination Campaigns Operation Wrath of God launched by Golda Meir in response to 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre attempt at deterring future attacks against Israelis During 2nd Intifada Assassinations of militant leaders and politicians begins as State Policy Impossible to prove if it works or not Likely ongoing

According to Krueger, what are the various ways we can measure the consequences of terrorism?

Objectives i. Limited, attainable goals ii. Aligned with international norms iii. Other tactics are used besides terrorism iv. Group can enlarge its supportà external pressure on government Economic consequences Psychological Political effectsà which political parties impacted Mediaàoverblown?

Sum of ALQ ideology

Provide a brief summary of the Al Qaeda ideology as described by Gregg. Grounded on assertion that weak/corrupt Muslim leadership is to blame for decline of Muslim community and leadership is weak because if has embraced Westàstrayed from path of Islam i. Blames western governments/democraciesàthreat to Islam 1. Democracy compromises sovereignty/oneness of God because places people in position of authority, not God Al Qaeda founded in wake of Soviet-Afghan war of 1980s with goal of spreading jihad i. Means of toppling secular Muslim regimes to establish pious governments Call for Al Qaeda to kill Americans/allies new addition Calls for total Islamic revolution of society, governance, faith Islam provides total way of life/offers complete direction for governance, economics, society i. Totality transcends time/space/provides solutions to modern questions for individual/collective life as it has done throughout the ages Worldwide Muslim community (ummah) needs to unify/return to foundations of faith Bin Laden's argument for totality of Islam: i. Idea that Muslim society could only be restored to strength/totality by returning to Islam 1. Offers complete template for spiritual, social, political, economic life ii. Envisioned state governed by Islamic system that upheld totality/managed spiritual, familial, social, economic, political relations Dismisses concept of state as unauthentic/calls for unification of ummah to overcome threats it faces i. Declaration of war demonstrates this call for reunificationàfills spiritual and pragmatic purpose Al Qaeda's goals consistent with growing movement in Muslim world i. To reject interpretations of scripture, call for literally following the Qur'an/Sunna because they are companions of prophet Muhammad ii. Message contends necessary path for change requires physical struggle/lesser jihadàjihad becomes pillar of Islam; it is a theoretical imperative, binding on all Muslims iii. Strategy to attack "far enemy"-western countries that support secular Muslim regimes 1. Argument for attacking US military as means of compelling withdrawal form Muslim world Describe the three ways proposed by the author to counter Al Qaeda's ideology. Which one did you consider the best and why? (1) Understand persistent themes of message/why messages resonate with at least some in Muslim world; vision for better world/means for achieving new reality (2) Consistency of grievances in revolutionary Islam suggest that may be best avenue to undercut ideology or revolutionary Islam (3) Allow groups to run in elections, properly managed, could create the conditions for groups to learn debate, compromise, modify vision/ legitimize non-violent groups with similar ideologies Challenging for vision for better world may be best means for fighting ideology

Hierarchical Structure

RAF, Red Brigades, IRA, PLO, ETA Hierarchical structures favor centralized coordination from a single leader or a leadership element. They are characterized by well-defined vertical command and control responsibilities and subordinate command structures (Media/ PR, Operations, Recruiting and Training, Security and Intelligence, Shura Council in the case of some religious groups, etc.) Strengths: Clear delegation of authority/Chain of command, allows for specialization, effective for coordinating large groups of believers/militants, Weaknesses: Vulnerable to decapitation, easier to penetrate than networks, visible, large

From McCauley, describe three things that he thinks "we've learned about 9/11".

