The Fourth Amendment: Arrests Part II

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin Scope of the Arrest Power

A defendant arrested without a warrant and held in custody must receive, within 48 hours, a judicial determination of whether the arrest met probable cause standard. Determinations that meet the 48 hour deadline may still be unconstitutional if the delay was unreasonable. ---- o Delays for the purpose of gathering additional information to justify the arrest. ---- o Delay motivated by ill will towards the arrested individual. ---- o Delay for delay's sake. Payton v. New York ---- o Arrests made within the home require a warrant

United States v. Sharpe

A federal agent and a state trooper attempted to stop separate cars because it was believed that the cars were transporting contraband. Because of a circuitous chain of events, twenty minutes passed between the Savage's initial stop and his search. Government argued: ---- o Length of the stop did not violate Terry. ---- o Odor of marijuana emanating from the car created probable cause. ---- o Automobile exception justified the search. Court upheld the legality of the search. ---- o Brevity of the stop must be balanced by the needs of law enforcement. Common sense and ordinary experience must govern over rigid criteria. Were the police diligently pursuing an investigation, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. "In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing ... The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the plice acted unreasonably in failing to recognize and pursue it. We readily conclude that, given the circumstances facing him, Agent Cooke pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner."

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco Reasonableness Standard

An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Do §503 of the SFHC, which authorizes inspection of private dwellings without a warrant, and §507, which makes it a crime to refuse such an inspection, violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspector obtain a warrant before searching his home. He also cannot be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland. Reasonableness test: ---- o First focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. ---- o No ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms

Defendant was lawfully stopped for driving with an expired tag and ordered outside the car. Officer noticed a bulge in his jacket, which turned out to be a revolver. Court found that the officer's interest in asking the defendant out of the car was substantial. ---- o The request was standard operating procedure. ---- o Precautionary measure to protect the officer from oncoming traffic.

Alabama v. White Reasonable Suspicion

FACTS: Anonymous tip gave details about the respondent and the actions she would take, said she would have cocaine; police observed all the details and corroborated the tip; they stopped the car and found cocaine HOLDING: Reasonable suspicion can justify a Terry-style stop when considering all the circumstances; stop here was constitutional REASONING: ---- o Reasonable suspicion is less demanding standard than probable cause ---- o Reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause ---- o Reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause Here, under the "totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop of the respondent's car."

Florida v. J.L.

FACTS: Anonymous tipster said a young black male with a plaid shirt had a gun; cops came up and saw the identified person; cops didn't not observe any suspicious behavior themselves; they frisked him and found a gun ISSUE: Does an anonymous tip about a persons appearance and allegation of a crime, without anything else (and no police observation or corroboration), justify a Terry search? HOLDING: No; anonymous tip alone is not enough REASONING: ---- o Officers' suspicion didn't arise from any observations of their own, but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller ---- o Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any illegal conduct ---- o The tip lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White ---- o No predictive information; left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility The requirement that an anonymous tip bear a standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a stop does not apply where the police already had grounds to make a Terry stop.

United States v. Arvizu

FACTS: Border patrol stopped a minivan, suspected of drug trafficking; facts alleged to support reasonable suspicion: vehicle was a minivan, type the agent knew smugglers used; van was on a dirt road used by smugglers; trip coincided with shift change that left the area un-patrolled; van slowed down when it saw the agent; driver appeared stiff and rigid; children waved at the agent abnormally; children's knees seemed propped up on something in the back of the van; van was registered to an address notorious for smuggling ISSUE: Do these facts satisfy reasonable suspicion? HOLDING: Yes REASONING: it is important to preserve the flexibility of the reasonable suspicion standard; we live in a more dangerous age today NOTES: this was a post 9/11 case;

Riley v. California

FACTS: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed. ISSUE: Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches? HOLDING: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.

Wong Sun v. United States Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Case

FACTS: During an individual's arrest, the individual told federal agents he had obtained the heroin from "Blackie Toy," a proprietor of a laundry. Agents then went to laundry owned by James Toy, even though there was nothing in the record to indicate that Toy was in fact "Blackie Toy." When Toy opened the door for the agent under the guise of a customer, he informed the agent that the business was closed. When the agent identified himself as agent, Toy immediately "slammed the door and started running" down the hall to his living quarters. ---- o Agents followed Toy into his bedroom. When Toy reached into a nightstand drawer, the agents placed him under arrest. A search of the drawer and premises revealed no narcotics. In response to allegations that he sold narcotics, Toy responded that it was some guy named Johnny Yee and gave the agents Johnny's address. When the agents found Yee at his house, he surrendered several tubes containing heroin. Yee informed the police that Toy and "Sea Dog" (Wong Sun) had delivered the heroin to him. ---- o A search of Wong Sun's house did not turn up any narcotics. After arraignment, Toy signed a statement that basically amounted to a confession. ---- o Wong Sun, while admitting the accuracy of the contents, did not sign his statement. Government's evidence tending to prove the petitioner's possession consisted of four items: ---- o Statements made by Toy at the time of his arrest. ---- o Heroin surrendered by Johnny Yee ---- o Toy's pretrial unsigned statement ---- o Petitioner Won Sun's statement. Court finds that there were neither reasonable grounds nor probable cause for Toy's arrest. ---- o Agent had no basis in experience for confidence in the reliability of Hom Way's information. "Identification of a suspect by a reliable informant may constitute probable cause for arrest where the information given is sufficiently accurate to lead the officer's directly to the suspect." Draper v. US ---- o There was no information on the record to lead police to equate "Blackie" Toy with James Wah Toy. Government asserted that Toy's flight down the stairs cured any defect in the information. ---- o Court disagrees because precedent (Miller v. US) holds that when an officer insufficiently or unclearly identifies his office or his mission, the occupant's flight from the door must be regarded as ambiguous conduct. ---- o While Agent Wong did eventually disclose his function, it was only after misrepresenting himself as a customer. ---- o Toy's refusal to admit the officer and his subsequent flight could be seen as a natural desire to repel an apparently unauthorized intrusion. As such, Toy's declarations in the bedroom must be considered "fruits" on an unlawful action. ---- o "Verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest . . . is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits." ---- o Policies underlying the exclusionary rule do not invite a logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Court dismisses the government's claim that the statements should be admissible because they resulted from "an intervening independent act of free will." Next, the Court must determine if the narcotics given up by Yee should also be excluded. Prosecutor candidly stated that "we wouldn't have found those drugs except that Mr. Toy helped us to." ---- o As such, the case for independent source, inevitable discovery, or attenuation is pretty much moot. Court does present the relevant inquiry. ---- o "The more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." ---- o Court also finds Toy's unsigned statement inadmissible.

Whren v. United States

FACTS: In high drug area of DC; cops became suspicious of the young guys in a dark pathfinder stopped at a stop sign, looking down; cop pulls guy over for failing to use a turn signal; cop walks up to the car and sees two bags of crack cocaine; cop arrests driver; driver alleges that he was pulled over just as a pretext to do a search ISSUE: Is it ok to use probable cause for one violation of the law (failing to use a turn signal) as a pretext to investigate other suspected violations (possession of drugs)? HOLDING: Yes REASONING: ---- o As long as cops have an objectively reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the court won't inquire into the subjective reasons why the cop detains someone ---- o Cop's motivation doesn't matter. If there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation had been committed, then cops had power to pull over and arrest if necessary NOTES: ---- o Petitioner wants court to adopt a test - whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop under the given reason

Terry v. Ohio STOPS AND FRISKS

FACTS: Officer in plain clothes observed two individuals on the corner; he saw them walk back and forth in front of a store; he thought they were "casing the joint"; he approached the two individuals who were with another man; he asked their names, they mumbled; he patted down terry for weapons; he found a revolver; he patted down the other two for weapons; one other had another revolver ISSUE: Whether a police search without a warrant is always going to be unreasonable (specifically - is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest) HOLDING: The stop and frisk, which is a seizure and search, was reasonable in this case REASONING: ---- o Sole justification of the search was to protect himself and the public from weapons (safety reasons) ---- o The search was limited to the outer clothing to discover weapons which might harm him or the public ---- o This was a seizure and a search Whether the seizure and search were unreasonable is a 2 part inquiry: Was the officer's action justified at its inception? ---- o Reasonably prudent man would have believed Terry posed a threat to safety based on suspicious activity ---- o It was reasonable to believe weapons were involved Was the officer's action reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place ---- o Scope of the search must be confined to discover guns, knives, clubs, and other hidden weapons (it was here) Terry search is less invasive than full search; done for the protection of officers and others around him DISSENT: ---- o To give the police a greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path ---- o Must have probable cause for magistrate to grant a warrant; must have less than probable cause for police officer to conduct a terry search Terry Test: ---- o McFadden approaches Terry and his two friends, what does the 4th requirement require? - nothing at this point (asking name doesn't implicate 4th amendment) ---- o Terry mumbles, McFadden grabs Terry and spins him around, what does the 4th amendment require? - this is a seizure; must have reasonable justification; but not necessarily clear what justification ---- o McFadden pats down Terry's pockets and reaches in one pocket to get the gun? - must have reasonable grounds for suspecting that McFadden has a weapon; must be confined in scope Reasonable Suspicion ---- o Articulated as the standard for a Terry search; but not stated as the standard until after Terry