Radicalization of opinion i. Base are people who do not care; top are people who sympathize more; apex are those that feel personal, moral obligation and use political violence Radicalization of action i. Base are people who do not care for causes; inert, activists, radicals, terrorists ii. Personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope of small increments in action, love for someone in a militant group, escape from a situation more risky than terrorism, thrill and status seeking, seeking new friends after losing social connection iii. There can be no useful profile of individuals likely to join a terrorist group iv. Intergroup conflict and group polarization, with group isolation as a multiplier of the power of group dynamics Relation of radical beliefs and radical action i. 99% of Muslims of with radical ideas never engage in radical action ii. Conversely, many individual move to radical action without previous radical ideas iii. Our conclusion is that there are two kinds of radicalization—radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action iv. Disconnected-disordered lone-wolf terrorists vs. caring-compelled lone-wolf terrorists v. Means and opportunity may be more important for understanding why only a few with radical opinions ever get to radical action vi. There is no 'conveyer belt' from extreme beliefs to extreme action vii. Groups with extreme ideas who argue against violence may be allies in fighting terrorism viii. Fighting extreme ideas is a different problem than fighting terrorists ix. We do not know when or how success in the War of Ideas will reduce terrorism Identify the reasons why Abrahms believe terrorism "does not work". How did he test the explanations? Strategic Model relies on premise that terrorism promotes government concessions depends on bargaining theoryàskeptical that this is actually effective Can be measured in terms of process goals or outcome goals i. Process goals: intended to sustain groups by attracting media attention, scuttling organization-threatening peace processes, boosting membership and morale often by provoking government overreaction ii. Outcome goals: stated political ends, can only be achieved with compliance of the target government Escalating to terrorism/violence hinders bargaining success Does terrorism really work? Empirical results of success rate i. Less than 10% (Abrahms) ii. Less than 4% (Jones and Libichi) iii. Less than 5% (Cronin) Why terrorism fails: Maximalist Inference Theory i. Outcome: large scale or extremely violent ii. Inference about perpetrators: Goal sought is maximalist, members are extremists 1. Governments or secondary audience less willing to negotiate or concede to the demands Does terrorism hamper economic development? Basque region: terrorist attacks cost as much as 10% of GDP Does terrorism damage business? Stock prices tend to become volatile, fall and stay there/level out Value of companies fell by about $400 million for each terrorist attack Does terrorism "terrorize"? People tend to resume normal activity within 6 months Political effects of terrorism In Israel, terrorist attacks within three months of an election increases electoral support for right-wing parties US Republican political party tends to gain more support Time of terrorist attacksàto maximize psychological effects 9am because it is the start of the day and will traumatize for the rest of the day/morning news/radio/commute Evening attacks because of concerts and sporting events

What are some of the factors that limit the usefulness of suicide terrorism? (pp. 75-76)

Sharp limits in types and scale of concessions terrorists likely to gain b. Unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to wealth or security c. Unless suicide terrorism acquires far more destructive technology, attacks in the service of more ambitious goals are likely to fail and will continue to provoke more aggressive military response