Minnesota v. Carter Scope of 4 Amendment protections

FACTS: Police received a tip from a confidential informant; police looked through drawn blinds to see Carter, Johns, and Thompson putting cocaine in baggies; Carter and Johns left the building and were stopped in their vehicle; they were arrested for a handgun and black pouch that was in plain sight; a search led to 47 grams of cocaine; a search of the apartment revealed cocaine residue and plastic baggies; police looking through window was held to be a search; Thompson was the lessee at the apartment; Carter and Johns simply used the apartment for a few hours ISSUE: Do Carter and Johns have standing to challenge the search as unreasonable? HOLDING: No, they didn't have expectation of privacy in the apartment of Thompson, and don't have standing to challenge the possible search REASONING: ---- o Overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the 4th amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not ---- o Purely commercial nature of the transaction, relatively short period of time on the premises, and lack of any previous connection to householder, all leads to the conclusion that Carter and Johns do not have standing ---- o The search which may have occurred at Thompsons apartment did not violate Carter and Johns 4th amendment rights ---- o Carter and Johns had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment Worth noting - standing doctrine is simple to state and simple to apply, but on the other hand has problems as a clear test because it says a person does not have privacy interests in his own actions in another person's home

Arizona v. Gant

FACTS: Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts. ISSUE: Is a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? HOLDING: Yes, under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court held that police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case. Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority improperly overruled its precedent in New York v. Belton which held that "when a policeman has made a lawful arrest... he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could not create a new governing rule

Maryland v. King "Special Needs," Regulatory and Administrative Searches

FACTS: The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. ISSUE: Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes? HOLDING: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a location. The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should be set on his/her release from custody. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. **The legitimate government interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody...

Utah v. Strieff Fixing an unlawful search and seizure

FACTS: Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff's person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop. ISSUE: Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful? HOLDING: In the absence of flagrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated (weakened) the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to the lawful arrest, which allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections should not be excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently attenuated. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was intended to prevent police officers from taking advantage of their own unconstitutional conduct, which was the case here. Because the initial unconstitutional stop was clearly calculated to procure further evidence, it was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the misconduct and the discovery of evidence. Justice Sotomayor also argued that allowing the police such free rein essentially created a group of second-class citizens that could be subjected to police invasion of constitutional rights at a whim. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in all but the last portion of the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the discovery of the evidence was too closely connected to the unconstitutional investigatory stop for the valid warrant to attenuate the connection. Because the two events were closely connected in time, the warrant itself was not an intervening circumstance, and the police conduct was purposeful and flagrant, the exclusionary rule should apply in cases like this one. Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent.

Indianapolis v. Edmond Impermissible Roadblocks

FACTS: Vehicle checkpoints in effort to interdict unlawful drugs; police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles at a time for a drug check; cops ask for license and registration, do an open-view examination, and walk a drug dog around the outside of the car; total stop lasts about 5 minutes; this is a civil case to get an injunction against these stops ISSUE: Is the stop constitutional? HOLDING: Not constitutional; must have individualized suspicion, or an exception like promoting highway safety (stopping drunk drivers, checking registration) and immigration (boarder patrol roadblocks) REASONING: ---- o A search and seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing ---- o The primary purpose of a roadblock cannot be simply to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing ---- o Must have "special needs" beyond the ordinary need of law enforcement

Illinois v. Wardlow Running from the cops

FACTS: cops were driving to an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in a four car caravan; they saw Wardlow standing on the corner holding an opaque bag; when he saw the cops, he turned and ran; cops followed him, cornered him, got out of the car, patted him down for safety, and found a gun ISSUE: Is unprovoked flight upon noticing the police enough to amount to reasonable suspicion? HOLDING: Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting the Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore, in investigating further REASONING: ---- o Unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such ---- o KEY: Reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior ---- o Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people; a Terry stop is far more minimal intrusion ---- o Individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime ---- o To conduct a Terry search, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot ---- o Reasonable suspicion is less demanding standard than probable cause and requires less than preponderance of the evidence, but it requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop ---- o Officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity Interestingly, the Court finds that Wardlow is entirely consistent with its prior decisions. ---- o Royer: individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business if there are no grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. ---- o Bostick: Any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for detention or seizure. ---- o Unprovoked flight is not a mere refusal to cooperate or "going about one's business" ---- o Although there may be reasons for flight from police, Terry accepts the risks that officers may stop innocent people. CONCURRENCE and DISSENT: ---- o Agree that there shouldn't be a per se rule about unprovoked flight; it doesn't have to be presumed innocent, but it doesn't have to be presumed criminal ---- o Cops must take all circumstances into account, including, neighborhood, time of day, direction and speed of flight, dress of the runner, whether the police were uniformed, etc. ---- o Here he does not think this case arises to the level of reasonable suspicion; must be a better showing than just the officer's testimony here; must articulate exactly what prompted the conclusion of reasonable suspicion

Murray v. United States Independent Source Doctrine

FACTS: information received form informants; cops watch Murray and co-conspirators; Murray drives a truck into a warehouse; stay about 20 minutes; then others drive the truck out; cops follow truck and ultimately arrest the men; found marijuana in the vehicles; cops force entry into warehouse; cops see marijuana; they leave and get a warrant based on previous information, not based on sight of marijuana; search after warrant obtained ISSUE: should marijuana found be excluded because the first entry was an illegal search? HOLDING: No because of independent source doctrine REASONING: ---- o Connection with the unlawful search may become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the search with the evidence found ---- o Evidence here was later legally obtained independently from the illegal search ---- o Scope of independent source doctrine - applies also to evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality ---- o Where an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because derived from an "independent source" ---- o Inevitable discovery doctrine - assumes validity of the independent source doctrine as applied to evidence initially acquired unlawfully

Hudson v. Michigan Knock and Announce Rule with FOTPT

FACTS: police knock and announce but only wait 3-5 seconds before turning the knob of an unlocked door to enter the home; Hudson moves to suppress evidence; Michigan conceded that the entry was a knock-and-announce violation; ISSUE: Does a violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule require suppression of all the evidence found in the search? ---- o Question is not whether 3-5 seconds is enough, but if suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy for a violation HOLDING: No, suppression of evidence is not appropriate for violating knock-and-announce requirement REASONING: Interests protected by the k&a requirement include: ---- o Protection of property ---- o Protection of human life and limb ---- o Privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance ---- o Do NOT include the shielding of potential evidence from the government's eyes Exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs ---- o Deterrence benefits are minimal; excluding evidence is not an effective deterrent here; massive deterrence is not necessary ---- o Social costs are high Civil liability is an effective deterrent here. New emphasis on internal police discipline, like education, training, and supervision These things weren't around when exclusionary rule was implemented strongly to deter on many occasions ---- o Evidence was not gained simply because of a violation of the k&a requirement; not but-for cause ---- o Acquisition of drugs and guns was the product of a legal search pursuant to a valid warrant, not the fruit of the fact entry was not preceded by a k&a

Brown v. City of Oneonta

FACTS: woman was attacked; she said it was a young black man who did it and he had a cut on his hand; police officers targeted and stopped many/all black students on a nearby campus to check their hands ISSUE: was it ok for police to target black students? HOLDING: yes REASONING: ---- o Not unconstitutional because not racial profiling ---- o Officers checked black students based on woman's description, not because they thought blacks were more likely to commit the crime ---- o No equal protection claim because no discriminatory purpose