Describe all the Councils

Shura Council i. Remained important through multiple leaderships ii. Headed by Abu Arkan al-Ameri iii. Grows or shrinks as circumstances and needs dictate; 9-11 members iv. Appointed by al-Baghdadi, recommended by emirs and provincial rulers v. Current affairs, critical decisions, policymaking; advice on war and peace decision making vi. Recommends leaders for other councils vii. Basic function: monitor how other councils adhere to Shariah laws b. Ahl al-Hal wal Aqd (Those who loosen and bind) i. Resembles idea of modern day parliament c. Shariah Council i. Headed by Abu Mohammed al-Ani ii. Writes al-Baghdadi's speeches iii. Issues guidebooks and messages, provides commentary for organization's media iv. Two departments: one acts as judiciary, the second works on preaching, recruitment, guidance, propagation, media monitoring v. Mainly non-Iraqi Arabs and other foreigners d. Media Council i. Concept of 'electronic jihad' ii. Publishes several Arabic and English magazines; controls several websites and online forums covering relevant jihadi material iii. Produces propaganda videos e. Department of Finance i. Wealthiest in history of jihadist movementsàexceeds that of al Qaeda and regional branches ii. Relies on network of fundraising activists who collect funds from individual businesspeople and in mosques iii. Controls revenues form oil, mining, and other natural resources iv. Donations an grants from various charities v. Ransom revenues-kidnap foreign nationals and negotiate for millions of dollars vi. Take possession of resources/goods in conquered areas vii. Seize government funds in captured areas viii. Agricultural revenues-control as much as a third of Iraq's wheat production f. Military Council i. Most important entity ii. 9-13 members iii. Current head is Abu Muslim al-Turukmani iv. Consist of sector commanders, each sector made up of three battalions of 300 to 350 fighters each, each battalion made up of several companies with 50-60 fighters v. General staff, special commandos, suicide officers, logistics forces, sniper forces, ambush forces vi. Handles all military aspects including strategic planning, battle commands, attack planning, oversight, supervision, correction of operations, armament and spoils management g. Security Council i. Headed by Abu Ali al-Anbari ii. Runs security affairs of organization, security detail for caliph iii. Monitors operations of security commanders in provinces, sectors, cities iv. Oversees implementation of judicial rulings and punishments v. Controls special units (suicide bombers, undercover agents) vi. Special platoons to control mail, coordinate communication, carry out assassinations, kidnappings, money collections

Do societal or macro-level explanations predict suicide terrorism better? (pp. 79-82)

Socioeconomic status i. Bombers come from higher socio-economic status; poor economic conditions, such as high unemployment, can create incentives for groups to use suicide tactics ii. Well educated individuals (engineers, and other elite degrees) indicate employment issue of these type of educated people in the region b. Regime type i. Terrorists from non-democracies are more likely to use suicide bombing because this is the only way to voice grievances c. Networks i. Individuals become bombers via complex social network processà religion can be unifying point for this; social networks further drive spread of suicide bombing ii. Globalization of martyrdom

Does Terrorism Work?

Success of an organization is largely dependent on the objectives that it establishes. The chosen objectives influence the survival prospects, growth rate, and success of a group. Groups with large, open ended goals such as AQ who seek to bring back the Islamic Caliphate, terminate secular governments in the Middle East, and to end Western influence in the Middle East have seemingly smaller prospects for success than do groups with discrete and attainable goals (Examples?) These groups generally have goals that are aligned with international norms, increasing the likelihood of international support, adopt multiple strategies and tactical approaches, and have prospects for wide support. Effects and Consequences Economic Krueger, p.106, writes that modern economic success is primarily a result of Human Capital. Buildings can be rebuilt, roads can be fixed...etc. Thus, the important objective is to protect the population. Economic consequences should then be a function of human casualties rather than economic casualties. Terrorist attacks thus far have failed to engender the critical mass of casualties necessary to wreak major economic havoc (3000 in 9/11 is way too small, think WMD scale 50,000+). Most notable evidence of Terrorism affecting the economics of a region is in the Basque Region of Spain. Confined to a regional level (whereas AQ attempted to cause economic effects at an international level), ETA was able to affect a 10% GDP gap between Basque Spain and the rest of Spain. ETA's attacks disincentivized regional and foreign-direct investment because of the unstable security situation. Psychological In class we talked about a 6-month period after a terrorist attack when the civilian population remained affected. Sharp drop off after Political In Israel, attacks were more likely to occur when left-wing party was in power. In America, approval raises for Republicans following lethal attack Ex: Current scrutiny of President Obama's ISIS policy in wake of San Bernardino Shootings Media Media can overstate threat of Terrorism Nacos article found that media products focused on Terrorist Attacks rather than Preventive Measures. (Key findings on p.17) Focus on threats good for getting higher Defense Budget Max Abrahms Empirical Results of Success Rate Analysis Analyzed political plights of 28 listed Foreign Terror Organizations (FTO) (FYI ONLY: This is the current list http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm) Found FTO success rate <10% and successful FTOs used Terrorism as a secondary tactic. Suicide Terrorism fails even more "In the months leading up to his death, UBL commanded his lieutenants to refrain from targeting Western civilians because in his view the indiscriminate violence was not having the desired effect on their Government." (p.589) Maximalist Inference Theory (I have a note "On exam") Outcome=Large Scale or Extremely Violent Can infer from outcome that goal is maximalist and not limited; members are extremist and thus we won't give in to them. Terrorism fails because Government or secondary audiences are less willing to negotiate or concede to demands Translated: Using extreme violence/killing large numbers of people leads victim to believe attacker is extremist and causes a psychological response characterized by a resistance to giving in to attacker. Miscellaneous Terrorists generally strike in the Morning/Evening To catch commuters and to feature more prominently in media spotlight. More likely to be killed by suicide, lightning, plane crash than Terrorism. Terrorism will statistically kill you before a train crash or shark attack.