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

If standing deals with "who can raise an exclusionary claim" then fruit of the poisonous tree deals with "what evidence can be excluded from an illegal search" Hypo: X's house searched illegally, find a slip of paper with Y's address; search Y's home; find criminal activity in Y's house ---- o Y has standing because it was an illegal search of his house ---- o Does X have standing? Yes Hypo: X's house searched legally, Y's house searched illegally ---- o Y has standing ---- o Does X have standing? No Claimant must show that there was illegality, that the illegality was directed against him -Standing; second step is whether that illegality was the cause of the further evidence

Notes after

In "normal" crimes with victims, the victim's testimony can supply probable cause. However, with victimless crime and proactive law enforcement, the police have a difficult time satisfying the probable cause requirements. The Fourth Amendment does not require that every search or seizure proceed with a warrant or probable cause. ---- o Instead, it prohibits unreasonable search and seizures. ---- o Terry represents the basic components of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. ---- o Reasonable intrusions must be proportionate to legitimate government purposes. ---- o Reasonableness must focus not only on privacy and secrecy but also bodily integrity and personal dignity. Dunaway v. New York ---- o Defendant was taken into custody without probable cause. ---- o Court rejected the application of Terry and its balancing test to custodial interrogations. ---- o The detention was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Florida v. Royer ---- o Based on Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions, detectives believed him to be a drug-courier. ---- o After a conversation with Royer, in which he became noticeable more nervous, the detectives asked Royer to accompany them into a room. ---- o They retrieved the suitcases and asked for permission to search them. ---- o The plurality concluded that the drugs should have been suppressed because at the time of the search, the interrogation had surpassed that allowed by Terry.

Chimel v. California Searches Incident to Arrest

Key theory to support search incident to arrest is police safety; second is to stop destruction of evidence. Police are looking for a burglar, come in his house and arrest him; what can they search? ---- o Mr. Chimel? Yes. They could even search him if they arrested him for a traffic violation (you get the search if you get the arrest) ---- o Couch he's sitting on? Yes ---- o Closets in that room? Yes, someone might be inside ready to get crazy on the police - Ahrens say may not be reasonable b/c police were in house waiting on guy before he entered house ---- o Can they walk into other rooms? There is a standard that they can go through the rest of the house when there's a reasonable suspicion that someone else is there that will get crazy ---- o Can the police go through his drawers? Nope, they don't have a warrant. This would have been a very bad case to try and argue that they should be able to search the entire house Allows the search of someone incident to arrest ---- o When you perform an arrest it is reasonable for the officer to search the person to remove any weapons that one might seek to resist arrest; the officer may also search and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent concealment or destruction; can also search the immediate surrounding area (area within in his reach) ---- o Standard for when it is reasonable for officers to search entire house: reasonable suspicion someone else hiding in house who might be armed and dangerous Two distinct propositions: ---- o 1) A search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest ---- o 2) A search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.

Arrests

Legal rules that govern arrests have been derived from three sources: Common law ---- o Arrests for misdemeanors were generally prohibited ---- o Exception was for breach of peace committed in the arrestor's presence, as long as the arrest was made at the time or shortly after the offense. ---- o For felonies, warrantless arrests were permitted so long as the arrestor had reasonable grounds. Statutes ---- o Most modern statutes authorize warrantless arrests whenever the offense is committed within the officer's presence. ---- o For felonies, the standard for warrantless arrests is "probable cause." Constitution ---- o Custodial arrests must be based on "probable cause"

Steagald v. United States

Officers had an arrest warrant for Lyons, whom an informant stated could be found at Steagald's house. Officers went to Steagald's house and searched it; they did not find Lyons but did find cocaine. The Court found that an arrest warrant did not justify the search of the home of someone other than the arrestee. ---- o There were two distinct interests here: Lyons' interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from an unreasonable search of his home. ---- o The arrest warrant addressed only the first interest. ---- o As such, the search of the petitioner's home was no more reasonable from petitioner's perspective as if it had been conducted without a warrant.

Michigan v. Long

Officers were on duty when they observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. They observed the car until it drove into a ditch. Long, the only occupant of the car, met the officers at the rear of the car and did not obey several requests for information. Officers followed Long as began towards the open door of the car and noticed a large hunting knife on the floorboard. The officers then subjected Long to a Terry-style pat down, which revealed no weapons. Without entering the vehicle, the officer shined his flashlight into the vehicle, revealing a bulge protruding under the armrest. The bulge was a pouch containing marijuana. Court upholds the stop. ---- o "Investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers." ---- o "The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police . . . have reasonable suspicion to believe] that the suspect is dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of the weapons."

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Consent Requirements

Police officers stopped a vehicle carrying six men for a routine traffic violation. Only one of the men, Alcala, provided a driver's license and informed the police that the vehicle belonged to his brother. Officer asked Alcala if he could search the car, and Alcala said yes. Prior to the search, no one was threatened with arrest and the environment was "congenial." The search revealed three wadded checks that had been stolen from a car wash. Ninth Circuit found that for consent searches, the state must establish that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Court reverses the bright line rule without establishing a definitive test for voluntary. Instead, voluntariness will be measured by the totality of the circumstances. ---- o Was the decision the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice?" ---- o Was the individual's will overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired? The term voluntary is an amphibian, no magic definition or rule. Government does not have to establish that the suspect had a right to refuse consent. Petitioner argues that consents are "waivers" under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, as such the Government has the burden of demonstrating "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst. ---- o Court finds that the Johnson criteria only apply where the rights implicate a fair trial. ---- o The Fourth Amendment does not implicate a fair trial, but rather one's privacy rights. Holding: ---- o When the subject is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.

United States v. Watson

Postal Inspectors received a tip that Watson was in possession of stolen credit cards. During a sting, the informant signaled to the inspectors that Watson did indeed possess the stolen cards. Pursuant to postal regulations, the inspectors arrested Watson without a warrant, but did not find any stolen cards on him. During a consented-to search, the inspectors found two stolen cards in Watson's car. The Court did not find that the Watson's arrest was invalid b/c it was executed w/o warrant. ---- o Postal regulations evidenced a judgment by Congress that it is not unreasonable to arrest without a warrant provided that they had probable cause to do so. ---- o Common law allowed for warrantless searches for misdemeanors conducted in the presence of the arrestor. ---- o J. Powell, in his concurrence, noted that the Court's jurisprudence created an anomaly in that restrictions for searches were greater than for arrests when the arrests were a much more traumatic event for the individual. In his dissent, J. Marshall decries the common-law bases for modern warrantless arrests because only the most serious crimes were considered felonies at common law.

Police Discretion and Profiling

Racial Profiling is not ok in normal police contexts. Can take race or ethnicity into account only if it is one of many factors Federal officers may not consider race or ethnicity, except as permitted by the Constitution and law of US, when investigating national security Difference between ethnic profiling and profiling based on nationality (Federal rules) ---- o Ethnic profiling is not permissible ---- o But it is ok to look to country that issued a passport Racial profiling - occurs whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating

Rakas v. Illinois

Standing is subsumed under substantive 4th amendment doctrine ---- o "the question is whether the challenged search and seizure violated the 4th amendment rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it." ---- o Defendant may seek to exclude evidence based on a illegal search only if the search infringed his own reasonable expectation of privacy, no someone else's RULE: anyone that is searched and seized has standing

Non-Trivial Privacy Invasions ROADBLOCKS: FULL BLOWN SEIZURES

TERRY: INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION WAS PRESENT, NOT SO IN THESE CASES WHY A RELAXED SET OF 4TH AMEND RULES APPLIES TO THESE SPECIAL NEEDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT? INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION—THE PRIVACY INTEREST DOES NOT CHANGE DEPENDING ON THE MOTIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 1976 ---- o Court approved suspicionless stopping of vehicles at a permanent checkpoint leading away from the Mexican border because balance leans towards government protecting the border. Delaware v. Prouse ---- o Declined to allow random, suspicionless police stops of automobiles to check drivers' licenses and registrations. ---- o Court noted that the holding was not preventing steps "from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." **** Police can almost always find a reason to stop a moving vehicle, so probable cause would not be an obstacle. Michigan Dept of State Police v. Sitz ---- o Court upheld suspicionless roadblocks used to check for drunk drivers. ---- o The rationale was the "magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States' interest in eradicating it," as well as the fact that all cars were stopped.