Define suicide terrorism. Discuss Horowitz's assessment of the strength of individual level (micro) variables and compare this to the explanatory power of group (meso) explanations of suicide terrorism (pp. 71-79)

Suicide terrorism i. Attack where the death of the bomber is the means by which the attack is accomplished; excludes attacks where the bomber's survival is extremely unlikely, but theoretically feasible b. Individual level (micro) variables i. Suicide bombers do not have levels of depression higher than expected from general population ii. Not irrational actions, decide to become bombers for a number of social, organizational, economic, religious reasons iii. Acts of terror are rational acts because they uphold supreme values of group iv. Cannot make individual generalizations because come from many different communities/situations v. Motivations for female bombers just as complex as motivations for men bombers 1. Need to recruit more female bombers c. Group level (meso) variables i. Relationship between opportunity and willingness that influences many other tactical decisions ii. Will use if it will make group success more likely; presumably the success rate is much higher than the use of other tactics iii. Occupation; outbidding; dependence on public opinion; religion iv. Suicide bombing is a military innovation for violent, non-state actors v. Organizations above a certain size threshold can adopt suicide bombing

Pros and Cons of H and N

The pros are generally related to characteristics such as clear chain of command, efficient vertical distribution of communications and intelligence, division of labor, and compartmentalization and operational security. The cons are similar and generally reference heightened effects of a security compromise and circuitous or inefficient distribution of communications, intelligence, or orders.

Active Supporters:

These supporters are fully aware they are supporting terrorist activities but do not engage in violent action. Example can include Financiers, Fundraisers and Money launderers; people who provide Safe houses; Counterfeiters, charities such as the Iranian-Sponsored Martyrs Fund who provide family of martyrs (not always terrorists see Mohammad Hossein Fahmideh, 13 year old Iranian boy who blew himself up under an Iraqi tank in the Iran-Iraq War); etc...

Passive Supporters:

These supporters are sympathetic to the cause but are not committed enough to directly engage in actions that would facilitate the organization. Generally a supporting populace like some Iranians, Palestinians, and other supporters of Martyrdom Operations.

Under what conditions does repression work against terrorist strategies?

Under what conditions does repression work against terrorist strategies? a. How mobilized the population is for a cause b. How despised a regime makes itself in its response c. Comes down to perception and identity 5. Explain when repression succeeds using the cases of the Tupamaros and the Muslim Brotherhood (we will focus on this two in class). a. Tupamaros i. Targeted symbols of imperialist regimes (US, Brazil) ii. Audacity of attacks increased=paranoia in business community iii. Police could not restore orderàmilitary intervened and crushed themàruled for next 12 years iv. Democracy was restored; repression had worked but at enormous cost b. Muslim Brotherhood i. Founded on concept on civic obligation; placing individual obligation towards community above self gain/promotion ii. Crackdown on extremist groups caused shift from evolution to revolution ideology iii. Terrorism had ended, but most extreme Islamic ideas still existed/nurtured by totalitarian state