Minnesota v. Dickerson

The Court has been unwilling to uphold even minor intrusions on privacy in the absence of officer safety. Just as there is a "plain view" exception to a warrant requirement, there is a "plain feel" exception to the Terry frisk. However, this feel is narrowly circumscribed to protect the officer's safety. Officer had concluded that the bulge in defendant's pocket was not a weapon, but subsequent feel led to the conclusion that the object was crack cocaine. ---- o Court invalidated the search b/c the activity exceeded the legitimate search for weapons.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests. Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses? ---- o No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

Wong cont.

WONG SUN ---- o Court finds that Sun's arrest is also without probable cause or reasonable grounds. ---- o However, no events turn on the question of the validity of the arrest. ---- o Sun's signed statement was not the product of the arrest, for he had released on bond, and made the statements several days later. ---- o Therefore, the connection between the arrest and the statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."****** ---- o Regarding the issue of Yee's heroin, the fact that the heroin is admissible as to Toy does not render it inadmissible against Sun because the seizure invaded no right of privacy or person that would entitle Sun to object to use at trial. Standing issue Notes The basic principal underlying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is causation. "But-for" analysis ---- o Was the evidence at issue obtained through an "independent source?" ---- o If so, it is admissible. ---- o Would the evidence be inevitably be discovered? "Proximate cause"

Birchfield v. North Dakota BAC testing

When a police officer arrests an individual upon probable cause of drunk driving, may the officer - without first obtaining a warrant - require the individual to submit to a breathalyzer, or administer a blood test, to confirm the precise level of the driver's BAC, which is the primary basis for state laws that prohibit drunk driving? Birchfield was convicted for refusing a blood test, William Bernard was convicted for refusing to submit to a breathalyzer, and Steve Beylund was told by the arresting officer that it would be a crime to refuse a blood test, and he submitted to the test. Holding: Balancing approach that was seen in Riley: ---- o On the privacy side of the balance, the Court concluded that breath testing "does not implicate significant privacy concerns." PERMISSIBLE ---- o Blood tests are a different matter that involve piercing the skin and extracting a part of the subject's body. Blood tests must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Implied consent may be used for the breath testing, but not blood tests. Justice Thomas interesting "exigent circumstance" argument upholding all tests.

Georgia v. Randolph Co-habitants consenting

Wife complained to the police that after a domestic dispute, her husband took her son away. Husband explained that the son was at a neighbor's house and denied cocaine use. After wife's volunteered evidence of drug use, police asked husband for consent to search, which he unequivocally refused. Police then asked wife for consent, which she readily gave. ---- o Search definitely revealed evidence of drug use; when the officer returned to the house after calling the DA, the wife withdrew consent. ---- o After getting a search warrant, they returned to the house, seized more evidence, the basis of which formed the indictment against the husband. Court affirmed the state courts order to suppress the evidence. ---- o At the outset, the Court notes that a warrantless search of a person's home is unreasonable per se. Jones v. US. ---- o Warrantless searches may be valid with the voluntary consent of the individual possessing authority; this extends to cases where the police erroneously, but reasonably, believe that the consent giver has authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez US v. Matlock: ---- o Defendant was arrested in the yard of a house where he lived with a Mrs. Graff and was detained in a squad car. When the police went to the door of the resident, Graff admitted them and consented to a search. ---- o Court upheld the consent, finding that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-consenting person with whom that authority is shared." The touchstone of the consent is whether it is objectively reasonable for the third party to give consent. ---- o E.g. a landlord or property manager would not be viewed as having authority to consent. See Minnesota v. Olson Here, the Court balances the right of the consenting tenant to bring crime to light against the privacy concerns of the non-consenting tenant. ---- o Consenting tenant can bring the evidence directly to the police. Court disagrees that the holding will hamper domestic abuse cases since the abuser would not consent. ---- o In those circumstances, the exceptions to warrantless searches apply. Because of the factual basis in both Matlock and Rodriguez, the Court must draw a very nuanced line for this holding. ---- o Matlock: the defendant was merely in the squad car and, therefore, could have refused. ---- o Rodriguez: police knew that the defendant was asleep, so a knock could have awakened him up to refuse the search. The search is valid so long as "there is no evidence that the police ... removed the potentially objecting tenant for the sake of avoiding possible objection." The Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Roberts, dissenting ---- o The Fourth Amendment protects privacy; therefore, if an individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will share access to that information, those papers, or places with the government. ---- o Therefore, a warrantless search is reasonable if the police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it.